Fact-checked by Grok 2 weeks ago

Commandant of the Marine Corps

The Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC) is the highest-ranking officer in the United States Marine Corps, a four-star general who serves as the professional head of the service, presides over Headquarters Marine Corps, and acts as the principal military advisor to the Secretary of the Navy on Marine Corps matters.^[1]^[2] The position was established by an Act of Congress on July 11, 1798, which organized a permanent Marine Corps under the Department of the Navy, with the Commandant responsible for its administration, discipline, and operational readiness.^[3]^[4] Appointed by the President from active-duty Marine Corps officers not below the grade of colonel, with Senate confirmation, the Commandant serves a four-year term but holds office at the President's pleasure thereafter, ensuring alignment with national defense priorities.^[5]^[6] As a statutory member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff since the National Security Act of 1947, the CMC participates in strategic planning and force structure decisions, transmitting Headquarters Marine Corps recommendations to the Secretary of the Navy while directing policies, plans, and programs for the Corps' approximately 180,000 active-duty personnel.^[1] The role demands balancing expeditionary warfighting capabilities with modernization efforts, as exemplified by recent Commandants' emphases on naval integration and force design reforms to counter peer adversaries.^[7]

Role and Authority

Core Responsibilities

The Commandant of the Marine Corps serves as the senior uniformed leader of the United States Marine Corps, reporting directly to the Secretary of the Navy and responsible for transmitting plans and recommendations to execute the Secretary's directives while acting as the agent for their implementation.^[8] Under this authority, the Commandant oversees the supervision of Marine Corps and Navy personnel as directed by the Secretary, ensuring the force's organization, readiness, and alignment with national defense objectives.^[8] ^[1] Core statutory functions include preparing the Marine Corps for employment through recruiting, organizing, supplying, equipping, training, servicing, mobilizing, demobilizing, administering, and maintaining its units, all in support of the Secretary's responsibilities and subject to broader naval oversight.^[9] The Commandant directs Headquarters, Marine Corps, to investigate and report on the efficiency and combat readiness of Marine organizations for operations under unified combatant commanders, coordinating actions across Marine Corps elements as needed.^[9] These duties emphasize sustaining a force capable of expeditionary operations, with the Commandant delegating functions to subordinates while retaining ultimate accountability for policy, plans, and programs.^[1] As a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Commandant provides military advice to the President, Secretary of Defense, National Security Council, and Homeland Security Council on Marine Corps matters, including strategy, resource allocation, and integration with joint forces.^[8] ^[1] This advisory role extends to designating Marine personnel and resources to combatant commands under the Secretary of the Navy's authority, ensuring the Corps' contributions to integrated naval and joint warfighting.^[1] The Commandant also maintains ongoing communication with the Secretary on Marine Corps operations, troop efficiency, and logistical needs to inform executive decision-making.^[8]

Position Within the U.S. Military Hierarchy

The Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC) holds the position of the highest-ranking active-duty officer in the United States Marine Corps, appointed as a four-star general under 10 U.S.C. § 8043.^[8] This rank places the CMC at the apex of the Marine Corps' uniformed leadership structure, presiding over Headquarters, Marine Corps (HQMC), which serves as the service's primary staff element for policy, planning, and administration.^[1] The CMC exercises command authority over all Marine Corps forces, resources, and personnel in peacetime, subject to the oversight of civilian authorities.^[8] Within the Department of the Navy, the CMC reports directly to the Secretary of the Navy, who holds ultimate responsibility for both the Navy and Marine Corps as executive agents of the Department of Defense (DoD).^[1] This subordination aligns the Marine Corps as a naval service focused on expeditionary and amphibious operations in support of naval campaigns, with the CMC coordinating closely with the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) on joint naval matters.^[8] The CMC transmits HQMC's plans, recommendations, and reports to the Secretary of the Navy and bears responsibility for executing those directives approved by the Secretary, ensuring alignment with departmental priorities such as force readiness and resource allocation.^[8] As a principal military advisor, the CMC serves as a statutory member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), providing expert counsel to the President, National Security Council, and Secretary of Defense on Marine Corps-specific issues, including force structure, doctrine, and operational requirements.^[8] In this advisory capacity, the CMC holds parity with other service chiefs—such as the Chief of Staff of the Army, Chief of Naval Operations, Chief of Staff of the Air Force, and Chief of Space Operations—but does not exercise command over joint forces, which resides with unified combatant commanders under the authority of the Secretary of Defense per the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986.^[8] The position confers no precedence over officers from other services, except the Commandant of the Coast Guard when serving in that role, underscoring the CMC's focused authority within the Marine Corps domain rather than a broader operational hierarchy.^[8] Operationally, the CMC maintains administrative control (ADCON) over Marine Corps units, including training, equipping, and manning, while tactical control in deployed scenarios falls to combatant commanders, reflecting the post-1986 division of service-specific versus joint operational responsibilities.^[1] This structure positions the CMC as the steward of Marine Corps institutional health and readiness, directly influencing resource advocacy through JCS channels and annual posture statements to Congress, but always subordinate to civilian leadership in the chain of command from the President as Commander-in-Chief downward.^[8]

Influence on Marine Corps Doctrine and Operations

The Commandant of the Marine Corps exercises primary authority over the development and dissemination of service doctrine, serving as the final approver of Marine Corps Doctrinal Publications (MCDPs) that define operational philosophies and procedures. Under 10 U.S.C. § 8043, the Commandant is responsible for Marine Corps policies, plans, and programs, including the preparation of forces for employment and the supervision of logistics and training.^[8] This statutory mandate enables the Commandant to direct doctrinal evolution in response to emerging threats, as evidenced by the approval process for publications like MCDP 1, Warfighting, signed on June 20, 1997, which codified maneuver warfare principles emphasizing initiative and combined arms.^[10] Similarly, the 38th Commandant, General David H. Berger, approved MCDP 8, Information, on June 21, 2022, integrating information operations into core warfighting functions to address contested environments.^[11] Commandants shape doctrine through strategic guidance documents, such as the Commandant's Planning Guidance (CPG), which outline force structure and operational priorities. Berger's July 16, 2019, CPG identified gaps in readiness for great power competition, prompting a doctrinal shift toward operational art—focusing on campaign-level planning over tactical execution—and revisions to MCDP 1 to emphasize naval integration and distributed operations.^[12] This initiative, formalized as Force Design 2030, reduced legacy capabilities like heavy armor in favor of littoral regiments optimized for maritime denial, influencing subsequent publications like MCDP 4, Logistics, approved March 21, 2023.^[13] The 39th Commandant, General Eric M. Smith, advanced this trajectory with the 2025 Force Design Update, prioritizing long-range precision fires and unmanned systems to enhance deterrence in the Indo-Pacific.^[14] In operations, the Commandant influences execution by directing readiness, training standards, and unit deployments under the Secretary of the Navy's oversight, commanding Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEFs) and brigades during active service.^[8] This includes issuing orders for exercises and contingencies, as seen in Berger's realignment of Marine forces to support fleet commanders in contested seas, reducing ground-centric commitments post-2001 conflicts.^[12] Historically, the 13th Commandant, General John A. Lejeune, advanced amphibious doctrine in the 1920s by institutionalizing advanced base operations, enabling expeditionary capabilities that proved decisive in World War II.^[15] The 29th Commandant, General Alfred M. Gray, bolstered operational intellect by expanding education and reading lists, fostering adaptive leadership amid Cold War transitions.^[16] These efforts ensure doctrine translates into effective operations, with the Commandant maintaining accountability for overall performance metrics like unit combat readiness rates.^[8]

Historical Origins and Evolution

Establishment During the American Revolution

On November 10, 1775, the Second Continental Congress authorized the formation of two battalions of Continental Marines to serve aboard naval vessels and conduct amphibious operations against British forces.^[17] ^[18] The resolution specified a structure including one colonel, two lieutenant colonels, two majors, and company-grade officers, with Marines tasked to fight at sea as infantry and secure naval prizes.^[19] Recruitment began shortly thereafter at Tun Tavern in Philadelphia, a site traditionally regarded as the birthplace of the Marine Corps due to its role in enlisting the initial 300 men.^[20] Samuel Nicholas, a Philadelphia tavern owner and captain in the Pennsylvania militia, was commissioned as the first Captain of Marines on November 28, 1775, making him the senior officer of the nascent force.^[19] ^[21] On June 25, 1776, Congress promoted Nicholas to major and placed him "at the head of the Marines," establishing him as the de facto commanding officer responsible for training, equipping, and deploying the approximately 300 Marines under his authority.^[22] In this role, Nicholas organized the first Marine landing operation, leading 234 Marines and 30 sailors in the amphibious assault on New Providence in the Bahamas on March 3-4, 1776, where they captured gunpowder and cannons vital to the Patriot cause despite minimal opposition.^[23] Throughout the Revolutionary War, Nicholas's command focused on integrating Marines into Continental Navy operations, including shipboard security, boarding actions, and shore raids, though the force remained small and ad hoc compared to later institutional structures.^[19] By tradition, Nicholas is recognized as the first Commandant of the Marine Corps, embodying the leadership precedent for the position, even though the formal title and permanent establishment emerged only with the re-creation of the U.S. Marine Corps in 1798.^[24] ^[25] The Continental Marines were disbanded in 1783 following the Treaty of Paris, but their wartime service under Nicholas laid the foundational doctrine of naval infantry versatility that influenced the enduring Commandant role.^[19]

19th-Century Developments and Challenges

Lt. Col. Archibald Henderson assumed the role of Commandant on October 17, 1820, initiating a 38-year tenure that marked a period of stabilization and professionalization for the position. During his leadership, Henderson emphasized rigorous training regimens and enforced stricter disciplinary standards, transforming the Marine Corps from a loosely organized force into a more disciplined entity capable of responding to both naval and expeditionary demands.^[26]^[27] He advocated for expanded opportunities in land operations alongside the Army, participating in campaigns such as the Seminole Wars and the Mexican-American War, where Marines under his guidance stormed Chapultepec Castle on September 13, 1847, contributing to the capture of Mexico City.^[28] A significant legislative development occurred on June 30, 1834, when Congress passed "An Act for the Better Organization of the United States Marine Corps," which elevated the Commandant's title from Major Commandant to Colonel Commandant and authorized a small staff, including an adjutant and quartermaster, to enhance administrative efficiency. This change reflected growing recognition of the Corps' distinct role under naval authority while affirming its independence from Army absorption.^[29] Henderson's persistent lobbying helped avert a proposed merger with the Army in 1829 under President Andrew Jackson, preserving the Corps' separate identity amid debates over its utility in an era dominated by naval power projection.^[30] The Commandancy faced persistent challenges from chronic underfunding and limited manpower, with the Corps maintaining an end strength of approximately 800 to 2,000 personnel throughout much of the century, constraining its ability to scale for large-scale conflicts.^[31] During the Civil War (1861–1865), under Commandants John Harris and later Jacob Zeilin, the position navigated internal divisions as nearly half the officer corps resigned to join Confederate forces, yet the Union Marines remained primarily shipboard guards with minimal effective land combat roles, such as at the First Battle of Bull Run on July 21, 1861, where inadequate infantry training exposed doctrinal shortcomings.^[32]^[33] Post-war budget cuts exacerbated existential threats, prompting introspection about the Corps' mission as steam propulsion reduced traditional shipboard needs and Army dominance questioned amphibious specialization.^[34] These pressures culminated in recurring congressional scrutiny, with proposals to disband or integrate the Marines surfacing after major wars, underscoring the Commandant's role in defending institutional autonomy through demonstrated versatility in small-scale interventions, such as suppressing the West Indies pirate threat in the 1820s and guarding legations abroad.^[34] By century's end, the position had evolved into a bulwark against obsolescence, laying groundwork for advanced base concepts that would define future doctrine, despite ongoing fiscal and perceptual hurdles.^[31]

World Wars and Institutional Growth

Major General George Barnett served as the 12th Commandant of the Marine Corps from February 25, 1914, to June 30, 1920, overseeing the service's mobilization and expansion during World War I. Under his direction, the Marine Corps strength increased from approximately 13,725 personnel (462 officers and 13,214 enlisted) on April 6, 1917, to a peak of 75,101 by December 11, 1918, following congressional authorizations that raised the statutory limits to 3,017 officers and 75,500 enlisted by July 1, 1918.^[35] Barnett authorized the formation of the Fifth Marine Regiment on May 29, 1917, and the Sixth Regiment on August 4, 1917, both deployed to France as part of the 4th Marine Brigade within the U.S. Army's 2nd Division; these units participated in key engagements such as the Battle of Belleau Wood in June 1918, where Marines advanced against fortified German positions, suffering 1,062 deaths but halting the enemy offensive.^[35] This combat validation shifted the Corps from primarily shipboard and occupation duties to recognized expeditionary infantry capabilities, prompting the establishment of training facilities like the Overseas Depot at Quantico on May 19, 1918, which prepared over 16,000 Marines for overseas service.^[35] The wartime experience under Barnett fostered institutional maturation, including the creation of specialized schools for officers and radio operators, and the deployment of roughly 30,000 Marines to Europe for eight major operations, capturing 12,026 prisoners and advancing 60 kilometers across fronts like Aisne-Marne and Meuse-Argonne.^[35] Post-armistice demobilization reduced strength sharply, but the Corps retained enhanced organizational structures, such as the Fifth Brigade formed on September 5, 1918, which underscored the Commandant's growing authority in force structuring amid interservice debates over Marine roles.^[35] These developments laid groundwork for amphibious doctrine refinement in the interwar period, though the Commandant's position remained subordinate to naval oversight until wartime pressures elevated its strategic influence. Lieutenant General Thomas Holcomb, the 17th Commandant from June 13, 1936, to January 1, 1944, directed the initial phases of Marine Corps expansion following U.S. entry into World War II, growing active-duty strength from about 28,000 in 1941 to over 385,000 by late 1943 through rapid recruitment, training infrastructure buildup, and formation of defense battalions for Pacific island garrisons.^[36]^[37] Holcomb prioritized amphibious assault capabilities, establishing fleet marine forces and expanding recruit training to six-week programs by January 1940, while managing early campaigns like the Wake Island defense in December 1941, which highlighted logistical challenges but affirmed the Corps' vanguard role.^[38] His tenure institutionalized specialized units, including the first enlistment of African American Marines in 1942 under congressional mandate, initially for segregated labor roles that evolved into combat support by mid-war.^[39] General Alexander A. Vandegrift succeeded Holcomb as the 18th Commandant on January 1, 1944, leading the Corps through its peak strength of approximately 485,000 personnel by 1945 and major Pacific offensives, including Guadalcanal (1942, pre-Commandant but under his prior division command) and later island-hopping campaigns that validated amphibious doctrine.^[40] Vandegrift's advocacy, exemplified in his 1943 congressional testimony and the "bended knee" speech emphasizing Marine independence from Army integration, secured the Corps' distinct service status and permanent billet on the Joint Chiefs of Staff framework amid post-war reorganization debates.^[41] Under these Commandants, World War II transformed the Marine Corps into a premier expeditionary force, with institutional growth reflected in doctrinal codification, aviation integration, and sustained end-strength authorization at 20% of Navy personnel by April 1941 legislation, ensuring enduring operational autonomy.^[42]

Cold War to Present: Adaptation to Modern Threats

Following the Vietnam War, Commandant General Leonard F. Chapman Jr. (1968–1975) initiated reforms to address personnel attrition and doctrinal stagnation, emphasizing all-volunteer force recruitment and training enhancements that increased end-strength from 199,000 in 1970 to over 195,000 by 1975 while improving retention through professional development programs.^[43] These changes enabled the Corps to shift from attrition-based tactics to maneuver warfare principles, formalized under Commandant General Alfred M. Gray Jr. (1987–1991), who published FMFM 1, Warfighting in 1989, prioritizing initiative, combined arms, and decentralized execution to counter conventional threats in a nuclear-shadowed environment.^[44] Gray's emphasis on expeditionary agility proved effective in operations like the 1983 Grenada invasion and Beirut deployment, where Marine forces rapidly projected power despite logistical constraints.^[45] In the 1990 Gulf War, under Gray's ongoing influence, the I Marine Expeditionary Force executed amphibious feints and overland maneuvers against Iraqi forces, breaching minefields and advancing 240 kilometers in 100 hours during Operation Desert Storm from February 24–28, 1991, validating maneuver doctrine with minimal casualties relative to 42,000 deployed Marines.^[46] Post-Cold War, Commandant General Carl E. Mundy Jr. (1991–1995) adapted to humanitarian and peacekeeping missions in Somalia (1992–1993) and the Balkans, integrating rapid-response capabilities like Maritime Prepositioning Ships to sustain forces in austere environments amid budget cuts that reduced active-duty strength to 174,000 by 1995. This era highlighted the Corps' pivot toward hybrid threats, blending conventional readiness with low-intensity conflict, as doctrinal updates incorporated lessons from urban combat and non-state actors. The September 11, 2001, attacks prompted Commandants like General James L. Jones Jr. (1999–2003) to reorient toward the Global War on Terror, deploying over 100,000 Marines to Afghanistan and Iraq by 2003, where they conducted counterinsurgency operations emphasizing small-unit leadership and cultural awareness, as seen in the 2004–2005 Fallujah clearances that secured key urban areas despite intense urban fighting. Subsequent leaders, including General James T. Conway (2006–2010), refined expeditionary basing and persistent presence concepts, enabling sustained rotations that logged over 1.5 million Marine deployments by 2014, though prolonged ground commitments exposed vulnerabilities in heavy equipment sustainment against improvised threats like IEDs.^[19] Facing resurgent peer competitors, Commandant General David H. Berger (2019–2023) launched Force Design 2030 in March 2020, divesting legacy systems like tanks and heavy artillery to prioritize mobile, low-signature units equipped with anti-ship missiles, drones, and long-range sensors for littoral denial against Chinese anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) networks in the Western Pacific. This initiative, creating Marine Littoral Regiments for stand-in forces on contested islands, responded to intelligence assessments of China's 400+ ship navy and hypersonic capabilities by 2025, aiming to integrate with joint forces for distributed operations while reducing logistics footprints by 70% in forward postures.^[47] Current Commandant General Eric M. Smith (2023–present) has updated the concept in 2025 to incorporate drone countermeasures and enhanced firepower, sustaining adaptations amid fiscal pressures and debates over divestment efficacy, as evidenced by ongoing exercises simulating Indo-Pacific scenarios against pacing threats from China and Russia.^[48]

Appointment and Tenure

Qualifications and Selection Criteria

The Commandant of the Marine Corps must be appointed from among the general officers of the United States Marine Corps, as specified in 10 U.S.C. § 8043.^[8] This statutory requirement ensures the position is filled by a senior commissioned officer holding the rank of brigadier general or higher, though in practice, the appointee is invariably a lieutenant general or general at the time of nomination. No additional formal qualifications, such as specific years of service, educational degrees, or combat experience, are mandated by law beyond this rank threshold and the general eligibility for flag officer promotions under Title 10 provisions governing Marine Corps officer advancements.^[8] The selection process begins with nomination by the President of the United States, who typically consults senior military advisors including the Secretary of Defense, Secretary of the Navy, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the incumbent Commandant before identifying a candidate.^[49] The nomination is then forwarded to the Senate for confirmation, where it undergoes review by the Senate Armed Services Committee, including hearings to assess the nominee's fitness, followed by a full Senate vote requiring a simple majority.^[50] This process aligns with standard procedures for four-star military appointments, emphasizing Senate oversight to balance executive prerogative with legislative accountability, though holds or delays can occur due to political considerations unrelated to the nominee's qualifications.^[49] In application, candidates emerge from a pool of three- and four-star generals who have progressed through competitive promotion boards evaluating performance in command, staff, and joint assignments, as governed by Department of Defense instructions on officer promotions. Selection prioritizes officers with proven operational leadership, often including division or expeditionary force commands, combat deployments, and advanced professional military education from institutions like the National War College, reflecting the demands of advising on Marine Corps strategy and resource allocation.^[51] While not codified, this merit-based trajectory underscores causal links between sustained excellence in high-stakes billets and elevation to the Commandancy, with historical precedents showing no deviations since the rank's formalization in the mid-20th century.

Congressional Confirmation and Term Limits

The Commandant of the Marine Corps is nominated by the President from among active-duty Marine Corps general officers and requires confirmation by the U.S. Senate under 10 U.S.C. § 8043.^[8] The nomination process typically involves review by the Department of Defense and the White House, focusing on the candidate's seniority, joint duty experience (including at least one full tour of duty as a general officer, unless waived for national interest), and leadership record.^[8] Upon submission to the Senate, the nomination is referred to the Senate Armed Services Committee, which holds hearings to assess the nominee's qualifications, strategic vision, and alignment with national security priorities; the committee then votes to report the nomination favorably or unfavorably to the full Senate.^[52] Senate confirmation usually proceeds via unanimous consent or a simple majority vote, with military flag officer nominations historically expedited due to operational needs, though delays can occur from senatorial holds or partisan disputes.^[50]^[53] The statutory term of office is four years, during which the Commandant serves at the President's pleasure and may be removed earlier if deemed necessary.^[8] No fixed term limits exist beyond this framework, but reappointment for an additional four-year term is authorized only during declared war or national emergency, ensuring continuity in prolonged crises while discouraging indefinite tenure.^[8] This structure balances executive authority with congressional oversight, as the Senate must reconfirm any reappointment. In practice, extensions have been invoked during major conflicts, such as World War II, to maintain experienced leadership amid sustained operations.^[8] Notable variations in confirmation timelines underscore the process's vulnerability to political dynamics; for instance, in September 2023, General Eric Smith faced a months-long delay before Senate confirmation as the 39th Commandant, marking the first such gap since 1910 and highlighting how holds by individual senators can temporarily leave the position vacant or acting.^[54]^[55] Despite such episodes, the four-year term has standardized command stability since its codification, with most incumbents completing full terms absent extraordinary circumstances.

Transition Processes and Succession

The transition to a new Commandant of the Marine Corps follows the completion of presidential nomination and Senate confirmation, as required under 10 U.S.C. § 8043, which mandates appointment from among Marine Corps general officers for a four-year term, subject to the President's pleasure.^[8] Upon confirmation, the incoming Commandant assumes full authority through a formal change of command ceremony, presided over by high-ranking officials such as the Secretary of the Navy or the Commandant of the Marine Corps' predecessor. These ceremonies, often conducted at the Marine Barracks Washington, D.C., involve the symbolic passing of the Marine Corps colors from the outgoing to the incoming Commandant, accompanied by remarks on leadership continuity, doctrinal priorities, and operational readiness.^[56] The process ensures minimal disruption, with pre-ceremony briefings on ongoing initiatives, force structure, and strategic planning to facilitate seamless handover of command responsibilities.^[57] In cases of vacancy due to retirement, resignation, death, or incapacity, the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps, also a four-star general appointed under 10 U.S.C. § 8044, performs the duties of the Commandant until a successor is confirmed. This statutory provision prioritizes continuity in Marine Corps leadership, with the Assistant exercising supervision over organizations and activities as directed.^[58] For instance, following General David H. Berger's retirement on July 10, 2023, Assistant Commandant General Eric M. Smith served in an acting capacity, managing daily operations, until his Senate confirmation as the 39th Commandant on September 20, 2023.^[59] If the Assistant Commandant is unavailable, duties may devolve to one of the Deputy Commandants or the Chief of Staff, though primary reliance remains on the Assistant to maintain command integrity without interim dilution of authority.^[60] Such succession mechanisms have been invoked during medical emergencies, as in November 2023 when General Smith required hospitalization; an official assumption of duties order under 10 U.S.C. § 8044 ensured no lapse in command functions.^[61] These processes underscore the Marine Corps' emphasis on rapid, orderly transitions to preserve operational tempo and institutional knowledge, avoiding prolonged acting statuses that could impair decision-making on resource allocation or threat responses.

Notable Commandants and Legacies

Pioneering Leaders and Combat Innovations

Archibald Henderson, the fifth Commandant from October 17, 1820, to January 6, 1859, solidified the Marine Corps' role as an independent combat force capable of expeditionary operations beyond shipboard duties.^[62] During his tenure, Henderson personally led Marine detachments in the Second Seminole War starting in 1836, conducting inland maneuvers against irregular forces in Florida's swamps, which demonstrated the Corps' adaptability in small-unit jungle warfare and influenced early tactics for rapid deployment from naval assets.^[31] He maintained a permanent battalion at Marine Barracks Washington as a training nucleus for landing parties, emphasizing readiness for amphibious assaults and combined arms coordination with naval gunfire, thwarting repeated congressional efforts to disband or subsumed the Corps into the Army.^[26] John A. Lejeune, the thirteenth Commandant serving from July 10, 1920, to March 5, 1929, pioneered the doctrinal foundation for modern amphibious warfare, reorienting the Corps from defensive advanced bases to offensive expeditionary strikes.^[63] In 1921, he established the Marine Corps Schools at Quantico, Virginia, to train officers in combined arms tactics, including infantry-artillery integration and ship-to-shore movements, which directly informed the 1934 Tentative Manual for Landing Operations and subsequent World War II amphibious successes.^[63] Lejeune renamed the static Advanced Base Force as the Marine Expeditionary Force in 1925, advocating its integration into the U.S. Fleet for joint Navy-Marine operations, and innovated close air support tactics during occupations in Haiti and the Dominican Republic, where Marine aviators provided direct suppression for ground advances.^[63]^[64] These reforms emphasized maneuver over attrition, prioritizing speed, surprise, and vertical envelopment precursors like parachute and glider feasibility studies.^[64]

Reformers and Strategic Shifts

General Alfred M. Gray, the 29th Commandant from 1987 to 1991, spearheaded the Marine Corps' adoption of maneuver warfare as its foundational doctrine, emphasizing speed, initiative, and decentralized decision-making over attrition-based approaches. This shift was rooted in analyses of historical campaigns and emerging threats, prompting reorganization of training, education, and equipment to prioritize combined arms operations and intellectual agility among leaders.^[16] Gray's reforms built on groundwork laid by his predecessor, General Robert H. Barrow (1979–1983), who endorsed early maneuver concepts amid post-Vietnam critiques of rigid tactics, leading to the 1989 publication of FMFM 1, Warfighting as the capstone manual.^[65] These changes enhanced the Corps' adaptability for high-intensity conflicts, evidenced by subsequent doctrinal evolutions that influenced joint operations. General Charles C. Krulak, the 31st Commandant from 1995 to 1999, introduced the "Strategic Corporal" concept, recognizing that junior leaders' decisions in complex urban environments could determine mission outcomes amid blurred lines between combat, peacekeeping, and humanitarian efforts. This reflected post-Cold War realities, including operations in Somalia and the Balkans, and prompted strategic shifts toward distributed lethality and cultural awareness training.^[65] Krulak oversaw the 1997 revision of Warfighting into MCDP 1, refining maneuver principles to incorporate information dominance and rapid adaptability, while advocating for lighter, more versatile forces suited to "three-block wars" involving simultaneous fighting, disaster relief, and stability tasks.^[65] His tenure institutionalized these ideas through updated professional military education, fostering a force resilient to asymmetric threats without diluting core warfighting ethos. General David H. Berger, the 38th Commandant from 2019 to 2023, initiated Force Design 2030 in 2019, a comprehensive restructuring to counter peer competitors like China in the Indo-Pacific by divesting legacy platforms such as main battle tanks (all 452 M1A1 Abrams eliminated by 2021) and heavy howitzers in favor of mobile, sensor-integrated units for expeditionary advanced base operations (EABO). Grounded in extensive wargaming that highlighted vulnerabilities in large, centralized formations against anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) systems, the initiative reduced end strength by about 12,000 personnel by 2030 and reoriented divisions toward sea denial and joint fires integration.^[66] Critics, often from legacy-focused perspectives, argued it overly emphasized defense over offense, but proponents cited empirical simulations showing improved survivability and contribution to sea control in contested littorals.^[67] Berger's guidance, updated through 2022, accelerated investments in long-range precision fires, unmanned systems, and networked logistics, marking the most significant doctrinal pivot since World War II amphibious reforms.^[68] These shifts prioritized empirical threat assessments over institutional inertia, though debates persist on balancing divestments with readiness metrics.

Commandants Facing Major Crises

Lieutenant General Thomas Holcomb served as the 17th Commandant from 1936 to 1944, presiding over the Marine Corps' unprecedented expansion following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941.^[36] Under his leadership, Marine Corps strength grew from approximately 19,000 personnel in 1940 to over 300,000 by 1944, necessitating rapid recruitment, training infrastructure development, and procurement of amphibious equipment amid chronic shortages in funding, promotions, and supplies.^[36] ^[69] Holcomb prioritized amphibious warfare doctrine, establishing specialized training commands, but faced internal resistance and logistical strains that tested the Corps' institutional resilience during the early Pacific campaigns.^[70] General Clifton B. Cates, the 19th Commandant from 1948 to 1952, confronted the sudden outbreak of the Korean War on June 25, 1950, when North Korean forces invaded South Korea, prompting an emergency mobilization of Marine reserves.^[71] Cates directed the rapid assembly and deployment of the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, which sailed from California on July 12, 1950, and participated in the Inchon landing on September 15, 1950, validating vertical envelopment tactics under combat conditions.^[71] He advocated fiercely before Congress for increased end strength and aviation assets, securing legislation in 1952 that authorized a permanent Marine air-ground task force structure, despite postwar budget constraints and inter-service rivalries.^[71] ^[72] General Lemuel C. Shepherd Jr., the 20th Commandant from 1952 to 1956, managed the Korean armistice on July 27, 1953, and subsequent force rotations while defending the Corps' autonomy against the 1949 Hoover Commission's recommendations to merge it into the Army.^[73] Shepherd implemented efficiency reforms, including streamlined promotions and enhanced amphibious capabilities, to counter threats of dissolution and ensure readiness for potential Cold War contingencies.^[73] General Wallace M. Greene Jr., the 23rd Commandant from 1964 to 1968, oversaw the escalation of U.S. involvement in Vietnam, including the deployment of the III Marine Amphibious Force, which landed 5,000 Marines at Da Nang on March 8, 1965, marking the first major combat commitment.^[74] Greene emphasized counterinsurgency operations and rural pacification, but grappled with strategic disagreements over search-and-destroy missions versus enclave defense, amid rising casualties exceeding 14,000 Marine deaths by 1968.^[74] His tenure highlighted tensions between Marine doctrinal preferences for combined arms and the broader Army-dominated war effort.^[74] General Leonard F. Chapman Jr., the 24th Commandant from 1968 to 1975, navigated the phased withdrawal of U.S. forces under Vietnamization, with the last Marine combat units departing by March 27, 1971, reducing Corps strength from a peak of 289,000 in 1969.^[75] Chapman spearheaded the transition to an all-volunteer force after the draft ended in 1973, implementing retention incentives and professionalization reforms to rebuild morale and readiness amid post-Tet Offensive scrutiny and domestic anti-war pressures.^[75] His leadership preserved core capabilities despite force drawdowns and the fall of Saigon on April 30, 1975.^[75]

Controversies and Debates

Discipline and Cultural Standards Enforcement

The Commandant of the Marine Corps holds ultimate responsibility for instilling and enforcing discipline across the force, including adherence to the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), prevention of misconduct such as hazing and sexual assault, and preservation of cultural standards rooted in warfighting proficiency and unit cohesion. High-profile lapses have tested this authority, prompting targeted reforms. In 2013, amid a surge in publicized incidents including sexual assaults and ethical breaches during deployments, Marine leaders reinforced basic training and accountability measures to address declining personal discipline.^[76] Gen. James Amos, serving as 31st Commandant from 2010 to 2014, spearheaded an internal campaign against "bad behavior," emphasizing sexual assault response, ethical conduct in combat zones, and retention of combat-oriented personnel through stricter oversight.^[77] Subsequent scandals amplified scrutiny of enforcement mechanisms. The 2017 Marines United incident, involving widespread non-consensual sharing of female service members' images online, led to 55 substantiated cases under Gen. Robert Neller's (34th Commandant, 2015–2019) direction, resulting in seven courts-martial, 14 nonjudicial punishments, six administrative separations, and 28 adverse actions; this prompted mandatory separation for offenders and revised social media policies to curb harassment.^[78]^[79]^[80] Hazing controversies, documented in over 20 drill instructor misconduct cases at Marine Corps Recruit Depot Parris Island by 2019, underscored persistent challenges, with investigations revealing abusive practices that contradicted official anti-hazing directives.^[81] Debates center on enforcement consistency, particularly disparities between enlisted and officer accountability. Investigative reports describe a "Black Book" maintained by Marine leadership to log senior officer crimes privately, potentially delaying or concealing public repercussions and fostering perceptions of a two-tiered system that erodes trust.^[82]^[83] Declining UCMJ prosecutions—down significantly by 2018—drew criticism from figures like Secretary of Defense James Mattis, who attributed it to commanders' reluctance to pursue courts-martial or nonjudicial punishment, risking softened standards amid recruitment pressures.^[84] Cultural tensions have arisen over integrating diversity efforts, with Gen. David Berger (38th Commandant, 2019–2023) defending unchanged physical and performance benchmarks as essential for victory, while responding to cultural surveys by dismissing resisters to gender integration and prioritizing mission capability over inclusivity concerns.^[85]^[86] These actions reflect Commandants' balancing of reform against preserving a merit-based, combat-focused ethos, though skeptics question whether institutional biases toward leniency compromise long-term readiness.^[87]

Force Structure Reforms and Readiness Critiques

Gen. David H. Berger, Commandant from 2019 to 2023, initiated Force Design 2030 in March 2020, which restructured Marine Corps units by divesting all tank battalions, reducing tube artillery from 21 to 9 batteries, eliminating three infantry battalions and associated units, and prioritizing lighter, distributed forces equipped with anti-ship missiles and unmanned systems for operations in the Indo-Pacific against peer adversaries like China.^[88] Critics, including retired Marine generals, argued that these changes diminished the Corps' combined-arms capabilities, rendering it less effective for forced-entry operations, crisis response, and sustained ground combat, as the reforms emphasized niche littoral roles over versatile maneuver warfare.^[68]^[89] Berger defended the initiative, asserting it addressed outdated structures from post-Cold War eras and was validated through wargames and fleet feedback, with no regrets expressed upon retirement despite internal dissent alleging a lack of rigorous testing and circumvention of traditional requirements processes.^[90]^[91] Readiness critiques intensified post-reform, with congressional analyses highlighting vulnerabilities such as reduced fire support and logistics sustainment in contested environments, potentially undermining the Corps' role as a force-in-readiness for global contingencies beyond the Western Pacific.^[88] A 2022 CSIS study examined these concerns, finding that while Force Design enhanced certain expeditionary capabilities like stand-in forces, it risked capability gaps in armored mobility and indirect fires, echoing broader debates on whether the shifts prioritized hypothetical peer conflicts over proven operational demands from Iraq and Afghanistan.^[68] Proponents countered that legacy structures were mismatched to modern anti-access/area-denial threats, with empirical data from simulations supporting the divestments' necessity despite short-term disruptions to unit cohesion and training.^[67] Under Gen. Eric M. Smith, confirmed as Commandant in September 2023, Force Design evolved into ongoing updates, including a 2025 refinement standardizing rifle squads at 15 Marines for improved lethality and establishing dedicated fires and reconnaissance companies within infantry battalions to integrate long-range precision fires.^[92]^[93] Smith emphasized adaptability in contested maritime spaces, but critiques persisted regarding persistent readiness shortfalls, such as equipment shortages and delayed fielding of new systems, which some attributed to the rapid pace of divestments outstripping acquisition timelines.^[66] While financial audits confirmed fiscal accountability in FY2023 and FY2024, operational readiness reports from GAO noted domain-wide challenges in sustainment and modernization, fueling arguments that structural pivots have not fully resolved tensions between innovation and near-term deployability.^[94]^[95]

Civil-Military Relations and Political Influences

The Commandant of the Marine Corps, as a statutory member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, provides professional military advice to civilian leaders including the Secretary of Defense, the President, and Congress on matters of national security, force structure, and operational readiness, while remaining firmly subordinate to civilian authority under the U.S. Constitution and statutes such as 10 U.S.C. § 8043. This advisory role necessitates regular testimony before congressional committees, where Commandants advocate for Marine Corps priorities such as amphibious capabilities and expeditionary forces, influencing policy through evidence-based assessments rather than partisan advocacy. Active-duty officers, including the Commandant, are prohibited by Department of Defense Directive 1344.10 from engaging in partisan political activities, preserving the military's apolitical posture amid civil-military norms established post-Vietnam to prevent undue influence on elected officials. A pivotal historical instance of the Commandant's engagement in civil-military relations occurred during postwar defense reorganization, when General Alexander A. Vandegrift testified before the Senate Committee on Naval Affairs on May 6, 1946, delivering the "Bended Knee" speech to defend the Marine Corps' independent role against Army-led efforts to integrate it into a unified structure that would diminish its amphibious mission.^[41] Vandegrift emphasized the Corps' proven contributions in World War II, including over 80% of Army divisions landing via Marine-led amphibious assaults, arguing that subsuming it would erode specialized capabilities essential for national defense without appealing to sentiment or tradition.^[41] His testimony, supported by empirical records of Marine operations from Guadalcanal to Iwo Jima, contributed to congressional inclusion of Marine preservation language in the National Security Act of 1947, which affirmed the Corps' statutory missions and reporting chain to the Secretary of the Navy.^[96] This episode exemplifies how Commandants leverage factual operational history to counter inter-service rivalries, a dynamic recurring in budget battles where civilian oversight ultimately decides resource allocation. In contemporary contexts, civil-military tensions have arisen over force structure reforms, as seen during General David H. Berger's tenure (2019–2023), when his Force Design 2030 initiative—divesting 12 tank platoons, reducing artillery tubes by 40%, and prioritizing littoral operations for Indo-Pacific competition—drew congressional scrutiny for potentially undermining combined arms capabilities without sufficient testing.^[90] Berger defended the changes in Senate and House Armed Services Committee testimonies, citing wargame data showing diminished utility of heavy armor against peer adversaries like China, but critics including retired Commandants argued it bypassed traditional requirements processes and risked readiness, prompting the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 to mandate independent reviews.^[89]^[97] Political influences manifest in such debates through congressional earmarks and service branch advocacy, where Commandants must navigate budget trade-offs—e.g., Berger's push for unmanned systems over legacy platforms—while yielding to civilian directives, as evidenced by delayed divestments in response to legislative holds.^[68] Commandants have occasionally faced controversy over public statements perceived as veering into domestic politics, testing apolitical norms. General Robert B. Neller, in a June 4, 2020, message to Marines following George Floyd's death, urged confronting racism and declared "things will not go backwards," framing it as ethical leadership but drawing criticism for implying directional social change amid national unrest.^[98] Neller later advised retired flag officers in September 2020 to weigh the impact of political endorsements on active-duty perceptions, underscoring institutional risks.^[99] Similarly, General James F. Amos expressed reservations during 2010 congressional hearings on repealing "Don't Ask, Don't Tell," citing survey data from over 72,000 Marines indicating potential unit cohesion strains, though he implemented the policy post-enactment. These cases highlight causal tensions: while Commandants' candor informs policy, public commentary on non-operational issues can invite perceptions of bias, particularly given documented partisan leanings among military personnel in surveys, yet empirical evidence shows no widespread erosion of civilian control when advice remains professional and data-driven.^[100]

Current Commandant and Recent Developments

Eric M. Smith’s Tenure (2023–Present)

General Eric M. Smith was confirmed by the U.S. Senate as the 39th Commandant of the Marine Corps on September 20, 2023, and assumed office on September 22, 2023, succeeding General David H. Berger.^[101] Smith's early tenure emphasized continuity in modernization efforts while prioritizing operational readiness amid evolving threats in the Indo-Pacific region. He served as acting Commandant from July 10 to September 21, 2023, during the transition period following Berger's retirement.^[101] On October 29, 2023, Smith suffered a cardiac arrest while jogging near his residence at Marine Barracks Washington, D.C., leading to hospitalization and a 17-day inpatient stay.^[102] He underwent successful open-heart surgery on January 8, 2024, to repair a congenital bicuspid aortic valve identified as a contributing factor.^[103] Smith returned to full duty in March 2024, resuming leadership without reported long-term impacts on his command responsibilities.^[104] Smith has overseen iterative updates to Force Design 2030, a doctrinal overhaul originally advanced under Berger to reorient the Marine Corps toward distributed maritime operations against peer adversaries like China. The 2025 Force Design Update, released on October 23, 2025, accelerates investments in logistics, long-range fires, and integrated sensing capabilities to enable "kill webs" in contested environments, while affirming divestments from legacy systems such as main battle tanks.^[105] ^[106] Smith described these changes as "righteous" and essential for adapting to the changing character of warfare, rejecting any "untouchable" programs in pursuit of agility.^[106] ^[107] These reforms have drawn criticism from some analysts and former officers who argue that reductions in traditional combined-arms capabilities, including armored forces, risk eroding the Corps' versatility for high-intensity conflicts beyond anti-access/area-denial missions.^[106] ^[108] Additional initiatives under Smith include advocacy for integrating commercial off-the-shelf generative AI tools to enhance decision-making and operational efficiency, as outlined in January 2025 guidance.^[109] He has also addressed amphibious force structure debates, stressing congressional mandates for a minimum of 31 amphibious warships to support Marine expeditionary operations, amid ongoing Navy-Marine Corps tensions over fleet priorities.^[107] Smith's tenure has maintained focus on talent management and training reforms to sustain recruitment and retention amid broader Department of Defense challenges.^[66]

Ongoing Modernization Efforts

The United States Marine Corps' ongoing modernization efforts are primarily guided by Force Design 2030, a multi-year initiative to reorient the service toward naval expeditionary warfare in contested maritime environments, particularly in the Indo-Pacific region amid great power competition. Initiated in 2020, this framework emphasizes divesting legacy capabilities like heavy tanks in favor of distributed, lethal operations using precision fires, unmanned systems, and resilient logistics to enable stand-in forces that persist inside adversary weapons engagement zones.^[66] The approach is informed by a continuous Campaign of Learning, incorporating wargames, exercises, and operational feedback to refine concepts such as Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO) and the development of "kill webs"—dynamic, joint networks integrating sensors, shooters, and decision-makers across domains.^[92] ^[110] In the 2025 Force Design Update, released on October 23, 2025, by Commandant Gen. Eric M. Smith, the Corps detailed progress in strengthening forward-deployed formations and fielding new capabilities to counter evolving threats including drones, long-range precision-guided munitions, cyber operations, and electronic warfare.^[92] Key advancements include the establishment and maturation of Marine Littoral Regiments (MLRs), specialized units optimized for littoral maneuver and fires integration; the 3d MLR achieved Initial Operating Capability in December 2023, while the 12th MLR, redesignated in 2025 and based in Okinawa, Japan, continues realignment toward full operational readiness with a focus on intermediate force projection.^[111] ^[112] These regiments incorporate scalable Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) elements, from Marine Expeditionary Units (MEUs) to Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEFs), to support joint and combined operations with enhanced data-driven command and control.^[92] Technological integration forms a core pillar, with accelerated procurement and testing of systems like the Navy Marine Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System (NMESIS), a mobile anti-ship missile platform demonstrated in joint exercises in Okinawa, Japan, on September 21, 2025, to enable strikes from expeditionary bases against maritime threats.^[113] Complementing this, the Marine Air Defense Integrated System (MADIS), a short-range ground-based air defense solution, has been fielded to counter unmanned aerial systems, as validated in drills in the Philippines on April 28, 2025, where it successfully engaged drone targets.^[114] The update also prioritizes resilient mobility assets, advanced unmanned platforms for sensing and striking, and logistics sustainment to shorten supply lines and stockpile munitions forward, ensuring Marines remain lethal and adaptable without over-relying on vulnerable fixed infrastructure.^[92] ^[112] Future directions emphasize iterative refinement through joint experimentation, with plans to deploy additional maritime reconnaissance units and unmanned missile launchers to enhance distributed lethality and integration with Navy and allied forces.^[115] These efforts preserve the Corps' core ethos of disciplined, initiative-driven warfighters while addressing capability shortfalls identified in peer-level conflicts, positioning the service for scalable operations across the competition continuum.^[92]

References

[1]
Commandant of the Marine Corps
The CMC reports directly to the United States Secretary of the Navy and is responsible for ensuring the organization, policy, plans, and programs for the Marine ...
[2]
10 USC 5043 - Commandant of the Marine Corps - OpenJurist
10 USC 5043 - Commandant of the Marine Corps · (1) preside over the Headquarters, Marine Corps; · (2) transmit the plans and recommendations of the Headquarters, ...
[3]
Reestablishment of the Marine Corps
This act of 11 July 1798 reestablished the United States Marine Corps under the Constitution. An Act for the establishing and organizing a Marine Corps.
[4]
CHIPS Articles: Congress Establishes Permanent U.S. Marine Corps
On July 11, 1798, President John Adams approved "An Act for Establishing and Organizing a Marine Corps", and it became law. The following day, the President ...
[5]
10 U.S.C. 5043 - Sec. 5043 - Commandant of the Marine Corps ...
The Commandant shall be appointed for a term of four years from officers on the active-duty list of the Marine Corps not below the grade of colonel. He serves ...
[6]
10 U.S.C. 5043 - Commandant of the Marine Corps - Content Details
10 U.S.C. 5043 - Commandant of the Marine Corps. View the most recent version of this document on this website. Summary; Document in Context. Publication Title.
[7]
STATEMENT OF GENERAL ERIC M. SMITH COMMANDANT OF ...
Upon my assumption of duties as Commandant of the Marine Corps, I outlined my top five priorities: 1) Balancing Crisis Response and Modernization, 2) Naval ...
[8]
10 U.S. Code § 8043 - Commandant of the Marine Corps
The Commandant shall be appointed for a term of four years from the general officers of the Marine Corps. He serves at the pleasure of the President.
[9]
10 U.S. Code § 8042 - Headquarters, Marine Corps: general duties
(4). as directed by the Secretary or the Commandant, coordinate the action of organizations of the Marine Corps; and. (5). perform such other duties, not ...
[10]
MCDP 1 Approved - Marine Corps Association
On 20 June 1997 the Commandant signed Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) 1, Warfighting. MCDP 1 replaces FMFM 1, Warfighting, as the Marine Corps'
[11]
Gen. David Berger Signs Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 8 ...
Jul 1, 2022 · Gen. David Berger, commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps, signed on Wednesday the service's new doctrine focused on the information warfighting ...
[12]
The Operational Warfare Revolution - Marine Corps University
Mar 4, 2020 · In 2019, General David H. Berger, Commandant of the Marine Corps, asserted that the U.S. Marine Corps is not prepared for the challenges of ...
[13]
AVAILABILITY OF MARINE CORPS DOCTRINAL PUBLICATION 4 ...
Mar 21, 2023 · GENTEXT/REMARKS/1. The Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC) approved Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) 4, Logistics, dated 21 March 2023 ...
[14]
https://seapowermagazine.org/marine-corps-lays-out-aggressive-modernization-efforts-in-force-design-update/
[15]
Doctrine Development: A Look At History - GlobalSecurity.org
In 1920, MG John A. Lejeune became Commandant of the Marine Corps and actively pursued the concept. He implemented several decisions that improved the basic ...
[16]
The Brain of the Marine Corps
This article examines how Gray, as the 29th Commandant of the Marine Corps, rebuilt the Marine Corps into an intellectual warfighting organization. He regarded ...
[17]
Birth of the U.S. Marine Corps | November 10, 1775 - History.com
Nicholas was the first commissioned officer in the Continental Marines and is celebrated as the first Marine commandant. After American independence was ...<|separator|>
[18]
Resolved, That two Battalions of marines be raised
Apr 23, 2021 · John Adams penned the following resolution on November 10, 1775: Resolved, That two Battalions of marines be raised, consisting of one Colonel, two Lieutenant ...
[19]
Brief Histories - Marine Corps University
The Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Randolph McC. Pate, ordered better supervision of the DIs and training in general to assure that there would ...
[20]
Exhibits: American Revolution - National Museum of the Marine Corps
The Continental Congress authorized the establishment of two battalions of Marines on 10 November 1775. According to legend, Captain Samuel Nicholas began ...
[21]
This Day in History: First Marine Commandant - Tara Ross
Nov 28, 2023 · On this day in 1775, a Philadelphia tavern owner is commissioned as commanding officer of the newly formed Marines. Samuel Nicholas received ...
[22]
MAJOR Samuel nicholas, continental marines (deceased)
On 25 June 1776, Congress placed Capt Nicholas "at the head of the Marines with the rank of Major." Accordingly, Commodore Hopkins was advised to send Maj ...
[23]
Meet the American who first commanded the Marines - Fox News
Nov 4, 2022 · Major Samuel Nicholas was the first captain of the Marines and in 1776 led his men on a daring raid on the Bahamas, establishing the Marines ...
[24]
The Samuel Nicholas Society - Marine Corps Association
He was the first officer commissioned in the United States Continental Marines and by tradition is considered to be the first Commandant of the Marine Corps.
[25]
[PDF] Samuel Nicholas - "Captain of Marines"
As a result, Nicholas is considered to be the first Commandant of the Marine Corps. In 1779, Nicholas requested command of the Marine Detachment for the new ...
[26]
Archibald Henderson: An Era - Marine Corps Association
Dec 15, 2024 · On October 17, 1820, Major Archibald Henderson was promoted to the rank of lieutenant colonel and became the fifth Commandant of the Marine Corps at the age of ...Missing: 19th challenges
[27]
Grand Old Man of the Marine Corps turns 220
Jan 17, 2003 · In the years that followed, Henderson led his Marines through service around the world, in conflict and humanitarian aid. He regulated training ...
[28]
Giants of the Corps: Archibald Henderson
Dec 15, 2024 · “The Henderson Era” brought continued changes. On July 4, 1840, Commandant Henderson issued orders that the Marine uniform would be changed ...Missing: reforms | Show results with:reforms
[29]
An Act for the Better Organization of the United States Marine Corps
The act defines the Marine Corps structure, its subject to navy laws, 4-year enlistments, and officers' rank similar to the army, but not commanding navy ...Missing: change | Show results with:change
[30]
Henderson I (Troop Transport No. 1)
Apr 9, 2020 · Henderson is credited with thwarting attempts by President Andrew Jackson to combine the Marine Corps with the Army in 1829. Later, Congress ...Missing: reforms | Show results with:reforms
[31]
Marine Corps Identity from the Historical Perspective
May 13, 2019 · Col. Commandant Archibald Henderson fought throughout his 38-year tenure in the first half of the 19th century to keep marines on ships while ...
[32]
Understanding Battlefield Performance of U.S. Marines Ashore ...
During the American Civil War, U.S. Marines rarely engaged in land operations and even more rarely conducted land-based or amphibious operations involving ...
[33]
U.S. Marines in the Civil War - Warfare History Network
U.S. Marines in the Civil War started out unprepared, but would take part in several significant battles, both on land and at sea.
[34]
Always Faithful Chapter 23 - Marine Corps University
In the 1800s, the Marine Corps faced a set of challenges that were not entirely foreign to them: proving their relevance, leadership, and fighting capabilities ...
[35]
None
Summary of each segment:
[36]
[PDF] Thomas Holcomb and the Advent of the Marine Corps Defense ...
examines what General Holcomb had to begin with in this expansion and how he administered and managed the largest Marine Corps increase Defense Battalions serve ...
[37]
Mobilization of the Organized Marine Corps Reserve for World War II
The U.S. Navy numbered only 160,997 sailors and had only six aircraft carriers in commission. The active duty Marine Corps numbered only 28,277. Expecting that ...
[38]
Marine Corps Boot Camp during World War II
In January 1940, once the Marine Corps reached its strength of 25,000, the recruit training was increased to a six-week course (table 1). Once the United States ...
[39]
[PDF] The Combat Role of African American Marines During World War II
On 25 May 1942, the Commandant ofthe Marine Corps, Lieutenant General Thomas. Holcomb, issued formal instructions to begin recruiting qualified, "colored ...<|separator|>
[40]
Vandegrift, Alexander A. - Naval History and Heritage Command
General Alexander A. Vandegrift, USMC (1887-1973). 18th Commandant of the Marine Corps, 1 January 1944 - 1 January 1948.
[41]
Bended Knee Speech - Marine Corps University
The "bended knee" speech, given by General Vandegrift, argues the Marine Corps should not be placed in the same category as the Army's airborne and armored ...Missing: growth | Show results with:growth
[42]
A Different War: Marines in Europe and North Africa (Introduction)
In April 1941, Congress stipulated that Marine Corps strength should be 20 percent of that of the Navy. Only a relatively few Marines were detailed to the ...Missing: personnel | Show results with:personnel
[43]
[PDF] Lessons from the Post-Vietnam Rebuild of the Marine Corps, 1969 ...
Apr 24, 1980 · Bloodied and scarred by its experiences in the conflict, the Marine Corps embarked upon a twenty year program to rebuild their force and reclaim ...
[44]
[PDF] The Evolution of the U.S. Marine Corps from Attrition to Maneuver ...
The Marine Corps evolved from attrition to maneuver warfare in the post-Vietnam era, mapping the approach to war in that era.
[45]
[PDF] the Cold War transformation of the US Marine Corps, 1947–1995
By doing so, they strengthened and nourished the soul of the Corps. And as they did this during the Cold War and post-Cold War inflection points described ...
[46]
the enduring lessons for success from Operation Desert Storm
Mar 24, 2021 · 30 years after the success of Operation Desert Storm, the Marine Corps still studies it as a tool for informing modern strategy and tactics.
[47]
[PDF] STATEMENT OF GENERAL DAVID H. BERGER COMMANDANT OF ...
21st century strategic competition requires a new posture to deter modern threats. ... A ready force that creates a strategic advantage over the pacing threat ...
[48]
Marine Corps marks 5 years of Force Design modernization
Jul 31, 2025 · Adapting to modern warfare Gen. Eric Smith, the 39th commandant of the Marine Corps, emphasized the need for affordable, lightweight and ...
[49]
[PDF] GAO-25-107679, Military Generals and Admirals
May 15, 2025 · After presidential approval and signature, the White House sends the nominations to the Senate Armed Services. Committee for consideration and ...
[50]
Nominations in Committee (Non-Civilian) - U.S. Senate
This document identifies non-civilian nominations submitted by the President to the Senate for confirmation during the current congress and that are currently ...
[51]
[PDF] Senate Armed Service Committee
Apr 30, 2019 · Section 8043, title 10, U. S. Code, outlines the duties and responsibilities of the Commandant of the Marine Corps. The Commandant, subject ...
[52]
Senate Procedures to Confirm Nominees - Congress.gov
Jul 30, 2024 · To screen and process nominations, the Senate relies on its committee system. Most nominations are referred to committee according to the Senate's rules and ...
[53]
Military Generals and Admirals: Information on the Effects of Senate ...
May 15, 2025 · During the confirmation process, a Senator can object to approving nominations through Senate procedures, thereby placing a “hold” on them.
[54]
The Marine Corps finally gets an official top leader
Sep 21, 2023 · The Senate voted Thursday to confirm Gen. Eric Smith to be the top Marine general, ending a monthslong limbo for the Corps as it lacked an official commandant.
[55]
Marines left without a confirmed commandant for 1st time since 1910
Jul 10, 2023 · For the first time since 1910, there is no Senate-confirmed commandant of the Marine Corps at the helm of the service.
[56]
Marine Corps Commandant Change of Command Ceremony - DVIDS
Apr 7, 2025 · Gen. James L. Jones, outgoing commandant of the Marine Corps, passes the Marine Corps colors to Gen. Michael W. Hagee, the new commandant.<|separator|>
[57]
change of command - Marines.mil
The Commandant of the Marine Corps Gen. David H. Berger delivers his remarks during the Marine Corps Recruiting Command Change of Command Ceremony at Marine ...
[58]
U.S.C. Title 10 - ARMED FORCES - GovInfo
(1) the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps shall perform the duties of ... Marine Corps Reserve who have had at least 10 years of commissioned service.<|separator|>
[59]
US Marines Without Confirmed Leader for First Time in 100 Years
Jul 10, 2023 · General Eric Smith, currently the assistant commandant, has been nominated to be the next leader, but will serve in an acting capacity because ...
[60]
ASSUMPTION OF DUTIES OF COMMANDANT ... - Marines.mil
By authority of 10 U.S.C. 8044, because there is a vacancy in the office of Commandant of the Marine Corps, the undersigned shall perform the duties of the ...Missing: Code § | Show results with:Code §
[61]
assumption of duties of assistant commandant - Marines.mil
Nov 8, 2023 · As directed by 10 U.S.C. 8044, until General Smith completes his recovery, I am also performing the duties of Commandant. My prayers, and the ...Missing: Code § | Show results with:Code §
[62]
Ingram > Colonel Archibald Henderson - Marine Corps University
On 17 October 1820, at the age of 37, LtCol Henderson was appointed as the Commandant of the Marine Corps. He served in this position for a little over 38 years ...Missing: reforms 19th century
[63]
Lejeune: A Leader Ahead of His Time - Marine Corps Association
Feb 15, 2024 · MajGen George Barnett, the 12th Commandant of the Marine Corps, and MajGen John Lejeune, the 13th CMC, along with staff members, taken in 1920.
[64]
The Early Architect of Amphibious Doctrine | Naval History Magazine
Lejeune, to whom historians generally give credit for transforming the Corps into the modern amphibious force we recognize today. No mention is made of Rear ...
[65]
Marine Corps Maneuver Warfare
Jan 13, 2021 · In 1997, Gen Charles C. Krulak oversaw the revision of Warfighting as MCDP 1, which clarified and elaborated on select ideas from the original ...
[66]
Force Design - Marines.mil
Semper Fidelis! Eric M. Smith General, U.S. Marine Corps Commandant of the Marine Corps ... Outputs include readiness reports, annual Lessons Learned ...
[67]
Marine Force Design: Changes Overdue Despite Critics' Claims
May 10, 2023 · The Marine Corps' Force Design 2030, written under the direction of the 38th commandant of the Marine Corps, Gen. David Berger, has been the target of much ...Missing: growth | Show results with:growth
[68]
Marine Corps Force Design 2030: Examining the Capabilities ... - CSIS
Jul 22, 2022 · A3: As of 2022, FD has transformed the capabilities of the Marine Corps by divesting in $16 billion worth of systems and equipment to reinvest ...
[69]
Thomas Holcomb Turned Marines Into Fearsome Weapon ...
By the time he retired from the Corps in 1943, he had molded his 385,000 Marines into the fiercest assault force in history on the way to victory in World War ...
[70]
Marine Raiders in the Pacific War (Creating the Raiders)
In February 1942, Lieutenant General Thomas Holcomb, the Commandant of the Marine Corps ... challenges the Corps faced in expanding from 19,000 men to ...
[71]
[PDF] Clifton B. Cates – “We Will Hold”
He used that war as a test-bed for vertical envelopment. As a result of Commandant Cates' use and performance during the Korean War, legislation passed in 1952 ...
[72]
August 2025: MMA Commemorates the Birthday of Clifton B. Cates ...
Sep 8, 2025 · ... War I, World War II and the Korean War. During his time as Marine Corps commandant, he became well known as the man who fought Congress to ...
[73]
Upshur > General Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr. - Marine Corps University
During Gen Shepherd's four-year appointment as the Commandant of the Marine Corps, he initiated a number of important policies that resulted in increased ...
[74]
Counselor of War - Marine Corps University
General Wallace M. Greene and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. General Greene became Commandant in 1964. The appointment was the capstone to a long career as a ...
[75]
Cushman > General Leonard F. Chapman, Jr.
By the end of his tenure, Gen Chapman witnessed the III Marine Amphibious Force withdrawal from Vietnam and the strength of the Corps drop from a peak of 289, ...
[76]
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304384104579141871788877910?gaa_at=eafs&gaa_n=AWEtsqfM9Z62r7ksyfLkCuoh3gQYYpnEDGqj2GlpuhjJOEeLljv91hn5uH0Y&gaa_ts=68fdfa25&gaa_sig=KDH7aYo0SVFKl_BpA2TWbW6WXeyu3HXsmrCoSU0Ed9MxVOSFb7hFUOURSRCllQu0Dr8_bLBQqV33sztDOvS2g%253D%253D
[77]
Marine Commandant Launches Offensive Against Bad Behavior - NPR
Feb 17, 2014 · Gen. James Amos is examining issues from discipline and sexual assault, to how to keep Marines who signed up to fight engaged.
[78]
Seven Marines court-martialed in wake of Marines United scandal
Mar 1, 2018 · It includes seven courts-martial, 14 nonjudicial punishments, six administrative separations and 28 adverse administrative actions.
[79]
After the Marines United Scandal, 'All Options' Are on the Table
Aug 9, 2017 · Less than half a year after a nude photo-sharing scandal rocked the Marine Corps, service leaders are working to hold individuals ...Missing: standards | Show results with:standards
[80]
Marines can now be fired for sharing nude photos
May 11, 2017 · Marines may now be removed from the Marine Corps for sharing nude photos online. The service updated its policy yesterday to strictly punish any Marine.
[81]
No, hazing doesn't teach discipline. It actually does the opposite
Oct 29, 2019 · The Washington Post recently obtained documents detailing incidents wherein over 20 Marines have been disciplined for misconduct just at MCRD ...
[82]
Marine Corps' Black Book Tracks, Hides Officer Crimes
Apr 7, 2022 · A Marine named Matthew Thomas, who was serving as the lead defense counsel in a contentious homicide trial involving two senior enlisted Marines and a Navy ...
[83]
Marine Corps Jeopardized by Broken Justice System - The War Horse
May 6, 2022 · The major allegedly gave demeaning nicknames to his subordinates and “frequently makes discriminatory and harassing comments to and about ...
[84]
UCMJ crackdown: Why Mattis thinks commanders have gone soft on ...
Sep 10, 2018 · Many military experts believe a primary cause for the falling UCMJ numbers stems from commanders' decisions to opt against courts-martial proceedings or NJPs.
[85]
Commandant Responds to Troubling Study on Marine Corps Culture
Dec 7, 2019 · If Marines have a problem with women they should "go somewhere else," Gen. David Berger said.Missing: USMC debates
[86]
A Chat with the Commandant: Gen. David H. Berger on the Marine ...
Apr 6, 2020 · The standards are the standards because that's what it takes to win. That's what it takes to fight and win. I think over time, clearly more and ...
[87]
Dissent Done Right - Marine Corps Association
Sep 9, 2022 · When a Marine lieutenant colonel was relieved of his command in August 2021 for publicly criticizing military leadership on social media, Major ...
[88]
U.S. Marine Corps Force Design Initiative: Background and Issues ...
Oct 3, 2024 · On March 23, 2020, the US Marine Corps (USMC) announced a major force design initiative referred to as Force Design 2030, which is now known as Force Design.
[89]
Top Marine pushes back on critics' 'lack of trust' in Corps' overhaul
Jun 22, 2023 · “We do not trust General Berger because he circumvented that process with a small cabal of supposed 'thinkers' whose ideas were never subjected ...
[90]
On his way out, Marines' Berger addresses Force Design critics ...
Jun 28, 2023 · Addressing The Criticisms ... Force Design 2030 has had its fair share of critics, and some of the loudest have come from previous commandants.
[91]
'No Regrets': Gen. Berger Defends Force Design Decisions
Jun 28, 2023 · Berger has faced criticism from former Marine officers about the service's Force Design 2030 modernization effort. Wednesday, he again said ...
[92]
U.S. Marine Corps Force Design Update - USNI News
### Summary of U.S. Marine Corps Force Design Update (October 23, 2025)
[93]
The Marine Corps has settled the debate over the size of a rifle squad
Apr 7, 2025 · In another force structure change, Smith announced that the Marines are establishing a dedicated fires and reconnaissance company within ...
[94]
Status of Remediation Efforts to Meet Audit Mandate | U.S. GAO
Sep 16, 2025 · The Marine Corps received a clean audit opinion on its fiscal year 2023 financial statements, becoming the first military service to ever do ...
[95]
GAO-25-108104, MILITARY READINESS
Mar 12, 2025 · This statement provides information on readiness challenges across the air, sea, ground, and space warfighting domains.Missing: critiques | Show results with:critiques
[96]
Asked & Answered | Proceedings - November 2021 Vol. 147/11/1,425
Vandergrift worked to counter the attack, testifying in Congress with the “no bended knee” speech and then helped push Congress to safeguard the Marine Corps.Missing: preservation | Show results with:preservation
[97]
Defense bill calls for outside scrutiny of Marines' modernization plan
Dec 8, 2023 · Some Force Design critics believe Berger circumvented the normal combat development process “with a small cabal of supposed 'thinkers' whose ...
[98]
Neller latest military notable to address racism in the US: 'Things will ...
Jun 4, 2020 · “To the racists in America,” Neller wrote. “For the record, things will not go backwards in this country. America is great but because we move ...
[99]
Marine commandant calls on retired military leaders to be thoughtful ...
Sep 30, 2020 · “As general officers, when we retire, need to consider that our public our our individual citizen rights and responsibilities and all that goes ...Missing: statements | Show results with:statements
[100]
Speaking Out: Why Retired Flag Officers Participate in Political ...
Nov 30, 2023 · Few other issues in U.S. civil-military relations are as controversial as the political activism of retired officers. Much of this modern ...
[101]
https://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/key_officials/KeyOfficials-2025-02-05.pdf
[102]
Marine Commandant Gen. Eric Smith Stable, Recovering After Heart ...
Nov 1, 2023 · Smith was admitted to a local Washington, D.C. hospital on Oct. 29, 2023, after suffering a medical condition near the Home of the Commandants ...
[103]
Marine Corps Provides Update on General Smith
The Commandant of the Marine Corps, Gen. Eric. M. Smith, underwent successful open heart surgery on Jan. 8 to repair a bicuspid aortic valve in his heart.
[104]
Gen. Eric Smith Resumes Full Duties After Recovering from Cardiac ...
Mar 5, 2024 · Marine Corps Commandant Gen. Eric Smith is fully back to work after recovering from a cardiac episode last year, the service announced Tuesday evening.Missing: controversies criticisms<|separator|>
[105]
Marine Corps Lays Out Aggressive Modernization Efforts in Force Design Update > United States Marine Corps Flagship > Press Release Display
No readable text found in the HTML.<|separator|>
[106]
In new guidance, top Marine says 'righteous' Force Design will guide ...
Aug 28, 2024 · The decision to divest tanks, advocated heavily by Berger, has been one of the most controversial aspects of the Force Design debate.
[107]
Marine Commandant: No 'Untouchable' Programs as it Modernizes
Aug 29, 2024 · Smith spoke to the ongoing controversy over how many amphibious warships the Navy must provide, noting the congressionally mandated minimum ...Missing: criticisms | Show results with:criticisms
[108]
A Three Step Solution To Rebuild the Marine Corps
May 19, 2025 · I have been a particularly virulent critic of FD for six years and have gone so far as to recommend replacing General Smith with a commandant ...
[109]
Marine commandant wants 'off-the-shelf' generative AI tools for the ...
Jan 15, 2025 · Marine commandant wants 'off-the-shelf' generative AI tools for the Corps. On the heels of new guidance, Gen. Eric Smith talked to reporters ...Missing: controversies criticisms
[110]
https://defensescoop.com/2025/10/23/marine-force-design-plan-urges-modernization-to-tackle-the-changing-character-of-war/
[111]
[PDF] 2025 Force Design Update - Marines.mil
MARINE LITTORAL REGIMENTS. We established two MLRs in III MEF—3d MLR and 12th MLR. 3d MLR achieved Initial Operating Capability (IOC) in December 2023, and 12 ...
[112]
https://www.stripes.com/branches/marine_corps/2025-10-24/force-design-updates-marine-corps-19529096.html
[113]
Marines showcase ship-killing NMESIS missile system in Japan
Sep 21, 2025 · Marines brought their NMESIS missile platform to Okinawa for drills focused on island defense and anti-ship tactics.
[114]
US Marines test new MADIS counter drone system in Philippines
Apr 28, 2025 · US Marines knocked down on Sunday two drones using the MADIS short-range air defense system during a drill in Zambales, a province in the northern Philippines.
[115]
https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2025/10/u-s-marines-to-deploy-maritime-recon-unit-unmanned-launchers/