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Parallel state

A parallel state denotes an institutional configuration wherein non-state actors, frequently endowed with coercive capabilities or illicit networks, exploit affiliations with official government bodies to shield and amplify their endeavors, thereby preserving systemic vulnerabilities while projecting an aura of authorized governance.^[1] This phenomenon typically manifests through symbiotic ties between state functionaries and extraneous interests, eroding the separation between public authority and private agendas in contexts of institutional frailty, such as transitional democracies or environments marked by pervasive insecurity.^[2] The parallel state's operations often hinge on dominant apparatuses like military or intelligence services, enabling these entities to sidestep electoral oversight and perpetuate elite dominance, as observed in cases where globalization and external geopolitical pressures bolster such hybrid formations.^[1] In Thailand, for instance, a constellation of monarchical, military, and bureaucratic elites constitutes a parallel state that maintains elevated administrative efficacy yet systematically disrupts democratic processes through interventions like the 2006 and 2014 coups against popularly elected administrations.^[3] Similarly, in Pakistan and Guatemala, Cold War-era empowerments of security institutions facilitated parallel states that intertwined state resources with organized crime, impeding poverty alleviation and security provision.^[2] Controversies surrounding parallel states frequently arise from their invocation in partisan conflicts, where incumbents decry oppositional infiltrations to justify consolidations of power, or challengers highlight ruling-party encroachments to expose democratic erosion. In Turkey, the AKP regime branded the Gülen movement's embedding in judicial, police, and prosecutorial ranks as a parallel state, prompting mass dismissals after 2013 graft investigations and the 2016 coup bid, though evidence of Gülenist operational sway within state machinery preceded the rupture.^[4]^[5] In Hungary, detractors of Viktor Orbán's Fidesz have documented the erection of parallel apparatuses via privatized public trusts and aligned media ecosystems, designed to insulate influence from electoral vicissitudes and sustain ideological hegemony.^[6]^[7] These instances reveal parallel states' defining trait: their capacity to foster resilience against reform while breeding opacity and unaccountability, complicating efforts toward transparent rule.^[3]

Definition and Conceptual Framework

Core Definition

A parallel state refers to an unofficial, hierarchical network of actors organically embedded within formal state institutions, exercising de facto authority over key functions such as policy implementation, personnel decisions, and enforcement mechanisms while evading direct accountability to elected officials or constitutional oversight.^[8] These structures typically emerge through systematic infiltration, patronage networks, or ideological recruitment, allowing them to operate alongside or in tension with the official government apparatus. Unlike overt opposition groups, parallel states leverage the legitimacy and resources of the host state to pursue autonomous agendas, often prioritizing loyalty to internal hierarchies over public mandates.^[3] The concept emphasizes causal mechanisms of power consolidation, where actors gain influence by occupying strategic positions in bureaucracy, judiciary, military, or security services, enabling them to shape outcomes independently of formal chains of command. For instance, such networks can deploy surveillance, legal manipulations, or resource allocation to undermine rivals or advance sectarian goals, as documented in analyses of entrenched elite coalitions that persist through regime changes.^[3] Empirical indicators include disproportionate representation of affiliated personnel in sensitive roles—such as over 10,000 judges and prosecutors in Turkey linked to specific movements by 2013—and coordinated actions that bypass executive directives, like unauthorized investigations or promotions based on affinity rather than merit.^[5] While the term has been invoked in politically contested contexts to justify institutional purges, its theoretical foundation lies in recognizing dual layers of governance: a visible, nominally democratic state juxtaposed against an insulated, unaccountable parallel entity that captures state capacity for private ends.^[9] This duality erodes democratic efficacy by creating competing centers of loyalty, where formal laws serve as facades for informal rule, a pattern observed across varying ideological bases from religious fraternities to bureaucratic cliques.^[10] Credible assessments distinguish genuine infiltration—evidenced by leaked communications and placement patterns—from unsubstantiated rhetoric, underscoring the need for verifiable data over partisan narratives in evaluating claims.^[4]

Theoretical Foundations

The concept of a parallel state originates in revolutionary political theory, particularly Vladimir Lenin's analysis of dvoevlastie (dual power) during the 1917 Russian Revolution, where two competing authorities—the bourgeois Provisional Government and proletarian soviets—coexisted, each claiming sovereignty and undermining the other's legitimacy.^[11] Lenin described this as an unstable transitional phase in which the parallel structure, rooted in class antagonism, enabled the soviets to erode bourgeois control through direct democratic organs, ultimately facilitating the Bolshevik seizure of power.^[12] This framework posits that parallel states arise from fissures in state monopoly on violence and legitimacy, allowing subordinate or oppositional networks to build autonomous institutions that mirror official governance while pursuing divergent interests.^[11] In postcolonial state theory, Hamza Alavi extended these ideas by theorizing the "overdeveloped state," where colonial legacies produced apparatuses (bureaucracy, military) disproportionately strong relative to weak civil societies and bourgeoisie, enabling these institutions to exercise relative autonomy and function as de facto parallel entities to elected or ideological leadership.^[13] Alavi argued that in societies like Pakistan post-1947, this overdevelopment—characterized by centralized coercive power inherited from imperialism—allowed state elites to mediate class conflicts independently, often prioritizing regime stability over societal demands, thus creating embedded networks that distort formal policy without overt rupture.^[14] This causal dynamic, grounded in empirical asymmetries of power post-independence, underscores how parallel states emerge not merely from revolution but from structural imbalances in state formation, where institutional singularity (e.g., military dominance) fosters clandestine factionalism.^[8] Nicos Poulantzas further refined these foundations through Marxist structuralism, introducing "relative autonomy" of the state as a condensation of class forces, where apparatuses embody internal contradictions that can manifest as parallel power blocs—democratic facades coexisting with authoritarian undercurrents in late capitalism.^[15] In his concept of authoritarian statism, Poulantzas described a symbiotic duality in which economic crises (e.g., 1970s stagflation) erode state cohesion, allowing repressive networks to operate alongside formal institutions, prioritizing capital's cohesion over democratic accountability.^[16] This relational approach, contrasting instrumentalist views of state capture, emphasizes how parallel states sustain capitalist reproduction via structural selectivity, selecting policies that reinforce dominant fractions while marginalizing alternatives.^[17] Empirical validation from transitional contexts, such as stalled democratizations, reveals these mechanisms as causal drivers of policy distortion by sub-state clans or intelligence factions.^[8]

Historical Development

Origins in Political Theory

The concept of the parallel state originated in analyses of fascist mobilization, where political movements construct autonomous institutions that replicate core state functions to consolidate power outside formal governmental channels. Historian Robert O. Paxton formalized the term in his 2004 book The Anatomy of Fascism, defining it as a network of party-controlled organizations—such as militias, welfare agencies, and administrative bodies—that operate alongside the official state, fostering loyalty and operational capacity independent of bureaucratic norms. Paxton argued this structure enables movements to penetrate and undermine state legitimacy by providing alternative avenues for patronage, security, and ideology, as seen in the Nazi Party's development of the SS and party chancellery, which by the 1930s paralleled and encroached upon Reich ministries.^[18] Paxton's framework draws on empirical patterns from interwar Europe, positing the parallel state as an intermediate phase between initial agitation and full regime capture, where these entities exploit societal mobilization to erode institutional boundaries. In fascist Italy and Germany, for instance, party organs handled youth indoctrination, labor arbitration, and paramilitary enforcement, numbering in the hundreds of thousands of personnel by the mid-1920s for Mussolini's squads and Hitler's SA, thereby creating de facto governance layers that blurred state-party distinctions. This theoretical construct emphasizes causal mechanisms like charismatic leadership and economic crisis, which incentivize such parallelism to bypass resistant elites, rather than mere conspiracy. Preceding Paxton's coinage, related ideas appeared in mid-20th-century totalitarian theory, such as the "dual state" described by Ernst Fraenkel in The Dual State (1941), which detailed Nazi Germany's division into normative legal apparatuses and prerogative party domains enforcing arbitrary rule through organizations like the Gestapo, affecting millions via extralegal detentions by 1936. Fraenkel's work, based on legal documents and exile observations, highlighted how these parallel mechanisms enabled totalitarian control by subordinating judiciary and administrative functions to ideological imperatives, influencing later scholarship on authoritarian resilience. Paxton's innovation lay in generalizing this to fascism's developmental stages, distinguishing it from static dualism by stressing dynamic infiltration and competition. These origins underscore a realist view of power dynamics, where parallel states arise not from abstract ideology alone but from incentives for actors to build shadow capacities amid weak formal institutions, as evidenced by fascist electoral gains—Nazis from 2.6% in 1928 to 37.3% in 1932—tied to parallel welfare and violence networks. Theoretical extensions caution against overgeneralization, noting that while effective in low-trust environments, such structures risk internal fragmentation, as internal Nazi purges in 1934 eliminated SA rivals to consolidate SS dominance.

Evolution and Key Milestones

The concept of the parallel state, formalized by historian Robert O. Paxton in his 2004 book The Anatomy of Fascism, initially described how fascist movements in interwar Europe established semi-autonomous organizations—such as party militias, unions, and administrative bodies—that mirrored and competed with formal state functions, often to consolidate power without fully dismantling existing institutions.^[18] Paxton's framework emphasized these structures' ideological alignment with ruling regimes, distinguishing them from oppositional or subversive networks, and drew on historical cases like Mussolini's Italy and Nazi Germany's dual apparatuses of party and state.^[19] A pivotal early empirical milestone occurred in Kosovo during the late 1980s, when Albanian leaders, led by Ibrahim Rugova, responded to Slobodan Milošević's revocation of the province's autonomy on March 28, 1989, by creating informal parallel institutions for education, healthcare, taxation, and governance; this system, funded partly through a 3% income tax on expatriates, sustained Albanian civil society until the 1999 NATO intervention, serving as a non-violent strategy for self-administration amid repression.^[20] By the mid-1990s, this parallel state had enrolled over 300,000 students in clandestine schools and operated 200 underground clinics, though it faced internal fractures as militant groups like the Kosovo Liberation Army gained traction around 1996.^[21] The term gained wider political currency in 2013 when Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan publicly accused the Gülen movement—led by Fethullah Gülen since the 1970s—of forming a "parallel state" through infiltration of judiciary, police, and military institutions, culminating in corruption probes against Erdoğan allies in December 2013 and escalating to the July 15, 2016, coup attempt, after which over 150,000 public employees were dismissed or investigated for alleged ties.^[22] Erdoğan's rhetoric, while rooted in documented Gülenist embedding (e.g., control of key police academies by the early 2010s), reflected mutual power struggles rather than Paxton's fascist model of alignment, prompting academic refinements to the concept for hybrid regimes.^[9] In parallel, scholarly applications expanded in the 2010s to Asian contexts, notably Thailand, where political scientists identified a persistent "parallel state" of intertwined bureaucratic, military, and royalist elites—originating in post-1932 absolute monarchy transitions and reinforced by 19 military coups since 1932—that undermined electoral democracy, as evidenced in the 2014 coup ousting Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra and subsequent constitutional manipulations favoring unelected networks.^[3] Similar analyses traced origins to crisis-driven military expansions in Pakistan from the 1950s, where parallel intelligence and administrative structures endured beyond formal civilian rule, influencing the concept's evolution toward explaining authoritarian resilience in developing states.^[8] These developments shifted focus from Paxton's European fascism to global patterns of informal power duplication, often organic to weak formal institutions rather than deliberate ideological constructs.

Characteristics and Mechanisms

Infiltration and Operational Strategies

Parallel states typically infiltrate official institutions through long-term, ideologically driven recruitment targeting vulnerable or impressionable individuals, such as students and young professionals, to embed loyal operatives in key sectors like education, judiciary, law enforcement, and national security. This process often spans decades, beginning with the establishment of front organizations—such as religious study houses or tutoring centers—that serve as recruitment hubs to identify and indoctrinate potential infiltrators.^[23] In documented cases, these networks prioritize strategic placement by exploiting entry mechanisms, including the manipulation of competitive examinations for civil service, police academies, and military schools, where questions are allegedly stolen and memorized in clandestine sessions to secure high-ranking positions.^[23] Operatives are directed to prioritize departments handling human resources, intelligence, and information technology, enabling control over hiring, data access, and internal surveillance.^[23] Operational strategies emphasize clandestine hierarchies that supersede official state chains of command, often structured around informal "imams" or handlers who issue directives to subordinates embedded within institutions, ensuring coordinated action without overt detection.^[23] Loyalty is maintained through ongoing communication networks and ideological reinforcement, with tactics like tedbir (precautionary deception) employed to conceal affiliations, such as adopting secular appearances or feigning neutrality in professional settings.^[23] These parallel command structures facilitate "organizational coups," where influence is exerted from within rather than through external overthrow, allowing the parallel entity to undermine rivals, manipulate investigations, and pursue autonomous policy goals, as evidenced by audio recordings of leaders advocating infiltration of state posts to serve group objectives.^[24]^[25] In broader mechanisms, parallel states leverage symbiotic relationships with ruling powers initially, as seen in alliances that enable mutual purges of common enemies before turning adversarial, thereby consolidating control over levers of power like judicial appointments and security operations.^[26] This infiltration often extends to creating auxiliary economic and media ecosystems that fund and propagate the parallel agenda, insulating it from official oversight while eroding institutional independence.^[27] Such strategies rely on exploiting institutional weaknesses, including nepotistic hiring and ideological vacuums, to build resilient, self-perpetuating networks capable of withstanding purges or regime changes.^[8]

Structural Features and Power Dynamics

Parallel states exhibit structural features centered on informal, decentralized networks of loyal adherents embedded within formal state institutions, prioritizing ideological or personal allegiance over bureaucratic hierarchies. These networks typically operate through compartmentalized cells or affinity groups, such as religious study circles or elite coalitions, which facilitate recruitment, coordination, and secrecy while minimizing vulnerability to centralized disruption.^[28]^[3] This embeddedness creates an organic linkage to official structures, allowing parallel entities to co-opt resources, personnel placements, and decision processes without assuming overt leadership roles. Funding often derives from private donations or business enterprises, enabling operational autonomy from state budgets.^[28] Key mechanisms include systematic infiltration strategies, such as prioritizing education, media, and civil society affiliations to build long-term influence pipelines into bureaucracy, judiciary, and security sectors. Adherents advance through meritocratic-like internal promotions based on demonstrated loyalty, gradually displacing non-aligned personnel and reshaping institutional cultures.^[28] This multi-institutional model disperses power across societal domains, embedding it not solely in state apparatuses but also in economic and cultural spheres to amplify leverage.^[28] Power dynamics within parallel states revolve around asymmetric influence, where informal networks exert veto or directive authority over formal governance, often checking elected officials through selective enforcement, information control, or institutional sabotage. This creates dual sovereignties, with the parallel structure deriving legitimacy from perceived guardianship of core values—such as security or tradition—against perceived threats from democratic majorities.^[3]^[8] Tensions arise from fragile alliances with ruling elites, fracturing when interests diverge and prompting escalatory actions like policy subversion or institutional takeovers, which perpetuate governance fragmentation and hinder democratic consolidation.^[3]^[8]

Empirical Examples

Turkey: The Gülen Movement Case

The Gülen movement, also known as Hizmet, emerged in the 1970s under Fethullah Gülen's influence as a network of religious, educational, and social organizations emphasizing Islamic ethics, interfaith dialogue, and civic engagement.^[29] By the 1990s and 2000s, it expanded into a vast transnational web, including over 1,000 schools worldwide, media outlets like Zaman newspaper, and business associations that funneled resources toward recruiting and placing adherents in key Turkish institutions such as the judiciary, police, and military.^[30] This network operated informally through personal loyalties and mentorships rather than a rigid hierarchy, enabling adherents—often vetted via Gülen-inspired prep schools and dormitories—to secure civil service positions via competitive exams and internal promotions.^[31] Initially allied with Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's Justice and Development Party (AKP) after 2002, the movement supported the government's efforts to dismantle the secular Kemalist establishment, including through corruption probes and trials like Ergenekon (2007–2013) that targeted military officers.^[32] Tensions escalated in late 2013 amid graft investigations implicating AKP figures, which Erdoğan attributed to Gülenist sabotage, leading him to label the movement a "parallel state" (paralel devlet) infiltrating official structures to wield unofficial power.^[33] Evidence of this infiltration included disproportionate representation of suspected Gülenists in sensitive posts: for instance, by 2016, audits revealed networks coordinating promotions and intelligence operations independently of elected oversight, such as the use of police units to wiretap rivals.^[34] While the movement portrayed its state involvement as legitimate civic participation, critics, including Turkish authorities, documented cases of exam-fixing and loyalty-based hiring that undermined meritocracy and created de facto parallel command chains.^[31] The movement's parallel state dynamics crystallized during the July 15, 2016, coup attempt, which killed 251 people and involved rogue military elements seizing key sites in Ankara and Istanbul.^[35] The Turkish government presented evidence linking plotters to Gülen, including confessions from arrested officers, encrypted communications via the ByLock app used by adherents, and depositions tying mid-level commanders to Gülen-affiliated networks; over 8,000 military personnel were implicated, with many having attended Gülen-linked schools.^[29] Gülen denied orchestrating the event from his Pennsylvania exile, and some Western analyses, such as a 2017 UK parliamentary report, noted individual Gülenist involvement but a "relative lack of hard evidence" implicating the entire movement as a centralized actor.^[36] Nonetheless, the coup underscored the movement's operational autonomy: its embedded personnel enabled rapid mobilization of tanks and aircraft, bypassing official chains of command, which functioned as a shadow governance layer rivaling the elected state.^[37] In response, the Turkish state declared a state of emergency on July 20, 2016, leading to the dismissal of 150,000 public employees, arrest of over 100,000 suspected affiliates, and seizure of Gülen-linked assets valued at billions, including 15 universities, 112 media entities, and thousands of schools.^[38]^[37] This crackdown dismantled the visible infrastructure but highlighted the prior erosion of sovereignty, as the movement's decentralized cells had sustained influence through opaque business financing and expatriate remittances, evading full state control.^[30] The case exemplifies a parallel state formed via long-term cultural and institutional embedding, where ideological networks exploit state vacuums to parallelize authority, though post-2016 purges restored centralized dominance at the cost of institutional trust.^[31]

Thailand: Bureaucratic and Elite Networks

In Thailand, bureaucratic and elite networks constitute a parallel state apparatus that operates extraconstitutionally to constrain or supplant elected governments, particularly those perceived as threats to monarchical and royalist interests. This structure, often termed the "deep state" or "network monarchy," encompasses the military, judiciary, high-level civil servants, and privy councillors who leverage institutional autonomy and royal legitimacy to intervene in politics.^[39]^[40] Post-1980 democratization efforts were undermined by these networks, which asserted dominance through indirect control, framing interventions as defenses against electoral excesses rather than power grabs.^[3] Central to this parallel state is the Privy Council, an unelected advisory body to the king, exemplified by Prem Tinsulanonda's tenure as president from 1998 until his death in 2019. Prem, a former prime minister (1980–1988) and army commander, mediated key crises, such as the 1992 "Black May" protests that ended military rule, while promoting royal projects and ideologies that reinforced elite hierarchies.^[41] The military arm, via the Royal Thai Army, has executed at least 13 coups since World War II, including the September 19, 2006, ouster of Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra amid corruption allegations and the May 22, 2014, takeover under General Prayuth Chan-ocha, both justified as restoring institutional order.^[42] Bureaucratic resistance manifests in civil servants' refusal to implement populist policies, such as Thaksin-era rural development initiatives, prioritizing hierarchical loyalty over electoral mandates.^[39] Judicial mechanisms amplify these networks' power, with the Constitutional Court functioning as a veto authority since its 1997 establishment. Notable interventions include the 2006 annulment of national elections boycotted by royalists, the December 2, 2008, dissolution of Thaksin's People Power Party on technical grounds, and repeated bans on successor parties like Pheu Thai affiliates, effectively nullifying voter preferences.^[39] This judicialization transfers royal veto power to courts, creating a "surrogate king" dynamic that bypasses legislative processes.^[39] Empirical patterns show these networks thrive during legitimacy crises, as in McCargo's analysis of royal proxies orchestrating behind-the-scenes maneuvers to delegitimize elected leaders.^[40] Elite cohesion stems from familial and bureaucratic ties tracing to pre-constitutional eras, with figures like Anand Panyarachun—interim prime minister in 1991–1992—embodying intersections of princely, military, and business lineages that sustain the parallel state's resilience.^[43] Despite formal democratic trappings since 1992, these networks have perpetuated instability, with Thailand experiencing recurrent government dissolutions and military oversight, as evidenced by Prayuth's post-2014 regime drafting a 2017 constitution that entrenched appointed Senate powers favoring royalists.^[3] This arrangement privileges causal continuity of elite dominance over electoral accountability, though academic critiques, such as Mérieau's, highlight its opposition to broader societal demands for reform.^[39]

Other Instances

In Iran, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) operates as a parallel state apparatus, functioning alongside the conventional military (Artesh) while wielding extensive political, economic, and paramilitary influence. Formed on May 5, 1979, shortly after the Islamic Revolution, the IRGC was designed to safeguard the revolutionary regime from internal and external threats, evolving into an ideologically driven force that reports directly to the Supreme Leader rather than the elected government.^[44] By the 1980s, during the Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988), it developed a parallel command structure, including the Qods Force for extraterritorial operations, which has since supported proxy militias in Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen.^[45] The IRGC's economic empire, managed through entities like the Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters, controls an estimated 20–60% of Iran's economy as of 2018, encompassing construction, telecommunications, and oil sectors, thereby insulating it from civilian oversight and enabling self-financing.^[46] This duality undermines state sovereignty, as the IRGC has intervened in elections, suppressed protests (e.g., 2009 Green Movement and 2022 Mahsa Amini unrest), and shaped foreign policy independently of the foreign ministry.^[47] In Peru during Alberto Fujimori's presidency (1990–2000), parallel state networks emerged through intelligence agencies and informal alliances that subverted democratic institutions. Fujimori's advisor Vladimiro Montesinos, head of the National Intelligence Service (SIN), built a clandestine apparatus involving corrupt judges, media figures, and military elements to rig elections, bribe opposition, and eliminate rivals, including via death squads against leftist insurgents.^[2] This "parallel state" facilitated authoritarian consolidation, as evidenced by the 1992 auto-golpe (self-coup) where Fujimori dissolved Congress with military backing, yet maintained populist legitimacy through economic stabilization and anti-terrorism successes against Shining Path. Investigations post-2000 revealed SIN's $50 million in illicit slush funds used for influence operations, highlighting how such structures erode accountability in transitional democracies.^[48] Other cases include Haiti's post-2010 earthquake reliance on non-governmental organizations (NGOs), which formed a de facto parallel governance layer handling aid distribution, service provision, and even security in the absence of effective state capacity, managing billions in funds while bypassing corrupt bureaucracies.^[49] In Malaysia, discussions of a "deep state" refer to entrenched bureaucratic and royal influences that parallel elected governments, as seen in interventions during the 1MDB scandal (2015–2018) and periodic monarchy-mediated power shifts, though lacking the militarized coercion of Iranian or Peruvian models.^[50] These instances demonstrate parallel states' adaptability to weak institutional contexts, often originating in security sectors before expanding into economic and political domains.

Normative Proposals and Alternatives

Parallel States in Conflict Resolution

In the context of conflict resolution, parallel states refer to a normative model proposing dual sovereign entities exercising overlapping authority over a shared territory, with jurisdiction allocated by personal affiliation rather than geographic boundaries. This framework, articulated primarily through the Parallel States Project initiated in 2009 by scholars including Mathias Mossberg and Mark LeVine, seeks to address impasses in ethno-territorial disputes where traditional partition fails due to intertwined populations, sacred sites, and security interdependencies. Unlike the conventional two-state solution, which emphasizes territorial separation, parallel states prioritize individual-based sovereignty, enabling citizens of either state to reside anywhere within the common land while remaining subject to their national institutions for core functions like law enforcement and taxation.^[51] The model's core mechanisms include harmonized external policies, such as unified border control and coordinated defense against external threats, potentially through joint military commands, while maintaining separate internal security apparatuses to preserve national control over domestic order. Economic integration is envisioned via shared markets and infrastructure, drawing analogies to supranational arrangements like the European Union, where sovereignty is pooled without erasing national identities. In application to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict—the primary case for which the model was developed—this structure would extend Israeli and Palestinian sovereignty across the entire area from the Mediterranean Sea to the Jordan River, resolving disputes over Jerusalem through co-capital status with divided administrative zones and addressing refugee claims by permitting returns under the receiving state's jurisdiction without undermining the demographic character of the other.^[51]^[52] Proponents argue that parallel states mitigate zero-sum territorial bargaining by decoupling residency from governance, allowing settlements to persist under Israeli authority even in areas claimed by Palestinians, and fostering interdependence to incentivize peace. For instance, the framework posits that mutual economic benefits and security cooperation could reduce incentives for violence, as seen in theoretical extensions to other divided societies with precedents in consociational power-sharing, though no full-scale implementation exists as of 2025.^[51]^[53] This approach contrasts with unilateral separation models by emphasizing layered sovereignty, where opt-out clauses or arbitration bodies handle overlaps, potentially stabilizing regions with fluid demographics and contested holy sites.

Critiques of Normative Models

Normative models advocating parallel states as mechanisms for conflict resolution or alternative governance structures often presuppose benign parallelism that fosters competition or service provision without eroding formal authority, yet critics argue these assumptions ignore entrenched power asymmetries and institutional pathologies. In fragile states, such models fail to account for how parallel entities, reliant on informal transactions with political elites, sustain organized interests with coercive capacities, thereby perpetuating governance weakness rather than enhancing it.^[2] This dynamic, observed in transitions from authoritarianism, prioritizes short-term security legitimation over long-term democratic consolidation, as parallel apparatuses exploit state vulnerabilities to entrench non-transparent rule-making.^[8] A core deficiency lies in the models' neglect of accountability voids, where parallel operations evade electoral scrutiny and judicial oversight, enabling elite capture or criminal co-optation that undermines public trust in institutions. For instance, in the United States federal context, emergent parallel bureaucratic networks have been faulted for diluting democratic responsiveness by insulating policy from elected mandates, a risk amplified in weaker polities.^[54] Empirical patterns reveal that these structures, while ostensibly filling service gaps, often prioritize rent-seeking over equitable outcomes, stalling poverty alleviation and fostering insecurity through fragmented authority.^[2] In conflict resolution applications, normative endorsements of parallel states—such as divided sovereignty models in territorially contested areas—overlook enforcement challenges and escalatory potentials. Proposals for parallel institutions in the Israeli-Palestinian context, which divide authority without partitioning land, have drawn criticism for compromising security by blurring defensive perimeters and complicating law enforcement, taxation, and demilitarization amid mutual distrust.^[55] Similarly, Kosovo's Albanian-led parallel state (1989–1999), initially a nonviolent bulwark against Serbian revocation of autonomy, devolved into underground operations lacking international legitimacy, fueling ethnic polarization and NATO intervention rather than negotiated unity.^[56] Persistent Serb parallel institutions in northern Kosovo post-independence exemplify how such models institutionalize division, inviting state raids and renewed tensions without resolving underlying sovereignty claims.^[57] Critics further contend that these models romanticize parallelism by downplaying its role in thwarting democratization, as seen in Thailand where military-monarchical networks have repeatedly derailed electoral progress through coups, preserving undemocratic veto powers under the guise of stability.^[3] International advocacy for tolerance of parallel entities, often tied to geopolitical expediency, exacerbates this by signaling permissibility, yet evidence suggests targeted disruption—via judicial reforms and civil society bolstering—better mitigates proliferation than accommodation.^[2] Ultimately, normative frameworks undervalue causal links between duality and state fragility, prioritizing theoretical symmetry over observed trajectories toward authoritarian resilience or collapse.

Controversies and Criticisms

Debates on Existence and Extent

The concept of parallel states sparks contention among scholars, policymakers, and analysts, with proponents citing empirical instances of informal networks exerting autonomous influence within formal institutions, while skeptics contend that such structures are overstated or illusory, often conflating them with standard bureaucratic inertia or political rivalries. In political science literature, parallel states are described as arrangements where organized groups leverage ties to state apparatus—frequently rooted in military, intelligence, or criminal expertise—to pursue independent agendas, as evidenced in cases from Colombia to Pakistan, where these entities perpetuate governance gaps while mimicking legitimacy.^[2] This view posits their existence as a rational response to state weakness, supported by observable control over resources and coercion in fragile contexts.^[8] Critiques frequently frame parallel state claims as conspiratorial, particularly in Western discourse on the "deep state," arguing they lack rigorous empirical validation and serve to delegitimize accountable institutions rather than identify genuine threats. For instance, analyses of U.S. bureaucracy portray "deep state" allegations as projections of executive frustration onto entrenched expertise, with no systematic evidence of coordinated subversion beyond isolated leaks or policy disputes.^[58] Scholarly bibliometric reviews highlight the fragmented nature of deep state discussions across disciplines, noting a paucity of unified empirical frameworks and a tendency toward ideological polarization that undermines claims of prevalence.^[59] Such skepticism is amplified in academic and media sources, which often prioritize institutional stability narratives over investigations into informal power dynamics. In specific empirical cases, like Turkey's Gülen movement, debates intensify over verifiable infiltration versus retrospective justification for purges. Prior to 2013, the movement maintained extensive networks in judiciary, police, and education sectors, enabling actions such as corruption probes against ruling party figures, which President Erdoğan labeled a "parallel state" effort to undermine elected authority.^[18] The 2016 coup attempt, attributed by Turkish courts to Gülen-linked officers, involved arrests of approximately 50,000 suspects and dismissals of over 150,000 public employees suspected of affiliation, providing concrete indicators of the network's depth in key institutions.^[4] Opponents, including movement sympathizers, counter that these measures reflect authoritarian consolidation rather than dismantling a true parallel entity, pointing to conceptual inconsistencies in state rhetoric and absence of pre-coup independent audits confirming coordinated disloyalty.^[60] Regarding extent, analyses suggest parallel states thrive disproportionately in transitional, post-conflict, or authoritarian settings—such as post-communist Balkans or Syrian regime manipulations—where formal sovereignty erodes, allowing shadow governance to fill voids through service provision or coercion.^[61] ^[62] In contrast, their scope in robust democracies appears limited to resilient subnetworks resisting reform, though persistent claims risk eroding trust without proportionate evidence. This variance underscores causal factors like institutional legacies and rule-of-law deficits, with proliferation linked to historical military bloat in crises.^[48] Source credibility varies, as state-centric accounts (e.g., Turkish government reports) may inflate threats for legitimacy, while Western critiques exhibit systemic reluctance to validate non-establishment power critiques.

Political Instrumentalization

The accusation of a parallel state has been deployed by political leaders to delegitimize institutional rivals, justify mass dismissals, and centralize authority, often blurring lines between genuine security threats and partisan consolidation. In Turkey, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan intensified this rhetoric after the July 15, 2016, coup attempt, which killed 251 people and was linked by Turkish authorities to the Gülen movement's infiltration of the judiciary, military, and bureaucracy—a network Erdoğan branded the "parallel state" since 2013 corruption probes exposed mutual infiltration attempts between his Justice and Development Party (AKP) and Gülenists.^[63] ^[35] This framing enabled emergency decrees suspending constitutional protections, resulting in the dismissal of over 4,000 judges and prosecutors within days, followed by 152,000 public sector employees fired and 50,000 detained by mid-2017, reshaping institutions to align with executive loyalty.^[64] ^[65] Evidence from pre-coup Gülenist activities, including school networks and media outlets used for recruitment, supported infiltration claims, yet the purges' breadth—encompassing educators and journalists without direct coup ties—drew accusations from human rights monitors of exceeding counter-coup necessities to eliminate AKP critics.^[66] ^[67] In Romania, the Social Democratic Party (PSD)-led government under Liviu Dragnea in 2018 weaponized "parallel state" narratives against the National Anticorruption Directorate (DNA), portraying its prosecutors as an unaccountable cabal undermining elected officials through selective investigations that convicted over 1,200 corruption cases from 2013 to 2017.^[68] This rhetoric, echoed in pro-government rallies drawing tens of thousands, justified emergency ordinances diluting prosecutorial powers, such as decriminalizing minor abuses of office, amid protests exceeding 500,000 participants decrying democratic backsliding.^[68] While DNA's aggressive tactics, including wiretaps on politicians, fueled legitimate grievances over overreach, the parallel state label shifted focus from documented graft—Romania's EU fund absorption lagged peers due to embezzlement—to portraying anti-corruption bodies as politically motivated, enabling PSD allies' legal reprieves.^[69] Similar dynamics appear in Thailand, where military and royalist elites have invoked parallel state structures—comprising entrenched bureaucratic and privy council networks—to interrupt democratization, as seen in the 2014 coup ousting Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra on charges of undermining monarchical loyalty, followed by constitutional reforms entrenching unelected oversight.^[3] These invocations rally conservative bases against populist governments, prioritizing stability over electoral mandates, though empirical data on elite entrenchment, such as military budget allocations rising 7% annually pre-coup, underscores causal links to power preservation rather than mere conspiracy.^[3] Across cases, such instrumentalization exploits public fears of subversion, evidenced by approval spikes—Erdoğan's post-coup ratings hit 68%—but risks eroding institutional trust, as Turkey's judicial independence score plummeted from 5.9 to 2.5 on global indices by 2020.^[35]

Implications for Governance and Stability

Effects on State Sovereignty

Parallel states erode state sovereignty by embedding clandestine networks within formal institutions, thereby fragmenting the central government's control over key levers of power such as the judiciary, police, and military. These structures, often originating from bloated security sectors or factional alliances during periods of crisis, allow non-elected actors to exert influence parallel to official authority, distorting policy to serve institutional or sectarian interests rather than national directives. This infiltration undermines the state's monopoly on legitimate coercion, as parallel entities can withhold security force action or manipulate judicial processes to ensure impunity for aligned actors, leading to inconsistent enforcement of laws and weakened internal cohesion.^[8] In Turkey, the Gülen movement exemplified this erosion through systematic penetration of the bureaucracy and security apparatus since the 1980s, creating a "state within a state" that challenged elected governance. By 2013, Gülenist control over police and judiciary enabled corruption investigations targeting ruling AKP officials, including ministers' relatives, which paralyzed policy execution and exposed internal divisions, contributing to economic instability such as the Turkish lira's devaluation. The movement's influence extended to one-third of flag officers by 2016, culminating in a failed coup attempt on July 15 that resulted in 270 deaths and directly threatened the state's command over its armed forces, necessitating emergency purges of over 70,000 personnel to reassert central authority.^[26]^[70] Broader implications include perpetuated governance fragility, as parallel states divert resources and foster public distrust in institutions unable to deliver uniform security or welfare. In contexts like Pakistan, military intelligence ties to non-state groups constrain civilian oversight, mirroring how parallel dynamics in weak transitional environments stall democratic consolidation and invite external influences that further dilute sovereign decision-making. While counterstrategies such as purges can temporarily restore monopoly, they often entail short-term disruptions to institutional continuity, highlighting the causal link between unchecked parallel proliferation and diminished sovereign efficacy.^[8]

Counterstrategies and Outcomes

Governments confronting parallel states have employed strategies such as personnel purges, institutional closures, and legal prosecutions to dismantle entrenched networks, often prioritizing rapid neutralization over long-term institutional reform. In Turkey, following the July 15, 2016, coup attempt attributed to the Gülen movement—labeled a "parallel state" for its infiltration of judiciary, military, and bureaucracy—President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan initiated widespread dismissals and arrests. Over 100,000 individuals were investigated, with approximately 41,000 arrested and tens of thousands dismissed from public service, including 40% of military generals.^[66] ^[65] A state of emergency, declared on July 20, 2016, and extended until July 18, 2018, facilitated these measures, enabling decree-based governance that bypassed parliamentary oversight.^[29] ^[71] Outcomes in Turkey included the significant weakening of the Gülen network's operational capacity within state institutions, with reduced influence in key sectors like education and law enforcement, as evidenced by the seizure of affiliated assets valued at $11–60 billion. However, these actions correlated with documented declines in judicial independence and human rights standards, including reports of arbitrary detentions and erosion of due process, drawing international criticism from organizations monitoring authoritarian consolidation. Initial public support for the purges, which temporarily lowered political polarization by framing the movement as an existential threat, gave way to concerns over power centralization under Erdoğan, contributing to a shift toward executive dominance rather than broader governance reforms.^[72] ^[73] In Thailand, efforts to counter the parallel state—comprising intertwined monarchy, military, and bureaucratic elites—have relied on military coups to reassert control against perceived encroachments by elected populist governments. The 2006 coup ousted Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, whose reforms challenged elite networks, while the 2014 coup by General Prayut Chan-o-cha dissolved a Thaksin-aligned government, suspending democratic processes under martial law. Since the 1932 end of absolute monarchy, Thailand has endured 12 successful coups, often justified as safeguarding national stability against "disruptive" electoral politics.^[74] ^[3] These interventions have perpetuated cycles of instability, with coups interrupting democratization and reinforcing the parallel state's resilience rather than dismantling it, as elite networks adapt through constitutional manipulations and judicial interventions. Outcomes include sustained elite dominance but persistent political crises, including protests and constitutional rewrites, undermining public trust in institutions and economic predictability, as seen in the post-2014 era's delayed elections and restricted civil liberties.^[75] ^[76] More targeted closures of parallel structures appear in Kosovo, where on January 15, 2025, authorities shuttered 28 Serbia-financed ethnic Serb institutions in northern municipalities, including administrative offices and health facilities, as part of efforts to assert sovereignty over parallel governance remnants from the 1999 conflict. This followed heightened tensions in the North Kosovo crisis (2022–2025, involving bans on Serb license plates and municipal boycotts.^[77] ^[78] Preliminary outcomes reflect enhanced central control and reduced dual administration, yet escalated ethnic segregation and security risks, with Serbia's non-recognition fueling diplomatic strains and EU-mediated dialogue stagnation. Kosovo's actions, while legally grounded in sovereignty claims, have prompted concerns over coordination failures with international partners, potentially hindering normalization talks and exacerbating minority integration challenges without parallel economic incentives for affected communities.^[79] ^[80] ^[81]

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