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Emerging power

An emerging power is a undergoing rapid expansion in economic output, technological capabilities, and diplomatic assertiveness, enabling it to challenge the prevailing established by traditional great powers. These nations typically feature large populations, abundant natural resources, and sustained high GDP growth rates, which fuel investments in modernization and infrastructure. Key exemplars include , whose GDP surpassed $18 trillion by 2023 through export-led industrialization and state-directed ; , projected to achieve over 7% annual growth amid a ; and , leveraging agricultural and mineral exports despite governance challenges. The grouping—initially , , , , and —exemplifies collective efforts by such powers to amplify their voice in , as seen in its 2023 expansion to include , , , , and the , representing over 45% of the world's population and 28% of global GDP. While these powers drive multipolarity through initiatives like the and Belt and Road, controversies arise from authoritarian tendencies in some members, territorial aggressions such as 's claims, and dependencies on commodity cycles that expose vulnerabilities to global downturns. Empirical assessments underscore that true emergence hinges on translating economic gains into and institutional reforms, rather than mere size, with varying success across cases—'s buildup contrasts with 's democratic constraints on .

Definition and Conceptual Framework

Core Definition

An emerging power refers to a undergoing rapid socioeconomic transformation, marked by accelerating economic output, demographic advantages, and expanding international engagement, which collectively enable it to challenge aspects of the prevailing global hierarchy dominated by established powers. These states typically exhibit sustained real GDP growth rates exceeding 5% annually over decades, transitioning from low- to middle-income classifications as defined by institutions like the , with increasing contributions to global GDP—such as China's share rising from under 2% in 1990 to over 18% by 2023. This economic momentum stems from factors including large labor forces, industrialization, and integration into global supply chains, fostering capabilities that extend beyond domestic into geopolitical leverage. Central to the concept is the interplay of material capabilities and agency: emerging powers not only accumulate resources but actively pursue status elevation through diplomatic assertiveness, military modernization, and institutional entrepreneurship. Military attributes often include rising defense budgets relative to GDP—averaging 2-3% in many cases—and investments in advanced technologies like assets, enabling regional influence projection without yet matching great-power parity. Politically, these nations advocate for multipolarity, critiquing Western-centric norms in forums such as the or , while forming coalitions like the grouping (established 2009) to amplify collective voice on issues from trade rules to development . The designation remains analytical rather than rigidly codified, requiring evidence of trajectory over snapshot metrics; for instance, a must demonstrate not just but against reversals, such as through diversified exports exceeding 20% of GDP or strategic control (e.g., earths or energy reserves). Scholarly assessments emphasize causal links between internal reforms—like market liberalization in post-1991—and external ambitions, distinguishing true emergents from transient booms. While the term gained prominence in the amid post-Cold War shifts, its application demands scrutiny of , as uneven or on foreign can limit ascent.

Historical Evolution of the Concept

The concept of emerging powers traces its intellectual antecedents to mid-20th-century , particularly A.F.K. Organski's outlined in his 1958 book World Politics. This framework analyzed how differential growth rates enable subordinate states to challenge dominant hegemons, often leading to conflict when the rising contender nears power parity and harbors dissatisfaction with the . Although Organski did not use the phrase "emerging powers," his emphasis on ascendant states' capacity to alter global hierarchies provided a causal foundation for later conceptualizations, shifting focus from static balances to dynamic transitions driven by economic and military capabilities. By the 1970s, empirical observations of rapid industrialization in select developing economies crystallized early applications of the idea, with countries designated as Newly Industrializing Countries (NICs) including the Asian Tigers—, , , and —alongside and Mexico. These states achieved average annual GDP growth rates exceeding 7% through export-led strategies, elevating their global economic shares from under 5% in 1970 to over 10% by 1980. , for instance, was explicitly regarded as an emerging power during this decade due to its industrial expansion and regional influence. The term "emerging markets" emerged in 1981, coined by Antoine van Agtmael at the to reframe perceptions of high-growth developing economies as viable investment destinations rather than high-risk frontiers. The end of the in 1991 and accelerated in the 1990s broadened the concept beyond economics to encompass geopolitical agency, as NICs and larger economies like and integrated into world trade, with their combined exports rising from $200 billion in 1990 to $1.5 trillion by 2000. The decisive popularization of "emerging powers" occurred in 2001 with Jim O'Neill's report "Building Better Global Economic BRICs," which forecasted that , , , and would collectively generate half the world's GDP growth by 2020 and overtake G6 economies by 2041 based on projections. This analysis, rooted in demographic and productivity trends, transitioned the discourse from mere market potential to systemic challengers capable of influencing institutions like the IMF and WTO. Subsequent developments, including the 2009 addition of to form , underscored the term's evolution toward multifaceted power, incorporating diplomatic coalitions and demands for reformed .

Key Characteristics and Criteria

Economic Dimensions

Economic dimensions form the foundational criterion for identifying emerging powers, characterized primarily by sustained high rates of GDP growth that propel these nations up the global economic hierarchy. Such growth typically exceeds 5% annually over extended periods, driven by factors including large populations exceeding 100 million inhabitants, which foster expansive domestic markets, and potential rates surpassing 50%. Rapid industrialization, , and technological adoption further underpin this expansion, enabling these economies to transition from low- to middle-income status while integrating into global supply chains. A hallmark is the increasing share in global output and trade; collectively, emerging and developing economies accounted for approximately 60% of global GDP in terms by 2016, rising from under 50% a prior, with their contributions to worldwide growth often outpacing advanced economies. This shift manifests in enhanced export competitiveness, financial infrastructure development—such as established banking systems, stock exchanges, and unified currencies—and rising inflows that support infrastructure and accumulation. For instance, growth spillovers from domestic shocks in major emerging markets have grown comparable to those from advanced economies over the past two decades, underscoring their systemic importance. Sustaining economic ascent requires diversification beyond commodity dependence toward and services, alongside policies promoting and demographic dividends from youthful populations and endowments. These attributes not only amplify domestic but also bolster leverage in economic institutions, where emerging powers advocate for reforms reflecting their augmented weight—evident in groups like , whose combined GDP share reached about 21% at market exchange rates by the mid-2010s. However, uneven progress across sectors and vulnerability to external shocks highlight that raw growth alone insufficiently guarantees enduring power without structural reforms.

Political and Military Attributes

Emerging powers demonstrate political attributes characterized by assertive and expanding influence in multilateral institutions, often leveraging economic leverage to advocate for reformed structures that reflect multipolarity. These states prioritize and non-interference principles, frequently aligning with like-minded nations to counterbalance Western-dominated frameworks, as evidenced by their growing roles in forums such as the grouping, where they coordinate positions on trade, development, and security issues. This diplomatic ambition stems from status-seeking behaviors, where rising material capacities translate into demands for greater representation in bodies like the , though success varies based on coalition-building efficacy and avoidance of overt confrontation. Militarily, emerging powers invest heavily in force modernization to achieve regional dominance and limited global reach, with defense expenditures often rising in tandem with GDP growth to fund acquisitions of advanced platforms such as fighter jets, submarines, and missile systems. For instance, these nations emphasize anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities to deter interventions, reflecting a strategic shift from territorial defense to amid perceived threats from established powers. Historical analyses indicate that such military expansions correlate with economic ascent, enabling these states to participate in , , and expeditionary operations, though qualitative gaps persist in areas like joint operations and compared to mature militaries. Despite rapid hardware improvements—driven by domestic R&D and foreign transfers—effectiveness hinges on addressing internal challenges like and deficiencies, as uneven progress can undermine deterrence credibility.

Institutional and Soft Power Factors

Emerging powers enhance their global influence through the establishment of parallel international institutions, circumventing limitations in Western-dominated bodies like the IMF and . The countries launched the (NDB) in 2014, headquartered in , to fund infrastructure and projects primarily in emerging economies, with initial capital of $100 billion. By 2023, the NDB alongside China's (AIIB), established in 2016 with 103 member countries, had approved over $71 billion in loans across sectors including energy and transportation. These entities grant members structural power by enabling norm-setting in development finance, such as prioritizing infrastructure over conditional lending, though their lending volumes remain below the 's $300 billion annual average. Complementing new institutions, emerging powers pursue greater representation within existing global organizations to amplify their voice. , , and have secured incremental quota reforms in the IMF, increasing their combined voting shares from 13% in 2010 to over 15% by 2023, yet they still advocate for further adjustments to reflect economic realities. Staffing patterns in organizations like the UN and IMF exhibit persistent Western bias, with emerging powers holding only about 20% of senior positions despite comprising over 40% of global GDP by in 2023. This underrepresentation prompts initiatives like (CRA), activated in 2014 with $100 billion in pooled reserves for currency crisis support, reducing reliance on G7-led facilities. Soft power among emerging economies relies on cultural diplomacy and values projection, though outcomes vary by reception and domestic credibility. In the 2024 Global Soft Power Index, ranked third overall, buoyed by economic familiarity and media reach, while climbed due to cultural exports like Bollywood films—exported to over 100 countries annually—and , practiced by an estimated 300 million people worldwide following the UN's 2014 declaration. leverages Carnival and football, drawing 6 million tourists yearly pre-COVID, to foster regional affinity in . However, 's Institutes, numbering over 500 globally at peak in 2019 but reduced to under 400 by 2024 amid Western closures, have proven ineffective in and due to perceptions of and threats to academic , with over 100 U.S. campuses shuttering partnerships since 2014. These efforts underscore that soft power efficacy hinges on perceived authenticity rather than state-directed promotion, as coercive undertones erode appeal in democratic societies.

Prominent Examples

Core BRICS Nations

The core nations—Brazil, , , , and —originated as an informal grouping of large emerging economies seeking greater influence in global economic governance amid perceptions of Western institutional dominance. The acronym was first proposed in a 2001 report by economist Jim O'Neill to denote , , , and as high-growth markets projected to drive future global expansion, based on their demographic advantages, resource endowments, and industrialization trajectories. These four convened for their inaugural summit on June 16, 2009, in , , where they formalized coordination on trade, investment, and multilateral reforms, emphasizing South-South cooperation without formal treaty obligations. acceded in December 2010, invited due to its continental leadership and commodity exports, transforming BRIC into and expanding the group's representation in . Economically, the core BRICS nations wield outsized influence through scale and diversification: as the world's manufacturing powerhouse, leveraging services and a young workforce, and via commodities, and through mining and regional finance. According to IMF estimates for 2024, their combined nominal GDP approached $27 trillion, accounting for over 25% of global output, with contributing the lion's share at $18.75 trillion, $3.91 trillion, $2.17 trillion, approximately $2.0 trillion (resilient despite sanctions via energy rerouting to ), and $0.37 trillion. This aggregate reflects faster-than-average growth, with BRICS averaging 4% GDP expansion in 2024 versus the global 3.3%, driven by domestic demand and intra-group trade exceeding $500 billion annually. However, per capita metrics reveal disparities— at around $13,000, under $3,000—highlighting uneven development and reliance on state-led models in and versus market-oriented reforms in and . Institutionally, the grouping established the (NDB) in 2014 during the summit, operationalized in 2015 with headquarters in and equal shareholding among founders, to finance infrastructure and sustainable projects totaling over $30 billion approved by 2024 as a counter to IMF-World Bank conditionality. The NDB prioritizes non-sovereign lending and local-currency issuance to mitigate dollar dependence, approving projects like and rail in , though its scale remains modest compared to Bretton Woods institutions. Politically, core BRICS nations advocate for IMF quota reforms and UN Security Council expansion, positioning themselves as voices for the Global South, yet their authoritarian leanings in and contrast with and India's democratic systems, fostering debates on shared values. Internal frictions undermine cohesion: India-China relations strain under unresolved Himalayan border disputes, including the 2020 Galwan Valley clash that killed over 20 Indian soldiers and prompted troop buildups exceeding 100,000, complicating joint initiatives. Russia's post-2022 invasion faced Western sanctions slashing technology access and GDP by 2-3% initially, though wartime spending and Asian pivots sustained 3% growth in ; this isolation tests solidarity, as and balance neutrality with imports from . grapples with volatility and fiscal deficits, while South Africa's crises and hinder its pivot role. Despite these, endures as a for de-dollarization experiments, like local-currency settlements comprising 20% of intra-trade by , signaling emergent multipolarity without supranational authority.

Expanded and Peripheral Contenders

, with a population exceeding 270 million and nominal GDP of approximately $1.4 trillion in 2024, ranks as Southeast Asia's largest economy and is projected to achieve 4.9% real GDP growth in 2025, driven by domestic consumption, commodity exports, and infrastructure investments. Its strategic location astride key maritime trade routes enhances its geopolitical leverage, positioning it as a to Chinese influence in the region through leadership and partnerships like the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue's indirect engagements. However, vulnerabilities persist, including reliance on raw material exports and exposure to global commodity price fluctuations, which could hinder sustained ascent without diversification into higher-value . Mexico, benefiting from proximity to the and integration via the USMCA trade agreement, recorded a nominal GDP of $1.8 trillion in 2024 and anticipates 2.4% growth in 2025, bolstered by nearshoring trends amid U.S.- tensions. As a member, it wields influence in North American energy markets, with oil production exceeding 1.8 million barrels per day, though internal challenges like violence and fiscal deficits limit broader . identifies Mexico among the Next 11 economies poised for significant expansion, potentially ranking in the global top 10 by 2050 if reforms address rule-of-law weaknesses. Turkey, aspiring to bridge and the , projects a nominal GDP surpassing $1.1 trillion in 2025, elevating it to the world's 16th largest , fueled by 3.0% projections and a sector contributing over 20% to GDP. Its military expenditures, at $40 billion annually, support regional interventions in and , underscoring membership alongside independent maneuvers, such as energy deals with despite Western sanctions. Yet, chronic above 50% in recent years and currency depreciation undermine long-term stability, as evidenced by lira volatility eroding investor confidence. Vietnam emerges as a high-growth outlier, with 2025 GDP growth forecasted at 6.1%, propelled by export-led industrialization and inflows exceeding $20 billion yearly, shifting supply chains from . Its nominal GDP neared $450 billion in 2024, with and textiles dominating exports valued at over $370 billion. Geopolitically, balances U.S. partnerships—evident in upgraded comprehensive strategic ties in 2023—against disputes with , enhancing its through economic diplomacy. Structural risks include overreliance on low-wage labor and environmental strains from rapid , potentially capping ascent without technological upgrades. Nigeria, Africa's most populous nation at over 220 million, holds Africa's largest with a 2024 nominal GDP of $252 billion, though 2025 growth is tempered at 3.1% amid oil dependency, which accounts for 90% of exports despite diversification efforts into and tech hubs like Lagos' Yaba corridor. As a potential pan-African leader via , its military engages regional insurgencies, but issues, including indices ranking it 145th globally in 2024, impede broader influence. Inclusion in ' Next 11 underscores demographic dividends, with youth comprising 70% of the population driving urban consumption, yet insecurity and infrastructure deficits—power outages costing 4% of GDP annually—pose barriers to realizing power status.
Country2025 Projected GDP Growth (%)Nominal GDP 2024 (USD trillion)Key StrengthPrimary Challenge
4.91.4Resource exports, populationCommodity volatility
2.41.8Nearshoring, trade integrationSecurity and fiscal issues
3.01.1 (proj.), military reachInflation and currency woes
6.10.45FDI, export Labor and environmental costs
3.10.25Demographics, oil reservesGovernance and infrastructure
These nations, often grouped in frameworks like ' Next 11, demonstrate potential through demographic advantages and regional heft but face empirical hurdles in institutional quality and innovation, distinguishing them from core emerging powers with more entrenched global roles. Analyses from institutions like the IMF emphasize that while aggregate growth outpaces advanced economies, per capita income gaps—e.g., Indonesia's $5,000 versus the U.S. $80,000—underscore the peripheral nature of their current influence.

Challenges and Limitations

Economic Traps and Structural Barriers

Emerging powers frequently encounter the middle-income trap, where rapid initial growth stalls as reaches levels between $1,136 and $13,845 annually, preventing transition to high-income status. According to the World Bank's 2024 , 108 middle-income economies remained ensnared in this trap by the end of 2023, with only 34 having escaped since the 1990s through sustained productivity gains and innovation. Growth slowdowns occur more frequently in these countries than in low- or high-income peers, often due to from labor-intensive industrialization and failure to shift toward technology-driven sectors. For instance, and , key BRICS members, have seen per capita GDP stagnate or decline relative to global averages since the , hampered by low investment in and R&D. Resource dependency exacerbates structural vulnerabilities in many emerging powers, manifesting as the "resource curse" where abundant natural endowments correlate with slower diversification and economic volatility. In BRICS nations, empirical analyses reveal that oil and mineral price fluctuations negatively impact financial and , as seen in Russia's heavy reliance on exports, which accounted for over 40% of revenues in 2022 before sanctions intensified exposure. Similarly, Brazil and South Africa exhibit reduced dynamism and higher due to commodity booms crowding out , with studies confirming that resource rents fail to translate into broad-based productivity without institutional reforms. This curse perpetuates Dutch disease effects, appreciating currencies and undermining non-resource sectors, as evidenced by South Africa's manufacturing share dropping from 24% of GDP in 1990 to under 13% by 2023. High external debt levels pose another barrier, particularly through opaque lending practices that strain fiscal capacities without commensurate infrastructure returns. Developing countries, including several emerging powers, face $35 billion in debt service payments to alone in 2025, with the 75 most vulnerable nations owing a record $22 billion amid slowing global growth. While Chinese loans under initiatives like the Belt and Road have financed projects in and , repayment pressures have led to restructurings in cases like Sri Lanka's 2022 default, highlighting risks of overborrowing tied to non-concessional terms and limited transparency. Private creditors now dominate debt distress in some analyses, but combined public and hidden liabilities amplify crowding out of domestic investment, with IMF data showing debt service consuming over 20% of exports in 15 emerging economies by 2024. Institutional frailties, including pervasive and weak governance, further impede sustained growth by eroding investor confidence and misallocating resources. Cross-country regressions indicate that reduces GDP growth by 0.5-1% annually in low-governance emerging economies, primarily through distorted public spending and barriers to . In and , for example, corruption perceptions indices correlate with stagnant , as bribes and regulatory hurdles increase operational costs by up to 10% of firm revenues per enterprise surveys. Without robust property rights and , these barriers perpetuate , as observed in Russia's post-2014 stagnation where institutional decay amplified sanction impacts, limiting diversification beyond commodities. Empirical evidence underscores that higher corruption indices predict lower outputs, trapping economies in low-value activities despite demographic advantages.

Geopolitical and Internal Constraints

Emerging powers face significant geopolitical constraints stemming from their strained relations with established Western powers and internal rivalries within loose coalitions like . Western sanctions, particularly on following its 2022 invasion of , have curtailed access to global financial systems and technology, with oil and gas revenues—accounting for about 25% of Russia's federal budget—declining due to price caps and export restrictions implemented since December 2022. In 2025, additional U.S. and measures targeting Russian oil companies further pressured exports, which constitute roughly 9% of global supply, exacerbating economic isolation without fully halting trade via non-Western partners. These measures highlight how emerging powers' energy dependencies can be weaponized, limiting their ability to project influence independently. Regional tensions compound these external pressures, as seen in India-China border disputes and India's rivalry with , bolstered by China's strategic partnership. Clashes along the since 2020 have strained bilateral ties, with China's infrastructure investments in —part of the —enhancing Islamabad's military capabilities and encircling geopolitically. BRICS itself lacks cohesion due to such asymmetries, with members like resisting China-dominated agendas to preserve , preventing the bloc from functioning as a unified counterweight to dominance. Internally, demographic and governance challenges erode emerging powers' long-term potential. China's population declined for the first time in decades in 2022, accelerating an aging with a shrinking projected to reduce GDP growth by 0.5% annually over the next decade, compounded by low birth rates despite policy reversals from the one-child era. Resource scarcity and minimal further constrain Beijing's ambitions, as alone cannot offset the decline in reproductive-age women. In democratic emerging powers like and , entrenched corruption and inequality undermine stability and growth. 's Gini coefficient, reflecting extreme income disparity, persists amid scandals that have eroded institutional trust, while 's similar issues—exacerbated by under prior administrations—have fueled social unrest and hampered service delivery. These internal fractures, including divergent political systems within (democracies alongside autocracies), limit and expose vulnerabilities to populist . Overall, such constraints reveal that emerging powers' ascent is hindered not just by external opposition but by unresolved domestic fragilities that prioritize short-term survival over sustained .

Geopolitical Implications

Influence on Global Institutions

Emerging powers, particularly the nations (, , , , and , expanded in 2024 to include , , , , and the ), have sought to reshape global financial institutions like the (IMF) and by advocating for quota and voting reforms that better reflect their growing economic weights. In July 2025, BRICS finance ministers proposed a unified formula for IMF quotas emphasizing economic output adjusted for and currency relative values, aiming to reduce the dominance of Western shareholders. This builds on prior efforts, such as 's 2023 renewal of calls for reform amid stalled quota reviews, where the U.S. has resisted significant shifts that could dilute its power. Despite incremental gains—China's IMF quota share rose to 6.4% by 2023, making it the third-largest holder—emerging economies' combined voting power remains below 50%, limiting their ability to drive policy independently. To circumvent these constraints, emerging powers have established parallel institutions, notably the New Development Bank (NDB) launched by BRICS in 2014 and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) initiated by China in 2016. The NDB, with authorized capital of $100 billion, focuses on infrastructure financing in member states and has approved over $30 billion in projects by 2023, positioning itself as a counterweight to Western-led banks by prioritizing BRICS-led governance without U.S. or European vetoes. Similarly, the AIIB has disbursed $8.4 billion in project financing in 2024 alone, emphasizing sustainable infrastructure and attracting 109 members, including many from Europe, which has compelled the World Bank to accelerate lending and adopt more flexible procurement rules to remain competitive. These entities challenge the Bretton Woods system's perceived biases, though their scale—combined annual approvals under $20 billion—remains dwarfed by the World Bank's $60 billion-plus, underscoring limited immediate disruption but fostering long-term multipolarity. In the , emerging powers exert through financial contributions, peacekeeping deployments, and reform advocacy, with leading as the second-largest funder of the regular budget and peacekeeping operations, contributing over 15% of the latter and deploying the most troops among permanent Security Council members as of 2025. collectively pushes for Security Council expansion to include permanent seats for , , and possibly , arguing that the current structure—unchanged since 1945—fails to represent the global South's 85% population share. However, progress stalls due to consensus requirements; 's support for "broad consultations" emphasizes developing-country gains but opposes rapid changes that might strengthen rivals like or . In the (WTO), emerging powers like and have blocked reforms since 2019, leveraging their combined 30%+ trade share to demand special treatment for developing nations, though this has paralyzed and drawn criticism for entrenching inefficiencies. Overall, these efforts signal a shift toward diffused but face from established powers, yielding partial staffing gains (e.g., increased representation in WTO secretariat) without fundamental governance overhauls.

Interactions with Established Powers

Emerging powers engage established powers such as the and through a mix of , strategic rivalry, and diplomatic hedging, often balancing cooperation in trade against competition in security domains. While nations collectively advocate for multipolar alternatives to Western-dominated institutions, their interactions reveal divergent approaches: pursues assertive competition with the , India maintains by partnering selectively with Washington while preserving ties to and , and faces isolation via sanctions but pivots toward non-Western markets. These dynamics reflect causal pressures from resource dependencies and geopolitical ambitions rather than ideological unity. China's relations with the exemplify intense strategic competition overlaid on massive , which reached $575 billion in goods in 2023 despite escalating tariffs. The imposed tariffs on $300 billion of Chinese imports starting in 2018 under the administration, continued and expanded by Biden through measures targeting electric vehicles and semiconductors in , prompting Chinese retaliatory controls on rare earth exports critical for defense and tech industries. Recent 2025 developments include sanctions on Chinese entities amid talks in over agriculture and minerals, yet leverages its domestic industrial upgrades in green tech to outpace short-term disruptions, viewing the as a protracted contest favoring its state-directed long game. European interactions mirror this, with the EU imposing tariffs on EVs in while deepening energy dependencies post-Russia sanctions. India's engagements contrast with hedging: it has strengthened defense ties with the via the alliance—comprising the , , , and India—to counter Chinese influence in the , including joint exercises and $20 billion in US arms sales since 2008. Border clashes with in 2020, resulting in 20 Indian and an undisclosed number of Chinese fatalities, underscore rivalry, yet India imports $100 billion annually from and Russian oil discounted by sanctions, rejecting full alignment with Western sanctions on . This autonomy stems from India's non-aligned tradition and economic pragmatism, as evidenced by its abstention from UN votes condemning in 2022-2024, prioritizing growth over bloc confrontation. Russia's ties with the West have deteriorated sharply since the 2022 Ukraine invasion, with over 16,000 and sanctions by 2025 targeting its energy sector, including a oil price cap enforced from December 2022 that reduced revenues by 20-30% initially. However, adaptations like fleet shipping and rerouted exports to and mitigated impacts, with Russia's economy growing 3.6% in 2023 via military spending and Asian pivots, though long-term tech isolation hampers innovation. Putin has decried 2025 sanctions on and —accounting for over 5% of global oil—as "unfriendly acts" damaging bilateral relations, yet claims resilience without capitulation. and , meanwhile, pursue neutral commerce, exporting commodities to while joining expansions without endorsing anti-Western confrontation.

Future Trajectories

Pathways to Sustained Rise

Sustained economic ascent for emerging powers hinges on transitioning from resource-dependent or low-value manufacturing models to high-productivity, innovation-driven growth, as evidenced by the experiences of East Asian economies that escaped the middle-income trap through deliberate industrial policies and export orientation. Key enablers include broad-based diversification away from primary commodities, with empirical studies showing that countries achieving this via targeted industrial policies—such as subsidies for manufacturing and technology adoption—sustained GDP per capita growth rates above 4% for decades, unlike those reliant on extractive sectors prone to effects. For instance, Vietnam's integration into global value chains since the 1990s, bolstered by trade agreements like the CPTPP, propelled average annual growth to 6.5% from 2000 to 2023, underscoring the causal role of export-led strategies in building domestic capabilities. Human capital accumulation forms a foundational pathway, with cross-country analyses indicating that investments yielding secondary and enrollment rates exceeding 70% correlate with gains sufficient to evade slowdowns at middle-income thresholds around $10,000-15,000 GDP (2011 ). exemplifies this, where public spending on education rose to 4.1% of GDP by the 1970s, fostering a skilled that underpinned annual R&D expenditures reaching 4.8% of GDP by , enabling shifts from assembly to original in semiconductors and automobiles. Complementary institutional reforms, including macroeconomic stability via fiscal discipline and independent central banking, mitigate volatility; data from 101 middle-income countries (1960-2010) reveal that those maintaining below 5% and debt-to-GDP ratios under 60% were 2.5 times more likely to converge toward high-income status. Technological upgrading and (FDI) absorption further propel sustained rise, provided domestic policies localize knowledge spillovers rather than mere capital inflows. Empirical evidence from nations highlights that faster convergence occurs when FDI is paired with originality in patent filings and reduced technology cycle times, as seen in China's climb from 1% to 25% of global value-added (2000-2020) through state-directed R&D clusters. However, causal realism demands recognizing prerequisites like property rights enforcement, where governance indicators above the 50th percentile threshold predict 1-2% higher growth, distinguishing successes from stagnation cases. Ultimately, these pathways require political commitment to long-term horizons over short-term , as demographic dividends—youthful populations with dependency ratios below 50%—amplify returns only when channeled into productive , per IMF models projecting 1.5-2% GDP boosts per 10% employment rise in formal sectors.

Risks of Stagnation or Decline

Emerging powers face the middle-income trap, where growth slows after reaching incomes between $1,000 and $12,000, as exemplified by , , and , which accounted for over 40% of global middle-income population in 2023 but require structural reforms in , , and to advance to high-income status. identifies 108 such countries at risk, noting that without shifts toward technology-driven productivity and reduced reliance on low-skill manufacturing, these economies stagnate, as seen in Brazil's GDP growth averaging under 1% annually since 2010 despite resource wealth. Demographic pressures exacerbate stagnation risks, particularly in core BRICS nations like and , where fertility rates have fallen below replacement levels—China's at 1.0 in 2023—leading to shrinking workforces and rising dependency ratios projected to reach 50% by 2050, straining pension systems and reducing potential output growth to below 2% annually. In contrast, and grapple with youth bulges and high —youth joblessness exceeding 20% in South Africa as of 2024—fostering social instability without commensurate job creation, which could cap long-term GDP expansion if skill mismatches persist. High debt levels pose fiscal vulnerabilities, with emerging markets' external public debt service hitting $487 billion in 2023, and nations like and facing debt-to-GDP ratios over 80%, amplified by global interest rate hikes that could trigger defaults or measures curtailing . The IMF highlights that elevated borrowing in these economies, often denominated in foreign currencies, heightens rollover risks amid geopolitical tensions, potentially slowing growth by 1-2 percentage points in vulnerable cases through 2025. Corruption and weak further impede progress, with empirical analyses showing a negative correlation between corruption perception indices and GDP growth in countries over 1996-2022, where higher graft levels—such as Russia's score of 28/100 on Transparency International's 2024 index—divert resources from productive and erode investor confidence. In and , corruption scandals have correlated with investment drops of up to 15% in affected sectors, perpetuating inefficiency and hindering diversification from commodity dependence, which exposes economies like and to price volatility. Internal divisions and limited economic cohesion compound these issues, as intra-BRICS trade remains below 10% of members' total despite expansion, reflecting mismatched interests—China's dominance versus resource exporters' vulnerabilities—and policy coordination failures that undermine collective against external shocks. Geopolitical isolation, including sanctions on reducing its growth by an estimated 2-3% annually since 2022, risks broader bloc fragmentation, stalling shared initiatives like dedollarization amid persistent reliance on Western financial systems.

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