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Alameda Research


Alameda Research LLC was a quantitative trading firm specializing in cryptocurrencies, founded in November 2017 by and Tara MacAulay. The company focused on , market-making, and high-volume trading across digital asset exchanges, initially leveraging price discrepancies in and expanding to thousands of tokens. At its height in 2021, Alameda reportedly managed over $1 billion in assets and executed daily trades valued between $1 billion and $10 billion. Closely intertwined with Trading Ltd., the exchange also established by Bankman-Fried in 2019, Alameda functioned as a proprietary trading arm, benefiting from preferential access to liquidity and funding.
The firm's operations unraveled in November 2022 when a leaked exposed an $8 billion liability hole, primarily consisting of unsecured loans from customer deposits used to cover Alameda's trading losses and speculative bets, including heavy exposure to the FTT . This revelation triggered a , prompting joint Chapter 11 bankruptcy filings for Alameda and over 130 affiliates, with total claims exceeding $8 billion in restitution. Bankman-Fried was convicted in November on seven counts of , , and for directing the diversion of billions in customer funds to Alameda for unauthorized purposes, including venture investments and personal expenditures; he received a 25-year sentence in 2024. The collapse highlighted vulnerabilities in opaque inter-entity financing within the sector, where Alameda's unchecked leverage amplified systemic risks rather than providing stable liquidity.

Founding and Early History

Inception in 2017

Alameda Research was established in October 2017 by Sam Bankman-Fried and Tara MacAulay in Berkeley, California, as a quantitative trading firm specializing in cryptocurrencies. Bankman-Fried, who had departed from Jane Street Capital earlier that year after developing an interest in crypto arbitrage opportunities during his tenure there, sought to pursue full-time trading in digital assets amid the market's rapid expansion. The firm's name evoked a research-oriented image to attract talent and partners, reflecting Bankman-Fried's quantitative background. Initially operating from modest premises at 2000 Center Street in , Alameda began with a small team of traders in their 20s, focusing on high-frequency strategies to exploit price discrepancies across cryptocurrency exchanges. The venture started with approximately $55 million in , drawn from Bankman-Fried's personal capital and early backers, enabling it to trade billions in volume daily across various crypto products despite the nascent and volatile market conditions. MacAulay, who brought experience from initiatives and prior trading roles, co-led early operations before departing in April 2018 citing internal risk management issues. The firm's inception capitalized on inefficiencies in crypto markets, such as cross-exchange , which Bankman-Fried had prototyped at Jane Street using trades. Alameda's quantitative approach emphasized algorithmic models over discretionary bets, positioning it as a from the outset, though it soon relocated to for a more permissive regulatory environment. This early setup laid the groundwork for rapid growth, with the firm managing over $1 billion in assets by later years through consistent profitability in and provision.

Initial Trading Strategies and Growth

Alameda Research was co-founded in September 2017 by and Tara MacAulay shortly after Bankman-Fried left his role as a trader at Jane Street Group, a quantitative trading firm. The company initially operated as a outfit focused on cryptocurrencies, leveraging algorithmic strategies to capitalize on market inefficiencies in the nascent space. Early efforts emphasized arbitrage trading, particularly exploiting price disparities for assets like across exchanges in regions such as the and , where premiums could reach significant levels due to varying liquidity and regulatory environments. Headquartered initially in , the firm relocated to in early 2018 to benefit from a more permissive regulatory landscape for activities, which facilitated faster execution and reduced oversight compared to U.S. jurisdictions. Starting with limited personal and seed capital—Bankman-Fried reportedly funded initial operations with around $4 million from prior savings and small investments—the team developed custom trading algorithms for high-frequency execution on platforms like and other derivatives exchanges. By leveraging maker-taker fee rebates and providing liquidity, Alameda achieved rapid profitability amid the 2017-2018 bull market, reportedly generating tens of millions in trading gains within its first year through a combination of spot and futures positions. Growth accelerated as the firm expanded its strategies to include market making, where it quoted buy and sell prices across multiple venues to capture spreads and rebates, amassing a of over 100 cryptocurrencies by mid-2018. This period saw recruitment of fellow quantitative traders from traditional , scaling operations to handle billions in daily while maintaining low-profile trading to avoid . A 2018 investor deck highlighted the firm's risk-managed approach, offering fixed-rate loans at 15% annualized returns backed by crypto collateral, signaling confidence in sustained expansion despite crypto's volatility; however, such promises later drew scrutiny for understating risks in an unregulated sector. By late 2018, Alameda's had grown substantially, positioning it as a key liquidity provider and laying groundwork for deeper ecosystem involvement.

Integration with FTX

Establishment of FTX in 2019

In May 2019, , who had co-founded in late 2017, established Trading Ltd. alongside as a centralized focused on derivatives and leveraged trading products. Incorporated in with operations based in , FTX targeted markets underserved by U.S.-regulated platforms, where such instruments were restricted, generating revenue primarily through a low 0.02% transaction fee on trades. The creation of FTX stemmed directly from Alameda's operational needs, as the trading firm's high-volume activities encountered liquidity shortages and inefficiencies on existing exchanges; Alameda became FTX's primary customer and market-making partner from , providing essential trading volume to bootstrap the platform. Bankman-Fried held approximately 60% equity in FTX, with Wang owning 16%, while shared personnel like Nishad Singh bridged engineering roles across both entities. FTX launched its native utility token, FTT, on May 8, 2019, initially priced at $0.10, which was designed to facilitate discounts on trading fees and other platform utilities. To fuel growth, the exchange secured $8 million in seed funding in August 2019, followed by a $100 million corporate from in December 2019, during which briefly acquired and then divested a minority stake.

Operational Dependencies and Funding Mechanisms

Alameda Research maintained deep operational ties to , leveraging the exchange as its primary trading venue and source following FTX's launch in 2019. As a market-making firm, Alameda provided on FTX, executing a significant portion of the platform's trading volume, which created mutual reliance where FTX depended on Alameda's activity for depth and Alameda benefited from preferential access to order flow and execution speeds. This integration included Alameda holding two dedicated trading accounts on FTX, enabling seamless borrowing and trading without the standard risk controls applied to other users. A critical dependency emerged through modified software on FTX that exempted Alameda from typical borrowing limits and risks, allowing it to access customer deposits as unsecured loans without triggering alarms or requirements. In May and June 2022, amid trading losses, this mechanism facilitated transfers of billions in FTX customer funds to Alameda to cover deficits, blurring lines between the entities and exposing Alameda to FTX's solvency risks. FTX's implemented this "backdoor" code change specifically for Alameda, enabling withdrawals that other accounts could not match. Funding for Alameda primarily flowed from these intra-group loans, estimated at over $10 billion by late 2022, sourced directly from user deposits rather than external capital. Alameda also held substantial positions in FTT, FTX's native token, which served as collateral for further borrowing and propped up valuations, though this created circular dependencies as Alameda's was dominated by FTT holdings vulnerable to FTX's performance. Executives, including , received personal loans totaling $4.1 billion from Alameda, funded indirectly through these mechanisms, for investments and .

Core Business Activities

Proprietary Trading and Market Making

Alameda Research conducted using its own capital to exploit inefficiencies in markets through quantitative strategies, including across exchanges, , and volatility trading. The firm, founded by former Jane Street traders, leveraged algorithmic models to identify and capitalize on price discrepancies, often executing thousands of trades daily to generate returns independent of client orders. This approach allowed Alameda to scale rapidly from a small operation in 2017 to handling substantial positions in digital assets by 2019. In parallel, Alameda functioned as a , providing by continuously quoting bid and ask prices on various cryptocurrency exchanges, thereby narrowing spreads and enabling smoother order execution for other participants. This activity involved deploying capital to absorb imbalances in buy and sell orders, earning profits from the difference between bid and ask prices while mitigating inventory risk through hedging. The firm's market-making efforts were particularly pronounced on , where it served as the primary liquidity provider from the exchange's in May 2019, supporting trading in less liquid pairs and contributing to overall . At its peak, Alameda's combined and market-making operations reportedly generated daily volumes exceeding $5 billion, positioning it as one of the largest liquidity providers in the sector and influencing for numerous tokens. However, its dominance on diminished over time, with trading volumes dropping to about 3% of the exchange's total by mid-2022, amid shifting market dynamics and increased competition from other firms. These activities relied on advanced computational infrastructure and a of engineers and quants, but raised concerns about potential advantages due to Alameda's close ties to , including preferential access to trading data and borrowing limits.

Venture Investments in Cryptocurrency Projects

Alameda Research allocated a portion of its capital to venture investments in early-stage projects, emphasizing (DeFi) protocols, layer-1 blockchains, scaling solutions, and related . These investments typically involved participation in seed and Series A rounds, often alongside other crypto-focused venture firms, with average round sizes between $3 million and $10 million. The firm's approach combined stakes with post-investment provision, aiming to support project launches and ecosystem growth. Key successes included an early investment in Solana, a high-throughput blockchain platform launched in 2020, which delivered an reported 817-fold (ROI) for Alameda. Investments in Aave, a DeFi lending protocol, generated 255x ROI, while , an Ethereum layer-2 scaling network, yielded 77.5x. Additional notable bets encompassed Jito, a Solana-based maximum extractable value (MEV) infrastructure project with 18.8x ROI, and contributions to ecosystems like , a decentralized exchange built on Solana that Alameda helped develop. Over 200 such ventures were funded, spanning categories like decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs), platforms, and (NFT) initiatives.
ProjectSectorReported ROI
SolanaLayer-1 Blockchain817x
AaveDeFi Lending255x
Layer-2 Scaling77.5x
JitoMEV Infrastructure18.8x
By late 2022, amid the firm's bankruptcy proceedings, portfolio disclosures indicated substantial token holdings derived from these investments, including approximately $50 million each in and NEAR Protocol tokens, alongside positions in DAO and over 200 lesser-known assets. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission filings alleged that billions in FTX customer funds were diverted to finance undisclosed venture deals at Alameda, raising questions about the sustainability and transparency of these activities.

Philanthropic and Political Engagements

Effective Altruism and Donations

Alameda Research was established in October 2017 by with the explicit goal of applying principles, particularly the "earn to give" strategy, which involves pursuing high-earning opportunities to maximize charitable impact through donations to rigorously evaluated causes. Bankman-Fried recruited early employees from the community, pitching the firm as a vehicle for generating substantial profits that could be directed toward high-impact , such as interventions and existential risk mitigation. The company's initial culture emphasized altruistic commitments, with early policies requiring employees to donate at least 50% of their salaries to effective charities—a mandate later relaxed—and plans to allocate 50% of firm profits to effective altruism-aligned organizations. Most early staff and investors shared dedication to these principles, viewing Alameda's quantitative trading operations as a means to fund evidence-based giving rather than traditional corporate . Profits from Alameda's cryptocurrency trading activities, which Bankman-Fried owned approximately 90% of by 2021, underpinned significant philanthropic outflows, though these were primarily channeled through his personal pledges and affiliated entities rather than direct corporate grants. Bankman-Fried committed to donating the vast majority of his wealth—estimated at up to $16.5 billion in forward pledges—to effective altruism causes, with actual pre-collapse disbursements totaling around $140 million to $190 million via the FTX Future Fund and related nonprofits, including $14 million to the Centre for Effective Altruism. These funds supported priorities like pandemic preparedness and artificial intelligence safety research, aligned with effective altruism's focus on cost-effective, long-term interventions. Following the 2022 collapse of Alameda and , scrutiny revealed that some philanthropic commitments may have been enabled by leveraged trading practices and inter-entity fund transfers lacking robust separation, raising questions about the sustainability and ethical sourcing of these donations despite their alignment with stated goals.

Political Contributions and Influence

Sam Bankman-Fried, founder of Alameda Research, directed the use of funds from the firm to support political donations exceeding $100 million ahead of the 2022 U.S. midterm elections, with prosecutors alleging these contributions derived from customer deposits misappropriated through commingled operations between Alameda and its sister exchange FTX. These donations were funneled through super PACs, campaigns, and straw donors, including Alameda and FTX executives, to circumvent federal contribution limits. Public disclosures show the majority flowed to Democratic candidates and committees, such as over $10 million to the House Majority PAC and Protect Our Future PAC, which supported figures advocating for cryptocurrency-friendly policies. While Bankman-Fried publicly emphasized donations to Democrats—totaling more than $40 million in disclosed contributions aligned with principles favoring and policy reform—prosecutors charged that undisclosed sums, including dark money to Republican-aligned groups, were similarly sourced from illicit Alameda-managed assets. records list Alameda Research as the employer for specific donations, such as $780 from Bankman-Fried to the of in October 2020, though the firm itself made no direct federal candidate contributions in the 2024 cycle. Bankman-Fried continued authorizing these transfers from Alameda even after internal awareness of an $13 billion funding shortfall at the firm in 2021. The strategy sought regulatory influence in , positioning Alameda and as key players in shaping legislation, with Bankman-Fried meeting lawmakers and advocating for lighter oversight on digital assets. Recipients included bipartisan figures, but the emphasis on Democrats reflected Bankman-Fried's stated alignment with progressive causes, though critics noted the use of executives like Nishad Singh—who donated $8 million exclusively to Democrats—as proxies to amplify reach. Following 's November 2022 collapse, at least $73 million in tied donations faced clawback risks in bankruptcy proceedings, prompting some recipients, such as Virginia lawmakers, to redirect or donate funds to amid . Federal charges against Bankman-Fried included violations for these practices, with evidence from unsealed indictments detailing how Alameda funds subsidized contributions to both parties, evading disclosure requirements. No evidence emerged of Alameda exerting direct beyond Bankman-Fried's personal efforts, and post-conviction analyses highlighted the donations' role in amplifying access rather than yielding substantive shifts before the .

Financial Practices and Risk Management

Use of Leverage and FTT Token

Alameda Research employed substantial in its and market-making activities, borrowing funds from counterparties including to amplify exposure to positions, often through and futures contracts. This strategy aimed to capitalize on small price inefficiencies but inherently magnified losses during adverse market movements, with borrowings frequently secured against volatile assets. Central to Alameda's leveraged operations was its heavy reliance on the FTT token, FTX's native exchange token designed for fee discounts and other platform utilities. By November 2022, Alameda held FTT comprising about $6 billion of its $14.6 billion , representing roughly 40% of total assets and a dominant portion of its liquidity profile. Alameda used these FTT holdings extensively as to obtain loans for trading, including from external crypto lenders and directly from using customer deposits as backing. This collateralization practice created a self-referential structure, as FTT's value derived primarily from 's operational viability and token buyback mechanisms, with Alameda and collectively controlling around 90% of the supply. Internal valuations sometimes exceeded prices—for instance, marking FTT at nearly 200% of value—allowing Alameda to sustain higher without immediate margin calls. Despite mechanisms purportedly designed to manage safely, the meant FTT could cascade into forced liquidations, undermining Alameda's ability to meet obligations.

Internal Controls and Risk Assessment

Alameda Research maintained few internal controls over its trading activities and funding sources, with assets and liabilities often treated interchangeably between the firm, , and affiliated executives, lacking clear distinctions or documentation. This included undocumented loans to executives and purchases that concealed liabilities, contributing to opaque financial reporting. Regulatory filings highlighted a complete failure of corporate controls, as evidenced by the post-collapse assessment from FTX's new CEO, III, who described "virtually no internal controls whatsoever." Employees who raised concerns about these deficiencies, including proposals for more rigorous controls, were dismissed by , prompting resignations among risk-focused staff in mid-2022. A key mechanism enabling this lax oversight was a coded "backdoor" in FTX's systems, implemented at Bankman-Fried's direction by FTX co-founder , which allowed Alameda to maintain a negative of up to $65 billion—far exceeding limits for other users—and withdraw customer funds without triggering or alerts. Some FTX employees discovered this exemption months before the November 2022 collapse but failed to fully address it, underscoring breakdowns. Alameda was deliberately exempted from FTX's auto- processes and standard borrowing caps, receiving an unbounded funded by commingled customer deposits, which grew to tens of billions of dollars. Risk assessment at Alameda emphasized high-leverage but systematically bypassed platform-wide safeguards, rendering it ineffective for the firm's largest exposures. FTX promoted a sophisticated "risk engine" to investors, yet this was programmed to exclude Alameda, permitting unlimited and positions in correlated, illiquid assets like the FTT token, which served as primary despite its vulnerability to price crashes from forced sales. Bankman-Fried later conceded minimal effort in managing these s, attributing failures to distractions from basic oversight rather than deliberate design flaws. The absence of segregation between Alameda's operations and FTX customer funds amplified s, with over $8 billion unaccounted for by late 2022, exposing over-reliance on internal transfers without independent valuation or .

Controversies and Allegations

Revelations of Fund Commingling

In November 2022, following the collapse of , initial reports emerged indicating that billions in customer deposits had been transferred from the to Alameda Research, revealing extensive of funds between the entities. Specifically, at least $1 billion in client funds was unaccounted for and had been moved to Alameda, which used these assets to cover trading losses and other obligations without customer consent or proper disclosure. This violated standard practices for segregating customer assets from operations, as had allegedly lent billions directly from customer balances to prop up Alameda's nearly $15 billion in assets amid mounting debts. Further investigations disclosed that Alameda benefited from a deliberate software backdoor in 's code, implemented at the direction of founder , which permitted unlimited withdrawals without collateral enforcement, allowing a negative of up to $65 billion. This mechanism enabled Alameda to access FTX customer funds freely for , venture investments, and personal expenditures, bypassing risk limits applied to other users. By mid-2022, Alameda's outstanding loans from exceeded $10 billion, primarily unsecured and funded by commingled customer deposits rather than legitimate collateral. Caroline Ellison, Alameda's CEO and Bankman-Fried's associate, confirmed these practices in her guilty plea in December 2022 and subsequent trial testimony in October 2023, stating that Bankman-Fried directed the use of customer funds to repay Alameda's lenders after losses from leveraged bets, including those tied to the FTT token. She described circulating falsified balance sheets to lenders that omitted the true extent of Alameda's reliance on uncollateralized loans, which totaled around $13 billion by November 2022. These revelations, corroborated by FTX co-founder Gary Wang's testimony, highlighted how Alameda executives knowingly diverted funds, treating customer assets as an internal for high-risk activities. Regulatory filings later quantified the scale: the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission alleged that Bankman-Fried commingled and misappropriated over $8 billion in FTX funds via Alameda for undisclosed political donations, purchases, and luxury spending. The similarly documented $12.7 billion in judgments against FTX and Alameda for fraud involving fund misuse, underscoring the absence of internal controls that would have prevented such transfers in a properly segregated operation. Despite Bankman-Fried's public denials in a December —where he acknowledged "genuine " but downplayed intent—these disclosures painted a of systemic between the entities, prioritizing Alameda's over protections.

Fraud Claims and Code Manipulations

In the criminal , evidence emerged that 's software contained a deliberate backdoor provision, inserted in 2019 by co-founder and engineering head Nishad Singh at Bankman-Fried's direction, which exempted Alameda Research from standard risk controls and requirements on the . This code alteration permitted Alameda to maintain a negative balance of up to $65 billion in FTX customer funds without automatic , effectively granting unlimited borrowing privileges not available to other users. Wang testified that the backdoor was concealed from FTX's public documentation and risk engine, allowing Alameda to withdraw billions in customer deposits for , venture investments, and purchases without disclosure or enforcement. The manipulation facilitated systemic fraud by enabling the commingling and misappropriation of at least $8 billion in customer assets to cover Alameda's trading losses, which exceeded $5 billion by mid-2022 due to leveraged bets on volatile cryptocurrencies. Prosecutors presented internal code reviews and chat logs during the October 2023 trial, including falsified representations of an "insurance fund" that overstated FTX's solvency by billions, as well as directives from Bankman-Fried to prioritize Alameda's liquidity over customer protections. , Alameda's CEO, corroborated this in her testimony, admitting that Bankman-Fried overrode risk parameters to allow Alameda's unchecked access, leading to unrepaid loans totaling $10 billion from . FTX employees independently discovered the backdoor in August 2022, months before the November collapse, through code audits that revealed Alameda's exempt status, but Bankman-Fried dismissed concerns and no corrective action was taken publicly. Both Wang and Singh pleaded guilty to charges prior to , providing such as messages and reconciliations showing deliberate concealment of Alameda's deficits from investors and regulators. The U.S. Department of Justice detailed how these code changes constituted wire and securities violations, as they deceived investors about FTX's risk exposure and Alameda's solvency interdependence. Bankman-Fried was convicted on November 2, 2023, of seven counts including to commit wire fraud and , with the code backdoor cited as foundational evidence of intentional deception rather than mere mismanagement. In March 2024, he received a 25-year sentence, with the court emphasizing the premeditated nature of the manipulations that prioritized Alameda's operations over customer safeguards, resulting in over $8 billion in victim losses. Regulatory actions, including a $12.7 billion CFTC judgment against and Alameda in August 2024, affirmed the fraudulent use of privileged code access to siphon assets, ordering restitution without admitting in the civil context.

Collapse in 2022

Precipitating Events and Bank Run

On November 2, 2022, CoinDesk published an article based on a leaked balance sheet from Alameda Research, revealing that as of June 30, 2022, the firm's assets totaled $14.6 billion, with a substantial portion—approximately 40%—consisting of FTT tokens issued by its sister company FTX. This disclosure underscored the heavy reliance of Alameda's solvency on FTT, a token lacking independent utility and backed primarily by FTX's own operations, thereby exposing circular financial dependencies between the entities that had previously been presented as arm's-length. The report triggered immediate market scrutiny, as it contradicted public assurances of separation and risk isolation between Alameda and FTX. The revelation amplified existing concerns from Alameda's prior trading losses earlier in 2022, including heavy exposure to volatile assets like the collapsed Terra-Luna ecosystem, which had already strained its liquidity. On November 6, 2022, , CEO of rival exchange , announced that would liquidate its remaining FTT holdings—valued at around $580 million—as a precautionary measure against potential risks. This statement, citing Alameda's issues, prompted a rapid sell-off of FTT, with its price plummeting over 75% within days, further eroding Alameda's asset base and intensifying doubts about the stability of both firms. These events precipitated a classic on FTX, as customer fears of —stemming from Alameda's intertwined finances and undisclosed loans of FTX user funds to cover Alameda's deficits—led to withdrawal requests totaling approximately $6 billion in the 72 hours preceding November 8, 2022. Alameda's manifested directly through its inability to unwind leveraged positions without triggering further FTT devaluation, as FTX's withdrawal halts on November 8 exposed the absence of segregated reserves. By November 10, Alameda announced it was winding down operations, unable to meet margin calls or sustain trading amid the cascading failures.

Bankruptcy Filing

On November 11, 2022, Alameda Research LLC filed a voluntary petition for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of under Case No. 22-11067 (JTD), seeking to reorganize its operations and protect assets amid a severe triggered by customer withdrawals and exposure of shortfalls. The filing, which listed the company as having significant assets but facing liabilities estimated in the billions due to trading losses and intercompany obligations with , was part of a joint administration involving over 130 affiliated entities, including FTX Trading Ltd. and FTX US. Chapter 11 proceedings allowed Alameda to continue as debtor-in-possession initially, enabling it to maintain operations under court supervision while proposing a plan for creditor repayment. The petition was submitted hours after Sam Bankman-Fried resigned as CEO of FTX, with John J. Ray III, a restructuring specialist with prior experience in high-profile insolvencies such as Enron, appointed to lead Alameda's bankruptcy efforts alongside FTX's. Ray's team immediately focused on stabilizing the firm by halting trading activities, securing digital wallets holding cryptocurrencies valued at billions, and initiating forensic investigations into Alameda's books, which revealed undisclosed loans and asset transfers exceeding $10 billion to FTX. Early court filings disclosed Alameda's assets primarily consisting of illiquid cryptocurrency holdings, venture investments, and claims against affiliates, offset by debts including over $1.4 billion in customer funds allegedly misused for proprietary trading. The filing invoked automatic stays on actions, preventing seizures of Alameda's accounts and positions, which were critical to preserving value for an estimated base including institutional investors, firms, and other entities. Subsequent docket entries confirmed the court's approval of first-day motions for cash use and professional retention, allowing Alameda to fund ongoing operations estimated at $20-50 million monthly during the phase. This process highlighted Alameda's pre-filing vulnerabilities, such as over-reliance on 's for backstopping trades, without detailing specific at the petition stage, which emerged later in adversary proceedings.

Criminal Trials and Convictions

, CEO of , pleaded guilty on December 21, 2022, to seven federal charges including conspiracy to commit wire fraud, commodities fraud, , and , admitting that had used billions in customer funds to cover its trading losses without authorization. As part of her plea deal, Ellison cooperated with prosecutors, providing testimony that detailed how directed the diversion of approximately $10 billion from to between 2019 and 2022. On September 24, 2024, U.S. District Judge Lewis Kaplan sentenced her to two years in prison, crediting her substantial assistance in the case against Bankman-Fried while noting her central role in the fraud. Sam Bankman-Fried, founder of FTX and de facto controller of , faced trial in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of starting in October 2023 on charges tied to the misuse of customer deposits to prop up . On November 2, 2023, a jury convicted him on all seven counts, including wire fraud, securities and commodities fraud, , and to defraud FTX customers, finding that he had orchestrated the transfer of over $8 billion in customer funds to to conceal its and fund risky trades. Evidence presented included internal documents and witness accounts showing Alameda's backdoor access to FTX funds via , which enabled unlimited withdrawals without repayment. Bankman-Fried was sentenced on March 28, 2024, to 25 years in prison, with the judge rejecting his claims of mere negligence and emphasizing the deliberate nature of the scheme that defrauded customers of up to $10 billion. Other Alameda executives, such as co-CEO , faced charges but avoided through agreements or non-prosecution in exchange for cooperation; Trabucco resigned in August 2022 without formal charges but contributed to the investigation. No criminal occurred for Alameda Research as a corporate entity, with prosecutions focusing on individual culpability under U.S. federal statutes.

Civil Settlements and Regulatory Actions

In December 2022, the U.S. initiated civil enforcement actions related to Alameda Research, charging its CEO and FTX co-founder with defrauding equity investors in by concealing the diversion of customer funds to Alameda and providing Alameda with undisclosed preferential access to FTX resources, including unlimited borrowing against non-marketable collateral. These charges alleged violations of federal securities laws, including anti-fraud provisions under the and , with the seeking injunctions, , civil penalties, and bars from serving as officers or directors. Concurrently, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) filed civil charges on December 13, 2022, against Alameda Research LLC, FTX Trading Ltd., and Sam Bankman-Fried for fraud and material misrepresentations in the offer and sale of digital asset commodities, including Bitcoin and Ethereum, involving the misappropriation of over $8 billion in customer funds transferred from FTX to Alameda without disclosure. The CFTC alleged violations of the Commodity Exchange Act, seeking restitution, disgorgement, civil monetary penalties, permanent trading and registration bans, and injunctions against further violations. On August 8, 2024, a U.S. District Court in the Southern District of New York entered a order resolving the CFTC's claims against Trading Ltd. and Alameda Research LLC, imposing a $12.7 billion judgment comprising $8.7 billion in restitution and $4 billion in to compensate victims of the . The order, entered amid Alameda's proceedings, prioritizes these funds for customer remediation via a supplemental remission fund, while also issuing permanent injunctions prohibiting Alameda from further CEA violations and imposing lifetime trading and registration bans; civil penalties were waived in deference to distributions. Individual defendants, including Bankman-Fried, Ellison, and others, remain subject to ongoing CFTC litigation. SEC claims against Alameda executives and related entities have been addressed in part through parallel criminal resolutions and proceedings, though no standalone entity-level equivalent to the CFTC's has been publicly finalized as of late 2024; remediation for securities violations is integrated into FTX-Alameda creditor recovery efforts. Additional civil actions, such as those pursued by state regulators like the involving Alameda's loan exposures, have resulted in third-party s (e.g., $50 million from in June 2024 for misleading investors on Alameda-related risks) but do not directly impose liabilities on Alameda itself.

Bankruptcy Proceedings and Recent Developments

Asset Liquidation and Recovery Efforts

Following the Chapter 11 bankruptcy filing of Alameda Research LLC on November 11, 2022, alongside affiliated entities including Trading Ltd., the joint administration prioritized the identification, recovery, and liquidation of assets to maximize creditor recoveries. Under the direction of CEO , appointed post-collapse, the estate pursued aggressive asset sales, including billions in cryptocurrency holdings such as , , and Solana (SOL), with planned liquidations estimated at $14.5 billion to $16.3 billion to fund repayments. These efforts yielded over $10 billion in recoverable value by early 2024, enabling projections for full repayment of non-governmental creditors plus interest. Recovery initiatives encompassed extensive litigation to claw back preferential transfers and fraudulent conveyances, including suits against entities like Genesis Digital Assets for $1.15 billion in shares acquired via Alameda loans during the collapse period. Additional actions targeted frozen assets and insider dealings, such as a $90 million claim against a blockchain developer for withheld FTX-linked tokens. The U.S. secured a $12.7 billion judgment against and Alameda in August 2024, mandating $8.7 billion in restitution and $4 billion in directed toward victim compensation, bolstering the estate's liquidity. Liquidation accelerated post-plan confirmation on October 8, 2024, with the reorganization effective January 3, 2025, facilitating phased distributions. By September 2025, the estate had disbursed approximately $6.2 billion to creditors, culminating in a third distribution of $1.6 billion commencing September 30, 2025, aimed at achieving near-100% recovery for customer claims. These proceeds stemmed primarily from strategic sales of digital assets and resolved disputes, though market volatility in cryptocurrencies posed ongoing risks to valuation stability.

Ongoing Holdings and 2025 Updates

As of October 2025, the estate of Alameda Research continues to hold approximately $1.2 billion in cryptocurrency assets across its wallets, with Solana () comprising a significant portion of the . These holdings stem from pre-collapse positions, recoveries through litigation, and staking rewards, managed under the oversight of the joint FTX-Alameda administrators following the 11 filing in 2022. Combined with FTX-related wallets, the estates maintain over $1.8 billion in crypto assets, including (BTC), (ETH), and , amid ongoing efforts to maximize creditor recoveries. In early 2025, the reorganization plan became effective on January 3, enabling structured distributions while preserving illiquid or high-value holdings for phased liquidation. Alameda received 500 BTC, valued at over $57 million, as part of asset recoveries, bolstering its BTC balance amid broader estate holdings exceeding $1 billion post-recovery. By July, the estate staked 20,736 (approximately $79 million) to generate yields, following withdrawals of 21,650 from exchanges like Bybit between December 2024 and January 2025. Solana positions, holding around 4.34 million as of , saw unlocks of $35 million in and redemptions of $45 million (192,000 ) from staking in , reflecting strategic management to avoid disruption during liquidation. Liquidation activities intensified in late 2025, with Alameda depositing over $30 million in assets to on October 4, signaling preparation for sales to fund payouts. Concurrently, the pursued recoveries, including a against operator Dunamu for $53 million allegedly held in a secret Alameda account, highlighting persistent efforts. These movements occur against a backdrop of the 's cumulative assets surpassing $16 billion post-bankruptcy, tempered by legal fees and operational costs, with distributions prioritizing verified claims under the confirmed plan. No full of holdings has occurred, as administrators balance recovery maximization with market stability.

Industry Impact and Analysis

Effects on Cryptocurrency Markets

The collapse of , revealed through its undisclosed $5 billion liability to on November 2, 2022, triggered a rapid loss of investor confidence that extended across markets. 's subsequent halt of withdrawals on November 8 exacerbated a , causing to reach its lowest price of the year at around $15,500 and FTX's native token FTT to plummet 76.4% in a single day. The total market dropped from over $1 trillion on November 6 to approximately $800 billion by November 21, reflecting widespread selling pressure amid fears of further insolvencies tied to Alameda's risky trading practices. Major assets like and also experienced significant negative responses, with heightened spilling over between blockchain-related instruments. Alameda's exposure, including its heavy in futures and spot markets, amplified deterioration on exchanges, leading to increased transaction costs and frozen withdrawals that deterred trading activity. This event contributed to a broader market contraction, where overall capitalization fell from $2.9 trillion in November 2021 to $798 billion by year-end, underscoring the sector's vulnerability to interconnected failures between trading firms and exchanges. While the impact remained largely confined to cryptocurrency assets—sparing traditional equity, energy, and currency markets—the FTX-Alameda fallout eroded trust in centralized platforms, prompting a reevaluation of in . Empirical analyses indicate a causal negative effect on prices post-bankruptcy, with rapid deviations from pre-collapse trajectories persisting into subsequent months. By late 2023, markets showed partial recovery amid regulatory scrutiny, but lingering caution from the episode continues to influence liquidity premiums and investor sentiment.

Causal Factors and Broader Lessons

The downfall of Alameda Research stemmed primarily from its excessive reliance on leveraged trading strategies in volatile markets, coupled with a profound lack of segregation between its operations and those of its affiliate, . Founded in , Alameda pursued high-risk quantitative trading, amassing billions in loans secured by FTX's native token, FTT, which it and FTX collectively controlled approximately 90% of by mid-2022. This created a : Alameda's was heavily weighted toward FTT—comprising the majority of its assets as revealed in a November 2, 2022, report—while FTT's value hinged on FTX's perceived solvency. When prices plummeted in May 2022 amid broader market turmoil, Alameda's leveraged positions triggered margin calls exceeding $2 billion from lenders, exposing liquidity shortfalls that FTX covertly addressed by diverting customer deposits—estimated at $8-10 billion—to prop up Alameda without adequate risk controls or disclosure. Compounding these vulnerabilities was systemic commingling of funds and failures, including Alameda's unrestricted access to FTX's backend systems, enabling unchecked s that bypassed standard safeguards. Internal audits were absent or ineffective, allowing Alameda to use FTT as for borrowing funds despite the token's illiquidity and dependency on FTX's health. The disclosure eroded market confidence, precipitating a withdrawal run on FTX starting November 6, 2022, which revealed an $8 billion shortfall in segregated client assets, directly tied to Alameda's unsustainable trading debts. This interplay of market shocks, opaque inter-entity loans, and deficient internal controls—rather than isolated errors—formed the causal chain, as evidenced by subsequent regulatory filings and testimonies attributing the crisis to deliberate risk underestimation over mere oversights. Broader lessons from Alameda's collapse underscore the perils of conflating with exchange operations in ecosystems, highlighting the necessity for robust firewalls to prevent fund misuse amid crypto's inherent volatility. Industry analyses post- emphasize that entities like Alameda exemplify how unchecked —often exceeding 20x on positions—amplifies downturns, as seen in the 2022 market's wipeout of over $2 in value, urging firms to implement dynamic risk models beyond static collateral like native tokens. The episode catalyzed calls for enhanced , including independent boards and mandatory segregation of client assets, revealing how Alameda's minimal oversight structure—a board with familial ties and no external checks—facilitated unchecked . Regulatory takeaways include the inadequacy of self-policing in crypto trading firms, prompting frameworks like the EU's MiCA and U.S. proposals for clearer custodian rules to avert similar liquidity crises; Alameda's evasion of anti-money laundering protocols and failure to safeguard deposits violated core principles now prioritized in post-FTX reforms. For market participants, the failure illustrates the fragility of tokenomics reliant on issuer confidence, with FTT's depegging serving as a caution against over-concentration in affiliated assets, and reinforces first-mover advantages in volatile sectors demand commensurate compliance infrastructure to mitigate contagion risks. These insights, drawn from forensic reviews rather than proponent narratives, affirm that while innovation drives crypto growth, absent causal safeguards—such as real-time auditing and diversified funding—replicates systemic vulnerabilities akin to traditional finance meltdowns.

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