Four Year Plan
The Four Year Plan (Vierjahresplan) was an economic mobilization program initiated by Adolf Hitler through a secret memorandum in August 1936, placing Hermann Göring in charge as Plenipotentiary from October 1936, with the core objectives of securing raw material self-sufficiency (Autarkie) and reorienting the entire German economy toward rapid rearmament for anticipated military conflict within four years.[1][2] The plan explicitly subordinated civilian production to war preparations, centralizing control over labor allocation, import restrictions, wage and price freezes, and the synthesis of critical resources like fuels, rubber, and textiles to insulate Germany from potential blockades during expansionist campaigns, particularly in Eastern Europe.[1] Key measures under the plan bypassed traditional ministries, granting Göring sweeping authority to establish state-controlled entities such as Reichswerke Hermann Göring for steel and heavy industry, alongside expansions in aluminum, synthetic oil refineries, and agricultural output to mitigate foreign dependencies.[2] While it accelerated armaments output—evident in doubled steel production and novel ersatz materials that supported Luftwaffe and Wehrmacht buildup—the program's inefficiencies stemmed from Göring's lack of economic acumen, fostering corruption, resource misallocation, and persistent trade deficits that undermined full autarky.[1][2] The plan's defining legacy lies in its causal pivot to a total war footing, prioritizing conquest-enabling capacities over domestic welfare, which intensified labor exploitation (including eventual forced recruitment) and set the stage for wartime plunder of occupied territories to sustain shortfalls in raw materials and output.[1] Despite partial successes in industrial substitution, empirical shortfalls in achieving import independence highlighted the limits of dirigiste policies absent territorial gains, contributing to economic strains that propelled aggressive foreign policy by 1939.[1][2]Historical Context
Economic Conditions in Weimar and Early Nazi Germany
The Weimar Republic, established in 1919 following Germany's defeat in World War I, inherited an economy crippled by the Treaty of Versailles, which imposed reparations totaling 132 billion gold marks (equivalent to about $442 billion in 2023 dollars) and restricted industrial and military capacity.[3] These burdens, combined with wartime debt and loss of territories, fueled fiscal deficits as the government printed money to finance expenditures, leading to inflation that escalated into hyperinflation by 1923.[4] In November 1923, the peak of the crisis, prices doubled every 3.7 days, with the exchange rate reaching 4.2 trillion marks per U.S. dollar, eroding savings, wages, and middle-class wealth while exacerbating social unrest and political fragmentation.[4] Stabilization efforts, including the introduction of the Rentenmark in November 1923 and the Dawes Plan in 1924—which restructured reparations and facilitated U.S. loans—temporarily restored currency stability and spurred industrial growth, with GDP rising 40% between 1924 and 1929.[5] The Wall Street Crash of October 1929 triggered a severe depression in Germany, amplifying vulnerabilities from dependence on short-term foreign loans and export markets.[6] Industrial production fell by 40% from 1929 to 1932, bank failures proliferated, and unemployment surged from 1.3 million in 1929 to over 6 million by early 1932, representing approximately 30% of the workforce and straining welfare systems designed for far lower levels.[6][7] Austerity measures under Chancellor Heinrich Brüning, including wage cuts and tax hikes, deepened deflationary pressures without halting the collapse, contributing to political instability with over 20 governments in 14 years and rising support for extremist parties.[8] Upon Adolf Hitler's appointment as Chancellor in January 1933, the Nazi regime pursued aggressive recovery policies, including massive public works programs like the Autobahn construction (employing 125,000 by 1936), compulsory labor service for youth, and rearmament in violation of Versailles limits.[9] Unemployment declined sharply from 6 million in 1933 to about 1.6 million by mid-1936, driven by deficit-financed spending that increased government outlays from 10 billion Reichsmarks in 1933 to 30 billion by 1936, financed through off-budget mechanisms like Mefo bills to evade Reichsbank constraints.[6][10] However, official figures understated the drop by excluding women from statistics, conscripting labor, and prioritizing military over civilian production, creating hidden inflationary pressures and a growing foreign exchange crisis as rearmament imports depleted reserves to critically low levels by 1936, with gold and forex holdings falling below 100 million Reichsmarks.[11][9] This imbalance, where imports for iron, oil, and rubber outpaced exports, underscored the unsustainability of the expansion without autarkic reforms or territorial conquest.[10]Hitler's August 1936 Memorandum
In August 1936, Adolf Hitler composed a confidential memorandum addressed to senior Nazi officials, including Hermann Göring, articulating the ideological and strategic imperatives for subordinating Germany's economy to military rearmament and achieving autarky within four years.[1] The document framed politics as an existential struggle among peoples for survival, positing Bolshevism—portrayed as directed by "world-wide Jewry" and exemplified by the Soviet Union's expanding military power—as an acute threat that necessitated immediate German preparation for conflict.[1] This memo, kept secret from the public and most government ministries, rejected pacifist economic constraints and emphasized that financial or resource limitations could not impede the war economy's development.[12] The memorandum's core directive required parallel economic mobilization with political and military rearmament, mandating that Germany attain complete independence from foreign imports for all military essentials by 1940.[12] Hitler specified that the army and Luftwaffe must be fully operational, the navy capable of engaging a major naval power, and the economy equipped for sustained warfare, with autarky prioritized in raw materials such as iron ore, petroleum, and rubber.[13] To this end, he called for aggressive expansion of domestic production, including boosting iron ore output from 7 million tons to 20-30 million tons annually, petroleum from 700,000-800,000 tons to 3 million tons, and synthetic rubber to 70,000-80,000 tons, while accelerating synthetic fuel and textile programs regardless of cost.[13] Agricultural self-sufficiency was deemed insufficient alone, with hints at eventual territorial expansion (Lebensraum) to address overpopulation and food shortages, though immediate focus remained on synthetic substitutes and import substitution.[13] Key principles outlined included conserving foreign exchange through heightened domestic output, rejecting private industry excuses for delays in synthetic production, and intervening with state control if firms failed to meet quotas for iron or fuel.[12] Hitler warned against overemphasizing civilian synthetics like fats or textiles at the expense of war-critical materials, insisting that the four-year period demanded unrelenting effort to forge a "war-capable" economy.[1] This approach explicitly prioritized military readiness over consumer welfare or balanced budgets, viewing economic policy as a tool for ideological survival against perceived Marxist expansionism.[1] The memorandum's significance lay in its role as the blueprint for the subsequent Four Year Plan, announced publicly on October 9, 1936, which centralized economic controls under Göring and accelerated Germany's shift toward total war preparation amid mounting foreign exchange crises and rearmament demands.[12] By committing to specific timelines and outputs, it overrode debates within the Economics Ministry, marking a decisive pivot from recovery-oriented policies to overt militarization, with synthetic industries like IG Farben receiving massive state backing to fulfill the autarky goals.[13]Establishment and Administration
Appointment of Hermann Göring
On October 18, 1936, Adolf Hitler issued a decree formally establishing the Four-Year Plan to prepare Germany's economy for potential war by achieving autarky in key raw materials and foreign exchange reserves, explicitly appointing Hermann Göring as Plenipotentiary responsible for its execution.[14] The decree stated that Göring, as Minister-President and General, would operate directly under Hitler's authority and possess the power to demand reports from, and issue binding directives to, all relevant government departments, party offices, and state entities to ensure compliance.[14] This centralization of economic authority under Göring aimed to overcome bureaucratic fragmentation that had hindered prior rearmament efforts, reflecting Hitler's preference for a single, energetic overseer rather than divided ministerial responsibilities.[15] Göring's selection stemmed from his established role as Hitler's most trusted deputy, having been designated successor in 1934 and already tasked with precursor economic duties.[16] In April 1936, Göring had been named Reich Commissar for Raw Materials and Foreign Exchange, granting him initial oversight of import restrictions and synthetic production initiatives critical to autarky goals.[17] Despite Göring's limited formal economic expertise, Hitler valued his administrative vigor and political loyalty, as evidenced by contemporary reports emphasizing Göring's "strongest will and greatest energy" within the National Socialist leadership to drive the plan forward.[18] The appointment effectively elevated Göring above competing figures like Economics Minister Hjalmar Schacht, who had advocated more market-oriented approaches, signaling a shift toward total state-directed mobilization.[15]Organizational Framework and Powers
The Four Year Plan was formalized through a decree issued by Adolf Hitler on October 18, 1936, which appointed Hermann Göring as Plenipotentiary General responsible for its execution, granting him overarching authority to unify economic efforts toward autarky and military preparedness.[19] This role positioned Göring above existing economic ministries, enabling him to direct policies across sectors including raw materials procurement, labor deployment, and industrial output, with the explicit mandate to bypass bureaucratic obstacles for rapid implementation.[20] The decree's provisions empowered the office to manage foreign exchange reserves, control imports and exports, and enforce production quotas, effectively centralizing economic decision-making under Göring's command despite his limited prior expertise in economics.[16] Organizationally, the Plan functioned as a supra-ministerial agency rather than a conventional department, structured around Göring's personal authority supplemented by a General Council for advisory functions and specialized technical offices for operational execution. Key subordinates included appointees like Helmut Wohlthat for administrative coordination and experts such as Carl Krauch for chemical synthetics, who headed raw materials divisions tasked with allocating scarce resources and overseeing state-backed enterprises like the Reichswerke Hermann Göring conglomerate established in 1937.[16] This framework allowed for direct intervention in private industry, setting mandatory targets for output in strategic goods such as steel and synthetic fuels, while integrating party loyalists to ensure alignment with regime priorities.[21] Göring's powers extended to chairing the Ministerial Council for the Defense of the Reich, which further amplified his influence by integrating defense and economic planning, permitting decrees that compelled compliance from ministries of economics, labor, and agriculture.[20] These authorities facilitated measures like rationing critical imports and mobilizing labor for rearmament, though they engendered conflicts with figures such as Economics Minister Hjalmar Schacht, whose resignation in 1937 underscored the Plan's dominance over orthodox fiscal policy.[22] By 1938, expansions via additional decrees had solidified the office's control, including oversight of price mechanisms and trade bilateralism, positioning it as the de facto economic command center until wartime exigencies prompted further restructuring.Primary Objectives
Rearmament and War Preparedness
The Four Year Plan prioritized rearmament as its core objective, aiming to render the Wehrmacht fully operational for offensive warfare by 1940, in line with Adolf Hitler's directive that the German economy must be restructured to sustain total war conditions.[13] [23] In his confidential memorandum of August 30, 1936, Hitler emphasized the need for immediate escalation of armaments production, declaring that Germany required "a completely armed Wehrmacht" capable of conducting war without reliance on foreign imports, with four years deemed the maximum timeframe for preparation.[13] This shift marked a departure from the more restrained financing under Hjalmar Schacht, redirecting fiscal policy toward deficit spending explicitly for military buildup.[22] Hermann Göring, appointed plenipotentiary on October 18, 1936, centralized control over rearmament through the Four Year Plan Office, integrating efforts across the Reich Air Ministry, Army Ordnance Office, and private industry to bypass bureaucratic delays.[15] Between 1936 and 1939, approximately two-thirds of Germany's total industrial investment—equivalent to billions of Reichsmarks in steel, chemicals, and machinery—was allocated to armaments and related infrastructure, enabling rapid scaling of munitions factories and machine-tool production.[22] Göring's approach involved coercive measures, such as pressuring firms like Krupp and IG Farben to prioritize military contracts, often at the expense of civilian output, while enforcing labor conscription under the Reich Labor Service to support factory expansion.[24] Under the plan, the Wehrmacht expanded dramatically: the army grew from 21 divisions in 1936 to 51 active divisions by September 1939, supported by universal conscription enacted in 1935 and intensified training regimens.[25] The Luftwaffe, prioritized for strategic bombing capabilities, increased aircraft production from roughly 5,000 units annually in 1936 to over 8,000 by 1939, including fighters like the Messerschmitt Bf 109 and bombers such as the Junkers Ju 88.[26] Naval rearmament lagged but included the launch of capital ships like the battleships Bismarck and Tirpitz, with U-boat construction ramping up to 57 submarines by 1939. Military expenditure as a share of national income surged from about 10% in 1936 to 23% by 1939, reflecting the plan's success in diverting resources—totaling around 90 billion Reichsmarks in armaments outlays from 1933 to 1939, with the bulk post-1936.[27] [25] War preparedness extended beyond production to logistical and defensive measures, including the stockpiling of 4.5 million tons of fuel and raw materials by 1939 and the construction of the Westwall fortifications along the western border, involving over 1 million workers by 1938.[22] These efforts achieved partial operational readiness, as evidenced by the Wehrmacht's performance in the 1938 Anschluss and Munich Agreement mobilizations, though shortages in raw materials and skilled labor persisted, foreshadowing wartime constraints.[19] Historians note that while the plan met quantitative targets for force size and output, qualitative issues—like rushed prototyping and overemphasis on quantity—compromised long-term effectiveness, as critiqued in postwar analyses of German military planning.[24]Autarky in Raw Materials and Energy
The Four Year Plan prioritized autarky in raw materials and energy to insulate Germany from foreign dependencies, particularly for rearmament and potential conflict, given shortages in oil, rubber, and certain metals despite ample coal reserves. In his August 1936 confidential memorandum, Adolf Hitler mandated 100% self-sufficiency in energy sources like fuels and raw materials such as rubber and iron ore, rejecting reliance on imports and calling for synthetic substitutes to be operational within 18 months for fuels and immediately scaled for rubber.[23] Hermann Göring, as Commissioner for the Four Year Plan, centralized control over resource allocation, directing state-backed cartels like IG Farben to expand domestic production through coal-based synthesis, while conserving foreign exchange by curtailing non-essential imports.[22] Energy autarky centered on synthetic petroleum production to offset the near-total absence of domestic crude oil, leveraging Germany's coal abundance via hydrogenation and Fischer-Tropsch processes. Initial planning allocated 574 million Reichsmarks—42% of the 1.4 billion Reichsmark budget—to synthetic fuel facilities, aiming for rapid capacity buildup under Göring's oversight.[28] Output rose from 1.4 million metric tons of synthetic and mineral oil combined in 1936 to 4.3 million metric tons by 1940, with synthetics comprising a growing share, though costs remained high at approximately 20-25% above imported oil prices.[29] Coal hydrogenation plants, such as those operated by Ruhrchemie and IG Farben, prioritized aviation fuel and diesel, reaching about 2.6 million tons of synthetics by 1939, but fell short of the plan's target for full import replacement due to technical inefficiencies and capital intensity.[30] In raw materials, synthetic rubber (Buna) production exemplified autarky efforts, as natural rubber imports from Asia were vulnerable to blockades; IG Farben commenced industrial-scale Buna-S manufacturing in 1937 following patents from the 1920s, with state subsidies under the Four Year Plan funding plants like Schkopau.[31] By 1938, Buna supplied only 5% of Germany's rubber needs, insufficient for tire and military applications, necessitating continued imports and alloy substitutes for metals like tungsten and chromium.[32] Complementary initiatives included synthetic textiles (e.g., Perlon nylon analogs from coal derivatives) and industrial fats, but iron ore goals—targeting 20-25 million tons domestically—relied on expanded Low Countries sourcing, underscoring partial reliance on territorial expansion over pure synthesis.[23] Overall, while synthetics advanced technological capabilities, autarky remained incomplete, with energy and materials imports persisting at 20-30% of pre-war levels for critical sectors.Agricultural and Industrial Self-Sufficiency
The Four Year Plan prioritized agricultural self-sufficiency to secure Germany's food supply against external disruptions, viewing a robust agrarian sector as essential for withstanding economic blockades or wartime isolation. This goal aligned with the broader autarkic vision outlined in Adolf Hitler's August 1936 memorandum, which demanded the economy be reoriented toward domestic production capabilities within four years, implicitly encompassing foodstuffs to support population and military needs. Hermann Göring, as overseer, explicitly stated that the plan aimed to render the agricultural sector secure from crisis, emphasizing protection under war conditions through centralized coordination via entities like the Reich Food Estate.[1][33][19] To realize this, the plan directed efforts toward intensifying output via land reclamation, improved yields, and livestock expansion, such as promoting sheep farming to enhance wool and meat production without heavy import dependence. Policies included production quotas, price supports, and labor mobilization to rural areas, countering urban drift and ensuring surplus for strategic reserves. These measures built on pre-existing Nazi agrarian reforms but accelerated under the Four Year framework to achieve an "independent food supply," as proclaimed in official rallies tied to the plan's launch.[34][35][22] Industrial self-sufficiency complemented these aims by focusing on expanding domestic manufacturing capacity for essential goods, reducing vulnerability to foreign trade interruptions beyond raw materials. The plan mandated state oversight of key sectors like steel, machinery, and consumer durables to boost output and substitute imports with homegrown equivalents, integrating private firms under Göring's authority to align production with national resilience goals. This objective sought to fortify the industrial base for sustained operations in isolation, prioritizing efficiency and scale to meet both civilian and preparatory military demands without external inputs.[21][15][1]Implementation Mechanisms
Resource Mobilization and Labor Allocation
The Four Year Plan centralized resource mobilization and labor allocation under Hermann Göring's authority as Plenipotentiary General, granting him oversight of raw material distribution, industrial inputs, and workforce deployment to prioritize rearmament and autarky objectives.[16] This structure subordinated economic ministries, including labor, to the Plan's office, enabling directives for allocating scarce resources like steel and coal predominantly to armaments production and synthetic fuel initiatives, often at the expense of consumer goods sectors.[20] By 1937, approximately two-thirds of industrial investment was funneled into Plan-related projects, reflecting a deliberate shift toward war preparedness through targeted resource controls.[22] Labor mobilization emphasized incorporating the entire workforce into national economic goals, with Hitler's August 1936 memorandum calling for ruthless subordination of individual interests to collective defense needs and full employment to sustain production without undernourishment.[23] The Reichsarbeitsdienst (RAD), a compulsory service for young men aged 18-25, was expanded to provide low-cost labor for infrastructure projects supporting autarky, such as land reclamation for agriculture and construction of facilities for synthetic production, mobilizing hundreds of thousands annually by the late 1930s.[36] The Deutsche Arbeitsfront (DAF), as the sole labor organization, enforced allocation by controlling training, job placements, and working conditions, directing workers to priority industries while prohibiting strikes and union independence established prior to the Plan.[37] To address emerging labor shortages from rapid rearmament—unemployment dropped from over 6 million in 1933 to virtual full employment by 1938—Göring's office implemented retraining for key sectors like chemicals and metals, alongside restrictions on job mobility, including the 1938 introduction of labor books requiring official approval for employment changes.[38][27] These measures ensured sustained output in armaments, with mandatory overtime and extended RAD service durations, though they strained worker conditions without compensatory wage increases beyond Plan-fixed limits.[39] Foreign labor recruitment began modestly in 1938 to supplement domestic shortages, marking an early shift toward coerced allocation that intensified post-1939.[16]Expansion of Synthetic Production
The expansion of synthetic production formed a critical component of the Four Year Plan's autarky strategy, targeting the chemical synthesis of fuels, rubber, and fibers from domestic coal to mitigate import vulnerabilities amid rearmament. Carl Krauch, an IG Farben executive, was appointed Plenipotentiary General for Special Questions of Chemical Production and head of the Office for Raw Materials and Synthetics, coordinating efforts across industry to scale output of synthetic petroleum via coal hydrogenation (Bergius process) and Fischer-Tropsch synthesis, as well as Buna-S rubber. Of the plan's initial 1.4 billion Reichsmarks budget, 42 percent (574 million RM) was directed toward synthetic fuel facilities, reflecting its priority as the largest single expenditure category.[28] Synthetic fuel production emphasized hydrogenation for gasoline and Fischer-Tropsch for diesel and kerosene, with IG Farben overseeing expansions at existing sites like Leuna (which averaged 3.6 million barrels annually post-1927) and new plants at Böhlen, Magdeburg, Schwarzheide, and Zeitz built between 1934 and 1935.[30] The overarching target was for synthetics to supply half of Germany's total oil consumption, with planned capacity approaching 5 million tons annually by the plan's end in 1940 to support military mobility.[30] Actual output rose from negligible pre-1936 levels to 9 million barrels (about 1.2 million tons) in 1938 and 16.7 million barrels (roughly 2.3 million tons) in 1939, bolstered by 70 million RM in government subsidies that year, though costs remained high at 32-45 RM per barrel—far exceeding imported oil prices.[30] These gains enabled aviation and mechanized forces but fell short of full self-sufficiency due to technical inefficiencies and resource demands. Synthetic rubber development centered on IG Farben's Buna-S (styrene-butadiene copolymer), showcased at the 1936 Berlin Motor Show to demonstrate tire viability for vehicles and aircraft.[31] The plan aimed for 845,000 long tons (approximately 860,000 metric tons) annual capacity to replace natural rubber imports entirely, with initial large-scale Buna-S output commencing in 1935.[40] By 1940, production reached 40,000 tons, supporting tire manufacturing but requiring further wartime scaling amid supply chain constraints.[40] Overall, the initiative involved constructing or upgrading over a dozen major facilities by 1940, prioritizing war-essential outputs despite economic strains from high capital and energy inputs, which diverted resources from other sectors.[41] Postwar analyses, drawing from interrogated officials like Heinrich Bütefisch, highlight how leadership decisions prioritized quantity over efficiency, yielding partial autarky but exposing vulnerabilities to Allied bombing later.[30]Price Controls, Rationing, and Trade Policies
The Four Year Plan implemented comprehensive price controls to curb inflation driven by deficit-financed rearmament and full employment, with Hermann Göring's office enforcing freezes on wages and prices for essential goods starting in 1936. These measures artificially suppressed costs for state purchases of war materials, enabling the government to redirect resources toward military production without immediate price spirals, though they distorted market signals and fostered black markets over time.[42][1] By 1938, violations were penalized harshly, including fines and production halts, as the Plan's decree empowered Göring to override sectoral objections in favor of overall economic mobilization.[43] Rationing targeted raw materials and consumer commodities to prioritize armaments, with the Raw Materials Office under the Four Year Plan allocating steel, copper, and rubber equivalents through quotas that restricted civilian and non-essential industrial access from 1936 onward. Synthetic substitutes were mandated to stretch supplies, but shortages persisted, leading to progressive curbs on imports and domestic use; for instance, non-ferrous metals were reserved almost exclusively for Luftwaffe and Wehrmacht needs by 1937.[1] Consumer rationing, initially limited to luxury items, expanded by 1939 to foodstuffs and fuels as war loomed, reflecting the Plan's failure to achieve full autarky and its reliance on administrative fiat over abundance.[44] Trade policies under the Plan shifted toward import minimization via strict licensing and foreign exchange rationing, building on prior New Plan restrictions but intensifying bilateral clearing agreements with Southeastern Europe and Latin America to barter German manufactures for ores, oil, and foodstuffs without hard currency depletion. Exports were compelled to generate Reichsmarks equivalents for irreplaceable imports, yet overall foreign trade stagnated as autarky goals reduced volumes by about 20% from 1936 to 1939, heightening vulnerability to blockades.[1][45] Göring's administration centralized decisions, sidelining the Economics Ministry to favor strategic acquisitions, though chronic deficits in raw materials imports—reaching 30% reliance on foreign sources by 1939—underscored the limits of these controls absent territorial expansion.[46]Economic Achievements
Production Gains and Unemployment Decline
The Four Year Plan, implemented from October 1936, accelerated industrial output growth through massive state-directed investment in rearmament and infrastructure, building on prior recovery efforts. Gross national product expanded from approximately 58 billion Reichsmarks in 1936 to 75 billion by 1939, reflecting an average annual growth rate of about 8 percent, largely fueled by deficit-financed public works and military production.[47] Steel production, a key indicator of heavy industry prioritized under the plan, rose from 19.2 million metric tons in 1936 to 23.6 million tons in 1939, supported by expanded capacity in facilities like the Reichswerke Hermann Göring. These gains were achieved amid resource constraints, relying on synthetic substitutes and imports, with overall industrial production indices climbing roughly 25-30 percent over the period, though skewed toward armaments rather than consumer goods.[48] Unemployment, already declining from Great Depression peaks due to earlier policies like work-creation programs, fell further under the plan's labor mobilization. Official registered unemployment dropped from 1.6 million in 1936 (about 7 percent of the workforce) to around 300,000 by 1939, approaching what regime statistics termed full employment.[47] This reduction stemmed from absorbing labor into expanding armaments factories, public projects, and compulsory service, including the Reich Labor Service and military conscription starting in 1935, which removed millions from civilian unemployment rolls.[48] However, the figures warrant scrutiny for methodological adjustments that inflated the apparent success: women were increasingly excluded from official labor statistics as they were pressured to prioritize homemaking via incentives like marriage loans; Jewish workers faced dismissal and were not counted post-1938 pogroms; and short-time workers or those in forced programs were reclassified as employed.[49] Independent estimates suggest true underemployment persisted in non-militarized sectors, with real living standards stagnant due to wage controls and rising hours worked, averaging 15 percent more by 1939 than in 1933.[47] Despite these qualifications, the plan's emphasis on total economic mobilization demonstrably reduced visible joblessness, bolstering regime propaganda on recovery.[48]Advancements in Armaments and Synthetics
The Four Year Plan, overseen by Hermann Göring, prioritized rearmament by directing substantial resources toward expanding military-industrial capacity, resulting in significant output growth in key armaments sectors. Steel production, critical for tanks, ships, and artillery, increased from approximately 19 million metric tons in 1936 to over 22 million metric tons by 1939, driven by state investments in facilities like the Reichswerke Hermann Göring, which exploited low-grade domestic ores to supplement imports.[50] Aircraft manufacturing expanded rapidly, with total production reaching nearly 8,300 units by 1939, up from lower pre-plan levels, enabling the Luftwaffe to amass thousands of combat-ready planes despite initial technological and material constraints.[51] These gains were achieved through labor mobilization, forced efficiencies, and allocation of raw materials away from civilian uses, though full self-sufficiency remained elusive due to persistent shortages in high-quality alloys and engines. In synthetics, the plan aimed to achieve autarky in strategic materials like fuel and rubber, essential for mechanized warfare, by scaling coal-based processes developed by firms such as IG Farben and Ruhrchemie. Synthetic oil production, primarily via hydrogenation and Fischer-Tropsch methods, rose to 16.7 million barrels annually by 1939, reducing reliance on foreign petroleum from over 70% of needs in 1936 to about 20% domestically sourced equivalents, though costs were high and yields inefficient compared to natural crude.[30] Buna synthetic rubber facilities, including the Schkopau plant initiated in 1936, achieved initial industrial output by 1937, with the Buna II site reaching 15,000 tons annual capacity by late 1938, supplementing natural rubber imports that had been curtailed by trade restrictions.[52] These advancements, while innovative in chemical engineering, fell short of war-ready scales—synthetic rubber output hovered below 10,000 tons yearly pre-1940—highlighting limitations in catalysis technology and energy inputs, as verified by post-war analyses of plant records.[53]| Material | 1936 Production | 1939 Production | Key Driver |
|---|---|---|---|
| Synthetic Oil | ~0.5 million tons | ~2.3 million tons (equiv.) | Coal hydrogenation plants[30] |
| Buna Rubber | Negligible (pilot) | ~5,000-10,000 tons | IG Farben Schkopau expansion[52] |
| Military Aircraft | ~5,000 units | ~8,300 units | Labor reallocation to aviation firms[51] |