Fact-checked by Grok 2 weeks ago

Director Special Forces

Director Special Forces (DSF) is the title held by the senior British military officer responsible for the overall command, direction, and professional oversight of the (UKSF), a directorate comprising elite units including the (SAS), (SBS), (SRR), and (SFSG). The position originated in 1987, when the role of Director SAS was expanded to Director Special Forces to encompass joint oversight of both and special operations assets, reflecting the integration of these capabilities under a unified command structure. Since 2009, the DSF has held the rank of Major-General, an elevation from that acknowledges the growing scale and complexity of UKSF operations, which involve high-risk missions such as counter-terrorism, hostage rescue, , and in support of national security objectives. The DSF, traditionally drawn from SAS leadership, reports directly to the Chief of the Defence Staff while maintaining operational to the Secretary of State for Defence and the , enabling rapid decision-making in classified environments but also drawing over and in protracted conflicts like , where allegations of excessive force and procedural lapses have prompted inquiries into UKSF conduct.

Overview and Role

Definition and Responsibilities

The Director Special Forces (DSF) is the senior officer in the British Armed Forces tasked with the overall command of the United Kingdom Special Forces (UKSF), a directorate encompassing elite units including the Special Air Service (SAS), Special Boat Service (SBS), Special Forces Support Group (SFSG), and associated elements such as the 18th (UKSF) Signal Regiment. This role, established formally in 1987 as an evolution from the Director SAS position, ensures the maintenance and deployment of specialized capabilities for high-risk, discrete operations aligned with national security objectives. The DSF, typically holding the rank of Major General since 2009 (previously Brigadier), operates under the strategic direction of the Chief of the Defence Staff and the Ministry of Defence (MoD), with direct accountability to the Secretary of State for Defence for operational matters. Key responsibilities include retaining full command of all assigned UKSF elements during joint operations, encompassing , execution, and coordination across naval, land, and air domains. The DSF advises the Chief of Joint Operations (CJO) and Commanders (JTFC) on integration, nominates component commanders, and directs the provision of UKSF capabilities to support broader military and political objectives, often in covert or deniable contexts. This extends to strategic-level oversight of , readiness, and resource allocation, ensuring UKSF's adaptability for missions such as counter-terrorism, rescue, , and , while maintaining operational under the "long-standing policy" of non-attributable actions unless disclosure serves national interests. In domestic resilience scenarios, the DSF may provide advice and direction for UKSF contributions to civil emergencies or to the civil , including specialized vehicle and equipment deployments compliant with blue-light warning standards. The role also involves multi-domain integration efforts, as highlighted in the 2025 Strategic Defence Review, to enable real-time, high-tempo operations within joint command structures.

Rank, Appointment, and Reporting Structure

The Director Special Forces (DSF) is a senior military appointment held by an officer in the rank of , a two-star (OF-7) position typically drawn from the with extensive experience. Prior to 2009, the role was held by Brigadiers (OF-6), but the rank was elevated to to reflect expanded responsibilities amid growing UK Special Forces (UKSF) commitments. Appointment to the DSF position occurs through the Ministry of Defence's senior officer selection process, emphasizing proven operational leadership in , often from units like the (). The incumbent serves a term of approximately three years, subject to extension based on operational needs, and is formally appointed by The Monarch on the recommendation of the Secretary of State for Defence, following advice from the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS). This aligns with standard procedures for two-star commands, prioritizing candidates with direct command of assets. In the reporting structure, the DSF heads the Directorate of Special Forces, a component of Strategic Command (formerly Joint Forces Command), and retains full command authority over all UKSF elements, including the , (SBS), , and supporting formations. Operationally, the DSF reports directly to the for tasking and direction on high-risk missions supporting interests, bypassing routine service chief intermediaries to ensure rapid response capabilities. Administratively, the directorate integrates with Strategic Command's framework for logistics, intelligence, and joint enablers, while the DSF provides specialist advice to the Commander Strategic Command and on integration. This dual-track structure—direct operational reporting to the combined with Strategic Command oversight—facilitates both autonomy in discrete tasks and alignment with broader defence priorities.

Organizational Command

United Kingdom Special Forces Composition

The (UKSF) directorate, commanded by the Director Special Forces (DSF), comprises elite Tier 1 units specialized in direct action, special reconnaissance, and counter-terrorism, alongside dedicated support formations to enable their operations. The core operational units include the (SAS), a established in 1941 for airborne raids and sabotage, consisting of 22 SAS as the active component with reserve squadrons from 21 and 23 SAS; the (SBS), the Royal Navy's equivalent formed during for maritime operations, focusing on amphibious assault and underwater warfare; the (SRR), an Army unit raised in 2005 to conduct covert surveillance and intelligence gathering in denied environments; and the (SFSG), a tri-service formation activated on 3 April 2006 from elements of the , Royal Marines, and RAF Regiment, tasked with providing fire support, perimeter security, and advance force operations for UKSF missions. Supporting the principal units are specialized enablers, including the 18 (UKSF) Signal Regiment, which delivers secure communications, cyber capabilities, and signals intelligence across SAS, SBS, and SRR squadrons; and the Joint Special Forces Aviation Wing (JSFAW), integrating 657 Squadron of the Army Air Corps for helicopter insertions and 47 Squadron of the Royal Air Force for fixed-wing support, with additional elements from the Royal Logistic Corps for air despatch. These components operate under DSF's operational control, with administrative oversight from parent services, enabling integrated tri-service task forces for high-risk deployments. Personnel selection emphasizes rigorous physical and mental standards, with UKSF drawing from volunteers across the British Armed Forces, though exact strengths remain classified for operational security.

Subordinate Units and Integration

The principal subordinate units under the Director Special Forces (DSF) include the , a British Army unit specializing in counter-terrorism, hostage rescue, and direct action raids; the , the Royal Navy's equivalent focusing on maritime operations, amphibious reconnaissance, and underwater sabotage; the Special Reconnaissance Regiment (SRR), dedicated to covert surveillance, target identification, and intelligence gathering in denied environments; and the Special Forces Support Group (SFSG), which provides fire support, tactical mobility, and specialist capabilities drawn from multiple services to augment operations. These units, totaling approximately 2,000 personnel as of the early expansion, operate under DSF's full command authority, enabling rapid deployment for high-risk missions while maintaining operational secrecy. Integration occurs through the UKSF Directorate's joint special operations task force headquarters, which synchronizes training, logistics, and mission planning across Army, Navy, and Air Force elements to ensure interoperability. The DSF nominates a Special Forces component commander for joint task forces, facilitating seamless assignment of units like the SAS for land-based strikes alongside SBS maritime insertions, supported by SFSG firepower and SRR intelligence feeds. This structure, formalized post-1987, emphasizes multi-domain capabilities, with auxiliary elements such as the 18 (UKSF) Signal Regiment for secure communications and the Joint Special Forces Aviation Wing for rotary-wing insertion and extraction, enhancing overall cohesion without diluting unit specialization. Recent adaptations, including 2025 multi-domain integration initiatives, aim to align UKSF more closely with conventional forces for high-tempo operations, though core subordinate integration remains DSF-centric to preserve elite autonomy and discretion. The Armed Forces (Terms of Service) Act 2023 legally defines as those units whose capabilities fall under DSF responsibility, underscoring centralized accountability for maintenance, readiness, and ethical oversight in operations.

Historical Development

Origins in SAS Command

The position responsible for commanding the British Army's () originated with the establishment of the role in 1964, created to provide centralized leadership over the , which encompassed the regular 22 Regiment and the reserve 21 and 23 units. This appointment addressed the need for unified oversight amid the 's expansion following post-World War II reactivation and operations in conflicts such as the (1948–1960) and Borneo Confrontation (1962–1966), where the unit honed tactics. Colonel , appointed to the inaugural Colonel SAS post in October 1964, commanded the group from , emphasizing training standardization and integration of reserve elements to enhance operational readiness. The role focused exclusively on the corps, reflecting its status as the primary special operations entity within the at the time, with responsibilities including doctrinal development, resource allocation, and preparation for counter-insurgency missions derived from wartime precedents. By 1969, the position evolved into Director SAS, held at brigadier rank, to better reflect the commander's authority over the expanded SAS structure while maintaining direct subordination to the . This transition coincided with growing emphasis on counter-terrorism capabilities, prompted by global incidents like the 1972 Munich Olympics attack, though the core function remained SAS-specific command without formal integration of Royal Navy units such as the . Directors SAS in the 1970s and early 1980s, including figures like Fergie Semple (1969–1972) and John Watts (1979–1982), prioritized sabotage, reconnaissance, and hostage rescue training, building on empirical lessons from deployments in (1970–1976) and . Through the pre-1987 period, the Director SAS effectively functioned as the progenitor of broader leadership, institutionalizing a model of unit under high-level strategic direction, which later expanded to encompass joint-service operations. This evolution was driven by causal necessities of modern threats requiring specialized, deniable capabilities beyond conventional forces, rather than administrative consolidation alone.

Evolution to Director Special Forces (1987 Onward)

In March 1987, the British expanded the remit of special forces command by redesignating the position of Director SAS as Director Special Forces, thereby integrating the Royal Navy's (SBS) under the authority of what had previously been an Army-centric role focused solely on the (SAS). This restructuring centralized operational control over both elite units, facilitating coordinated responses to emerging threats such as counter-terrorism and maritime interdiction, which had been highlighted by operations like the 1980 and the 1982 . The Director Special Forces, typically a Major General, assumed responsibility for training, doctrine development, and deployment readiness across these formations, reporting directly to senior leadership. The transition reflected a recognition of the need for interoperability between Army and Navy capabilities, as SBS expertise in underwater and coastal operations complemented land-based and skills. By formalizing this oversight, the position enabled streamlined and exercises, reducing previous that had limited cross-service . Initial command under the new title prioritized enhancing rapid reaction forces for high-value targets, with the Director Special Forces gaining authority over logistics and intelligence support tailored to . From the late 1980s onward, the role evolved to address post-Cold War contingencies, incorporating advancements in technology such as improved night-vision and communications equipment to support missions in diverse environments. The Director's influence extended to policy formulation for special forces employment, emphasizing deniability and precision to align with national strategic objectives amid increasing global deployments. This period saw the position's holder advising on the integration of special forces into broader joint operations, laying groundwork for further expansions without altering the core two-star command structure established in 1987.

Expansion with UKSF Formation (1980s–2000s)

The United Kingdom Special Forces (UKSF) directorate was formally established at the end of March 1987, when the existing post of Director Special Air Service (SAS) was redesignated as Director Special Forces (DSF), thereby unifying command over both the British Army's SAS and the Royal Navy's Special Boat Service (SBS) under a single operational headquarters. This restructuring, driven by the need for enhanced coordination in counter-terrorism and special reconnaissance missions following high-profile operations such as the 1980 Iranian Embassy siege, placed the DSF—a brigadier-rank officer typically from the SAS—directly responsible for planning, training, and executing joint UKSF activities, reporting to the Chief of Defence Staff via the Ministry of Defence. The integration of SBS, which had operated semi-independently since its post-World War II revival and formal renaming in the 1980s, expanded the DSF's remit to include maritime special operations, enabling more seamless amphibious and underwater capabilities alongside the SAS's land-focused expertise. Throughout the late 1980s and 1990s, the DSF oversaw incremental growth in UKSF capabilities amid evolving threats, including the formation of the SBS's in specifically for , which mirrored the SAS's dedicated warfare (CRW) wing and facilitated rapid-response across environments. Deployments in the 1991 , where squadrons conducted deep reconnaissance and sabotage behind Iraqi lines, underscored the value of unified command, prompting refinements in logistics and intelligence support under the DSF without major structural additions during this decade. By the early 2000s, operational demands accelerated expansion; the was established in 2001 to centralize helicopter and fixed-wing aviation assets from the and , improving insertion and extraction for global missions in and . Further augmentation occurred with the creation of specialist support elements, such as the Signal Squadron in 2000, which incorporated signallers dating back to the 1980s to enhance communications in maritime operations. These developments under successive DSF appointments strengthened UKSF's capacity for sustained , with the directorate's brigadier-led structure maintaining operational secrecy while adapting to increased reliance on precision strikes and gathering. The expansions reflected a causal shift toward integrated, multi-domain , prioritizing empirical lessons from field deployments over doctrinal inertia.

List of Commanders

Pre-DSF SAS Leadership (1960s–1980s)

Prior to the creation of the Director Special Forces post in 1987, the (SAS) operated under the command of a serving as the (CO) of the 22nd SAS Regiment, based at Bradbury Lines in since 1960. This officer held responsibility for the regiment's four sabre squadrons (A, B, D, and G), training regimens including the grueling selection process refined in the , operational deployments, and integration with reserve units like 21 and 23 SAS. Oversight came from the Ministry of Defence's Directorate of Land/Air Warfare and theatre commanders, rather than a dedicated directorate, allowing the CO significant autonomy in counter-insurgency and covert roles. In the 1960s, during the Indonesian Confrontation (1963–1966), John Woodhouse commanded 22 SAS, directing cross-border "Claret" operations into involving deep patrols of up to 16 men, which gathered intelligence on Indonesian positions and disrupted supply lines while minimizing civilian casualties through "hearts and minds" tactics. Woodhouse's leadership emphasized small-team mobility and adaptation of WWII-era raiding principles to , contributing to the containment of incursions into without escalating to full-scale invasion. His tenure, from approximately 1962 to 1965, solidified the SAS's role in strategic raiding and influenced subsequent doctrine. The 1970s saw SAS leadership pivot to advisory and firqat-building missions in the (1965–1976), where John Watts, as CO in the early 1970s, coordinated B Squadron's deployment to train Omani irregulars—local defectors formed into firqats numbering around 6,000 by 1975—and led operations like the defense of Mirbat in 1972, though tactical command there fell to subordinates. Watts's approach integrated SAS expertise in long-range patrols and psychological operations, aiding Sultan Qaboos's forces in reclaiming the Jebel region by 1976. Concurrently, the regiment conducted undercover tasks in under successive COs, focusing on intelligence against the Provisional IRA, with operations veiled to maintain deniability. By the late 1970s and early 1980s, Lieutenant Colonel Michael Rose assumed command of 22 from 1979 to 1982, overseeing the regiment's response to domestic terrorism, including Operation Nimrod—the 5 May 1980 assault on the Iranian Embassy in , where SAS troops stormed the building in under six minutes, rescuing 26 hostages and killing five terrorists after a six-day siege broadcast live. Rose's prior experience in SAS counter-revolutionary warfare shaped the emphasis on rapid intervention capabilities, honed through exercises like those at the fictionalized "" training grounds. His leadership bridged the gap to broader coordination, amid growing deployments to the Falklands in 1982. Successive COs through 1986 maintained this focus on counter-terrorism and expeditionary roles, setting precedents for the unified command structure to follow.

Directors Special Forces (1987–Present)

The position of Director Special Forces (DSF) was created in 1987, evolving from the Director SAS role to provide unified command over the (SAS) and (SBS), with subsequent expansions incorporating additional UKSF elements. The DSF, typically a Major General, reports to the Chief of the Defence Staff and is responsible for operational direction, policy, and integration of special forces capabilities within broader military strategy. Appointments reflect officers with extensive special operations experience, often from the SAS or Parachute Regiment lineages. Public disclosure of tenures remains partial owing to operational security, but verifiable appointments from Ministry of Defence-linked records, official biographies, and defence analyses include the following:
TenureNameRank at AppointmentRegiment/Background
2001–2003Queen's Own Highlanders (SAS command experience)
2009–2012Jonathan "Jacko" PageParachute Regiment (SAS operations)
2012–2015 (SAS command)
2015–2018Parachute Regiment
2018–2021 (special forces service)
2021–2022 (UKSF leadership in )
Post-2022 appointments have not been publicly confirmed as of October 2025, consistent with the directorate's emphasis on discretion amid ongoing inquiries into historical operations. The role's prominence increased with UKSF's growth, including the addition of support units like the , reflecting adaptations to post-Cold War threats.

Operational Achievements

Key Counter-Terrorism and Hostage Rescue Missions

One of the earliest operations under the newly established Director Special Forces oversight occurred during the Peterhead Prison riot on 28 September 1987, when approximately 50 inmates seized control of D-hall at HMP in , taking Jackie Stuart . On 3 1987, D of 22 , the on-call counter-terrorism unit, conducted a rooftop to Stuart after five days of failed; the operation successfully freed the with no reported SAS casualties, though prisoners in adjacent blocks spotted the approaching team. In , Special Forces under DSF coordination executed numerous counter-terrorism operations against (PIRA) active service units from 1987 to 1998, focusing on intelligence-led ambushes and arrests to disrupt bombings and shootings. Notable among these was the on 3 June 1991, where troops killed three PIRA members—Peter Cleary, Lawrence McNally, and Tony Doris—en route to attack a mobile checkpoint, preventing an imminent terrorist strike with no forces casualties. These operations, often involving the 's specialized for , contributed to a decline in PIRA operational capacity through targeted eliminations of bomb-makers and gunmen, though exact numbers remain partially classified. A landmark hostage rescue mission was on 10 September 2000 in , where elements, supported by the for prior reconnaissance and 1st Battalion The Parachute Regiment, assaulted camps to free five captured British soldiers from the Royal Irish Regiment and approximately 20 an civilians. The rapid helicopter-borne raid succeeded in extracting all hostages, capturing the rebel leader, and recovering stolen equipment, severely degrading the ' capabilities and accelerating their surrender; it resulted in one UK soldier killed and 12 wounded, highlighting UKSF integration with conventional forces. In the post-9/11 era, DSF-directed UKSF conducted extensive counter-terrorism raids in and , prioritizing captures and disruptions of insurgent networks over publicized recoveries due to operational secrecy. In from 2003, Task Force Black (primarily ) executed over 1,000 operations under JSOC integration, killing or capturing hundreds of insurgents including foreign fighters and bomb-makers, which reduced coalition risks by dismantling cells. In under (2001–2014), UKSF targeted and leadership in missions, such as night raids yielding over 3,000 detentions, though specific rescues remained rare and unconfirmed publicly amid broader . The maintained maritime counter-terrorism readiness, rotating squadrons for immediate response to ship hijackings or sea-based threats, as demonstrated in training evolutions for rapid vessel assaults.

Contributions in Conventional and Asymmetric Warfare

The (UKSF), directed by the Director Special Forces since the directorate's establishment in 1987, provided critical enablers in conventional operations during the 1991 under . squadrons, including B and D, executed deep reconnaissance patrols into western to locate and designate launchers for coalition airstrikes, disrupting Iraq's ballistic missile threats and supporting the broader ground offensive that liberated by 28 February 1991. These missions involved insertion via helicopters and extended foot patrols in hostile terrain, yielding intelligence that informed coalition targeting and prevented potential attacks on . The SBS complemented these efforts with specialist demolitions and maritime interdiction, including a January 1991 operation where teams infiltrated by to sever Iraqi fibre-optic communications cables, impairing command structures ahead of the ground phase. Under unified DSF oversight, such joint Army-Navy integration enhanced operational tempo, though exact outcomes remain partially classified due to the secretive nature of . In , DSF-commanded UKSF shifted focus to counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism post-2001, particularly in from 2003 onward. Task Force Black (later Knight), comprising rotating and squadrons with SFSG support, conducted targeted raids in and southern , neutralizing insurgent cells linked to through and intelligence-driven arrests, which stabilized key urban areas amid . These operations, often at night using precision firepower, emphasized and to minimize civilian harm while disrupting bomb-making networks and foreign fighters. From 2001 in , UKSF under DSF executed similar missions against and leadership, including SBS-led operations in starting in late 2001, such as and to support initial U.S.-led advances. task units later focused on high-value target raids and mentoring commandos, contributing to the capture or elimination of mid-level commanders and the disruption of opium-funded insurgent logistics through 2014. This asymmetric emphasis leveraged UKSF's adaptability for stabilisation, with DSF coordination enabling seamless transitions between and capacity-building in protracted conflicts.

Controversies and Criticisms

Allegations of Unlawful Killings in Afghanistan (2010–2013)

Between mid-2010 and mid-2013, UK Special Forces, primarily the SAS, conducted deliberate detention operations—commonly known as night raids—in Helmand Province, Afghanistan, as part of Task Force Helmand. These operations targeted insurgent networks but gave rise to allegations of systematic extrajudicial killings, including the execution of detained or unarmed Afghan males, often of fighting age, to circumvent detention protocols and reporting requirements. Witnesses, including UKSF personnel, have testified that troops planted "drop weapons" on bodies to justify shootings as combat engagements, used detainees as human bait to draw fire, and in some cases shot individuals at close range after surrender, such as placing pillows over heads before pistol execution. A former senior UKSF officer stated during the Independent Inquiry Relating to Afghanistan that the SAS "was carrying out murders" and operated with a perceived "golden pass to get away with murder," reflecting inadequate oversight from higher command, including concerns raised but not acted upon by special forces leadership. Specific incidents documented in inquiry evidence and journalistic investigations include the 7 February 2011 raid in Luy Mandah, where nine individuals, including 14-year-old Sami Ullah, were killed execution-style with shots to the head; an member later reportedly joked about "flat-packing" the victims. On 9 February 2011, eight people, including 15-year-old Mohammad Taher, died similarly in another operation, with post-mortem evidence inconsistent with claims of armed resistance. Further cases, such as the 16 February 2011 killing of four family members with only two weapons recovered and the 18 October 2012 deaths of four, including 12-year-old Ahmed , involved allegations of troops entering compounds, detaining males, and shooting them without threat. Internal UKSF emails from 2011 acknowledged patterns of disproportionate kills—e.g., one raid yielding six deaths but only three weapons—and senior officers expressed concerns over "" risks, yet operations continued without systemic halt. At least 84 deaths across approximately 26 operations have been flagged for potential EJK, though reviews initially deemed most lawful. These claims surfaced prominently through a 2022 investigation, which the later described as "broadly accurate," prompting legal challenges by Afghan families alleging up to 80 summary executions. Operation Northmoor, a probe launched in 2014 into 675 allegations including these killings, amassed evidence of fabricated reports but was closed in 2019 without prosecutions, costing £10 million amid accusations of interference by UKSF command and premature termination. The statutory Independent Inquiry Relating to , established in 2022 under Sir , continues to examine the operations' conduct, decision-making, and investigative adequacy, with 2023–2025 hearings featuring veteran testimonies of ignored warnings and a culture prioritizing operational tempo over . No personnel have been convicted, and the inquiry's final report, expected post-2025, will assess whether deaths were unlawful and if command failures, potentially up to Director Special Forces level, enabled patterns of abuse.

Oversight, Accountability, and the 'No Comment' Policy

The Director Special Forces (DSF), as the head of the (UKSF), operates under the strategic direction of the Chief of the Defence Staff and reports directly to the Secretary of State for Defence, with ultimate accountability to the for high-risk operations. This chain of command bypasses intermediate military oversight bodies, reflecting the classified nature of UKSF activities, which prioritize operational secrecy to maintain tactical advantages in counter-terrorism and . Internal (MoD) reviews and audits provide primary oversight, but these are not subject to routine external parliamentary examination, distinguishing UKSF from regular forces. Accountability mechanisms for DSF and UKSF personnel rely on the military justice system, including investigations by the of the Royal and potential prosecutions via the independent Service Prosecuting Authority. For instance, following allegations of unlawful killings in between 2010 and 2013, the initiated internal probes, though critics, including parliamentary reports, have questioned their independence and thoroughness due to reliance on self-reported evidence from involved units. The Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament holds limited oversight over UKSF intelligence-related activities but excludes direct operational scrutiny, unlike its mandate for agencies such as and . Ad hoc inquiries, such as the 2022 independent review chaired by Sir Jonathan Haddon-Cave into operations, represent exceptional external accountability efforts, yet outcomes remain constrained by classification restrictions. The UK's long-standing 'no comment' policy prohibits official confirmation or discussion of specific UKSF operations, personnel, or capabilities, justified by the need to protect methods, sources, and ongoing missions from adversaries. Enforced since at least the 1980s formation of UKSF, this approach extends to parliamentary inquiries, where ministers routinely decline to engage on details, citing national security. While proponents argue it preserves effectiveness—evidenced by successful missions like the 1980 Iranian Embassy siege—it has drawn criticism for enabling potential impunity, as external verification of compliance with international law becomes infeasible without disclosure. Reports from bodies like the All-Party Parliamentary Group on Extraordinary Rendition and Associated Illegal Detention have recommended relaxing the policy for unclassified strategic data, such as funding and staffing levels (UKSF budget approximately £1 billion annually as of 2020s estimates), to balance security with democratic accountability without compromising tactics.

Recent Developments and Reforms

Post-Afghanistan Inquiries and Investigations (2020s)

In the early 2020s, allegations of unlawful killings by UK Special Forces (UKSF), particularly the (SAS), during operations in from 2010 to 2013 prompted renewed scrutiny. These claims centered on deliberate detention operations involving night raids, where detainees were allegedly executed after surrender rather than processed for intelligence or handover. Operation Northmoor, a (RMP) investigation launched in 2014, examined over 600 incidents but encountered significant obstructions, including restricted access to personnel and evidence, leading to its effective closure by 2020 without prosecuting senior figures. The inquiry highlighted patterns of detainee mistreatment, such as reports of up to 54 unarmed Afghans killed in a single tour by one SAS squadron, often documented as combat losses despite evidence suggesting post-capture executions. In response to media investigations, including reports in 2022 and 2023 featuring eyewitness testimonies from veterans, the government established a statutory Independent into in March 2023, chaired by Sir . The inquiry, with public hearings commencing in 2024, focused on systemic issues in command chains, including the role of the Director Special Forces (DSF) in oversight during the relevant period. Testimonies revealed concerns among serving and former personnel about a culture of impunity, with soldiers reporting that Afghan males posing no immediate threat were killed to meet "kill-or-capture" quotas or avoid logistical burdens of detention. Evidence presented included digital logs and forensic discrepancies, such as multiple "finds" of weapons on bodies after raids, raising questions about fabricated justifications. Senior UKSF leadership, including figures who held the DSF position during peak operations (2009–2012), faced accusations of obstructing investigations by withholding documents and personnel. General Sir , who commanded UKSF elements in amid these allegations, was cited in 2025 hearings for actions that delayed RMP access, contributing to a perceived "secrecy operation" within the force. The (MoD) admitted in September 2024 that a report on SAS killings was "broadly accurate," acknowledging failures in accountability, though it maintained that isolated incidents did not reflect systemic policy. Former Defence Secretary testified that he was advised against launching the full in 2021, citing risks to operational morale, but proceeded amid mounting evidence. By mid-2025, had rebuked attempts to suppress expert reports on tactics, such as the "Pugsley Material" analyzing raid patterns, underscoring tensions between transparency and the DSF's traditional "no comment" policy on operations. Veterans' accounts described psychological tolls on troops, including "psychopathic traits" in some operators and inadequate support, potentially exacerbating errors in high-stress environments. While no convictions have resulted as of October 2025, the proceedings have prompted calls for reformed oversight of the DSF role, including mandatory external audits of kill chains and detention protocols to align with . The inquiry remains ongoing, with final recommendations expected to address causal factors like resource strains and command insularity in .

Adaptations to Contemporary Threats (2020–2025)

In the wake of the 2021 Afghanistan withdrawal, the (UKSF), directed by the Director Special Forces (DSF), initiated a strategic reorientation from counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism dominance toward high-end warfighting against peer adversaries, driven by escalating threats from and . This shift aligned with the 2021 Integrated Review's emphasis on Euro-Atlantic deterrence and engagement, recognizing that prolonged low-intensity operations had eroded readiness for contested environments characterized by advanced air defenses, , and hybrid tactics. The June 2025 Strategic Defence Review formalized UKSF's adaptation to a "new era of threat," prioritizing deterrence via , rapid maneuver, and integration with allied forces to counter Russian aggression in and . Under DSF oversight, which commands over 2,000 personnel across units like 22 SAS and , emphasis grew on grey-zone operations, such as covert reconnaissance and sabotage to disrupt adversary command structures in peer conflicts, informed by observations from the 2022 . Investments exceeded £2 billion by 2020 for global strike capabilities, including precision munitions and loitering systems, enabling remote warfare that minimizes exposure in denied areas. To balance persistent terrorism risks with state threats, UKSF retained core counter-terrorism roles—such as the Special Projects Team for domestic incidents—while expanding training for high-threat scenarios, including interoperability via the 2021-formed (rebranded Ranger Regiment). , initiated post-2020, enhanced deep-strike precision against hardened targets, reflecting causal lessons from that small, agile teams excel in asymmetric disruption but require technological augmentation against symmetric foes. The assumed leads in tracking Russian subversion in regions like the Baltics, underscoring a doctrinal pivot to counter-intelligence fusion with kinetic effects. By 2025, these adaptations positioned UKSF for "warfighting readiness," with DSF elevating doctrine to integrate and domains for outpacing adversaries, though domestic terrorism's "huge aggregate scale" necessitated sustained resourcing alongside peer preparation. Official assessments affirm UKSF's strategic astuteness in preempting shifts, ensuring against unpredictable threats like daily intrusions and risks from authoritarian states.

References

  1. [1]
    UK Special Forces - GOV.UK
    The UK Special Forces (UKSF) is a military organization conducting high-risk operations for UK interests on behalf of the Ministry of Defence.
  2. [2]
    UK Directorate of Special Forces
    The Director Special Forces (DSF) is the title of the professional head of the UKSF. The DSF, previously a Brigadier, has since 2009 held the rank of Major- ...
  3. [3]
    UKSF: The United Kingdom Special Forces - Grey Dynamics
    The current UKSF came into being in 1987 when the post of Director of the Special Air Service (SAS) became Director of Special Forces (DSF). The UKSF was born ...
  4. [4]
    [PDF] The UK Government's “Long-Standing Policy” on Special Forces ...
    The elements that Director Special Forces is responsible for, as of 2020: ○ Special Air Service. ○ 22 SAS. □ L Det (reserves). ○ Special Boat Service (SBS).
  5. [5]
    British Special Forces in the 2020s: Still A National Asset
    In 2009, the post of Director UKSF – the senior Army officer double-hatted as overall commander of British Special Forces and overseer of their doctrine, ...
  6. [6]
    UK Special Forces breakdown: 18 (UKSF) Signals Regiment
    Jan 12, 2020 · ... Director Special Forces (DSF), a position manned by a senior British military officer responsible for special forces operations. The DSF ...
  7. [7]
    Defence Review 2021: accountability is the first victim of UK Special ...
    Mar 23, 2021 · The most senior UKSF officer, the Director Special Forces, is only accountable to the Defence Secretary and the Prime Minister. There is no ...
  8. [8]
    Top UK Special Forces general oversaw blocking of Afghan 'war ...
    May 12, 2025 · MOD Gen Sir Gwyn Jenkins led UK Special Forces (UKSF) in Afghanistan at a time when alleged war crimes were committed.
  9. [9]
    [PDF] Joint Doctrine Publication 0-01.1 - GOV.UK
    of Director Special Forces, in support of political and military strategic objectives. 2. 'Discrete' in this sense should not be confused with 'discreet ...
  10. [10]
    [PDF] JDP 01: UK Joint Operations Doctrine - GOV.UK
    Director Special Forces (DSF) retains full command of all assigned SF. (3) Operational command. You are to exercise OPCOM of UK assigned naval, land and air ...
  11. [11]
    [PDF] JDP 6-00 - GOV.UK
    Director Special Forces. 213. DSF commands all UK Special Forces (UKSF) and provides advice to CJO and the JTFC. He nominates a Special Forces (SF) CC and ...
  12. [12]
    [PDF] DSA03 DLSR - Movement and Transport Safety Regulations - GOV.UK
    Director Special Forces (DSF). For the provision of Military Aid to the. Civil Power (MACP), UKSF vehicles can be fitted with all BL warning devices ...
  13. [13]
    [PDF] Strategic Defence Review 2025 – Making Britain Safer - GOV.UK
    Jun 2, 2025 · Services and Director Special Forces in achieving multi-domain integration in real time and at high tempo. Delivery should be left to the ...
  14. [14]
    General Sir Mark Carleton-Smith, GCB, CBE
    Sir Mark Carleton-Smith was Former Chief of the General Staff, British Army, and served in the Gulf, Balkans, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Kosovo. He also commanded ...
  15. [15]
    [PDF] Joint Forces Command - GOV.UK
    The Chief of Joint Operations and Director Special Forces, who sit within the Joint Forces Command, report directly to the Chief of the Defence Staff on ...
  16. [16]
    About us - Strategic Command - GOV.UK
    Directorate of Special Forces conducts short notice high risk operations in support of UK interests; Defence Intelligence provides strategic defence ...
  17. [17]
    United Kingdom Special Forces (UKSF) Group
    UKSF is commanded by Director Special Forces (DSF), usually a Brigadier, a post that has to date always been filled by a SAS Brigadier.
  18. [18]
    What are the Special Forces? | National Army Museum
    All of these units are overseen by a Director supported by a specialist staff. ... British Special Forces selection is widely considered to be one of the ...
  19. [19]
    Special Forces Support Group | SFSG
    A profile of the Special Forces Support Group (SFSG), a new special forces unit with the remit of supporting UKSF operations.
  20. [20]
    SAS: The UK Army Special Air Service - Grey Dynamics
    The SAS is under the operational command of the Director of Special Forces (DSF), a senior role within the Ministry of Defence (MoD). The DSF is also the ...Missing: composition | Show results with:composition
  21. [21]
    How the UK is changing its special forces for a modern world
    Sep 10, 2025 · In the UK, “Special Forces” refer to the top tier of special operations units within UKSF, namely the Special Air Service, Special Boat Service ...
  22. [22]
    Colonel John Waddy, survivor of Operation Market Garden who ...
    Oct 4, 2020 · In 1964, Waddy took up a newly created post as Colonel SAS, which has since evolved into that of Director Special Forces. He did much to develop ...
  23. [23]
    Extended biography of John Waddy - Airborne Assault Museum
    The next posting in October 1964 proved far more interesting as he was appointed as Colonel SAS (later Commander of the SAS Group) and assumed ...
  24. [24]
    Colonel John Waddy - Airborne Assault Museum - ParaData
    Sep 27, 2020 · In 1964 he was appointed Colonel SAS and commander of the SAS Group (comprising all 3 SAS Regiments). Subsequently in 1967 he was posted to ...
  25. [25]
    [PDF] THE ORGANISATIONAL STATUS OF SPECIAL FORCES IN THE ...
    At the end of March 1987, the United Kingdom Special Forces Directorate was established, headed by the Director Special Forces, who was also the commander of ...
  26. [26]
    A History Of The SBS - The Special Boat Service - Elite UK Forces
    The SBS began its history during World War 2 as the Special Boat Section, an Army commando unit tasked with amphibious operations.
  27. [27]
    The 18 (UKSF) Signal Regiment - Grey Dynamics
    The SFSG is under the operational command of the Director of Special Forces (DSF). The DSF is a senior role (Major General or OF-7) within the Ministry of ...
  28. [28]
    Special Air Service (SAS) | History, Organization, & Operations
    Sep 21, 2025 · The SAS was first formed in North Africa in July 1941, during World War II. David Stirling, its founder, saw the potential for a strike force ...Missing: command | Show results with:command<|separator|>
  29. [29]
    Woodhouse, John Michael (Oral history) | Imperial War Museums
    Recollections of operations as commanding officer of 22nd Special Air Service Regt in GB and in Borneo, Malaysia during Indonesian Confrontation, 1962-1965 ...Missing: SAS | Show results with:SAS
  30. [30]
    [PDF] SAS performance in cross border operations in Borneo 1964-66
    Oct 23, 2016 · 43 SAS involvement in Borneo came as the result of active lobbying by the commanding officer of the SAS,. Lieutenant Colonel John Woodhouse.
  31. [31]
    Lieutenant General Sir John Watts - The Times
    Dec 15, 2003 · Sir John Watts was a formidable SAS commando who helped quash rebellions in Oman, later becoming head of land forces and Chief of Defence Staff.<|separator|>
  32. [32]
    The Dhofar War - British Modern Military History Society
    Led by the SAS under the command of Major Johnny Watts, a veteran of The Jebel Akhdar War, the firqats and other forces moved into the Dohfari jebel against ...
  33. [33]
    General Sir Michael Rose KCB, CBE, DSO, QGM - Skarbek
    General Rose is one of Britain's most distinguished soldiers. He commanded the 22nd SAS regiment, UK Special Forces, the Army Staff College, UK Land Forces ...
  34. [34]
    General Sir Michael Rose | Honorary Fellow | St Edmund Hall
    Michael Rose is a retired British Army general. As well as Special Air Service Regiment commanding officer, he was Commander UNPROFOR Bosnia.
  35. [35]
    Sir Graeme Lamb - Burnham Global
    ... Director Special Forces from 2001-2003. Gen. Lamb served 35 years in the British Army, including operational deployments in Northern Ireland, Bosnia ...<|separator|>
  36. [36]
    UK Special Forces war crimes: senior officers, 2010-13 - Unredacted
    Feb 19, 2024 · Major General (now Lieutenant General) Jonathan 'Jacko' Page was Director Special Forces (DSF) from 2009 to February 2012. During this time, he ...
  37. [37]
    Brigadier (later Major General) James Chiswell, 2011 (c)
    In 2010-2011 he served as Task Force Commander during Operation HERRICK 13 and in 2015 he became Director Special Forces. Part of a digital archive compiled ...
  38. [38]
    Military leadership beyond the SDR - by Eliot Wilson - The Ideas Lab
    May 22, 2025 · Walker was Jenkins's predecessor as Director Special Forces (2018-21), and before he was appointed as CGS, he was Deputy Chief of the Defence ...
  39. [39]
    British - First General to Command the Royal Navy since ... - Facebook
    May 15, 2025 · From 2021 to 2022, he served as Director Special Forces. Jenkins was appointed a Companion of the Order of the Bath in the 2021 New Year Honours ...
  40. [40]
    The prison riot that ended with the SAS - BBC
    Sep 26, 2017 · 50 inmates took control of D-hall at Peterhead Prison and took two warders hostage. One was released but prison officer Jackie Stuart was held for five days.
  41. [41]
    The Peterhead prison siege that ended with the SAS as officer ...
    Sep 19, 2022 · During the rescue of Jackie Stuart, four SAS men snuck across the roof at 5am, when prisoners in overlooking cell blocks spotted them. It was at ...
  42. [42]
    The Troubles | National Army Museum
    As the numbers of troops deployed in the Northern Ireland fluctuated, counter-terrorist action by the British Army and intelligence agencies was stepped up. In ...
  43. [43]
    The Evolution of Counterterrorism in Northern Ireland - ASAP History
    Mar 17, 2020 · British forces stationed in Northern Ireland quickly found themselves out of their depth, fighting an enemy who enjoyed a great deal of public ...
  44. [44]
    Operation Barras | National Army Museum
    Sep 10, 2000 · In September 2000, British troops undertook a daring hostage rescue operation in the war-torn West African country of Sierra Leone.
  45. [45]
    British Special Forces – where they came from and what they do
    Jan 20, 2022 · ... Special Boat Company in 1951. It was rebranded as the Special Boat Squadron in 1974 and then finally the Special Boat Service in 1987. Just ...Missing: command | Show results with:command
  46. [46]
    Task Force Black: British Special Forces in Iraq - Grey Dynamics
    Task Force Black (later renamed to Task Force Knight) was a grouping of UKSF Units assigned to operate under JSOC command in Iraq.
  47. [47]
    Ops 1. UK Special Forces Operations: Afghanistan - AOAV
    May 16, 2023 · This section outlines the extent of UKSF's operations in Afghanistan. Britain's war in Afghanistan officially ended in October 2014. But Special ...
  48. [48]
    How British SBS Commandos Train to Recapture Hijacked Ships
    Oct 27, 2020 · ... SBS specializes in direct action, special reconnaissance, counterterrorism, and hostage rescue. ... in the Global War on Terror. During that ...
  49. [49]
    Special Air Service (SAS) - Gulf War I Desert Storm Operations
    When war loomed in the Gulf in late 1990/early 1991, Britain committed a large number of forces, including the 22nd Special Air Service.
  50. [50]
    British Special Forces - Gulf War 2
    In the 1991 war, the SBS carried out vital demolitions operations - one notable mission had them fly by Chinook deep behind Iraqi lines to blow up a fibre-optic ...
  51. [51]
    SBS Operations in Afghanistan - Elite UK Forces
    The Special Boat Service has carried out a series of operations in Afghanistan, starting not long after the attacks of September 11th 2001.
  52. [52]
    SAS had golden pass to get away with murder, inquiry told - BBC
    Jan 8, 2025 · In a closed-door hearing, a former senior UK Special Forces officer tells a public inquiry he believes the SAS "was carrying out murders".
  53. [53]
    Independent inquiry into alleged unlawful activity by UK Special ...
    Jul 17, 2024 · An independent statutory inquiry is investigating alleged unlawful activity by UK Special Forces during deliberate detention operations in ...
  54. [54]
    UK special forces soldiers tell inquiry of Afghan murder concerns
    Jan 7, 2025 · UK special forces soldiers tell inquiry of Afghan murder concerns · UK inquiry examines claims of extra-judicial killings · Soldiers concerned ...
  55. [55]
    UK Special Forces war crimes: operations, 2010-13 - Unredacted
    Feb 19, 2024 · The evidence strongly suggests that, between at least 2010-2013, UKSF units in Afghanistan were engaged in systematic war crimes and a subsequent attempt to ...29-30 November 2010 (1 killed) · February 2011 (8 killed) · February 2011 (4 killed)
  56. [56]
    'Flat packing them': soldier says SAS described killing Afghans in ...
    Jan 9, 2025 · Afghans who were killed by members of the SAS in Afghanistan were described dismissively as having been “flat packed” according to revealing testimony.<|separator|>
  57. [57]
    SAS unit repeatedly killed Afghan detainees, BBC finds
    Jul 11, 2022 · Internal emails seen by the BBC show top special forces officers were aware of concerns over killings.
  58. [58]
    BBC report on unlawful SAS killings 'broadly accurate', MoD ...
    Sep 23, 2024 · Former-defence secretary Sir Ben Wallace appeared at an inquiry investigating allegations the SAS carried out unlawful killings in Afghanistan.
  59. [59]
    Closure of SAS investigation was premature, inquiry told - BBC
    Jan 27, 2025 · Operation Northmoor, which began in 2014 and eventually cost £10m, was shut down in 2019 with no charges being brought. It has faced ...
  60. [60]
    [PDF] How Defence Works (September 2020) - GOV.UK
    Sep 22, 2020 · The Defence Secretary is appointed by the Prime Minister and accountable to Parliament for the activities of the Ministry of Defence and the ...<|control11|><|separator|>
  61. [61]
    [PDF] Accountability and Oversight of UK Special Forces
    Jun 30, 2023 · 2 The Directorate of Special Forces conducts high risk operations in support of UK interest,3 and forms part of the Strategic Command; one ...
  62. [62]
    A culture of impunity: accountability failures in Britain's armed forces
    Jul 30, 2025 · Mandate full parliamentary oversight of UK Special Forces, including the lifting of the exemption that places them outside the Defence ...
  63. [63]
    Strengthened parliamentary oversight needed for UK Special Forces ...
    Sep 11, 2024 · Key recommendations include establishing a parliamentary select committee dedicated to Special Forces issues, relaxing the 'No Comment' policy ...
  64. [64]
    Top military chief says UK Special Forces are vanguard for wider ...
    Jan 22, 2024 · General Sir Jim Hockenhull spoke to Forces News, giving an exceptionally rare insight into this incredibly secretive organisation.
  65. [65]
    Evidence on The effectiveness and influence of the committee system
    We propose the following recommendations to improve the effectiveness of parliamentary select committees overseeing Britain's defence policy.
  66. [66]
    The Dangers of the UK's Blanket No Comment Policy for Special ...
    Jul 20, 2017 · The Dangers of the UK's Blanket No Comment Policy for Special Forces ... Special Forces, Special Operations Forces, UK, United Kingdom.
  67. [67]
    [PDF] Strengthening parliamentary oversight of UK Special Forces
    Parliamentary oversight of UK Special Forces should be strengthened to enhance accountability and protect civilians.<|control11|><|separator|>
  68. [68]
    Terms of reference - GOV.UK
    Jul 17, 2024 · ... inquiry into alleged unlawful activity by UK Special Forces during deliberate detention operations in Afghanistan ... killings (EJK) by UK ...
  69. [69]
    ITS1 Server - Independent Inquiry relating to Afghanistan
    In 2015, Operation Northmoor officers – the Royal Military Police's investigation into allegations of unlawful killing by Special Forces in Afghanistan ...
  70. [70]
    Ex-UK Special Forces break silence on 'war crimes' by colleagues
    May 11, 2025 · Veterans who served with the SAS and SBS give BBC Panorama eyewitness accounts of alleged executions.Missing: terrorism hostage
  71. [71]
    Independent Inquiry relating to Afghanistan - Independent Inquiry ...
    The Government established an independent statutory inquiry to investigate matters arising from the deployment of British Special Forces to Afghanistan.Documents · Hearings · News · About us
  72. [72]
    U.K. Special Forces Allowed to 'Get Away with Murder' in ...
    Jan 8, 2025 · Evidence released by an official inquiry into alleged war crimes painted a disturbing picture of an elite fighting force with a culture of ...
  73. [73]
    Ex-defence secretary Wallace 'was advised against inquiry into SAS ...
    Sep 23, 2024 · Top civil servant tried to persuade ex-defence secretary not to commission inquiry into UK military actions in Afghanistan. ... unlawful killings, ...
  74. [74]
    Chair of inquiry into killings in Afghanistan rebukes MoD bid ... - AOAV
    Sep 24, 2025 · ... unlawful killings by British Special Forces. The MoD had argued that releasing the “Pughsley Material” (the expert's report, addendum and ...
  75. [75]
    UK special forces veterans accuse colleagues of war crimes in Iraq ...
    May 12, 2025 · Former personnel describe soldiers exhibiting 'psychopathic traits' and executions of handcuffed prisoners.