Fact-checked by Grok 2 weeks ago

Logistics combat element

The Logistics Combat Element (LCE) is a task-organized component of the ' Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF), designed to deliver the full spectrum of tactical logistics functions essential for sustaining operations in austere environments. It encompasses supply, maintenance, transportation, general engineering, health services, and other support services to enable the MAGTF to maintain combat readiness and operational tempo for up to 60 days without external resupply. As one of the four principal elements of the MAGTF—alongside the command element, , and —the LCE ensures logistical self-sufficiency and adaptability across expeditionary missions, from small Marine Expeditionary Units (MEUs) to large Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEFs). Its structure is not fixed but tailored to mission requirements, drawing personnel and equipment from Marine Logistics Groups (MLGs) to form detachments, battalions, regiments, or full groups as needed. Key functions are executed through integrated teams that provide direct support to maneuver units, including distribution of ammunition and fuel, equipment repair, , and infrastructure development in forward areas. The LCE's doctrinal foundation emphasizes expeditionary agility, with and multinational forces, and the integration of as a warfighting to extend operational reach. In practice, units like Combat Logistics Regiments (CLRs) serve as LCE headquarters for brigade-sized forces, coordinating capabilities such as explosive ordnance disposal and general to support sustained . This element's role has evolved to address modern challenges, including distributed operations and contested environments as outlined in updates through 2025, underscoring its critical contribution to the MAGTF's overall success in amphibious and expeditionary campaigns.

Marine Air-Ground Task Force Context

Overview of MAGTF

The Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) serves as the foundational operational concept and principal organizational structure of the , designed for expeditionary operations that emphasize rapid deployment, maneuver from the sea, and sustained combat . It integrates a balanced, combined-arms force under a single commander, consisting of four core elements—a command element for overall direction, a for maneuver, an for air support, and a logistics element for sustainment—to enable versatile responses across the spectrum of military missions, particularly in amphibious and littoral environments. MAGTFs embody a scalable principle, allowing them to be task-organized based on mission demands, with the flexibility to incorporate joint, allied, or multinational forces while maintaining self-sufficiency for up to 60 days of operations. The four standard types vary in size and capability: the Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), the smallest at approximately 2,200 personnel, serves as a forward-deployed crisis response force; the Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB), ranging from 14,500 to 20,000 personnel, provides mid-scale power for sustained engagements; the Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF), exceeding 40,000 personnel, functions as the largest warfighting organization for major theater operations; and special purpose MAGTFs, tailored for specific tasks like evacuations or . The MAGTF concept evolved from amphibious warfare doctrines developed during , where integrated Marine air-ground teams demonstrated the effectiveness of combined operations in the Pacific theater, and was further refined through post-war conflicts such as and to address modern expeditionary challenges. Formally codified in 1963 via Marine Corps Order 3120.3, it solidified the Corps' naval expeditionary role, prioritizing sea-based mobility, forcible entry, and adaptability to contested littorals for global crisis response.

Core Elements of MAGTF

The Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) is structured around four principal elements that provide a balanced, integrated force for expeditionary operations: the , , , and Logistics Combat Element (LCE). The serves as the headquarters, responsible for overall planning, coordination, and execution of MAGTF operations, ensuring unity of command and effort across all components. Typically led by a for a or a —such as a for a or for a —the integrates intelligence, communications, and administrative support to direct the force in alignment with the commander's intent. The provides the MAGTF's primary combat power on land, task-organized to conduct ground operations through maneuver, including , , , and armor units. Scalable from a reinforced landing team in an MEU to a full Marine division in an MEF, the GCE focuses on seizing, holding, and exploiting terrain to achieve operational objectives, often in austere environments. Complementing this, the delivers versatile air capabilities, encompassing for strikes and , rotary-wing for transport and attack, and unmanned systems for and , thereby enhancing mobility, firepower, and across the . These elements are inherently interdependent, with the GCE relying on the ACE for close air support, deep fires, and rapid insertion to amplify ground maneuver, while the ACE depends on the GCE for forward positioning and targeting data to optimize air operations. The LCE acts as the enabling backbone, providing shared logistics sustainment—such as supplies, maintenance, and transportation—to all elements, ensuring operational endurance without which the MAGTF's integrated effects would falter. This synergy was exemplified during Operation Desert Storm in 1991, where I Marine Expeditionary Force elements coordinated for maneuver warfare: the CE orchestrated deception and breaches, the GCE executed double obstacles penetrations with infantry and armor, the ACE delivered preparatory airstrikes and close support via F/A-18s and AV-8B Harriers, and the LCE supplied critical engineering assets and resupply, enabling rapid advances through Iraqi defenses and the seizure of key terrain like Mutla Ridge.

Definition and Purpose

Core Concept of LCE

The Logistics Combat Element (LCE) is a task-organized unit within the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) that provides (CSS), encompassing supplies, , , and services to sustain all other MAGTF elements during operations. This element ensures logistical sustainment across the competition continuum, enabling by integrating multifunctional capabilities tailored to mission requirements. Originally designated as the Combat Service Support Element (CSSE), the term was updated to LCE in 2006 to emphasize the combat-oriented nature of modern Marine Corps logistics and better align with the MAGTF's expeditionary demands in the 21st century. The LCE's structure is inherently scalable, ranging from a compact detachment of approximately 300 personnel in a Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) for rapid, self-contained deployments to a comprehensive Marine Logistics Group supporting a Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) with approximately 12,000 personnel for theater-level operations. Guiding principles of the LCE include logistical self-sufficiency to minimize reliance on external support, forward presence to position resources for immediate response and deterrence, and seamless integration with elements to facilitate distributed operations in contested environments. As outlined in Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) 4, , the LCE enables persistent engagement by providing resilient, adaptable support that sustains operational tempo and warfighting effectiveness across all MAGTF components.

Primary Responsibilities

The Logistics Combat Element (LCE) is tasked with providing the full spectrum of (CSS) to enable the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) to accomplish its mission, including the delivery of essential sustainment resources across Classes I through V supplies as defined in Marine Corps doctrine. Class I encompasses subsistence items such as and ; Class II covers and general supplies; Class III includes petroleum products like ; Class IV involves construction and barrier materials; and Class V addresses ammunition and explosives, ensuring continuous operational tempo without reliance on external infrastructure for initial phases. This provision of sustainment supports self-sufficiency for up to 60 days in austere conditions, optimizing basic loads and host-nation support to extend endurance. The LCE delivers tailored support to all MAGTF elements, including the (GCE) for maneuver sustainment, the (ACE) for refueling and , and the command element (CE) for operational continuity, through integrated supply, , transportation, and health services. These responsibilities are executed via task-organized units such as logistics regiments, which coordinate direct or general support to minimize logistical footprints while maximizing responsiveness. Effectiveness is measured by metrics like equipment operational readiness rates, targeting at least 90% mission capable to sustain capabilities, and supply throughput capacities measured in tons per day to ensure timely distribution in dynamic environments. Emphasizing an expeditionary posture, the LCE facilitates rapid deployment via maritime, air, or prepositioned stocks, enabling forces to operate in contested domains with agile architectures that support operations from predeployment through redeployment phases. In response to modern threats, post-2020 initiatives have integrated protections and developed resilient networks, forming a "supply web" of multiple sourcing and distribution paths to counter disruptions from adversarial actions; the October 2025 update further emphasizes building capabilities for sustainment in the Pacific theater. This adaptation prioritizes flexibility over linear efficiency, allowing the LCE to maintain sustainment in high-threat scenarios.

Historical Development

Origins in Combat Service Support

The origins of the logistics combat element trace back to the U.S. Marine Corps' early (CSS) units during , particularly in response to the demands of amphibious assaults in the Pacific theater. Shore parties, consisting of engineer, transportation, and ordnance personnel, emerged as ad hoc formations to manage beach unloading and initial supply distribution under fire. During the in August 1942, these units faced severe disorganization due to inadequate command-and-control doctrine, as outlined in early amphibious manuals like FTP 167, leading to chaotic offloads of troops and equipment. Base depots, such as the one established at Henderson Field following a critical shipment of and stores on 15 August 1942, served as vital hubs for sustaining air operations and evacuating casualties via Marine R4D shuttle runs starting 20 August. These efforts highlighted the Corps' initial reliance on improvised logistics to counter Japanese interdiction, with the later formalizing support through Special Naval Construction Battalions for combat stevedoring. Post-World War II formalization of Marine logistics began with the reorganization of the (FMF) under "J" Tables of Organization on 15 September 1947, emphasizing mobility and efficiency for expeditionary roles. Influenced by the War's requirements for sustained ground operations, the deployed on 12 July 1950 with integrated logistics support, including helicopter evacuations initiated by VMO-6 on 4 August 1950, marking a shift toward air-mobile resupply. By 1951, Force Troops, FMF Atlantic, were organized at on 1 April to provide division-level support, while Headquarters FMF Pacific Troops activated at Camp Pendleton on 1 September, establishing dedicated logistics structures. The conflict further drove innovations, such as Helicopter Transport Squadron 161's record evacuation of 365 casualties in October 1952 and Navy-Marine aircraft conducting 37% of all UN air strikes by June 1953, underscoring the need for permanent CSS elements beyond arrangements. In the , key milestones included the creation of separate commands, such as the 3d Marine Division's establishment at Camp Pendleton on 7 January 1952 with embedded supply units, and the 3d Force Service Regiment's participation in Exercise FUEL PUMP on Okinawa from 8-13 August 1957. The Fleet Marine Force Organization and Composition Board (Hogaboom Board), convened from 4 June to 1 December 1956, recommended doctrinal shifts toward permanent support structures, moving from improvised WWII-era setups to formalized regiments capable of sustaining prolonged operations. This evolution addressed vulnerabilities exposed in island-hopping campaigns, where lines were highly susceptible to enemy attack and environmental hazards, as seen in Guadalcanal's "shoestring" supply challenges that nearly compromised the offensive. These lessons prompted integrated MAGTF concepts for self-sufficient, all-domain support. During the Vietnam era, CSS groups expanded significantly to sustain counterinsurgency operations, with the Force Logistic Support Group (FLSG) growing from 700 to nearly 3,000 personnel by December 1965 to manage supply, maintenance, and transportation for over 38,000 Marines under III MAF. Units like the 3d Service Battalion handled incoming material totaling 2,014 short tons and 225,271 cubic feet in December 1965 alone, while outgoing shipments reached 3,688 short tons, supporting enclaves at Da Nang, Chu Lai, and Phu Bai. These developments, initially coordinated by the FLSG—including the unloading of 10,925 tons at Chu Lai from 7-12 May 1965—and later by the Force Logistic Command (FLC), operational from 1966 to 1970, processed vast supply volumes, including daily averages of 2,505 measured tons at Da Nang by year-end. This buildup enabled prolonged ground engagements, with FLC overseeing ammunition, fuel, and civic aid distributions exceeding 512,400 pounds of rice denied to insurgents in operations like GOLDEN FLEECE. These developments laid the groundwork for the modern logistics combat element's naming and structure.

Evolution and Modernization

Following the , the U.S. Marine Corps implemented key reforms to enhance its capabilities, including the reorganization into standing Marine Amphibious Forces by the early 1980s, with Marine Amphibious Brigades (MABs) incorporating dedicated battalions to support rapid deployment and sustainment operations. These changes addressed lessons from prolonged ground engagements by emphasizing amphibious readiness and integrated support structures. Concurrently, the shift to an all-volunteer force in 1973 required adaptations in and personnel to maintain a professionalized force amid budget constraints and drawdowns. In the and , the logistics element became more deeply integrated into the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) structure, as demonstrated during the (1990-1991), where the 1st Force Service Support Group (1st FSSG) provided essential to the , sustaining approximately 93,000 Marines and handling over 292,000 short tons of equipment and cargo across maritime prepositioning ships and ground transport. This operation highlighted the evolution toward scalable, expeditionary logistics capable of supporting large-scale deployments in austere environments, including fuel distribution of over 6 million gallons to units and establishment of forward supply points. The early 2000s marked a doctrinal shift with the redesignation of the Combat Service Support Element (CSSE) to the (LCE) in 2006, as directed by the , to better emphasize its integrated combat role within the MAGTF amid the Global War on Terror. This update, building on 2005 reorganizations of Force Service Support Groups into , aligned terminology with other MAGTF elements like the and facilitated revisions to Marine Corps publications. Recent modernization efforts under , initiated in 2020, prioritize littoral operations and stand-in forces by redesigning for reduced footprints, distributed sustainment, and resilience in contested environments, including integration with Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO) through multi-domain delivery and light, multifunctional combat battalions. The June 2023 annual update refined Marine Logistics Group (MLG) and multi-functional combat battalion structures to enhance scalability and agility. The October 2025 Force Design Update further accelerates these efforts, modernizing forward forces to seize and hold key maritime terrain in the littorals while delivering lethal effects and shaping operations, with emphasis on resilient, distributed capabilities as of November 2025. Technological advancements, such as the adoption of the Global Combat Support System-Marine Corps (GCSS-MC) in the 2010s—beginning with initial operational testing in 2010 and full deployment by 2013—have automated , enabling visibility and for over 23,000 personnel.

Organizational Structure

Marine Logistics Groups

The Marine Logistics Group (MLG) serves as the primary Logistics Combat Element (LCE) headquarters for a Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF), delivering command and control for sustainment operations across theater-level engagements, including supply, maintenance, transportation, and health services to enable the MEF's maneuver elements. In terms of structure, an MLG's composition varies but typically includes three Combat Logistics Regiments (CLRs) for active units—with the 2nd MLG having two since the deactivation of CLR-25 in July 2020—a Headquarters Regiment (or equivalent, such as CLR-37 in the 3rd MLG following its redesignation from Headquarters Regiment in November 2018) that includes a headquarters and service battalion for administrative and support functions, a dental battalion for oral health care, and a medical battalion for expeditionary healthcare; the total authorized strength is approximately 15,000 personnel, though this varies with task organization and mission requirements. The maintains three active-duty MLGs aligned with its MEFs: the 1st MLG, supporting I MEF and based at Camp Pendleton, California; the 2nd MLG, supporting II MEF and based at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina; and the 3rd MLG, supporting III MEF and based at , Okinawa, Japan. These units trace their activation to the post-World War II era, with the 1st MLG originating from the 1st Combat Service Group activated on 1 July 1947 at , ; the 2nd MLG from the 8th Field Depot activated on 1 August 1944 at ; and the 3rd MLG from the 3rd Force Service Regiment activated on 1 May 1958 at , Okinawa—all redesignated as MLGs on or around 21 October 2005 as part of a broader reorganization of Marine Corps logistics elements from Force Service Support Groups. The 4th MLG, a reserve component under Marine Forces Reserve, provides augmentation to the active MLGs during contingencies. In operational contexts, the 1st MLG exemplified its role during Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003 by deploying to in January and providing critical coordination, including multi-echelon sustainment for I MEF forces advancing into from March to October. The MLGs command subordinate regiments and battalions to execute these theater-wide missions.

Combat Logistics Regiments and Battalions

The Combat Logistics Regiment (CLR) functions as the tactical-level logistics headquarters within a Marine Logistics Group (MLG), delivering intermediate support including command and control, supply, maintenance, transportation, and engineering to Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs) beyond their organic capabilities. A CLR is typically structured with a headquarters company for administrative and communications functions, three subordinate Combat Logistics Battalions for direct tactical execution, and specialized attachments such as engineer and maintenance companies to enhance sustainment operations; this organization supports Marine Expeditionary Brigades (MEBs) or larger forces with approximately 2,500 personnel. The Combat Logistics Battalion (CLB), as the primary subunit of a CLR, is task-organized to provide scalable, direct support to Marine Expeditionary Units (MEUs) or MEBs, ensuring self-sustainment for up to 15 days through integrated functions like and repair. Each CLB includes a for command oversight and field , alongside core companies for supply , motor operations, and handling; strength varies from 500 to 800 based on mission demands and attachments from the parent MLG. Specialized subunits within CLBs bolster tactical flexibility, such as bridge companies that construct and maintain mobility assets for crossing obstacles, bulk platoons that distribute products under conditions, and explosive disposal (EOD) teams that neutralize unexploded munitions to protect supply lines. These elements, often drawn from an Engineer Support Battalion or similar CLR assets, enable the battalion to adapt to diverse environments while integrating with ground elements. Eight active CLRs are distributed across the three active MLGs to align with structures, exemplified by CLR-1 supporting the 1st MLG on the West Coast and CLR-27 under the 2nd MLG on the East Coast; activations such as CLR-17 in 2005 were undertaken to meet operational surges, including logistics demands during the Iraq campaign. CLRs and CLBs under MLG oversight maintain high readiness through annual multinational exercises like the Rim of the Pacific (), which test joint logistics interoperability in amphibious and sustainment scenarios with allied partners.

Key Functions and Capabilities

Supply and Distribution Support

The Logistics Combat Element (LCE) provides critical supply and distribution support to the Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) by managing the flow of essential materials across various , as defined in Marine Corps doctrine. Class I supplies include subsistence items such as food rations and water, ensuring nutritional sustainment for personnel. Class II covers equipment, clothing, and tools for individual and organizational use. Class III encompasses petroleum, oils, and lubricants, primarily fuel for vehicles and . Class IV consists of construction and barrier materials to support infrastructure development, while Class V focuses on and explosives for operations. These classifications prioritize , with the LCE maintaining basic loads scaled to MAGTF size—typically 15 days for a , 30 days for a , and 60 days for a . Distribution networks in the LCE integrate multiple methods to deliver supplies efficiently from rear areas to forward units, adapting to terrain and threat levels. Convoy operations employ ground vehicles for bulk transport over established routes, often protected by security elements to counter improvised threats. Aerial resupply uses helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft for time-sensitive deliveries to isolated positions, enabling rapid insertion of critical items like ammunition or medical supplies. Sea-based prepositioning leverages the Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF), where ships pre-load equipment and supplies for offload in austere ports or beaches, supporting force assembly within days of alert. In Marine expeditionary force-scale operations, these networks achieve significant throughput, sustaining hundreds to over 1,000 tons of supplies per day depending on operational tempo and mode integration. Inventory management within the LCE relies on supply officers who oversee accountability and visibility using the Global Combat Support System-Marine Corps (GCSS-MC), an tool that provides near-real-time tracking of assets from requisition to delivery. This system integrates data across the , enabling for and automated replenishment to support just-in-time delivery principles. By minimizing stockpiles at forward sites, GCSS-MC reduces the logistical footprint, enhances responsiveness, and aligns with expeditionary requirements for agility in dynamic environments. In contested environments, the LCE faces challenges from (A2/AD) threats, such as long-range precision fires that target concentrated logistics nodes. Under , dispersal techniques distribute supply points across multiple expeditionary advanced bases, leveraging low-signature operations and naval to maintain throughput while complicating enemy targeting. This approach emphasizes resilient, decentralized to sustain distributed operations against peer adversaries. As updated in the 2025 Force Design Update, enhancements include 12 expeditionary fabrication labs for in-field repairs, autonomous low-profile vessels for low-risk supply transport, and pre-placed stockpiles in the to support forces. A representative case study is the LCE's role in (2001–2014), where combat logistics regiments and battalions managed distribution in Afghanistan's rugged terrain. For instance, logistics elements delivered essential supplies such as meals ready-to-eat and to support a battalion's , contributing to broader efforts that sustained forces amid supply line vulnerabilities. These operations highlighted the LCE's adaptability in integrating , aerial, and contracted for reliable throughput.

Maintenance and Transportation Services

The Logistics Combat Element (LCE) within the Marine Air-Ground (MAGTF) is responsible for intermediate-level , which encompasses repairs and for ground vehicles, weapons systems, and engineer equipment to ensure operational sustainment. This level of goes beyond unit-level organizational repairs, focusing on , component replacement, and refurbishment using specialized tools and repair parts sourced through integrated supply class processes. Mobile maintenance teams (MSTs), equipped with intermediate sustainment personnel, test equipment, and recovery assets, deploy forward to establish repair points near the front lines, enabling rapid and equipment swaps without evacuating assets to rear areas. These teams prioritize minimizing for MAGTF maneuver elements by performing on-site fixes for issues like failures in tactical vehicles or of engineer machinery. Transportation services in the LCE are executed primarily through motor transport companies embedded in combat logistics regiments and battalions, providing tactical mobility for personnel, supplies, and equipment across diverse terrains. Key assets include the High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV), used for light utility transport and reconnaissance support, and the (MTVR), a 7-ton-class capable of off-road payloads up to 7.1 tons to sustain expeditionary operations. For littoral and port environments, the LCE employs inland watercraft such as and (MHE), including rough-terrain forklifts and cranes, to facilitate offloading from amphibious ships and intra-theater movement via rivers or harbors. These capabilities ensure seamless integration of ground and waterborne , supporting rapid deployment and resupply in contested areas. Recovery and evacuation operations form a critical component of LCE sustainment, focusing on retrieving disabled equipment from the to maintain force mobility and combat effectiveness. Battlefield recovery vehicles, such as the M88A2 Heavy Equipment Recovery Combat Utility Lift and Evacuation System (), are organic to maintenance units and capable of towing up to 70 tons, winching mired vehicles, or performing on-site repairs under fire. The LCE coordinates (CASEVAC) through motor transport assets, linking with medical elements to transport wounded personnel via armored HMMWVs or MTVR variants configured for litter patients, ensuring timely movement to forward aid stations. To enhance reliability, the LCE targets equipment serviceability rates of 85-95 percent for ground assets, measured as the percentage of mission-essential items fully operational or requiring minimal intervention, with active-component averages reaching 92 percent in recent years through rigorous sustainment programs. Post-2015, the Marine Corps has integrated technologies, including sensors on wheeled vehicles to monitor vibrations, temperature, and wear in , enabling data-driven forecasts of failures via algorithms in pilot projects. For instance, during from 2014 onward, elements of the (MLG) delivered forward maintenance support, repairing tactical vehicles and equipment in austere conditions to sustain coalition operations against ISIS.

References

  1. [1]
    None
    Summary of each segment:
  2. [2]
    Combat Logistics Regiment 17
    CLR-17 serve as the Logistics Combat Element (LCE) headquarters for a Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) sized Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF).CLB-15 · CLB-11 · CLB-13Missing: definition | Show results with:definition
  3. [3]
    None
    Summary of each segment:
  4. [4]
    About - 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit
    The Marine Expeditionary Unit is a Marine Air-Ground Task Force with a strength of about 2,200 personnel. The MEU consists of four major parts: a command ...
  5. [5]
    What is a Marine expeditionary brigade?
    Jul 25, 2011 · A Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) is a "middleweight" force of about 14,500 Marines and sailors, within each MEF, that can operate ...
  6. [6]
    What is II MEF?
    With more than 47,000 Marines and Sailors, II MEF is representative of the largest and most powerful Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF). The MAGTF concept is ...
  7. [7]
    [PDF] Lessons from the Post-Vietnam Rebuild of the Marine Corps, 1969 ...
    Apr 24, 1980 · Second, the Marine Corps retained, but refined, the MAGTF concept initially formulated during World War II, formally codified in 1962, and ...
  8. [8]
    Marine Air-Ground Task Forces in MOOTW - Marine Corps University
    In 1962, the MAGTF became official Marine doctrine, codified in Marine Corps Order 3120.3. New and specifically built amphibious ships followed.Missing: formalized | Show results with:formalized
  9. [9]
    None
    ### Summary of MAGTF Types, Command Levels, and GCE Scalability
  10. [10]
    None
    Below is a merged summary of the MAGTF Core Elements from MCWP 3-10, consolidating all information from the provided segments into a dense, comprehensive response. To maximize detail and clarity, I’ve organized the core elements and their interdependencies into a table in CSV format, followed by a narrative summary of integration and logistics support. All unique details, roles, definitions, and page references are retained, and useful URLs are listed at the end.
  11. [11]
    None
    Summary of each segment:
  12. [12]
    https://www.marines.mil/portals/1/Publications/U.S.%20Marines%20in%20the%20Persian%20Gulf%2C%201990-1991_With%20the%20I%20Marine%20Expeditionary%20Force%20in%20Desert%20Shield.pdf?ver=2017-06-01-134642-233
  13. [13]
    renaming of the combat service support element (csse ... - Marines.mil
    Nov 29, 2006 · The CSSE was renamed LCE to better represent the core element of a MAGTF responsible for combat service support, and the new name more ...
  14. [14]
    None
    Summary of each segment:
  15. [15]
    [PDF] Force Design 2030 - Marines.mil
    supply chain management, cyber, synthetic biology, ... will serve as the base logistics combat elements for the MLRs, MEUs, and other crisis response forces.<|control11|><|separator|>
  16. [16]
    New Marine Corps Logistics Doctrine Emphasizes Resiliency
    May 31, 2023 · The document described a supply web as “networks of interrelated connections that provide flexibility through multiple sourcing and distribution ...
  17. [17]
    None
    Below is a merged summary of the 1st Force Service Support Group (1st FSSG) role in the Gulf War, combining all provided segments into a single, comprehensive response. To retain all details efficiently, I’ve organized key information into tables where appropriate, followed by a narrative summary of logistical achievements and roles. This ensures a dense yet clear representation of the data.
  18. [18]
    https://www.marines.mil/portals/1/Publications/MCWP%203-40.pdf?ver=2017-03-15-124213-007
  19. [19]
    [PDF] Global Combat Support System – Marine Corps (GCSS-MC)
    MCOTEA conducted the IOT&E of Release 1.1 from. May 24 – August 6, 2010, in Dumfries, Virginia, and in. Okinawa, Japan, with actual users in a live environment ...Missing: adoption | Show results with:adoption
  20. [20]
    [PDF] Global Combat Support System Marine Corps: Root Cause Analysis
    In this report, the. GAO reported that GCSS-MC Block 1 deployment will slip from FY 2010 to FY 2013, ... Global Combat Support System – Marine Corps (GCSS-MC),.
  21. [21]
    None
    Below is a merged summary of the Marine Logistics Group (MLG) organizational structure, consolidating all provided segments into a single, comprehensive response. To maximize detail and clarity, I’ve organized key information into tables where appropriate (in CSV format for dense representation) and supplemented with narrative text for context. All information from the individual summaries is retained, with duplicates reconciled and cross-referenced where necessary.
  22. [22]
    1st Marine Logistics Group
    Colonel Michael W. Stehle is currently serving as the Chief of Staff, 1st Marine Logistics Group. Sergeant Major Timothy R. Eldredge was born in Virginia Beach ...About · Contact Us · CLR-17 · Combat Logistics Battalion 7Missing: count | Show results with:count
  23. [23]
    2nd Marine Logistics Group Home Page - Marines.mil
    2nd Marine Logistics Group provides tactical logistic support above the organic capabilities of supported elements of Marine Expeditionary Force.Missing: count | Show results with:count
  24. [24]
    3d Marine Logistics Group
    3rd Marine Logistics Group. 3d MLG Logo. III Marine Expeditionary Force. Providing responsive combat logistics support to III MEF and other Marine Forces ...
  25. [25]
    About - 1st Marine Logistics Group
    From 1947-1954. Activated 1 July 1947 at Pearl Harbor, Territory of Hawaii, as the 1st Combat Service Group, Service Command, Fleet Marine Forces · From 1955- ...
  26. [26]
    About - History - 2nd Marine Logistics Group
    2nd Marine Logistics Group · 1944-1949. Activated 1 August 1944 at Pearl Harbor, Territory of Hawaii, as 8th Field Depot, Supply Service, Fleet Marine Force
  27. [27]
    logistics combat element (lce) reorganization update and poam
    Dec 5, 2005 · REF A DIRECTED THE REDESIGNATION OF THE FSSG TO THE MARINE LOGISTICS GROUP (MLG). ALL MLG'S HAVE REDESIGNATED AS OF 4 DEC 05. THIS MARADMIN ...Missing: 2000s Reference War Terror
  28. [28]
    Fourth Marine Logistics Group - Marine Forces Reserve
    Fourth Marine Logistics Group · Commanding General · Deputy Commander · Chief of Staff · Command Senior Enlisted Leader · Command Master Chief · About · Connect · Links.Personnel Retrieval and... · Combat Logistics Regiment 4 · 4th Medical BattalionMissing: count | Show results with:count
  29. [29]
    Combat Logistics Regiment 1 - 1st Marine Logistics Group
    CLR-1 provides logistics support to the 1st Marine Division beyond it's organic capabilities in any environment and throughout the spectrum of conflict.CLB-1 · 1st Distribution Support Battalion · CLR-17 · ContactMissing: structure | Show results with:structure
  30. [30]
    CLR-17 re-designates as HQ Reg. - 1st Marine Logistics Group
    Apr 7, 2014 · CLR-17 re-designates as HQ Reg. 7 Apr ... For a short stint during Operation Iraqi Freedom 1, we became Combat Service Support Group 11.Missing: 2005 | Show results with:2005
  31. [31]
    Combined, joint forces complete amphibious raid during RIMPAC ...
    Aug 14, 2024 · Training for combined and joint forces culminated in an amphibious raid on July 27th as part of Exercise Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) 2024.
  32. [32]
    4 Force Sustainment | Naval Expeditionary Logistics
    For example, Table 4.1 illustrates how the number of Marines ashore and tons of supplies required per day ashore would change as various elements of a full, ...
  33. [33]
    GCSS-MC - USMC Officer
    Oct 28, 2024 · GCSS-MC, or the Global Combat Support System-Marine Corps, is an enterprise-level logistics and supply chain management system used by the USMC.Missing: adoption 2010s
  34. [34]
    [PDF] Marine Corps Logistics Doctrine 2030 - DTIC
    Apr 15, 2021 · Guided by maneuver warfare philosophy, MCDP 4 focuses on the impacts that logistics actions help combat forces generate operational tempo, ...
  35. [35]
    https://www.marines.mil/News/Messages/Messages-Display/Article/893197/logistics-combat-element-lce-reorganization-update-and-poam/
  36. [36]
    Marines Keep Rolling Through Dangerous Afghan Terrain
    The logistics train has delivered more than 18,000 cases of food and 250,000 gallons of fuel throughout the unit's occupying area.Missing: meals | Show results with:meals
  37. [37]
    [PDF] LOGISTIC COMBAT ELEMENT ENLISTED FMF WARFARE STUDY ...
    A Logistics Combat Element (LCE) is task organized to provide the full range of combat service support necessary to accomplish the Marine Air Ground Task Force ...
  38. [38]
    [PDF] US Marine Corps Motor Transport Equipment - Public Intelligence
    Oct 1, 2011 · This technical manual provides the principal technical characteristics of US Marine Corps motor transportation equipment.
  39. [39]
    Medium & Heavy Tactical Vehicles - PEO Land Systems
    The Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement (MTVR) is a medium lift tactical vehicle capable of transporting 7.1 ton off-road payload, 15-ton on-road payload, and ...Missing: LCE HMMWV
  40. [40]
    [PDF] Unit Embarkation Handbook - Navy Tribe
    Marine Corps Motor Transport Assets . ... Transportation and state transportation agencies. Bonded Cargo. Normally, there is a 2-hour on/offloading time.
  41. [41]
    M88A2 HERCULES Recovery Vehicle - BAE Systems
    The M88A2 Heavy Equipment Recovery Combat Utility Lift and Evacuation System (HERCULES) improved Recovery Vehicle is the recovery system of choice for today's ...Missing: LCE battlefield casualty
  42. [42]
    [PDF] statement of - Senate Armed Services
    Dec 12, 2018 · On average, Marine squadrons last year achieved readiness rates above service combat readiness standards for the first time since sequestration.
  43. [43]
    [PDF] GAO-23-105556, MILITARY READINESS
    Dec 8, 2022 · The Marine Corps is in the early stages of implementing predictive maintenance and started a predictive maintenance pilot project for wheeled ...Missing: IoT | Show results with:IoT
  44. [44]
    New Special Purpose MAGTF supports Inherent Resolve - DVIDS
    Dec 5, 2014 · “SPMAGTF-CR-CC provides the Combatant Commander with a self-contained, rapid-response, contingency force that can self-move and sustain itself ...