Fact-checked by Grok 2 weeks ago

Huwaytat

![1838 map of the Red Sea region; the Howeitat are marked with a red arrow in the north section, to the east of the Gulf of Aqaba.](./assets/WELLSTED$1838 The Huwaytat are a large Arabian Bedouin tribe traditionally engaged in camel breeding and nomadic pastoralism, with historical territories centered around the Gulf of Aqaba and extending across southern Jordan, northwestern Saudi Arabia, the Sinai Peninsula in Egypt, southern Israel, and into Iraq.^[1] Their society is organized into segments, such as the Abu Tayyi, known for cross-border raiding and alliances that shaped regional power dynamics in the early 20th century.^[1] The tribe's most notable historical role came during the Arab Revolt in World War I, when Sheikh Auda Abu Tayi, a prominent Huwaytat leader, forged an alliance with T.E. Lawrence and Sharif Nasir's forces, leading a tribal contingent that captured the Ottoman-held port of Aqaba in July 1917 after a daring overland traverse of the desert and victory at Aba el Lissan.^[2]^[1] This feat opened a vital supply route for the revolt against Ottoman rule and highlighted the Huwaytat's martial prowess and strategic adaptability.^[2] Post-war border delineations fragmented their lands under the British mandates of Palestine and Transjordan, yet segments continued to support emerging states, including aiding Abdulaziz Ibn Saud in consolidating Saudi control over the northwest.^[1] In contemporary times, the Huwaytat maintain a presence in these transboundary regions, with an estimated 40,000 members in Saudi Arabia's Tabuk Province alone, where tensions have arisen over state-driven development projects encroaching on traditional grazing lands, underscoring ongoing conflicts between tribal customary rights and modern statist authority.^[1]

Origins and Genealogy

Ancestral Claims and Hashemite Descent

The Huwaytat tribe asserts descent from Husayn ibn Ali, grandson of the Prophet Muhammad through his daughter Fatima and son-in-law Ali ibn Abi Talib, thereby positioning itself among the Ashraf—noble families tracing lineage to the Banu Hashim. This claimed genealogy classifies the Huwaytat as Hashemite sharifs, a status that historically elevated their social standing among Bedouin confederations and facilitated alliances with Sharifian rulers in the Hejaz. Tribal nasab, or genealogical recitations preserved orally and in written clan records, trace the tribe's eponymous ancestor to Husayn's progeny, emphasizing pure Qurayshite origins over the admixtures common in other nomadic groups.^[3] Empirical support for these ancestral claims derives primarily from internal tribal genealogies rather than external archival corroboration, with Ottoman administrative records from the 19th century acknowledging the Huwaytat's noble Arab pedigree in contexts of taxation and tribal governance, distinguishing them from lesser Bedouin factions deemed of servile or mixed descent. These documents, such as defters cataloging Hijazi and Levantine tribes, often noted the Huwaytat's sharifian pretensions as a basis for granting autonomy or exemptions, reflecting a pragmatic recognition of self-proclaimed elite status amid fluid desert hierarchies. However, independent verification remains constrained by the reliance on endogamous nasab traditions, which prioritize symbolic prestige over documented pedigrees traceable to medieval sayyid registries.^[4] In contrast to predominantly nomadic tribes like the Rwala or Shammar, whose ancestries incorporate Turkic or Persian elements from historical migrations, the Huwaytat genealogy underscores a blend of settled agrarian influences from coastal Sinai and Aqaba settlements with core nomadic lineages, fostering a hybrid identity that reinforced their intermediary role between urban sharifs and pure desert raiders. This admixture is evident in clan subdivisions, such as the al-Jazi branch, which maintained semi-sedentary holdings while upholding sharifian taboos against intermarriage with non-Ashraf. Such distinctions, rooted in genealogical exclusivity, underscore the tribe's self-perception as custodians of prophetic heritage amid broader Bedouin ethnogenesis.^[5]

Early Tribal Formation and Migrations

The Huwaytat tribe emerged as a confederation of Bedouin clans in the northwest Arabian Peninsula, particularly around the Hijaz and Tabuk regions, where camel pastoralism formed the economic backbone of nomadic life. This adaptation to arid environments relied on dromedary camels for transport, milk, and meat, enabling seasonal movements between scarce pastures and water sources while supporting raiding for supplementary resources. Early cohesion likely arose from inter-clan alliances for mutual defense and resource sharing, as smaller groups consolidated to counter threats from rival pastoralists in resource-poor terrains.^[1]^[6] Migrations northward into the Sinai Peninsula and southern Transjordan were propelled by ecological pressures, including episodic droughts and overgrazing, which depleted local grazing lands and incentivized expansion toward coastal wadis and oases. Camel mobility facilitated these shifts, allowing herders to traverse vast distances—up to 100 kilometers daily under optimal conditions—while raids on sedentary villages provided tribute in grain and livestock to offset pastoral shortfalls. Such movements often sparked conflicts with settled populations, as nomads asserted claims over transit routes and seasonal territories, leading to cycles of retaliation and further dispersal.^[7]^[8] By the early 19th century, these dynamics had positioned the Huwaytat as a formidable presence across these frontiers, with documented alliances, such as with the Habahba against the Bani Sakhr, illustrating how migratory pressures fostered strategic partnerships for territorial security. The tribe's semi-nomadic structure, blending herding with opportunistic agriculture in fertile pockets like al-Sharat, underscored causal adaptations to marginal lands, where mobility trumped fixed settlement amid unpredictable rainfall and inter-tribal competition.^[7]^[8] ![1838 map of the Red Sea region; the Howeitat are marked with a red arrow in the north section, to the east of the Gulf of Aqaba.](./assets/WELLSTED$1838

Historical Territories and Presence

Pre-Modern Distribution Across the Peninsula

![1838 map of the Red Sea region; the Howeitat are marked with a red arrow in the north section, to the east of the Gulf of Aqaba.](./assets/WELLSTED$1838 The Huwaytat tribe maintained a pre-modern distribution primarily across the arid zones east of the Gulf of Aqaba, encompassing territories in present-day southern Jordan, northwestern Saudi Arabia, and the northern Sinai Peninsula. Traveler accounts from the early 19th century, such as those documenting the region around Aqaba and the Wadi Araba, place the tribe's core encampments in these interconnected desert and semi-desert landscapes, where seasonal migrations followed water sources and grazing lands.^[9]^[1] Their economic base relied on pastoral nomadism, centered on herding camels, goats, and sheep across vast rangelands, supplemented by raiding rival tribes and extracting protection fees from trade and pilgrim caravans traversing routes like the Damascus-Mecca pilgrimage path. This livelihood system enabled territorial control through mobility, with the tribe leveraging alliances and skirmishes to dominate caravan security in the Aqaba hinterlands during the 19th century. Archaeological evidence of temporary camps and rock inscriptions in areas like Wadi Rum corroborates long-term Bedouin presence, though specific Huwaytat attributions remain tentative due to nomadic ephemerality.^[10]^[11] Sub-tribal divisions, such as the Abu-Rabia and Abu Tayi branches, influenced localized dominance within the broader range; for instance, the Abu Tayi held sway over central Wadi Araba pastures, while Abu-Rabia groups concentrated in southern Jordanian wadis, fostering segmented authority over resources and routes. These factions, often numbering in the thousands per branch by the mid-19th century, adapted to environmental pressures through inter-tribal marriages and feuds, maintaining the Huwaytat's expansive footprint without fixed settlements.^[3]

Interactions with Ottoman and Regional Powers

In the late Ottoman period, the Huwaytat tribe resisted imperial centralization through extensive raiding activities that challenged Ottoman authority across the Transjordan and beyond. Under the leadership of Audeh Abu Tayeh, Huwaytat forces conducted expeditions reaching as far as Hama and the Euphrates basin, exploiting the empire's difficulties in controlling nomadic mobility.^[12] These raids disrupted Ottoman supply lines and trade, prompting responses such as fortified garrisons at key points like Aqaba, where tribal skirmishes arose over control of desert routes.^[13] The Huwaytat maintained autonomy by levying protection fees on travelers and caravans in their territories east of the Gulf of Aqaba, a practice rooted in economic pragmatism rather than outright rebellion. Ottoman attempts to regulate these interactions through subsidies and military patrols often failed to fully integrate the tribe, as Huwaytat leaders balanced nominal submission with opportunistic resistance to preserve raiding revenues and grazing rights.^[14] As Ottoman control intensified in the early 20th century, the Huwaytat pursued alliances with regional figures like Sharif Hussein of Mecca to counter centralizing policies. Prior to the 1916 Arab Revolt, Huwaytat paramount Auda Abu Tayeh coordinated with Sharif Nasir, Hussein's brother, engaging Bedouin sheikhs to build opposition, driven by anticipated economic rewards such as subsidies and plunder shares over ideological fervor.^[15] This selective partnering exemplified the tribe's agency in leveraging power imbalances for sustained independence amid imperial pressures.

Military Role in the Arab Revolt

Key Leaders and Alliances

![Auda, head chief of Howeitat tribe, 55 yrs. old][float-right] Auda abu Tayi served as the paramount sheikh of the Huwaytat tribe during the Arab Revolt, renowned for his strategic acumen and unyielding warrior ethos that galvanized tribal forces against Ottoman rule. Born around 1874, Auda commanded respect across northern Arabia, with T.E. Lawrence describing him as the "greatest fighting man in northern Arabia" due to his leadership in raids and feuds that honed his tactical prowess.^[16] His authority extended over key Huwaytat sections east of the Gulf of Aqaba, where he navigated intertribal rivalries to maintain cohesion amid Ottoman encroachments.^[17] The Huwaytat under Auda forged a critical alliance with Sharif Hussein's forces and British liaison T.E. Lawrence in early 1917, driven by longstanding anti-Ottoman grievances including punitive expeditions and conscription demands that disrupted pastoral livelihoods. This coalition was cemented through promises of autonomy, territorial recognition, and shares in plunder from Ottoman garrisons, aligning tribal incentives with the broader revolt proclaimed by Sharif Hussein on June 5, 1916.^[18] Auda's participation resolved internal tribal hesitations, as debates over risking warriors against a superior empire yielded to consensus on potential gains in independence and loot, bolstered by Lawrence's diplomatic overtures and gold subsidies.^[19] This partnership amplified the Huwaytat's influence disproportionate to their numbers, leveraging Auda's prestige to recruit irregular fighters for Sharif Nasir's column.^[20]

Specific Battles and Strategic Contributions

The Huwaytat tribe, particularly the Abu Tayi subclan, conducted guerrilla raids on the Hejaz Railway in the northern Hejaz region near Ma'an, disrupting Ottoman supply lines to isolated garrisons such as Medina.^[21] These operations exploited the mobility of camel-mounted Bedouin warriors, employing hit-and-run tactics to mine tracks, ambush repair parties, and destroy bridges, which forced Ottoman forces to divert significant troops for railway protection and repairs.^[22] Empirical records indicate low Arab casualties—often fewer than ten per raid—while inflicting disproportionate damage, with over 100 derailments and numerous garrisons neutralized by 1917, thereby straining Ottoman logistics across the 1,200-kilometer line.^[21] A pivotal engagement was the capture of Aqaba on July 6, 1917, where approximately 500 Huwaytat and allied irregulars under Auda abu Tayi joined forces led by Sherif Nasir ibn Ali and advised by T.E. Lawrence for an overland assault across the Sinai Desert.^[20] The attackers, traversing 260 miles of arid terrain with limited water, surprised Ottoman defenders expecting naval threats, overrunning coastal batteries through a camel charge that routed around 400 garrison troops.^[23] Arab losses numbered fewer than 10 killed, while Ottoman casualties exceeded 300 killed or captured, enabling the port's seizure with minimal destruction and establishing a vital supply base for subsequent northern advances.^[20] This victory marked a strategic turning point by severing Ottoman control over the Gulf of Aqaba, allowing British resupply via sea to Arab forces, which facilitated intensified railway sabotage and pressure on Ottoman flanks in Transjordan.^[23] Huwaytat mobility proved decisive in evading Ottoman reinforcements and sustaining irregular warfare, contributing to the diversion of an estimated 20,000 Ottoman troops to defensive roles rather than frontline offensives.^[21] Post-capture territorial gains included control over approaches to Ma'an, enhancing raid efficacy against the railway's northern segments.^[20]

20th-Century Developments and State Relations

Post-Revolt Integration into Jordan and Egypt

Following the conclusion of the Arab Revolt in 1918 and the subsequent establishment of the Emirate of Transjordan in April 1921 under Emir Abdullah I, the Huwaytat tribe's northern branches, centered around Aqaba, integrated into the new polity through their prior Hashemite alliances forged during the revolt. Loyalist elements among the Huwaytat provided military support to Abdullah's forces as he consolidated control from Ma'an northward, countering threats from rival tribes and external incursions in the early 1920s. British mandate policies facilitated this process by offering subsidies and land access to encourage semi-sedentary lifestyles, with reports from the period noting that many Huwaytat members began tilling plots while maintaining camel herding and participation in frontier patrols.^[24]^[25] This blend of nomadic traditions with state-oriented service, including recruitment into the nascent Arab Legion, secured the tribe's position amid the colonial reconfiguration of mandates.^[6] In parallel, Huwaytat clans in the Sinai Peninsula aligned with Egyptian sovereignty after the unilateral declaration of independence on February 28, 1922, transitioning from Ottoman-era fluidity to formalized oversight under the Egyptian government, though British frontier administration retained de facto control over Bedouin mobility and security until the late 1940s. These groups, inhabiting northeastern Sinai near the Gulf of Aqaba, benefited from the post-war stabilization that curtailed unregulated raiding, with Egyptian authorities granting sheikhs nominal recognition to manage internal disputes and grazing rights.^[26] Unlike their Transjordanian kin, Sinai Huwaytat faced stricter border demarcations imposed by the 1906 Anglo-Ottoman agreement, ratified post-war, which channeled tribal economies toward seasonal labor in ports like Suez rather than trans-desert trade.^[27] Across both regions, Huwaytat sheikhs preserved substantial autonomy despite acquiring formal citizenship under the mandates, leveraging familial networks and customary law to mediate state-tribal relations. In Transjordan, paramount leaders from the Abu Tayi lineage, successors to Auda abu Tayi, negotiated tribute exemptions and judicial prerogatives, embedding tribal hierarchies within the emirate's consultative assemblies.^[28] Similarly in Egypt, local sheikhs retained authority over marriage alliances and resource allocation, often serving as intermediaries with Cairo's provincial governors to avert unrest. This negotiated retention of authority reflected pragmatic state strategies to co-opt rather than dismantle tribal structures, ensuring loyalty amid the volatile post-Ottoman borders.^[29]

Encounters with Saudi Expansion

During the expansion of Saudi Arabia under Abdulaziz Ibn Saud in the 1920s, Ikhwan militias—Wahhabi irregulars instrumental in the conquests—launched cross-border raids into Transjordanian territories, targeting Huwaytat encampments and resources as part of efforts to assert control over northern frontiers. These attacks, occurring primarily between 1922 and 1924, depleted Huwaytat livestock and compelled the tribe to scale back large-scale raiding expeditions, which had been a cornerstone of their nomadic economy.^[30]^[31] The Saudi conquest of the Hejaz in 1924–1925 extended control to the Tabuk region, incorporating Huwaytat-held grazing lands into the nascent kingdom and disrupting tribal autonomy. Ikhwan forces subdued local resistance, aligning with Ibn Saud's unification campaign that prioritized centralized authority over decentralized Bedouin structures. This incorporation, coupled with ongoing border frictions into the 1930s, marked a causal shift where state-building imperatives eroded traditional Huwaytat territorial claims.^[32] Centralization policies, including prohibitions on intertribal raiding and imposition of taxes on winter pastures, generated displacement pressures on Huwaytat clans remaining in Saudi domains, driving migrations eastward to the Emirate of Transjordan for alliance under Emir Abdullah's protection. These movements, accelerated by resource depletion from raids, reflected broader tensions between Wahhabi state consolidation and tribal nomadic practices, with Huwaytat leveraging Hashemite ties from the Arab Revolt era to secure refuge.^[31]

Contemporary Distribution and Status

Presence in Jordan, Sinai, and Saudi Arabia

The Huwaytat maintain their largest concentrations in southern Jordan, particularly within the Aqaba and Ma'an governorates, where they constitute one of the principal Bedouin tribes alongside settled and semi-nomadic communities. These areas encompass traditional grazing lands extending from the Gulf of Aqaba inland, with tribal members distributed across rural villages and urban peripheries like Aqaba city and Ma'an town. While precise tribal censuses are unavailable, Bedouin groups, including the Huwaytat, represent a notable demographic segment in these governorates, reflecting broader patterns of tribal affiliation amid Jordan's total population exceeding 11 million.^[1] In the Sinai Peninsula of Egypt, Huwaytat subgroups inhabit eastern coastal and inland zones, forming part of the region's diverse Bedouin mosaic estimated at 300,000 to 400,000 individuals overall. Their presence centers around areas near the Gulf of Aqaba, with divisions maintaining distinct territorial claims amid a landscape shifting from pastoralism to partial integration with state structures. This distribution underscores the tribe's historical continuity across borders, though specific population figures for Huwaytat subgroups remain undocumented in national statistics.^[33] Within Saudi Arabia's Tabuk Province, Huwaytat remnants number approximately 40,000, accounting for roughly 8 percent of the province's population of about 594,000 as of 2022. Concentrated in northern desert fringes, their numbers have contracted from historical peaks due to long-standing sedentarization initiatives that encouraged settlement and reduced nomadic mobility prior to contemporary infrastructure expansions. This shift has concentrated many in peri-urban areas around Tabuk city, altering traditional rural-nomadic divides.^[1]

Socioeconomic Adaptations and Challenges

In Jordan, Huwaytat tribesmen have undergone a socioeconomic shift from nomadic pastoralism to diversified wage labor since the 1950s, incorporating military service, tourism guiding, livestock herding, and informal economic activities.^[34] Many in the Wadi Rum region leverage ancestral desert knowledge as paid guides for tourists or manage small-scale tourism operations, supplementing herding with seasonal income from camel and jeep safaris.^[35] The Jordanian military offers stable employment and pensions to Bedouin recruits, including Huwaytat members, as part of a broader policy integrating tribal loyalties into state structures and providing welfare through armed forces benefits. Persistent challenges stem from environmental constraints and policy shifts, notably severe water scarcity in southern Jordan's arid zones, where annual rainfall averages under 50 mm, undermining traditional herding by reducing pasture viability and livestock health.^[36] Land privatization and state-designated grazing reserves since the 1970s have restricted nomadic mobility, compelling further sedentarization and dependency on supplemental fodder, though government subsidies for water conveyance projects like the Disi-Amman pipeline partially alleviate shortages for communities near Aqaba.^[37] These adaptations have yielded relative resilience, with tribal welfare buffered by military remittances and tourism revenues exceeding $100 million annually in protected areas like Wadi Rum by the 2010s.^[35] Huwaytat in Saudi Arabia exhibit lower socioeconomic integration, maintaining heavier reliance on pastoral herding amid limited formal employment opportunities and state-driven modernization that marginalizes tribal economies.^[38] Without equivalent military or tourism incentives, they face amplified vulnerabilities from water deficits and land reallocations, fostering informal coping strategies over structured welfare support.^[1] This contrast highlights Jordan's tribal co-optation policies enabling adaptive diversification, versus Saudi centralization exacerbating peripheral exclusion.^[39]

Conflicts with Modern States

Saudi Displacements and NEOM Project

The NEOM project, a planned megacity and economic zone in northwestern Saudi Arabia's Tabuk Province, was announced by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman on October 24, 2017, encompassing approximately 26,500 square kilometers of territory traditionally inhabited by the Huwaitat tribe.^[40] The initiative targets ancestral Huwaitat grazing lands and villages near the Red Sea coast and Gulf of Aqaba, prompting displacements to facilitate construction of linear urban developments like The Line.^[41] Saudi authorities have framed these relocations as voluntary and essential for national economic diversification under Vision 2030, offering compensation packages including financial payments and new housing, though tribal members have described such offers as undervaluing properties and ignoring cultural ties to the land.^[9] Evictions intensified from early 2020, affecting Huwaitat communities in areas such as Al-Khuraiba village, with reports indicating the displacement of several thousand residents by mid-decade to clear sites for infrastructure.^[42] Tribal accounts, disseminated via activists and human rights organizations, assert that demolitions proceeded without adequate consent or alternatives, leading to arrests of resisters labeled by Saudi officials as threats to security or terrorism suspects under anti-extremism laws.^[40] A former Saudi intelligence officer claimed in 2024 that security forces received authorization for lethal force against those obstructing evictions, contradicting official narratives of peaceful resettlement.^[40] The killing of Abdul Rahim al-Huwaiti on April 13, 2020, emerged as a pivotal incident, when security forces raided his home in Al-Khuraiba after he refused entry to a government land valuation team linked to NEOM preparations.^[41] Al-Huwaiti, a 43-year-old Ministry of Finance employee and tribal activist, was shot dead during the confrontation; Huwaitat representatives maintain he acted in self-defense against an unlawful intrusion, while Saudi state media portrayed the event as a necessary response to armed resistance from an individual with alleged terrorist affiliations.^[43] This episode catalyzed broader tribal protests and international scrutiny, including UN queries to Riyadh, though Saudi responses emphasized legal compliance and development imperatives over forced displacement claims.^[44]

Legal and Human Rights Disputes

In October 2020, representatives of the Al-Huwaitat tribe communicated with United Nations bodies, alleging systematic forced displacement, abductions, and harassment by Saudi security forces to clear land for development projects, and requesting an urgent investigation into these practices.^[45]^[46] Saudi officials responded by framing resisting tribe members as national security threats, often invoking provisions of the 2017 Counter-Terrorism Law to justify arrests and prosecutions based on claims of armed opposition and disruption of public order.^[47] United Nations human rights experts raised concerns in May 2023 regarding terrorism convictions against six Al-Huwaitat individuals, including death sentences for three, which were tied to their vocal opposition to evictions through social media and public statements rather than verifiable violent acts.^[47]^[48] The convictions relied on broad interpretations of terrorism statutes, with critics, including the UN rapporteurs, highlighting insufficient evidence of material threats and procedural irregularities such as coerced confessions, while Saudi courts upheld the sentences as proportionate responses to alleged threats to state infrastructure.^[49]^[50] Evictions persisted into 2025, exemplified by the June forcible removal of the remaining residents from Al-Khuraiba village, involving state security operations that displaced families without documented compensation or relocation alternatives, subordinating tribal land claims to Vision 2030's diversification imperatives.^[42]^[51] Parallel detentions of additional tribe members on security pretexts continued, with human rights monitors documenting patterns of arbitrary holds lacking transparent judicial review, amid Saudi assertions that such measures prevent sabotage of economic initiatives.^[52]^[53]

Tribal Organization and Customs

The Huwaytat tribe functions as a confederation of clans and sub-tribes, including the nomadic camel-breeding Abu Tayyi and the more settled al-Taqiqa along the Red Sea coast, under the authority of paramount sheikhs based traditionally in areas like Duba.^[1] These leaders maintain governance through kinship cohesion known as ʿasabiyya, fostering ad hoc alliances and migration to preserve autonomy amid territorial changes.^[1] Dispute resolution occurs via consultations among sheikhs and elders, drawing on customary Bedouin practices where mediation prioritizes collective honor over individual retribution.^[1] Central to Huwaytat social order is the honor code of sharaf, which mandates male protection of family ird (honor), alongside virtues of courage and hospitality (diyafa), where guests receive unconditional shelter and provisions for up to three days, even from enemies.^[54] Blood feuds (tha'r), arising from offenses to honor, are traditionally suspended or settled through tribal arbitration, compensation (diya), or exile, though modernization has reduced their frequency while preserving their cultural weight. Gender roles align with patrilineal kinship, emphasizing male dominance in external affairs; the Bedouin tent's spatial division among the Jordanian Huwaytat separates a public diwan section for men—used for councils, guests, and decision-making—from the private women's area for domestic activities.^[34] In pastoral tasks, men historically managed long-distance herding, raiding, and protection of livestock, while women handled milking, weaving, and child-rearing, with empirical variations by sub-tribe: nomadic groups like Abu Tayyi retain stricter divisions tied to mobility, whereas semi-sedentary clans such as al-Taqiqa or Ibn Jazi incorporate women in supplementary wage labor amid sedentarization.^[1] These customs endure despite state influences, reinforcing tribal identity through oral enforcement and occasional modern adaptations like social media for solidarity.^[1]

Language and Oral Traditions

The Huwaytat primarily speak the Huwaitat dialect, a variety of Bedouin Arabic classified within the Northwest Arabian dialect group, exhibiting distinct phonological and morphological features that set it apart from sedentary Levantine Arabic and northern Peninsular Bedouin varieties such as those of the ʿAneze or Shammari tribes.^[55] This dialect retains archaic elements, including older diphthongs and unique pronominal suffixes—masculine forms like -ah/-ih and feminine -ha/-hain—along with vowel shifts such as /ö/ ~ /u/ and /e/ ~ /i/ patterns, reflecting historical nomadic adaptations to the arid terrains of the Aqaba region and Sinai.^[55] Specific lexicon preserves terms tied to Bedouin lifeways, such as "tör" for cliff in Wadi Rum narratives, and kinship designations embedded in tribal nomenclature, like those denoting clans such as Tawāyha or ʿUmerāt, which underscore genealogical depth over standardized Modern Standard Arabic equivalents.^[55] Influences from adjacent sedentary dialects in Greater Syria appear in certain grammatical forms, though the core remains Peninsular-oriented with Hijazi undertones due to proximity to western Arabian linguistic zones.^[55] Huwaytat oral traditions center on tribal poetry, a vital medium for preserving historical narratives of raids (ghazw), intertribal conflicts, and nasab (genealogies) that affirm descent from Judhami Arab lineages and Hashemite affiliations.^[56] These poetic forms, often improvised and chanted during gatherings, encode collective memory of migrations, alliances, and survival strategies in the Red Sea littoral, transmitted verbatim across generations by sheikhs and elders without reliance on written records.^[56] Folklore elements, including proverbs and anecdotal salfah (narratives), further reinforce social norms and terrain-specific knowledge, distinguishing Huwaytat expressions from urban Arabic literary traditions.^[57] Historically, nomadic existence limited literacy to rare Quranic memorization among religious figures, fostering dependence on oral recitation; contemporary state-sponsored education in Jordan and Saudi Arabia has elevated literacy rates above 95% among younger cohorts, gradually supplementing but not supplanting these verbal heritage practices.^[57]

Notable Figures and Achievements

Historical Warriors and Leaders

![Auda Abu Tayi, head chief of the Howeitat tribe][float-right] Auda abu Tayi (c. 1860–1924), sheikh of the Abu Tayi section of the Howeitat tribe, emerged as a key military leader during the Arab Revolt against the Ottoman Empire in World War I.^[16] His leadership was instrumental in the July 6, 1917, capture of Aqaba, a fortified Ottoman port on the Gulf of Aqaba, where a force of approximately 500 Howeitat and allied Bedouin warriors, supported by British advisor T.E. Lawrence, executed a daring 260-mile desert traverse from Wejh to surprise the garrison from the northeast.^[2] This tactical maneuver exploited the terrain's inaccessibility, leading to the Ottoman defenders' capitulation with fewer than 25 Arab casualties and the seizure of significant supplies, including artillery and supplies for 5,000 troops.^[58] Auda's role extended beyond the Aqaba raid, as he commanded Howeitat contingents in broader Revolt operations, leveraging the tribe's mobility and raiding expertise honed from generations of desert warfare to disrupt Ottoman supply lines and maintain tribal autonomy amid imperial pressures.^[19] Prior to the Revolt, Auda had elevated his clan's status through intertribal conflicts and resistance to Ottoman incursions, preserving Howeitat grazing lands in the Sinai-Aqaba region against encroachment by Egyptian and Ottoman forces.^[16] These efforts demonstrated adaptive guerrilla tactics, such as camel-mounted ambushes, which proved effective in asymmetric warfare against larger, supply-dependent armies.^[58] While post-Ottoman skirmishes involved Howeitat sheikhs in border clashes with emerging states like the Saudi Ikhwan in the early 1920s, verifiable leadership records emphasize Auda's earlier exploits as the tribe's defining warrior contributions, substantiated by British military dispatches rather than solely anecdotal accounts.^[17] His strategic alliances during the Revolt not only aided in weakening Ottoman control but also temporarily secured Howeitat influence in the post-war territorial delineations around Transjordan and Sinai.^[2]

Recognized Contributions to Regional History

The Huwaytat tribe's participation in the Arab Revolt of 1916–1918 against the Ottoman Empire significantly contributed to the disruption of Ottoman control in the Hejaz and Transjordan regions, facilitating the broader Allied campaign that accelerated the empire's collapse in the Middle East. By joining forces with Sharif Hussein's Hashemite-led forces, Huwaytat warriors, leveraging their mobility and knowledge of desert terrain, conducted raids on the Hejaz Railway, a critical Ottoman supply line connecting Damascus to Medina, which hampered troop movements and logistics.^[59]^[1] This guerrilla strategy, involving hit-and-run attacks on garrisons and infrastructure, exemplified irregular warfare tactics that complemented conventional British advances from Egypt, ultimately contributing to the Ottoman surrender in Arabia by October 1918.^[21] Causally, the Huwaytat's alignment with the revolt bolstered Hashemite legitimacy and military capacity, enabling the provisional Arab governments in Damascus and Hejaz that influenced post-war territorial arrangements. Their support helped secure key victories, such as the capture of Aqaba in July 1917, which opened a land route for supplies and shifted momentum toward Arab forces, paving the way for Faisal's short-lived Kingdom of Syria and Abdullah's eventual Emirate of Transjordan under British mandate.^[60] This tribal backing was instrumental in the Hashemite consolidation of power, as the revolt's outcomes pressured negotiators at the 1919 Paris Peace Conference to recognize Arab claims, though tempered by the Sykes-Picot Agreement's divisions, thereby reshaping borders from Ottoman vilayets into mandates that formed modern Jordan, Iraq, and Syria.^[34] The Huwaytat's employment of decentralized, nomadic-based irregular warfare during the revolt provided a historical precedent for asymmetric conflicts, influencing subsequent insurgencies by demonstrating how lightly armed tribal forces could undermine a conventional empire through sustained attrition and disruption rather than direct confrontation.^[61] Post-revolt, their resilience against sedentarization pressures from emerging states preserved elements of pre-modern Bedouin organizational models, offering a counterpoint to centralized state-building and sustaining nomadic adaptive strategies amid 20th-century border enforcements and economic shifts.^[1]

Representation in Literature and External Perceptions

Depictions in Western Accounts

T.E. Lawrence's Seven Pillars of Wisdom (1926), an eyewitness account of the Arab Revolt, portrays the Howeitat tribe as fierce desert warriors pivotal to guerrilla successes against Ottoman forces. Lawrence depicts Auda Abu Tayi, paramount sheikh of the Abu Tayi section of the Howeitat, as "the greatest fighting man in northern Arabia," emphasizing his leadership in rallying tribesmen for bold inland raids, including the July 6, 1917, capture of Aqaba from behind enemy lines.^[62]^[16] This heroic archetype highlights the tribe's valor, endurance in harsh terrain, and opportunistic raiding tactics, framing them as indispensable allies in disrupting Ottoman supply lines.^[63] Critiques of Lawrence's narrative, informed by British records and Ottoman perspectives, identify exaggerations in the scale of engagements and casualties, such as claims that Howeitat forces under Auda killed 5,000 Ottoman soldiers in September 1918 operations near Damascus—figures inflated to amplify the Revolt's impact.^[63] Lawrence, as a British intelligence officer, minimized indigenous Arab initiative to underscore his own orchestration, portraying Bedouins like the Howeitat as impulsive yet noble primitives requiring external direction, a bias rooted in colonial imperatives rather than detached observation.^[64] Nonetheless, archaeological evidence, including bullet casings from Jordanian sites consistent with described ambushes, corroborates the occurrence of core events involving Howeitat participation, validating factual kernels amid the embellishments.^[65] These accounts shaped enduring Western Orientalist views of Bedouin tribes as romantic exemplars of pre-modern heroism and tribal autonomy, influencing literature and popular perceptions of Arab warfare as chivalric rather than strategically pragmatic.^[64] Lawrence's emphasis on Howeitat exploits perpetuated a narrative of exotic valor, often detached from the tribe's complex internal feuds and economic motivations, prioritizing mythic appeal over granular tribal dynamics.^[63]

Modern Media and Tribal Narratives

In the 21st century, coverage of the Huwaytat tribe in relation to Saudi Arabia's NEOM megaproject has highlighted tensions between development imperatives and allegations of forced displacement. International outlets such as Al Jazeera have reported on incidents including the April 2020 killing of Abdul Rahim al-Huwaiti, a tribe member who refused to vacate his property, framing it as resistance to eviction for the project.^[66] These reports, drawing from activist accounts and family statements, describe a pattern of harassment, abductions, and arrests targeting Huwaytat individuals opposing relocation, with the tribe appealing to the United Nations in October 2020 for intervention against alleged abuses.^[45] Human Rights Watch and UN experts have echoed these concerns, documenting death sentences issued in 2022-2023 to at least three tribe members for protesting evictions, labeling the charges as politically motivated.^[53]^[67] Saudi state-aligned media and official narratives counter these portrayals by emphasizing NEOM's role in economic diversification under Vision 2030, portraying opposition as threats to national security rather than legitimate grievances. State responses have classified resisters, such as al-Huwaiti, as armed militants justifying lethal force, with security operations framed as counter-terrorism measures.^[68] Official projections promote NEOM as generating up to $100 billion annually in non-oil GDP by 2030 and creating over 250,000 jobs, positioning relocations as compensated transitions to modern opportunities rather than coercive expulsions.^[69]^[70] This framing aligns with Public Investment Fund statements underscoring the project's innovation in sustainable urbanism, though independent verifications of compensation adequacy remain limited.^[71] Huwaytat members have leveraged social media platforms to amplify resistance narratives, sharing videos and posts about arrests for online criticism of NEOM, which has drawn threats and detentions.^[72] Activists like Alya al-Huwaiti have used Twitter to publicize family experiences of intimidation, contributing to global awareness but prompting Saudi crackdowns under cybercrime laws.^[59] These efforts underscore tribal traditions of autonomy, yet they risk escalation, as evidenced by prosecutions for "inciting public opinion" against state projects.^[73] While NEOM promises substantial economic uplift—potentially boosting Saudi GDP growth from 4.4% to 6.3% through infrastructure and tech hubs—verifiable evidence from U.S. State Department reports and BBC investigations confirms forcible relocations of Huwaytat communities in Tabuk province since 2020, including uncompensated evictions and lethal enforcement orders.^[74]^[40] This divergence in media framings reflects broader tensions: activist sources prioritize individual rights and historical land ties, often from outlets with regional biases, while state media stresses collective progress, downplaying dissent amid opaque relocation processes. Empirical data on displacement scales remains contested, with tribal estimates exceeding hundreds affected, against official claims of voluntary participation.^[1]

References

[1]
Saudi Arabia's Neom Project, the Howeitat Conflict and Tribe-State ...
Aug 24, 2023 · Today they inhabit Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Israel, Egypt and Iraq. The Abu Tayyi segment hails from a group of camel-breeding nomads that played a ...Missing: notable figures
[2]
The Taking of Akaba - 1917 - T.E. Lawrence, Auda abu Tayi, Prince ...
Auda abu Tayi of the Howeitat (center) drew together the Arab force that he led to capture Akaba. He is flanked here by his two brothers.
[3]
Our TRIBE - Howaitat — Bedouin Directions
The Heuwaitaat tribe is a very large tribe and we live all over Jordan (and other countries like Saudi Arabia, Syria, & even Egypt).Missing: history origins
[4]
[PDF] The emergence of Saudi Arabian administrative areas
We shall consider in the following pages the admin- istrative system introduced into Arabia by the Ottomans. 2.3. Administrative Divisions of Arabia under the ...
[5]
TRIBES II | BEDOUIN HERITAGE
The Howeitat (Huwetat, Huwaytat, Howaitat)) Bedouins take a rather original stand among the Arabian tribes. From Egypt to Djof, from the Dead Sea until far ...
[6]
[PDF] the Banu Sakhr of Transjordan in the Early Twentieth Century
Deriving from the Arabic badawī, “desert dweller”, “Bedouin” has come to refer to a people who pursue specifically a life of camel- rearing nomadic pastoralism.
[7]
[PDF] Reviewing Social Life in Eastern Jordan through Burckhardts Tour in ...
One of the cases included the Habahba tribe which allied with the Huwaitat to protect themselves from the Bani Sakhr tribe but the latter, despite their ...
[8]
[PDF] Reviewing Social Life in Eastern Jordan through Burckhardt's Tour ...
Jun 1, 2023 · One of the cases included the Habahba tribe which allied with the Huwaitat to protect themselves from the Bani Sakhr tribe but the latter ...
[9]
'It's being built on our blood': the true cost of Saudi Arabia's $500bn ...
May 4, 2020 · “For the Huwaitat tribe, Neom is being built on our blood, on our bones,” says Alia Hayel Aboutiyah al-Huwaiti, an outspoken activist and member ...Missing: notable | Show results with:notable
[10]
[PDF] AN ANALYSIS OF THE FUTURE SMART CITY THROUGH THE LINE
... Huwaitat tribe, who have resided across this region of Saudi Arabia for generations. A Bedouin or tribal people, the Huwaitat historically practiced nomadic ...
[11]
[PDF] ,U·M·I - The University of Arizona
the Gulf of Aqaba. It is a bolson desert and ... the Huwaitat took khuwa from the settlers of Karak at the ... have their role in stimulating the process of Bedouin ...
[12]
[PDF] Jordan: Towards the End of the Ottoman Empire 1841-1918
The Adwan raided as far as Jerusalem and Jaffa in. Palestine, while the Howeitat under Audeh Abu Tayeh raided as far as Hama and the Euphrates basin. An injured ...Missing: tolls | Show results with:tolls
[13]
'Aqaba Castle in the Ottoman Period, 1517–1917 - ResearchGate
For most of the period during which 'Aqaba belonged to the Ottoman Empire, the precise nature of its frontier status needs to be nuanced, since, ...
[14]
(PDF) Ruling the Desert: Ottoman and British Policies towards the ...
Feb 19, 2015 · PDF | The various policies developed by the Ottomans and British for governing the indigenous Bedouin tribes of the Negev/Naqab and ...
[15]
[PDF] Not All Quiet on the Ottoman Fronts: Neglected Perspectives on a ...
Abu Tayeh of the Huwaitat Bedouin, Hussein's brother, Sharif Nasir and his friends visited the Druze and Bedouin sheikhs around the Hauran and requested.
[16]
Lawrence of Arabia . Auda Abu Tayeh - PBS
Many considered Auda the real hero of the Arab revolt. Lawrence described him as the "greatest fighting man in northern Arabia". Auda could trace his roots ...Missing: key leaders
[17]
Arabia during World War I - The Arab Revolt - Part 3 - MegaMilitary
Mar 5, 2024 · They included tribesmen from the Howeitat, the Shararat, the Bani 'Atiya and the Rwalla. These northern tribesmen urged Feisal to move the ...
[18]
Auda Abu Tayi: The Warrior of the Desert and the Broken Promises ...
In 1916, Sharif Hussein of Mecca declared a revolt against Ottoman rule, with British support. Lawrence, a British intelligence officer, was sent to liaise with ...Missing: Huwaytat | Show results with:Huwaytat
[19]
The Arab Revolt | Common Purpose, Competing Interests
May 29, 2025 · Perhaps his greatest friend and ally in the war was Auda Abu Tayi, a leader in the Howeitat tribe of Bedouins, who respected Lawrence's efforts ...Missing: Huwaytat | Show results with:Huwaytat
[20]
Capture of Aqaba 1917: Lawrence and the Arab Army's desert victory
On 6 July 1917, Arab Revolt forces under Sherif Nasir ibn Ali, Auda abu Tayi, and T. E. Lawrence captured Aqaba from the Ottomans after a daring overland march.Missing: Huwaytat | Show results with:Huwaytat
[21]
The Arab Revolt, 1916-18 - A Complex Desert Campaign - the Archive
Mar 29, 2019 · ... Howeitat tribesmen en route, finally took Aqaba on 6 July 1917.[xx] This type of long range “advance to contact” would be used again during ...
[22]
Lawrence of Arabia's Debt to Seapower - August 1979 Vol. 105/8/918
▻ Most of Lawrence's guerrilla raids were directed against the Hejaz Railway, which ran parallel to the Red Sea coast, at an average distance inland of about ...
[23]
6 July 1917 - The fall of Aqaba - Osprey Publishing
Jul 6, 2016 · On 6 July 1917 Lawrence of Arabia captured the port town of Aqaba in perhaps one of the greatest coups of the Arab Revolt.Missing: Huwaytat | Show results with:Huwaytat
[24]
[PDF] Winning Over The Tribes In Mandate Trans-Jordan: Security ... - CORE
reported that “'many' of the Huwaytat were personally engaged in tilling their land,” and that a member of the Sirhan tribe referred to himself as fallah in ...
[25]
The Hashemites and the Creation of Transjordan - Presses de l'Ifpo
The Hashemites are Sharifs or members of the Ahl al-Bayt*. Indeed, the Jordanian dynasty has direct lineage to the Prophet Muhammad through his daughter Fatima.
[26]
http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/5051/1/5051_2504.PDF
[27]
[PDF] Durham E-Theses - British Sinai - CORE
Egypt became officially independent in 1922. However British control of the Sinai. Peninsula continued until well after the Second World War. This thesis ...
[28]
the tribal system in the face of the state-formation process: mandatory
It is true that in Transjordan tribal confederacies such as the Bani Sakhr, the Huwaytat, the Balqa' alliance under the 'Adwan, and even the. Majali coalition ...
[29]
https://brill.com/display/book/9789047400622/B9789047400622_s008.pdf
[30]
Full text of "The Story Of The Arab Legion" - Internet Archive
... Ikhwan raids on the Huwaitat. Their efforts had compelled the Huwaitat to abandon raiding parties several hundred strong and had compelled them to limit ...
[31]
Tribal Politics in Contemporary Jordan: The Case of the Hirak ... - jstor
tribes like the Huwaytat were decimated by steep Saudi taxes on their winter graz grounds, while Ikhwan raids steadily sapped their resources. Amplifying ...
[32]
The 1925 Hajj Season and the Saudi Conquest of the Hijaz
Aug 14, 2020 · The 1925 Hajj Season and the Saudi Conquest of the Hijaz. 14th August ... [13] Immediately following the 1924 Hajj season, Ibn Saud ...
[33]
ISIS in Sinai held back by Egypt's Bedouins - CNN
Nov 10, 2015 · Sulieman El Meharwel of the Mesaied tribe, left, and Sulieman Abu Swailam of the Huwaitat tribe meet with other tribal leaders in Sinai.Missing: demographics | Show results with:demographics
[34]
Tabuk, Saudi Arabia - Wikipedia
It has a population of 594,350 (as of 2022). It is close to the Jordan–Saudi Arabia border and houses the Second air force base in Saudi Arabia.
[35]
THE MODERN SOCIOCULTURAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE ... - jstor
The tribe claims descent both from the Prophet Mohammed and from the Nabataeans who built Petra. Its members were among the first people who welcomed and ...Missing: notable | Show results with:notable<|separator|>
[36]
[PDF] Tourism in Wadi Rum, Jordan: Bedouin Cultural Commercialization ...
The Bedouin adapted by shifting to permanent structures, relying on tourism, and commercializing culture, but are now almost totally sedentarized and reliant ...Missing: post- | Show results with:post-
[37]
Jordan's Bedouins take on the struggles of climate change
May 26, 2023 · “Due to the low rainfall and high evaporation rates, it is challenging to sustain an adequate water supply. Wadi Rum receives very little ...Missing: subsidies | Show results with:subsidies
[38]
[PDF] Challenges to Sustainable Water Management in Jordan
Water and sewer administrations in Jordan are intensely subsidized. The income covers part of the operation and support costs. The tax framework is an ...
[39]
Riyadh will manage tribal marginalisation backlash
May 29, 2020 · The killing of a Huwaitat tribesman resisting eviction for the Neom megaproject highlights deeper trends.<|separator|>
[40]
STATE FORMATION AND THE ENCAPSULATION OF NOMADS - jstor
politics. The Jordanian national army, interestingly enough, served as a beneficial force for the bedouin and came to occupy such an ...Missing: welfare | Show results with:welfare
[41]
Neom: Saudi forces 'told to kill' to clear land for eco-city - BBC
May 8, 2024 · The villages were mostly populated by the Huwaitat tribe, who have inhabited the Tabuk region in the country's north-west for generations.Missing: sub- Abu-
[42]
Saudi forces kill man who refused to give up property: Activists
Abdul Rahim al-Hwaiti was allegedly shot dead after he refused to give up his property for a Red Sea mega-project.
[43]
Last inhabitants of Al-Khuraiba village evicted to make way for Neom
Jun 23, 2025 · ALQST for Human Rights is an independent NGO established in 2014 by Saudi Arabian human rights defender Yahya Assiri for the purpose of ...
[44]
Saudi activist's killing exposes local tensions over Neom construction
The shooting of a Saudi tribal activist protesting his eviction as part of the construction of Neom has increased local tensions over the project.
[45]
مقررو الأمم المتحدة يسائلون السعودية عن قتلها عبدالرحيم الحويطي
The letter indicated that al-Huwaiti, a 43-year-old Saudi national, was killed on 13 April 2020, amid evictions in the village of al-Khuraybah, as part of the ...
[46]
Al-Huwaitat tribe seeks UN help to stop Saudi forced displacement
Oct 9, 2020 · Saudi Arabia's al-Huwaitat tribe has sent an urgent communication to the United Nations calling for an investigation into allegations of forced displacement ...Missing: sub- | Show results with:sub-
[47]
Saudi Arabia: Al-Huwaitat tribe urge UN to intervene to stop forced ...
Saudi Arabia's al-Huwaitat tribe has sent an urgent communication to the United Nations calling for an investigation into allegations of forced displacement ...Missing: sub- Abu- territory
[48]
Saudi Arabia: UN experts alarmed by imminent executions linked to ...
May 3, 2023 · GENEVA (3 May 2023) – UN experts* today expressed alarm at the imminent risk of execution of three members of the Howeitat tribe in Saudi ArabiaMissing: sub- divisions
[49]
UN Human Rights Council experts "express alarm" over executions ...
May 5, 2023 · "All six individuals have been charged under the overly vague 2017 Saudi law on combating crimes of terrorism and its financing," they continued ...
[50]
Saudi Tribe Members Opposing Neom Megacity Given Death ...
May 4, 2023 · The UN group said they were convicted under "overly vague" terror laws for their objections. Saudi Arabia is pushing ahead with the megacity, ...
[51]
Death sentences upheld for three men who resisted Neom project
Jan 24, 2023 · They were tried on a number of vague charges under the Saudi Counter-Terrorism Law in relation to their peaceful actions, including activity on ...Missing: May | Show results with:May
[52]
Saudi Regime Forces Expel Al-Huwaiti Family at Gunpoint to Make ...
Jun 27, 2025 · Saudi State Security forces, accompanied by the governor of Duba, Mahmoud Al-Harbi, forcibly expelled the mother and sister of Abdulrahim Al-Huwaiti.
[53]
Arbitrary Detention And Unjust Sentences For Saudi Arabia's Al ...
Jul 16, 2025 · Saudi Arabia's $500 billion NEOM project envisions a futuristic megacity expanding across the Tabuk region, embodying the Kingdom's ...
[54]
The Man Who Bought The World: Rights Abuses Linked to Saudi ...
Nov 20, 2024 · The last decade has been one of the most consequential in the modern history of Saudi Arabia. ... Release members of the Huwaitat tribe who ...<|separator|>
[55]
Bedouin - New World Encyclopedia
Notable Bedouin tribes ; Howeitat in Wadi Araba, and Wadi Rum, Jordan; Beni Sakhr in Syria and Jordan ; Al Murrah in Saudi Arabia; Bani Hajir (AlHajri) in Saudi ...Missing: 19th | Show results with:19th<|separator|>
[56]
remarks on the arabic dialect of the hwetat tribe - Academia.edu
The text addresses the dialect-geographical history of the Huwaitat tribe, correcting earlier assumptions. Distinctive features of the Huwaitat dialect ...
[57]
[PDF] Abu Athera, Said Salman (1995) Tribal poetry of the Tarabin and H ...
... Huwaitat tribes differ from these in some details. The bedouin in these two tribes are not very religious people; like their brothers in. Arabia, they ...
[58]
[PDF] phd thesis - an analysis of jordanian bedouin riddles from the badia ...
... Bedouins, especially the Huwaitat tribe in southern Jordan, which is considered to be one of the tribes that contributed to the establishment of the current ...
[59]
The Battle of Aqaba—and T.E. Lawrence—Shaped the Future of the ...
Jul 2, 2020 · Auda was the foremost fighting chieftain of the Howeitat, the tribe whose territory straddled the desert and semi-desert regions of southernmost ...
[60]
Saudi tribe challenges crown prince's plans for tech city - BBC
Apr 22, 2020 · Alya Abutayah Alhwaiti told the BBC the threats were made in a phone call and on Twitter after she raised international awareness about a ...
[61]
Becoming Saudi Arabia | The Son King - Oxford Academic
Chapter One is an historical introduction to the country, analyzing the major events that led to the formation of the modern Saudi state in 1932.
[62]
Responding to the Arab Revolt: the Circassian Volunteer Cavalry ...
May 7, 2025 · This article investigates Ottoman military responses to the Arab Revolt that commenced on 10 June 1916.Missing: Huwaytat | Show results with:Huwaytat
[63]
Seven Pillars of Wisdom - Project Gutenberg Australia
Blood feuds were nominally healed, and really suspended in the Sherifian area: Billi and Juheina, Ateiba and Ageyl living and fighting side by side in ...Missing: honor | Show results with:honor
[64]
How Colonel T.E. Lawrence Deceived the Hashemite Arabs to revolt ...
The chief protagonist in the Hashemite Arab revolt was Thomas Edward (Ned) Lawrence, “El 'Aurens” of Arabia reputation, “the man with the gold”.Missing: Huwaitat | Show results with:Huwaitat
[65]
T. E. Lawrence's Misrepresentation of the Arabs in Seven Pillars of ...
Lawrence's depiction minimizes Arab agency in the Revolt, emphasizing his role in their liberation. He exaggerates his linguistic skills, claiming to know ...
[66]
Digs & Discoveries - Fact-Checking Lawrence of Arabia
Some scholars have accused British military officer T.E. Lawrence, later known as Lawrence of Arabia, of exaggerating his experience fighting with Bedouin ...
[67]
Saudi activists dispute official narrative on al-Hwaiti killing
Apr 17, 2020 · Abdul Rahim al-Hwaiti was shot dead by security forces after refusing to give up his property for a mega-project.
[68]
Human rights experts alarmed over 'imminent executions' in Saudi ...
May 3, 2023 · A large group of UN-appointed independent human rights experts expressed concern over the possibly imminent execution of three members of the Howeitat tribe in ...Missing: response | Show results with:response
[69]
Saudis kill 'armed' protestor opposed to 'megacity' 33 times size of ...
Apr 17, 2020 · Saudi political activist Omar bin Abdulaziz termed al-Howeiti the 'Martyr of NEOM.' ... The protestor, Abdul-Rahim al-Howeiti, was shot dead by ...
[70]
Case Study: NEOM - Catalyst for Progress and Its Economic Impact ...
NEOM aims to diversify Saudi Arabia's economy, create jobs, and contribute up to $100 billion annually to GDP by 2030, with most from non-oil sources.
[71]
Project NEOM - a highly ambitious and progressive megacity plan
This development is expected to create over 250,000 jobs and will contribute to KSA's GDP, which was expected to increase from 4.4% to 6.3% by 2020. The ...
[72]
NEOM - Public Investment Fund
NEOM provides innovative solutions to diversify Saudi Arabia's economy, supporting Vision 2030. Explore more on our website today.Missing: potential | Show results with:potential
[73]
Al-Huwaitat arrests - WCH | Stories
Oct 1, 2020 · On 1 October 2020 two members of the al-Huwaitat Indigenous tribe in Saudi Arabia were arrested for criticising the Saudi government and its NEOM development ...
[74]
[PDF] The Dark Side of Neom:
ALQST is aware of some 47 members of the Huwaitat tribe who have been arrested and detained, some as recently as September and October 2022, for speaking out ...Missing: history | Show results with:history<|control11|><|separator|>
[75]
[PDF] saudi arabia 2022 human rights report - U.S. Department of State
Several members of the al-Huwaitat tribe, who were reported to be forcibly displaced to make way for the NEOM megacity project in Tabuk province, were.