Fact-checked by Grok 2 weeks ago

Engineering ethics

Engineering ethics constitutes the systematic examination of moral obligations inherent to the engineering profession, mandating that engineers hold paramount the safety, health, and welfare of the public in all professional endeavors.^[1]
Central to this field are codified principles from bodies such as the National Society of Professional Engineers (NSPE) and the American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE), which require engineers to undertake work only within their competence, provide honest and objective services, disclose potential conflicts of interest, and refrain from actions that harm the profession's reputation.^[2]^[3]
Notable controversies, exemplified by the 1986 Space Shuttle Challenger disaster, underscore ethical failures where engineers at Morton Thiokol identified risks from O-ring seals in low temperatures but faced managerial override prioritizing schedule pressures, leading to structural failure 73 seconds after launch and the deaths of seven crew members.^[4]^[5]
Such cases reveal causal dynamics where deference to non-technical authority can precipitate catastrophic outcomes, prompting reforms in whistleblower protections and ethics integration into engineering education to foster first-order accountability to verifiable risks over hierarchical compliance.^[6]

Historical Development

Pre-20th Century Foundations

In ancient engineering practices, such as the construction of Roman aqueducts starting with the Aqua Appia in 312 BCE, durability and precision were essential for functionality and long-term utility, driven by the practical need for reliable infrastructure that supported urban populations.^[7] These structures, built using gravity-fed systems of channels, bridges, and arches, demanded high workmanship to prevent leaks or collapses, with builders relying on reputation for securing future commissions rather than formal ethical codes.^[8] During the medieval period, craft guilds in Europe enforced standards through apprenticeships and collective oversight, where substandard work risked exclusion or loss of patronage, aligning self-interest with quality outcomes in bridge and cathedral construction.^[9] The Industrial Revolution in the 18th and 19th centuries intensified ethical pressures on engineers amid rapid infrastructure expansion, particularly in Britain's "Railway Mania" of the 1840s, where cost-driven decisions often compromised safety.^[10] Factory conditions highlighted risks to workers from machinery without safeguards, prompting early legislative responses like the UK's Factory Act of 1833, though engineers bore responsibility for designing safer systems.^[11] Bridge failures underscored these tensions; the Dee Bridge collapse on May 24, 1847, killed five when cast-iron girders failed under a passing train due to inadequate composite strength between cast iron and wrought-iron ties, drawing criticism toward designer Robert Stephenson for overreliance on unproven materials amid haste.^[10]^[12] Individual engineers like Isambard Kingdom Brunel exemplified adherence to rigorous standards without centralized codes, as seen in his Great Western Railway projects where meticulous surveys minimized gradients and curves, prioritizing structural integrity over immediate cost savings despite higher expenses.^[13] Brunel's opposition to prescriptive rules for bridges reflected a commitment to innovation grounded in empirical testing, contrasting with lapses elsewhere, such as the Tay Bridge disaster on December 28, 1879, where designer Thomas Bouch's emphasis on economy led to flawed ironwork and insufficient wind resistance, resulting in 75 deaths and revelations of overlooked defects during construction.^[14] These incidents highlighted causal links between corner-cutting for profit and public harm, fostering informal norms of accountability through professional scrutiny and parliamentary inquiries.^[15]

20th Century Institutionalization

The institutionalization of engineering ethics in the 20th century began with the adoption of formal codes by major professional societies in the early decades, driven by the need to professionalize amid rapid industrialization and emerging state regulations. The American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE), established in 1852, developed its inaugural Code of Ethics in 1914, which prioritized engineers' duties to the public and profession over personal or client interests, responding to incidents of misconduct and calls for self-regulation.^[16] Similarly, the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) and the American Institute of Electrical Engineers (predecessor to the IEEE) enacted codes in 1914 and 1912, respectively, embedding principles of integrity, competence, and public safety to distinguish professional practice from trade work.^[17] These early codes marked a shift toward codified standards, influenced by broader societal demands for accountability in infrastructure and technology projects. The formation of the National Society of Professional Engineers (NSPE) in 1934 further centralized ethical frameworks, advocating for uniform licensing and practice standards across states to counter fragmented regulations post-Great Depression.^[18] NSPE approved its Canons of Ethics in 1946 and supplemented them with Rules of Professional Conduct in 1957, explicitly requiring engineers to hold public safety paramount and avoid conflicts that could compromise welfare.^[18] Post-World War II, wartime experiences with military engineering—such as large-scale projects involving ethical trade-offs between innovation and human cost—heightened awareness of technology's societal impacts, prompting revisions to emphasize broader responsibilities beyond client directives.^[17] This era saw ethics integrated into licensing exams and professional oaths, with over 40 states enacting PE laws by 1950 to enforce competence and ethical adherence. Pivotal incidents reinforced these codes' emphasis on safety protocols. The 1979 Three Mile Island nuclear accident, involving equipment failures and operator errors that led to a partial core meltdown, exposed gaps in risk assessment and communication, underscoring the ethical imperative for engineers to prioritize hazard mitigation over operational expediency.^[19] In response, societies like NSPE and ASCE advocated for enhanced training in human factors and ethical decision-making, influencing code updates to strengthen obligations for transparent reporting and public protection.^[20] By century's end, these institutional mechanisms had reduced unchecked individualism in engineering, fostering a culture where ethical lapses faced professional repercussions through peer review and licensure boards.^[18]

Post-2000 Adaptations and Challenges

In response to accelerating technological change and globalization, engineering ethics codes underwent significant revisions in the early 21st century to emphasize sustainability and long-term societal impacts. The American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) adopted a revised Code of Ethics in 2020, mandating that engineers "adhere to the principles of sustainable development" rather than merely striving toward them, while strengthening commitments to resilient infrastructure amid climate and urbanization pressures.^[21]^[22] These updates addressed globalization's demands for ethical practices in international projects, including equitable treatment across diverse stakeholders and avoidance of outdated provisions that no longer aligned with modern supply chain complexities.^[16] The rapid integration of artificial intelligence (AI) and software into engineering workflows post-2000 introduced novel ethical challenges, such as algorithmic bias, unintended harms, and accountability in autonomous systems, prompting specialized frameworks. U.S. responsible AI policies from 2020 to 2025, including the National Institute of Standards and Technology's AI Risk Management Framework and executive directives, focused on mitigating bias and potential harms through transparency and testing without imposing overly restrictive regulations that could hinder innovation.^[23] In software engineering, this era saw the emergence of ethics guidelines emphasizing fairness in AI design, with interdisciplinary approaches drawing from philosophy and computer science to address value-laden technology deployment.^[24] These adaptations recognized AI's non-neutral impact on society, requiring engineers to prioritize harm prevention alongside performance gains.^[25] Corporate scandals and globalized operations tested self-regulation's efficacy, underscoring the need for robust ethical cultures to sustain public trust. The 2001 Enron collapse, involving ethical lapses in energy infrastructure accounting and operations, contributed to heightened scrutiny of engineers' roles in corporate decision-making, influencing subsequent accountability measures like the Sarbanes-Oxley Act's internal controls applicable to technical reporting.^[26] A 2022 Royal Academy of Engineering report highlighted self-regulation's value, noting engineers' 87% trust rating in the UK—second only to nurses—attributable to strong ethical adherence in areas like safety and environment, while recommending proactive steps to embed ethics in professional training and oversight.^[27]^[28] This data affirmed that voluntary ethical commitments, rather than solely external mandates, effectively maintained credibility amid globalization's ethical dilemmas, such as cross-border labor standards and technology transfers.^[29]

Core Ethical Principles

Professional Competence and Integrity

Professional competence in engineering ethics mandates that practitioners limit their work to domains where they possess requisite knowledge, skills, and experience, while integrity requires truthful representation of qualifications without exaggeration or deception. The National Society of Professional Engineers (NSPE) Code of Ethics explicitly states that engineers "shall perform services only in areas of their competence" and "shall issue public statements only in an objective and truthful manner," underscoring the obligation to engage in ongoing professional development to sustain expertise amid evolving technologies. Likewise, the American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) Code of Ethics requires members to "perform services only in areas of their competence" and to "strive to increase their knowledge and improve their skills," positioning competence as foundational to ethical practice.^[30] These codes derive from the recognition that engineering outputs depend on accurate application of technical principles, where misrepresentation erodes trust and elevates risks. From a causal standpoint, insufficient competence disrupts reliable outcomes by introducing errors in design, analysis, or implementation, as unmastered principles lead to flawed causal chains in systems. Empirical reviews of engineering incidents attribute a significant portion of preventable failures to human factors, including inadequate expertise, with post-failure analyses revealing that underqualified involvement correlates with higher defect rates in critical components.^[31] Integrity complements competence by deterring false claims that could bypass scrutiny, fostering market mechanisms like client vetting and peer review to incentivize verifiable proficiency over unproven assertions. Debates on enforcement pit self-regulating approaches against mandatory structures. Free-market proponents argue that professional liability under tort law and insurance requirements naturally select for competence, as practitioners face financial and reputational penalties for deficiencies without needing universal oversight beyond initial licensure.^[32] Conversely, engineering societies emphasize formalized measures, such as mandatory continuing professional development, with over 30 U.S. states requiring professional development hours for license renewal to mitigate competence decay, reflecting the view that voluntary efforts alone insufficiently address variability in individual diligence.^[33] This tension highlights that while liability enforces accountability reactively, proactive certifications aim to preempt errors through standardized competence thresholds.

Obligations to Public Safety and Society

Engineers' primary ethical duty centers on safeguarding public safety, health, and welfare, a principle enshrined in professional codes and accreditation standards. The National Society of Professional Engineers (NSPE) Code of Ethics mandates that engineers "hold paramount the safety, health, and welfare of the public" in fulfilling professional responsibilities.^[2] Similarly, ABET criteria for accrediting engineering programs require curricula to develop students' ability to design solutions that account for public health, safety, and welfare, alongside global, cultural, and environmental impacts.^[34] This obligation derives from the causal link between engineering decisions and real-world outcomes, demanding rigorous risk assessments grounded in quantifiable data rather than speculative harms. Empirical evidence underscores the consequences of neglecting this duty, as inadequate attention to verifiable risks has precipitated structural failures and loss of life. For instance, miscalculations in cost-benefit analyses for infrastructure like dams have historically led to breaches, with data from engineering incident analyses revealing patterns where overlooked geotechnical or hydraulic factors amplified vulnerabilities.^[35] Surveys of practicing engineers indicate variability in perceived responsibility for public safety, often correlating with underestimation of systemic risks, which contributes to preventable incidents.^[36] Such failures highlight the need for first-principles evaluation of failure modes, prioritizing designs where safety margins exceed minimal thresholds based on probabilistic modeling and historical failure rates. Prioritizing public safety has yielded measurable societal benefits, particularly in transportation infrastructure. Post-1920s advancements in U.S. highway engineering, including standardized safety features and alignment with traffic flow principles, contributed to declining mortality rates; by the mid-20th century, fatality rates per vehicle-mile traveled dropped significantly due to divided highways and guardrails informed by crash data.^[37] The Interstate Highway System, operational from 1956 onward, further reduced deaths and injuries through engineered separations of opposing traffic and controlled access, delivering net benefits in user safety and economic efficiency.^[38] However, expansive interpretations of societal obligations beyond empirically verifiable risks can impede progress. Overregulation, often justified under broad public welfare pretexts, has been shown to suppress innovation by increasing compliance costs, with studies finding that firms facing headcount-triggered regulatory thresholds innovate less, delaying technologies that enhance long-term safety.^[39] Mandates emphasizing unquantified "social good," such as diversity, equity, and inclusion initiatives without demonstrated ties to technical competence, risk diluting focus on causal factors in safety; research on bias trainings reveals they frequently fail to reduce prejudices and may exacerbate divisions, offering no substantiated gains in engineering reliability.^[40] Effective adherence thus requires distinguishing proximate risks—amenable to data-driven mitigation—from distal social aims lacking causal evidence of safety uplift.

Honesty, Conflicts of Interest, and Confidentiality

Engineers are obligated to maintain honesty in all professional communications, including technical reports, bids, and public statements, by avoiding any form of deception or misrepresentation that could mislead stakeholders or compromise project integrity. The IEEE Code of Ethics requires members to "reject bribery in all its forms" and to "avoid real or perceived conflicts of interest whenever possible," while promoting truthful conduct in professional activities. Similarly, the ASCE Code of Ethics mandates that engineers "shall be objective and truthful in professional reports, statements, or testimony," explicitly prohibiting the issuance of intentionally false or misleading information in bids or engineering documents. These principles stem from the recognition that dishonest practices, such as inflating capabilities in competitive bids, undermine trust in the profession and can lead to suboptimal engineering outcomes. Conflicts of interest arise when an engineer's personal, financial, or relational ties could impair impartial judgment, necessitating full disclosure to affected parties to enable informed decision-making. Under ASCE guidelines, engineers must act as "faithful agents or trustees" for employers or clients while avoiding conflicts, with prompt disclosure required for any known or potential influences, such as equity stakes in suppliers or consulting fees from competitors. IEEE emphasizes disclosing unavoidable conflicts to all concerned parties, particularly in software and systems engineering where dual loyalties might affect design integrity. Failure to disclose can result in biased decision-making; for instance, a study on large-scale construction projects found that undisclosed conflicts contributed to subjectively biased cost estimates in 30% of cases, often leading to inflated budgets due to favoritism toward affiliated vendors. Self-reporting mechanisms, such as mandatory annual disclosures in professional registrations, have been implemented in jurisdictions like those governed by NSPE-aligned bodies to mitigate these risks through verifiable transparency rather than relying on subjective self-assessments. Confidentiality obligates engineers to protect proprietary client information, including technical processes and business affairs, without consent for disclosure, as codified in both IEEE and ASCE ethics frameworks to foster trust in professional relationships. ASCE specifies that engineers "shall not disclose, without consent, confidential information concerning the business affairs or technical processes of any present or former client or employer," reinforcing a contractual duty that prioritizes agreed-upon boundaries over expansive interpretations of public need. Debates in engineering ethics highlight tensions between this duty and broader public interest claims, particularly when confidential data reveals potential hazards; however, resolutions typically favor contractual realism, limiting disclosures to legally compelled scenarios or imminent threats under public safety canons, rather than proactive leaks that could breach fiduciary obligations. This approach aligns with causal analyses showing that routine confidentiality upholds long-term industry accountability, whereas premature revelations often invite litigation without proportional benefits, as evidenced in professional review cases where unsubstantiated public interest overrides eroded client confidence and professional viability.

Accountability, Reporting, and Whistleblowing

Engineering codes of ethics, such as the National Society of Professional Engineers (NSPE) Code, impose a duty on engineers to report violations that could endanger public safety, requiring notification to appropriate authorities if employers or clients persist in unprofessional conduct.^[41] This obligation stems from the paramount principle of public welfare, with escalation protocols typically mandating internal reporting to superiors or compliance officers before external disclosure to regulatory bodies or law enforcement.^[42] In practice, such protocols aim to resolve issues within organizations while balancing confidentiality, though failure to adhere can lead to professional withdrawal from the project.^[43] Legal safeguards for whistleblowers emerged prominently in the U.S. during the 1980s, with the Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989 providing federal employees protections against retaliation for disclosing illegality, gross mismanagement, or safety risks.^[44] For engineers in private sectors, protections are patchier, often relying on state laws or sector-specific statutes, but post-1986 Challenger disaster reforms at NASA introduced enhanced reporting channels and anti-retaliation policies to address ignored warnings from engineers like Roger Boisjoly, who documented O-ring failure risks months prior.^[45] These changes included procedural overhauls in decision-making and whistleblower training, aiming to reduce suppression of technical dissent.^[46] Despite such measures, real-world efficacy remains limited by high retaliation risks, with surveys indicating that 75% of software engineers—who share similar professional contexts—faced career harm, such as demotion or isolation, the last time they reported wrongdoing internally.^[47] Broader studies corroborate this, showing that over 50% of employees across sectors fear job loss from disclosures, underscoring persistent systemic incentives against reporting.^[48] Post-Challenger data suggests some decline in overt suppression incidents due to cultural shifts and legal deterrents, yet quantitative evidence of overall reduction is sparse, with ongoing cases of professional ostracism highlighting whistleblowing's unreliability as a primary safeguard.^[49] Debates center on individual moral agency—where engineers bear personal responsibility to act despite risks—versus structural critiques that view whistleblowing as inefficient, often surfacing issues only after escalation rather than preventing them through proactive reputational pressures or incentive-aligned cultures.^[50] Proponents of the former emphasize ethical imperatives in codes, while skeptics argue over-reliance on heroic individual action ignores how organizational incentives perpetuate silence, advocating supplementary mechanisms like independent audits over ad-hoc disclosures.^[51] Empirical patterns from engineering incidents reveal that while whistleblowing can avert disasters when heeded, its low success rate in altering entrenched practices questions its standalone viability against market-driven accountability.

Professional Frameworks and Enforcement

Codes of Ethics from Societies and Bodies

The National Society of Professional Engineers (NSPE) established its Code of Ethics in 1964, evolving from earlier Canons of Ethics adopted in 1946 following initial proposals in 1935, to guide licensed professional engineers in the United States.^[18] The code comprises six Fundamental Canons, emphasizing paramount public safety, health, and welfare; competence within expertise; truthful public statements; faithful service to employers or clients; avoidance of deceptive acts; and honorable conduct to enhance the profession's reputation.^[52] It further includes Rules of Practice and Professional Obligations, addressing issues like conflicts of interest and sustainable development.^[53] The American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) maintains a distinct Code of Ethics, originally adopted in 1914 and comprehensively revised on October 26, 2020—the first major update since 1974—to prioritize brevity, behavioral intent, and a stakeholder hierarchy placing public welfare foremost, followed by clients, profession, and firm.^[16]^[21] This revision integrates diversity, inclusion, resilience, and legal compliance, while removing absolute prohibitions on certain competitive practices to reflect modern engineering contexts.^[54] Internationally, the World Federation of Engineering Organizations (WFEO) promulgated a Model Code of Ethics in 2001, serving as a template for national bodies worldwide, with principles centered on integrity, competent practice, leadership, environmental protection, and sustainable development.^[55]^[56] This model underscores truth, fairness, accountability, and public welfare, adapting to global challenges like climate adaptation through supplementary codes of practice.^[57] Enforcement variations reflect jurisdictional differences: U.S. codes like NSPE's tie directly to professional licensure, where violations can lead to disciplinary actions by state boards, whereas the UK's Engineering Council provides aspirational guidance through four principles—honesty and integrity, respect for life, law, environment, and public good; accuracy and rigour; and leadership—integrated into competence standards without mandatory licensing for all engineers.^[58] Surveys indicate engineers generally report higher ethical adherence than the broader UK workforce, though student perceptions often question full compliance feasibility, with over 30% doubting realistic adherence to codes in practice.^[59]^[60] These codes have demonstrably supported ethical decision-making, correlating with reduced corruption risks in infrastructure projects where adherence is emphasized.^[61]

Mechanisms of Self-Regulation

Engineering self-regulation encompasses profession-led processes such as standardized licensing examinations administered by organizations like the National Council of Examiners for Engineering and Surveying (NCEES), which require candidates to pass the Fundamentals of Engineering (FE) exam followed by the Principles and Practice of Engineering (PE) exam after gaining supervised experience, ensuring a baseline of competence without relying on external governmental mandates. State licensing boards, operating under model rules developed by NCEES, enforce these standards through ongoing requirements like continuing education and maintain disciplinary authority to investigate complaints, impose sanctions including fines, suspensions, or license revocations for violations such as negligence or misrepresentation.^[62] Peer review mechanisms, often integrated into project workflows by firms and societies, involve independent evaluations of designs and calculations to detect errors prior to implementation, providing a layer of internal accountability that leverages collective expertise.^[63] Empirical evidence indicates these mechanisms contribute to lower incidence of failures in licensed engineering domains compared to unregulated activities; for instance, structural collapses and other public safety incidents have been linked to exemptions from licensure requirements, where non-licensed personnel oversaw critical decisions, underscoring the protective role of mandatory professional oversight.^[64] Peer reviews demonstrably enhance project outcomes by identifying inaccuracies and compliance gaps early, reducing liability exposure and serving as evidentiary defense in disputes, with studies showing collaborative peer processes yield higher-quality feedback than solitary checks.^[65] Disciplinary proceedings, while infrequent—typically involving a small fraction of licensees annually—exert significant deterrence through publicized cases and the threat of career-ending revocations, as handled by state boards and informed by NSPE ethical reviews.^[66] Historical patterns reveal that lapses in these self-regulatory practices, such as inadequate peer scrutiny, have precipitated notable failures, yet consistent application correlates with sustained public safety in fields like civil and structural engineering.^[67] Advantages of self-regulation include adaptability to evolving technologies, drawing on practitioners' specialized knowledge to set dynamic standards faster than bureaucratic alternatives, thereby fostering innovation without compromising core competencies.^[68] Economic models suggest it minimizes lobbying costs and enhances welfare by aligning incentives for firms to exceed minimal thresholds voluntarily, avoiding the rigidities of top-down rules that could stifle productivity.^[69] Drawbacks involve risks of regulatory capture, where industry interests may dilute enforcement, though data from audited self-systems in technical fields show superior outcomes in expertise-driven compliance over generalized mandates.^[70] Overall, these internal levers have proven resilient in preempting ethical and technical lapses, with revocation and sanction data reflecting proactive rather than reactive efficacy.^[71]

Interactions with Government Regulation

Government regulation intersects with engineering ethics by imposing mandatory standards on design, construction, and operation that engineers must integrate into professional practice, often through licensing requirements, inspections, and penalties for non-compliance. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), established in 1970 under the Occupational Safety and Health Act, exemplifies beneficial interventions, correlating with a decline in U.S. workplace fatalities from approximately 38 per day in 1970 to 15 per day in 2023, alongside reductions in reported injuries and illnesses from 10.9 cases per 100 full-time workers in 1972 to 2.7 in 2022.^[72] These outcomes reflect causal links between enforced safety protocols and empirical improvements in hazard mitigation, though attribution is complicated by concurrent technological advances and industry shifts.^[73] However, regulatory burdens impose substantial economic costs that can hinder engineering progress. Estimates indicate that federal regulatory compliance expenditures reached $2.155 trillion in 2023, equivalent to about 7% of U.S. GDP, with manufacturing sectors facing disproportionate impacts from rules on emissions, safety, and labor.^[74] ^[75] Empirical analyses show that such accumulation slows innovation, as firms reduce R&D investment when scaling triggers additional oversight; for instance, a study of U.S. firms found that regulations tied to firm size depress patenting rates and productivity growth.^[39] In engineering contexts, this manifests as deferred projects and elevated costs, where compliance diverts resources from core technical advancements. Aviation engineering highlights tensions in regulatory enforcement. Following the 2018 and 2019 Boeing 737 MAX crashes, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) intensified scrutiny, revoking delegated certification authority and imposing production caps, which delayed approvals for variants like the MAX 7 and MAX 10 by years and contributed to Boeing's slowed competitiveness against Airbus.^[76] These measures, while aimed at safety, extended certification timelines—evident in ongoing holds for the 777X program—and prompted FAA proposals in 2025 for streamlined processes to mitigate innovation lags.^[77] Critics argue this post-incident overreach, influenced by political pressures, exemplifies how politicized oversight prioritizes risk aversion over evidence-based balancing, fostering delays without proportional safety gains.^[78] Debates persist on optimal calibration, with evidence favoring hybrid approaches where professional self-regulation predominates and government intervenes only for clear market failures like externalities in public safety. Infrastructure projects under statutes like the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) demonstrate regulatory pitfalls, as environmental reviews have extended timelines by 2–7 years on average for major developments, inflating costs by 20–50% and deterring private investment in engineering feats such as pipelines or bridges.^[79] Such delays, often amplified by litigation rather than technical necessities, underscore causal harms to societal welfare, including forgone economic growth and heightened vulnerability to aging systems, supporting calls for deregulation to enhance competition and engineer-led accountability.^[80]

Illustrative Case Studies

Pre-1980s Engineering Failures

The Tay Bridge disaster of December 28, 1879, involved the collapse of the central spans of the first Tay Rail Bridge in Scotland during a severe gale, plunging a passenger train into the Firth of Tay and resulting in approximately 75 deaths.^[81] The official inquiry attributed the failure primarily to inherent design defects, including inadequate lacing bars on the iron girders and poor-quality cast iron in the columns, compounded by ineffective construction supervision and workmanship under tight budget constraints imposed by the North British Railway Company.^[82] ^[81] Engineer Thomas Bouch bore significant accountability for these lapses in professional competence, as he overlooked warnings about the structure's vulnerability to high winds and prioritized cost savings over robust testing and material quality verification.^[83] However, systemic incentives, such as commercial pressures to complete the ambitious 2-mile span quickly and cheaply to capture rail traffic, contributed to the override of safety protocols, highlighting tensions between economic imperatives and public welfare obligations.^[84] The disaster prompted stricter British railway bridge design standards, including mandatory wind load considerations and independent inspections, underscoring the ethical imperative for engineers to challenge inadequate funding models that compromise structural integrity.^[85] The Great Boston Molasses Flood on January 15, 1919, saw a 50-foot-high steel storage tank rupture in Boston's North End, unleashing 2.3 million gallons of molasses in a 15-foot-high wave that killed 21 people, injured 150, and caused extensive property damage.^[86] Engineering analysis revealed the failure stemmed from substandard construction using thin, unwelded steel plates susceptible to brittle fracture in cold temperatures, exacerbated by the tank's untested design for hydrostatic pressure and lack of maintenance despite visible leaks and audible groans during filling.^[87] ^[88] The United States Industrial Alcohol Company, prioritizing wartime production profits over safety, ignored engineering warnings and ethical duties to investigate anomalies, reflecting a broader pattern where cost-cutting neglected public safety in industrial facilities.^[87] Legal proceedings held the company liable for negligence, leading to improved tank design codes, such as reinforced cylindrical vessels and mandatory pressure testing, which reinforced engineers' accountability to report and mitigate foreseeable hazards rather than defer to managerial production pressures.^[89] This case illustrates how individual competence failures, like insufficient material specifications, intersected with systemic profit-driven overrides, resulting in preventable casualties and prompting ethical reforms in chemical engineering practices.^[90] The Quebec Bridge collapse on August 29, 1907, during construction over the St. Lawrence River, claimed 75 lives when the south cantilever arm buckled under excessive compressive loads, marking one of North America's deadliest structural failures.^[91] Chief engineer Theodore Cooper's design underestimated dead weight by 50% due to flawed compression member calculations and reliance on unverified assumptions for the world's longest span ambition, without on-site oversight or adequate scale modeling.^[92] Economic pressures from the Quebec Bridge Company to minimize costs and expedite completion amid competitive rail demands led to overridden safety margins, as engineers deferred critical stress analyses to avoid delays.^[93] The Royal Commission report faulted both design errors and lapses in professional judgment, yet emphasized systemic issues like fragmented responsibility between consulting and fabricating parties, which diluted accountability.^[94] Post-failure reforms included Canadian steel bridge codes mandating factored load safety factors and peer-reviewed designs, teaching that engineers must prioritize empirical validation over optimistic projections influenced by commercial incentives.^[95] The Tacoma Narrows Bridge failure on November 7, 1940, demonstrated aerodynamic instability when the slender, lightweight suspension deck twisted and collapsed into Puget Sound amid 40-mph winds, with no human fatalities but significant economic loss.^[96] Designer Leon Moisseiff's adoption of deflection theory for a flexible deck ignored emerging wind-induced vibration risks, as pre-1940 bridge failures were misattributed to static loads rather than dynamic aeroelastic effects like flutter.^[97] ^[98] Cost-saving choices, including shallower stiffening trusses to reduce material expenses under Depression-era budgets, amplified the vulnerability, revealing ethical shortcomings in venturing beyond validated expertise without interdisciplinary consultation on novel phenomena.^[99] While chief engineer David Steinman criticized the design as overreliance on unproven theory, the incident balanced individual innovation hubris against systemic underinvestment in wind tunnel prototyping, ultimately driving U.S. bridge standards to incorporate aerodynamic testing and torsional rigidity requirements.^[100] These pre-1980 cases collectively reveal recurring patterns where technical miscalculations intertwined with economic imperatives eroded safety margins, yielding codes that enforce rigorous verification and ethical vigilance against such overrides.^[101]

Late 20th to Early 21st Century Incidents

The Space Shuttle Challenger disaster on January 28, 1986, exemplified failures in engineering integrity and whistleblowing amid organizational pressures. Engineers at Morton Thiokol, including Roger Boisjoly, had documented O-ring erosion in solid rocket boosters from prior flights and warned in a July 31, 1985, memo that cold temperatures could exacerbate seal failures, potentially causing "loss of human life."^[45] Despite recommending against launch due to forecasted low temperatures on launch day, management reversed the engineers' position after NASA officials expressed dissatisfaction, prioritizing schedule adherence over empirical risk data.^[102] The subsequent O-ring failure in the right booster led to the vehicle's breakup 73 seconds after liftoff, killing all seven crew members.^[103] Post-accident investigations highlighted groupthink suppressing data-driven dissent, with whistleblowers like Boisjoly and Allan McDonald facing retaliation for testifying on the decision process.^[104] The Ford Pinto case in the 1970s illustrated ethical tensions in cost-benefit analyses prioritizing economics over safety. Pre-production crash tests in 1970 revealed that rear-end impacts at 20-30 mph could rupture the Pinto's fuel tank, risking fires, yet Ford proceeded with production to meet competition timelines.^[105] An internal analysis estimated that modifying the tank would cost $11 per vehicle, while projected liabilities from 180 burn deaths, 180 serious injuries, and 2,100 burned vehicles over the model's life totaled $200,000—deeming fixes uneconomical.^[106] Actual incidents, including a 1973 Indiana crash resulting in three deaths, prompted lawsuits exposing the memo, leading the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration to declare the tank defective in 1978 and mandate recalls for 1.5 million 1971-1976 Pintos.^[105] This revealed integrity lapses where engineers' safety concerns yielded to managerial directives favoring short-term profits, without robust quantitative risk models accounting for non-monetary human costs.^[107] These incidents spurred advancements in engineering ethics by underscoring the need for formalized quantitative risk assessment over subjective judgments. Following Challenger, NASA adopted probabilistic risk models integrating empirical failure data and environmental factors, reducing reliance on qualitative overrides.^[108] The Pinto fallout contributed to enhanced automotive standards, including Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 301 updates emphasizing crashworthiness testing.^[106] Yet, they persist as cautionary examples of how complexity amplifies whistleblowing barriers, with group dynamics often eclipsing first-hand technical evidence unless supported by institutional safeguards for dissent.^[5]

Recent Controversies (2010s-2025)

The Boeing 737 MAX aircraft faced intense scrutiny following two fatal crashes attributed to flaws in its Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS), a software designed to prevent stalls by automatically adjusting the horizontal stabilizer. On October 29, 2018, Lion Air Flight 610 crashed into the Java Sea shortly after takeoff from Jakarta, killing all 189 aboard, and on March 10, 2019, Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 plunged near Addis Ababa, resulting in 157 deaths, for a total of 346 fatalities. Investigations revealed that MCAS relied on a single angle-of-attack sensor prone to erroneous data, and Boeing had not adequately disclosed its functionality to pilots or regulators during certification.^[109]^[110] The U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) had delegated significant certification authority to Boeing under its Organization Designation Authorization program, allowing the company to self-certify compliance, which a 2020 congressional report criticized as enabling shortcuts and inadequate oversight.^[109]^[111] By 2021, a U.S. Department of Transportation Inspector General report identified weaknesses in FAA processes, including insufficient independence in reviews, leading to Boeing's $2.5 billion settlement with the U.S. Department of Justice in 2021 and ongoing production audits revealing compliance failures as late as 2024.^[111] The 2023 implosion of the OceanGate Titan submersible underscored tensions between rapid innovation and established safety protocols in experimental engineering. On June 18, 2023, the Titan, a cylindrical carbon-fiber and titanium vessel designed for tourist dives to the Titanic wreck, suffered a catastrophic failure at approximately 3,300 meters depth in the North Atlantic, killing all five occupants, including CEO Stockton Rush.^[112] The design deviated from conventional spherical shapes proven for deep-sea pressures, and OceanGate rejected third-party certification from bodies like DNV, citing it as stifling innovation; internal and external experts had warned since 2018 of hull fatigue risks from repeated dives and acoustic anomalies detected in prior expeditions.^[113] A 2025 U.S. Coast Guard Marine Board of Investigation report detailed systemic lapses, including absent risk management frameworks, unqualified crew for emergency responses, and prioritization of commercial viability over empirical testing, with no formal safety director in place.^[114] These findings fueled debates on whether deregulatory approaches to "disruptive" technologies enable ethical oversights, as the incident prompted calls for international standards on private submersibles without yielding immediate regulatory changes by 2025.^[115] The February 6, 2023, earthquakes in Turkey and Syria, registering magnitudes of 7.8 and 7.5, exposed enforcement failures in construction amid entrenched corruption, contributing to over 50,000 deaths and the collapse of more than 300,000 buildings. In Turkey, post-quake assessments found that up to 90% of failures in urban areas like Hatay and Kahramanmaraş stemmed from substandard materials, unpermitted alterations, and violations of seismic codes enacted after 1999 quakes, with empirical data showing modern reinforced-concrete structures pancaking due to inadequate beam-column joints and excess stories added illegally.^[116]^[117] Government amnesties under President Erdoğan's administration, including a 2018 program forgiving fines for 7 million buildings in exchange for fees, incentivized non-compliance, while lax inspections—often influenced by bribery—prioritized economic growth over adherence to engineering standards.^[118] By 2024, accountability efforts stalled, with probes into over 1,000 contractors yielding few prosecutions amid protections for politically connected developers, highlighting how systemic graft undermines ethical codes more than their absence, as collapsed buildings in compliant zones fared better per structural analyses.^[119]^[120] Recovery data through 2025 indicated persistent vulnerabilities, with rebuilt structures facing similar risks absent reformed permitting.^[121]

Ongoing Debates and Critiques

Self-Regulation versus Excessive Oversight

In engineering ethics, the tension between self-regulation by professional societies and licensing boards and externally imposed government oversight centers on balancing public safety with operational efficiency and innovation. Proponents of self-regulation argue that internalized ethical standards, enforced through mechanisms like state licensing boards and codes from organizations such as the National Society of Professional Engineers (NSPE), foster accountability without the bureaucratic inertia of top-down mandates. These bodies investigate complaints and impose sanctions, with disciplinary actions remaining relatively infrequent; for instance, NSPE's Board of Ethical Review has issued opinions on fewer than 500 cases since the 1950s, amid over 500,000 licensed professional engineers in the U.S. as of 2024, suggesting effective deterrence through peer accountability rather than pervasive violations.^[66]^[122] Critics of excessive oversight contend that layered government regulations often introduce delays and cost escalations without commensurate safety gains, as evidenced by U.S. infrastructure projects where federal permitting processes extend timelines by 1 to 2 years on average due to litigation and compliance hurdles, adding billions in development expenses. Economic analyses indicate that self-regulatory frameworks, leveraging industry expertise, achieve oversight at lower costs than governmental alternatives, as self-regulatory organizations (SROs) conduct investigations more efficiently while maintaining safety standards comparable to or exceeding state mandates. In engineering contexts, this efficiency preserves innovation incentives, avoiding the stagnation seen in overregulated sectors where precautionary rules prioritize risk aversion over practical outcomes.^[123]^[124]^[125] Empirical evidence supports self-reliance in high-stakes fields; the 1978 Airline Deregulation Act reduced federal economic controls while preserving safety oversight through the Federal Aviation Administration, resulting in a continued decline in jet fatality rates post-deregulation, with no detectable increase in accidents despite a 50% surge in passenger volume and entry of new carriers. This contrasts with precautionary government mandates, often advocated from perspectives emphasizing systemic safeguards, which can embed politicized biases—such as disproportionate emphasis on environmental litigation—that inflate costs without proportional risk reduction, as critiqued in analyses of regulatory capture and inefficiency. Market-oriented viewpoints, prioritizing incentives like reputational accountability and liability, align with these outcomes, demonstrating that self-regulation harnesses causal mechanisms of competition and expertise to sustain ethical conduct more dynamically than rigid oversight.^[126]^[127]^[128]

Shortcomings in Ethics Education and Assessment

Engineering ethics education often suffers from marginal integration into core curricula, typically treated as an add-on module with minimal credit allocation, as evidenced by accreditation self-assessments where ethics ranks lowest in emphasis.^[6] A 2021 multi-level review of empirical and theoretical literature highlights systemic gaps, including ad-hoc implementation without cohesive strategies and insufficient linkage to technical coursework, leading to fragmented learning that fails to embed ethical reasoning in practical engineering contexts.^[129] Faculty challenges exacerbate these issues, with instructors frequently lacking specialized training in ethics pedagogy and relying on resource-intensive co-teaching models that receive little institutional support.^[6] Assessment practices reveal further deficiencies, primarily in capturing real-world ethical behaviors and organizational cultures that influence professional decisions. One critique posits that standard assessments overlook behavioral outcomes, focusing instead on abstract knowledge that does not translate to on-the-job application, thereby underestimating contextual factors like workplace pressures.^[130] Another identifies cultural misalignment, where evaluations ignore how engineering environments prioritize efficiency over ethical deliberation, resulting in metrics that assess isolated competencies rather than integrated ethical performance. Longitudinal data from a 2010-2012 study of 450 U.S. engineering undergraduates across 16 institutions showed no significant retention of ethics knowledge, with average scores on Fundamentals of Engineering-style questions remaining static at approximately 3 out of 5 correct answers over two years, despite gains in moral reasoning scores.^[131] Pedagogical approaches emphasizing emotional responses or broader social justice themes over rational, technical analysis have drawn criticism for diluting focus on verifiable safety outcomes. While emotions influence decision-making, engineering contexts demand prioritized rational evaluation of causal risks, such as structural failures, where evidence links ethical lapses directly to technical oversights rather than diffuse societal factors.^[132] Critics contend that infusing social justice elements risks alienating students and diverting from core professional duties like public safety, without demonstrated causal ties to reduced incidents, as traditional codes emphasize paramount welfare through competence.^[133] Reforms should prioritize rigorous, evidence-based training integrated with technical simulations and behaviorally oriented assessments to enhance retention and applicability, countering ideological expansions lacking empirical validation in safety improvements.^[129]

Tensions Between Innovation, Economics, and Ethical Constraints

Engineers frequently encounter conflicts where the imperative to innovate rapidly for economic competitiveness clashes with ethical obligations to mitigate foreseeable harms. In fields like artificial intelligence and quantum computing, ethical scrutiny over potential misuse, such as breaking encryption or amplifying biases, has prompted calls for precautionary measures that could delay deployment. For instance, proposals for temporary pauses in advanced AI training, as advocated in open letters signed by over 1,000 experts in 2023, highlight fears of uncontrolled capabilities, yet such restraints risk ceding technological leadership to less-regulated actors, potentially costing billions in foregone productivity gains.^[134]^[135] Economic analyses underscore how overly stringent ethical constraints can impede research and development, diverting resources toward compliance rather than breakthroughs. Empirical studies indicate that regulatory burdens in high-tech sectors correlate with reduced innovation rates, as firms allocate 10-15% more to legal and oversight functions, squeezing core R&D budgets in competitive markets. In quantum computing, ethical concerns over dual-use applications have led governments to impose export controls and funding conditions since 2022, slowing international collaboration and extending timelines for practical applications like materials simulation by years. Conversely, market-driven incentives have accelerated sustainable engineering, with solar photovoltaic costs plummeting 89% from 2010 to 2020 through iterative improvements, yielding environmental benefits without top-down ethical mandates.^[136]^[137] Critics argue that "ethics washing"—superficial adherence to ethical guidelines to satisfy mandates or secure subsidies—undermines genuine progress, particularly in green energy transitions where firms tout compliance amid supply chain abuses. Verifiable risks, such as structural failures from cost-cutting, warrant rigorous ethical prioritization, as evidenced by historical incidents where economic pressures precipitated disasters; however, speculative harms from unproven technologies lack causal evidence to justify halting advancements that demonstrably enhance welfare, like AI's role in accelerating vaccine development during the COVID-19 pandemic. Prioritizing empirically grounded constraints over hypothetical doomsdays preserves engineering's capacity to deliver net societal gains.^[138]^[139]^[140]

References

[1]
Code of Ethics | National Society of Professional Engineers
This is the fundamental document guiding engineering practice. The ethical standards in the code address which services engineers should provide.
[2]
[PDF] Code of Ethics for Engineers
Conduct themselves honorably, responsibly, ethically, and lawfully so as to enhance the honor, reputation, and usefulness of the profession. II. Rules of ...
[3]
Ethics - ASCE
The American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) Code of Ethics is the model for professional conduct for ASCE members. ... Test your civil engineering ethics ...
[4]
The Space Shuttle Challenger Disaster - Online Ethics Center
Jun 1, 1992 · The issues covered in the student handout include the importance of an engineer's responsibility to public welfare, the need for this ...
[5]
Ethical Lessons Learned from the Challenger Disaster
Jul 1, 2024 · And some of those managerial and engineering decisions inevitably will carry moral ramifications. We should analyze these decisions, so that we ...
[6]
A Multi-level Review of Engineering Ethics Education
Aug 24, 2021 · This paper aims to review the empirical and theoretical research on engineering ethics education, by focusing on the challenges reported in the literature.
[7]
Roman Aqueducts - Engineering and Technology History Wiki
Oct 29, 2015 · Aqueducts were built for a utilitarian purpose. They supplied the water that is the lifeblood of any civilization.
[8]
Roman Aqueducts: Masterworks of Classic Engineering
Feb 6, 2024 · Roman aqueducts were hydraulic structures that enabled water distribution, using complex systems, bridges, and gravity, and were made with ...
[9]
Historical and Technical Notes on Aqueducts from Prehistoric to ...
The aim of this paper is to present the evolution of aqueduct technologies through the millennia, from prehistoric to medieval times.
[10]
Failures - Dee Bridge Collapse - Penn State College of Engineering
England experienced a rapid infrastructural expansion in the 1840's that would eventually be referred to as the "Railway Mania" era. Such projects often relied ...
[11]
Following the Case of the River Dee Bridge Disaster, 1847
Oct 29, 2013 · This paper establishes relations—historical, material and evidential connections—between two responses to a 'crisis'. The first features in ...
[12]
(PDF) Aesthetics versus function: The fall of the Dee bridge, 1847
Aug 9, 2025 · We have reviewed the witness evidence and concluded that the bridge probably failed by fatigue due to a defect at a sharp corner in a flange on a girder.
[13]
Isambard Kingdom Brunel - ASCE
Isambard Kingdom Brunel, son of the distinguished engineer Sir Marc Isambard Brunel, was both an extravagant and prolific engineer in his own right.
[14]
The Tay Bridge Disaster Engineering Essay | UKEssays.com
Jan 1, 2015 · As it was unethical on part of the Bouch to compromise safety for budget. And it was a bad practice and unethical to use repaired piers on a new ...<|control11|><|separator|>
[15]
The Tay Bridge Disaster - PEimpact - Recognizing the impact of PEs
Dec 16, 2021 · This bridge was to have a high span so that sailing ships plying between the UK and Australia could pass beneath on their way in and out of the firth.<|separator|>
[16]
Code of Ethics - ASCE
First adopted in 1914, the ASCE Code of Ethics is the model for professional conduct for ASCE members. The Code of Ethics was most recently updated on ...
[17]
Full article: A historico-ethical perspective on engineering education
Primary examples are the codes of ethics of the AIEE, adopted in 1912, of the ASME and of the ASCE, both of which were adopted in 1914. Each of these three ...
[18]
History of the Code of Ethics for Engineers
The first reference to a Society Code of Ethics is found in the May 1935 issue of The American Engineer in the form of a suggestion for membership consideration ...<|separator|>
[19]
Engineering Ethics of Chernobyl and the Three Mile Island - IvyPanda
Jul 28, 2024 · This paper analyzes the Chernobyl nuclear power plant accident and the Three Mile Island Incident in the context of engineering ethics.
[20]
Three Mile Island Nuclear Accident - Online Ethics Center
The Three Mile Island accident began with a pump failure, leading to a partial meltdown, a stuck open PORV, and a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA).
[21]
ASCE installs new Code of Ethics
Nov 10, 2020 · Strengthened language on an engineer's ethical responsibility to “adhere to the principles of sustainable development.” • Removed outdated ...Missing: innovation | Show results with:innovation
[22]
Part 2 of 2: ASCE's new code of ethics explained
Jan 2, 2021 · The new Code of Ethics is much more prescriptive. Section 2a requires that engineers “adhere to the principles of sustainable development,”Missing: revisions innovation
[23]
[PDF] Engineering U.S. Responsible AI Policy, A Survey, 2020-2025
Aug 19, 2025 · Developing Responsible AI responsibly implies addressing issues of ethics, bias, harm, and untruths while keeping alert to future dangers in new.
[24]
Review A high-level overview of AI ethics - ScienceDirect.com
Sep 10, 2021 · This review embraces inherent interdisciplinarity in the field by providing a high-level introduction to AI ethics drawing upon philosophy, law, and computer ...
[25]
[PDF] Global Engineering Ethics: What? Why? How? and When?
Dec 29, 2022 · Ethics is central to engineering, since technology is never value neural. It exists to make peoples' lives better and, therefore, inevitably ...
[26]
Enron Scandal and Accounting Fraud: What Happened?
The Enron scandal drew attention to accounting and corporate fraud, as shareholders lost $74 billion in the four years leading up to its bankruptcy, and its ...Missing: engineering | Show results with:engineering
[27]
[PDF] Maintaining society's trust in the engineering profession
The report proposes a series of actions for the engineering profession to take forward with the aim of promoting an ethical culture within the engineering.
[28]
[PDF] Annual Review 2022 | Engineering Council
The most recent Ipsos. MORI Veracity Index shows engineers are second only to nurses as the most trusted profession, with 87% of those polled trusting engineers ...
[29]
Engineering Ethics for a Globalized World | Request PDF
This volume identifies, discusses and addresses the wide array of ethical issues that have emerged for engineers due to the rise of a global economy.Missing: post- | Show results with:post-
[30]
[PDF] ASCE Code of Ethics - Updated July 2017
Jul 29, 2017 · Engineers must use their skills for human welfare, be honest, strive for competence, support societies, prioritize public safety, and avoid ...
[31]
Engineering Ethics: Competence - ASCE
Apr 22, 2021 · Competence is defined as the possession of a required skill, knowledge, or qualification. It is also an ethical obligation for civil engineers.
[32]
[PDF] ENGINEERING LICENSURE QUALIFICATIONS TASK FORCE
Most professions preferred self-regulation to licensure, arguing (in the case of engineering) that only engineers should pass judgment on other engineers.
[33]
Mandatory Continuing Education - ASCE
Feb 1, 2009 · As of January 2009, some 32 states have made continuing education certification a requirement for the relicensing of engineers.
[34]
[PDF] 2024-2025 Criteria for Accrediting Engineering Programs - ABET
an ability to apply engineering design to produce solutions that meet specified needs with consideration of public health, safety, and welfare, as well as ...
[35]
A critical analysis of construction incident trends and strategic ...
Study reveals patterns, trends, and vulnerable areas to identify main reasons for incidents and effective interventions.
[36]
Engineers' perceptions of their responsibility for public safety
This paper presents an analysis of the perceptions of responsibility among practicing engineers regarding their role in public safety.
[37]
A Brief History of Traffic Deaths in the U.S.
May 16, 2024 · More and faster cars, wider highways, and unsafe driver behaviors contribute to tens of thousands of deaths every year—but researchers see a ...
[38]
The US Interstate Highway System: 40 Year Report
The interstate highway system has positively influenced economic growth, reduced traffic deaths and injuries, provided substantial benefits to users, and been a ...
[39]
Does regulation hurt innovation? This study says yes - MIT Sloan
Jun 7, 2023 · Firms are less likely to innovate if increasing their head count leads to additional regulation, a new study from MIT Sloan finds.
[40]
Developing scientifically validated bias and diversity trainings ... - NIH
Research consistently shows that non-scientific bias, equity, and diversity trainings do not work, and often make bias and diversity problems worse.
[41]
III.2.b. - National Society of Professional Engineers
If the client or employer insists on such unprofessional conduct, they shall notify the proper authorities and withdraw from further service on the project.
[42]
Duty To Report Violation—Anonymous Complaint
Jan 1, 2002 · The duty of engineers to come forward with information on ethical violations by other engineers is a basic ethical obligation.Missing: whistleblowing | Show results with:whistleblowing
[43]
[PDF] Whistleblowing -- NSPE Case No. 82-5 - Online Ethics Center
The Code only requires that the engineer withdraw from a project and report to proper authorities when the circumstances involve endangerment of the. Page 4 ...
[44]
The Whistleblower Protection Act (WPA): A Legal Overview
Dec 30, 2024 · The Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989 (WPA or the Act) provides protections for most federal employees who disclose government illegality, ...
[45]
Roger Boisjoly and the Challenger Disaster - The Novum
Jan 31, 2022 · Olivia Burgess explores the case of engineer-turned-whistleblower Roger Boisjoly, who predicted the Challenger explosion and whose ...
[46]
[PDF] Whistleblower Protection Plan - NASA
The table below indicates those educational opportunities that inform employees about their rights as whistleblowers and their protections under federal law and ...
[47]
75% of Software Engineers Faced Retaliation Last Time They ...
Nov 20, 2023 · Of those who speak up, 75% report facing retaliation the last time they reported wrongdoing to their employers.
[48]
Half of employees fear losing their job if they blow the whistle ...
Oct 7, 2024 · Half (51 per cent) of UK employees would not feel safe disclosing if their company was breaking the law, new research has revealed.
[49]
[PDF] Challenger Space Shuttle Disaster Bibliography - LibraOpen
A decade after the Challenger explosion, NASA has made major changes to increase ... with what we know about whistle-blowers, for example, that whistle-blowers ...
[50]
Whistleblowing | Meaningful Work: Rethinking Professional Ethics
On occasion, whistleblowing may be a necessary evil or even admirable, but it is bad news all around. It is proof of organizational trouble and management ...
[51]
[PDF] THE PROMISE AND PERILS OF TECH WHISTLEBLOWING
Today, whistleblowing is an important part of broader efforts to bring accountability and transparency to the tech industry. Yet existing frameworks for ...
[52]
NSPE Code of Ethics for Engineers
Engineers must perform under a standard of professional behavior that requires adherence to the highest principles of ethical conduct.
[53]
[PDF] NSPE Ethics Reference Guide
Engineers shall approve only those engineering documents that are in conformity with applicable standards. c. Engineers shall not reveal facts, data, or ...
[54]
Part 1 of 2: ASCE's new code of ethics explained
Dec 1, 2020 · Create safe, resilient, and sustainable infrastructure. Treat all persons with respect, dignity, and fairness in a manner that fosters equitable ...
[55]
The Code of Ethics - WFEO
The WFEO code of ethics includes demonstrating integrity, practicing competently, exercising leadership, and protecting the environment.
[56]
[PDF] WFEO (UNESCO) Model Code of Ethics - 2001
The code emphasizes truth, honesty, respect, fairness, competence, accountability, and sustainable development, including public and environmental protection.
[57]
[PDF] WFEO MODEL CODE OF ETHICS PREAMBLE
The WFEO Model Code of Ethics is designed to assist member organisations in guiding ethical behavior by formulating their own Codes of Ethics.
[58]
Guidance on ethical principles - Engineering Council
EERG published its report, 'Engineering Ethics: Maintaining society's trust in the engineering profession', in February 2022. The report was launched at an ...Missing: self- | Show results with:self-
[59]
[PDF] Ethics in the engineering profession
Jun 1, 2023 · Key Finding 1. Engineers and technicians report good ethical practice and ethical culture in engineering compared to the general UK workforce, ...
[60]
[PDF] ETHICS IN ENGINEERING: STUDENT PERCEPTIONS AND THEIR ...
Over. 30% of the students surveyed also stated that they do not believe that professional engineers can realistically be expected to abide by the code at all ...
[61]
The Role of Engineering Ethics in Mitigating Corruption in ... - NIH
Jul 18, 2024 · This paper reviews professional codes of ethics, and relevant literature on corruption mitigation in the context of civil engineering infrastructure ...
[62]
[PDF] model rules - NCEES
Jan 1, 2024 · 250 DISCIPLINARY ACTIONS ... Professional engineer—by education, examination, and experience, or by comity.
[63]
[PDF] Risk Tip 10 – Essential Benefits of Project Peer Review
If an issue or claim later should occur, a proper peer review will serve as a solid defense that the engineering team acted reasonably and prudently in.
[64]
Engineering Licensing-Exemptions Put the Public at Unnecessary ...
Feb 9, 2022 · The common characteristic? All the engineering organizations behind these failures were exempt from placing licensed engineers in charge.Missing: effectiveness | Show results with:effectiveness
[65]
Peer Review in Design: Pluses and Perils - Risk Strategies
Peer review in design is a powerful tool for improving project quality, mitigating risk, and fostering collaboration.
[66]
Board of Ethical Review Cases
May 2, 2024 · The following constitute all published opinions of the NSPE Board of Ethical Review. Opinions issued by the NSPE Board of Ethical review ...Missing: disciplinary | Show results with:disciplinary
[67]
[PDF] Countering Threats to Licensure with ASCE's Engineer Tomorrow ...
They further concluded that inadequate peer review failed to detect the calculation errors in the bridge design. In these two examples, it was the failure ...
[68]
[PDF] Federal Agency Use Of Audited Self-Regulation As A Regulatory ...
Audited self-regulation is a regulatory technique used by federal agencies, with advantages like technical expertise and flexibility, but also disadvantages ...
[69]
Allocating lawmaking powers: Self-regulation vs government ...
Relative to the legislative solution, such self-regulation increases firms' profits and may increase welfare by reducing the lobbying expenditures of consumers.Missing: cons | Show results with:cons
[70]
[PDF] SELF REGULATION AND THE PROFESSIONS - HAL
Oct 12, 2017 · Following economic analysis, another problem with self regulation is its relation with the general interest. Kay and Vickers insist on the fact ...Missing: engineering | Show results with:engineering
[71]
Engineering Ethics Violations: Nationwide Review - PDH-PRO
By reviewing disciplinary actions across multiple state boards, we've identified the most frequent types of ethical violations that result in fines, suspensions ...
[72]
https://www.osha.gov/data/commonstats
[73]
Nearly 50 years of occupational safety and health data
Jul 17, 2020 · Improving workplace fatality statistics. In 1992, BLS established the CFOI to accurately enumerate and capture details of fatal work-related ...
[74]
Burdensome Federal Regulations Cost Economy $2 Trillion Annually
Apr 30, 2025 · Our highly conservative $2.155 trillion regulatory cost figure is equivalent to approximately 7 percent of GDP ...
[75]
[PDF] The Cost of Federal Regulation to the U.S. Economy, Manufacturing ...
U.S. federal government regulations cost an estimated $3.079 trillion in 2022 (in 2023 dollars), an amount equal to 12% of U.S. GDP. These costs fall unevenly ...
[76]
FAA begins to ease restrictions on Boeing - Leeham News
Oct 6, 2025 · Certification of the 737 MAX 7 and MAX 10 derivatives was paused during the 21-month grounding of the MAX 8 and MAX 9 following the March 10, ...Missing: increased scrutiny effects
[77]
FAA Plans Overhaul To Speed Up Certification Of New Airplanes
Sep 18, 2025 · FAA plans to streamline aircraft certification. Here's how delays with Boeing's 777X and 737 MAX may shape the planes you'll fly soon.
[78]
[PDF] The Impact of Regulation on Innovation in the United States
This section examines the empirical evidence on the impact of government regulation on innovation. The review is organized by industry for readability, as ...Missing: overreach | Show results with:overreach
[79]
[PDF] What impacts the performance of large-scale government projects?
In addition to complexity, studies have indicated that delay of government- initiated infrastructure projects is a result of inadequate resources, public ...
[80]
Assessing the impact of regulations and standards on innovation in ...
This paper critically examines the idea that regulation stifles innovation in the field of AI. Current trends in AI regulation, particularly the proposed ...
[81]
The Tay Bridge Collapse– a failure from design - structures centre
Oct 31, 2022 · In 1879, the Tay Bridge collapsed due to inadequate design, ineffective supervision, poor workmanship, tight budget restrictions...
[82]
A Conflict of Interest at the Tay Bridge Disaster Inquiry
The central part of the Tay Bridge collapsed during a storm on the evening of Sunday 28 December 1879. A train and carriages, and all crew and passengers, fell ...
[83]
Engineering Lessons from Tay Bridge | PDF | Railway - Scribd
- The official inquiry concluded that the bridge failed due to inherent defects in its structure and that Bouch was mainly to blame for failures in the design, ...
[84]
[PDF] Engineering Dreams Into Disaster: History of the Tay Bridge
Without the Tay, the magnificent edifice of the century, the Forth Bridge, over- engineered and over-cautious, would not have existed. Nor would the transition ...
[85]
The Tay Bridge Disaster: A Lesson in Design and Maintenance
Jan 11, 2017 · The investigation into the disaster concluded that the bridge's poor design and maintenance had been major reasons why it failed.<|separator|>
[86]
Why the Great Molasses Flood Was So Deadly | HISTORY
Jan 15, 2019 · When a steel tank full of molasses ruptured in 1919, physics and neglect contributed to making the accident so horrific, leading to 21 deaths.
[87]
[PDF] The Molasses Flood of 1919 and Other Ethical Failures in Engineering
Yet another instance of negligence was the failure to investigate why the tank groaned when being filled and why the tank leaked profusely—certainly not ...
[88]
The 1919 Boston Molasses Flood: 21st Century Engineering ...
A modern engineering analysis of the Boston storage tank that ruptured and released a flood of molasses into streets in 1919 discovered design flaws that led ...Missing: ethics | Show results with:ethics<|separator|>
[89]
The Molasses Flood of 1919 and Other Ethical Failures in Engineering
These concepts are illustrated with a description of the Great Boston Molasses Flood of 1919, for which a new possible cause was identified only in 2014.Missing: disaster | Show results with:disaster
[90]
[PDF] Ethical Exotica: Small, Sticky Cases For Analysis - ASEE PEER
This paper examines two relatively unknown cases involving molasses storage tank collapses: the Boston Molasses Flood of 1919 and the 1998 Ingenio Melchor ...
[91]
Quebec Bridge, The First Failure, 1907 - Structure Magazine
a) The collapse of the Quebec Bridge resulted from the failure of the lower chords in the anchor arm near the main pier. The failure of these chords was due to ...Missing: accountability | Show results with:accountability<|separator|>
[92]
Infrastructure Disaster – Quebec Bridge 1907 – Engineering and ...
The Commissioners found responsibility for the failure to lie at the ... Next: Engineering Failures – Florida University Overpass Collapse 2018. Back ...Missing: accountability | Show results with:accountability
[93]
Quebec Bridge Collapse and Ethical Issues Research Paper
Apr 12, 2022 · Hence, the collapse of the Quebec Bridge forms one of the major structural failures of the 20th century that highlighted the need of ethics in ...Missing: accountability | Show results with:accountability
[94]
[PDF] civil engineering - lessons from failures—quebec bridge - AustLII
Although the failure was 100 years ago, the lessons to be learned are timeless. The lessons from this and other past failures are still relevant and worth ...Missing: accountability | Show results with:accountability
[95]
Lessons from the Quebec Bridge Collapses: Enhancing Safety with ...
Nov 27, 2024 · The Quebec Bridge disasters underscored significant flaws in project management, including: Inadequate Design Verification: The inability to ...
[96]
November 7, 1940: Collapse of the Tacoma Narrows Bridge
Early suspension-bridge failures resulted from light spans with very flexible decks that were vulnerable to wind (aerodynamic) forces. In the late 19th century ...
[97]
Tacoma Narrows Bridge history - Bridge - Lessons from failure - wsdot
The best suspension bridge designers in the 1930s believed that earlier failures had occurred because of heavy traffic loading and poor workmanship. Wind was ...Missing: ethics | Show results with:ethics
[98]
[PDF] Ethical Issues from the Tacoma Narrows Bridge Collapse
It is then that we must rely largely on judgment and if, as a result, errors, or failures occur, we must accept them as a price for human progress.” This raises ...
[99]
Tacoma Narrows Bridges - ASCE
The 1940 bridge was initially designed by Clark Eldridge, of the Washington State Highway Department, an engineer not considered among the elite for that type ...
[100]
[PDF] Ethical Issues from the Tacoma Narrows Bridge Collapse
It is then that we must rely largely on judgment and if, as a result, errors, or failures occur, we must accept them as a price for human progress.” This raises ...
[101]
The Role of Engineering versus Management. Cumulative Failure ...
Jun 25, 2020 · PDF | The article investigates engineering disasters as failures of either engineering design, project management decisions, or management ...
[102]
The Challenger Space Shuttle Disaster | Blog of the APA
Jul 16, 2025 · A central component of my Engineering Ethics ... I pause it around 13:30 to discuss the technical failure and the decision process prior to launch ...
[103]
Truth, Lies, and O-Rings: Inside the Space Shuttle Challenger Disaster
... engineering and honoring Allan J. McDonald, MSU alumnus and Challenger explosion whistleblower. ... Failure Team report submitted to the Presidential Commission.
[104]
[PDF] Roger Boisjoly and the Challenger Disaster: The Ethical Dimensions
ABSTRACT. This case study focuses on Roger Boisjoly's attempt to prevent the launch of the Challenger and subsequent quest to set the record straight ...
[105]
Ford Pinto - Engineering.com
Oct 24, 2006 · One of the tools that Ford used to argue for the delay was a “cost-benefit analysis” of altering the fuel tanks. According to Ford's estimates, ...
[106]
[PDF] Ethics: An Alternative Account of the Ford Pinto Case
Based on the test results, NHTSA declared that the Pinto gas tank was a safety defect. Ford then agreed to “voluntarily” recall all 1971-1976 Pintos—the ...
[107]
Engineering Ethics: The Ford Pinto Exploding Fuel Tank - NoonPi
Ford's engineers discovered in pre-production crash tests that rear-end collisions would rupture the Pinto's fuel system extremely easily.
[108]
Engineering Ethics and Risk - Online Ethics Center
The Challenger case is utilized as a lesson in unsound and unethical risk assessment. Gotterbarn, Don, Tony Clear and Choon-Tuck-Kwan. 2008.
[109]
Congressional Inquiry Faults Boeing And FAA Failures For Deadly ...
Sep 16, 2020 · A sweeping congressional inquiry into the development and certification of Boeing's troubled 737 Max airplane finds damning evidence of failures at both Boeing ...Missing: deaths | Show results with:deaths
[110]
How the Boeing 737 Max Disaster Looks to a Software Developer
The Boeing 737 Max disaster looks to a software developer. Design shortcuts meant to make a new plane seem like an old, familiar one are to blame.
[111]
[PDF] Weaknesses in FAA's Certification and Delegation Processes ...
Feb 23, 2021 · However, two fatal accidents in 2018 and 2019 involving the Boeing 737 MAX 8 raised concerns about FAA's oversight and certification of civilian ...Missing: shortcuts | Show results with:shortcuts
[112]
OceanGate Was Warned of Safety Concerns with Titanic Mission
Jun 20, 2023 · Experts inside and outside the company warned of potential dangers and urged the company to undergo a certification process.
[113]
Titanic sub updates: OceanGate knew about safety concerns for years
Jun 21, 2023 · Experts from within and outside OceanGate raised concerns about the safety of its Titan submersible as far back as 2018, years before it went missing.
[114]
[PDF] Implosion of the Submersible TITAN (CG1788361) in ... - dco.uscg.mil
Aug 4, 2025 · In conclusion, the investigation revealed multiple flaws in OceanGate's safety and risk management protocols. The lack of a Director of ...
[115]
Sacrificing Safety in the Name of Innovation: the OceanGate Titan ...
Apr 18, 2024 · In 2023, the OceanGate Titan submersible embarked on a mission to visit the Titanic, ending in a catastrophic implosion and the loss of all five souls on board.
[116]
The Human Costs of Systemic Corruption - Just Security
Aug 11, 2025 · In 2023, Turkey was hit by a devastating earthquake – one that claimed some 50,000 lives. More than 300,000 buildings collapsed, crushing entire ...
[117]
Turkey-Syria earthquakes: deficiencies in building structures and ...
Feb 5, 2024 · Turkey-Syria earthquakes: deficiencies in building structures and construction shortcuts were main cause of casualties. A partially-collapsed ...
[118]
Political corruption and earthquakes: Governance in Turkey under ...
Apr 18, 2024 · The recent earthquake of 2023, which destroyed many buildings, has highlighted the continued presence of corruption in the Turkish public ...INTRODUCTION · THE GROWTH OF TURKEY'S... · TURKEY'S ANTI... · POLICY...
[119]
How Turkey protected the powerful from earthquake accountability
Nov 21, 2024 · Almost two years have passed since the 2023 earthquakes. Turkish authorities have been clogging legal proceedings while victims have lost hope in justice.
[120]
'Rotten buildings': Corruption in spotlight after Turkey quake
Feb 13, 2023 · The death toll in Turkey's worst earthquake in modern history is fueling longstanding criticism about lax enforcement of construction regulations.
[121]
Turkey and Syria face long road to recovery after earthquakes
Feb 16, 2023 · But Erdogan's critics have said that his government enabled corruption in the construction sector with weak enforcement of building regulations ...
[122]
PE and PLS totals by discipline up to and through 10/16/2024
Oct 23, 2024 · The data on the Download Resource button above shows the total number of current PE (Professional Engineer) and PLS (Professional Land Surveyor) licensed by ...
[123]
Unlocking US federal permitting: A sustainable growth imperative
Jul 28, 2025 · Projects subject to litigation in district courts typically face delays of 1.0 to 2.0 years, and those that appeal in circuit courts ( ...
[124]
[PDF] Curtail Regulatory Delays for Infrastructure Projects | Republican ...
Inefficiencies in the federal permitting process often delay U.S. infrastructure projects for decades and add billions of dollars to project development costs.
[125]
Self-Regulation and Government Oversight | Request PDF
Aug 10, 2025 · The main advantage of SROs is that they are often capable of conducting regulatory investigations at lower costs than governments (Braithwaite ...
[126]
What Deregulation Has Meant for Airline Safety
The number of passepgers on U.S airlines has jumped over 50 percent since 1978 o More airlines provide service, giving more choice to Americans.
[127]
[PDF] 1 AVIATION DEREGULATION AND SAFETY IN THE UNITED STATES
Fatality rates for travel on jet airlines have continued their long-run decline since deregulation. However, accident rates which fell significantly in the ...
[128]
[PDF] Deregulation and Air Travel Safety - Cato Institute
Airline deregulation has had no detectable impact on air safety as measured by the number of air fatalities experienced by scheduled airlines. Moreover, the ...
[129]
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11948-021-00333-6
[130]
(PDF) Two criticisms of engineering ethics assessment
PDF | On Nov 25, 2024, Rockwell Clancy and others published Two criticisms of engineering ethics assessment | Find, read and cite all the research you need ...
[131]
[PDF] A longitudinal look at the impact of engineering ethics education
Are these students receiving instruction on codes of ethics? And if so, is this knowledge being retained? It would appear not. If the ethics experiences ...
[132]
Emotions in Engineering Ethics Education: Systematic Review and ...
Jul 29, 2025 · Our extensive systematic review identified 30 publications relevant to engineering, technology, or computer science education that were ...
[133]
The Rise of Engineering's Social Justice Warriors
Nov 21, 2018 · In his view, incorporating social justice into engineering sends a message that conservatives are unwelcome. It is hard to envision the ...
[134]
Full article: Ethics in Innovation - Taylor & Francis Online
Oct 30, 2023 · Disruptive innovations are more likely to spark ethical concerns. Generative AI is the latest disruptive innovation raising ethical alarm bells.
[135]
Quantum computing ethical risks | Deloitte Insights
May 12, 2022 · Quantum's “known unknowns” include potential ethical considerations from abuse, misuse, or unintended consequences.
[136]
Engineering and the Problem of Moral Overload - PMC - NIH
May 1, 2011 · In this paper, we argue that ethics can be the source of technological development rather than just a constraint and technological progress can create moral ...
[137]
Technical and Ethical Issues in Quantum Computing - Wevolver
Sep 15, 2024 · Quantum computing brings groundbreaking tech advances and ethical challenges, requiring frameworks for secure and fair use.
[138]
7 Proven Strategies Every Energy Company Can Use to Protect from ...
Greenwashing in the energy sector can take various forms, such as claiming that a product is “green” or “eco-friendly” without substantial evidence, using ...
[139]
Market forces are driving a clean energy revolution in the US
Today, renewable energy resources like wind and solar power are so affordable that they're driving coal production and coal-fired generation out of business.Missing: achievements | Show results with:achievements
[140]
Engineering Ethics: Balancing Innovation and Responsibility
Mar 3, 2025 · The interplay between engineering innovation and ethical responsibility is a dynamic and ongoing process. Engineers must remain vigilant, ...