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Islamic Defenders Front

The Islamic Defenders Front (Indonesian: Front Pembela Islam, abbreviated FPI) was a hardline Islamist vigilante organization founded in August 1998 by Habib Muhammad Rizieq Shihab amid the political turmoil following the fall of President Suharto.^[1]^[2] The group positioned itself as a defender of Islamic morality, conducting raids on establishments accused of promoting vice, such as bars and nightclubs, and organizing mass protests against perceived blasphemers and secular policies.^[3]^[4] Under Rizieq Shihab's leadership as its Grand Imam, the FPI maintained a paramilitary wing known as the Islamic Defenders Militia (Laskar Pembela Islam), which enabled direct confrontations with authorities and rival groups, contributing to a pattern of street violence and intimidation that heightened religious tensions in Indonesia.^[4]^[2] The organization's activities included vocal opposition to liberal reforms, such as anti-Ahok protests in 2016-2017 that mobilized hundreds of thousands against the Christian governor of Jakarta accused of blasphemy, amplifying its influence in Islamist politics despite repeated clashes with law enforcement.^[3]^[1] The FPI faced escalating scrutiny for links to extremism, with nearly 30 leaders and members convicted of terrorism-related offenses, prompting the Indonesian government to formally dissolve the group via a joint ministerial decree on December 30, 2020, citing its involvement in criminal and paramilitary activities that threatened national security.^[5]^[6] Following the ban, remnants rebranded under new entities, perpetuating similar ideologies and tactics, while Rizieq Shihab's legal troubles, including arrests for COVID-19 violations and incitement, underscored the group's contentious legacy.^[6]^[2]

Founding and Early Development

Establishment and Initial Objectives

The Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) was founded on 17 August 1998, coinciding with Indonesia's Independence Day, amid the political turmoil following President Suharto's resignation on 21 May 1998, which precipitated widespread riots, economic collapse, and a breakdown in public order.^[7]^[8] Led by Habib Muhammad Rizieq Shihab, a Hadhrami descendant and Islamic preacher, the organization was declared at the Al-Umm Islamic Boarding School in Ciputat, South Jakarta, by a coalition of haba'ib (descendants of the Prophet Muhammad), ulama, preachers, and Muslim activists.^[7]^[8] This formation occurred during the early Reformation era, when the weakening of state institutions created opportunities for Islamist groups to assert influence in addressing perceived lawlessness and moral decay.^[9] The initial objectives of FPI centered on enforcing amar ma'ruf nahi munkar (enjoining what is right and forbidding what is wrong) as the core principle guiding its activities, with the explicit goal of restoring Islamic dignity and combating societal vices in a secular state.^[7]^[8] The group launched a national anti-maksiat (anti-vice) campaign targeting prostitution, alcohol sales, gambling, and other behaviors deemed immoral, positioning itself as a vigilante force to fill the gap left by ineffective authorities amid rising human rights abuses against Muslims and lax social controls.^[8] According to its foundational documents, such as the Risalah Historis dan Garis Perjuangan, FPI aimed to comprehensively apply Islamic moral standards across all life sectors to foster a Muslim community that embodies mercy to the worlds (rahmatan lil alamin).^[7] In its early phase, FPI also committed to supporting national stability by assisting the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI) in security tasks, including self-reliant community security (PAM Swakarsa) for the Special Session of the People's Consultative Assembly in November 1998, reflecting an initial alignment with state efforts to restore order.^[7] This dual focus on moral enforcement and security cooperation underscored the organization's self-perception as a defender of Islam against both internal corruption and external threats like secularism and globalization.^[10]

Ties to Military and Political Elites

The Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) was founded on August 17, 1998, at the Al-Umm Islamic Boarding School in Ciputat, Jakarta, amid the political turmoil following President Suharto's resignation on May 21, 1998. The organization emerged as a paramilitary-style civilian militia with explicit backing from Indonesian military elites, including General Wiranto, then-Panglima of the Armed Forces (ABRI), who sponsored its formation to bolster security during the transitional period.^[11] This support aligned with broader efforts by security apparatus remnants to counter anarchy, student-led reformasi protests, and perceived leftist threats in the wake of anti-Chinese riots and economic collapse.^[12] FPI's structure incorporated vigilante elements, drawing recruits from Islamist networks and providing them with training and logistics tacitly enabled by military channels.^[13] Early operational ties manifested through FPI's integration into the government-sanctioned Pam Swakarsa (self-reliant security) initiative, launched in late 1998 under military oversight to safeguard political stability. FPI members participated as auxiliary forces in suppressing demonstrations, notably during the October 1999 Special Session of the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR), where they helped protect the Habibie administration against mass protests demanding accountability for 1998 violence.^[14] Wiranto, as Coordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs under President B.J. Habibie, facilitated such alignments, viewing Islamist militias like FPI as counterweights to reformist unrest while shielding military figures from human rights scrutiny related to East Timor and May riots.^[15] These connections extended to logistical aid, including transportation and non-interference during FPI's initial raids on vice establishments, framed as moral enforcement but serving elite interests in restoring order.^[11] Politically, FPI garnered patronage from Habibie-era elites, including indirect endorsement from figures like Amien Rais, who shared anti-Suharto reformist rhetoric but prioritized stability. The group's utility in mobilizing Islamist support for Habibie's 1999 MPR defense—amid threats of impeachment—cemented reciprocal ties, with FPI publicly rallying against opposition while elites overlooked its vigilante excesses.^[15] By 1999-2000, however, strains emerged as FPI's autonomy grew, shifting from proxy enforcer to independent actor, though foundational military-political networks persisted in providing selective impunity during early expansions.^[16] This elite sponsorship, rooted in pragmatic realpolitik rather than ideological affinity, enabled FPI's rapid organizational buildup from a few hundred to thousands of cadres within its first two years.^[12]

Historical Evolution

Period of Government Alignment

The Islamic Defenders Front maintained alignment with segments of the Indonesian government and military establishment in the immediate post-founding years, leveraging connections forged during the turbulent transition from Suharto's New Order regime. Established on August 17, 1998, the organization received backing from conservative army generals who sought to mobilize civilian militias to counter reformist chaos, secular influences, and potential communist resurgence amid the Asian financial crisis and regional unrest.^[17]^[18] This support positioned the FPI as a paramilitary adjunct aligned with elite interests in preserving hierarchical order and Islamic orthodoxy, rather than outright opposition to the nascent democratic framework under President B.J. Habibie (May 1998–October 1999).^[3] Under President Abdurrahman Wahid (1999–2001), the FPI's early vigilante operations—such as raids on Jakarta nightclubs and gambling dens starting in late 1999—encountered minimal resistance from security forces, reflecting tacit alignment with Wahid's eclectic coalition that included military remnants wary of unchecked liberalization. The group's actions, framed as defending Islamic morality against Western-style vice, resonated with conservative elements within the armed forces, who occasionally shielded FPI members from prosecution; for instance, arrests following a December 1999 assault on entertainment venues resulted in brief detentions rather than dissolution.^[19] This tolerance extended into the Megawati Sukarnoputri administration (2001–2004), where despite public criticisms of her secular nationalist heritage, the FPI's elite ties prevented systemic crackdowns, allowing it to expand membership to approximately 10,000 by 2003 while conducting over 50 documented raids.^[20] During Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's presidency (2004–2014), alignment manifested through sustained governmental forbearance toward the FPI's activities, including anti-vice campaigns and protests against perceived moral decay, as SBY's administration prioritized stability and courted Islamist support to counterbalance secular rivals like Megawati's PDI-P. The organization avoided outright bans, with police often intervening lightly in clashes—such as the 2005 raid on a Jakarta cafe—attributable to lingering military patronage and the FPI's utility in mobilizing conservative Muslim sentiment without directly challenging SBY's moderate image.^[21] By 2010, this period saw the FPI's national expansion to dozens of branches, bolstered by unhindered operations that aligned with state narratives on religious harmony tempered by enforcement against "deviant" behaviors.^[2]

Transition to Political Opposition

The Islamic Defenders Front's transition to overt political opposition crystallized during the 2014 Indonesian presidential election, marking a departure from the relative tolerance it enjoyed under President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY), whose administration often accommodated FPI demands with minimal resistance.^[15] Under SBY from 2004 to 2014, FPI operated with implicit government leniency despite its vigilante actions, reflecting a broader pattern of soft handling toward Islamist groups amid post-Suharto political instability.^[15] However, with Joko Widodo's (Jokowi) candidacy, FPI leader Muhammad Rizieq Shihab positioned the organization against him, endorsing rival Prabowo Subianto and portraying Jokowi as emblematic of secular and elite influences antithetical to strict Islamic orthodoxy.^[22] This endorsement aligned FPI with Prabowo's opposition coalition, leveraging anti-Jokowi sentiment infused with religious rhetoric accusing the incoming administration of undermining syariah implementation and tolerating moral decay.^[2] Post-2014, FPI's oppositional stance intensified as Jokowi's government pursued policies perceived by the group as prioritizing economic pragmatism over Islamist priorities, such as limited enforcement of blasphemy laws and resistance to broader syariah adoption.^[23] Unlike the pre-Jokowi era where opposition was sporadic and less confrontational, FPI under Rizieq adopted a more aggressive posture, organizing rallies and issuing fatwas against government figures for alleged apostasy or liberalism.^[24] This shift was driven by ideological incompatibility, with FPI viewing Jokowi's pluralist leanings—rooted in his Javanese abangan background—as a causal threat to Indonesia's Islamic identity, prompting sustained mobilization that escalated into major protests by 2016.^[2] The realignment not only elevated FPI's profile within hardline Islamist networks but also strained its prior elite connections, prioritizing doctrinal purity over pragmatic alliances.^[25]

Major Protests and Mobilizations (2010s)

During the 2010s, the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) shifted toward orchestrating large-scale national protests, most prominently through the Aksi Bela Islam series targeting Jakarta Governor Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (Ahok) for alleged blasphemy against Islam in a September 2016 speech.^[3] These mobilizations, coordinated by FPI alongside other Islamist groups, framed the campaigns as defenses of Quranic sanctity and Islamic supremacy against secular and minority influences.^[2] The initial rally on October 14, 2016, drew thousands to Jakarta's City Hall, where participants in white attire chanted anti-Ahok slogans and demanded his removal, setting the stage for escalation.^[26] This was amplified by Aksi 411 on November 4, 2016, which mobilized hundreds of thousands across Indonesia, with Jakarta seeing massive congregations calling for Ahok's arrest on blasphemy charges; FPI leader Muhammad Rizieq Shihab played a central role in rallying support.^[27] ^[28] The pinnacle came with Aksi 212 on December 2, 2016, assembling an estimated 200,000 to over one million protesters in Jakarta, the largest such gathering since the fall of Suharto; organized under FPI's influence, it pressured authorities, leading to Ahok's trial, conviction in May 2017, and two-year imprisonment.^[4] ^[3] These events boosted FPI's visibility, enabling it to leverage religious grievances for political opposition against President Joko Widodo's administration.^[2] Throughout the decade, FPI also joined smaller mobilizations, such as supporting blasphemy law retention in 2010 and opposing perceived moral laxity, but the anti-Ahok protests represented its peak in mass coordination and impact on national discourse.^[29]

Clashes with Authorities (2019-2020)

In 2019, the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) was involved in several confrontations amid political tensions surrounding Indonesia's general elections. On April 8, FPI's Yogyakarta branch reported a physical clash at their headquarters with a group suspected to be supporters of the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P), resulting in injuries and prompting FPI to file a police complaint; the incident stemmed from alleged provocations during a political campaign nearby.^[30] Later, during post-election protests on May 21-22 in Jakarta, rioters displaying large posters of exiled FPI leader Muhammad Rizieq Shihab engaged in violence against police in areas like Slipi, throwing stones, fireworks, and other projectiles, which contributed to widespread unrest and property damage following the official announcement of election results.^[31] ^[32] These events highlighted FPI's role in mobilizing crowds that escalated into direct confrontations with security forces, though police attributed much of the incitement to Islamist militants unaffiliated with the core protest.^[32] Tensions persisted into 2020, particularly after Rizieq Shihab's return from self-imposed exile in Saudi Arabia on November 10, when FPI organized large-scale gatherings at Rizieq's residence in Petamburan, Jakarta, defying COVID-19 health protocols restricting mass assemblies.^[33] These events drew thousands, leading to police enforcement actions, including arrests for quarantine violations and dispersal orders, as authorities monitored for potential unrest; FPI framed the gatherings as expressions of religious devotion, while police cited public health risks and prior FPI history of violence.^[5] Skirmishes occurred between FPI paramilitary-style guards (known as laskar) and surveillance teams, with reports of early November incidents involving gunfire exchanges during police tailing of Rizieq's convoy, though details remained disputed between official accounts of defensive police action and FPI claims of unprovoked aggression.^[34] By mid-December, confrontations intensified, culminating in a December 7 shootout on a Jakarta toll road where police killed six FPI members escorting Rizieq; authorities stated the guards initiated the attack by firing on officers, wounding one and killing another in crossfire, while FPI alleged the victims were unarmed and shot execution-style without warning.^[35] ^[36] Further clashes followed, including on December 19 when Rizieq supporters pelted police with rocks during an arrest attempt related to the same quarantine breaches, underscoring escalating friction between FPI's defiance of restrictions and state efforts to curb the group's activities.^[37] These incidents, marked by mutual accusations of provocation, reflected FPI's paramilitary posture against perceived government overreach, though police reports emphasized the group's repeated violations as triggers.^[5]

Disbandment and Aftermath

December 2020 Shootings and Government Response

On December 7, 2020, Indonesian police engaged in a fatal clash with six members of the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) on the Jakarta-Cikampek toll road at kilometer 50, resulting in the deaths of all six FPI personnel by gunfire.^[38]^[39]^[40] The incident occurred during a police pursuit of a convoy believed to be escorting FPI leader Muhammad Rizieq Shihab, who had recently returned from self-imposed exile; authorities stated that the FPI members initiated the violence by attacking officers with improvised firearms and sharp weapons after their vehicle was stopped.^[41]^[42] FPI spokespersons, including deputy secretary-general Munarman, rejected the police account, labeling the shootings as extrajudicial killings and demanding accountability.^[43] The National Commission on Human Rights (Komnas HAM) subsequently investigated and concluded on January 8, 2021, that the killings constituted unlawful acts by police, citing excessive use of force and failures in procedural safeguards, though police maintained the action was defensive and necessary against an armed threat.^[44]^[45] International observers, including Amnesty International, called for an independent probe into the use of lethal force, highlighting discrepancies in ballistic evidence and witness statements.^[46] In response, two officers faced murder charges in 2021 related to four of the deaths, underscoring internal scrutiny but no broader convictions at the time.^[47] The Indonesian government, under President Joko Widodo, leveraged the incident to accelerate FPI's dissolution, issuing a joint ministerial decree on December 30, 2020, formally banning the organization for repeated involvement in criminal and terrorist activities that threatened national security and public order.^[48]^[49] Coordinating Minister Mahfud MD justified the ban as a measure to uphold the rule of law, citing FPI's history of vigilantism and opposition to state policies, while Rizieq Shihab was arrested days after the shootings on unrelated charges.^[2] Critics from Islamist circles argued the response exemplified state repression of dissent, but official statements emphasized protection of Indonesia's pluralistic Pancasila ideology against paramilitary-style groups.^[50]

Official Dissolution and Legal Ramifications

On December 30, 2020, the Indonesian Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal, and Security Affairs, Mahfud MD, announced the official dissolution of the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) through a joint ministerial decree signed by the ministers of home affairs, law and human rights, and religious affairs, citing the organization's repeated involvement in violent acts, terrorism, and failure to adhere to legal requirements as a mass organization.^[5]^[17] The decree explicitly prohibited all FPI activities, declaring the group unlawful and ordering the cessation of its operations, with enforcement to follow constitutional and regulatory frameworks, including a 2014 Constitutional Court ruling on mass organization dissolution procedures.^[51] Although FPI's registration as a mass organization had lapsed de jure on June 21, 2019, due to non-renewal of its certificate of registration (SKT), the group had persisted in conducting unauthorized activities, prompting the formal ban after escalating clashes, including the December 7, 2020, shootout that killed six FPI members.^[5]^[51] Legal ramifications extended to criminal prosecutions of FPI leadership and members, with six senior officials designated as suspects in the December 2020 shooting incident for alleged attacks on police, leading to charges under anti-terrorism and public order laws.^[5] FPI leader Muhammad Rizieq Shihab, who had returned from self-exile in November 2020, faced multiple convictions post-dissolution: in May 2021, the East Jakarta District Court sentenced him to eight months' imprisonment and a 20 million rupiah fine for violating COVID-19 health protocols during mass gatherings, including his daughter's wedding attended by thousands; in June 2021, he received a four-year sentence for spreading false information about COVID-19 tests and concealing results.^[52]^[53] Shihab was released on parole in July 2022 after serving reduced terms across these cases.^[54] Additional FPI affiliates, such as lawyer Munarman, were arrested in 2021 for orchestrating attacks linked to the group, underscoring the government's crackdown on residual networks.^[55] The dissolution decree imposed no explicit asset forfeiture in initial announcements, but authorities pursued administrative measures to dismantle FPI's infrastructure, including revocation of operational permits and monitoring of successor entities under Indonesia's mass organizations law (UU No. 17/2013), which allows for dissolution of groups contravening public order or ideology.^[51] Critics, including some legal experts, argued the process required clearer enumeration of violations to align with due process, though the government maintained compliance with existing statutes amid FPI's history of vigilante actions and opposition to state policies.^[56] By 2021, public opinion polls indicated majority support for the ban, reflecting perceptions of FPI as a threat to national stability.^[57]

Reincarnations and Successor Organizations

Following the Indonesian government's decree dissolving the Islamic Defenders Front on December 30, 2020, former FPI members rapidly announced successor entities to continue their activities under new names.^[58] On December 31, 2020, Sobri Lubis, a former FPI chairman, and other senior figures established the Islamic Unity Front (Front Persatuan Islam), which employed confrontational rhetoric against the ban but saw most of its members transition to another group shortly thereafter.^[6] The primary reincarnation emerged as the Islamic Brotherhood Front (Front Persaudaraan Islam, often termed Neo-FPI), publicly declared on January 1, 2021, with its headquarters retaining the former FPI location at Jalan Petamburan III in Jakarta.^[6] Initially led by Qurthubi Jaelani, who had previously chaired FPI's Banten chapter, the organization outlined programs focused on eradicating liberalization, promoting deradicalization to safeguard Pancasila, and advancing Aswaja-ization to align with moderate Sunni proselytization.^[6] A national congress held on March 18, 2021, at Pesantren Salafiyah Al-Futuhiyan in Lebak, Banten, resulted in the appointment of a new board, with Muhammad bin Husein Alatas—son-in-law of FPI founder Muhammad Rizieq Shihab—named chairman on March 25, 2021, serving until 2029.^[58] These successors maintain conditional recognition of Indonesia's Pancasila ideology and the 1945 Constitution, referencing sharia elements from the Jakarta Charter, while analysts assess them as continuations of FPI's core despite efforts to project a softer image through mainstream alignments, such as with Nahdlatul Ulama.^[58] The Indonesian government has not formally recognized these groups, viewing them as illegal extensions of the dissolved FPI, amid ongoing scrutiny of figures like former FPI secretary-general Munarman for alleged terrorism links in April 2021.^[58]

Ideology and Core Principles

Defense of Islamic Orthodoxy

The Islamic Defenders Front positioned itself as a defender of Islamic orthodoxy by advocating the strict adherence to Sunni principles as embodied in Ahlus Sunnah wal Jamaah, emphasizing the preservation of core doctrinal purity against modern dilutions. Central to this stance was the organization's doctrine of amar ma'ruf nahi munkar (enjoining good and forbidding evil), which it sought to implement comprehensively across social, political, and moral domains to counteract perceived deviations from prophetic methodology (manhaj nubuwwah). This approach framed orthodoxy not merely as theological fidelity but as active resistance to influences like secularism and liberal interpretations that FPI viewed as eroding traditional Islamic norms.^[15]^[59] FPI's vision explicitly called for the establishment of a pious society under Sharia law, rejecting innovations (bid'ah) and pluralistic adaptations of Islam—such as "Islam Nusantara"—as compromises with non-Islamic ideologies. Founder Muhammad Rizieq Shihab articulated this as a duty to revive authentic Sunni practices, drawing on Salafi-influenced readings of scripture to prioritize literal adherence over contextual accommodations. The group critiqued Indonesia's Pancasila framework when it conflicted with Sharia imperatives, though it pragmatically asserted compatibility to operate within the republic, ultimately aspiring toward a caliphate-like governance for full orthodox realization.^[60]^[61] In practice, this defense targeted internal threats to orthodoxy, including liberal Muslim scholars and groups promoting tolerance or syncretism, which FPI labeled as heretical drifts from Sunni consensus. By mobilizing against such elements, FPI aimed to enforce communal moral standards aligned with classical fiqh rulings, positioning vigilante actions as extensions of religious obligation rather than mere political activism. This ideological rigidity distinguished FPI from more accommodationist Indonesian Islamic organizations, underscoring its role as a self-appointed guardian of unadulterated faith amid post-Suharto societal liberalization.^[62]^[3]

Anti-Liberalism and Rejection of Pluralism

The Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) has consistently articulated opposition to liberalism as a foreign ideological import that erodes Islamic orthodoxy and promotes moral relativism incompatible with Sharia governance. In alignment with a 2005 fatwa issued by the Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI), which declared liberalism, secularism, and pluralism as deviations from Islam, FPI adopted these propositions, viewing them as threats to the enforcement of amar ma'ruf nahi mungkar (commanding good and forbidding evil).^[3]^[63] FPI's leadership, including founder Muhammad Rizieq Shihab, framed liberalism as enabling un-Islamic practices such as usury, alcohol consumption, and lax sexual norms, which they actively sought to suppress through vigilante actions and public campaigns.^[64] Central to FPI's rejection of pluralism is the assertion that it undermines tawhid (the oneness of God) by equating Islam with other faiths or ideologies, thereby diluting the supremacy of divine law. Shihab and FPI spokespersons have denounced religious pluralism as a form of apostasy, arguing that Indonesia's Pancasila state ideology—while nominally monotheistic—fosters tolerance for non-Islamic beliefs at the expense of Sharia implementation.^[63] This stance manifests in FPI's resistance to interfaith dialogue initiatives and their advocacy for an Islamic caliphate model over democratic pluralism, which they see as prioritizing human sovereignty over God's.^[65] For instance, during the 2010s protests against perceived blasphemers, FPI mobilized against figures promoting pluralist interpretations, equating such views with threats to national Islamic identity.^[3] FPI's anti-liberal rhetoric extends to critiques of democracy itself, with Shihab declaring in 2014 that "democracy is more dangerous than pig's meat," associating it with secular-liberal values that allow majority rule to override Islamic prohibitions.^[65] This position reflects a broader ideological commitment to theocratic governance, where pluralism is rejected not merely as impractical but as theologically invalid, prioritizing empirical enforcement of Sharia over consensual coexistence. FPI's publications and sermons often cite Quranic verses and hadith to substantiate this, warning that liberal-pluralist influences lead to societal decay, as evidenced by their campaigns against liberal Islamic networks like Jaringan Islam Liberal (JIL).^[64] Despite operating within Indonesia's pluralist framework for tactical survival, FPI's core doctrine remains uncompromising, influencing successor groups post-dissolution to perpetuate these views.^[63]

Anti-Communism and Perceived Internal Threats

The Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) has consistently framed communism as an existential threat to Islamic orthodoxy and Indonesian national identity, viewing it as ideologically incompatible with Islam due to its atheistic foundations and historical antagonism toward religious institutions. This stance draws from Indonesia's 1965-1966 anti-communist purges, during which up to three million suspected communists were killed, an event FPI invokes to justify vigilance against any perceived resurgence of leftist ideologies. FPI leaders, including Muhammad Rizieq Shihab, have described communism as a "latent danger" that infiltrates through secularism, liberalism, and efforts to rehabilitate the outlawed Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI), positioning it as an internal betrayal rather than solely an external ideology.^[2]^[66]^[67] FPI's anti-communist activism manifested in public mobilizations, such as the June 3, 2016, rally in Jakarta where members joined thousands of hard-line Islamists in chanting "Crush communists, down with PKI" and demanding President Joko Widodo explicitly ban communism, reflecting fears of underground PKI networks exploiting democratic openings. Similar demonstrations occurred on September 29, 2017, where FPI participants rallied against a purported communist revival, linking it to government tolerance of symbols and narratives sympathetic to historical leftists. These actions aligned FPI with broader conservative coalitions, including military veterans, emphasizing communism's portrayal as an enduring "evil" threat embedded within society.^[68]^[69]^[66] Rizieq Shihab amplified these concerns through targeted campaigns, including a 2017 lecture accusing Indonesian government bills and logos—such as the national emblem—of containing covert communist symbols like the hammer and sickle, prompting police interrogation on January 23, 2017, amid heightened sensitivities over PKI rehabilitation. In August 2015, FPI issued an open letter to Widodo warning of communists repackaging their ideology under a "humanistic" guise via initiatives like the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, which they claimed masked efforts to overturn anti-communist legacies. By July 2020, FPI documented indicators of PKI revival, citing pushes to repeal the 1966 People's Consultative Assembly Decree (Tap MPR 65/66) and demands for official apologies to purged communists, framing these as subversive internal maneuvers to erode Islamic dominance. Such perceptions positioned FPI as a self-appointed guardian against "traitors within," with posters and rhetoric equating communism to moral and spiritual corruption.^[70]^[71]^[72]^[73]

Activities and Operations

Vigilante Enforcement Against Moral Violations

The Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) frequently conducted unauthorized raids, known as razia, targeting establishments and individuals perceived to violate Islamic moral codes, including the consumption and sale of alcohol, prostitution, pornography, and activities associated with LGBT individuals. These actions were framed by FPI as fulfilling the religious obligation of amar ma'ruf nahi mungkar (enjoining good and forbidding evil), often involving vandalism, intimidation, and physical assaults without legal authority.^[4]^[74] Such vigilantism peaked during Ramadan, when FPI members would patrol and disrupt "dens of vice" like bars and nightclubs, citing the heightened sanctity of the month.^[75]^[76] In October 2004, FPI members trashed a Jakarta nightclub popular with foreigners, destroying property and threatening staff over alcohol service, as part of a series of planned attacks on entertainment venues.^[77] Similar raids occurred in subsequent years; for instance, in July 2013 during Ramadan, FPI supporters vandalized bars and alcohol vendors in Jakarta, smashing bottles and equipment to enforce perceived moral purity.^[78]^[79] That same month, approximately 50 FPI members attempted a raid on a suspected prostitution area in Jakarta, fleeing after confrontation with locals but highlighting their proactive targeting of sex work.^[78] FPI also extended vigilantism to LGBT-related activities, collaborating with or tipping off police for raids. On November 28, 2016, an FPI informant prompted a police operation in Jakarta against an alleged gay sex party, leading to 13 arrests for moral deviance.^[4]^[80] In January 2016, FPI joined Bandung police in Operation Yustisia, detaining four pairs of suspected lesbians during a sweep framed as combating sexual immorality.^[81] By January 2019, FPI led a raid on an HIV prevention NGO in Pekanbaru, Sumatra, accusing it of promoting LGBT "vice" through condom distribution to sex workers and transgender individuals; the action involved smashing windows and demanding closure, supported by soldiers and residents.^[82] These incidents underscore FPI's pattern of extralegal enforcement, often resulting in property damage and fear among targets, though the group claimed to act in defense of societal Islamic norms.^[83]^[84]

Campaigns Against Religious Minorities

The Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) has targeted religious minorities perceived as deviating from Sunni Islamic orthodoxy, including Ahmadiyya adherents, Shia Muslims, and Christians, through protests, intimidation, and physical confrontations aimed at restricting their practices and presence. These actions often framed such groups as threats to Islamic purity, invoking religious edicts against "deviant" sects and opposing non-Muslim places of worship. FPI's involvement in 17 incidents of violence against religious minorities, including Ahmadiyah and Christian congregations, was documented in 2016 by the Setara Institute for Democracy and Peace.^[85] Police records from 2010-2011 attributed 34 cases of violence and destruction to FPI, many involving confrontations with minority communities.^[86] FPI campaigns against Ahmadiyya Muslims, labeled heretical by the group for their belief in a post-Muhammad prophet, included calls for the sect's dissolution and participation in attacks on their facilities. In collaboration with other hardline organizations, FPI contributed to a climate of hostility that facilitated mob violence against Ahmadiyah mosques and members, as noted in analyses of post-Suharto era intolerance. The group's rhetoric and actions aligned with broader efforts to enforce fatwas declaring Ahmadiyah non-Muslim, leading to documented raids and property damage.^[87]^[3] Against Shia communities, FPI mobilized opposition, particularly in Sampang, East Java, where in 2011 its local branch rallied crowds to demand the expulsion of Shia residents and threatened violence if they remained, exacerbating sectarian tensions that culminated in arson and displacement. Since 2014, FPI has conducted anti-Shiite media campaigns in alliance with the National Anti-Shiite Alliance, promoting narratives of doctrinal impurity and justifying restrictions on Shia gatherings. These efforts reflected FPI's alignment with Salafi-influenced anti-Shia geopolitics, contributing to incidents like the 2011-2012 Sampang violence that displaced hundreds.^[20]^[3]^[88] FPI opposed Christian communities by demanding closures of churches lacking full permits and protesting their expansion, often citing un-Islamic influences. In Bekasi in 2010, FPI's local leader challenged the legal status of the Galilea Protestant Church, leading to halted services amid threats. Similar pressures in Aceh in 2015 saw FPI advocate shutting down unlicensed churches, exploiting regulatory gaps to incite intolerance. These campaigns extended to mass rallies against perceived Christian political influence, such as those led by FPI against Jakarta's Christian governor in 2016-2017, where accusations of blasphemy fueled sectarian divides.^[89]^[90]^[91]

Political Activism and Mass Rallies

The Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) conducted political activism through coordinated mass rallies that mobilized conservative Muslim supporters to challenge secular governance, demand stricter enforcement of Islamic law, and oppose leaders perceived as undermining religious orthodoxy. These events often targeted national political figures and policies, framing them as threats to Islam, and drew participation from affiliated groups like the National Movement to Defend the Indonesian Ulema Council (GNPF-MUI).^[92] ^[93] FPI's rallies emphasized anti-pluralist and anti-liberal themes, seeking to influence electoral outcomes and judicial processes by amplifying public pressure.^[94] A pivotal campaign unfolded in 2016 amid Jakarta's gubernatorial election, where FPI co-organized the Aksi 411 rally on October 14, followed by the larger Aksi 212 on December 2. The 212 rally in central Jakarta attracted an estimated 200,000 to 500,000 participants, who marched to demand the arrest and trial of incumbent governor Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (Ahok) on blasphemy charges stemming from a campaign speech referencing a Quranic verse.^[95] ^[96] Led by FPI's Muhammad Rizieq Shihab alongside ulema council figures, the protest featured prayers at the National Monument and calls for Sharia-inspired governance, contributing to Ahok's December 2016 disqualification, trial conviction in May 2017, and two-year imprisonment.^[97] ^[94] Attendance figures reported by organizers exceeded one million, though independent estimates were lower, highlighting FPI's capacity to consolidate Islamist networks for political leverage.^[96] FPI extended this activism against President Joko Widodo's administration, portraying his policies as concessions to secularism and Western influence. Post-2014 and 2019 elections, rallies accused Jokowi of electoral fraud and promoting liberalism, with FPI joining broader coalitions in protests that disrupted urban centers and pressured legislative debates on issues like the criminal code revisions.^[34] ^[98] Annual 212 reunions, such as the December 2, 2018, event at Al-Jawahir field, drew thousands under FPI coordination, featuring speeches by opposition politicians and reaffirmations of the movement's demands for Islamic primacy in state affairs.^[99] These gatherings maintained momentum despite security deployments, occasionally turning tense but largely adhering to organized prayer formats.^[100] By 2019, a December 2 rally saw peaceful assembly of conservative groups, including FPI affiliates, underscoring sustained political mobilization until the organization's formal dissolution in December 2020.^[101] FPI's rally strategy relied on charismatic leadership and symbolic dates, such as tying actions to Islamic historical events, to frame political dissent as religious duty. This approach amplified FPI's influence within Indonesia's conservative Muslim base, fostering alliances with political parties and figures opposed to pluralist reforms, though it drew state scrutiny for inciting division.^[98] ^[2] The 2016-2017 cycle, in particular, demonstrated causal links between mass turnout and policy shifts, as Ahok's ouster elevated Islamist voices in national discourse.^[97]

Responses to Perceived Blasphemy

The Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) has frequently mobilized supporters in response to instances of perceived blasphemy against Islam, primarily through mass protests demanding enforcement of Indonesia's 1965 blasphemy law, which criminalizes insults to religion with penalties up to five years imprisonment.^[85] These actions often involve coordinated rallies accusing public figures of defaming Islamic teachings, framing such responses as essential for upholding religious orthodoxy.^[63] A prominent case occurred in 2016 involving Jakarta Governor Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (Ahok), whose September speech referencing a Quranic verse was interpreted by critics as blasphemous. On October 14, 2016, FPI led thousands of protesters from Jakarta and beyond to demand Ahok's prosecution, marking an early escalation in public mobilization.^[102] This was followed by a November 4, 2016, demonstration organized by FPI and allied Islamist groups, where tens of thousands gathered to call for his removal, though the event turned violent with clashes between protesters and security forces.^[103] ^[104] The campaign peaked with the December 2, 2016, "Aksi 212" rally in Jakarta, spearheaded by FPI leader Muhammad Rizieq Shihab and drawing an estimated 200,000 to 1 million participants, who prayed and marched against Ahok's alleged blasphemy.^[63] These protests, amplified by a fatwa from the Indonesian Ulema Council declaring Ahok's statements blasphemous, exerted significant pressure on authorities, contributing to his December 2016 arrest and subsequent trial. On May 9, 2017, Ahok was convicted of blasphemy and inciting violence, receiving a two-year prison sentence, an outcome FPI celebrated as a victory for Islamic honor.^[105] ^[2] Beyond the Ahok case, FPI has invoked blasphemy charges in smaller-scale actions, such as supporting vigilantism against sects deemed heretical or protesting media content perceived as insulting Islam, often blending legal advocacy with threats of direct enforcement.^[106] However, the organization's blasphemy responses have drawn scrutiny for exploiting Indonesia's vague legal framework to target political opponents, with critics arguing they undermine pluralistic norms despite FPI's insistence on fidelity to sharia principles.^[107]

Leadership and Internal Structure

Role of Muhammad Rizieq Shihab

Muhammad Rizieq Shihab, born on August 24, 1965, in Jakarta to Arab-Indonesian parents of Hadhrami descent, founded the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) in August 1998 amid the political turmoil following the fall of President Suharto.^[108] ^[13] As a self-proclaimed descendant of the Prophet Muhammad—earning the honorific "Habib"—Shihab positioned himself as the organization's spiritual and ideological leader, adopting the title of Grand Imam (Imam Besar).^[109] ^[2] Under his guidance, FPI was established as a paramilitary-style group with initial backing from elements of the Indonesian military to restore order and enforce Islamic moral standards during the post-Suharto transition.^[13] Shihab served as FPI's chairman and primary ideologue, directing its focus on "amar ma'ruf nahi munkar" (enjoining good and forbidding wrong) through vigilante actions against perceived moral and religious transgressions, such as raids on bars, nightclubs, and events deemed un-Islamic.^[4] ^[110] He framed these activities as a "moral jihad" against liberal influences, secularism, and internal threats like communism, mobilizing members for street enforcement and large-scale protests.^[4] Shihab's charismatic preaching and fatwas shaped FPI's Salafi-influenced orthodoxy, emphasizing strict adherence to Sunni Islamic principles while rejecting pluralism and Western liberalism.^[111] As leader, Shihab orchestrated major political mobilizations, including mass rallies against blasphemy cases and government policies seen as anti-Islamic, such as the 2016-2017 protests against Jakarta Governor Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (Ahok) that drew hundreds of thousands to Jakarta's streets.^[2] His role extended to forging alliances with conservative political figures and influencing the passage of over 400 Sharia-inspired regional laws through FPI's advocacy.^[112] Despite multiple arrests— including a seven-month sentence in 2003 for insulting police and later detentions—Shihab maintained control from exile in Saudi Arabia between 2017 and 2020, directing FPI's opposition to President Joko Widodo.^[113] ^[53] His return in November 2020 precipitated FPI's dissolution by the government in December, amid charges of violence and terrorism links, though Shihab continued to inspire splinter groups.^[17] ^[114]

Organizational Hierarchy and Membership

The Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) maintained a rigidly hierarchical structure reminiscent of military organizations, with authority flowing from a central leadership body downward through provincial, municipal, district, and local levels to facilitate coordinated action and enforcement of its ideological goals. At the apex was the Dewan Pimpinan Pusat (DPP), the national leadership council based in Jakarta, divided into two primary components: the Majelis Syura (Shura Council), responsible for doctrinal oversight and advisory functions through sub-boards on sharia implementation, trusteeship, consultation, supervision, and honor; and the Majelis Tanfidzi (Executive or Tanfidzi Council), handling operational execution under a general chairperson with specialized fields including da'wah (proselytization), hisbah (moral enforcement), jihad (struggle), khilafah (caliphate advocacy), and organizational administration.^[115] ^[116] This dual-council model, common in Islamist groups, emphasized ulama (scholars) and habib (descendants of the Prophet) in the Syura for legitimacy, while the Tanfidzi enabled paramilitary-style mobilization.^[115] Subordinate tiers mirrored the central structure: Dewan Pimpinan Daerah (DPD) at the provincial level, Dewan Pimpinan Wilayah (DPW) for major cities, Dewan Pimpinan Ranting (DPR) for regencies or districts, and localized command posts at neighborhood units (RW/RT).^[115] Supporting bodies included commissions for expertise, recruitment, investigation, and legal aid; autonomous institutions like da'wah fronts and legal assistance agencies; and subsidiary entities such as the Laskar Pembela Islam (Islamic Defenders Militia), a paramilitary wing trained in combat tactics often with informal assistance from Indonesian military (TNI) elements during early years.^[115] ^[3] The hierarchy enforced discipline through ranks, rotation limited to elite selection rather than democratic processes, and a bipolar worldview pitting "true" Islam against perceived enemies, enabling rapid deployment for vigilantism.^[115] Membership was drawn primarily from conservative Sunni Muslims sympathetic to Salafi-influenced orthodoxy, often recruited through mosque networks, existing Islamic mass organizations like Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) or Muhammadiyah, and pledges of loyalty to sharia enforcement, with no formal binding rules but emphasis on ideological commitment over bureaucratic adherence.^[116] The organization distinguished between jamaah (congregational members focused on religious activities) and laskar (militia recruits undergoing physical and ideological training).^[117] Estimates of total membership varied widely due to self-reported inflation and lack of verification; FPI leaders claimed up to one million, but independent analyses pegged core active members at 10,000 to 20,000, with broader influence reaching perhaps 200,000 nationwide pre-dissolution through branches in most provinces.^[3] ^[60] ^[118] Post-2020 government ban, formal structures dissolved, though sympathizers reorganized informally in over 20 provinces.^[119]

Reception and Societal Impact

Support Among Conservative Muslims

The Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) derives significant backing from conservative Muslim communities in Indonesia that prioritize rigorous enforcement of Sharia-based moral codes and vigilance against deviations from orthodox Islamic practice. These supporters, often aligned with traditionalist interpretations emphasizing amar ma'ruf nahi munkar (commanding right and forbidding wrong), perceive FPI's raids on establishments promoting alcohol, gambling, or prostitution as legitimate efforts to preserve societal piety and counter liberal influences. Such views align with broader conservative sentiments that favor Islamist governance over secular pluralism, viewing FPI as a bulwark against moral decay.^[3] This support manifested prominently in FPI-orchestrated mass mobilizations, including the November 2016 rally against Jakarta Governor Basuki Tjahaja Purnama's alleged blasphemy, which drew over 100,000 participants, and subsequent events like Aksi 212 on December 2, 2016, estimated at up to one million attendees from conservative Islamic networks. These gatherings, framed as defenses of religious honor, amplified FPI's appeal among piety-conscious Muslims disillusioned with state tolerance of perceived insults to Islam, fostering a narrative of collective empowerment through Islamist activism.^[120]^[121] Even following FPI's official ban on December 30, 2020, pockets of conservative Muslim sympathy endure, with some interpreting the dissolution as targeted suppression of authentic Islamic expression rather than a response to vigilantism. For these adherents, FPI exemplifies proactive faith defense, influencing ongoing conservative discourse despite the organization's formal disbandment and the emergence of rebranded successors. Academic analyses note that while FPI's Salafi-influenced rhetoric appeals to hardliners, its broader resonance lies in tapping mainstream conservative anxieties over secularism and minority influences.^[34]^[63]^[122]

Criticisms of Violence and Extremism

The Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) has faced widespread criticism for its use of violence in enforcing moral and religious standards, often through its paramilitary wing, Laskar Pembela Islam, which conducted illegal raids (sapu bersih) on establishments deemed immoral, such as bars and entertainment venues, resulting in assaults and property damage.^[3]^[51] These actions were justified by FPI as amr ma'ruf nahi munkar (enjoining good and forbidding evil), but critics, including Indonesian authorities and human rights organizations, argue they constituted vigilantism that intimidated citizens and violated legal due process.^[123] FPI members have been implicated in targeted attacks against religious minorities, particularly Ahmadiyya Muslims, whom the group deems heretical. In July 2005, FPI provided logistical support and manpower for a mob assault on an Ahmadiyya mosque compound in Parung, West Java, demanding its closure and contributing to the displacement of residents.^[124] Similar incidents include blocking Ahmadiyya Friday prayers at the An Nur Mosque in June 2015 and inciting violence against Ahmadiyya communities in regions like South Sulawesi.^[125]^[126] Critics contend these acts exacerbated sectarian tensions and fostered an environment of religious intolerance, with FPI's rhetoric framing such minorities as threats to orthodox Islam.^[2] The group has also been accused of extremism linked to terrorism, with Indonesian officials citing the conviction of nearly 30 FPI leaders and members for terrorism-related offenses as a key factor in its dissolution on December 30, 2020.^[5] FPI's social media activity prior to account suspensions included threats of violence against perceived enemies, such as vows to "flatten" certain locations, which analysts viewed as incitement.^[127] Human rights reports highlight FPI's role in broader patterns of abuse against LGBT individuals and Christian communities, including raids on events and churches, portraying the organization as a driver of societal polarization through physical coercion rather than peaceful advocacy.^[128]^[129] Despite FPI's denials of systematic extremism, the cumulative record of arrests—hundreds of members jailed for violent crimes—underscores criticisms that its methods prioritized confrontation over legal or dialogic means.^[34]

Government and Legal Perspectives

The Indonesian government formally dissolved the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) on December 30, 2020, through a joint decree issued by the ministers of home affairs, religious affairs, and law and human rights, declaring the organization lacked legal standing due to repeated engagement in criminal and terrorist acts, including paramilitary training and refusal to comply with mass organization regulations.^[5]^[51] The decree cited FPI's violation of Indonesia's national ideology, Pancasila, via activities such as illegal raids, atrocities, and ideological opposition to state pluralism, which authorities linked to broader threats including support for groups like the Islamic State among some members.^[6]^[17] Prior to the 2020 ban, a 2017 Supreme Court ruling required FPI to re-register as a mass organization under new legal frameworks, which it failed to complete, resulting in de jure dissolution effective June 21, 2019; despite this, FPI persisted with activities, prompting the Coordinating Ministry for Political, Legal, and Security Affairs to enforce the full prohibition.^[51] Officials, including Coordinating Minister Mahfud MD, justified the action as necessary to curb FPI's history of vigilante violence, religious intolerance, and non-compliance, arguing it undermined public order and legal supremacy.^[51]^[5] Legally, Indonesian courts have pursued FPI leaders and members for offenses including violations of health protocols during mass gatherings, unlawful assembly, and incitement. FPI leader Muhammad Rizieq Shihab was arrested in December 2020 upon his return from exile and sentenced to four years' imprisonment in June 2021 for organizing crowds in breach of COVID-19 restrictions and emergency laws.^[130] Additional convictions targeted FPI affiliates for terrorism-related financing and violence, reflecting judicial alignment with government efforts to dismantle the group's operational capacity.^[17] Post-dissolution, authorities monitored FPI remnants for rebranding attempts, viewing them as continuations of prohibited extremist networks rather than reformed entities.^[6]

Regional Variations and Public Opinion

The Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) exhibited stronger organizational presence and activity in Java, particularly in Jakarta and West Java, where its urban branches conducted frequent raids on establishments deemed un-Islamic and mobilized large protests, such as the 2016-2017 rallies against Jakarta Governor Basuki Tjahaja Purnama.^[3] In contrast, FPI's influence waned in outer islands like Sumatra and Sulawesi, with sporadic vigilantism in South Sulawesi adapting to local ethnic dynamics but lacking the scale of Javanese operations.^[19] Regional adaptations reflected Indonesia's diverse demographics; in areas with significant non-Muslim populations, such as parts of West Kalimantan, FPI garnered limited sympathy from select local elites but faced resistance due to interfaith tensions.^[131] Public opinion toward FPI remained polarized, with support concentrated among conservative urban Muslims but broadly unfavorable nationally. A November 2020 Saiful Mujani Research and Consulting (SMRC) survey found that 69% of respondents were aware of FPI, with 43% of those expressing liking the group and 41% disliking it, indicating near-even division among the informed.^[132]^[133] Following FPI's December 2020 dissolution by government decree, a survey cited in analyses showed 59% of Muslim respondents supporting the ban versus 31% opposing it, while 97% of non-Muslims favored it, underscoring ethnic-religious divides in perception.^[34] A December 2020 Polmatrix poll indicated majority public endorsement of police actions against FPI members amid clashes, reflecting widespread approval for curbing its activities.^[134] Overall, FPI's approval never exceeded niche conservative bases, peaking during blasphemy controversies but eroding amid accusations of thuggery and legal scrutiny.^[2]

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Indonesia Arrests Firebrand Cleric's Lawyer Over Attacks
Apr 28, 2021 · Police arrested Islam Defenders Front leader Rizieq Shihab's lawyer, Munarman, in a raid on his house in Jakarta's satellite city of Tangerang ...
[56]
Pengamat Soroti Tindak Lanjut Pembubaran FPI – DW – 31.12.2020
Dec 31, 2020 · Pemerintah telah resmi membubarkan organisasi masyarakat Front Pembela Islam (FPI) karena dianggap tidak lagi memiliki legal standing sebagai ...
[57]
Indonesia: Battling against Islamist influence - Open Doors
As reported by New Mandala on 18 June 2021, a recent poll shows that the government"s December 2020 policy of banning the Islamic Defenders" Front (FPI) is ...
[58]
The New FPI: Don't Buy the Same Horse Twice | FULCRUM
May 4, 2022 · The FPI was instrumental in mobilising its followers during the Aksi Bela Islam in 2016 and 2017, which contributed to the downfall of Ahok ...
[59]
The contribution of Ahlussunnah Waljamaah's theology in ...
May 20, 2021 · ... Front Pembela Islam (FPI) understand and apply theology of Islamic teachings in line with Ahlussunnah Waljama'ah (Saleh 2008), which is ...
[60]
CO17228 | Islamic Defenders Front: An Ideological Evolution? - RSIS
Dec 4, 2017 · Synopsis The Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) has gained a reputation as one of the most outspoken hardline Islamist groups in Indonesia today.Missing: elites | Show results with:elites
[61]
[PDF] Islamic Defenders Front: An Ideological Evolution? - DR-NTU
It was developed by FPI leader Habib Rizieq. Shihab and FUI's general secretary Muhammad al-Khatnath. This ideology states that in contrast to established ...
[62]
[PDF] The Ideological Battle for the Identity of Islam in Indonesia
Aug 13, 2015 · Conservative and radical organizations, such as the Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia and the. Islamic Defenders Front, have criticized the Islam ...
[63]
Civilizational Populism in Indonesia: The Case of Front Pembela ...
Dec 12, 2022 · Yet the FPI cannot be considered a fringe movement. Through violent acts, protests, physical intimidation, and the populist rhetoric of leader ...
[64]
Ormas Islam tolak liberalisme | Berita online Gereja Katolik Indonesia
Mar 13, 2012 · Ketua Front Pembela Islam (FPI), Habib Rizieq menuduh JIL sebagai pembawa kesesatan karena pola penafsiran agama mereka yang mengarah pada ...
[65]
[PDF] Resisting Democracy
Feb 24, 2014 · “Democracy is more dangerous than pig's meat!” declared Habib Rizieq Shihab, leader of the Front Pembela Islam (FPI; Defenders of Islam ...
[66]
Islamists Rally in Jakarta, Fearing Return of Communism
Sep 29, 2017 · The incident led to a government-sponsored and military-backed anti-communist pogrom in 1965-1966, in which up to three million communists were ...
[67]
(PDF) Front Anti Komunis dan Front Pembela Islam - ResearchGate
Lebih jauh, FAK dan FPI juga bertujuan untuk memberikan perlawanan terhadap PKI dan ideologi komunisme, dan pemikiran liberalisme, sekulerisme, serta perbuatan ...
[68]
Indonesian Muslim hard-liners hold anti-communist protest
Jun 3, 2016 · The demonstrators shouted “Crush communists, down with PKI,” referring to the outlawed Indonesian Communist Party, and called on President Joko ...
[69]
Indonesia's Gotta Catch All the Communists - Tribunal 1965
Apr 22, 2017 · Members of Islamic Defenders Front (PFI) shout slogan during a rally to an anti-communism campaign in Jakarta, Indonesia, on June 03, 2016.
[70]
An Islamist militant group says Indonesia's new bills have secret ...
Jan 26, 2017 · Habib Rizieq, the leader of the militant Islamic Defenders Front ... “There is a deep strain of anti-communism, particularly in the Muslim ...
[71]
Indonesia police question cleric over lecture on communist symbols
Jan 23, 2017 · Communism remains a highly sensitive issue in Indonesia after bloody anti-communist purges in the country in 1965 and symbols and some ...
[72]
Surat FPI untuk Presiden Jokowi tentang Bangkitnya Ideologi Komunis
Aug 23, 2015 · Dengan menunggang agenda Komisi Kebenaran dan Rekonsiliasi ini kaum Komunis Indonesia tengah menampilkan Komunisme yang berwajah humanis untuk ...
[73]
Ketum FPI Ungkap Habib Rizieq Bikin Kajian Indikasi Kebangkitan PKI
Jul 5, 2020 · "Upaya-upaya untuk mencabut Tap MPR 65 Tahun '66, lalu adanya upaya mendesak pemerintah Indonesia minta maaf kepada komunis, kepada PKI," ...Missing: terhadap | Show results with:terhadap
[74]
Memories Of FPI Night Entertainment And Alcohol Raids - VOI
The cases of FPI raids have surfaced everywhere. This condition makes FPI's name known as a mass organization that is passionate about upholding Islamic values ...
[75]
Indonesia's rising intolerance - Human Rights Watch
Sep 3, 2013 · The group is also notorious for attacking nightclubs, bars and other purveyors of alcoholic drinks, particularly during the annual Muslim ...Missing: raids | Show results with:raids
[76]
Indonesians begin Ramadan, hardliners target 'sinful' bars - Al Arabiya
Jul 10, 2013 · Islam's holiest month is used by hardliners in Indonesia as an opportunity to attack nightclubs, bars and shops that openly sell alcohol, the ...
[77]
Muslims threaten Indonesian nightclub attacks - ABC News
Oct 25, 2004 · A militant Indonesian Muslim group plans more raids on clubs selling alcohol this week after trashing a nightspot frequented by foreigners ...
[78]
Indonesians angered over hard-line Ramadan raids - AP News
Jul 29, 2013 · About 50 FPI supporters attempted to raid an area they believed was allowing prostitution. While fleeing the scene to escape an angry mob of ...Missing: alcohol | Show results with:alcohol
[79]
Indonesia Islamic group rallies to demand alcohol ban | Reuters
Jan 12, 2012 · The FPI protest group has in recent years raided bars, nightclubs and the office of Indonesia's Playboy magazine, though it has had limited ...
[80]
https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2016/11/28/after-fpi-tipoff-police-raid-alleged-gay-sex-party-arrest-13.html
[81]
Gelar operasi yustisia, polisi dan FPI jaring terduga LGBT di Bandung
Jan 27, 2016 · BANDUNG, Indonesia – Empat pasang terduga lesbian terjaring razia saat aparat kepolisian dan ormas Front Pembela Islam (FPI) menggelar operasi ...
[82]
Vigilante Raid on Indonesian HIV Group - Human Rights Watch
Jan 17, 2019 · ” The Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) was joined by Indonesian soldiers and local residents in an incident that follows a disturbing pattern ...Missing: clashes | Show results with:clashes
[83]
Indonesia bans militant Islamic group – DW – 12/30/2020
Dec 30, 2020 · The Islamic Defender's Front has a long record of vandalizing nightspots and hurling stones at Western embassies.
[84]
https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/01/23/indonesian-police-anti-lgbt-islamists-restart-sinister-collaboration
[85]
Indonesia's Religious Minorities Under Threat - Human Rights Watch
Feb 2, 2017 · The most recent high-profile targets of the blasphemy law include Jakarta Governor Basuki Purnama, FPI leader Rizieq Shihab and three former ...
[86]
Hard-Line Muslims Test Indonesia's Tolerance - NPR
May 24, 2012 · ... Islamic Defenders Front, which, according to police records, has been involved in 34 cases of violence and destruction in the past two years.
[87]
Ban on FPI could backfire on government - Tue, January 5, 2021 ...
It is also notorious for its attacks against religious minorities and any movement it perceives to be a violation of Islamic norms, including Ahmadiyah Muslim ...
[88]
Minority Shi'a Groups as a Part of Civil Society in Indonesia
Aug 20, 2016 · The violent attacks on Shi'a communities in Sampang, Madura in 2011-12 were the most destructive incidents. This essay discusses how Shi'a ...
[89]
Muslim Groups Demand Closure of Large, Legal Church in Indonesia
Feb 25, 2010 · At the Galaxy area demonstration, FPI Bekasi branch head Murhali Baeda tried to impugn the legal status of the Galilea church by telling ANTARA, ...Missing: incidents | Show results with:incidents
[90]
[PDF] urgent action - christian minority in aceh under threat
Oct 28, 2015 · The FPI demanded the closure of the churches on the grounds that they did not have a permit to establish places of worship in accordance with ...
[91]
In Indonesia, minorities under threat from Muslim hardliners - Reuters
Oct 28, 2015 · Analysts say the FPI and similar hardline groups, emboldened by government inaction, are using legal pretexts to undermine Christians, Hindus, ...
[92]
Full article: Defend Islam rally action 212 and their reunion
Nov 27, 2023 · The refusal was started by the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), which from the beginning had been an involved party in the Jakarta Muslim Governor ...
[93]
[PDF] Studi Kasus Aksi Bela Islam oleh GNPF-MUI Tahun 2016-2017
dalam Aksi Bela Islam di antaranya Front Pembela Islam (FPI), Hizbut. Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), Muhammadiyah, serta masyarakat miskin per- kotaan korban ...<|separator|>
[94]
Bigger than Ahok: explaining the 2 December mass rally
Dec 7, 2016 · The 2 December rally represents a significant setback for political diversity in Indonesia. It will make it, at least in the short term, far harder for ...
[95]
Understanding the 212 Movement - Jakarta Globe
Apr 17, 2018 · The religiously charged rally that drew hundreds of thousands to central Jakarta in December 2016, has shown the great impact of religion ...
[96]
Apakah aksi 411 dan 212 membuat FPI menjadi 'besar'? - BBC
Dec 2, 2016 · Front Pembela Islam (FPI) menolak tuduhan yang menyebut aksi massa belakangan ini terkait dengan isu pemilihan kepala daerah (pilkada) DKI ...
[97]
The Islamist Challenge to Jokowi - Foreign Affairs
Dec 8, 2016 · Indonesian President Joko Widodo appears to have checkmated the hard-line Islamists demanding the jailing of Jakarta's governor.
[98]
The 212 Movement: Lying Low But Up Against the Jokowi ...
Feb 14, 2023 · His organisation, Front Pembela Islam (FPI), was banned in 2020 by the Indonesian authorities. The 212 Movement first came into the ...
[99]
212 Reunion: listening in to the fringes of political Islam - OBSERVER
Dec 2, 2018 · The crowd was directed towards a centre stage where FPI leaders were joined by opposition figures (deputy speakers of parliament Fadli Zon and ...
[100]
Messages of peace and unity in 212 Reunion rally - ANTARA News
Nov 30, 2018 · The Indonesian capital city, Jakarta, is bracing for this year`s 212 reunion rally on Sunday (Dec 2), which coincidentally falls in the ...
[101]
Conservative Muslims rally peacefully in Indonesia amid tight security
Dec 2, 2019 · Thousands of Indonesian Muslims from conservative groups held a peaceful rally in central Jakarta on Monday, with a spokesman for one of the ...<|separator|>
[102]
Jakarta: Blasphemy Protests Call for Governor's Prosecution | TIME
Nov 4, 2016 · On Oct. 14, the FPI led thousands of protesters, from the Indonesian capital and outside, to demand authorities prosecute Basuki for blasphemy.
[103]
Indonesia protest: Jakarta anti-governor rally turns violent - BBC News
Nov 4, 2016 · The protest was held to demand that Mr Purnama be prosecuted for blasphemy over comments he made in September that were seen as criticising ...Missing: incidents | Show results with:incidents
[104]
Indonesia: Thousands rally against blasphemy in Jakarta - Al Jazeera
Nov 4, 2016 · Tens of thousands in Jakarta demand the resignation of its governor who they say committed blasphemy.<|separator|>
[105]
Ahok trial: The blasphemy case testing Indonesian identity - BBC
Feb 14, 2017 · A group called the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) has been leading the protests. Until now its main activities have been raids on those it ...
[106]
[PDF] How Anti-Blasphemy Laws Engender Terrorism
ganizations, Front Pembela Islam (FPI) or “Islamic Defenders. Front.” Originally founded in 1998, FPI began as a socially con- servative religious movement ...
[107]
Politicising blasphemy in Indonesia: How Islamic alliances are ...
Nov 10, 2020 · Many of those who report claimed instances of blasphemy are affiliated with conservative Muslim groups, although they may act as individuals.
[108]
How firebrand cleric Habib Rizieq plans to Islamize Indonesia
Nov 24, 2020 · The FPI was co-founded by Shihab and a few other clerics just a few months after the fall of Suharto in May 1998, a moment that ended his 32 ...Missing: connections early
[109]
Meet the Habibs: the Yemen connection in Jakarta politics
Dec 14, 2017 · Firebrand cleric and Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) leader 'Habib' Rizieq Shihab has long been the face of the hard-line Islamic movement in Jakarta.
[110]
2021/21 "Indonesian Islam beyond Habib Rizieq Shihab
Dec 12, 2020 · *A'an Suryana is Visiting Fellow at ISEAS Yusof – Ishak Institute. Nur Syafiqah Binte Mohd Taufek is a Research Officer at the same institute.
[111]
Indonesian Islam beyond Habib Rizieq Shihab - Fulcrum.sg
Apr 27, 2021 · In particular, the role of Habib Rizieq Shihab, the Grand Imam of the Islamic Defender's Front (FPI), in exploiting Islamism and populist ...
[112]
[PDF] Rizieq Shihab and His Far- Right Islamist Populism | Deakin
May 14, 2021 · Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) have helped introduce more than 400 Shariah-inspired laws, including those that penalize adul-. Page 13. 12 tery ...
[113]
A firebrand cleric's return boosts Islamist politics - Lowy Institute
Nov 19, 2020 · Habib Rizieq Shihab can wield a potent influence, but even those welcoming him home from exile are wary of being burned.<|control11|><|separator|>
[114]
Indonesia: Ban leads to rebranding of radical Islamic FPI
The FPI reacted to the ban by simply copying what other radical groups have done elsewhere; it heeded Rizieq"s advice to "˜Relax and just create a new vehicle" ...
[115]
[PDF] Militarism in Civil Organization: Study of Front Pembela Islam (FPI ...
a) The Islamic Defenders Front is a community organization that has experienced militarism. This is shown in the hierarchical organizational structure, with ...
[116]
[PDF] Fpi: Potret Gerakan Islam Radikal Di Indonesia
Tujuan (Visi-Misi) Gerakan FPI. FPI di dirikan mempunyai visi misi sebagai berikut: Visi gerakan FPI adalah penegakkan amar ma'ruf nahi mungkar adalah satu ...
[117]
[PDF] REINTERPRETASI GERAKAN DAKWAH FRONT PEMBELA ISLAM ...
Front Pembela Islam (FPI) adalah sebuah kelompok organisasi sosial keagamaan. Islam di Indonesia. Cara berdakwah para anggota FPI yang radikal, sering.
[118]
When disaster hits, Indonesia's Islamists are first to help
Jun 11, 2019 · Maman Suryadi Abdurrahman, the head of the front's Islamic Defender Troops militia, said the organization has a million members. Researchers ...<|separator|>
[119]
Indonesian Islamists' pragmatic pivot in 2024 - New Mandala
Feb 1, 2024 · I limit my analysis to non-violent Islamist groups such as FPI—relaunched, after the ban of the Front Pembela Islam/Islamic Defenders' front ...
[120]
Is Islam an increasingly polarizing political cleavage in Indonesia?
Apr 25, 2019 · Two distinct political camps have emerged from the election, largely based on different interpretations of Islamic political theology and regional identities.
[121]
Thousands to pray for peace ahead of Jakarta protests - ABC News
Nov 29, 2016 · The last rally led by hardline groups, including the Islamic Defenders Front, attracted more than 100,000 people and turned violent after dark, ...Missing: attendance | Show results with:attendance
[122]
The Case of Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) in Indonesia - Journal UMY
The government disbanded FPI at the end of 2020 because of its numerous violent actions. However, it continues to get support from many Islamic communities.
[123]
(PDF) The Islamic Defenders Front: Demonization, Violence and the ...
Aug 6, 2025 · PDF | On May 1, 2014, Mark Woodward and others published The Islamic Defenders Front: Demonization, Violence and the State in Indonesia ...
[124]
“It's a Jihad”: Justifying Violence towards the Ahmadiyya in Indonesia
Jun 19, 2020 · During the attack on the Ahmadiyya compound in Parung on 15 July 2005, the role of the FPI was mainly to be the “muscle” in the demand to ...Missing: LGBT | Show results with:LGBT
[125]
INDONESIA: Ahmadiyya group threatened and prevented from ...
Jul 8, 2015 · On Friday, 12 June 2015, a vigilante group, Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), blocked Ahmadis from performing their Friday prayers at their own An Nur Mosque.Missing: LGBT | Show results with:LGBT
[126]
[PDF] INDONESIA Executive Summary The constitution protects religious ...
As an example of societal violence against the Ahmadiyya community, members of FPI attacked an Ahmadiyya complex in Makassar, South Sulawesi during the month of ...Missing: LGBT | Show results with:LGBT
[127]
Membaca 3.000 kicauan @DPP_FPI sebelum Twitter memblokirnya
Jan 24, 2017 · Berbagai kicauan FPI juga berbau ancaman kekerasan. Dalam satu seri kicauannya, FPI mengatakan bahwa mereka siap meratakan tempat-tempat ...
[128]
“These Political Games Ruin Our Lives”: Indonesia's LGBT ...
Aug 10, 2016 · The rights of Indonesian sexual and gender minorities have come under unprecedented attack in 2016.
[129]
Laporan Kebebasan Beragama Internasional 2019 - Kedutaan ...
Sumber-sumber menyatakan bahwa FPI dikenal karena kekerasan terhadap kelompok agama minoritas dan memaksa menutup bar dan tempat hiburan yang dianggap tidak ...
[130]
2021 Report on international religious freedom: Indonesia
FPI's organization, symbols, and activities were officially banned in December 2020 after the government issued a proclamation declaring the FPI a “ ...Missing: timeline | Show results with:timeline
[131]
CO18107 | West Kalimantan: Identity Politics at the Forefront - RSIS
Jun 26, 2018 · FPI has found support and sympathy amongst some local notables and conducts vigilantism and racketing activities in the name of restoring public ...
[132]
Survei SMRC: 43 Persen Orang Suka FPI - VOA Indonesia
Nov 26, 2020 · Empat puluh tiga persen warga yang disurvei SMRC mengaku suka dengan FPI, meskipun hanya sepertiga warga yang mengaku mengenal FPI setuju ...
[133]
Survei SMRC: 73% Responden Tahu HRS, Hanya 43% yang Suka
Nov 26, 2020 · "Kita menemukan dari total 69 persen warga yang tahu (FPI) ini, 43 persen di antaranya mengaku suka, 41 persen di antaranya tidak suka, dan 16 ...
[134]
Survei Polmatrix Soal Opini Masyarakat Terkait Ketegasan Polri ...
Dec 29, 2020 · Merdeka.com - Survei yang dilakukan Polmatrix Indonesia menunjukkan sebagian besar publik mendukung ketegasan Polri terhadap anggota Front ...