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Soft power

Soft power denotes the capacity of a nation or political entity to persuade others to adopt desired outcomes through the appeal of its culture, political values, and foreign policies, rather than through coercion or material inducements.^[1]^[2] The concept was introduced by political scientist Joseph S. Nye Jr. in his 1990 book Bound to Lead, challenging prevailing narratives of American decline by emphasizing non-military sources of influence.^[1] In contrast to hard power, which relies on military force or economic sanctions to compel compliance, soft power operates via attraction, enabling targets to voluntarily align with the influencer's objectives.^[3]^[4] Key resources for generating soft power include a country's cultural exports, such as media and education; its ideological commitments to principles like democracy and human rights; and the perceived legitimacy of its diplomatic conduct.^[5]^[6] For instance, the United States has historically leveraged Hollywood films, university prestige, and advocacy for open markets to foster global affinity, contributing to its post-Cold War preeminence despite relative economic shifts.^[5] While soft power has informed strategies in public diplomacy and cultural outreach, its efficacy remains contested due to challenges in empirical measurement and attribution of causal effects, as attraction's indirect pathways defy straightforward quantification.^[7] Critics argue the concept overstates intangible influence's potency against hard power's immediacy, particularly in crises where coercion proves decisive, and question whether it truly alters preferences or merely masks underlying self-interests.^[8]^[9] Nonetheless, Nye's framework has endured, evolving into discussions of "smart power"—a hybrid integrating both approaches—and influencing analyses of rising powers like China, whose Confucius Institutes and Belt and Road initiatives exemplify attempts to cultivate appeal amid coercive elements.^[10]^[11]

Origins and Conceptual Development

Coining and Early Formulation by Joseph Nye

Joseph S. Nye Jr. first introduced the term "soft power" in his 1990 book Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power, where he challenged prevailing narratives of U.S. decline by emphasizing non-coercive forms of influence in the emerging post-Cold War international order.^[1] In the same year, Nye elaborated the concept in his article "Soft Power" published in Foreign Policy (No. 80, Autumn 1990, pp. 153–171), defining it as the ability of a country to achieve its goals through attraction and persuasion rather than through command or coercion.^[12] This formulation arose in the context of the Soviet Union's weakening grip and the anticipated U.S. predominance, where Nye argued that military and economic "hard power" alone would prove insufficient for sustaining global leadership amid increasing interdependence and complex challenges.^[5] Nye distinguished soft power as a form of co-optation, rooted in the appeal of a nation's culture, political ideals, and policies, which shape the preferences of others voluntarily.^[12] He identified key resources including cultural attractions (such as Hollywood films and popular music that exported American lifestyles), ideological values like democracy and human rights, and the legitimacy of foreign policies perceived as principled rather than self-serving.^[13] In contrast to traditional balance-of-power strategies reliant on threats, Nye posited that soft power enabled the U.S. to foster alliances and influence without overextending its military, drawing on historical precedents like Britain's 19th-century cultural exports but tailored to the unipolar dynamics following the Cold War's end.^[12] Nye further developed these ideas in his 2004 book Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, where he reiterated the core mechanisms while applying them to contemporary U.S. foreign policy challenges, such as countering anti-American sentiments post-9/11. Here, he exemplified soft power's operation through America's global cultural dominance—evident in the widespread emulation of U.S. consumer brands and educational institutions—and its promotion of democratic governance, which contrasted with coercive alternatives and helped legitimize interventions like NATO expansion.^[13] Nye cautioned, however, that soft power's effectiveness depended on credibility; hypocritical policies could erode attraction, underscoring the need for alignment between rhetoric and action in the post-Cold War era.^[14] In 2004, Joseph Nye expanded his conceptualization of soft power in the book Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, integrating it with hard power into the hybrid strategy of "smart power" to address multifaceted global challenges more effectively.^[13] This refinement responded to post-Cold War complexities, emphasizing that while soft power relies on attraction through culture, political values, and foreign policy, its efficacy increases when calibrated with coercive elements, avoiding overreliance on military might alone.^[14] The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks further underscored these adaptations, as the emergence of transnational terrorism revealed the insufficiency of pure attraction models in countering ideological extremism, prompting arguments for soft power's role in winning hearts and minds alongside hard power interventions.^[15] ^[16] Scholarly extensions in the mid-2000s built on Nye's framework by emphasizing public diplomacy's relational dynamics. Jan Melissen's 2005 edited volume The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations advocated for a shift from state-centric broadcasting to interactive, network-based engagement with foreign publics, viewing public diplomacy as a core mechanism for cultivating soft power in an era of fragmented global audiences.^[17] This approach highlighted diplomacy's evolution toward mutual influence rather than unidirectional persuasion, adapting soft power to decentralized information flows.^[18] Critiques also refined the concept's theoretical boundaries. In her 2005 article "Why 'Soft Power' Isn't So Soft," Janice Bially Mattern challenged the portrayal of soft power as non-coercive, positing that it functions through "representational force"—a sociolinguistic process that constructs attraction via shared narratives, potentially compelling adherence akin to harder forms of influence.^[19] This perspective revealed soft power's latent coercive potential, where attraction emerges not merely from voluntary appeal but from normative pressures embedded in discourse.^[20] By the 2010s, discussions incorporated hybrid economic instruments, such as development aid, as bridges between soft and hard power, often framed as intermediate strategies that leverage material incentives to foster long-term attraction.^[21] These evolutions reflected geopolitical shifts toward interdependence, where pure soft power models yielded to pragmatic blends addressing both ideational and resource-based causal pathways in influence exertion.^[22]

Integration with Broader Power Theories

Soft power has been positioned within liberal institutionalist frameworks, where it complements theories of complex interdependence, as developed by Robert Keohane and Joseph S. Nye in their 1977 analysis of how transnational ties and institutions mitigate zero-sum conflicts by fostering mutual vulnerabilities and cooperative gains.^[23] In this view, soft power's mechanisms of attraction—through cultural exports and normative alignment—reinforce regime stability and long-term compliance without direct coercion, aligning with Keohane's emphasis on issue-specific regimes that evolve from interdependent preferences rather than power hierarchies.^[24] This integration posits soft power as an enabler of institutional liberalism, where shared values and information flows reduce transaction costs in international bargaining, evidenced by the expansion of economic forums like the World Trade Organization since the 1990s.^[25] In contrast, realist theories, particularly John Mearsheimer's offensive realism, critique soft power as peripheral in an anarchic system where states pursue relative gains through military and economic capabilities, viewing attraction-based influence as unreliable against existential threats. Mearsheimer argues in The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (2001) that great powers maximize power amid uncertainty, rendering soft power's ideational appeals subordinate to hard power's tangible deterrence, as historical patterns of conquest—from ancient empires to 20th-century wars—demonstrate coercion's primacy over persuasion in security dilemmas.^[26] This skepticism underscores a zero-sum orientation, where soft power fails to alter core behaviors like balancing against hegemons, as seen in China's military buildup despite Western cultural outreach.^[27] Debates have extended to "sharp power," a term coined by Christopher Walker and Jessica Ludwig in 2017 to denote authoritarian tactics that manipulate open societies' information ecosystems, diverging from soft power's organic attraction by prioritizing disruption and control.^[28] Unlike Nye's model, sharp power—exemplified by Russia's 2016 election interference and China's Confucius Institutes' selective narratives—erodes independent discourse without genuine appeal, reflecting autocracies' rejection of liberal pluralism in favor of illiberal projection.^[29] From a causal realist standpoint, soft power functions primarily as a force multiplier for hard power rather than an independent driver, with empirical patterns in alliance formation showing that cultural affinity bolsters military pacts only when underwritten by credible deterrence, as in NATO's endurance post-1949 through U.S. commitments blending values with nuclear guarantees.^[30] Studies of post-Cold War coalitions reveal that states with high soft power metrics, like the U.S., sustain alliances longer when pairing attraction with economic aid and bases, but soft power alone—absent hard backing—yields limited adherence, as evidenced by failed European-led interventions in Libya (2011) lacking U.S. enforcement.^[31] This interdependence highlights soft power's contingent efficacy, amplifying outcomes in symmetric relationships but proving brittle in high-stakes rivalries.^[8]

Core Definition and Distinctions

Fundamental Definition and Mechanisms

Soft power constitutes the ability of a state or other actor to achieve desired outcomes by shaping the preferences of others through attraction and persuasion, rather than through coercion, threats, or material inducements. This form of influence relies on the voluntary alignment of target audiences with the actor's goals, as they come to desire what the actor wants due to the perceived legitimacy, appeal, or moral authority of its culture, political values, and policies. As defined by Joseph Nye, soft power co-opts people rather than commands them, generating behavioral changes rooted in internal conviction rather than external pressure.^[6]^[3] At its core, soft power operates via two principal mechanisms: ideational diffusion and relational network building. Ideational diffusion involves the spread of norms, values, and cultural artifacts—such as media exports, educational systems, or governance models—that embed attractive paradigms in foreign societies, prompting emulation without mandate. For instance, the dissemination of liberal democratic norms has led to observable policy adoptions, including constitutional reforms in post-colonial states mirroring elements of Western frameworks due to their demonstrated efficacy in fostering prosperity and stability. Relational building, conversely, fosters enduring trust through consistent, credible actions that signal reliability, such as multilateral diplomacy or humanitarian initiatives, which cultivate networks of goodwill and reduce resistance to influence over time.^[32]^[33] These mechanisms yield verifiable effects distinguishable by the absence of compulsion, with success measured through empirical indicators like the rate of unsolicited policy convergence or cultural adoption. Causal realism underscores that attraction must precede behavioral change, as evidenced by econometric analyses linking exposure to influential models—via trade, migration, or information flows—to subsequent institutional reforms, rather than to enforced compliance metrics such as treaty signings under duress.^[1]^[34]

Contrast with Hard Power and Coercion

Hard power encompasses coercive strategies that compel other actors to comply through tangible threats or incentives, primarily military force—such as invasions or deterrence operations—and economic measures like sanctions that inflict costs to alter behavior.^[5] These approaches yield rapid, short-term results but are resource-intensive, often provoking backlash or long-term resistance due to their reliance on overt domination.^[35] Soft power, conversely, functions non-coercively by cultivating attraction to a state's values, culture, and policies, thereby aligning others' self-interests with its own without compulsion or payment, fostering legitimacy through voluntary emulation rather than enforced submission.^[5] This distinction underscores soft power's emphasis on endogenous preference formation over exogenous imposition, though its mechanisms demand time to build enduring influence absent the immediacy of hard power tactics.^[35] Debates on substitutability reveal soft power's limitations as a standalone tool, with critics arguing it derives credibility from underlying hard power capabilities rather than operating independently. Historian Niall Ferguson, for example, dismissed soft power as insufficient for core national interests without the "iron hand" of coercion, positing that U.S. cultural exports gained traction post-World War II only because military hegemony—evident in the 1945 atomic bombings and occupation of Japan—projected irresistible resolve, making ideological appeals credible.^[36]^[27] Empirical cases affirm this causal linkage: In the Vietnam War (1955–1975), U.S. hard power shortcomings—marked by over 58,000 American deaths, domestic protests, and the 1975 fall of Saigon—eroded global perceptions of American competence and morality, blunting the appeal of concurrent soft power assets like jazz diplomacy and Hollywood despite their prior resonance in Asia and Europe.^[10]^[37] Joseph Nye, soft power's originator, has noted such military failures directly undermine attractiveness by signaling policy incoherence, rendering cultural inducements ineffective against hardened opposition.^[10] Thus, while soft power may amplify hard power outcomes, it rarely substitutes for them in high-stakes coercion scenarios where attraction alone cannot deter aggression or enforce compliance.^[35]

Sources and Pillars of Soft Power

Joseph Nye identifies three principal sources of soft power: a country's culture, its political values, and its foreign policies.^[38] Culture generates attraction when its elements—such as artistic outputs, educational systems, or lifestyle appeals—are perceived as desirable by foreign audiences, fostering voluntary emulation rather than imposed adoption.^[5] Political values contribute when a nation credibly embodies ideals like democratic governance or individual liberties, creating aspirational pull that aligns others' preferences with its own without coercion.^[3] Foreign policies enhance soft power to the extent they are viewed as legitimate, morally coherent, and oriented toward multilateral cooperation rather than unilateral dominance.^[39] These pillars are interdependent, such that deficiencies in one can erode the others; for instance, foreign policies perceived as hypocritical—contradicting publicly espoused political values—undermine cultural appeal by signaling inauthenticity, thereby dissipating overall attraction.^[40] Nye emphasizes that soft power arises from genuine perceived utility and alignment with recipients' interests, not manipulative propaganda, which often backfires by eroding credibility.^[41] Empirical studies support this causal linkage indirectly through correlations between cultural exports and favorable international perceptions, though isolating soft power's independent effects remains challenging due to confounding variables like economic ties.^[42] Critics note that while Nye's framework conceptually delineates these sources, real-world application reveals caveats: cultural attraction can stem from superficial novelty rather than deep value resonance, and political values' efficacy depends on consistent domestic implementation, as lapses invite skepticism.^[7] Foreign policies' soft power yield is contingent on contextual legitimacy, with unilateral actions historically correlating with diminished global favorability in surveys of elite opinions.^[1] Overall, the pillars' potency hinges on authenticity, as fabricated appeals fail to sustain long-term preference shifts, per analyses of influence mechanisms.^[43]

Theoretical Underpinnings and Causal Realism

First-Principles Analysis of Attraction

Attraction in the context of soft power emerges from a foundational mechanism of rational self-interest, whereby actors—states, elites, or societies—voluntarily adopt foreign cultural, ideological, or institutional elements only if they demonstrably enhance instrumental goals such as prosperity, security, or organizational efficiency. This process rejects idealistic notions of inherent appeal, instead grounding emulation in a realist calculus of comparative utility: foreign models succeed when their causal pathways to outcomes (e.g., sustained economic expansion via market-oriented norms) outperform domestic alternatives in replicable, observable ways.^[44] Empirical disparities in growth rates, with capitalist frameworks averaging higher GDP per capita gains across adopting economies since the 19th century, illustrate how perceived superiority drives preference formation over coerced alignment.^[44] The causal sequence proceeds sequentially: initial exposure through diffusion channels (e.g., education, media, or diplomatic ties) prompts evaluative scrutiny against local benchmarks, leading to emulation solely if the model's logic aligns with self-perceived needs and yields verifiable advantages. This chain hinges on autonomy, fracturing under suspicions of ulterior motives or cultural hegemony, which reframes attraction as imposition and erodes voluntary uptake. Behavioral psychology underpins this, as cognitive assessments prioritize outcome predictability over abstract admiration, ensuring soft power's efficacy remains contingent on transparent causal realism rather than manipulative narratives.^[45] Dominant relativist paradigms, often amplified in academia despite systemic ideological skews toward equivalence across systems, undermine this logic by de-emphasizing hierarchical outcomes in favor of normative parity, yet historical precedents contradict such views. Roman law's persistence into modern civil codes, for instance, stemmed from its rational structuring of imperial-scale administration and property rights, enabling adaptable governance that subsequent polities emulated for its proven durability over two millennia, not relativistic tolerance.^[46] Confidence in a model's empirical edge, rather than concessions to diversity as ends in themselves, thus sustains attraction's causal potency, as diluted assertions fail to convince rational evaluators of net benefits.^[47]

Empirical Validation and Causal Pathways

Empirical studies have sought to validate soft power's mechanisms by examining correlations between national favorability ratings and support for associated policies or alliances. For instance, Pew Research Center surveys from the early 2000s documented peak U.S. favorability in many countries following the post-9/11 solidarity period, with median favorable views reaching 70% or higher in Europe and parts of Asia, which aligned with increased public backing for U.S.-led initiatives like counterterrorism coalitions. This correlation weakened post-2003 Iraq invasion, as favorability dropped sharply—e.g., from 83% in Poland in 2002 to 62% by 2004—coinciding with reduced policy acquiescence in multilateral forums. Such patterns suggest soft power's role in shaping preferences, though researchers note these links as associative rather than strictly causal without controls for economic or security factors.^[48] Causal pathways often operate through network effects, where cultural exports via media and diaspora communities diffuse attractive values, fostering voluntary alignment. Diaspora networks, for example, amplify homeland influence by embedding cultural norms in host societies, as seen in Indian expatriates promoting Bollywood and tech entrepreneurship in the U.S., which has correlated with policy shifts favoring India in trade and immigration.^[49] Media pathways similarly propagate narratives; international broadcasting like the BBC World Service has been linked to improved UK favorability in surveyed regions, with audience exposure predicting higher support for British foreign policy positions by 10-15% in panel data analyses.^[50] These networks create feedback loops, where initial attraction via entertainment or education leads to mimetic adoption of governance models, quantifiable through social network analysis in international relations literature. In international relations, diffusion models further trace soft power's causality by modeling policy convergence as a function of perceived attractiveness rather than coercion. For EU aspirants like those in the Western Balkans, econometric studies using gravity models show that alignment with EU norms—e.g., judicial reforms and market liberalization—occurs via ideational emulation, with soft power indicators (cultural ties, elite exchanges) explaining up to 20% of variance in adoption rates beyond economic incentives.^[51] Complementary research on "soft channels" of diffusion highlights exemplary emulation, where aspirants benchmark against EU success stories, leading to observable convergence in environmental and human rights policies without formal conditionality.^[52] However, establishing unconfounded causality remains challenging, as soft power effects are frequently entangled with hard power confounders; in Europe, for instance, NATO's security umbrella has driven alignment more deterministically than U.S. cultural appeal alone, with regression discontinuities revealing that military commitments explain 40-50% of variance in pro-Western orientations post-Cold War.^[8] This interdependence underscores the need for instrumental variable approaches in future validations to isolate attraction's independent contribution.^[53]

Interdependence with Military and Economic Leverage

Soft power's efficacy is contingent upon the foundational support of military and economic hard power, as acknowledged by its originator Joseph Nye, who in 2011 emphasized that "command power" (hard power) can paradoxically generate "co-optive power" (soft power) by establishing credibility and security contexts conducive to attraction. This interdependence counters narratives portraying soft power as autonomous; instead, it amplifies when backed by demonstrable strength, as seen in the post-World War II era where U.S. economic aid via the Marshall Plan—totaling $13 billion from 1948 to 1952—fostered European goodwill only because it was underwritten by American military supremacy, including a nuclear monopoly until 1949 that deterred Soviet expansion. Without such backing, aid risks being perceived as weakness rather than benevolence. Realist theorists, including Stephen Walt, contend that soft power operates as an epiphenomenon of hard power, deriving apparent influence from the underlying coercion and deterrence that hard resources provide, rather than independently shaping preferences.^[54] Empirical patterns in alliances substantiate this: NATO's cohesion, often attributed to U.S. cultural appeal, hinges on Article 5's military guarantee, with data showing alliance persistence correlates more strongly with defense expenditures—U.S. military spending reached $877 billion in 2022, dwarfing peers—than intangible attractions alone. Détente enables soft power's cultivation; absent it, attraction falters amid survival imperatives, as first-principles causal analysis reveals preferences form under the shadow of potential force. Instances of diminished hard power engagement reveal soft power's vulnerability. The Obama administration's "leading from behind" strategy, articulated in 2011 Libya intervention and Iraq troop drawdown to zero by 2011, prioritized multilateral restraint over unilateral projection, yet this retraction—coupled with non-intervention in Syria's 2013 chemical attacks—engendered vacuums exploited by ISIS, whose territorial caliphate expanded to control 88,000 square kilometers by 2014, eroding U.S. regional allure as allies questioned resolve.^[55] Such outcomes underscore that soft power's persuasive mechanisms presuppose hard power's restraint of chaos, preventing adversarial hard power from supplanting cooperative dynamics.^[56]

Measurement and Quantification Efforts

Key Soft Power Indices and Methodologies

The Brand Finance Global Soft Power Index, first published in 2021 and expanded in subsequent years to encompass all 193 United Nations member states, quantifies soft power via perceptual data from surveys of over 170,000 respondents across more than 100 countries.^[57] Its methodology aggregates 55 metrics into scores out of 100, organized across three pillars—familiarity and reputation (e.g., business and trade, culture and heritage, media and communications), and influence (e.g., diplomacy and trade, education and science, sustainable future)—to evaluate how nations shape global preferences.^[58] The 2025 edition ranks the United States first with a score reflecting sustained leadership in reputation and influence, followed by China in second place after overtaking the United Kingdom, highlighting shifts driven by economic and cultural projections.^[59] In contrast, the International Monetary Fund's Global Soft Power Index (GSPI), detailed in a October 2024 working paper, employs an objective, data-driven approach with 29 indicators spanning six dimensions: culture (e.g., UNESCO heritage sites, international awards), education (e.g., tertiary enrollment rates, student mobility), engagement (e.g., tourism arrivals, migrant stock), enterprise (e.g., exports of goods/services, foreign direct investment), digital (e.g., internet users, secure servers), and governance (e.g., voice/accountability, rule of law indices).^[60] Covering a broad sample of countries over multiple decades, the GSPI aggregates these via principal component analysis to produce composite scores, enabling longitudinal comparisons less susceptible to survey biases and emphasizing verifiable socioeconomic outcomes over subjective perceptions.^[61] Preceding these, the Portland Soft Power 30 index, developed by Portland Communications from 2015 to 2019 in collaboration with entities like Facebook and ComRes, ranked the top 30 nations using a hybrid methodology blending objective data (e.g., Olympic medals, Nobel prizes) and polls in five categories: government (e.g., policy outputs, international alliances), culture (e.g., music/film exports), diplomacy (e.g., aid contributions), education (e.g., university rankings), and business/innovation (e.g., patents, corporate brands). This framework influenced successors like Brand Finance's index, which adopted broader coverage while noting trends such as the Gulf region's ascent, where nations like Qatar leverage media platforms (e.g., Al Jazeera's global reach) and investment funds to amplify influence in engagement and enterprise pillars.^[62]

Challenges in Empirical Assessment

Assessing the empirical impact of soft power encounters fundamental difficulties due to its intangible and indirect mechanisms, which resist direct quantification and often conflate perceptual data with causal influence. Existing metrics predominantly depend on subjective surveys gauging foreign publics' favorability toward a country's culture, values, or policies, yet these fail to verify whether such attitudes translate into tangible behavioral changes, such as policy concessions or alliance shifts.^[61]^[62] For instance, self-reported admiration does not reliably predict compliance or preference formation, as respondents' biases, cultural familiarity, or transient media exposure can inflate scores without evidencing deeper attraction.^[63] This subjectivity is compounded by opaque methodologies in many indices, where weighting of factors like governance or education lacks standardization, introducing potential evaluator biases toward Western democratic norms.^[64] Distinguishing causation from mere correlation further undermines empirical rigor, as elevated soft power attributions frequently overlap with hard power residues, obscuring isolated effects. Critics contend that nations scoring highly in soft power, such as Japan, often benefit from economic spillovers—where prosperity enables global cultural dissemination (e.g., via exported media like anime)—rather than attraction deriving solely from ideational appeal.^[65] Such entanglements make it arduous to isolate soft power's independent role, as econometric analyses reveal that trade volumes and GDP per capita strongly predict perceptual favorability, suggesting reverse or bidirectional causality rather than pure soft influence.^[66] Longitudinal data gaps exacerbate these issues, with scant randomized or quasi-experimental studies tracking soft power's pathways over time to establish causality. Nye's framework, while foundational, has drawn detractors for its limited predictive utility; for example, pre-Arab Spring assessments of Western soft power's appeal in the Middle East did not foresee authoritarian resilience or backlash against perceived cultural impositions, highlighting failures in forecasting preference shifts amid crisis.^[8] This scarcity of robust, time-series evidence leaves assessments vulnerable to post-hoc rationalizations, where correlations in polling data are misinterpreted as causal successes without controlling for confounding variables like security alliances or economic aid.^[67]

Comparative Rankings and Trends

The Brand Finance Global Soft Power Index 2025 ranks the United States first overall with a score of 79.5, maintaining its lead amid China's ascent to second place after overtaking the United Kingdom for the first time.^[68] ^[69] China's score has risen consistently since the index's inception in 2020, particularly in the business and trade pillar, narrowing the gap with the US through enhanced perceptions of economic influence and familiarity.^[70] European powers like the UK (third) and Germany (fifth) exhibit stability in absolute terms but relative decline as Asian nations advance, with Japan's fourth-place ranking underscoring regional shifts.^[57] South Korea climbed three positions to 12th in the 2025 index, marking it as the fastest-improver among the top 100 nations, driven by cultural exports such as K-pop and media that boost global familiarity and engagement.^[59] India, while ranking 28th in 2023 assessments, has similarly gained traction through Bollywood's international reach and a expansive diaspora, contributing to incremental rises in cultural perception metrics across indices from 2020 onward.^[71] These trends highlight Asia's growing soft power footprint, with consistency observed in parallel measures like the HEPI/Kaplan Soft-Power Index for higher education, where US institutions dominate leader education (paralleling national rankings) and Asian universities show rising influence.^[72] In regional developments, Gulf states have advanced notably; the United Arab Emirates rose from 18th in 2020 to 10th in 2025, with Expo 2020 Dubai accounting for over 60% of its 2023 score gain through enhanced tourism and branding perceptions.^[73] ^[74] ^[75] Conversely, Russia, holding 16th in 2025 despite widespread Western condemnation, has seen a marked decline in soft power post its February 2022 Ukraine invasion, with global approval ratings stagnating at 21-22% and losses in diplomatic and cultural influence.^[59] ^[76] ^[77] These shifts align across indices, reflecting empirical perception data from over 170,000 respondents in Brand Finance surveys.^[78]

Effectiveness, Achievements, and Empirical Outcomes

Documented Successes in Shaping Preferences

Empirical studies indicate that U.S. foreign aid allocations correlate with increased alignment of recipient countries' votes in the United Nations General Assembly on key issues, demonstrating soft power's role in influencing state preferences through economic incentives tied to cultural and diplomatic appeal. For instance, analysis of voting data from 1973 to 1984 revealed that aid induced compliance on vital resolutions, with recipients adjusting positions to match U.S. stances more frequently following disbursements.^[79] Similar patterns hold in broader datasets, where aid from major donors, including the U.S., predicts voting coincidence rates exceeding 70% on contested matters, beyond mere colonial or alliance ties.^[80] Japan's post-World War II economic model, characterized by state-guided industrialization and export promotion, was emulated across Asia, shaping developmental preferences and bolstering non-coercive alliances. Countries such as South Korea and Indonesia adopted analogous strategies, leading to rapid growth phases that aligned their economic policies with Japanese norms, as documented in regional trade and investment patterns from the 1960s onward.^[81] Japan's Official Development Assistance (ODA), emphasizing infrastructure and technical transfers, further reinforced this emulation, with recipient surveys showing elevated favorability and policy convergence in East Asia by the 1990s.^[82] France's Francophonie initiatives, combining linguistic cultural promotion with aid, have sustained influence over preferences in former colonies, particularly in Africa, where member states exhibit higher UN voting alignment on Paris-favored resolutions compared to non-Francophone peers. Quantitative reviews of aid flows post-Cold War link these programs to diplomatic support, with Francophone nations voting in line with French positions at rates 15-20% above global averages on cultural and security issues.^[83] This effect persists despite economic critiques, as cultural affinity amplifies aid's persuasive leverage.^[84]

Quantifiable Impacts on Policy and Alliances

Empirical analyses have demonstrated that higher soft power rankings correlate with increased foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows, accounting for approximately 34% of the variation in global FDI patterns, as soft power fosters preferences for economic alignment and policy compatibility.^[85] Similarly, soft power explains up to 60% of variations in international trade flows, where favorable perceptions encourage trading partners to adopt compatible regulatory frameworks and reduce barriers, distinct from coercive tariff pressures.^[85] System GMM estimations in cross-country studies further confirm a positive and statistically significant effect of soft power on inward FDI, controlling for economic fundamentals, suggesting causal pathways through enhanced investor confidence in governance and cultural affinity.^[86] In alliance formation, soft power has underpinned voluntary integrations, as evidenced by the 2004 NATO enlargement, which added seven Eastern European states—Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia—alongside the EU's accession of ten countries, driven by aspirants' attraction to Western democratic norms and prosperity models rather than solely security inducements. Pre-enlargement Pew Research surveys indicated majority favorable views of the United States in key Eastern European nations, such as over 70% in Poland and Hungary by the early 2000s, correlating with public support for NATO membership as a pathway to integration with perceived cultural and institutional successes. This attraction-based dynamic contrasts with coercive alliances, yielding more stable commitments, as quantitative alliance duration models show ideational alignment extending partnership longevity by factors of 1.5 to 2 times compared to purely strategic pacts.^[87] On specific policies, U.S. cultural soft power via Hollywood has facilitated global adoption of intellectual property (IP) norms, with empirical evidence from network analysis of IP rule diffusion showing socialization effects—where exposure to U.S. media increases acceptance of stringent IP standards—quantified as a 20-30% higher likelihood of policy convergence in high-exposure countries.^[88] This is reflected in trade data where nations strengthening IP laws post-1990s cultural influxes experienced 15-25% rises in bilateral U.S. exports, linking media-induced preferences to enforceable policy shifts like TRIPS compliance.^[89] Such impacts underscore soft power's role in embedding durable, non-coerced alignments through preference shaping.^[90]

Long-Term vs. Short-Term Efficacy

Soft power's efficacy manifests primarily through the gradual internalization of attractive values, norms, and cultural elements, fostering sustained influence that outlasts coercive measures employed by hard power. Joseph Nye has observed that while military force can secure short-term territorial or strategic gains, maintaining post-conflict stability requires the attraction-based mechanisms of soft power to shape preferences and legitimacy over time.^[13] Empirical analyses confirm this temporal distinction, with hard power interventions correlating to immediate behavioral compliance but often eroding without complementary soft power to embed enduring alignments.^[91] In the long term, soft power's embedded cultural and institutional legacies demonstrate resilience beyond the decline of originating empires. For instance, the English common law system, disseminated through British colonial administration, persists in over 50 former colonies, influencing contemporary legal frameworks, economic development, and governance structures decades after independence.^[92] Studies of colonial legacies reveal that such legal origins from British rule correlate with higher commitments to rule of law and institutional stability, effects that econometric models attribute to path-dependent cultural transmission rather than ongoing coercion.^[93] This contrasts with hard power's ephemerality, as evidenced by the outlasting of common law traditions amid the dissolution of the British Empire by 1997.^[94] Short-term applications of soft power face constraints in acute crises, where immediate tangible benefits—such as material aid—generate goodwill more rapidly than ideational appeals alone. During the COVID-19 pandemic, vaccine distribution initiatives functioned as soft power tools by associating donors with lifesaving outcomes, yielding measurable upticks in favorable perceptions within months, faster than protracted cultural diplomacy.^[95] However, pure attraction-based efforts, like rhetorical endorsements of values, exhibited slower impact, underscoring soft power's reliance on time for preference formation amid urgency.^[96] Time-series analyses further validate soft power's lagged causal pathways, particularly in broader societal transformations like democratization waves. Cross-national panel data from 1960 to 2020 indicate that exposure to attractive democratic norms via media and education precedes measurable democratic transitions by 5–10 years, with Granger causality tests showing unidirectional effects from soft power proxies to regime change indicators.^[97] In counterinsurgency contexts, vector autoregression models of incident data reveal soft power's contributions to sustained reductions in violence emerge after 2–5 years, following initial hard power suppressions, highlighting its role in preventive consolidation rather than instantaneous deterrence.^[91] These dynamics affirm soft power's comparative advantage in durable outcomes, contingent on initial hard power stabilization.

Criticisms, Limitations, and Failures

Conceptual Vagueness and Overhyping

Critics contend that the concept of soft power suffers from inherent vagueness, as its core idea of achieving influence through attraction rather than coercion encompasses such a broad array of phenomena—from cultural exports to diplomatic rhetoric—that it becomes analytically imprecise and resistant to falsification.^[98] Joseph Nye's original formulation, introduced in 1990, defines soft power as the ability to shape preferences via culture, political values, and foreign policies, yet this elasticity allows proponents to retroactively attribute nearly any favorable international outcome to soft power mechanisms without specifying causal pathways.^[99] Realist scholars like Christopher Layne argue this renders the concept "unbearably light," lacking the substantive weight to distinguish genuine attraction from mere acquiescence to underlying hard power imbalances or self-interested calculations by target states.^[98] This vagueness facilitates overhyping, particularly in the post-Cold War period when optimism about a unipolar liberal order led to exaggerated claims that soft power could supplant or diminish the primacy of military and economic coercion.^[100] Nye's framework gained prominence amid assumptions of enduring U.S. hegemony through ideational appeal, yet empirical instances reveal soft power's limited standalone efficacy; for example, despite the global dominance of American popular culture—with Hollywood films grossing over $40 billion annually in international markets by the early 2000s—such attraction failed to generate acquiescence to U.S. policy goals in the Middle East.^[99] The 2003 Iraq invasion, undertaken against widespread international opposition, encountered fierce local resistance despite pre-existing cultural familiarity with U.S. media, underscoring how soft power neither prevented conflict nor sustained post-intervention stability without hard power enforcement.^[101] Realist critiques emphasize that soft power's purported independence ignores causal realities where attraction often derives from or reinforces hard power foundations, rendering inflated narratives—prevalent in policy-oriented academia—a distraction from verifiable determinants of influence.^[8] Post-Cold War U.S. experiences, including stalled democratization efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan despite billions invested in cultural and aid programs, demonstrate soft power as an adjunct at best, not a panacea; data from alliance formations and trade negotiations show correlations with economic-military leverage far outweighing isolated ideational factors.^[99] This overemphasis, sometimes echoed in institutionally biased analyses favoring multilateral diplomacy over unilateral strength, has empirically underperformed against state behaviors driven by security dilemmas and balance-of-power dynamics.^[98]

Dependence on Hard Power Foundations

Critics of soft power theory, including historian Niall Ferguson, contend that its efficacy is not autonomous but contingent upon the underlying credibility of a state's hard power capabilities, such as military deterrence and economic coercion, which provide the enforcement mechanism for attractive narratives.^[36] Without this foundation, attempts at persuasion falter, as observed in historical instances where diminished hard power projection eroded perceived legitimacy and voluntary alignment.^[65] For example, following the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam in 1975, the subsequent "Vietnam syndrome"—a reluctance to commit military force—correlated with a temporary decline in American global appeal, as allies in Europe and Asia questioned Washington's resolve and reliability, reducing the persuasive pull of its cultural and ideological exports.^[102] In autocratic regimes, efforts to project "sharp power"—coercive manipulation disguised as attraction—further illustrate this dependence, as such tactics lack intrinsic legitimacy and require hard power backstops to prevent backlash or defection.^[103] Sharp power, as defined by analysts at the National Endowment for Democracy, operates in the informational and civil society spheres but fails to generate genuine soft power because it suppresses openness, leading to skepticism rather than emulation; without accompanying military or economic threats to enforce compliance, these initiatives often provoke resistance, as seen in recipient countries' rejection of opaque influence operations.^[104] Joseph Nye himself acknowledges that sharp power undermines true soft power by prioritizing control over appeal, implying that autocracies' inability to decouple the two reveals soft power's reliance on a credible hard power posture for validation.^[105] The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), launched by China in 2013, exemplifies how purported soft power gains through infrastructure aid are undermined by perceptions of predatory intent when unbolstered by overt military deterrence, fostering "debt-trap" narratives that erode trust.^[106] In cases like Sri Lanka's 2017 handover of the Hambantota port after defaulting on BRI loans totaling over $1.5 billion, recipient governments and publics viewed the projects not as benevolent development but as leverage for geopolitical concessions, highlighting how economic inducements alone fail to sustain attraction absent a hard power shadow to deter alternatives.^[107] Analyses from the Council on Foreign Relations note that such opacity and opacity in lending—often non-transparent terms exceeding $1 trillion across 140+ countries—amplifies sovereignty concerns, converting potential soft power into reputational costs and reinforcing the causal link to hard power credibility.^[108]

Real-World Shortcomings and Counterexamples

In the Middle East, U.S. cultural exports via Hollywood and media have not curbed entrenched anti-Western hostility or terrorism, even alongside substantial foreign aid; for example, portrayals of Arabs as terrorists in films reinforced stereotypes rather than building affinity, coinciding with attacks like those post-9/11 despite regional exposure to American entertainment.^[109]^[110] Similarly, U.S. aid exceeding $2 billion annually to Middle East and North Africa partners has failed to translate into reduced adversarial sentiment or alignment, as regional recoveries remain fragile amid ongoing instability.^[111] Russia's RT network, funded by the state at over $300 million annually, has backfired as overt propaganda, fostering distrust rather than appeal; global surveys show fewer than half of respondents in 33 countries viewing Russia favorably in 2019, with RT's narratives dismissed amid perceptions of bias.^[112] China's Confucius Institutes, numbering over 500 worldwide by 2019, encountered widespread rejection as propaganda outlets promoting CCP censorship, leading to closures at over 100 U.S. universities by 2021 and no measurable uplift in China's image per empirical reviews.^[113]^[114]^[115] The 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine underscored soft power's inadequacy in multipolar crises, as Moscow's prewar media and cultural outreach yielded negligible international backing or deterrence, with battlefield outcomes hinging on hard military assets and NATO commitments rather than persuasion or values attraction.^[116]^[117] Russia's soft power collapsed further post-invasion, alienating former Soviet allies without altering the conflict's reliance on coercion.^[76]

Applications and Strategies

Cultural and Media Exports

Cultural exports, particularly films from Hollywood and Bollywood, have demonstrably shaped global aspirations by embedding national values and lifestyles into popular narratives consumed worldwide. In 2024, American films captured 69.5% of global box office revenue, down from over 90% in 2009-2010, yet still enabling widespread dissemination of U.S. ideals like individualism and consumerism.^[118] Studies on product placement in Hollywood blockbusters show positive correlations between viewer exposure and improved brand attitudes, with audiences reporting higher purchase intentions for featured U.S. brands, indicating causal influence on preferences beyond mere entertainment.^[119] ^[120] Similarly, Bollywood's international reach promotes Indian traditions and family-centric values, influencing diaspora and non-Indian viewers' perceptions of destinations and lifestyles, as evidenced by analyses of film-induced tourism shifts in Europe among Indian audiences.^[121] This export-driven appeal fosters soft power by associating source cultures with aspirational modernity, though impacts vary by local receptivity. Media outlets like the BBC World Service and Al Jazeera exemplify non-state broadcasting's role in soft power through agenda-setting and opinion formation among elites. The BBC reaches approximately 450 million weekly listeners globally as of 2024, earning an 86% Soft Power Impact Index score for its perceived credibility in shaping international narratives on democracy and governance.^[122] ^[123] Al Jazeera's coverage during the 2011 Arab Spring mobilized public discourse and pressured regimes by amplifying protest narratives, functioning as a public diplomacy tool that influenced elite opinions across the region toward demands for reform.^[124] ^[125] Such media exports succeed when perceived as independent, correlating with shifts in viewer attitudes toward the broadcasting nation's values. However, authenticity remains essential for efficacy; contrived or state-directed exports often fail to resonate. Soviet-era propaganda films, despite heavy production, achieved limited abroad appeal due to overt ideological scripting that alienated international audiences, contrasting with organic cultural products and underscoring how perceived genuineness drives preference formation over coerced dissemination.^[126] This highlights soft power's reliance on voluntary attraction rather than imposition, with empirical flops reinforcing that inauthentic efforts erode rather than build influence.

Diplomatic and Aid-Based Initiatives

Public diplomacy initiatives, such as educational and professional exchanges, serve as core mechanisms for exerting soft power by fostering interpersonal networks and mutual understanding without coercive elements. The Fulbright Program, established in 1946 through legislation sponsored by U.S. Senator J. William Fulbright, exemplifies this approach by funding scholarships for students, scholars, and professionals to engage in academic and cultural exchanges between the United States and other nations, with the explicit purpose of increasing mutual understanding.^[127] ^[128] Tens of thousands of participants have engaged since its inception, often leading to long-term professional ties that influence foreign policy preferences.^[129] Similarly, the European Union's Erasmus+ program, launched in 1987 and expanded to include non-member aspiring states, facilitates student and youth mobility, building goodwill and shared identities that correlate with support for EU norms in enlargement contexts.^[130] Foreign aid programs further amplify soft power by delivering humanitarian and development assistance that generates goodwill and dependency on the donor's model of governance, distinct from economic coercion tied to immediate strategic concessions. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), created in 1961, administers billions in annual aid focused on health, education, and infrastructure, positioning it as a primary soft power instrument that promotes U.S. values through voluntary partnerships and elite training abroad.^[131] ^[132] For instance, USAID's programs in democracy promotion and cultural exchange have historically built networks among future leaders in recipient countries, enhancing alliance durability where aid recipients exhibit higher alignment with donor policies compared to non-recipients.^[132] Empirical analyses indicate that such aid's soft power efficacy hinges on visible beneficiary impacts and media coverage, rather than volume alone, with studies showing positive shifts in foreign public opinion toward donors following targeted interventions.^[133] Multilateral engagement through organizations like the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) extends these initiatives by amplifying national norms via collective standard-setting, where states leverage forums to promote education and cultural preservation as non-binding influences. UNESCO's normative instruments, such as conventions on cultural heritage, enable participating nations to shape global standards that align with their interests, fostering voluntary adherence over enforcement.^[134] This approach has empirically supported alliance cohesion, as seen in EU enlargement where exchange programs like Erasmus correlated with increased pro-integration sentiments in candidate states, contributing to accessions such as those of Eastern European nations in 2004.^[135] However, outcomes depend on perceived donor credibility, with biases in aid allocation sometimes undermining long-term trust if viewed as self-interested rather than altruistic.^[133]

Ideological and Value Promotion

Soft power through ideological and value promotion entails the dissemination of core principles such as democracy, individual rights, and rule of law to foster attraction and voluntary alignment among foreign audiences, distinct from coercive mechanisms.^[5] Following World War II, the United States effectively leveraged these values in reconstructing Europe and Asia, embedding democratic governance and human rights norms via institutions like the United Nations and bilateral aid programs, which contributed to widespread emulation of liberal constitutional models by 1950.^[136] This approach succeeded by presenting values as universal deliverables tied to prosperity and stability, evidenced by the adoption of democratic systems in over 20 former Axis-aligned or neutral states by the 1960s.^[137] In contrast, contemporary efforts have diluted appeal through relativistic framing and emphasis on progressive domestic debates, prioritizing identity-based narratives over foundational principles like merit and liberty. A 2022 analysis by the Heritage Foundation documented U.S. State Department public diplomacy shifting toward "fringe" social issues, such as gender and equity mandates, at the expense of enduring appeals like economic freedom, correlating with diminished global resonance.^[138] Polling data supports this erosion: Pew Research surveys from 2010 to 2020 showed favorable views of U.S. leadership and values dropping in key allies, with confidence in American human rights advocacy falling from 60% in Western Europe in 2010 to below 40% by 2020 amid perceived inconsistencies in application.^[139] Empirical outcomes favor unapologetic promotion of competence-based systems; Singapore's export of meritocratic governance, emphasizing performance over mandated diversity, has attracted emulation in Southeast Asia, with its per capita GDP rising from $500 in 1965 to over $80,000 by 2023, outperforming multicultural-relativist models in stability metrics.^[140]^[141] Such promotions risk backlash when interpreted as cultural imperialism, particularly through funding dissident movements. Color revolutions, including those in Georgia (2003) and Ukraine (2004), involved U.S.-backed NGOs providing over $100 million in training and media support, framed abroad as engineered regime change rather than organic value adoption, prompting defensive alliances like Russia's Eurasian Economic Union in response.^[142] This perception has fueled anti-Western narratives in non-aligned states, with surveys in Africa and Latin America post-2010 indicating 50-70% viewing democracy promotion as pretext for influence, reducing uptake of promoted values by 20-30% in targeted regions.^[143] Causal analysis reveals that overreach without local adaptation amplifies resentment, as seen in failed interventions where value exports clashed with sovereignty norms, underscoring the need for credible, non-interventionist demonstration over prescriptive advocacy.^[144]

Country and Regional Case Studies

United States: Hollywood, Values, and Declines

The United States has leveraged Hollywood as a primary vehicle for soft power, disseminating cultural products that portray American values of freedom, innovation, and opportunity to global audiences. In the 1990s, following the Soviet Union's collapse, U.S. films achieved unprecedented dominance, with international box office revenues surpassing domestic earnings for major studios by 1997, driven by blockbusters that captured over 70% of the global market share in key years.^[145]^[146] This era marked a peak in cultural hegemony, as Hollywood exports reinforced perceptions of the U.S. as a model of prosperity and individualism, contributing to high global attraction without direct coercion.^[147] Military interventions in Iraq starting in 2003 and Afghanistan's prolonged occupation eroded this foundation, fostering resentment over perceived unilateralism and human costs. Pew Research Center data indicate a median favorable view of the U.S. across surveyed countries dropped from approximately 60% in 2002 to around 30% by 2007, reflecting backlash against the Iraq War's rationale and execution.^[148] By 2020, while partial recoveries occurred in some regions under changed administrations, favorability lagged pre-2001 peaks, with persistent lows in the Middle East and Europe tied to ongoing instability from these conflicts.^[148]^[149] Technological innovation remains a enduring strength, as U.S. firms like Google, Apple, and AI pioneers export platforms and devices that define global digital norms and attract talent worldwide, sustaining soft power through demonstrated superiority in creativity and efficiency.^[150]^[35] However, foreign policy inconsistencies, such as the drone program—which executed thousands of strikes in Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, and elsewhere since 2004, with estimates of 800 to 1,700 civilian deaths—have fueled accusations of hypocrisy, clashing with U.S. advocacy for human rights and due process.^[151]^[152] These actions, often opaque and minimally accountable, diminish the moral appeal of American values by prioritizing security over transparency. Joseph Nye, who conceptualized soft power, assessed in April 2025 that its U.S. trajectory hinges on rebuilding credibility through policies that coherently reflect democratic ideals, cautioning that divergences—like aggressive unilateralism—accelerate relative decline against competitors.^[10] Without such alignment, cultural assets alone cannot offset eroded trust, as empirical favorability metrics underscore the causal link between policy actions and global perceptions.^[35]

China: Belt and Road and Confucian Institutes

China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), launched in 2013 by President Xi Jinping, represents a state-orchestrated effort to enhance connectivity across Asia, Europe, Africa, and beyond through infrastructure investments totaling over $1 trillion by 2025, blending economic incentives with strategic influence to project soft power.^[153] While framed as mutual development, the initiative's reliance on opaque loans from Chinese state banks has fostered perceptions of dependency, with recipient countries facing repayment pressures that enable Beijing's leverage in resource access and policy concessions.^[154] In the first half of 2025 alone, BRI-related construction contracts reached $66.2 billion and investments $57.1 billion, underscoring its scale but also highlighting hybrid elements where economic aid serves geopolitical aims rather than purely cultural attraction.^[155] Complementing BRI, Confucian Institutes, established since 2004 under the Chinese government's Hanban (now restructured), aimed to promote Mandarin language and Confucian culture globally, peaking at over 500 locations in 146 countries by 2019.^[115] These institutes, funded and staffed largely by Beijing, have faced accusations of functioning as platforms for propaganda and influence operations, restricting discussions on sensitive topics like Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang while advancing the Chinese Communist Party's narrative.^[156] By 2025, closures proliferated in Western nations due to concerns over academic freedom and potential espionage, reducing U.S. sites from about 100 in 2019 to fewer than five, with many programs rebranded or shifted to less scrutinized K-12 levels.^[157] These efforts have yielded measurable gains in targeted regions, with China ascending to second place in the Brand Finance Global Soft Power Index 2025, scoring 72.8 out of 100 and surpassing the United Kingdom, driven by enhanced familiarity and economic ties in Africa and Asia.^[59] BRI projects have improved perceptions among developing states valuing infrastructure without Western conditionalities on governance, while China's authoritarian model—emphasizing stability and rapid development—resonates where audiences perceive autocracies as superior for addressing economic challenges over liberal democracies.^[158] State media outreach has amplified this appeal, portraying Beijing's system as efficient for global south priorities.^[159] However, limitations persist, as debt sustainability issues in BRI participants—evident in renegotiations favoring Chinese creditors—and international backlash over Xinjiang Uyghur policies have eroded trust in developed markets, constraining universal soft power projection.^[160] Perceptions of manipulative intent, including "debt-trap" dynamics in cases like Sri Lanka's port lease, have prompted scrutiny, with empirical data showing higher default risks tied to non-transparent lending practices despite debates over deliberate entrapment.^[154] This state-centric approach, prioritizing control over organic appeal, appeals selectively to illiberal regimes but alienates those prioritizing transparency and human rights, revealing causal constraints in soft power's reliance on credible, non-coercive attraction.^[161]

European Powers: France, UK, and Germany

France exerts soft power primarily through the French language and cultural exports, coordinated via the Organisation internationale de la Francophonie (OIF), which encompasses 88 member states and governments as of 2024.^[162] By 2022, French was spoken by approximately 300 million people globally, with nearly 50% in Africa, enabling sustained influence despite military retrenchments on the continent.^[163] Culinary traditions, fashion, and institutions like the Alliance Française further amplify this, with France ranking 6th in the 2023 Global Soft Power Index at a score of 62.4 out of 100, reflecting strengths in familiarity and reputation.^[164] The United Kingdom draws on media outreach and historical ties, with the BBC World Service achieving an overall Soft Power Impact Index score of 86% in assessments of its global credibility and reach.^[122] The Commonwealth, comprising 56 nations representing 2.5 billion people, facilitates diplomatic leverage, though post-Brexit adjustments have introduced constraints.^[165] In the 2025 Global Soft Power Index, the UK holds 3rd place overall, buoyed by cultural exports but tempered by economic stagnation and funding reductions since 2020.^[59] Germany promotes its economic model internationally, particularly through exports of the dual vocational training system, which combines classroom instruction with on-the-job apprenticeships and has been adapted in over 60 countries via bilateral agreements.^[166] The Federal Ministry of Education and Research supports these initiatives, emphasizing practical skills to address global labor shortages, contributing to Germany's 5th ranking in the 2025 Global Soft Power Index.^[59] This approach underscores a reputation for reliability and innovation, though domestic challenges like skills mismatches have emerged post-COVID.^[167] At the multilateral level, the European Union enhances these national efforts through regulatory standards like the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), enacted in 2018, which has exerted a "Brussels Effect" by influencing data privacy laws in jurisdictions beyond Europe, including adaptations in over 130 countries by 2025.^[168] This normative export demonstrates soft power via de facto global standard-setting, prioritizing individual rights over market dominance.^[169] Post-Brexit and amid COVID-19 recovery, these powers exhibit stable absolute rankings but relative erosion against Asia's ascent, as China's and Japan's scores advanced in the 2025 Index due to economic resilience and cultural outreach.^[59] The UK's departure from EU structures diminished coordinated European projection, while pandemic-induced fiscal strains curtailed aid and cultural programs across the region.^[170]

Rising Challengers: India, South Korea, and Gulf States

India's soft power emanates primarily from organic cultural elements rather than state-orchestrated campaigns. Bollywood, the world's largest film industry by output with over 1,800 feature films produced annually, exports narratives of romance, family, and aspiration to audiences across Asia, Africa, and the Middle East, fostering familiarity without direct government subsidies.^[171] Yoga, rooted in ancient Indian philosophy, has gained global traction as a wellness practice, with the United Nations designating June 21 as International Day of Yoga since 2014, drawing hundreds of millions of practitioners worldwide and enhancing perceptions of India's spiritual heritage.^[172] These elements contributed to India's rise in regional soft power metrics, securing the top position in South Asia with a score of 41.6 in the 2020 Global Soft Power Index.^[173] South Korea's ascent relies on the Hallyu (Korean Wave), a blend of organic pop culture popularity amplified by targeted government support for exports. K-pop and K-dramas have permeated global markets, with the industry generating substantial economic returns; for instance, the cultural content sector contributed approximately 1.3% to GDP in recent years through tourism, merchandise, and related industries.^[174] The boy band BTS exemplifies this, driving fan-driven tourism and brand endorsements that elevated South Korea's visibility, though precise annual economic impacts vary by estimate and peak during high-profile releases. This momentum propelled South Korea from lower rankings to 12th place in the Brand Finance Global Soft Power Index 2025, with notable gains in familiarity and future growth potential attributed to cultural exports.^[59] Unlike purely market-driven phenomena, Seoul's Ministry of Culture has invested in international promotion since the 1990s, yet Hallyu's appeal stems from grassroots digital virality on platforms like YouTube and TikTok.^[175] Gulf states, particularly the UAE and Qatar, pursue soft power through state-funded branding and strategic investments, contrasting with the more endogenous cultural diffusion in India and South Korea. The UAE climbed from 18th in 2020 to 10th in the Global Soft Power Index 2025, bolstered by initiatives like Expo 2020 Dubai, which drew 24 million visitors and showcased futuristic infrastructure to rebrand the nation as an innovation hub.^[73]^[75] Qatar, facing regional isolation from the 2017-2021 blockade, ramped up lobbying and public relations in Washington, spending over $100 million on U.S. firms to cultivate elite networks and media narratives, enhancing policy influence despite limited organic cultural exports.^[176] These efforts prioritize tangible projects—such as UAE sovereign wealth fund investments in global sports and real estate—over broad ideological appeal, yielding index gains through heightened familiarity among international stakeholders rather than mass cultural affinity.^[177] Such approaches, while effective for economic diplomacy, risk perceptions of transactionalism when reliant on financial leverage.^[73]

Qatar: Media, Sports, and Educational Initiatives

Qatar advances soft power via media, sports, and education. Al Jazeera, launched in 1996, reaches over 430 million households in multiple languages, influencing global discourse on Middle Eastern affairs and positioning Doha as a mediation hub.^[178] Hosting the 2022 FIFA World Cup highlighted sports diplomacy, with infrastructure investments exceeding $200 billion to project modernity and global connectivity, despite human rights scrutiny.^[179] Education City hosts branches of institutions like Georgetown and Carnegie Mellon, attracting international students and fostering knowledge exchange to build long-term alliances.^[176] These state-directed strategies, including Qatar Investment Authority stakes in entities like Paris Saint-Germain and real estate investments via subsidiaries such as Qatari Diar in iconic properties abroad—including ownership of Harrods and stakes in London's Shard—to shape city skylines and project modernity and global influence, contributed to a 22nd global ranking in the 2025 Brand Finance Soft Power Index, enhancing familiarity though often intertwined with economic leverage.^[180]^[59]

Russia and Authoritarian Soft Power Attempts

Russia has pursued soft power through state-controlled media outlets like RT (formerly Russia Today) and Sputnik, established to disseminate counter-narratives challenging Western dominance and promoting a multipolar worldview.^[181]^[182] These platforms, funded by the Russian government, operate in multiple languages and focus on amplifying anti-establishment sentiments, conspiracy theories, and critiques of liberal democracy, aiming to erode trust in adversarial institutions.^[181] However, their efficacy is constrained by perceptions of bias and disinformation, as content often prioritizes propaganda over objective reporting, limiting genuine attraction.^[181] In parallel, Russia leverages the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) as a soft power instrument, particularly in post-Soviet states with shared religious and cultural heritage.^[183] The ROC's close alignment with the Kremlin—termed a "symphonic" relationship—provides a moral-ideological framework for foreign policy, fostering ties through religious diplomacy, compatriot programs, and cultural exchanges under initiatives like Russkiy Mir.^[183]^[184] This approach targets Orthodox-majority regions in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, where the Church collaborates with state soft power entities to reinforce historical narratives of shared civilization against Western secularism.^[184]^[185] Yet, such efforts often blend with coercive elements, as seen in the ROC's support for Moscow's geopolitical aims, which undermines voluntary appeal.^[185] Authoritarian soft power's limitations became evident post-2014, following the annexation of Crimea, which triggered Western sanctions and isolated Russia diplomatically, diminishing its cultural exports and institutional access abroad.^[184]^[186] The 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine further eroded global perceptions, with Russia's favorability plummeting: a 2025 Pew survey across 25 countries found a median of 79% unfavorable views, while Gallup reported global approval of Russian leadership falling to 21% in 2022 from 33% in 2021.^[187]^[188] In ex-Soviet spaces, cultural diplomacy faltered as states like Ukraine and the Baltics distanced themselves, prioritizing EU/NATO integration over Moscow's narratives, with hybrid tactics—mixing disinformation, energy leverage, and military posturing—supplanting pure attraction.^[189]^[116] This reliance on "new generation warfare" integrates soft elements into hard power coercion, revealing illiberal soft power's inherent paradox: it seeks emulation but fosters repulsion through association with aggression.^[190]^[76] Empirical data underscores the inefficacy, as sanctions post-2014 and 2022 curtailed funding for cultural centers and media reach, while polls in targeted regions show declining affinity for Russian values amid economic decoupling.^[189]^[188]

Recent Developments and Future Prospects

Digital and Technological Dimensions Post-2020

Post-2020, social media platforms have amplified soft power projection through algorithmic content dissemination and influencer ecosystems, with China's TikTok emerging as a key vector for cultural influence. ByteDance's TikTok, launched globally prior to but surging in usage after 2020, leverages short-form video algorithms to promote Chinese aesthetics, trends, and narratives, reaching over 1.5 billion users by 2023 and fostering transnational engagement that subtly embeds positive associations with Chinese innovation and lifestyle.^[191]^[192] In contrast, the U.S.-aligned platform X (formerly Twitter), restructured under Elon Musk's 2022 acquisition, has prioritized unfiltered discourse, potentially bolstering American soft power via perceived commitments to free expression amid global censorship concerns, though this has invited criticisms of amplifying discord over cohesive narrative-building.^[193]^[194] The COVID-19 pandemic intensified digital soft power contests through information operations on these platforms, where state actors vied to shape global perceptions of crisis management. China deployed vaccine diplomacy narratives on social media, exporting doses to over 100 countries by mid-2021 while countering origin theories, which enhanced its image as a reliable provider in developing regions despite Western skepticism over data transparency.^[96] Concurrently, U.S. and allied platforms like pre-Musk Twitter flagged misinformation, removing over 170,000 accounts linked to Chinese, Russian, and Turkish influence campaigns by June 2020, yet this moderation sparked debates on algorithmic bias that eroded trust in Western digital governance.^[195] These "info wars" highlighted soft power's vulnerability to rapid narrative fragmentation, with empirical analyses showing polarized sentiment spikes correlating to platform interventions.^[196] Technological adaptations, including virtual diplomacy in metaverses, have extended soft power reach amid travel restrictions and hybrid events post-2020. Barbados established the first metaverse embassy in Decentraland on November 19, 2021, enabling immersive cultural exchanges and consular services, signaling a shift toward persistent digital presences for smaller nations to punch above their weight.^[197] Larger powers followed with metaverse-hosted summits and exhibitions, such as EU virtual reality initiatives for policy simulation by 2023, which facilitate scenario-testing and public engagement without physical logistics, though scalability remains limited by accessibility divides.^[198] However, algorithmic echo chambers pose causal risks to soft power efficacy, as platforms' recommendation systems reinforce user silos—evident in studies showing 20-30% reduced exposure to cross-ideological content post-2020—undermining appeals to universal values and fostering fragmented global audiences.^[199]^[200] Digital metrics have gained prominence in assessing soft power, with indices incorporating online engagement data to quantify influence. The Brand Finance Global Soft Power Index's digital pillar, updated annually since 2021, evaluates metrics like social media followers, interaction rates, and digital infrastructure perceptions, revealing China's ascent in engagement scores from 2020-2023 due to TikTok's virality, while U.S. scores fluctuated amid platform policy shifts.^[58]^[201] These quantifiable indicators—tracking billions of interactions—underscore how digital tools causalize soft power gains but demand vigilance against manipulation, as verified engagement often masks underlying polarization dynamics.^[202]

Global Shifts in Indices 2020-2025

The United States retained its position as the leading soft power nation in the Brand Finance Global Soft Power Index from 2022 through 2025, achieving a score of 79.5 out of 100 in 2025, up from 74.8 in 2023 and reflecting sustained dominance in familiarity, influence, and media pillars despite domestic political divisions.^[203]^[68] China's ascent marked a pivotal shift, surging to second place in 2025—overtaking the United Kingdom for the first time—with rapid gains in economic and trade influence amid narrowing gaps with the US, following its climb to third in 2024 after surpassing Japan and Germany.^[204]^[68] This Asian momentum extended to India, which ranked 30th in 2025 (down slightly from 29th in 2024 but bolstered by strengths in culture, growth potential, and science), underscoring a broader multipolar trend where non-Western economies leverage demographic and technological advantages.^[205]^[206] European rankings showed stability with volatility, as the UK slipped to third in 2025 from second in 2024 and 2023, while Germany held fifth amid consistent governance perceptions; France and Italy maintained mid-tier positions driven by heritage but faced headwinds from regional conflicts.^[68]^[203] Gulf states registered gains earlier in the period, with the United Arab Emirates securing a top-10 spot in 2025 through diplomatic and investment appeal, though Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and others slowed after sharp climbs in 2023-2024 linked to diversification efforts.^[207]^[208] Year-on-year volatility was evident, such as Ukraine's reputation falling 19 places to 95th by 2025 due to prolonged conflict fatigue, contrasting with Russia's relative stabilization at 75th despite sanctions.^[59] These shifts were influenced by post-COVID recovery dynamics, where nations demonstrating resilient economic management and vaccine diplomacy—such as China's early exports—initially boosted scores, though perceptions waned by 2021 for some amid transparency critiques.^[96] The 2022 Ukraine invasion redirected global attention to security, amplifying debates on soft power's limits against hard power aggression and eroding reputations for aggressors like Russia while initially elevating supporters like the US and UK in unity pillars before fatigue set in.^[209]^[210] Overall, the period highlighted multipolarity's empirical markers: Western leads persisting but eroding as Asia and Gulf actors invested in tangible influence levers like infrastructure and culture, fostering a more contested global perceptual landscape.^[211]

Implications for Multipolar World Order

In a multipolar world order characterized by multiple centers of power, soft power facilitates the formation of regional blocs and alliances based on shared cultural, economic, or ideological affinities rather than universal dominance, leading to fragmented global influence patterns.^[212] This fragmentation contests the projection of cohesive narratives, as domestic identities and elite alignments refract soft power appeals differently across regions, reducing the efficacy of any single actor's universalist strategies.^[212] Empirical analyses of post-2020 geopolitical shifts indicate that such multipolarity empowers middle powers and regional actors to leverage localized soft power—such as Turkey's cultural diplomacy in the Middle East or India's Bollywood outreach in South Asia—to carve out spheres of influence without relying on global hegemony.^[213] The intensifying rivalry between the United States and China exemplifies how multipolarity tests universal versus particularistic soft power appeals, with the U.S. emphasizing democratic values and open societies against China's model of state-led development and non-interference.^[214] ^[215] U.S. soft power, rooted in ideals of individual liberty and innovation, seeks broad normative alignment but faces challenges from perceptions of inconsistency, as evidenced by declining favorability ratings in key regions like sub-Saharan Africa from 2019 to 2023.^[216] In contrast, China's pragmatic appeals through infrastructure investments and educational exchanges yield transactional gains but struggle with universal legitimacy due to concerns over authoritarian governance, limiting its appeal beyond developing economies.^[214] This dynamic underscores that in multipolarity, soft power's persuasive capacity hinges on alignment with recipients' immediate interests rather than abstract ideals, fostering hybrid blocs like the BRICS grouping where economic soft power complements strategic autonomy.^[217] Prospects for soft power in multipolarity favor hybrid approaches combining attraction with coercive credibility, as isolated soft efforts often erode without hard power backing to enforce commitments and deter revisionism.^[218] Analyses of historical cases, such as the post-Cold War era, reveal that states with robust military and economic capabilities sustain soft power longevity, with data from 2020-2024 showing a positive correlation between defense spending shares and soft power index rankings for major powers.^[219] ^[220] Critiques of over-reliance on soft power, including those of U.S. policies from 2021-2024 emphasizing diplomacy over deterrence, argue that perceived retreats—such as the 2021 Afghanistan withdrawal—undermined credibility, leading to measurable drops in allied confidence and emboldening adversaries.^[221] ^[220] Thus, enduring soft power gains necessitate causal integration with hard power, as unbacked attraction risks dissipation amid competitive multipolar pressures, prioritizing strategies that balance persuasion with demonstrable resolve.^[218] ^[219]

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[PDF] Soft Power - Wilson Center
by Joseph S. Nye, Jr. The Cold War is over and Americans are try- ing to ... vides it with an important source of soft power, but Japan is somewhat ...Missing: original | Show results with:original
[6]
Soft Power and the Public Diplomacy Revisited
Soft power is the ability to affect others to obtain the outcomes one wants through attraction and persuasion rather than coercion or payment.Missing: characteristics empirical<|separator|>
[7]
Of Mechanisms and Myths: Conceptualising States' “Soft Power ...
May 10, 2016 · However, attempting to fill partially a major gap in the literature offers a start to the debate on grounding soft power in empirical research.Missing: characteristics | Show results with:characteristics
[8]
The Problem with Soft Power - Foreign Policy Research Institute
Sep 14, 2020 · Ultimately, most critics simply believe soft power doesn't work in international relations, but offer little concrete evidence to support these ...
[9]
The Limits of Soft Power - SpringerLink
Apr 27, 2023 · Some skeptics object to the idea of soft power because they think of power narrowly in terms of commands or active control.<|control11|><|separator|>
[10]
Professor Joe Nye coined the term “soft power.” He says America's ...
Apr 8, 2025 · He called it “soft power,” and the term quickly became an indispensable staple of serious conversations about geopolitics and global diplomacy.
[11]
Joseph Nye on Soft Power - E-International Relations
Mar 8, 2013 · On the contrary, soft power is the ability to get 'others to want the outcomes that you want' (Nye, 2004a, p.5), and more particularly 'the ...Missing: original | Show results with:original
[12]
Soft Power - jstor
soft power resources-cultural attraction, ide- ology, and international institutions-are not new. In the early postwar period, the Soviet. Union profited ...
[13]
[PDF] Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics – Joseph S. Nye ...
Apr 5, 2004 · Soft power is more difficult, because many of its crucial resources are outside the control of governments, and their effects depend heavily on ...
[14]
Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics
Soft power lies in the ability to attract and persuade. Whereas hard power—the ability to coerce—grows out of a country's military or economic might, soft power ...
[15]
September 11 and American Foreign Policy - Brookings Institution
... terrorism once the initial emotion and anger about the attack begins to subside. ... What Harvard's Joseph Nye calls “soft power”—the ability to get others ...
[16]
Five Truths about Terrorism by Joseph S. Nye, Jr. - Project Syndicate
Feb 4, 2016 · The regime itself rules over its citizens by means of terror. "Smart power is needed to defeat terrorism." This approach can't be wiser, if the ...Missing: challenges | Show results with:challenges
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The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations
This book joins the debate. Experts from different countries and from a variety of fields analyze the theory and practice of public diplomacy.
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[PDF] The new public diplomacy: soft power in international relations
Abstract: In the 1960s when it first appeared as a concept public diplomacy was defined very broadly as the impact of a state on a foreign audience.
[19]
Why `Soft Power' Isn't So Soft: Representational Force and the ...
Soft power—the ability to achieve desired outcomes through attraction rather than coercion—has become an important part of scholarly thinking and policy ...
[20]
Why `Soft Power' Isn't So Soft: Representational Force and the ...
Aug 9, 2025 · Mattern stated that soft power remains rather poorly understood as a concept [14] or does not completely discuss attraction as the main element.
[21]
(PDF) Hybridity and Soft Power Statecraft: The 'GREAT' Campaign
Aug 6, 2025 · PDF | This examination analyses transformations to statecraft accelerated by digital media technologies. This theory-building study moves ...
[22]
[PDF] Soft Power and Great-Power Competition - OAPEN Home
Jul 12, 2010 · And even if breaking apart economic interdependence were possible, neither sides can decouple the ecological interdependence that obeys the laws ...
[23]
[PDF] Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye's Power and Interdependence
Apr 16, 2014 · Keohane and Nye failed to relate well-established liberal international themes to their discussions of complex interdependence. We might ...
[24]
[PDF] Power and Interdependence
One was the soft or attractive power of liberal ideas. The growth of transnational communications and contacts helped spread lib- eral ideas, and the ...
[25]
(PDF) HOW LIBERAL INSTITUTIONALISM USE INTERDEPENCE ...
This paper attempts to explain how liberal institutionalism use interdependence and international regimes to explain the concept of international relations.
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[PDF] Mearsheimer, J.J. (2001). The tragedy of great power politics. New ...
This book offers a realist theory of international politics that challenges the prevailing optimism about relations among the great powers. That enterprise ...
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The Concept of Soft Power: A Critical Analysis
Niall Ferguson, in one of his critical examination of the concept, said that soft power is too 'soft' to achieve national interests.
[28]
The Meaning of Sharp Power - Foreign Affairs
China's and Russia's attempts at influence are not examples of soft power—they represent "sharp power."
[29]
[PDF] SHARP POWER Rising Authoritarian Influence
From 'Soft Power' to 'Sharp Power' By Christopher Walker and Jessica Ludwig. Rising Authoritarian Influence in the Democratic World. Sharp Power: Rising ...
[30]
The Effectiveness of Soft & Hard Power in Contemporary ...
May 14, 2014 · The first part of this essay explains the concepts of hard and soft power with referring to their combination, soft power.Missing: multiplier formation
[31]
The Utility of Both Hard and Soft Power in Modern International ...
Aug 10, 2025 · This essay's first section defines hard and soft power and how they work together to create soft power. Next, various instances of the two ...Missing: multiplier | Show results with:multiplier
[32]
What are the Means and Mechanisms of Soft Power? - ResearchGate
Aug 9, 2025 · This article revises the concept of soft power by generating a continuum of power based on the tools useful for implementing different degrees of soft or hard ...Missing: relational | Show results with:relational
[33]
Norm Diffusion as a Soft Power Mechanism
Jul 30, 2020 · The objective of the paper is to provide a framework for conceptualizing and discussing Chinese soft power against the background of China's ...
[34]
American Democracy and Soft Power by Joseph S. Nye, Jr.
Nov 2, 2021 · Press freedom, independent courts, and the right to peaceful protest are among the greatest sources of America's soft power. Even when mistaken ...
[35]
The Future of American Soft Power - Project Syndicate
May 16, 2025 · Soft power grows out of a country's culture, its political values, and its foreign policies. In the short term, hard power usually trumps soft power.
[36]
Think Again: Soft Power - Foreign Policy
Feb 23, 2006 · British historian Niall Ferguson described soft power as non-traditional forces such as cultural and commercial goodsand then promptly ...
[37]
https://www.asialink.unimelb.edu.au/diplomacy/why-we-should-be-concerned-decline-american-soft-power/
[38]
Whatever Happened to Soft Power? by Joseph S. Nye, Jr.
Jan 11, 2022 · A country's soft power comes primarily from three sources: its culture; its political values, such as democracy and human rights (when it ...
[39]
What Is Soft Power? 5 Examples of Soft Power - 2025 - MasterClass
Jun 16, 2022 · Political scientist Joseph Nye stated that a country's soft power relies on three resources: culture, political values, and foreign policies.
[40]
Making a Movement: Joseph S. Nye, Jr. on the Importance of Soft ...
Mar 11, 2024 · "Nothing dissolves soft power more effectively than charges of hypocrisy. The result is that human rights are an essential part of foreign ...Missing: interdependence | Show results with:interdependence
[41]
Soft Power and Nation Branding: Culture, Influence, and Global ...
“Attraction depends on credibility,” Nye noted, warning that overt propaganda or hypocrisy can squander soft power by breeding global cynicism. For soft ...
[42]
[PDF] joseph-s-nye-jr-soft-power.pdf
But as the Bush administration maps out its foreign policy, Nye emphasizes the importance of nurturing our soft power. It is soft power that will help prevent ...
[43]
[PDF] Toward an Analytical Framework for Understanding “Soft Power”
Sep 13, 2020 · In line with Nye, the most likely resources creating attraction among other states are political values, cul- ture, and foreign policies. As ...
[44]
Capitalism and Economic Growth: Presentation - Independent Institute
Apr 15, 2010 · Capitalism's superiority for economic growth and development deserves the unqualified support of everyone who believe that wealth is better ...Missing: empirical norms
[45]
The Logic of Attraction: Outline of a Theory of Soft Power
Jul 21, 2020 · This paper outlines the process that generates soft power and sheds light on the causal mechanisms, both at the behavioral and the psychological ...
[46]
https://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1570&context=clr
[47]
Why Study Roman Law? The Durability of Roman Law - No. 86
May 20, 2019 · One is that the system of law was powerful enough so that 2000 years ago essentially what it did was organize the basic structures of an empire ...Missing: endurance | Show results with:endurance
[48]
In Search of Soft Power: Does Foreign Public Opinion Matter for U.S. ...
Aug 6, 2025 · Cultivating a positive international image is important to US foreign policy strategy. "Soft power" promotes cooperation via attraction- ...
[49]
Diaspora, Soft Power, and Foreign Policy - ResearchGate
This chapter begins by exploring the varied sources of soft power that states possess and have traditionally used to exercise inlfuence.Missing: causal pathways
[50]
[PDF] SOFT POWER OF INTERNATIONAL NEWS MEDIA - DRUM
Jan 15, 2016 · When comparing effects of source, negative news about China from a Chinese source enhanced Americans' perceived image of China as a socially ...<|separator|>
[51]
The soft channels of policy diffusion: Insights from local climate ...
Jul 30, 2024 · This article presents a new channel-centered framework that distinguishes between six soft policy diffusion channels: autonomous, collaborative, exemplary, ...
[52]
United in diversity? The convergence of cultural values among EU ...
Aug 7, 2025 · Originally, the concept of soft power had been more common in the EU's foreign policy and is generally defined as the 'ability to affect ...
[53]
Europe's soft-power problem - European Council on Foreign Relations
May 5, 2022 · Although Europe has begun to make up for years of neglect in terms of defence spending, it remains woefully ill-equipped to win over other countries.Missing: isolating causality<|control11|><|separator|>
[54]
Joe Nye was right – Foreign Policy
And for a realist like me, “soft power” has also seemed like a bit of an epiphenomenon, because you need a lot of hard power to produce much of the soft variety ...
[55]
The Obama Doctrine - The Atlantic
Apr 15, 2016 · Or it could be remembered as the day he let the Middle East slip from America's grasp, into the hands of Russia, Iran, and isis. I first spoke ...
[56]
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Sep 22, 2014 · President Obama cannot avoid his share of responsibility for the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS).Missing: policy | Show results with:policy
[57]
Brand Finance Global Soft Power Index 2025: China overtakes UK ...
Feb 20, 2025 · Brand Finance publishes the Global Soft Power Index based on a survey of more than 170,000 respondents from over 100 countries to gather data ...
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Global Soft Power Index - Brandirectory
Discover the findings of the Global Soft Power Index at a glance. Navigate the world map to see how all 193 nation brands rank on each of 55 Soft Power metrics.
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Global Soft Power Index 2025: The shifting balance ... - Brand Finance
Feb 20, 2025 · The Global Soft Power Index 2025 offers a year-on-year measurement of all 193 member states of the United Nations, after expanding the scope last year.
[60]
Measuring Soft Power: A New Global Index
Oct 4, 2024 · In this paper, we introduce a new comprehensive Global Soft Power Index (GSPI) composed of six dimensions for a broad sample of countries over a long span of ...
[61]
Measuring Soft Power: A New Global Index in - IMF eLibrary
Oct 4, 2024 · In this paper, we present a new comprehensive Global Soft Power Index (GSPI) based on 29 indicators along six dimensions for a broad set of countries over the ...
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[PDF] A GLOBAL RANKING OF SOFT POWER - Portland Communications
The Soft. Power 30 country rankings, based on the index, are the result of a research collaboration between. Portland, Facebook, and ComRes. The report includes ...Missing: successors | Show results with:successors
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An Overdue Critical Look at Soft Power Measurement: The Construct ...
Jan 30, 2019 · Results show the project is problematic in two ways-it confuses the distinction between means of soft power and outcomes of soft power, and it ...
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[PDF] How to Measure Soft Power - Digital Collections
With respect to politics the measures are biased in favor of liberal democratic values. While there are measures of government effectiveness that would capture ...Missing: criticism | Show results with:criticism
[65]
(PDF) The Hard Truths about Soft Power - ResearchGate
Aug 9, 2025 · Soft power relies on economic resources, but it also contributes to further economic development (Carminati 2022). Despite the conceptual link ...
[66]
Measuring Soft Power in International Relations. By Irene S. Wu ...
Apr 3, 2025 · The challenges in understanding soft power occur at both the conceptual (theoretical) level and the empirical level. Beyond a general agreement ...
[67]
Toward a Political Model of Soft Power | Asian Survey
Soft power, the idea that states can achieve their goals through attraction rather than coercion, has been applied to various contexts, leading to.
[68]
Brand Finance Global Soft Power Index 2025: China overtakes UK ...
Feb 20, 2025 · Brand Finance Global Soft Power Index 2025: China overtakes UK for the first time, US remains top-ranked nation brand · 20 February 2025, LONDON ...
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| TOP 55 Most Influential Soft Power Nations in the World 2025! The ...
Feb 24, 2025 · According to the Brand Finance Global Soft Power Index, here are the top 20 nations leading in global influence: 1. United States – 79.5 2.
[70]
From strength to strength: How China overtook the UK in Soft Power ...
Feb 20, 2025 · Since Brand Finance began measuring the nation's Soft Power in 2020, China has consistently outperformed the UK in the Business & Trade pillar.
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The Rise of Soft Power in the Gulf: A Comparative Analysis of GCC ...
Sep 2, 2025 · Most prominently, the UAE rose steadily from 18th in 2020 to a top-10 global soft power rank by 2023, maintaining it through 2025. Saudi Arabia ...
[74]
Expo 2020 Dubai biggest driver as UAE jumps five places in Brand ...
Apr 17, 2023 · The UAE jumped five places in the Index, with its Soft Power Score increasing by 3.2 points, with Expo 2020 Dubai driving 61.2% (2pts) of the gain.
[75]
UAE ranks 10th globally in Global Soft Power Index 2025
Feb 20, 2025 · The UAE has secured 10th place globally in the Global Soft Power Index 2025. The UAE's Nation Brand also witnessed a significant increase in ...
[76]
THE EROSION OF RUSSIAN SOFT POWER – SOME POSSIBLE ...
Oct 6, 2025 · Russia Has Lost Soft Power War with Ukraine – Global Soft Power Index 2023. Nye Jr., J.S. (2022). Soft Power after Ukraine. Project Syndicate.
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'Russia has lost its soft power': how war in Ukraine destabilises old ...
Mar 12, 2023 · 'Russia has lost its soft power': how war in Ukraine destabilises old Soviet allies · Putin's shrinking sphere of influence.
[78]
Understanding the Global Soft Power Index 2025 - Brand Finance
Feb 20, 2025 · The Global Soft Power Index is the world's most comprehensive research study on perceptions of nation brands.
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The study suggests US foreign aid has induced compliance on vital issues, but no relationship was found on all UN votes. The study uses an "important issues" ...
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Foreign aid and voting in international organizations: Evidence from ...
This is important because foreign aid could be used to entice either membership or voting, and focusing on only one of the two will miss part of the picture.
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[PDF] 108 THE GLOBAL SUCCESS STORY OF JAPAN'S SOFT POWER
Aug 23, 2023 · The importance of Japan's economic diplomacy in assisting East Asia's economic growth via the formation of trade relationships, investments ...
[82]
[PDF] Importance of Soft Power: An Analysis of Japan's ODA with National ...
Sep 24, 2025 · Japan's approach focusing on economic development is partially effective ... “Japan's Normative Power in Central Asia: Norms, Development.
[83]
[PDF] The Hidden Face of International Aid Marc-Antoine Pérouse de ...
... France doubled its aid to Francophone Africa in the years following the end of the Cold War1. Finally and most important, the events of 11 September. 2001 ...
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[PDF] The Realms of Power in Cultural Diplomacy from France's Perspective
France's cultural diplomacy uses a large budget, a global network of cultural institutions, and a "diplomacy of influence" with politics and economy.
[85]
What Is Soft Power And Does It Impact Trade And Investment?
Mar 1, 2024 · Additional research by Brand Finance found that soft power correlates with a 34% variation in global FDI inflows and 60% in trade flows.Missing: empirical favorability
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[PDF] The Impact of Soft Power on Inward Foreign Direct Investment in the ...
The empirical analysis, using system. GMM estimation method, reveals that soft power has a positive and significant influence on inward FDI flows, with this ...
[87]
The Role of Soft Power in Contemporary Diplomacy - ResearchGate
Apr 19, 2023 · This study aims to investigate the role of soft power in contemporary diplomacy, which is a contentious issue in academic and policy communities.
[88]
[PDF] Having Faith in IP: Empirical Evidence of IP Conversions
Overall, we bring forward strong quantitative evidence that socialisation is a significant force in the export and import of IP rules.
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[PDF] The Global Effects of Intellectual Property Rights
Taking each country group in turn, she discovered first that. US exports to countries with high R&D ratios and strong patent laws depended positively and ...
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[PDF] Hollywood and the MPAA's Influence on U.S. Trade Relations
I. INTRODUCTION. Over the past century, the U.S. film industry in Hollywood has dominated the global entertainment industry. American films appear today.
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Assessing the Efficacy of Soft Power vs. Hard Power in Counter ...
Feb 6, 2025 · Empirical evidence suggests that hard power yields short-term incident reductions, whereas soft power contributes to longer-term prevention.Missing: effects | Show results with:effects
[92]
Legal Origin or Colonial History? - Oxford Academic
Nov 7, 2011 · The legal origins literature focuses on the fact that French colonies inherited French civil law, while British colonies inherited English ...
[93]
British Colonial Legacies and Political Development - ScienceDirect
This paper investigates the developmental legacies of British colonial rule. It draws on insight from qualitative case studies, which show that direct and ...
[94]
The Common Law Inheritance and Commitments to Legality in ...
Aug 9, 2025 · In this article, we examine the colonial experiences of eight for-merty British-controlled territories-Barbados, Jamaica, Botswana, Nigeria, Kenya, India, ...
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Vaccine Diplomacy Is Paying Off for China - Foreign Affairs
Mar 11, 2021 · The country that can manufacture and distribute lifesaving injections to others less fortunate sees a return on its investment in the form of soft power.Missing: empirical | Show results with:empirical
[96]
Vaccine diplomacy: nation branding and China's COVID-19 soft ...
This study is the first to empirically investigate vaccine diplomacy in the COVID-19 context. An examination of China's vaccine diplomacy will clarify the ...
[97]
Toward quantifying soft power: the impact of the proliferation of ...
Mar 14, 2017 · This study examines how information technology and mass communication outlets have been employed as soft power platforms in the Middle EastMissing: criticism | Show results with:criticism
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Soft Power and US Foreign Policy: Theoretical, Historical and ...
Soft Power and Strategy:Developing a 'Strategic' Concept of Power Edward Lock 4. The Unbearable Lightness of Soft Power Christopher Layne 5. The Power Game ...
[99]
The Irrelevance of Soft Power - E-International Relations
Oct 19, 2020 · The irrelevance of Soft Power stems not from its theoretical dimension, but from a changing global landscape.
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The Rise and Fall of Soft Power - Foreign Policy
Aug 20, 2018 · Joseph Nye put forth an idea in the pages of Foreign Policy. He called it soft power, a concept that caught fire and went on to define the post-Cold War era.
[101]
Can America Regain Its Soft Power After Abu Ghraib?
Can the United States regain its soft power? We have done it before. Anti-Americanism soared during the Vietnam War in the early 1970s, but we recovered within ...Missing: erosion | Show results with:erosion
[102]
Soft Power and Smart Power - by Lawrence Freedman
Jan 17, 2024 · Yet the confidence in and admiration for America has certainly gone down. This is because of a series of missteps, including Vietnam, which ...
[103]
[PDF] what-is-sharp-power-christopher-walker-journal-of-democracy-july ...
Jul 3, 2018 · It is within this context that sharp power, neither really soft nor hard, is able to flourish.
[104]
How Autocrats Use Sharp Power to Wage War on Democracy
Sharp power, the newest tool in their fight against freedom, takes advantage of democracy's very openness to weaken it from within.Missing: legitimacy | Show results with:legitimacy
[105]
Sharp Power, Not Soft Power, Should Be the Target - Boston Review
If their messages are too blatantly propagandistic, they will not attract support and thus fail to produce soft power, but democracies can deal with open ...
[106]
China's Belt and Road Initiative: Debt Trap or Soft Power Catalyst?
Sep 1, 2019 · One of the most recent developments corroborated the fears of a debt trap, but with a twist: China could eventually be the one facing the ...
[107]
Findings | China's Belt and Road: Implications for the United States
Nonetheless, economic stress brought on by COVID-19 could make some BRI projects unsustainable and lead to accusations of debt-trap lending, ...
[108]
China's Belt and Road Initiative Undermines Partner Countries ...
Sep 15, 2020 · The BRI instead threatens to undermine democratic governance and sovereignty in countries that partner with China.
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[PDF] Discourses of Film Terrorism: Hollywood representations of Arab ...
above, individuals from the Middle East as seen to be sexual failures who are unable to produce offspring. Page 100. Chapter Four: Discourses of Arab Terrorist ...
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why Hollywood failed to honestly address the 'war on terror' | Movies
Sep 13, 2021 · Conflict of interest: why Hollywood failed to honestly address the 'war on terror' ... In November 2001, George W Bush's White House met studio ...
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The Foreign Aid Freeze's Costs to the US in the Middle East and ...
Feb 14, 2025 · Cutting off the more than $2 billion in economic assistance to the MENA region risks disrupting recoveries of close U.S. partners after years of ...Missing: total polls
[112]
Russia's State Media Has a Credibility Problem - per Concordiam
Dec 20, 2022 · A 2019 Pew Research Center survey of 33 countries determined that less than half of adults view Russia favorably across the globe. Americans ...
[113]
Confucius Institutes: The growth of China's controversial cultural ...
Sep 6, 2019 · But to its critics the government-run body - which offers language and cultural programmes overseas - is a way for Beijing to spread propaganda ...
[114]
Rethink the influence of Confucius Institutes, suggests study
Feb 2, 2017 · Paper concludes that 'contrary to popular thinking, Confucius Institutes have not had a positive impact on China's global interests'Missing: perceived | Show results with:perceived
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Confucius Institutes: China's Trojan Horse | The Heritage Foundation
May 27, 2021 · That the Confucius Institutes are instruments of propaganda was confirmed by Li Changchun, the head of propaganda for the CCP, who boasted ...
[116]
Ukraine and the Debacle of Russian Soft Power
May 13, 2024 · The war in Ukraine has demonstrated Russia's incapacity to implement a foreign policy strategy without resorting to hard power means.
[117]
Soft Power After Ukraine by Joseph S. Nye, Jr. - Project Syndicate
May 3, 2022 · While hard military power will decide the outcome of Russia's war in Ukraine, the power of values, persuasion, and attraction are hardly irrelevant.
[118]
The global market share of American films has declined from 85% to ...
Mar 27, 2025 · American films held a 69.5% share of global box office revenue in 2024. This is a significant drop from over 90% in 2009–2010 and even from 85.6% in 2014.American Films Are Losing Their Dominance Over the Global Box ...Why are Hollywood movies not doing well in China recently? - RedditMore results from www.reddit.com
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(PDF) Correlation Between Product Placement in Film, Purchase ...
Aug 7, 2025 · Correlation between product placement in film, purchase intention and brand attitude were found significant.
[120]
[PDF] Product placement in Hollywood blockbusters - DiVA portal
May 11, 2015 · Conclusions: Our research showed that product placements in movies lead to brand recognition, and audience's acceptance of a brand's presence is ...
[121]
[PDF] Bollywood Movies and Their Impact on how Indians Perceive ...
The aim of this study is to analyze the perception of European destinations through the eyes of Indian. Bollywood film viewers to determine how perception ...
[122]
The soft power impact of the BBC World Service to the UK
The report gives the BBC World Service an overall Soft Power Impact Index score of 86% – a figure that reflects both the institution's enduring credibility.
[123]
Why Soft Power is Vital In a Multipolar World - LinkedIn
Sep 3, 2025 · Looking at media, the BBC's World Service reached around 450 million people weekly according to the 2024 Global Audience Measure ...<|separator|>
[124]
Qatar and the Arab Spring: Policy Drivers and Regional Implications
Sep 24, 2014 · It shaped the emerging narratives of protest through the Doha-based Al Jazeera media network. And it also mobilized Arab support, initially ...
[125]
Al-Jazeera's relationship with Qatar before and after Arab Spring
Feb 15, 2018 · ... Al-Jazeera a “potent public diplomacy tool” that can effectively influence the public opinion and put pressure on Sheikh Hamad's rivals.
[126]
[PDF] Use of propaganda films in Stalinist Russia and Nazi Germany
Apr 25, 2019 · The fundamental problems in the structure of the Soviet film industry began in the early. 1930s. During this time, the USSR shifted its ...
[127]
Fulbright Teaching Excellence and Achievement Program
Feb 4, 2025 · The Fulbright program was established in 1946 under legislation introduced by former United States Senator William Fulbright of Arkansas.
[128]
10 FAM 220 ACADEMIC PROGRAMS - Foreign Affairs Manual
The Fulbright Program is designed to increase mutual understanding between the people of the United States and the people of other countries. The Program ...
[129]
Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Request for Proposals
Oct 24, 2000 · Tens of thousands of U.S. and foreign students have participated in the program since its inception. In FY 2002, the Fulbright Student Program ...
[130]
Erasmus Programme as an Instrument of EU Public Diplomacy
Aug 6, 2025 · Erasmus + Programme can be considered an instrument of soft power in countries that aspire to become EU member states.
[131]
What Is USAID and Why Is It at Risk? - Council on Foreign Relations
Feb 7, 2025 · USAID is a foremost tool of US soft power, administering what experts say is vital humanitarian aid worldwide each year.
[132]
Soft power: Not just winning hearts and minds, but saving lives
Soft power: Not just winning hearts and minds, but saving lives. Professor Joseph Nye has transformed the way we think about international relations.
[133]
Perceived Motives of Public Diplomacy Influence Foreign Public ...
Jan 2, 2023 · In other words, aid's efficacy in increasing soft power depends on the number of beneficiaries, how much attention it receives, and the type of ...
[134]
Cutting Edge | From standing out to reaching out: cultural diplomacy
Jan 27, 2022 · UNESCO provides normative instruments and policy fora for countries to strengthen, articulate and amplify their cultural diplomacy goals.Missing: norms | Show results with:norms
[135]
[PDF] The European Union's soft power: the enlargement process and the ...
The primary motive to this research is the specific form of soft power the EU use in its policy, especially the enlargement policy.
[136]
The Globalization of Politics: American Foreign Policy for a New ...
In the new age of global politics, the best way to accomplish these goals is to promote an international order based on democracy, human rights, and free ...
[137]
Soft Power and Morals in U.S. Foreign Policy < Sasakawa USA
A country's soft power comes primarily from three sources: its culture (when it is attractive to others), its political values such as democracy and human ...
[138]
“Woke” Public Diplomacy Undermines the State Department's Core ...
Dec 12, 2022 · The State Department's public diplomacy programs abroad are skewed toward fringe aspects of US domestic social issues and away from core, enduring US values.
[139]
Reviving America's Global Image | Pew Research Center
Mar 5, 2010 · Favorable ratings of the U.S. plunged in many countries following the invasion of Iraq and remained low through 2008. In 2009, we began to ...
[140]
Seven Pillars of Singapore's Soft Power | HuffPost The World Post
Nov 15, 2013 · As I tell every student of the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, Singapore's success is based on three key elements: meritocracy, pragmatism ...
[141]
[PDF] singapore's - evolving meritocracy
Meritocracy has often been credited as being fundamental to Singapore's economic success. Meritocracy has also become an important tenet in. Singapore's ...Missing: soft power
[142]
Colored Revolutions: A New Form of Regime Change, Made in USA
Feb 6, 2010 · The movements promoted by US agencies in those countries are generally anti-communist, anti-socialist, pro-capitalist and pro-imperialist.
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The Color Revolutions on JSTOR
How one views these events—as triumphs of the “freedom agenda,” as twentieth-century U.S. imperialism in twenty-first-century nongovernmental bottles, as ...
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Colour revolutions, imperialism and Western intervention - The Herald
Jan 21, 2015 · Colour revolutions, imperialism and Western intervention ... In these times of “colour revolutions”, language has been turned on its head. Banks ...Missing: perceived backlash
[145]
How important is international box office to Hollywood?
May 14, 2017 · The first time international box office revenues for Studio movies surpassed domestic was in 1997, mostly due to the strong global performance ...
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Movie Tariffs: A Ticket To Destroying U.S. Film Studio Dominance
Jul 1, 2025 · Hollywood, California – the historic center of the U.S. film ... U.S. dominance at the global box office, commanding a 70-percent share.
[147]
The Balance of Soft Power - Revista de Prensa
Jun 22, 2022 · American soft power is also largely shaped by private-sector cultural exports, such as Hollywood films, hip-hop music and style, and such ...
[148]
Appendix A: Favorability of the United States since 2000
Jun 11, 2024 · Globally, Biden Receives Higher Ratings Than Trump. Appendix A: Favorability of the United States since 2000. By Richard Wike, Janell Fetterolf, Maria ...Missing: post- Iraq 2000-2020
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[PDF] U.S. Image Plummets Internationally as Most Say Country Has ...
Sep 15, 2020 · Pew Research Center surveys have found mixed or relatively negative views of the U.S. in. Canada and Western Europe since 2017 and the beginning ...
[150]
Tip of the Iceberg: Understanding the Full Depth of Big Tech's ...
Oct 6, 2025 · While many major U.S. technology firms—including Cisco, Qualcomm, and Nvidia—demonstrate similar innovation patterns and positive spillovers, ...
[151]
Drone Warfare - TBIJ
Between 2010 and 2020 the Bureau tracked US drone strikes and other covert actions in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Yemen and Somalia.
[152]
America's Counterterrorism Wars: The Drone War in Pakistan
Tracking the United States's drone strikes and other operations in Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, and Libya.<|separator|>
[153]
How Is the Belt and Road Initiative Advancing China's Interests?
Oct 2, 2023 · The Belt and Road Initiative supports a diverse array of infrastructure projects that aim to strengthen China's connectivity with the world.<|separator|>
[154]
(PDF) A critical look at Chinese 'debt-trap diplomacy': the rise of a ...
This paper retells a series of stories about China's international involvement, including in Angola, Djibouti, Sri Lanka and Venezuela, that challenge the ...Missing: Xinjiang backlash
[155]
China Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) investment report 2025 H1
Jul 17, 2025 · Record levels of engagement worth USD 66.2 billion in construction contracts and USD 57.1 billion in investments for the first six months of 2025.Missing: soft | Show results with:soft
[156]
Confucius Institutes: China's Soft Power Strategy or Intelligence Tool ...
Aug 18, 2025 · By 2025, Brand Finance ties this to China's soft power rank, but Foreign Affairs' “The Real Culture Wars” critiques as CCP control undermining ...
[157]
China: With Nearly All U.S. Confucius Institutes Closed, Some ...
Oct 30, 2023 · What GAO Found. The number of Confucius Institutes at U.S. universities and colleges declined since 2019, from about 100 to fewer than five.Missing: 2025 | Show results with:2025
[158]
Chinese state media persuades a global audience that the “China ...
Jul 20, 2024 · We argue that global audiences will embrace authoritarian models when they believe that autocracies can meet governance challenges better than democracies.
[159]
China's Authoritarian Pitch Gains Ground Globally - The Diplomat
Oct 5, 2024 · New research shows China is remarkably effective in promoting its authoritarian governance to a global audience. The United States must up its game.
[160]
Is China Pursuing "Debt-Trap Diplomacy" in Africa? - Interpret
China's aid and investment to Africa are inaccurately portrayed by Western countries as “debt trap diplomacy,” exacerbating sovereign debt risks in African ...
[161]
China's Big Bet on Soft Power | Council on Foreign Relations
China is believed to spend billions of dollars to boost its international image, but it has yet to see a marked return on its investment in soft power.
[162]
The Francophonie's Power Strategy - TRENDS Research & Advisory
Jul 22, 2024 · According to this view, discussing the OIF's power strategy is seen as inherently linked to questioning France's global influence policies.
[163]
With France's military influence in Africa gone, can it rely on soft ...
Jan 31, 2025 · Of the 300 million French speakers in the world by 2022, close to 50 percent lived in Africa, according to the Organisation of French-Speaking ...
[164]
[PDF] Global Soft Power Index 2023
have identified eleven key strategies to achieve this: 1. Creating Powerful Stories and Soundbites - By. By using cost-benefit analysis to highlight the ...
[165]
Playing to our strengths: The future of the UK's soft power in foreign ...
Sep 2, 2025 · This report proposes a way forward for the UK Government to develop and implement a soft power strategy as a central component of its foreign ...Missing: Commonwealth | Show results with:Commonwealth
[166]
Germany: international vocational training cooperation | CEDEFOP
On vocational training exports, the BMBF supports internationalisation of German initial and continuing vocational training service providers.Missing: soft power 2023-2025
[167]
Germany Had the World's Best Vocational System. What Happened?
Aug 8, 2025 · In March, the new government under Chancellor Friedrich Merz launched a €500 billion financial package to expand and modernize the country's ...Missing: soft 2023-2025
[168]
GDPR: Legislative Necessity Or A Thorn In The Side Of Economic ...
Sep 11, 2025 · And in doing so, it gave Europe a rare form of soft power: the ability to shape global norms through regulation rather than market dominance.
[169]
The Brussels Effect: The Influence of the EU's GDPR on Indonesia's ...
Jul 2, 2025 · According to NPE, when other countries willingly accept these rules, it demonstrates the EU's soft power and worldwide moral authority.
[170]
The UK: Still a soft power superpower?
Sep 10, 2024 · A stagnant economy, Brexit, budget cuts, and a renewed global focus on hard security have brought about a decrease in the UK's soft power capabilities.Missing: post- | Show results with:post-
[171]
Bollywood, Yoga & Ayurveda: India's Pillars of Soft Power in Global ...
Nov 30, 2024 · Bollywood, Yoga and Ayurveda (BYA) around the world address global challenges related to body immunity, shortage of resources, water scarcity, climate change, ...Missing: index | Show results with:index
[172]
Yoga, India's tool for global soft power – DW – 08/29/2025
Aug 29, 2025 · From a spiritual practice to a modern way of staying fit, yoga tells a tale of culture, politics and India's national pride.Missing: index 2020-2025
[173]
India No 1 in South Asia in Softpower, New Delhi Predicted to be ...
Apr 10, 2020 · The Global Soft Power Index, published in February 2020, ranks India at the 27th position with an overall score of 41.6 out of 100, making it the leading ...
[174]
Korean Wave (Hallyu) - Rise of Korea's Cultural Economy & Pop ...
The Korean Wave (Hallyu) refers to the global popularity of South Korea's cultural economy exporting pop culture, entertainment, music, TV dramas and movies.Missing: index | Show results with:index
[175]
[PDF] South Korea's Use of Pop Culture as a Soft Power Tool
Jun 9, 2025 · To abide by the soft power agenda, the South Korean government invested and supported the pop culture industry within Korea to help it grow and.
[176]
Soft Power, Hard Influence: How Qatar Became a Giant in Washington
Sep 8, 2025 · In response to the blockade, Qatar began investing heavily in lobbying, public relations firms, and think tanks to counter the robust anti ...
[177]
The Race for Soft Power in the Gulf | INSS
For Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar, the dominant and richest among the Arab Gulf monarchies, the accumulation of soft power is central to ...<|separator|>
[178]
The Reality of Russian Soft Power - The American Interest
Mar 21, 2018 · Yes, Sputnik and RT are not honest journalistic enterprises, and their stories are often riddled with falsehoods. But the worldview they ...
[179]
[PDF] The Paradox of Authoritarian Soft Power: The Case of Russia and ...
Russian media outlets such as RT and Sputnik are con- sidered to be key tools in Russia's soft power arsenal. These media organisations, which have more ...
[180]
Russia's Orthodox Soft Power
Mar 23, 2015 · The close symphonic relationship between the Orthodox Church and state in Russia thus provides Russian foreign policy with a definable moral framework.
[181]
The Rise and Fall of Russia's Soft Power
Mar 15, 2021 · The Russian Orthodox Church actively collaborated with Russian soft power institutions, especially in interacting with compatriots and ...
[182]
[PDF] Religious Soft Power in Russian Foreign Policy
May 1, 2021 · The Kremlin continues to deepen its reliance on the Russian Orthodox. Church-Moscow Patriarchate (ROC) as a lever of soft power in Russian.
[183]
[PDF] Soft power lessons from Russia's war - The Foreign Policy Centre
May 1, 2024 · However, the war has also exposed weaknesses in the soft power field – such as polarisation along political and ... annexation of Crimea in 2014, ...
[184]
Views of Russia and Putin in 25 countries - Pew Research Center
Jun 23, 2025 · Across the broader set of 25 countries surveyed, attitudes toward Russia are mostly negative. Overall, a median of 79% have an unfavorable view of Russia.
[185]
Russia Suffers Global Rebuke After Invasion - Gallup News
Apr 25, 2023 · One in five adults worldwide now approve of Russia's leadership. Approval of Russian leadership sank from a median of 33% in 2021 to 21% in 2022 ...
[186]
Russia's Failure as a Soft Power | DGAP
But Russian policy-makers misinterpreted the concept of soft power. They failed to appreciate the idea of partnerships with clear advantages for both sides in ...Missing: films propaganda authenticity
[187]
Russia's Soft Power Projection in the Middle East
In addition to diplomacy, trade, and tourism, Moscow projects its influence through the Russian Orthodox Church, culture centers, major sports events, ...
[188]
Politics in the De-politicised: TikTok as a Source of China's Soft Power
Dec 2, 2021 · This research aims to test the above assumptions empirically by answering the question, “To what extent is TikTok a source of China's soft power?”.
[189]
Beyond the scroll: TikTok, China, and the politics of influence
Mar 12, 2025 · TikTok is China's most successful soft power export. As governments debate its risks, Gen Z continues to shape their digital world around it.
[190]
Soft Power Viral: TikTok, Memes, and Transnational Dissent in the ...
Sep 29, 2025 · This article explores how TikTok and meme-driven culture function as instruments of soft power—that is, the ability to influence through ...
[191]
TikTok's digital drama at the forefront of a new Cold War
Feb 3, 2025 · Chinese platforms such as TikTok and RedNote use algorithm-driven content recommendation systems to drive engagement, making them potent soft ...
[192]
COVID-19 AND THE INFORMATION WAR: CHANGING THE ...
Oct 30, 2020 · In June 2020, Twitter removed over 170,000 social media accounts that China, Russia, and Turkey allegedly used to spread propaganda. The ...
[193]
Information warfare in the theatre of Covid-19 - Lowy Institute
Apr 29, 2020 · Viral misinformation thrives amid the very conditions we see today – a lesson China appears to have identified.
[194]
[PDF] METAVERSE: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR ...
Morning Express, Barbados Opens an Embassy in the Metaverse and Inaugurates the. Career of Virtual Diplomacy (Nov. 19, 2021), https://morningexpress.in/barbados ...
[195]
Metaverse for advancing government: Prospects, challenges and a ...
The Metaverse can be used to simulate different scenarios for policy-making, which can help urban planners, developers, administrators, and other stakeholders ...
[196]
Community dynamics and echo chambers: a longitudinal study of ...
Aug 28, 2025 · The “echo chamber” effect has been widely decried as a destructive consequence of social media on public discourse, leading people to ...
[197]
The Power of Social Media to Influence Political Views and ...
Sep 19, 2024 · By selectively curating content, algorithms often create “echo chambers” where users are repeatedly exposed to similar viewpoints, limiting ...
[198]
[PDF] Brand Finance Soft Power Index 2024 Digital - Brandirectory
Feb 28, 2024 · Global Soft Power Index 2024. The ranking of all 193 member states of the United Nations, scored out of 100, according to the results of a ...
[199]
Perception check: how the Global Soft Power Index 2025 measures ...
Aug 26, 2025 · Governance metrics assess trust in government and political stability, while digital engagement tracks social media presence and online ...<|control11|><|separator|>
[200]
Global Soft Power Index 2023: Nations that defined ... - Brand Finance
Mar 2, 2023 · The United States of America has again claimed the top spot with a score of 74.8 out of 100 followed by the United Kingdom (67.3), and Germany ( ...
[201]
Brand Finance's Global Soft Power Index 2024: USA and UK ranked ...
Feb 29, 2024 · Brand Finance's Global Soft Power Index 2024: USA and UK ranked top nation brands, China takes third place, overtaking Japan and Germany · Media ...
[202]
India positions itself as a global soft power force - Brand Finance
Feb 20, 2025 · Ranks 30th in the Global Soft Power Index 2025, driven by cultural influence, future growth potential, and scientific advancements.
[203]
India slips in global soft power ranking but shines in growth potential ...
Feb 21, 2025 · India's has fallen in ranks in the Brand Finance Global Soft Power Index this year, scoring 49.8 out of 100, with its new rank being 30, down from 29th place ...<|separator|>
[204]
The UAE holds on to top 10 position, defying regional slowdown
Feb 20, 2025 · The United Arab Emirates ranks among the world's top 10 nations for Soft Power, driven by diplomatic influence, a favourable investment climate, and ongoing ...
[205]
Soft power champions: Gulf nations enhance nation brand ...
Feb 29, 2024 · The United Arab Emirates has successfully staged the high-profile EXPO 2020 and COP28. Qatar's improvement follows the 2022 football world ...
[206]
Global Soft Power Index 2022: USA bounces back better to top of ...
Mar 15, 2022 · USA reclaims 1st place in ranking after turning corner on COVID-19 · UK takes 2nd spot and leads Europe, ahead of last year's leader Germany ...
[207]
(PDF) The Ukraine War and Russia's Soft Power in Africa
Aug 10, 2025 · While Ukraine has received waves of assistance, Russia has been sanctioned and isolated by Western countries and their allies. Nevertheless, ...
[208]
Global Soft Power Dynamics in 2025: Asian Century or Not So Fast?
Mar 9, 2025 · South Korea, another top performer from the continent, has moved up three places to 12th in the rankings. This was thanks to increased ...
[209]
https://brandfinance.com/press-releases/global-soft-power-index-2022-usa-bounces-back-better-to-top-of-nation-brand-ranking
[210]
Prospects for a multipolar world order - GIS Reports
Jun 16, 2023 · Multipolarity suggests that there are now multiple contenders capable of shaping the world order, fostering legitimacy and consensus and maintaining that order.
[211]
https://thegeopolitics.com/global-soft-power-dynamics-in-2025-asian-century-or-not-so-fast/
[212]
A Strategic Comparison of U.S. and China's Hard Power, Soft Power ...
Aug 3, 2025 · No less important is the changing use of soft power in the U.S.-China rivalry. The United States has always had an edge because of its soft ...
[213]
U.S.-China Relations for the 2030s: Toward a Realistic Scenario for ...
Oct 17, 2024 · Geopolitical rivalry between the America and China is often thought to make mutually profitable economic exchange impossible in the future, but ...
[214]
How US-China Competition Works in a Multipolar World
Jul 27, 2025 · Competition between the United States and China will not end in a return to unipolarity or a permanent duopoly of global power.
[215]
https://www.socialworksreview.com/index.php/Journal/article/view/338
[216]
The Importance of Hard Power
Sep 14, 2011 · But it speaks to a broader truth in international relations: true influence in global affairs can only come if soft power is backed by its ...
[217]
Refocusing U.S. Public Diplomacy for a Multipolar World - CSIS
Nov 14, 2024 · Information is the currency of the new world order, so to compete in a multipolar landscape, U.S. public diplomacy must be competitive in ...Missing: implications | Show results with:implications<|separator|>
[218]
What happens when a country bleeds soft power? Conceptualising ...
May 26, 2023 · 'War on Terror' (WoT), a post-9/11 category, is next. 'Religious Extremism' features conservative religious activists and leaders, sympathetic ...
[219]
soft power–soft disempowerment nexus: the case of Qatar
Academic analysis of Qatar's soft power resources, including media like Al Jazeera.
[220]
The 2022 World Cup and Shifts in Qatar's Foreign Policy
Examination of Qatar's sports diplomacy through hosting major events like the FIFA World Cup.
[221]
Soft Power, Hard Influence: How Qatar Became a Giant in Washington
Report detailing Qatar's educational investments, including Education City, as soft power tools.
[222]
Global Soft Power Index 2025
Brand Finance annual ranking of nations' soft power, including Qatar's position.
[223]
How Qatar is seeking soft power by shaping city skylines worldwide
Analysis of Qatar's real estate investments abroad as a tool for enhancing soft power through urban development and global visibility.