George Shultz
George Pratt Shultz (December 13, 1920 – February 6, 2021) was an American economist, academic, business executive, and statesman who served in four different Cabinet-level positions across the administrations of Presidents Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan, a distinction shared by only one other individual in U.S. history.[1][2] Born in New York City and educated at Princeton University (BA, 1942) and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (PhD in industrial economics, 1949), Shultz combined rigorous economic analysis with practical policymaking throughout his career.[1][3] Shultz's government service began under Nixon as Secretary of Labor (1969–1970), where he enforced federal desegregation guidelines in Southern schools; he then directed the Office of Management and Budget (1970–1972) and served as Secretary of the Treasury (1972–1974), advocating for floating exchange rates and the end of the Bretton Woods system amid economic challenges including inflation and the oil crisis.[4][3] His tenure ended with his public break from Nixon during the Watergate scandal, testifying against executive interference in the independent bureaucracy.[3] Appointed Secretary of State by Reagan in 1982, Shultz held the post for over six years—the longest since the 1960s—overseeing diplomacy that pressured the Soviet Union through military buildup and strategic engagement, facilitating arms control talks and contributing to the Cold War's peaceful resolution without conceding U.S. strategic advantages.[5][6][3] Beyond government, Shultz was dean of the University of Chicago's business school (1962–1968), president of Bechtel Corporation (1974–1982), and a longtime distinguished fellow at Stanford's Hoover Institution, where he influenced policy on economics, energy, and international relations until his death at age 100.[1][2] Known for emphasizing trust, candor, and empirical reasoning in decision-making, Shultz's career exemplified the integration of economic principles with realist foreign policy, though he faced internal administration tensions over issues like arms negotiations and covert operations.[7][3]