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Nangarhar Province

Nangarhar Province is a province in eastern Afghanistan bordering Pakistan, encompassing an area of 7,727 square kilometers with its capital at Jalalabad.^[1] It is divided into 22 districts and has a population of approximately 1.436 million residents, predominantly Pashtuns alongside Pashai, Arabs, and Tajiks.^[1]^[2] The province features diverse terrain including the Spin Ghar mountain range and river valleys conducive to agriculture, while serving as a strategic gateway to Pakistan via the Torkham border crossing.^[3]^[1] Under Taliban governance since their capture of the province in August 2021, Nangarhar functions as an economic hub reliant on cross-border trade, with the Torkham port handling thousands of trucks transporting essentials like cement, medicines, rice, and potatoes despite periodic closures due to bilateral tensions.^[4]^[5]^[6] The region's significance stems from its historical role in facilitating commerce and transit between Afghanistan and Pakistan, though smuggling dynamics and security operations, including Taliban-led weapon confiscations, have shaped local livelihoods and border economies.^[7]^[8] Past militancy hotspots in districts like Achin have transitioned to Taliban consolidation, amid ongoing challenges from cross-border disputes and economic dependencies on informal trade networks.^[1]^[9]

Geography and Environment

Topography and Borders

Nangarhar Province occupies eastern Afghanistan, spanning approximately 7,727 square kilometers of varied terrain that includes fertile river valleys and rugged mountains.^[1] The province's landscape centers on the Kabul River valley, which supports agricultural plains surrounding the capital, Jalalabad, at elevations around 500 meters above sea level.^[10] To the south and east, the topography rises into the Spin Ghar and Safed Koh mountain ranges, forming part of the Hindu Kush system and marking the border with Pakistan's Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province.^[1] The province shares a 243-kilometer international border with Pakistan, characterized by steep, forested ridges that rise to peaks exceeding 3,000 meters, such as in Achin District, where elevations reach up to 3,874 meters.^[11] Internally, Nangarhar adjoins Kunar and Laghman provinces to the north and Kabul Province to the west, with terrain transitioning from lowland plains to foothills that facilitate irrigation-based farming but also enable irregular cross-border passages due to the porous mountainous frontiers.^[2]^[12] The Kabul River, flowing westward through the province, irrigates the central lowlands, contrasting sharply with the arid, elevated districts where sparse vegetation covers steep slopes.^[13]

Climate and Natural Resources

Nangarhar Province exhibits a subtropical steppe climate classified as BSh, generally arid to semi-arid, with marked seasonal temperature extremes driven by its eastern location, monsoon influences, and adjacency to the Spin Ghar mountain range. Summers in lowland areas like Jalalabad frequently exceed 35°C, occasionally reaching 40°C, while winters drop below freezing in higher elevations, with annual averages around 21.75°C surpassing national norms by about 6%. Precipitation remains low, averaging under 300 mm annually, concentrated in brief summer monsoons and winter snowmelt from surrounding peaks, which sustains limited rainfed agriculture but necessitates irrigation for broader viability.^[14]^[15]^[16] Groundwater aquifers, replenished by mountain runoff from rivers like the Kabul and Kunar, form a primary natural resource enabling irrigated farming of heat-tolerant crops such as citrus fruits including oranges and lemons, alongside olives in suitable microclimates. These resources underpin agricultural potential in fertile valleys, though over-extraction has led to declining water tables in districts like Jalalabad and Behsud, exacerbating drought risks in this water-stressed environment. Mineral deposits, including high-quality pink onyx marble, talc, magnesite, and chromite, occur in the Spin Ghar range, but extraction remains limited by infrastructure deficits, security issues, and underdeveloped processing.^[17]^[18]^[19]^[20]^[21] The province's position in the tectonically active Hindu Kush region, shaped by Indian-Eurasian plate subduction, exposes it to frequent seismic hazards, with earthquakes resulting from thrust faulting at depths up to 300 km. A magnitude 6.0 event on August 31, 2025, centered 27 km northeast of Jalalabad at approximately 23:47 local time, inflicted structural damage across Nangarhar and adjacent provinces like Kunar and Laghman, underscoring the area's vulnerability to such shallow-to-intermediate quakes that amplify ground shaking in valleys. This tremor, part of ongoing activity in the subduction zone, caused widespread collapses in poorly constructed buildings, linking climatic aridity—which hinders resilient infrastructure—with compounded disaster risks.^[22]^[23]^[24]^[25]

History

Pre-Islamic and Early Islamic Periods

The territory of modern Nangarhar Province lay within the ancient Gandhara region during the pre-Islamic period, serving as a hub for Greco-Buddhist civilization from the Hellenistic era onward. Archaeological evidence from Hadda, situated approximately 10 kilometers south of Jalalabad, reveals a complex of Buddhist monasteries, stupas, and viharas active from the 1st century BCE through the Kushan Empire (c. 30–375 CE), with artifacts including over 23,000 Greco-Buddhist sculptures excavated by French archaeologists between 1923 and 1928.^[26]^[27] These findings demonstrate syncretic artistic influences from Greek, Persian, and Indian traditions, centered around sites like Tapa-i-Kalan stupa, underscoring the area's integration into trans-regional trade networks along the Kabul River valley.^[26] Additional excavations in Nangarhar, including Kushan-era remnants and earlier Bronze Age indicators near Torkham border areas, confirm the province's longstanding role in caravan routes and cultural crossroads predating Islamic arrival, with artifacts such as pottery and structural foundations dating to the 1st–3rd centuries CE.^[28]^[29] This material record aligns with Gandhara's position as a conduit for Buddhist dissemination under Indo-Greek, Indo-Scythian, and Kushan rulers, where empirical stratigraphy shows layered occupation from at least the 5th century BCE. Arab Muslim forces initiated conquests in the region during the mid-7th century, extending from Persia into Khorasan and eastern Afghanistan between 642 and 870 CE, with incursions into Kabulistan—encompassing Nangarhar—by around 667 CE amid resistance from local Hindu Shahi dynasties. Full subjugation occurred progressively under Umayyad and Abbasid governance by the early 8th century, transitioning the area from Buddhist-majority polities to Islamic administration through military campaigns and tribute systems, as documented in early Arabic chronicles.^[30] By the late 10th century, Nangarhar fell under Ghaznavid control following Sultan Mahmud's defeat of Hindu Shahi king Jayapala around 1001 CE, integrating the province into a Turkic-Islamic empire spanning eastern Afghanistan and facilitating commerce via Kabul River pathways.^[31]^[32] The Ghaznavids (977–1186 CE) consolidated authority through fortified outposts and tribal alliances, promoting Persianate Islamic culture while exploiting local resources, until Seljuk incursions eroded their eastern holdings.^[33] Pashtun tribal migrations intensified from the medieval era, with historical genealogies and settlement patterns indicating proto-Pashtun groups in the Sulaiman foothills and Nangarhar highlands by the 13th–15th centuries, predating Mughal dominance.^[34] Under Mughal expansion after Babur's 1504 capture of Kabul, these tribes asserted greater control over Nangarhar by the mid-16th century, evidenced by administrative records of Pashtun levies and land grants, establishing enduring demographic foundations through kinship-based migrations rather than centralized imposition.^[35]

19th–20th Century Developments

Nangarhar Province, centered on Jalalabad, integrated into the Durrani Empire following Ahmad Shah Durrani's unification of Pashtun tribes in 1747, with the region serving as a key eastern outpost.^[36] Under Timur Shah Durrani (r. 1772–1793), Jalalabad functioned as the empire's winter capital, underscoring its strategic value amid ongoing tribal consolidations and Persianate influences.^[37] By the early 19th century, as the Durrani state transitioned to Barakzai rule under Dost Mohammad Khan (r. 1826–1863), Nangarhar's Pashtun tribes, including the Shinwari and Mohmand, navigated alliances and conflicts with central authorities while resisting external pressures from Sikh and British expansions in the Peshawar Valley. The province's frontier status intensified during the Anglo-Afghan Wars (1839–1842, 1878–1880), where Jalalabad emerged as a critical defensive position; British forces briefly occupied it in 1842 en route to Kabul, exposing vulnerabilities in Afghan control over eastern passes.^[38] Amir Abdur Rahman Khan (r. 1880–1901) centralized power through military campaigns against semi-autonomous tribes, but Nangarhar remained a porous border zone. The 1893 Durand Line agreement with British India, spanning approximately 2,640 kilometers, formalized the Afghan-Pakistan frontier, bisecting Pashtun tribal lands and embedding enduring disputes over cross-border kinship networks and smuggling routes in Nangarhar's eastern districts.^[39]^[40] Under King Zahir Shah (r. 1933–1973), Nangarhar benefited from periods of internal stability and tentative modernization, including expansions in road infrastructure like the Kabul-Jalalabad highway to enhance commerce and administrative reach.^[41] Efforts at land redistribution in the 1960s sought to undermine feudal tribal holdings, yet encountered staunch opposition from local elites, preserving de facto autonomy via customary jirga systems among dominant clans.^[42] In the 1970s, conservative religious networks in Nangarhar, drawing from traditional ulema and madrasa education, amplified resistance to President Daud Khan's secular policies, laying groundwork for Islamist mobilization through indigenous critiques of modernization that intertwined Pashtunwali ethics with anti-communist sentiments. These dynamics reflected deeper causal tensions between centralizing reforms and entrenched tribal-religious structures, rather than isolated ideological imports.^[42]

Soviet Era and Civil Wars

During the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan from 1979 to 1989, Nangarhar Province served as a major hub for mujahideen resistance due to its strategic location bordering Pakistan, facilitating arms and fighter supplies from Peshawar.^[43] Local commanders, including Fazal Haq Mujahid, who led operations from Nangarhar and headed the Eastern Zone Military Council, coordinated guerrilla attacks against Soviet forces, which maintained a key military base and airfield in Jalalabad.^[1] The introduction of U.S.-supplied Stinger missiles in the region enabled mujahideen to down Soviet aircraft, with early uses reported in Nangarhar in October 1986, shifting the tactical balance by reducing aerial dominance.^[43] As Soviet troops withdrew in early 1989, mujahideen forces launched a major offensive against Jalalabad on March 5, aiming to capture the city as a symbolic victory and supply hub before the full pullout.^[44] Initial advances secured the airfield and outskirts, but Afghan government forces, bolstered by Soviet air support, mounted a fierce defense, leading to protracted fighting through May that inflicted heavy losses on the attackers and resulted in an estimated 12,000 to 15,000 civilian deaths from bombardment and crossfire.^[44] The failure highlighted mujahideen disunity and logistical shortcomings, with daily casualties exceeding 20 treated in Peshawar hospitals, undermining their momentum amid the Soviet exit.^[45] Following the Soviet withdrawal and the 1992 collapse of the Najibullah regime, Nangarhar descended into factional civil war among mujahideen groups, with Hezb-e Islami under Gulbuddin Hekmatyar asserting dominance in eastern Afghanistan, including parts of the province, through alliances with local warlords.^[1] This power vacuum fueled internecine violence and economic reliance on opium, whose production in Afghanistan surged at an annual rate of 19% from 1989 to 1994, with Nangarhar emerging as a significant cultivator amid disrupted agriculture and high rural poverty.^[46] Warlord control exacerbated smuggling across the porous border, entrenching narcotics as a funding source for militias while eroding central authority. The Taliban advanced into Nangarhar in August 1996, capturing Jalalabad with minimal resistance after local shuras and factional leaders surrendered or fled to Pakistan, consolidating Pashtun-dominated rule and displacing Hezb-e Islami influence.^[47] Initial Taliban governance imposed strict Islamic edicts, including localized restrictions on opium amid taxation of existing trade at around 10%, though cultivation persisted until a nationwide ban in 2000.^[48] This relative stability, however, enabled al-Qaeda to establish training facilities in the province, such as the Darunta camp near Jalalabad, where foreign fighters prepared for operations leading up to the September 11, 2001, attacks, reflecting the regime's permissive stance toward transnational jihadists in exchange for support.

Post-2001 Insurgency and Reconstruction

Following the ouster of the Taliban regime in late 2001, Nangarhar Province saw initial reconstruction efforts led by U.S.-backed Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) established from 2002 onward. These interagency units, comprising military, diplomatic, and development personnel, focused on improving security, governance, and infrastructure, with the Nangarhar PRT coordinating projects such as the construction of 20 schools, 12 major roads, five irrigation systems, two bridges, and five major structures by 2008.^[49] Under Governor Haji Din Mohammad (2002–2005), aggressive campaigns achieved near-total opium poppy eradication, enforcing bans in 2002 and for the 2004–2005 and 2005–2006 growing seasons in line with President Karzai's national policy, reducing cultivation to negligible levels temporarily.^[50] Taliban resurgence intensified from 2006, coinciding with a sharp spike in opium cultivation as enforcement waned after Din Mohammad's removal and replacement by Gul Agha Sherzai. UNODC data recorded a 285% increase in Nangarhar's poppy area to 18,739 hectares in 2007, reflecting the province's reversion to a traditional opium hub amid growing insurgent influence, particularly in districts like Achin, which became hotspots for improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and militant operations linked to networks including the Haqqani group.^[51] PRTs continued operations until 2014, but empirical outcomes highlighted governance failures, with local power brokers maintaining ties to illicit trade despite aid inflows, undermining long-term stability.^[42] Between 2014 and 2021, Nangarhar experienced persistent instability despite U.S. drone strikes targeting Taliban and affiliated militants, as weak central authority and endemic corruption eroded reconstruction gains. SIGAR assessments identified corruption as a core obstacle, with aid diversion and patronage networks—prevalent under successive governors—fostering dependency rather than self-sustaining development, even as PRTs phased out and Afghan forces assumed control. Opium cultivation fluctuated but remained elevated, with UNODC reporting 2,027 hectares in 2021, illustrating how insurgent safe havens and governance deficits perpetuated cycles of violence and economic distortion.^[52]^[53]

Taliban Governance (2021–Present)

The Taliban rapidly consolidated control over Nangarhar Province following their nationwide offensive, capturing Jalalabad on August 13, 2021, with limited opposition due to the province's predominant Pashtun population aligning ethnically and tribally with many Taliban fighters.^[54] In the immediate aftermath, the group appointed Pashtun loyalists to key administrative roles, including an initial governor replaced amid security incidents; by February 24, 2022, Haji Gul Mohammad Barich, a senior Taliban commander, was installed as provincial governor, overseeing a centralized structure emphasizing sharia courts and loyalty to supreme leader Hibatullah Akhundzada.^[55] This reconfiguration dismantled prior republican-era district councils, replacing them with Taliban-appointed officials focused on ideological enforcement over technocratic governance.^[56] Sharia-based policies were rigorously applied in Nangarhar, including an indefinite ban on female secondary and higher education enacted nationally in December 2022, resulting in near-total exclusion of girls beyond primary levels and a reported 80% drop in overall female school enrollment by 2023, with local verification in eastern provinces like Nangarhar confirming halted classes and shuttered institutions.^[57] Morality police units, revived as the Ministry for the Propagation of Virtue and Prevention of Vice, conducted patrols enforcing veiling mandates, gender segregation, and prohibitions on unaccompanied female travel, with Nangarhar witnessing intensified crackdowns on perceived infractions such as improper attire or music, aligning with broader edicts issued in August 2024.^[58] In March 2024, authorities in six Nangarhar districts banned women from employment in carpet-weaving factories, a key local industry, citing moral oversight, which compounded economic pressures on female-headed households without evidence of exemptions for the province's tribal context.^[59] Recent administrative strains emerged from mass returns of Afghan expatriates, with 118,820 returnees from abroad arriving in Nangarhar by late 2024, exacerbating resource shortages in housing, water, and food amid the province's hosting of over 37,000 internally displaced persons that year.^[60] UNHCR data indicate over 2 million total returns to Afghanistan in 2025 alone, many funneled through Nangarhar's Torkham border crossing, overwhelming Taliban-managed aid distribution and prompting ad hoc tribal mediation for settlements, though official statements claim stabilized governance under sharia without acknowledging contraction in formal employment or services.^[61] Sporadic local pushback, including underground female education networks, persisted despite crackdowns, reflecting incomplete ideological buy-in even in a Taliban-aligned stronghold.^[59]

Demographics

Ethnic and Linguistic Composition

Nangarhar Province has a population of approximately 1.7 million people.^[2] The ethnic composition is dominated by Pashtuns, who comprise over 90% of residents, with the remainder consisting primarily of Pashai, Arabs, Tajiks, and smaller groups.^[62] Specific breakdowns indicate Pashtuns at 90.1%, Pashai at 3.6%, Arabs at 2.6%, Tajiks at 1.6%, and others at 2.1%.^[62] This Pashtun majority, subdivided into tribes such as Shinwari, Mohmand, Khogiani, and Ghilzai, exerts significant influence over tribal politics and local power dynamics in the province.^[1] Pashto serves as the primary language, spoken by the Pashtun population across urban and rural areas.^[63] Dari functions as a secondary language for interethnic communication, while Pashai minorities in northern districts use Pashayi dialects.^[63] The prevalence of Pashto aligns with linguistic patterns in neighboring Pakistani border regions, supporting cross-border kinship networks among Pashtun communities that extend into Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province.^[1] Urban centers like Jalalabad show marginally higher diversity due to internal migration, contrasting with more homogeneous rural Pashtun majorities exceeding 90% in many districts.^[31]

Population Distribution and Districts

Nangarhar Province is administratively divided into 22 districts, with Jalalabad serving as the provincial capital and primary urban center.^[3] Jalalabad, the largest city, has an estimated population of approximately 200,000 residents as of recent assessments.^[64] This urban hub contrasts with the predominantly rural character of the province, where about 84% of the total population of roughly 1.7 million resides in rural areas, concentrated in fertile valleys along river systems.^[2] Settlement patterns reflect topographic influences, with higher rural densities in valley floors supporting agriculture and tribal communities, while mountainous districts exhibit sparser populations due to rugged terrain and isolation. For instance, Achin District, located in the southern border region, features low population density amid its mountainous landscape, with estimates ranging from 55,900 to over 100,000 inhabitants, many in dispersed villages.^[65]^[66] Districts such as Bihsud and Sherzad, nearer to Jalalabad, show denser rural clustering tied to valley accessibility.^[1] Post-2021 population dynamics have included influxes from returnees crossing the Torkham border from Pakistan and internal displacements, tracked by the International Organization for Migration (IOM). IOM data indicate significant returned internally displaced persons (IDPs) in districts like Achin, numbering over 101,000 individuals between 2021 and 2022, contributing to localized pressures on settlement patterns despite overall rural predominance.^[67] These movements have augmented urban peripheries around Jalalabad while straining remote areas' capacities.^[68]

Governance and Administration

Provincial Structure Under Taliban Rule

Following the Taliban's assumption of power in August 2021, Nangarhar's provincial administration operates under a centralized appointment system directed by the supreme leader in Kabul, with the governor holding authority over 22 district chiefs who manage local governance without electoral input.^[69] This structure replaced the pre-2021 republican model, which involved presidential appointments vetted by provincial councils partially elected since 2005, by emphasizing loyalty screening through ideological and military credentials.^[70] For instance, initial post-takeover governors in Nangarhar underwent rapid replacements, including the appointment of Mawlawi Muzammil in September 2021 after security incidents, followed by Haji Gul Mohammad Barich on February 24, 2022, as part of broader reshuffles to install Taliban loyalists.^[71]^[55] District chiefs, appointed similarly via Kabul's directives, report directly to the governor for administrative oversight, including revenue collection and basic service implementation, though empirical indicators like uneven policy enforcement reveal persistent local adaptations.^[70] Appointments remain exclusively male and largely Pashtun-dominated, with ongoing reshuffles as late as 2025 targeting perceived disloyalty, contrasting prior systems' nominal inclusivity quotas.^[72] While formal hierarchies promote uniformity from the capital, de facto tribal and factional dynamics, particularly the Haqqani network's sway in eastern provinces bordering Pakistan, influence selection processes for key roles, enabling veto-like leverage through entrenched local alliances.^[73] This is evident in Nangarhar's strategic position, where Haqqani-linked operatives have historically facilitated cross-border operations, embedding their preferences in provincial staffing despite centralization rhetoric.^[74] Taliban policies on external entities further integrate provincial structures into national control, as seen in the December 2024 decree threatening license revocations for NGOs employing women, which disrupted aid logistics in Nangarhar and other provinces by halting compliance non-adherent operations.^[75] UN assessments highlight how such measures, enforced via provincial offices, reduced humanitarian access by prioritizing ideological conformity over operational needs, with over 100 NGOs affected nationwide by early 2025.^[75]^[76]

Local Dispute Resolution and Tribal Influence

In Nangarhar Province, traditional mechanisms such as jirgas (ad-hoc assemblies of elders for Pashto-speaking groups) and shuras (more permanent local councils) predominate in resolving disputes, particularly those involving land inheritance, water rights, and honor-related conflicts like blood feuds. These bodies convene tribal or community elders to mediate based on customary norms, often bypassing formal state courts due to perceptions of corruption, inaccessibility, and inefficiency in the latter. Ethnographic studies in Nangarhar villages document frequent use for inherited land disputes, where elders apply precedents from oral traditions to allocate shares among heirs, frequently incorporating fines or compensation (baad) rather than imprisonment.^[77] Pre-2021 surveys indicated strong local preference for these informal systems, with approximately 69% of respondents nationwide reporting satisfaction (16.6% very satisfied and 52.3% somewhat satisfied) with available dispute-resolution services, many of which centered on shuras and jirgas over formal judiciary options. This preference stemmed from rapid resolution, cultural familiarity, and enforcement through social pressure, including oaths and communal ostracism. Under Taliban governance since August 2021, these mechanisms have persisted and integrated with the regime's sharia-based edicts, as Taliban officials in Nangarhar often defer to tribal elders for non-criminal matters, blending Pashtunwali codes—emphasizing hospitality (melmastia), revenge (badal), and asylum (nanawatai)—with Islamic rulings to maintain order in Pashtun-majority districts.^[78]^[79]^[70] Informal systems resolve an estimated 80% or more of local cases in rural Nangarhar, per community-based analyses, allowing Taliban authorities to focus on security and high-profile enforcement while leveraging tribal structures for legitimacy. However, these processes exhibit biases favoring influential strongmen or larger clans, who dominate elder selection and outcomes, potentially perpetuating inequalities and escalating vendettas when resolutions fail due to non-compliance. Critics, including reports from international observers, note that weaker parties—such as women or minority ethnic groups like Pashais—face disadvantages, as decisions rarely align with statutory equality principles and can reinforce patriarchal norms without independent appeal mechanisms.^[77]^[79]

Economy

Agricultural Production and Trade

![Inside the Afghan customs and border patrol station at Torkham.jpg][float-right] Nangarhar Province's agriculture centers on staple cereals such as wheat, rice, and maize, alongside vegetables and fruits, leveraging the fertile Jalalabad plain for cultivation.^[80] Wheat dominates winter cropping, providing the majority of caloric intake, while rice and maize contribute significantly to national output, with Nangarhar accounting for 16% of Afghanistan's rice production at approximately 78,000 metric tons annually in recent assessments.^[81] ^[82] These crops support local food security but face yield variability due to environmental factors. Irrigation drawn from the Kabul River basin sustains farming across key schemes, including the Nangarhar irrigation project encompassing 32,000 hectares of command area.^[83] This water resource enables consistent planting on rain-fed and irrigated lands, though only about half of Afghanistan's arable areas, including those in Nangarhar, receive regular irrigation.^[18] Drought cycles and erratic precipitation have periodically diminished outputs; for example, below-average rainfall projected for the 2024/25 winter season threatens pasture and crop viability in eastern provinces like Nangarhar.^[84] Recent floods in May 2023 also damaged wheat and vegetable fields, slightly lowering production prospects despite overall resilience.^[85] Agricultural trade relies heavily on exports of fresh produce, grains, and fruits via the Torkham border crossing to Pakistan, with Jalalabad's markets serving as primary hubs for loading trucks bound for Peshawar.^[86] Border disruptions, including closures post-2021 Taliban governance and intermittent shutdowns as recent as October 2025, have stranded thousands of trucks and caused spoilage of perishable goods, inflicting substantial losses on farmers and traders.^[87] ^[88] These interruptions, compounded by supply chain breakdowns, have exacerbated contractions in formal agricultural activity, mirroring national GDP declines of around 20-27% in the initial years following the 2021 takeover.^[89]

Illicit Activities and Smuggling

Nangarhar Province has long functioned as a major hub for opium production and processing, historically ranking among Afghanistan's top two provinces for poppy cultivation due to its fertile eastern plains and proximity to smuggling routes.^[90] Prior to intensified bans, UNODC surveys documented extensive cultivation, with districts like Achin and Sherzad serving as key processing nodes where raw opium was converted into heroin, facilitating export and generating revenue that sustained local power structures and insurgent operations.^[91] The illicit opium economy intertwined with poverty-driven farming and weak governance, providing quick cash returns far exceeding legal crops in remote areas.^[92] The Taliban's April 2022 decree banning opium poppy cultivation led to a sharp national decline, but enforcement in Nangarhar has proven uneven, with satellite verification revealing sporadic eradication lapses and potential resurgence in border districts amid economic desperation.^[91]^[93] Processed narcotics, along with arms and chemical precursors like acetic anhydride, continue to flow through smuggling corridors toward Pakistan, primarily via the Torkham border crossing, where porous controls enable hidden transport in vehicles and pedestrian traffic. These activities undermine formal trade, foster corruption among border officials, and channel funds to non-state actors, including remnants of insurgent networks that tax or participate in the trade.^[94] Cross-border smuggling generates substantial illicit revenue, with estimates for broader Afghan opiate trafficking indicating profits in the hundreds of millions annually from regional hubs like Nangarhar, though precise provincial figures remain elusive due to clandestine operations.^[95] In Achin district, historical ties between opium labs and funding for groups like the Taliban and ISIS-K highlight causal links to sustained conflict, as traffickers exploit tribal smuggling lineages to bypass enforcement.^[92] Weak institutional oversight exacerbates these flows, perpetuating an underground economy that prioritizes short-term gains over long-term stability despite official prohibitions.^[7]

Security and Conflicts

Historical Patterns of Violence

Nangarhar Province's history of violence traces to the Soviet-Afghan War (1979-1989), when the region emerged as a primary base for mujahideen resistance due to its proximity to Pakistan supply routes and rugged terrain suitable for guerrilla operations. Soviet forces responded with intensive aerial bombings and ground assaults, displacing populations and fostering deep-seated grievances among Pashtun tribes like the Shinwari and Mohmand, who dominated local mujahideen factions. These conflicts entrenched patterns of decentralized armed resistance, with tribal militias often prioritizing intra-tribal rivalries alongside anti-occupation fighting, setting precedents for fragmented violence that persisted beyond the Soviet withdrawal in 1989.^[96] Tribal feuds compounded these legacies, manifesting in recurrent land and resource disputes that escalated into armed clashes independent of broader insurgencies. In March 2010, for instance, subtribes of the Shinwari, including the Alisher, engaged in fighting over disputed territory in Nangarhar, resulting in at least 13 deaths and highlighting how ancient claims could override anti-Taliban alliances promoted by U.S. forces. Similar disputes in Achin district, involving up to 8,000 jeribs of arid land, drew in external actors and prolonged hostilities through 2011, underscoring the causal role of weak state mediation in perpetuating localized violence.^[97]^[98]^[99] Following the 2001 U.S.-led intervention that toppled the Taliban, Nangarhar's border districts, such as Achin and the Tora Bora cave complex, evolved into safe havens for Taliban remnants regrouping from Pakistan, enabling sustained low-intensity operations like ambushes on supply convoys along Highway 7. This shift revived mujahideen-era tactics, with insurgents leveraging tribal networks for sanctuary and recruitment, transforming the province into a conduit for cross-border militancy. Improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and roadside ambushes became hallmarks of this violence, exploiting the province's road networks and porous Durand Line, as insurgents targeted Afghan National Security Forces and civilians perceived as collaborators.^[100]^[101] United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) documentation reveals Nangarhar's consistent ranking among Afghanistan's most conflict-affected provinces, with IEDs and ground engagements driving elevated civilian tolls amid the insurgency's peak from 2010 to 2020; eastern regions like Nangarhar accounted for disproportionate shares of such incidents due to tactical preferences for asymmetric warfare in populated valleys. Empirical underreporting persists, as restricted media and humanitarian access in remote districts limits verification, with UNAMA relying on corroborated eyewitness accounts that likely capture only a fraction of total violence given logistical barriers and insurgent intimidation.^[102]^[103]^[101]

ISIS-K Operations and Taliban Responses

The Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISIS-K) established a foothold in Nangarhar Province, particularly Achin District, by mid-2015, when its fighters—comprising Afghan and foreign militants—seized territory from local insurgents and Taliban elements.^[104] This expansion drew recruits through an ideology rejecting the Taliban's localized governance and pragmatic alliances as insufficiently puritanical, instead advocating transnational jihad and targeting the Taliban as apostates for compromising on global caliphate ambitions.^[105] From 2021 to 2025, ISIS-K cells in Nangarhar contributed to high-profile attacks beyond the province, including the August 26, 2021, suicide bombing at Kabul airport that killed 13 U.S. service members and over 170 Afghans, as well as subsequent bombings in Kabul and other areas claimed by the group.^[106] U.S. assessments indicate these operations often originated from eastern Afghan strongholds like Nangarhar, where ISIS-K maintained training and planning networks despite territorial losses.^[107] The Taliban has conducted counteroperations against ISIS-K in Nangarhar, including the 2024 killing of a senior ISIS-K commander identified as the group's military leader in Achin District.^[108] Taliban spokesmen have claimed multiple such victories—over a dozen high-value target eliminations since 2021—but U.S. intelligence reports persistent ISIS-K recruitment and operational capacity in the province, fueled by local grievances and ideological appeals, undermining narratives of decisive Taliban control.^[107]^[109] Both ISIS-K and Taliban forces have employed child soldiers in Nangarhar conflicts, with the U.S. State Department's 2025 Trafficking in Persons Report documenting patterns of recruitment and use by non-state armed groups and de facto authorities, often involving coercion or economic desperation amid governance vacuums.^[110] This practice, verified through survivor accounts and UN monitoring, underscores mutual reliance on exploitative tactics that perpetuate instability rather than resolve underlying insurgent dynamics.^[110]

Cross-Border Dynamics with Pakistan

The Durand Line, the internationally recognized but disputed border separating Nangarhar Province from Pakistan's Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, has long facilitated cross-border militant movements and smuggling amid mutual accusations of incursions. Torkham, the principal crossing in Nangarhar's Achin District, serves as a focal point for these dynamics, with Pakistan repeatedly fencing sections to curb flows, yet the terrain's porosity enables evasion.^[111] Torkham has experienced recurrent closures from 2022 to 2025, often triggered by clashes or administrative disputes, which temporarily halt formal trade but sustain underground transit of arms and drugs. For instance, the crossing shut on February 21, 2025, over an Afghan outpost construction dispute, reopening only after weeks of tension; similar closures occurred on September 22, 2025, without stated cause, and October 12, 2025, following heavy exchanges of fire. Despite such measures, Pakistani Anti-Narcotics Force operations intercepted 17 kg of heroin and 4 kg of methamphetamine concealed in a honey bee-laden truck at Torkham on September 15, 2025, highlighting persistent smuggling routes. Arms trafficking persists via similar clandestine paths, with non-state actors exploiting border villages for transfers.^[112]^[113]^[114] Pakistan's counter-militancy campaigns, including spillovers from operations like Zarb-e-Azb in 2014, displaced Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) fighters into Nangarhar, bolstering local insurgent networks. Post-2021, Taliban reluctance to dismantle TTP sanctuaries in Afghan border zones has fueled Islamabad's grievances, prompting drone strikes and artillery responses. Unidentified drones hit TTP positions in Nangarhar on August 28, 2025, targeting fighters alongside those in Khost and Paktia. These frictions escalated into direct clashes, with Afghan and Pakistani forces exchanging artillery in Nangarhar on October 11-12, 2025, resulting in Afghanistan reporting 58 Pakistani soldier deaths from retaliatory operations against alleged violations. Such incidents have produced civilian crossfire casualties, though precise Nangarhar-specific tallies remain underreported amid the opacity of bilateral data.^[101]^[115]^[116]^[111]

Infrastructure and Public Services

Transportation and Connectivity

Highway 7 constitutes the principal transportation corridor in Nangarhar Province, linking Jalalabad to Kabul approximately 150 kilometers westward and extending eastward to the Torkham border crossing with Pakistan. This route handles the majority of freight and passenger traffic, supporting trade volumes exceeding 1 million tons annually pre-2021, though volumes have fluctuated amid border tensions. Post-Taliban takeover in August 2021, inadequate maintenance has resulted in widespread potholing, erosion, and structural weakening, contributing to extended travel times and heightened accident risks along the corridor.^[117] ^[118] The Torkham crossing, pivotal for overland commerce with Pakistan, suffers chronic congestion and intermittent closures due to administrative disputes, security incidents, and infrastructure bottlenecks. In October 2025, clashes between Afghan and Pakistani forces prompted shutdowns, stranding over 1,500 trucks carrying essentials like cement and rice, thereby delaying cross-border movements by days or weeks. Border roads, while facilitating informal trade, amplify isolation for rural districts when blockages occur, as alternative routes remain underdeveloped or impassable.^[119] ^[120] Rail connectivity is negligible in Nangarhar, with no operational lines serving the province, confining options to road and limited air transport. Jalalabad Airport (OAJL) operates sporadically for humanitarian and military flights, as evidenced by its role in post-disaster evacuations, but lacks regular commercial service, rendering it underutilized for civilian connectivity.^[121] ^[122] A magnitude 6.0 earthquake striking Nangarhar and adjacent areas on August 31, 2025, inflicted substantial damage to local roads, triggering landslides that blocked key arteries including those linking to Jalalabad. This has exacerbated mobility challenges for over 100,000 Afghan returnees from Pakistan, many routed through Torkham, by rendering mountain passes and secondary routes impassable and delaying aid delivery amid ongoing aftershocks. Repair efforts face resource constraints under Taliban administration, perpetuating access gaps that isolate remote communities and hinder economic recovery.^[123] ^[124]

Healthcare Access and Challenges

Healthcare access in Nangarhar Province relies on a network of public hospitals, district clinics, and basic health centers, with the provincial capital Jalalabad hosting the main referral hospital alongside smaller facilities in districts like Haska Mina. Nationally, Afghanistan operates approximately 4,242 primary healthcare facilities distributed across districts, though Nangarhar-specific staffing and operational data reveal chronic under-resourcing even prior to 2021.^[125] Post-Taliban takeover, these services have deteriorated due to Taliban-imposed restrictions on female employment, which have reduced the availability of women health workers critical for treating female and child patients, leading to clinic closures and reduced hours in provinces including Nangarhar.^[126] Human Rights Watch documented cases where such policies forced facilities to limit services, as male-only staffing violates cultural norms barring women from male providers.^[126] Child health metrics underscore the crisis: in Nangarhar, at least 700 children under five died from malnutrition and seasonal diseases between March and September 2024, averaging over three deaths daily at provincial facilities, amid broader national under-five mortality exceeding 50 per 1,000 live births.^[127] ^[128] These outcomes stem from aid suspensions following the 2021 regime change, compounded by Taliban bans on female NGO staff, which previously supplemented public services; international NGOs delivered essential care pre-2021 but now operate under threats of license revocation if retaining women employees, as decreed in December 2024.^[129] The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights warned this policy would exacerbate shortages, given NGOs' role in reaching remote areas.^[129] Persistent polio transmission highlights vaccination challenges, with Afghanistan reporting wild poliovirus type 1 cases in 2024—fewer than in 2023 but involving under-vaccinated children—and surveillance gaps between Nangarhar and adjacent provinces hindering containment.^[130] Vaccine hesitancy, rooted in historical distrust from CIA-linked campaigns and ongoing access barriers under Taliban oversight, has delayed campaigns; a nationwide drive restarted in October 2024 but remains mosque-restricted, limiting coverage in Pashtun-majority Nangarhar.^[131] WHO-supported efforts provided medical kits to over 1 million people nationally in late 2024, yet de facto authority policies continue to impede female-led outreach, perpetuating outbreaks.^[132]

Education System and Enrollment

Prior to the Taliban takeover in August 2021, Afghanistan's education system, including in Nangarhar Province, experienced enrollment expansions driven by international aid and government initiatives, with primary school gross enrollment rates reaching approximately 107% nationally by 2019, though net rates were lower at around 60-70% due to overage students and dropouts.^[133] In Nangarhar, primary schools numbered 357 as of 2011, supporting broader access in urban centers like Jalalabad, where infrastructure and teacher availability were comparatively higher than in rural districts.^[134] Female participation in primary education hovered around 40% nationally pre-2021, reflecting gradual gains from near-zero under prior Taliban rule (1996-2001), but persistent barriers like poverty and insecurity limited sustained attendance, particularly in rural Nangarhar areas where enrollment often fell below 50%.^[135] Following the 2021 Taliban resurgence, secondary education for girls was banned nationwide, affecting 1.4 million females and halving overall secondary enrollment rates, with primary access also declining by 1.1 million students (including both genders) from 6.8 million in 2019 to 5.7 million in 2022 due to economic pressures, teacher shortages, and policy shifts prioritizing religious instruction.^[136] In Nangarhar, these restrictions compounded district-level disparities, with urban Jalalabad maintaining relatively higher primary enrollment through better-resourced facilities, while rural zones like Sherzad and Khogyani districts reported enrollment rates under 50%, exacerbated by child labor demands in agriculture and cross-border trade.^[137] Adult literacy efforts persisted, with Nangarhar's eastern education department enrolling 11,000 individuals (45% women) in 2023 courses, though overall provincial adult literacy remained low at 27.6% based on earlier benchmarks.^[63] Under Taliban governance, madrassas have proliferated fourfold nationally, emphasizing Quranic memorization and religious jurisprudence over secular subjects like mathematics and science, with enrollment surging as formal schools face curriculum overhauls and funding cuts.^[138] In Nangarhar, a historical hub for Pashtun religious scholarship, this shift has amplified madrassa attendance, particularly among boys in rural areas, where secular primary net enrollment lags urban rates by 20-30 percentage points due to fewer qualified teachers and infrastructure deficits.^[135] UNESCO data indicates stalled primary growth post-2023, with boys' participation increasingly vulnerable to poverty, projecting long-term literacy stagnation in provinces like Nangarhar absent policy reversals.^[139]

Culture and Society

Historical and Religious Heritage

Nangarhar Province preserves remnants of ancient Buddhist heritage from the Greco-Buddhist period, particularly at the Hadda archaeological site located approximately 10 kilometers south of Jalalabad, which features monastic complexes, stupas, and artifacts exemplifying Gandharan art styles blending Hellenistic and Buddhist elements dating to the 1st–5th centuries CE.^[140] Excavations at Hadda uncovered thousands of sculptures, including stucco figures of worshippers and bodhisattvas, highlighting the region's role as a center for early Buddhist iconography before the Islamic conquests.^[27] Similarly, the Surkh Rod Stupa in Surkh Rod District, constructed in the 2nd–3rd centuries CE, represents Kushan-era Buddhist architecture amid the province's strategic position along ancient trade routes.^[141] These pre-Islamic sites suffered extensive damage from prolonged conflicts, including looting during the Soviet-Afghan War (1979–1989) and subsequent civil wars in the 1990s, with further deterioration from iconoclastic actions and neglect under Taliban rule in the late 1990s and early 2000s, though specific demolitions like those at Bamiyan were more pronounced elsewhere.^[142] Over three decades of instability have left many structures in ruins, with artifacts often smuggled or lost, underscoring the vulnerability of Nangarhar's archaeological legacy to wartime depredation rather than systematic religious erasure alone.^[142] Islamic religious sites in Nangarhar include historic mosques such as the Eidgah Mosque and Qazi Mosque in Jalalabad, alongside shrines like the 300-year-old Mia Ali Sahib shrine in Samarkhel, where Pashtun folklore attributes healing properties for mental ailments through rituals blending Sufi practices and local tribal customs.^[143] These shrines, often tied to venerated saints or warriors, reflect the integration of Sunni Islam with Pashtunwali codes of honor and hospitality, preserved through oral narratives rather than formal architecture.^[34] Post-2021 Taliban governance has seen limited preservation initiatives for heritage sites, including emergency stabilizations at high-risk locations in Nangarhar identified by cultural organizations, alongside recent discoveries of Kushan- and Mughal-era mounds and caravan watchtowers in districts like Hesarak and Khogyani, indicating ongoing archaeological interest despite resource constraints.^[144]^[145] Pashtun oral traditions in the province, documented in ethnographies, trace tribal genealogies to ancient lineages such as the Shinwari and Mohmand confederacies, linking historical migrations to verifiable kinship structures that underpin local identity without reliance on monumental records.^[34]

Notable Individuals and Contributions

Haji Abdul Qadeer, a prominent Pashtun leader from the influential Arsala family in Nangarhar Province, commanded mujahideen forces against the Soviet occupation in the 1980s as part of the Hezb-e Islami faction led by Yunus Khalis.^[146] He served as governor of Nangarhar from 1992 to 1996 amid the post-Soviet civil war, exerting control over eastern Afghanistan's tribal networks and border trade routes. Following the Taliban's overthrow in late 2001, Qadeer was appointed vice president under Hamid Karzai and acting governor of Nangarhar, leveraging his local militias to secure the province against residual Taliban elements. His tenure reinforced clan-based patronage systems but drew criticism for perpetuating warlordism, including alleged complicity in opium cultivation and processing, which fueled regional instability and corruption.^[147]^[148] Qadeer was assassinated on July 6, 2002, in Kabul by gunmen, an attack attributed to rival factions amid disputes over power-sharing.^[148] His brother, Haji Din Mohammad, also from the Arsala clan, succeeded him as governor of Nangarhar from July 2002 to 2004, focusing on stabilizing the province through tribal alliances and initiating one of Afghanistan's first provincial opium poppy bans in the 2004/05 season to curb narcotics-driven violence.^[149]^[150] A former mujahideen fighter aligned with Hezb-e Islami Khalis, Din Mohammad later participated in national reconciliation efforts and chaired the Peace and Development Islamic Party, though his influence waned amid central government encroachments and internal rivalries.^[146] Like his brother, his rule exemplified the blend of anti-Taliban resistance and localized strongman governance, criticized for enabling militia abuses and uneven enforcement of central policies in Nangarhar's fractious political landscape.^[151]

Sports and Local Traditions

Cricket dominates recreational sports in Nangarhar Province, particularly in Jalalabad, where venues such as the Ghazi Amanullah Khan International Cricket Stadium and the Najibullah Taraki Cricket Ground host local matches and tournaments.^[152] The eighth edition of a domestic cricket league occurred in May 2025 at these sites, drawing community participation despite persistent security risks evidenced by past attacks on spectators, including a 2018 bombing that killed eight at a Ramadan night match.^[153] ^[154] Traditional equestrian games like buzkashi, involving riders competing over a goat or calf carcass, reflect Pashtun heritage in the province, serving as communal events that reinforce tribal bonds amid rugged terrain.^[155] Post-conflict infrastructure constraints limit broader sports access, with facilities strained by decades of violence and minimal investment under Taliban governance since August 2021.^[156] Women face effective exclusion from organized sports due to nationwide Taliban decrees barring female participation in public athletic activities, a policy enforced without exception in Nangarhar as part of wider curbs on women's mobility and visibility.^[157] Local traditions center on events like Nowruz, the Persian New Year celebrated in March, which historically promote Pashtun tribal unity through gatherings and rituals but encounter official resistance and security interruptions. Nangarhar residents have protested provincial authorities' failure to organize public Nawroz festivities, highlighting cultural suppression.^[158] Taliban officials deem Nowruz practices, such as flag-hoisting at shrines, forbidden on religious grounds, leading to raids and prohibitions that disrupt these community rites.^[159]

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Oct 17, 2025 · Farmers, traders suffer huge losses as Torkham and ... Jalalabad, Peshawar, and Kabul, severely disrupting trade flows The Dawn said.
[89]
[PDF] Assessing Key Trends in The Afghan Economy Three Years into The ...
Sep 1, 2024 · Three years into Taliban rule, Afghanistan's economy is stagnant and fragile. While the sharp. 18-month economic contraction that followed ...
[90]
[PDF] Socio- Economic & Psychological Assessment of Fluctuations and ...
Nangarhar Province has traditionally been within the top two opium producing provinces in. Afghanistan (alternating between first and second position with ...
[91]
[PDF] Afghanistan opium survey 2023 - UNODC
From July 2000 until fall 2001 the Taliban, which had assumed control over much of Afghanistan in the mid-1990s, issued a similar ban on poppy cultivation and ...
[92]
[PDF] How Opium Profits the Taliban - United States Institute of Peace
In Afghanistan's poppy-rich south and southwest, a raging insurgency intersects a thriving opium trade. This study examines how the Taliban profit from ...
[93]
Trouble In Afghanistan's Opium Fields: The Taliban War On Drugs
Sep 12, 2024 · The Taliban have instituted a ban on narcotics in Afghanistan. While that has led to a massive drop in production, it is hitting the rural poor particularly ...
[94]
[PDF] Narcotics Smuggling in Afghanistan
Jun 1, 2022 · In the process, the TTP absorbed smuggling networks and, similar to their Afghan counterparts, tapped the drug trade for revenue, mostly through.
[95]
[PDF] THE GLOBAL AFGHAN OPIUM TRADE - Unodc
Trafficking in Afghan opiates is also very lucrative, generating some US$ 61 billion in illicit funds in 2009 (out of US$68 billion for the global illicit ...
[96]
Afghanistan: about the borderlands - Drugs and Disorder - SOAS
Jul 26, 2020 · As a key centre of resistance against the communist regime, Nangarhar was severely affected by the (1979-1989) Soviet-Afghan War. Violent ...
[97]
Afghan tribe kills each other, not the Taliban - NBC News
Mar 12, 2010 · Two Shinwari subtribes took up arms to fight each other over an ancient land dispute, leaving at least 13 people dead, according to local officials.Missing: history | Show results with:history
[98]
Afghan Tribal Rivalries Bedevil a U.S. Plan - The New York Times
Mar 11, 2010 · The dispute began about 10 days ago when the Alisher subtribe of the Shinwari laid a claim to land also claimed by another branch of the tribe ...
[99]
How outside interference politicised the Achin land conflict
Oct 30, 2011 · The conflict originates from the dispute over a desert tract of land of approximately 5,000 to 8,000 jerib (that is between 10-15 square ...Missing: history | Show results with:history
[100]
Journey to Afghanistan's Taliban badlands - BBC News
Aug 9, 2011 · Increasing violence in Nuristan - and in other border provinces of Laghman, Kunar and Nangarhar - poses a significant security threat. It ...
[101]
Descent into chaos: Why did Nangarhar turn into an IS hub?
Sep 27, 2016 · ISKP emerged and grew in a political-military vacuum that had plagued Nangarhar for years. The two main military-political forces which maintain ...
[102]
[PDF] 1 JANUARY TO 30 JUNE 2018 In the first six months
Jul 15, 2018 · The UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) renews its calls on parties to the conflict to increase efforts to protect the civilian ...
[103]
Nangarhar | European Union Agency for Asylum
IOM identified 153 799 IDP arrivals in Nangahar Province in the period between August 2021 and December 2021. In the same period, 165 243 IDPs returned to ...Missing: Central Statistics
[104]
Special Forces Soldiers help Afghan forces defeat ISIS in eastern ...
Aug 10, 2018 · ... Nangarhar province. By June 2015, ISIS-K fighters, comprised of both Afghans and foreign fighters, seized territory in Afghanistan for the ...
[105]
The Islamic State Threat in Taliban Afghanistan
Jan 1, 2022 · The suicide bombing that struck the Kabul airport in August 2021 ... ISIS-K or ISK). The attack ushered in urgent questions about the ...
[106]
Country Reports on Terrorism 2021: Afghanistan - State Department
... bomber attacked the Kabul airport, killing 13 U.S. servicemembers and more than 170 Afghan civilians. On October 8, an ISIS-K suicide bomber attacked a Shia ...
[107]
[PDF] April 30, 2025 Quarterly Report to Congress
Apr 30, 2025 · The UN Security Council reported in February that ISIS-K is the “greatest extraregional terrorist threat” because ISIS-K targets the Taliban ...
[108]
[PDF] Operation Enduring Sentinel Report to Congress, July 1, 2024 ...
Sep 4, 2024 · The U.S. Government further addressed the terrorist threat in Afghanistan by increasing focus, coordination, and collaboration with members of ...
[109]
Mapping the Local and Transnational Threat of Islamic State Khorasan
May 19, 2024 · The attack in Moscow has further heightened concerns among U.S. officials about the threat of similar terrorist attacks in the West, whether ...<|separator|>
[110]
2025 Trafficking in Persons Report: Afghanistan - State Department
During the reporting period, there was a pattern of recruiting or employing child soldiers and a pattern of sexual slavery (bacha bazi – a practice in which men ...
[111]
Afghan, Pakistani armies engage in intense border clashes
Oct 12, 2025 · Armies of Pakistan and Afghanistan engaged in artillery firing in border provinces of Khost, Nangarhar, Paktika, Paktia, Kunar and Khost, ...
[112]
Pakistan-Afghanistan border clashes ease, thousands seek shelter
Mar 4, 2025 · The Torkham crossing has been shut since February 21 due to a dispute over the construction of a border-area outpost by Afghanistan, Pakistani ...
[113]
Pakistan-Afghan border crossings closed after heavy clashes
Oct 12, 2025 · “The Torkham border has been completely closed for pedestrian movement and trade,” said the official, who spoke on condition of anonymity ...Missing: closures incidents
[114]
Torkham Drug Bust Exposes the Dangers of Free Afghan Border ...
Sep 16, 2025 · Torkham Drug Bust Exposes the Dangers of Free Afghan Border Movement ... On September 15, Pakistan's Anti-Narcotics Force (ANF) carried out a ...
[115]
Unidentified Drones Strike Pakistani Taliban In Khost, Nangarhar ...
Aug 28, 2025 · Unidentified drones targeted fighters of Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and the Hafiz Gul Bahadur faction in three Afghan provinces on ...
[116]
Afghanistan says it has killed 58 Pakistani soldiers in overnight ...
Oct 12, 2025 · Afghanistan said Sunday it killed 58 Pakistani soldiers in overnight border operations, in response to what it called repeated violations of ...
[117]
Afghanistan, The End of the Line: How Lack of Transportation ...
Feb 23, 2016 · Afghanistan's highways, many constructed by international donors, are not fully connected and are deteriorating at an untenable rate. Aviation ...
[118]
https://atlaspress.news/en/2025/10/22/taliban-kabul-gardez-highway-repair-transport-infrastructure/
[119]
https://www.nbcrightnow.com/national/people-can-breathe-hope-for-peace-on-afghan-pakistan-border/article_b3fad0fe-5e0a-5153-b89c-f2757690fd45.html
[120]
Pakistan reports a new clash with Afghan forces along border
Oct 15, 2025 · A line of cargo trucks bound for Pakistan is stranded on the Afghan side of the Torkham border crossing, which remained closed after clashes ...
[121]
Jalalabad Airport (JAA/OAJL) | Arrivals, Departures & Routes
Jalalabad Airport, (JAA/OAJL), Afghanistan - View live flight arrival and departure information, live flight delays and cancelations, and current weather ...
[122]
Jalalabad Airport Becomes Evacuation Hub After Afghanistan ...
Sep 1, 2025 · Jalalabad Airport Becomes Evacuation Hub After Afghanistan Earthquake A 6.0-magnitude earthquake in eastern Afghanistan has left 622 people ...
[123]
Damaged roads frustrate Afghan quake relief as death toll passes ...
Sep 3, 2025 · At least 1,400 people have been killed and 3,000 injured, according to the Islamic Emirate government. The majority of the casualties are in ...
[124]
Afghanistan Earthquake: One month impact report - September 2025
Oct 16, 2025 · Entire villages and more than 6,300 homes were reported as destroyed and over 2,100 damaged, with impassable roads and difficult terrain ...
[125]
2025 Afghanistan earthquake - Wikipedia
Seismicity is detectable to a depth of 300 km (190 mi) beneath Afghanistan due to plate subduction. These earthquakes beneath the Hindu Kush are the result of ...
[126]
The current situation of health equity in underserved areas of ...
In Afghanistan, health services are provided mainly through primary healthcare (PHC) facilities (4,242), with different categories distributed in 401 districts ...
[127]
“A Disaster for the Foreseeable Future”: Afghanistan's Healthcare ...
Feb 12, 2024 · As the number of primary health facilities has shrunk because of the loss of staff and funds, secondary and tertiary health facilities are ...
[128]
700 Children Die from Malnutrition and Seasonal Diseases in ...
Sep 10, 2024 · At least seven hundred children have died from malnutrition and seasonal diseases in Nangarhar province, eastern Afghanistan, over the past six months.
[129]
Afghanistan Infant Mortality Rate (1950-2025) - Macrotrends
Afghanistan infant mortality rate for 2023 was 50.40, a 3.08% decline from 2022. Afghanistan infant mortality rate for 2022 was 52.00, a 2.99% decline from 2021 ...Missing: Nangarhar Province
[130]
Afghanistan: Licenses of NGOs must not be revoked - ohchr
Non-governmental organizations' licenses will be revoked if they continue to employ Afghan women. This is absolutely the wrong path being taken by the de facto ...Missing: revocations Nangarhar
[131]
Progress Toward Poliomyelitis Eradication — Afghanistan, January ...
Dec 12, 2024 · This report describes immunization and surveillance activities and progress toward polio eradication in Afghanistan during January 2023–September 2024.<|separator|>
[132]
Polio Cases on the Increase in Afghanistan: How is the Emirate ...
Feb 2, 2025 · The Islamic Emirate finally restarted polio vaccination for under-fives in late October 2024. However, it has restricted delivery of the vaccines to mosques ...
[133]
[PDF] AFGHANISTAN EMERGENCY SITUATION REPORT - WHO EMRO
Nov 3, 2024 · In November 2024, WHO delivered 476 critical medical kits to bolster healthcare services across Afghanistan, supporting an estimated 1 186 100 ...
[134]
School enrollment, primary (% gross) - Afghanistan
School enrollment, primary, female (% gross) · School enrollment, primary, male (% gross) · Trained teachers in primary education (% of total teachers).
[135]
Nangarhar - Afghanistan | Data and Statistics
Capital:Jalalabad · Languages:Pashto, Dari · Governor:Hayatallah Hayat · Population (persons):1635872 (2018) · Area in sq.km:7,727.0 (2015) · Population Density ( ...Missing: distribution | Show results with:distribution
[136]
[PDF] Education Sector Analysis Afghanistan Volume I
Attendance in pre-school education in an organized learning or child education ... The graph above shows enrolment rates at pre-primary, primary, lower secondary, ...
[137]
Afghanistan: 1.4 million girls still banned from school by de facto
1.4 million Afghan girls have been deliberately deprived of schooling. Access to primary education has also fallen sharply, with 1.1 million fewer girls and ...
[138]
[PDF] The Learning Crisis in Afghanistan - World Bank Document
Afghan students in urban schools tend to outperform those in rural schools in both Mathematics ... school level among urban and rural schools, or among schools ...
[139]
Religious education surges under Taliban as secular schooling ...
Oct 8, 2024 · The number of madrassas, or religious schools, has increased fourfold under the Taliban in Afghanistan as experts worry that the rise could fuel extremism in ...
[140]
[PDF] Afghanistan Education Situation Report 2025 - UNESCO
In 2024, primary enrolment reached 6.77 million, but growth stalled between 2023 and 2024. Boys' participation is increasingly affected by poverty and.
[141]
Haḍḍa - WHAV
Haḍḍa. Hadda was the name of a Buddhist and major artistic center located in the south of the city of Jalalabad, in the Nangarhar Province of eastern ...
[142]
Surkh Rod Stupa, Surkh Rod District, Afghanistan - Darya Expeditions
The Surkh Rod Stupa was constructed during the 2nd and 3rd centuries AD, a period when Buddhism was spreading rapidly throughout Afghanistan.
[143]
Historic Afghan Sites Face Ruin - Institute for War & Peace Reporting
Mar 12, 2014 · Nangarhar province was once part of the ancient kingdom of Gandhara ... Buddhist site of Hadda, south of the provincial centre Jalalabad.Missing: pre- | Show results with:pre-
[144]
Harsh Remedies at Afghan Shrine
Aug 31, 2011 · The Mia Ali Sahib shrine at Samarkhel in Nangarhar province has offered its own form of treatment for psychiatric disorders for the last 300 years.
[145]
Preserving Culture Heritage At Risk
BRD has identified 19 high-risk cultural heritage sites in Ghazni and Nangarhar provinces. Emergency measures include site stabilization and the construction ...
[146]
Several New Archaeological Sites Discovered in Nangarhar
May 5, 2025 · The findings include four ancient sites and five towers, believed to have served as wayfinding markers for caravans during ancient times.Missing: evidence kingdoms
[147]
[PDF] Hajji Din Mohammad Biography
Hajji Din Mohammad, a former mujahedin fighter from the Khalis faction of Hezb-e Islami, became governor of the eastern province of Nangarhar after the ...Missing: opium ban 2004-2006
[148]
Abdul Qadir | Afghanistan - The Guardian
Jul 7, 2002 · He had been governor of his mountainous home province of Nangarhar from 1992 to 1996, and, after the fall of the Taliban last November, sped ...
[149]
Afghan blast fuels security fears | World news | The Guardian
The Afghan vice-president and governor of the eastern province of Nangarhar, Haji Abdul Qadir, was gunned down outside his Kabul office last month. There ...Missing: Qadeer biography
[150]
Interview with the new governor of Nangarhar - The New Humanitarian
Aug 1, 2002 · Haji Din Mohammad, brother of Haji Qadir, the assassinated former Afghan vice-president and governor of the eastern Afghan province of Nangarhar, admits he ...Missing: influence | Show results with:influence
[151]
7 Nangarhar: A Model Province - Oxford Academic
The first ban was imposed by the then Governor Hajji Din Mohammed in the 2004/05 growing season. The second, which was more effective, lasted from 2007/08 to ...<|control11|><|separator|>
[152]
Politics and governance in Afghanistan: The case of Nangarhar ...
Jun 19, 2014 · Chief among them are members Arsala family whose post-2001 political dominance in the east was consolidated by Gul Agha Sherzai's ...
[153]
Infrastructure Development | ACB - Afghanistan Cricket Board
The Najibullah Taraki Cricket Ground is located in Jalalabad City, the center of Nangarhar Province. This ground was recently built and currently hosts multiple ...
[154]
Eighth edition of domestic cricket tournament kicks off in Nangarhar
May 5, 2025 · The matches are being held at two venues: the Ghazi Amanullah Khan Cricket Stadium in Jalalabad and the Najib Tarakai Cricket Ground. The ...
[155]
Eight killed in bomb attack on cricket match in Afghanistan
May 20, 2018 · Eight people have been killed and dozens more wounded by multiple explosions at a cricket match in the eastern Afghan city of Jalalabad, officials said.
[156]
Buzkashī | Traditional Afghan Sport, Horseback Riding & Team Game
Buzkashī, a rugged equestrian game, played predominantly by Turkic peoples in northern Afghanistan, in which riders compete to seize and retain control of a ...Missing: Nangarhar | Show results with:Nangarhar
[157]
Taliban enters Afghan presidential palace after Ghani flees
Aug 15, 2021 · A top Taliban official has said that the real test of governing is set to begin after the group entered the Afghan capital, Kabul, and took control of the ...
[158]
Sports bodies must pushback against the Taliban's ban on women ...
Aug 9, 2024 · ... Taliban's ban on women and girls in Afghanistan participating in all sports.“For nearly three years, the Taliban has barred women and girls ...Missing: Nangarhar | Show results with:Nangarhar
[159]
Locals Blast Nangarhar Officials For Not Celebrating Nawroz
Residents and cultural figures in eastern Nangarhar province lashed out at local officials for not celebrating Nawroz in the province and have called for an ...Missing: Nowruz disruptions
[160]
Taliban Prevents Nowruz Celebration With Traditional Flag-Hoisting ...
Mar 21, 2025 · Several sources reported that Taliban fighters raided the shrine the previous night and expelled its security guards.Missing: Nangarhar disruptions