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Khartoum Resolution

The Khartoum Resolution refers to the political resolutions unanimously adopted on 1 September 1967 by the heads of state of member countries at the fourth Arab Summit held in , , immediately following 's victory in the June 1967 . The document outlined a unified Arab strategy emphasizing armed resistance to reclaim territories lost to , including the , , , and , while rejecting any compromise with the government. Its most defining feature was the explicit "three no's" policy—no peace with , no recognition of , and no negotiation with —framed as adherence to core Arab principles pending full Israeli withdrawal from occupied lands and the restoration of Palestinian rights. The summit's proceedings were convened amid Arab military defeat and internal divisions, with Egyptian President playing a pivotal role in pushing for rejectionist terms to avoid perceived capitulation, despite some delegations favoring more pragmatic recovery efforts. Beyond the headline refusals, the resolution committed to ongoing "struggle against by every means" for territorial liberation, established a $378 million annual fund to support frontline states and groups, and temporarily imposed an oil embargo on Western supporters of —though the latter was quietly lifted within months due to economic pressures. These measures aimed to project pan- solidarity and deterrence, but they entrenched a policy of non-engagement that foreclosed direct bilateral talks for decades. The resolution's uncompromising stance became a of Arab- relations, frequently invoked by Israeli leaders to justify security-focused policies and territorial retention, as it signaled no immediate prospect for diplomatic absent unconditional concessions. While later Arab initiatives, such as the 1982 Fez plan, introduced conditional overtures, the framework persisted in shaping rejectionist narratives within Palestinian and broader Arab , contributing to prolonged and cycles of . Its legacy underscores the causal link between post-war Arab strategic choices and the absence of early accords, prioritizing ideological unity over pragmatic despite evident military imbalances.

Historical Context

Lead-up to the Six-Day War

Tensions along 's borders with and escalated throughout the , marked by frequent infiltrations, sabotage attempts, and artillery exchanges. Syrian forces, often supporting groups, conducted hundreds of cross-border raids and shelling attacks on Israeli settlements from the between February 1966 and May 1967. In response, carried out retaliatory operations, including raids against ian targets following attacks such as the November 1966 murder of three Israeli civilians near the border. These incidents heightened mutual suspicions, with 's attempts to divert the Jordan River's headwaters in 1964-1965 prompting Israeli airstrikes on the works to protect its water supply, further straining relations. A pivotal aerial clash occurred on April 7, 1967, when Syrian artillery targeted Israeli villages, leading to an air battle over the in which Israeli forces downed six Syrian MiG fighters. This event underscored 's vulnerability and prompted closer military coordination with . On May 13, 1967, Soviet intelligence falsely reported to Egyptian and Syrian leaders that Israel was massing troops for an imminent invasion of , a claim later confirmed as erroneous but which spurred Egyptian mobilization. Egyptian President , seeking to assert regional leadership, demanded the withdrawal of the (UNEF) from the on May 16, which UN Secretary-General approved by May 18, removing the buffer between Egyptian and Israeli forces. Nasser then ordered Egyptian troops into the , amassing seven divisions near the border by late May, and on May 22, 1967, declared the Straits of Tiran closed to shipping and vessels bound for 's port, effectively imposing a naval that viewed as a under . This action violated the 1956 armistice arrangements and 1958 UN consensus on free passage through the straits. On May 30, signed a mutual defense pact with , placing Jordanian forces under Egyptian command and allowing Iraqi troops to deploy there, while invoked its alliance with . Facing encirclement and economic strain from prolonged mobilization, launched a preemptive air strike on Egyptian airfields on June 5, 1967, initiating the .

Outcomes of the Six-Day War and Territorial Changes

The concluded on June 10, 1967, following a United Nations-brokered , marking a decisive Israeli victory against , , and . Israel's preemptive air strikes on June 5 destroyed much of the Arab air forces on the ground, enabling rapid ground advances that overwhelmed numerically superior enemy troops. Casualties reflected the asymmetry: Israel reported around 700 military deaths, while Arab forces suffered approximately 18,000 fatalities, with alone accounting for over 11,000, 6,000, and 1,000. These losses included thousands of prisoners captured by , further crippling Arab military capabilities in the immediate aftermath. Territorially, the war transformed Israel's borders through the occupation of vast areas totaling over 67,000 square kilometers, roughly tripling its pre-war size of about 20,000 square kilometers. captured the and from , securing a buffer against future Egyptian threats and control over the Straits of Tiran; the , including , from , which incorporated historic Jewish sites and expanded urban boundaries; and the from , providing defensive highlands overlooking northern . These gains were formalized under lines, with establishing over the territories, though no immediate occurred except for the unification of under on June 27, 1967. The occupations introduced immediate logistical challenges, including governance of over a million newly administered residents and fortified positions to deter retaliation, while bolstering Israel's strategic position amid ongoing mobilization threats. Egypt's President Nasser initially denied defeats but conceded the losses publicly by mid-June, prompting introspection that influenced subsequent diplomatic responses.

The 1967 Arab League Summit

Summit Convening and Objectives

The Fourth Summit convened on , 1967, in , , under the chairmanship of Sudanese Ismai'il al-Azhari, and concluded on . Held in the aftermath of the Arab states' defeat in the (June 5–10, 1967), during which seized the and from , the and from , and the from , the summit served as an emergency gathering of Arab leaders to address the strategic and political fallout from these territorial losses. The primary objectives centered on restoring Arab unity and coordinating a collective response to Israel's military gains, including strategies to reclaim occupied territories through diplomatic, economic, and potential military means. Leaders sought to eliminate internal divisions exacerbated by the war's humiliation, affirming commitments to joint action and coordination among member states. A key aim was to mobilize resources for reconstruction, with resolutions directing oil-producing Arab nations—such as , , and —to provide financial assistance totaling approximately $378 million annually to and for rebuilding their economies and forces devastated by the . This support mechanism underscored the summit's focus on sustaining long-term resistance capabilities rather than immediate concessions.

Key Participants and Discussions

The 1967 Arab League Summit in , held from August 29 to September 1, was attended by eight Arab heads of state, including Egyptian President , Jordanian King , Saudi Arabian King , and Sudanese President as host, along with leaders or representatives from , , , , and ; Syria notably boycotted the gathering amid post-war recriminations. Discussions emphasized restoring Arab solidarity after the defeat, with participants affirming commitment to the 1965 Casablanca Arab Solidarity Charter and pledging to eliminate inter-Arab differences through coordinated action. Central debates revolved around strategies for reclaiming territories lost to , including the , , , and , with Nasser advocating a stance against any concessions that could legitimize Israeli gains. Jordan's King Hussein, facing domestic pressures and territorial losses, expressed reservations about outright rejectionism but ultimately aligned with the consensus to avoid isolation, while oil-rich Gulf states like and focused on economic leverage, proposing oil revenues as a "positive " to fund rather than an embargo that risked global backlash. Financial aid commitments emerged as a key outcome of the talks, with Arab oil producers agreeing to provide £135 million annually—£95 million to and £40 million to —to bolster military preparedness and deter further advances, reflecting a pragmatic of the need for sustained confrontation over immediate escalation. Tensions surfaced over Palestinian representation and guerrilla operations, but the summit's proceedings prioritized unified rejection of direct engagement with , framing territorial recovery as contingent on withdrawal without reciprocal or , a position hardened by Nasser's influence despite underlying divergences in Arab priorities.

Resolution Content

Formal Resolutions Adopted

The Arab League Summit in , convened from August 29 to September 1, 1967, concluded with the unanimous adoption of seven formal resolutions by the attending heads of state from , , , , , , , and , along with representatives from , , , and the . These resolutions focused on political unity, territorial recovery, economic support, and military preparedness in response to Israel's occupation of the , , , , and following the . The first resolution reaffirmed Arab solidarity, joint action, and coordination to resolve internal differences, explicitly endorsing the principles of the Solidarity Charter adopted at the 1965 Summit. The second committed Arab states to unified efforts aimed at eliminating the consequences of , declaring the occupied territories as Arab lands and rejecting any infringement on Arab . The third resolution outlined a coordinated diplomatic strategy to secure full withdrawal from occupied territories, while insisting on the inalienable rights of people; it pledged adherence to non-recognition of and rejection of any peace or negotiation that compromised these objectives. The fourth addressed economic leverage, designating oil as a strategic asset to bolster economies harmed by the war, with a decision to resume production and exports while providing financial aid to affected states like and . Further resolutions included approval of a Kuwaiti proposal for an Arab economic and social development fund to promote and , as recommended by prior Arab conferences. The sixth emphasized accelerating military buildup across Arab states to deter future threats, and the seventh called for the prompt elimination of foreign military bases within Arab territories to enhance strategic . These measures reflected a consensus on defensive posture and resource mobilization without immediate recourse to hostilities.

The Three No's Press Statement

The Three No's Press Statement, issued on September 1, 1967, at the close of the Summit in , , encapsulated the unified position of 13 participating Arab states toward after its victory in the . The statement articulated a policy of rejectionism, declaring that the conference was "committed to the following: no peace with , no recognition of , no negotiations with it," pending Israeli withdrawal from territories occupied since June 5, 1967, and the restoration of Palestinian rights. This phrasing, often rendered in Arabic as al-lā'āt al-thalāth (the three no's), served as a public manifesto of Arab solidarity, prioritizing indirect confrontation through political, economic, and military means over direct . The statement emerged from closed-door deliberations where leaders, including Egypt's and Jordan's King Hussein, reconciled internal divisions to project a hardline front, despite private Egyptian overtures toward possible Rogers Plan-style talks in subsequent months. It was not a numbered formal resolution but a concluding press communique, designed for maximum signaling effect to domestic audiences and the , reinforcing commitments to armed struggle and economic leverage, such as using exports as a "positive " against and its supporters. Historians note the statement's deliberate ambiguity: while framed as conditional on Israeli concessions, its categorical "no's" foreclosed bilateral negotiations, interpreting United Nations Security Council Resolution 242's land-for-peace framework as mandating full withdrawal without reciprocal security guarantees for . Unanimously endorsed by attendees excluding Algeria's observer status, it reflected a strategic pivot from pre-war rhetoric to post-defeat realism, aiming to deter Israeli entrenchment in the , , , and through sustained non-recognition. The U.S. State Department contemporaneously assessed it as barring peace initiatives, underscoring its role in entrenching a zero-sum paradigm.

Immediate Reactions and Consequences

Responses within the

The Khartoum Resolution was unanimously endorsed by attending Arab leaders on September 1, 1967, as a demonstration of post-war solidarity, with the summit's concluding statement emphasizing the "unity of Arab ranks" and the elimination of internal differences to focus on reclaiming lost territories through collective effort. This consensus masked underlying tensions, as radical factions led by , , , and the advocated for immediate escalation, including an oil embargo and renewed military confrontation, while moderate like prioritized financial stabilization to prevent further fragmentation. In , President publicly aligned with the resolution's stance, framing it as a strategic rejection of "aggression" that preserved dignity and enabled reconstruction, bolstered by pledges of $378 million in annual aid from oil-producing nations to rebuild forces. Nasser's government portrayed the Three No's as a against capitulation, though internal policy debates revealed a for avoiding direct negotiations that could expose divisions, with Nasser accepting Saudi-mediated compromises to secure unity. Jordan's King Hussein similarly supported the outcome, describing the Khartoum position in private communications as "reasonable and responsible," linking it to potential flexibility on issues like passage through the if tied to territorial , while publicly committing to the no-negotiation amid $175 million in pledged for Jordanian recovery. Hussein's endorsement reflected a pragmatic effort to balance domestic pressures for defiance with the need to avert regime-threatening unrest. Syria, under President , expressed reservations during summit deliberations, boycotting elements of the agenda and rejecting any softening of rhetoric, insisting on unqualified armed liberation rather than the resolution's calibrated rejectionism, which Syrian officials viewed as insufficiently militant. This hawkish posture persisted, with opposing subsequent UN frameworks like Resolution 242 and prioritizing guerrilla support over diplomatic openings. Across the , the resolution was leveraged by regimes to rally public sentiment, presenting the Three No's as a unified front that restored morale after the defeat, though it deferred substantive policy shifts amid economic aid commitments totaling over $550 million from to frontline nations and for the 1967–1968 period. Despite surface unity, the compromises embedded in the text—favoring financial and diplomatic coordination over immediate war—highlighted pragmatic concessions by moderates to contain radical demands, setting the stage for future policy divergences.

Israeli and Western Reactions

Israeli Prime Minister condemned the summit's resolutions as irresponsible, arguing that the Arab states' refusal to negotiate or recognize strengthened Israel's resolve against returning to the prewar borders that had endangered its security. On September 3, 1967, Eshkol stated in the that the Arab stance eliminated any basis for to revert to vulnerable positions, effectively repealing an earlier cabinet decision from June 19, 1967, to withdraw from captured territories in exchange for peace guarantees. Israeli officials expressed shock at the resolutions, viewing them as a definitive rejection of peace overtures made immediately after the , which had included offers to trade land for recognition and non-aggression pacts. In the United States, President assessed the communiqué in a September 1967 letter to Saudi King Faisal as outlining Arab refusals without positive steps toward settlement, complicating U.S. efforts to broker amid the post-war . The U.S. response emphasized the need for direct negotiations implicitly rejected by the "Three No's," influencing American support for 242 later that November, which called for Israeli withdrawal from territories while securing and recognized borders. British Foreign Secretary George Brown interpreted the Khartoum decisions as conclusive evidence of Arab disinterest in peace, particularly under Egyptian President , prompting the to prioritize realistic security arrangements over immediate territorial concessions in subsequent diplomatic initiatives. Western European powers, including the , aligned with U.S. views in seeing the resolutions as prolonging conflict, though under maintained a more equivocal stance critical of Israeli actions without directly endorsing the Arab position. Overall, the resolutions dashed Western hopes for swift postwar reconciliation, reinforcing advocacy for balanced frameworks like Resolution 242 that conditioned land returns on explicit peace commitments.

Interpretations and Debates

Interpretation as Arab Rejectionism

The Khartoum Resolution's concluding press statement, issued on September 1, 1967, articulated the "Three No's"—no peace with , no recognition of , and no s with it—which many analysts and Israeli policymakers interpreted as a categorical rejection of any diplomatic engagement or compromise, effectively prioritizing the existential struggle against 's existence over pragmatic territorial recovery. This view posits that, despite 's military victories in the (June 5–10, 1967) and its subsequent offers to trade captured territories for peace treaties—as conveyed through UN channels—the Arab states' unified stance closed off bilateral talks, interpreting "" to encompass any direct or indirect discussions under duress from battlefield outcomes. explicitly cited the resolution as reinforcing 's determination against unilateral withdrawals to the vulnerable pre-1967 armistice lines, framing it as evidence of enduring Arab belligerence rather than a mere defensive posture. Proponents of this rejectionist interpretation argue that the Three No's reflected not tactical restraint but a strategic commitment to Israel's delegitimization, rooted in pre-war Arab rhetoric such as Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser's May 1967 calls for Israel's annihilation and blockade of the Straits of Tiran, which precipitated the conflict. The resolution's broader context, including affirmations of armed struggle and non-recognition of UN Security Council Resolution 242's land-for-peace framework without full Israeli capitulation, underscored a causal chain where Arab unity post-defeat prioritized pan-Arab solidarity and rejection of Israel's right to exist over empirical opportunities for de-escalation, as evidenced by the absence of counter-proposals for phased withdrawals or confidence-building measures at the summit. This reading gained traction in Western analyses, with outlets like The Washington Post later attributing stalled progress in the Arab-Israeli conflict to such "intransigence," linking Khartoum's no-negotiation clause to the rejection of Palestinian self-determination options and the perpetuation of military confrontations. Empirical support for the rejectionism lens includes the Arab states' failure to initiate overtures in the decade following , culminating in the coordinated 1973 surprise attack by and on October 6, 1973—launched without prior diplomatic testing of positions—despite the resolution's own emphasis on recovering lost territories through unspecified means. Critics of counter-narratives, which portray the Three No's as a refusal to negotiate from weakness rather than outright hostility, counter that primary documents show no provisions for future talks contingent on concessions, instead endorsing ongoing "joint action" and military coordination against , consistent with patterns of and proxy conflicts in the late and . While some academic interpretations, often from institutions with noted ideological tilts toward viewing as the primary aggressor, downplay this as post-colonial defiance, the resolution's plain text and immediate sequel of non-engagement substantiate the causal realism of Arab agency in foreclosing pathways until unilateral shifts, such as 's 1979 treaty under .

Counter-Interpretations and Contextual Defenses

Some historians, including and Fred Khouri, have interpreted the declarations not as an unqualified denial of or Israel's legitimacy, but as qualified positions: no formal while territories remained occupied, no direct bilateral talks absent Israeli withdrawal and recognition of Palestinian rights, and no de jure recognition pending resolution of the 1967 conquests, while permitting indirect and de facto acceptance of Israel's existence. This view posits the stance as tactical restraint rather than ideological absolutism, aligning with UN Security Council Resolution 242's framework of land-for-, which Arabs endorsed post-Khartoum as a basis for recovering the , , , and without immediate concessions. Contextually, the summit's positions reflected the psychological and political imperatives following the Six-Day War's Arab defeat on June 5-10, 1967, where captured approximately 70,000 square kilometers of territory from , , and , displacing over 300,000 and shattering pan-Arab military confidence. Leaders like Egypt's and Jordan's King Hussein confronted domestic hardliners and public demands for retribution, rendering premature negotiations politically untenable; Hussein's memoirs later framed as a moderate victory over radical factions pushing for immediate guerrilla escalation, preserving Arab unity and forestalling internal collapse. Egyptian Foreign Minister Mahmoud Riad emphasized that the No's targeted normalization under duress, not perpetual enmity, allowing regimes to rebuild militaries—Egypt's forces grew from 180,000 to over 300,000 by 1970—while pursuing multilateral avenues like the Jarring Mission for indirect mediation. In Egypt's case, facilitated a strategic from war footing to diplomatic maneuvering, as evidenced by Nasser's post-summit acceptance of elements in 1969-1970, which proposed partial withdrawals in exchange for cease-fires, signaling the resolutions' role in buying time for recovery rather than entrenching rejectionism. Proponents argue this prevented a dictated favoring Israel's retention of gains, compelling pressure via the UN and superpowers; by rejecting direct talks, avoided bilateral deals that could fragment the front, as seen in Hussein's 1970 secret overtures to , which 's framework indirectly enabled by maintaining collective leverage. Such defenses highlight how the stance comported with just war principles post-aggression, prioritizing restitution over capitulation amid Israel's initiations in the occupied zones by late 1967.

Empirical Assessments of Intransigence

The Resolution's Three No's—no peace with , no recognition of , and no negotiation with —were empirically manifested in the Arab states' refusal to engage in substantive diplomatic processes immediately following the 1967 . The appointed Gunnar Jarring as special representative on November 21, 1967, to facilitate implementation of Resolution 242 through bilateral talks, yet the mission collapsed by April 23, 1968, primarily due to Arab insistence on avoiding direct negotiations, consistent with the commitment to indirect or preconditioned contacts that stalled progress. outright rejected participation, while and conditioned involvement on withdrawal without reciprocal security assurances, leading to no agreements despite Jarring's shuttling efforts across 14 months. This outcome aligned with Foreign Minister Eban's observation that Arab adherence to precluded viable . Subsequent U.S. initiatives further highlighted this pattern: William Rogers' December 1969 plan, envisioning Israeli withdrawal from most occupied territories in exchange for demilitarization and peace treaties, was publicly rejected by Egyptian President on December 26, 1969, as a scheme to legitimize Israeli gains, prompting escalation in the where Egyptian forces shelled Israeli positions across the from July 1967 to August 1970, resulting in over 1,400 Israeli and thousands of Egyptian casualties without any parallel negotiation track. and echoed reservations, demanding full pre-1967 borders without direct talks, and the dismissed the outright, dooming it to failure by early 1970. These rejections occurred amid Arab military rearmament, with receiving $1 billion in Soviet arms by 1970, underscoring prioritization of confrontation over compromise. The policy's intransigence peaked with the October 6, 1973, , initiated by coordinated Egyptian and Syrian attacks without prior diplomatic overtures, aiming to reclaim territories lost in through force rather than negotiation—a direct extension of Khartoum's framework, as evidenced by Sadat's pre-war rejection of U.S. proposals. Direct Arab-Israeli talks only materialized after Egypt's 1973 battlefield stalemate, culminating in Sadat's November 1977 visit and the 1979 , indicating that the decade-long absence of negotiations (–1977) stemmed from deliberate policy adherence rather than external barriers. While some analyses, often from institutionally left-leaning academic sources, frame the Three No's as temporary rallying rhetoric amid Arab disarray, the record of rejected frameworks like Jarring and Rogers, coupled with sustained hostilities, empirically validates it as a causal driver of prolonged conflict, independent of interpretive defenses.

Long-term Impact

Role in Prolonging Conflicts

The Khartoum Resolution's endorsement of "no peace with , no recognition of , and no negotiation with " on September 1, 1967, established a unified Arab policy that precluded diplomatic avenues for resolving territorial disputes arising from the , thereby extending the state of belligerency. This stance, adopted unanimously by members including , , and , rejected 's post-war overtures for direct talks despite its military victories and occupation of the , , , and . Israeli leaders, anticipating potential Arab concessions akin to those after the 1948 and 1956 conflicts, instead faced a doctrinal barrier that rationalized indefinite retention of these territories as security buffers absent reciprocal engagement. The resolution's rejectionism manifested in sustained low-intensity hostilities, such as the launched by in July 1967, which inflicted over 1,400 Israeli military casualties by its August 1970 ceasefire without yielding territorial returns or peace commitments. This pattern escalated to the October 1973 Yom Kippur War, where and Syria's coordinated surprise attack—resulting in approximately 2,600 Israeli deaths—stemmed from unresolved grievances over the 1967 status quo, yet again prioritized confrontation over the negotiation explicitly barred by . By framing Israel's existence as illegitimate, the policy incentivized proxy militancy and arms buildups, including Soviet-supplied arsenals that enabled these campaigns, while discouraging internal Arab debates on until battlefield defeats exposed the futility of non-diplomatic strategies. Empirical evidence of prolongation is evident in the two-decade lag before substantive peace breakthroughs, as Arab adherence to the Three No's framework—upheld in subsequent declarations—stifled multilateral initiatives like UN Security Council Resolution 242's land-for-peace formula, which required negotiation for implementation. Only Egypt's unilateral departure from Khartoum policy under President , culminating in his 1977 Jerusalem visit and the 1979 Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty, demonstrated that reversing rejectionism enabled ; similar shifts with in 1994 followed analogous policy divergences. The resolution's causal role lay in its unification of disparate Arab actors around intransigence, creating a self-reinforcing stalemate where Israeli defensive postures met Arab , perpetuating cycles of violence until economic pressures and strategic realignments eroded the consensus by the 1980s.

Departures and Reversals in Arab Policy

The first significant departure from the Khartoum Resolution's stance occurred under Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, who initiated direct negotiations with Israel by addressing the Knesset in Jerusalem on November 19, 1977, effectively reversing the "no negotiation" pledge. This culminated in the Camp David Accords, signed on September 17, 1978, between Sadat, Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin, and U.S. President Jimmy Carter, establishing a framework for peace that included mutual recognition and Israel's withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula. The Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty followed on March 26, 1979, in Washington, D.C., formally ending the state of war, normalizing diplomatic relations, and committing both parties to non-belligerency, marking the Arab world's initial breach of the "no peace" and "no recognition" principles. Subsequent shifts included the Palestine Liberation Organization's (PLO) policy reversal in 1988, when Chairman publicly affirmed Israel's right to exist in peace during a speech in on December 14, renouncing terrorism and accepting United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 as a basis for negotiations. This declaration enabled U.S.-PLO dialogue and laid groundwork for later accords like in 1993, diverging from the Khartoum framework by endorsing bilateral talks over unified Arab rejectionism. Jordan formalized its departure through the Israel-Jordan , signed on October 26, 1994, at the Arava border crossing, which terminated belligerency, established full diplomatic ties, and addressed water rights, borders, and security cooperation. A wave of further reversals emerged in 2020 via the , brokered by the , with the and announcing normalization agreements with on August 13, followed by formal declarations on September 15 that included mutual recognition, economic cooperation, and cessation of boycotts. Sudan joined on October 23, 2020, agreeing to normalize ties in a deal that explicitly abandoned the 1967 —ironically hosted in its capital—prioritizing economic incentives like U.S. aid and delisting as a terrorism sponsor over pan-Arab solidarity. Morocco followed in December 2020, exchanging ambassadors and expanding trade, security, and aviation links in exchange for U.S. recognition of its sovereignty over . These pacts represented the most rapid series of Arab recognitions since 1994, driven by shared concerns over and economic pragmatism rather than resolution of the Palestinian issue.

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