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Political polarization

Political polarization denotes the divergence of political attitudes toward ideological extremes, whereby subsets of a population adopt increasingly dissimilar views on parties, policies, and partisans, often intensifying partisan animosity and hindering cross-aisle cooperation.^[1]^[2] This phenomenon manifests in two primary forms: ideological polarization, reflecting substantive differences in policy preferences, and affective polarization, involving emotional dislike and distrust toward out-partisans, with empirical evidence indicating the latter has escalated more pronouncedly in recent decades.^[3]^[4] In the United States, where polarization has garnered extensive study, partisan ideological gaps have widened to historical peaks, as measured by self-reported conservative-liberal identifications, while affective metrics from surveys like the American National Election Studies reveal growing in-group favoritism and out-group hostility since the 1980s.^[5]^[6] Contributing factors include elite-level partisan sorting, whereby political leaders and activists first diverge on issues, cueing mass followers, alongside residential and social self-selection into homogeneous communities that reinforce echo chambers, though direct causal evidence for media-driven mass polarization remains limited.^[7]^[3] These dynamics have yielded legislative gridlock, eroded institutional trust, and heightened risks of political violence, as perceptions of extremism—often overestimated by engaged citizens—fuel mutual recriminations across ideological lines.^[8]^[3] While most pronounced in the U.S., similar trends appear in other advanced democracies, driven by analogous mechanisms like electoral incentives and cultural shifts, underscoring polarization's threat to deliberative governance.^[9]

Conceptual Foundations

Definitions and Distinctions

Political polarization refers to the divergence of political attitudes toward ideological extremes, whereby subsets of a population adopt increasingly dissimilar views on parties, policies, and political actors.^[1] ^[2] This process often involves a shift away from centrist positions, with groups clustering at opposing ends of the ideological spectrum on dimensions such as economic policy, social issues, and governance.^[10] A primary distinction exists between ideological polarization and affective polarization. Ideological polarization measures the extent to which individuals and parties hold divergent positions on specific policy issues or values, reflecting greater consistency and extremity in beliefs over time.^[11] ^[12] For instance, it captures growing divides on topics like taxation, immigration, or environmental regulation, where disagreement stems from substantive worldview differences rather than mere group affiliation.^[13] In contrast, affective polarization emphasizes emotional responses, characterized by in-group favoritism toward one's own party and out-group derogation toward opponents, often manifesting as distrust, contempt, or hostility independent of policy disputes.^[14] ^[15] This form involves an uncivil or antagonistic element, where partisan identity drives interpersonal animus, as evidenced by surveys showing Americans rating opposing partisans 20-30 points lower on feeling thermometers since the 1980s.^[3] ^[10] Polarization also differs by level: elite polarization among political leaders, donors, and activists tends to outpace mass polarization in the broader electorate.^[16] ^[7] Elite dynamics, such as party leaders adopting more extreme platforms to mobilize bases, can amplify public perceptions of division, even as average voters exhibit moderate overlap in views— with data indicating U.S. ideological polarization among elites accelerating since the 1970s while mass sorting has increased but remained asymmetric.^[9] ^[3] Related concepts include perceived polarization, where individuals overestimate extremity in others' views due to selective exposure or media amplification, potentially fueling actual divides.^[11] ^[17] These distinctions underscore that polarization encompasses both cognitive alignments and visceral reactions, with empirical measures like Pew Research surveys revealing affective gaps widening faster than ideological ones in recent decades.^[4]

Types of Polarization

![Affective polarization in the US from ANES data through 2020][float-right] Political polarization is commonly categorized into ideological and affective types, with distinctions also drawn between elite and mass levels. Ideological polarization measures the extent to which political actors diverge in their policy positions and ideological self-placements, such as on economic, social, or foreign policy issues.^[18] Affective polarization, by contrast, captures the emotional divide between partisans, characterized by increasingly negative feelings toward out-party members relative to in-party favoritism, often assessed via feeling thermometer ratings.^[18] ^[19] Elite polarization refers to growing divides among political leaders, legislators, and party elites, who have exhibited substantial ideological sorting and affective hostility since the 1970s, with congressional voting records showing minimal overlap between Democrats and Republicans by the 2010s.^[19] Mass polarization, occurring among the general public, shows more modest increases, particularly in affective terms; surveys indicate that while partisan identity has strengthened, the public's ideological positions on issues like government spending or abortion have not diverged as sharply as elites'.^[19] ^[20] Data from the American National Election Studies (ANES) reveal that affective gaps between Democrats and Republicans widened from about 15 points in the 1970s to over 50 points by 2020, driven more by elite cues than mass ideological shifts.^[18] These types interact dynamically: elite ideological polarization often amplifies mass affective responses, as voters perceive and mirror partisan conflicts signaled by leaders, though direct mass ideological divergence remains limited outside specific demographics like college-educated urbanites.^[19] Perceived polarization, where individuals overestimate out-group extremism, further exacerbates affective divides but does not always align with actual ideological spreads.^[21] In multiparty systems, affective polarization may manifest along ideological lines, with sentiments toward distant parties growing more negative, yet elite-driven dynamics predominate in explaining trends across contexts.^[22]

Measurement Approaches

Political polarization is quantified through distinct measurement approaches that differentiate between ideological divergence in policy preferences and affective animosity toward political opponents. Ideological polarization evaluates the extent to which individuals or groups hold divergent views on issues, often using survey-based scales to assess consistency and extremity of positions. For instance, Pew Research Center analyzes self-reported ideological placements and policy attitudes, finding that ideological overlap between Democrats and Republicans has decreased, with 92% of Republicans positioning to the right of the median Democrat as of 2014 surveys.^[23] This approach employs metrics like the share of consistent liberals or conservatives, which rose from 10% in 1994 to 21% in 2014 among the public.^[23] Affective polarization, in contrast, captures emotional partisanship by measuring relative liking or disliking of in-group versus out-group members, typically via feeling thermometer scales ranging from 0 (coldest) to 100 (warmest). The American National Election Studies (ANES) computes this as the gap between average ratings of one's own party and the opposing party, revealing a widening divide from about 15 points in the 1970s to over 50 points by 2020.^[24] This metric highlights growing partisan animus independent of policy disagreements, as validated in robustness tests showing consistency across survey modes and items.^[25] For elite-level polarization, roll-call voting analysis employs multidimensional scaling techniques like DW-NOMINATE to score legislators' positions based on bill support patterns, demonstrating increasing partisan separation in Congress since the 1970s, with Democrats and Republicans rarely overlapping in the first dimension by the 2020s.^[26] Advanced methods, such as entropy-based nonparametric measures, further refine mass polarization by accounting for distribution shapes beyond simple means, offering sensitivity to bimodality or clustering in public opinion data.^[27] Implicit association tests adapted for politics also probe subconscious biases, correlating with explicit thermometers to indicate deeper affective divides.^[28] These approaches collectively underscore polarization's multifaceted nature, though critics note potential overreliance on self-reports susceptible to social desirability effects.^[29]

Historical Context

Early Manifestations

The emergence of organized political parties in the late 18th-century United States marked one of the earliest manifestations of polarization, as Federalists favoring centralized authority clashed with Democratic-Republicans emphasizing decentralized power and agrarian priorities.^[30] This rivalry fueled intense partisan animosity, culminating in Federalist-backed legislation like the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798, which criminalized criticism of the government and targeted immigrant groups aligned with opponents.^[31] Such measures reflected not mere policy disputes but visceral distrust, with Jeffersonians decrying them as tyrannical assaults on liberty, exacerbating elite divisions that influenced public sentiment along geographic and economic lines.^[32] By the antebellum era, polarization intensified into sectional conflict over slavery's expansion, dividing the industrializing North—where emancipation laws had proliferated post-Revolution—from the slave-dependent South.^[33] The 1850 Compromise and subsequent Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854 repealed the Missouri Compromise's restrictions, igniting "Bleeding Kansas" as pro- and anti-slavery settlers engaged in armed clashes, with over 200 deaths reported by 1859.^[34] This violence underscored a causal rift: economic interdependence on cotton fueled Southern defensiveness, while Northern moral and free-labor ideologies hardened opposition, eroding cross-regional compromise.^[35] Public opinion surveys and election data from the 1850s reveal stark geographic sorting, with Northern voters increasingly coalescing against slavery's extension, as evidenced by the Republican Party's rapid rise from fringe status in 1854 to national contention by 1856.^[36] The 1860 election of Abraham Lincoln, who garnered only 40% of the popular vote but won via Northern majorities on an anti-expansion platform, triggered Southern secession ordinances within months, initiating the Civil War in April 1861.^[33] This episode represented polarization's acute form, where irreconcilable views on human bondage and federal authority dissolved national unity, resulting in over 620,000 deaths and Reconstruction-era animosities that persisted into the late 19th century.^[37] Unlike modern affective divides, these early instances were predominantly issue-driven, rooted in tangible economic and moral stakes, though they similarly fostered identity-based loyalties that hindered institutional mediation.^[7] In the Gilded Age (circa 1870–1900), partisan competition remained fierce, with parties capturing near-equal vote shares—often within 1–2% nationally—but ideological overlap persisted, as Northern Republicans and Democrats diverged more regionally than programmatically on issues like tariffs and currency.^[31] Congressional voting records show high intraparty cohesion on patronage and logrolling deals, yet low interparty polarization compared to peaks like the Civil War era, with frequent control shifts reflecting competitive balance rather than entrenched extremes.^[32] This period's dynamics, analyzed in roll-call data spanning 1876–1896, highlight how weak national party structures amplified local fissures, prefiguring later realignments without the uniform ideological sorting seen today.^[38]

Post-World War II Developments

Following World War II, the United States experienced a period of relatively low political polarization characterized by ideological overlap within parties and bipartisan cooperation, particularly in foreign policy. The Democratic Party encompassed conservative Southern members alongside Northern liberals, while Republicans included progressive Northeasterners and fiscal conservatives, enabling cross-party coalitions on issues like civil rights compromises and economic policy. DW-NOMINATE scores indicate that the ideological distance between the median Democrat and Republican in Congress was minimal during the 1950s, with overlap exceeding that of later decades.^[26]^[39] A bipartisan consensus emerged on Cold War containment strategies, exemplified by the Truman Doctrine in 1947, the Marshall Plan in 1948, and NATO's formation in 1949, which garnered support from both parties despite initial Republican isolationist sentiments. Domestically, the post-war economic boom and New Deal legacy fostered a broad agreement on Keynesian policies and welfare expansion, though McCarthyism from 1950 to 1954 highlighted tensions over domestic communism, temporarily elevating partisan divides. Affective polarization, as measured by feeling thermometer differentials in ANES surveys starting in 1960, remained subdued, with in-party favorability only modestly higher than out-party ratings until the late 1970s.^[40]^[41] Developments in the 1960s initiated gradual party sorting, driven by the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Voting Rights Act of 1965, which alienated Southern Democrats and accelerated conservative migration to the Republican Party under Barry Goldwater's 1964 campaign. The Vietnam War escalation after 1965 and associated protests further strained bipartisan norms, contributing to ideological divergence in Congress by the early 1970s, as evidenced by rising party unity votes. Watergate in 1972-1974 eroded trust but did not immediately spike polarization; instead, it coincided with the onset of elite-level shifts, where national party platforms became more distinct by 1972.^[39]^[42] By the 1980s, under Reagan, Republican conservatism solidified, narrowing intra-party liberalism, while Democrats consolidated progressive stances post-Great Society programs, marking the transition from heterogeneous coalitions to more homogeneous parties. This era's polarization, however, lagged behind mass public shifts and was less affective than ideological, with congressional DW-NOMINATE gaps widening steadily but not reaching post-Cold War peaks until later. Scholars note that while elite polarization advanced, voter ideologies remained moderately sorted, reflecting institutional inertia rather than rapid mass realignment.^[26]^[13]

Acceleration After the Cold War

Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991, political polarization in the United States intensified across ideological, partisan, and affective dimensions. In Congress, ideological divergence between Democrats and Republicans expanded steadily from the 1970s but accelerated in the 1990s, with the 104th Congress (1995–1997) marking a notable shift toward greater party-line voting following the Republican midterm gains led by Newt Gingrich's Contract with America. By the 2010s, average roll-call voting scores placed the parties farther apart than at any point in the prior 50 years, with over 90% of Democrats voting more liberally and Republicans more conservatively than their counterparts two decades earlier.^[26] Affective polarization, gauged by the American National Election Studies (ANES) through partisan thermometer ratings, exhibited a pronounced uptick post-1990, diverging from relative stability in prior decades. Prior to 1990, the gap between in-party warmth and out-party coldness hovered around 25–30 points; by 2000, it surpassed 40 points, reaching over 50 points by 2016 and continuing to climb through 2020. This trend outpaced ideological sorting among the mass public, where median partisan differences on issues grew but remained less extreme than elite divides, suggesting elite cues amplified public animus.^[43]^[44] The post-Cold War era's lack of a unifying external adversary has been cited as a contributing structural factor, redirecting competitive energies inward and exacerbating domestic fissures over culture, economics, and governance. Events such as the 1998 Clinton impeachment, the disputed 2000 presidential election, and the partisan battles over the Iraq War from 2003 onward further entrenched divisions, with congressional approval ratings plummeting to historic lows by the mid-2000s. Despite brief unifying moments like the September 11, 2001 attacks, polarization metrics resumed upward trajectories, culminating in heightened partisan conflict during the Obama and Trump administrations.^[45]^[3]

Causal Factors

Elite and Party Dynamics

Elite polarization, characterized by the growing ideological divergence among political party leaders, elected officials, and activists, has intensified in advanced democracies, particularly the United States, since the late 20th century. In the U.S. Congress, DW-NOMINATE scores—a measure of legislators' voting patterns on a left-right ideological scale—reveal a stark widening of the partisan gap, with the average difference between Democratic and Republican members increasing from about 0.8 units in the 1970s to over 1.6 units by the 2020s.^[46] ^[26] This elite-level shift stems from the exodus of moderate Southern Democrats toward the Republican Party after the 1960s civil rights era, coupled with the ideological purification of both parties through primary elections that reward extremity.^[26] ^[47] Party dynamics exacerbate this trend via mechanisms of self-reinforcement, where leaders strategically emphasize divisive issues to mobilize bases, reducing cross-aisle compromise. Empirical analyses of congressional behavior indicate that elite polarization precedes mass-level shifts, as party elites provide cues that shape voter perceptions and preferences; for instance, experimental studies demonstrate that exposure to polarized elite rhetoric prompts citizens to form opinions more along partisan lines rather than based on policy merits.^[48] ^[13] In the U.S., this top-down influence is evident in the correlation between rising congressional polarization from the 1980s onward and subsequent increases in partisan identity strength among voters, though mass ideological positions remain more moderate than elite ones.^[49] ^[50] Asymmetry in elite polarization exists, with data showing Democrats in Congress shifting leftward on economic and social dimensions since the 1970s, while Republicans have moved rightward, particularly on cultural issues, though the net partisan divergence is symmetric in aggregate voting records.^[51] ^[52] Party institutions, including gerrymandering and campaign finance rules favoring incumbents with strong partisan support, further entrench these dynamics by diminishing incentives for moderation; for example, the proportion of House members with centrist DW-NOMINATE scores (between -0.3 and +0.3) fell from over 20% in the 1970s to under 5% by 2020.^[53] ^[42] This elite-driven process not only amplifies affective animus between parties but also sustains feedback loops, where polarized leaders interpret public signals through partisan lenses, perpetuating the cycle.^[54]^[51] Public opinion trends in the United States reveal growing alignment between partisan identification and ideological positions, though mass-level ideological polarization remains limited. Analysis by the Pew Research Center of surveys from 1994 to 2014 found that the proportion of respondents holding consistently liberal views increased from 10% to 21%, while those with consistently conservative views rose from 5% to 16%; this ideological consistency became far more predictive of partisanship, with 92% of consistent conservatives identifying as or leaning Republican by 2014, up from 77% in 1994.^[55] ^[23] However, examinations of policy attitude distributions indicate that shifts often stem from partisan resorting—voters realigning with parties matching preexisting views—rather than widespread extremization of opinions across the electorate.^[13] Affective polarization in public sentiment has intensified more markedly, with partisan identifiers increasingly viewing the opposing party through lenses of disdain rather than mere disagreement. Data from the American National Election Studies (ANES) feeling thermometer measures, which rate parties on a 0-100 scale, show the gap between evaluations of one's own party and the rival widening steadily; by 2020, Democrats rated Republicans an average of 28 points lower than their own party, and Republicans rated Democrats 30 points lower, compared to gaps under 20 points in the 1980s.^[24] This trend persists into recent years, with ANES post-2020 data reflecting further divergence in partisan affect, though perceptions of polarization often exceed actual ideological divides, particularly among highly engaged voters.^[56] Social sorting amplifies these dynamics by progressively linking partisan affiliations with social, demographic, and geographic identities, fostering in-group favoritism and out-group hostility. Research documents heightened partisan spatial segregation, where from 1972 to 2020, the correlation between congressional district partisanship and voter ideology strengthened, with Democrats and Republicans concentrating in urban-liberal and rural-conservative locales respectively.^[57] Similarly, social identities such as race, religion, and education have sorted along partisan lines; for example, white evangelicals' Republican affiliation rose from 56% in 1992 to 81% by 2016, while non-religious identifiers shifted toward Democrats.^[58] This alignment heightens affective polarization, as individuals with fused partisan-social identities report greater enthusiasm for their side and anger toward opponents than those with cross-cutting ties, who exhibit lower emotional intensity but reduced political engagement.^[59] Cross-national comparisons suggest such sorting correlates with affective divides in established democracies, though U.S. levels exceed those in countries like Canada or Germany.^[60]

Media and Communication Shifts

The transition from a dominant broadcast television model to cable and digital media has fragmented audiences, enabling selective exposure to ideologically aligned content. In the United States, the deregulation of media ownership via the Telecommunications Act of 1996 facilitated the expansion of cable networks like Fox News, launched that year, and the partisan reorientation of MSNBC, which shifted toward liberal commentary by the early 2000s.^[61] This fragmentation correlates with rising partisan gaps in news consumption, as evidenced by time-series analyses linking increased cable TV penetration and computer-based media access to heightened polarization in public attitudes from the 1990s onward.^[62] Empirical experiments indicate that while media diversity alone does not fully account for polarization, sustained exposure to slanted cable news persuades viewers toward partisan views and reinforces tastes for like-minded sources, amplifying divides.^[63]^[61] The 24-hour news cycle, epitomized by CNN's around-the-clock coverage since 1980 but intensified by competitors, prioritizes sensationalism and rapid iteration over depth, fostering outrage-driven narratives that heighten affective animosity. Studies of cable news content from 2012 to 2022 reveal escalating ideological divergence, with Fox News and MSNBC diverging further from neutral benchmarks, contributing to viewer polarization beyond mere selection effects.^[64]^[65] Over-time exposure to such partisan outlets, disentangled from general polarization coverage, demonstrably shifts attitudes, with conservative-leaning viewers of Fox News exhibiting stronger Republican identification and liberal viewers of MSNBC showing analogous effects.^[66] This dynamic creates a feedback loop where polarized coverage anticipates and reinforces audience predispositions, outpacing social media's influence in driving mass polarization.^[67] Social media platforms, proliferating after 2006 with sites like Facebook and Twitter (now X), exacerbate fragmentation through algorithmic curation that prioritizes engagement via emotionally charged, partisan content. Research demonstrates that digital media facilitates "partisan sorting," where users increasingly align social ties and information diets with political identities, causal in rising affective polarization as measured by negative partisan stereotypes.^[68] While echo chambers—homophilous networks limiting cross-ideological exposure—exist, their prevalence is moderated; nonetheless, platforms amplify polarization by surfacing extreme viewpoints, with studies linking higher usage to misperceptions of out-party hostility.^[69]^[70] Contrary to root-cause claims, platforms like YouTube and Twitter intensify pre-existing divides rather than originate them, as evidenced by quasi-experimental designs showing limited attitude shifts from isolated exposure but cumulative effects via network homophily.^[71]^[72] These shifts have disproportionately affected public discourse since the 2010s, with Pew Research documenting a doubling of consistent ideological consistency in opinions from 1994 to 2014, coinciding with cable dominance and social media adoption.^[23] Causal analyses attribute part of this to media-induced selective exposure, though socioeconomic sorting and elite cues interact; for instance, partisan news consumption predicts 5-10% shifts in policy views, persisting briefly but compounding over repeated viewership.^[73] Critics from academic sources often underemphasize these effects relative to structural factors, yet data from diverse methodologies affirm media's role in causal realism: fragmented communication erodes shared facts, elevating tribal signaling over deliberation.^[74]

Institutional and Electoral Structures

Electoral systems significantly influence the degree of political polarization by shaping party competition and incentives for moderation or extremism. Majoritarian systems, such as first-past-the-post, tend to produce two-party dominance and greater ideological divergence between parties, as smaller or moderate factions struggle to gain representation, per Duverger's law.^[75] In contrast, proportional representation (PR) systems foster multiparty coalitions, which empirical studies link to reduced polarization by encouraging compromise and diluting zero-sum partisan battles.^[76] ^[77] Cross-national analyses indicate that PR-adopting democracies exhibit lower levels of affective and ideological polarization compared to majoritarian ones, though causation is mediated by cultural and socioeconomic factors.^[78] ^[79] In the United States, the single-member district plurality system amplifies polarization by rewarding parties that mobilize core bases rather than broad electorates, leading to legislative sorting where representatives diverge from median voter preferences.^[80] Gerrymandering, the partisan manipulation of district boundaries, exacerbates this by creating safe seats that insulate incumbents from general election pressures, shifting competition to primaries where ideologically extreme voters dominate.^[81] ^[82] However, aggregate national effects of gerrymandering on overall congressional polarization appear limited, as partisan advantages often offset across states, with stronger impacts on policy gridlock than voter ideology.^[83] ^[84] Primary elections in the U.S. further contribute by allowing low-turnout, highly partisan electorates to select nominees, incentivizing candidates to adopt extreme positions to avoid intra-party challenges.^[85] Evidence from congressional roll-call data shows that districts with competitive primaries produce more polarized voting behavior, though the causal link is not universal and depends on district competitiveness.^[86] ^[87] Reforms like nonpartisan or open primaries have been proposed to broaden participant pools and moderate outcomes, but empirical tests yield mixed results on reducing extremism.^[88] ^[89] Broader institutional features, such as bicameral legislatures and federalism, can entrench polarization in majoritarian contexts by enabling veto points that reward obstruction over negotiation.^[42] In the U.S., the Senate's malapportionment amplifies minority party leverage, fostering gridlock that reinforces partisan identities. Federalism, while allowing policy experimentation across states, intensifies national polarization when unified party control at state levels leads to divergent policies and intergovernmental conflicts.^[90] ^[91] Studies suggest federal structures mitigate polarization only in multiparty systems with PR, where cross-jurisdictional coalitions form; in two-party settings, they amplify partisan sorting.^[92] ^[93]

Socioeconomic and Cultural Drivers

Rising income inequality has been empirically linked to increased political polarization, with cross-country analyses showing a positive correlation between Gini coefficients and attitude polarization measures from surveys like the World Values Survey. For instance, a 2021 study across 57 countries from 1981 to 2014 found that higher inequality predicts greater divergence in left-right self-placement, though the direction of causation remains debated, as polarization may also exacerbate economic divides through policy gridlock. In the United States, time-series data from 1913 to 2009 indicate that while inequality and polarization trends coincide, Granger causality tests fail to establish inequality as a primary driver, suggesting mutual reinforcement rather than unidirectional causation. Regional socioeconomic disparities further amplify affective polarization, as evidenced by European studies where long-term economic decline in peripheral areas fosters resentment toward prosperous cores, leading to divergent partisan attachments.^[94]^[95]^[96]^[97] Educational attainment contributes to ideological sorting, with higher education levels associated with more liberal positions, widening the gap between college graduates and non-graduates. Pew Research data from 2016 reveal that among Democrats, the ideological divide between those with postgraduate degrees and high school or less education spans 1.2 units on a 10-point scale, compared to 0.6 units among Republicans, reflecting asymmetric polarization. Cross-country evidence from 2010–2020 surveys confirms an "education-polarization gradient," strongest in the U.S., where alignment between ideology and non-political values like openness to change intensifies with schooling, potentially due to selective exposure in academic environments. This sorting has accelerated since the 1990s, correlating with stagnating social mobility and credential inflation, though experimental studies attribute part of the effect to institutional influences rather than education per se.^[98]^[99]^[100] Cultural shifts, including rapid changes in social norms around family, religion, and identity, underpin polarization by heightening perceived threats to traditional values. Quantitative analyses of U.S. public opinion from 1972 to 2018 show that cultural initiatives—such as advocacy for secularism and multiculturalism—drive partisan divergence more than economic factors, with conservatives increasingly viewing progressive cultural dominance as existential. Immigration exacerbates this, as meta-analyses of European and U.S. data indicate that perceived cultural influx correlates with rightward shifts among natives, while elite framing polarizes responses: a 2022 study across six countries found that pro-immigration rhetoric from left-leaning parties widens attitude gaps by 15–20% along ideological lines. In the U.S., immigration policy debates since the 1990s have seen Democrats shift leftward on enforcement, contributing to partisan asymmetry, with white racial attitudes mediating 25–30% of the polarization per longitudinal models. Ethnolinguistic fractionalization further fuels affective divides, as 2024 research in diverse societies links negative outgroup attitudes to heightened partisan animus, independent of economic competition.^[101]^[102]^[103]^[104]^[105]

Empirical Realities and Controversies

Ideological vs. Affective Polarization

Ideological polarization denotes the widening divergence in policy preferences, issue positions, and self-reported ideological placements between political parties or groups.^[23] In the United States, mass-level ideological polarization has increased modestly since the 1970s, primarily through partisan-ideological sorting where individuals align their party affiliation more closely with their views, rather than a uniform shift toward extremes.^[106] For instance, Pew Research Center data from 1994 to 2014 showed the share of consistently conservative or liberal respondents rising from 10% to 21%, though significant overlap in views persists across parties.^[23] Elite-level ideological divergence, however, has grown more sharply, with congressional voting records indicating near-perfect party-line splits on key issues by the 2010s.^[107] Affective polarization, by contrast, captures the emotional dimension of partisan divides, characterized by heightened in-group favoritism and out-group animosity independent of policy disagreements.^[108] It is commonly measured using feeling thermometer scales, where respondents rate parties or partisans on a 0-100 scale of warmth; the gap between own-party and rival-party ratings serves as the indicator.^[24] American National Election Studies (ANES) data reveal this gap expanding from approximately 17 points in 1978 to over 50 points by 2020, reflecting a surge in negative evaluations of opponents.^[24] ^[109] This trend outpaces ideological shifts, as affective hostility has risen even amid stable or shrinking policy divides, decoupling emotional bias from substantive differences.^[12] ^[110] The distinction matters because affective polarization correlates with behaviors like reduced cross-party social ties and tolerance for undemocratic actions against opponents, amplifying risks beyond mere disagreement.^[43] Studies attribute its growth to identity fusion—where partisanship blends with social, racial, and religious cues—rather than ideology alone, fostering tribalism in American politics.^[22] While both forms coexist, evidence suggests affective polarization's rapid ascent since the late 1970s has uniquely intensified in the U.S. compared to other democracies, driven by endogenous factors like elite cues and media fragmentation.^[111]^[3]

Misperceptions and Exaggerated Narratives

Research indicates that individuals systematically overestimate the ideological extremism and policy radicalism of members of the opposing political party, contributing to heightened affective polarization despite relatively moderate average positions among ordinary citizens. In a 2018 study analyzing American National Election Studies data, Douglas J. Ahler and Gaurav Sood found that Democrats overestimated the proportion of Republican voters who are evangelical ministers by estimating 44%, when the actual figure was closer to 10%; similarly, Republicans overestimated the share of Democrats who are gay, lesbian, or transgender fabric designers or unionized teachers at around 30-40%, far exceeding reality.^[112]^[113] These misperceptions extend to policy views, with partisans assuming out-party members hold more extreme stances—such as Democrats perceiving greater Republican support for abolishing the Environmental Protection Agency or Republicans viewing Democrats as more favorable to open borders—than surveys reveal.^[112] The "Perception Gap," documented in a 2019 More in Common survey of over 2,000 Americans, quantifies this distortion, showing an average gap of 18 percentage points between perceived and actual beliefs of the opposing side on issues like immigration and patriotism, with the gap widening to 29 points among social media posters.^[114] For instance, Republicans estimated that 50% of Democrats identify as more liberal than Bernie Sanders, while the actual share was about 20%; Democrats similarly exaggerated conservative extremism beyond Donald Trump.^[115] Such errors are symmetrical across parties and most pronounced among the politically engaged, who view opponents as more uniformly radical, fostering narratives of existential threats that amplify intergroup hostility.^[3]^[116] Exaggerated meta-perceptions—beliefs about what out-partisans think of one's own group—further entrench these narratives, predicting support for partisan violence and reduced willingness to compromise, as evidenced in a 2020 PNAS analysis of survey experiments where correcting such views lowered hostility but did not fully mitigate affective divides.^[116] Media consumption, particularly from partisan outlets, sustains these distortions by overrepresenting fringe voices, leading citizens to infer that atypical extremists represent the norm; experimental corrections of factual misperceptions, however, often fail to durably reduce polarization, suggesting deeper cognitive and social mechanisms at play.^[117]^[118] This pattern holds globally but is acute in the U.S., where public worries about division reached 90% in 2020 polls, exceeding measured ideological divergence.^[1]

Global Comparisons and Unique Drivers

While political polarization has intensified globally since the 1990s, its magnitude and trajectories differ markedly by region and institutional context. According to V-Dem Institute data, societal polarization—measured as the extent to which populations divide into hostile political camps—rose across most world regions from 2000 to 2020, except in Oceania, with sharper increases in Eastern and Central Europe, Southern Europe, and the Balkans.^[119] In established democracies, the United States stands out for the rapidity of its polarization: a 2020 analysis of survey data from 1945 to 2016 showed U.S. affective polarization (dislike of out-partisans) growing faster than in Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia, or Germany, driven by widening partisan gaps on issues like immigration and economic policy.^[120] Perceptions of partisan conflict also rank high in the U.S., with 88% of respondents in a 2022 Pew Research Center survey across 19 countries reporting strong divisions, exceeded only by South Korea at 90%, compared to a median of 65%.^[121] Unique drivers often stem from country-specific institutional and socioeconomic conditions, amplifying common global pressures like income inequality and media fragmentation. In the U.S., the first-past-the-post electoral system concentrates competition into two ideologically distant parties, fostering zero-sum dynamics absent in proportional representation systems elsewhere; this structural rigidity, combined with elite cue-giving from party leaders, has sorted voters along racial, educational, and cultural lines more starkly than in multiparty Europe.^[122] European polarization, by contrast, frequently revolves around supranational integration and migration: in countries like Poland and Hungary, V-Dem indices highlight clashes between nationalist incumbents and pro-EU opposition, exacerbated by post-2015 refugee inflows that mobilized far-right support without the U.S.-style media echo chambers.^[123] A 2021 cross-national study linked higher income inequality to greater issue polarization in 46 democracies, but this effect intensifies in winner-take-all systems like the U.S. or U.K., where economic grievances translate into anti-elite populism more readily than in consensus-oriented Nordic models.^[94] In emerging democracies, ethnic or historical legacies introduce distinct causal pathways; for instance, in Colombia and Kenya, polarization traces to post-conflict power-sharing failures and tribal clientelism, rather than ideological sorting seen in the West, though global media diffusion has imported identity-based rhetoric.^[124] South Korea's extreme levels reflect generational divides over historical authoritarianism and North Korea threats, with youth disillusionment fueling anti-establishment protests distinct from U.S. cultural wars.^[121] These variations underscore that while technological and economic shifts propel polarization universally, domestic institutions and cleavage structures determine its perniciousness, with two-party dominance and weak mediation mechanisms yielding more entrenched hostility.^[125]

Consequences

Detrimental Effects

Political polarization fosters legislative gridlock by intensifying partisan conflicts, resulting in fewer laws enacted despite heightened stakes for those passed. In the United States, congressional productivity declined as polarization surged from the mid-1990s onward, with gridlock levels rising steadily over the past half-century.^[126]^[127] This impasse hinders effective governance, as divided powers amplify obstruction in polarized environments.^[42] Affective polarization erodes social trust, with perceptions of deepening divides directly lowering interpersonal confidence. Panel data from the United States indicate that increases in perceived polarization reduce generalized social trust by 2.4 to 2.7 percentage points, even controlling for actual ideological extremity.^[128] Experimental interventions reducing such perceptions boost trust in fellow citizens by up to 8.6 percentage points.^[128] This decline extends to everyday interactions, diminishing fairness and tolerance across partisan lines.^[129] Polarization strains interpersonal relationships, making individuals less inclined to form cross-partisan marriages, friendships, or social ties. Surveys reveal polarized citizens avoid out-party members, fostering social segregation that reinforces divides.^[108] In Europe, affective animosity correlates with avoidance and intolerance, amplifying intergroup threats and negative emotions.^[130] Extreme polarization heightens risks of political violence by dehumanizing opponents and normalizing aggression through elite rhetoric. In the US, partisan aversion predicts greater support for violence, with Democrats expressing hostility toward Republicans 8% more likely to endorse it.^[131] Threats against Congress members escalated tenfold from 2016 to 2020, alongside record-high hate crimes.^[3] While affective polarization alone does not directly cause violence, it creates fertile ground for leaders to incite it, particularly amid low self-control and impunity.^[3] Polarization undermines democratic stability by exacerbating antidemocratic attitudes and institutional distrust. In half of severely polarized developing democracies, regime ratings declined, linking pernicious divides to backsliding.^[3] Misperceptions of out-party norm-breaking fuel support for suppressing votes or subverting elections, persisting despite efforts to reduce emotional animosity.^[3] Overall, these dynamics impair compromise, policy responsiveness, and societal cohesion.^[132]

Constructive Aspects

Polarization can foster greater civic engagement by motivating individuals to participate more actively in democratic processes. Empirical studies indicate that heightened affective polarization correlates with increased voter turnout and political participation, as partisans feel a stronger stake in electoral outcomes. For instance, analysis of U.S. data shows that affective polarization positively predicts behaviors such as voting, protesting, and joining advocacy groups, which sustain democratic vitality.^[1]^[133] By sharpening ideological distinctions between parties, polarization offers voters clearer policy alternatives, enabling more accountable governance. In polarized systems, elections incentivize parties to differentiate platforms, reducing ambiguity and compelling leaders to deliver on promises to retain support. Theoretical models supported by cross-national evidence suggest this dynamic improves government quality, as competition in divided electorates weeds out ineffective policies more effectively than in consensus-driven environments.^[134] Elite polarization, in particular, has been linked to higher turnout without necessarily eroding institutional trust, providing a counterbalance to elite capture in moderate cases.^[54] Polarization also underpins collective action and social cohesion within ideological groups, serving as a psychological mechanism for mobilization toward shared goals. Research frames it as the foundation for effective crowd behavior and decision-making in diverse societies, where unified fronts amplify voices on issues like civil rights or economic reform. While excessive polarization risks gridlock, moderate levels historically correlate with breakthroughs in policy innovation, as clashing views compel evidence-based refinements over complacency.^[135]^[136]

Case Studies

United States

The United States exemplifies acute political polarization, featuring both ideological divergence and affective animosity between Democrats and Republicans. Affective polarization, gauged by the American National Election Studies (ANES) via feeling thermometer ratings—where respondents score parties from 0 (coldest) to 100 (warmest)—has escalated markedly; the gap between in-party and out-party evaluations widened from about 20 points in the 1970s to over 50 points by 2020, with trends persisting into the 2020s as out-party ratings fell further below 40.^[24] ^[56] Ideological polarization, tracked by Pew Research Center surveys, shows the proportion of consistently liberal or conservative adults doubling from 10% in 1994 to 21% by 2014, driven by partisan sorting where individuals align views across issues like immigration, economics, and social policies; Gallup data from 2024 indicate 37% self-identifying as conservative, reflecting entrenched divides amid demographic shifts.^[23] ^[5] Empirical analyses attribute U.S. polarization to elite-level cues in Congress, where DW-NOMINATE scores reveal increasing distance between parties since the 1990s, cascading to mass attitudes via media and social networks.^[23] Cable news outlets like Fox News and MSNBC, alongside social media algorithms, foster selective exposure, amplifying partisan identities over policy deliberation, though studies reject the internet as the primary driver given similar timelines across nations with varying digital adoption.^[111] ^[71] Geographic self-sorting exacerbates this, with urban-rural divides aligning Democratic strongholds in coastal metros and Republican bases in heartland areas, heightening cultural clashes on topics like gun rights and abortion.^[23] Notably, misperceptions inflate perceived extremism: Carnegie Endowment research finds Americans overestimate opponents' radicalism, with politically active individuals most prone to this error, sustaining affective divides beyond actual ideological gaps.^[3] ^[107] Consequences include legislative gridlock, evidenced by 20+ government shutdowns or threats since 1995, including the 35-day closure in 2018-2019 over border funding, stalling appropriations and eroding public trust.^[137] Heightened tensions culminated in events like the January 6, 2021, Capitol breach, where thousands gathered to contest the 2020 election certification, resulting in confrontations that injured over 140 officers and led to felony charges against 1,200+ participants.^[137] Threats against officials surged post-2016, with reports of violent rhetoric correlating to partisan disapproval rates exceeding 80% for opposing leaders by 2024.^[138] ^[139] Yet, polarization correlates with higher turnout—66% in 2020 versus 55% in 2000—suggesting mobilization benefits, though at the cost of compromise and institutional stability.^[140] Despite academic emphases on risks, data indicate actual political violence remains rare relative to rhetoric, with affective divides durable yet resistant to interventions like cross-partisan dialogues.^[141] ^[142]

European Contexts

Political polarization in Europe has intensified since the 2010s, driven primarily by socioeconomic grievances, mass migration, and skepticism toward supranational institutions like the European Union, though it manifests differently from the United States due to prevalent multi-party systems that encourage coalition-building over zero-sum bipartisanship. Empirical analyses indicate a significant uptick in ideological polarization, particularly along cultural lines such as immigration attitudes and national identity, with dictionary-based measures of legislative debates showing increased divergence between mainstream and challenger parties across EU countries from 2000 to 2023. Affective polarization—dislike of out-groups based on partisan affiliation—exists but remains lower on average than in the U.S., as voters in multi-party contexts often view multiple parties as viable rather than forming stark in-group/out-group binaries; however, it has risen notably in nations with strong populist challengers, correlating with declining trust in elites and institutions. A 2023 survey across 10 EU countries found high affective divides on issues like migration and climate policy, though less so on gender equality or welfare financing.^[143]^[144]^[145] The 2024 European Parliament elections exemplified this trend, with populist and nationalist parties—often emphasizing border control and economic protectionism—gaining ground amid voter dissatisfaction with inflation, energy crises post-Ukraine invasion, and perceived policy failures on integration. The Identity and Democracy group expanded from 73 seats in 2019 to 84, while the European Conservatives and Reformists held around 78, reflecting broader shifts: in France, Marine Le Pen's National Rally secured 31% of the vote, prompting snap national elections; in Germany, the Alternative for Germany (AfD) reached 16%, fueling street protests and attacks on politicians amid debates over migration quotas; Italy's Brothers of Italy, under Giorgia Meloni, maintained influence after national victories in 2022. In the Netherlands, Geert Wilders' Party for Freedom won 23% in 2023 national polls, forming a coalition government. These gains stem from empirical patterns where lower-income, less-educated rural voters increasingly back anti-establishment platforms, exacerbating urban-rural divides without the binary intensity of U.S. two-party dynamics.^[146]^[147]^[148] In the United Kingdom, post-Brexit polarization peaked around the 2016 referendum, with 52% voting Leave on sovereignty and immigration concerns, leading to enduring partisan animus that contributed to the Conservative Party's 2024 electoral collapse after 14 years in power; Labour's landslide victory under Keir Starmer reflected a realignment favoring centrist economics over cultural radicalism. Across Europe, multi-party fragmentation tempers affective extremes by necessitating cross-ideological alliances, yet persistent trends—such as V-Dem data showing democratic backsliding linked to partisan divides in 28 countries from 2000-2022—raise concerns over governance efficacy. While academic sources often attribute polarization to "populism," causal factors include verifiable policy outcomes like the 2015-2016 migration influx (over 1 million arrivals) straining welfare systems and fostering native backlash, rather than mere rhetoric. Mainstream media narratives, prone to institutional biases favoring pro-EU integration, may understate these structural drivers in favor of framing challengers as threats to norms.^[149]^[150]^[111]

Emerging Democracies

In emerging democracies, political polarization frequently arises from deep-seated identity cleavages, such as ethnic, religious, or secular-Islamist divides, which elites exploit through divisive rhetoric and populist mobilization. Unlike established democracies, these contexts often feature weaker institutions that fail to mediate conflicts, allowing polarization to fuse elite strategies with mass sentiments and erode democratic norms. Empirical analyses indicate that such polarization has intensified in countries like Brazil, India, and Turkey since the early 2000s, driven by economic inequalities, rapid democratization, and the rise of charismatic leaders who frame politics as zero-sum struggles between "the people" and entrenched elites.^[151]^[152] In Brazil, polarization escalated following Jair Bolsonaro's 2018 presidential victory, marked by campaigns emphasizing anti-corruption and anti-establishment themes that deepened societal rifts along ideological lines. V-Dem data show a steep rise in polarization from 2000 to 2023, correlating with events like the 2023 Brasília riots and ongoing trials of former leaders. A October 2025 survey revealed 83% of respondents viewing the country as more divided than two years prior, with perceptions of chaos attributed to figures like President Lula da Silva by 49% of the public, hindering legislative cooperation and fostering governance deadlock akin to U.S. levels.^[151]^[152]^[153] In India, Hindu nationalist mobilization under Narendra Modi since 2014 has polarized politics around religious identity, building on 1980s tensions between secularism and communalism, with V-Dem metrics indicating sharp increases in polarization over two decades. Turkey exhibits a more gradual but entrenched divide between secularists and Islamists, intensified by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's leadership since the early 2000s, leading to authoritarian measures against opponents and a breakdown in pluralistic discourse.^[151]^[152] These patterns yield consequences including electoral violence, as seen in Kenya's 2007 ethnic clashes killing over 1,000, and institutional erosion, where polarized elites undermine checks and balances to consolidate power. In severely polarized cases like Turkey and Kenya, identity-based animosities extend to mass levels, reducing tolerance for opposition and facilitating democratic backsliding, while emerging cases like Brazil and India risk similar trajectories if identity cleavages override policy deliberation. Cross-national studies highlight that without institutional reforms to depersonalize politics, such polarization perpetuates cycles of instability, as evidenced by declining democratic indicators in these nations post-2010.^[151]^[154]

Future Trajectories

Recent Trends and Data

In the United States, affective polarization remained elevated but showed signs of stabilization in recent years. Data from the American National Election Studies (ANES) 2024 Time Series Study revealed continued low feeling thermometer ratings for the opposing political party, with Democrats rating Republicans at an average of 28 out of 100 and Republicans rating Democrats at 25 out of 100, extending a downward trend from prior cycles. ^[56] This indicates persistent emotional distance between partisans, though the gap did not widen dramatically from 2020 levels. A September 2024 University of Pennsylvania study analyzing multiple surveys found that partisan polarization in attitudes and behaviors remained consistent before and after the 2024 presidential election, challenging narratives of acute post-election spikes.^[155] Pew Research Center surveys highlighted ongoing negative public sentiments toward political discourse. In a 2023 survey, 65% of Americans reported feeling exhausted when thinking about politics, 55% angry, and only 10% hopeful, with 61% describing conversations with those holding opposing views as stressful or frustrating—up from 50% in 2019.^[156] By July 2025, 80% of respondents stated that Republican and Democratic voters not only disagree on policies but also on basic facts, reflecting deepened perceptual divides.^[157] Ideological self-identification remained steady in 2024, with 37% identifying as conservative and 34% as moderate, per Gallup polling, suggesting that elite-level partisan sorting continues to outpace mass ideological shifts.^[5] Globally, affective polarization trends post-2020 varied by country, with the United States exhibiting one of the highest levels but slower recent growth compared to earlier decades. A cross-national analysis of nine OECD countries found U.S. affective polarization increased the most from 1980 to 2020, yet stabilized or slightly declined in some metrics during the COVID-19 period, unlike rises in ideological polarization elsewhere.^[158] ^[159] In Europe, surveys indicated mixed patterns, with declining trust in institutions correlating with stable or decreasing partisan animosity in select nations like Germany and the UK from 2020 to 2023.^[160] These data underscore that while misperceptions of polarization—often amplified among politically engaged individuals—persist, empirical measures of emotional and ideological divides have not uniformly escalated since 2020.^[3]

Potential Mitigation Strategies

Cross-partisan dialogue programs have demonstrated modest success in reducing affective polarization, with quasi-experimental studies showing that structured in-person conversations between individuals of opposing political views can decrease negative emotions toward out-parties, particularly when focused on non-contentious topics or personal motivations rather than policy disputes.^[161]^[162] For instance, interventions encouraging participants to discuss reasons for not identifying with the opposing party yielded temporary reductions in partisan animosity among both Republicans and Democrats, though effects often dissipate without sustained interaction.^[163] However, such efforts face challenges from partisan deliberative biases, where individuals selectively interpret information to confirm preexisting views, limiting long-term depolarization.^[164] Correcting misperceptions about the opposing side's norms and intentions represents another evidence-based approach, as pilot experiments indicate that aligning perceived ingroup attitudes with reality—such as revealing that one's own party is less extreme than assumed—can lower affective polarization by mitigating exaggerated fears of democratic threats from rivals.^[165] Empirical reviews confirm that interventions targeting fears of the out-group, including through fact-based corrections of stereotypes, outperform those focused solely on policy disagreements, though gains are typically short-lived without reinforcement.^[3] Broader intergroup contact, drawing from the contact hypothesis, similarly fosters prejudice reduction when interactions emphasize shared identities over divisions, but real-world applications often fail due to self-segregation in polarized environments.^[166] Institutional reforms like ranked-choice voting (RCV) aim to incentivize broader electoral coalitions, with proponents arguing it selects candidates who appeal beyond base voters, potentially moderating polarization; however, rigorous analyses of implementations, such as in San Francisco, find no significant reduction in polarized voting patterns or ideological extremism among winners.^[167]^[168] Similarly, curbing gerrymandering through independent redistricting commissions seeks to eliminate safe seats that reward ideological purity, yet causal evidence links primary electorates and nationalized media more strongly to legislator polarization than district boundaries alone.^[169]^[170] Media literacy initiatives and platform design changes show mixed results; while reducing social media exposure has been linked to lower policy polarization in short-term deactivations, comprehensive meta-analyses reveal limited causal impact of digital media on affective divides, attributing much to preexisting sorting rather than content algorithms.^[71]^[171] Interventions affirming individuals' self-worth to lower ego-defensiveness can temporarily bridge divides, but overall, large-scale reviews of depolarization attempts underscore no panacea, with many treatments yielding negligible or fleeting effects amid entrenched cognitive and social mechanisms.^[172]^[173]^[141]

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[PDF] Primary Elections and Partisan Polarization in the U.S. Congress
We test this claim using congressional elections and roll call voting behavior. Many of our findings are null. We find little evidence that the introduction of ...
[87]
Do Primary Elections Exacerbate Congressional Polarization?
May 28, 2024 · Do primary election incentives cause elected officials to take more extreme or partisan positions? We study this question for members of the ...<|separator|>
[88]
How did we get here: Primaries, polarization, and party control
Oct 12, 2023 · We examine the existing evidence on party primaries and political polarization in American politics and find that the existence or openness of primary ...
[89]
Nonpartisan primaries would ease U.S. polarization, advocates say
Sep 18, 2023 · There's a lot of discontent with America's political system, including with party-based primary elections. So reform advocates are urging ...
[90]
Partisan Federalism - Harvard Law Review
Competition between today's ideologically coherent, polarized parties leads state actors to make demands for autonomy, to enact laws rejected by the federal ...Missing: bicameralism mitigate
[91]
The State of American Federalism 2019–2020: Polarized and ...
The state of American federalism is characterized by polarization and punitiveness. As in previous years, political polarization continues to shape ...
[92]
[PDF] FEDERAL DEMOCRACY AND THE CHALLENGES OF POLITICAL ...
The interplay and tensions between politics within democratic governments and in the federal system can reinforce polarization. Hence, to cope with polarized ...
[93]
Federalism and Polarization - Law & Liberty
Apr 29, 2020 · Rather than contributing to polarization in an unhealthy way, state policy and administrative discretion might be seen as an accommodation to ...Missing: bicameralism mitigate
[94]
Income Inequality and Global Political Polarization: The Economic ...
Nov 23, 2021 · These conventional studies suggest that an increase in income inequality tends to translate into greater support for left-wing political parties ...
[95]
[PDF] Income Inequality and Political Polarization: Time Series Evidence ...
Rising income inequality and political polarization have led some to hypothesize that the two are causally linked. Properly interpreting such correlations ...
[96]
[PDF] Political Polarization and Income Inequality - Princeton University
Below we argue that this is consistent with party polarization on economic policy issues. Second, increased inequality might have made low income groups poorer ...
[97]
Full article: Regional inequalities as drivers of affective polarization
We contend that socio-economic inequalities between regions – both current and long-term changes – drive divergent patterns of affective polarization. We also ...<|separator|>
[98]
A Wider Ideological Gap Between More and Less Educated Adults
Apr 26, 2016 · Overall, 38% of the public expresses a mix of liberal and conservative positions. In both 1994 and 2004, nearly half (49%) had mixed attitudes.Missing: metrics | Show results with:metrics
[99]
Education and ideological polarisation: Cross‐country evidence and ...
Oct 9, 2024 · We investigate how ideological polarisation varies with educational attainment, explore cross-country variations in ideological polarisation and identify ...CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK · METHODS · RESULTS · DISCUSSION AND...
[100]
Education and ideological polarisation: Cross‐country evidence and ...
Sep 23, 2024 · These 'education–polarisation' gradients are linked to stronger align- ment between political ideology and non- political values, and greater ...
[101]
The great divide: drivers of polarization in the US public
Oct 28, 2020 · Our empirical and quantitative evidence suggests that political polarization in the US is mainly driven by strong political/cultural initiatives in the ...
[102]
Political elite discourses polarize attitudes toward immigration along ...
Oct 25, 2022 · Social polarisation may not be primarily caused by actual immigration, but by the political elite discourses surrounding it. That is, different ...
[103]
Immigration, Race & Political Polarization
In the case of immigration, the polarization developed when Republicans stood still and Democrats moved left. White racial resentment has been another feature ...
[104]
Immigration, Race & Political Polarization | Daedalus | MIT Press
Jan 4, 2021 · In the case of immigration, the polarization developed when Republicans stood still and Democrats moved left. White racial resentment has been ...<|control11|><|separator|>
[105]
Ethnolinguistic Attitudes as Drivers of Affective Polarization against ...
Jun 26, 2024 · This study explores the link between ethnic divides and affective polarization by proposing that individual differences in outparty affect towards ethnic ...
[106]
https://academic.oup.com/psq/article/137/4/645/6985995
[107]
Charting multidimensional ideological polarization across ... - Nature
Jul 2, 2025 · Here we present a methodology to quantify multidimensional ideological polarization by embedding the respondents to a wide variety of political, social and ...
[108]
Affective Polarization | Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics
Jul 16, 2025 · ... affective polarization. Since the late 1990s or early 2000s, Americans have increasingly received their news from slanted sources that echo ...
[109]
Partisan Affective Polarization: Sorting, Entrenchment, and Fortification
Apr 28, 2021 · Abstract. Partisan affective polarization, measured with feeling thermometer ratings, has increased gradually in the United States over a ...
[110]
On the contextual determinants of the interplay between ideological ...
In brief, our analyses show that ideological extremism and affective polarization overlap to a larger extent in older democracies, in parliamentary systems, in ...
[111]
U.S. is polarizing faster than other democracies, study finds | Brown ...
more than in Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia or Germany ...
[112]
The Parties in Our Heads: Misperceptions about Party Composition ...
Misperceptions about out-party composition are associated with partisan affect, beliefs about out-party extremity, and allegiance to one's own party.
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Democrats Are Wrong About Republicans ... - Politics News
Jun 26, 2018 · Ahler and Sood confirmed the 44 percent across Republican categories estimated by Democrats. Blacks made up about a quarter of the Democratic ...
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[PDF] How False Impressions are Pulling Americans Apart
... Perception Gap of 18, those who do post on social media have an average Perception Gap of 29 —a more than fifty percent increase. Source: More in Common (2019) ...
[115]
The Perception Gap
Our study explores how Americans tend to have a distorted understanding of people on the other side of the aisle, what causes it, and why it matters.Quiz · About · In The News · Cookie Policy
[116]
Exaggerated meta-perceptions predict intergroup hostility ... - PNAS
Jun 11, 2020 · Our research provides evidence that strong partisan biases in meta-perceptions are largely symmetrical for Democrats and Republicans.
[117]
Correcting misperceptions of partisan opponents is not effective at ...
Aug 20, 2024 · In summary, our evidence suggests that corrections of out-party misperceptions are ineffective in treating our democratic ills. Perceptions of ...
[118]
Correcting inaccurate metaperceptions reduces Americans' support ...
We found evidence that exaggerated perceptions of rival partisans' support for violence are a major cause of partisans' own support for partisan violence.
[119]
Reducing Pernicious Polarization: A Comparative Historical ...
May 5, 2022 · Rising polarization in Europe is being driven by deepening political divisions in Eastern and Central Europe, Southern Europe, and the Balkans.
[120]
America leads other countries in deepening polarization | Stanford ...
Jan 20, 2020 · America's widening political divide stands out above other nations, according to a new cross-country polarization study by Stanford economists.Missing: levels | Show results with:levels<|separator|>
[121]
Most across 19 countries see strong partisan conflict in their society
Nov 16, 2022 · A median of 65% of adults across 19 surveyed countries say there are strong or very strong disagreements in their country between people who ...
[122]
Drivers of US political polarisation: Three stylised facts and their ...
Aug 25, 2021 · Potential determinants for these trends in US political polarisation include racial divisions, elite polarisation, and cable TV news consumption.
[123]
Full article: Party system ideological polarization in Western Europe
This article aims to fill this gap by introducing a novel publicly available dataset of party system ideological polarization in Western European party systems.
[124]
How to Understand the Global Spread of Political Polarization
Oct 1, 2019 · Even in democracies as different as Colombia, Kenya, and Poland, many of the roots, patterns, and drivers of polarization were the same.
[125]
Political Polarization is Not Unique to the U.S., but its Causes Are
Oct 18, 2024 · Whether the cause is income inequality, economic recession, immigration or a winner-take-all voting system, these same causes will drive ...
[126]
Political polarization may slow legislation, make higher-stakes laws ...
Jan 26, 2024 · They found that as polarization increased, especially in the mid-1990s and 2000s, Congress passed fewer bills, but the bills they did pass were ...Missing: empirical | Show results with:empirical
[127]
Polarized We Govern? - Brookings Institution
In the new paper “Polarized We Govern?,” Sarah Binder finds that levels of legislative gridlock have steadily risen over the past half-century.Missing: empirical | Show results with:empirical<|separator|>
[128]
Social Trust in Polarized Times: How Perceptions of Political ... - NIH
Mar 18, 2022 · This study examines the consequences of perceived polarization for levels of social trust in the United States.
[129]
Trends in Political Science Research: Affective Polarization
Feb 13, 2025 · Affective polarization increasingly influences everyday social interactions, undermines trust, diminishes fairness, and erodes interpersonal ...<|control11|><|separator|>
[130]
Consequences of affective polarization: Avoidance, intolerance and ...
Aug 23, 2023 · Negative emotions arise in response to both intergroup anxiety and perceptions of 'realistic' and 'symbolic' threats posed by an outgroup (see, ...
[131]
Political Polarization and Political Violence - Penn State
It finds that in the United States, Democrats who express aversion toward Republicans are 8% more likely to express support for the use of political violence, ...
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[PDF] Coping with Affective Polarization: A Research Program
Affective polarization is especially harmful because it may inhibit coop- eration and compromise across political camps, reduce trust in government, increase ...
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https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/00323217251338496
[134]
Is polarization bad? - ScienceDirect.com
The adverse effects of political and social polarization on government policies are empirically well documented, yet some democracies seem to cope well or ...
[135]
Polarization is the psychological foundation of collective engagement
May 6, 2024 · Just as groups can make good decisions and people within crowds can act sensibly and rationally, polarization is not bad, in and of itself, and ...
[136]
When Is Political Polarization Good and When Does It Go Bad?
Apr 16, 2024 · Two kinds. Political polarization is the ideological distance between opposed parties. If the differences are large, it can produce logjams, ...
[137]
Gridlock From Polarization: The Current State of the United States ...
Nov 22, 2023 · Gridlock occurs when the two main parties have such differing ideals to the point that they are unwilling to compromise leading to policies being stuck or ...Missing: empirical | Show results with:empirical
[138]
At Disagree Better Event, National Security Experts Warn of the ...
Sep 22, 2023 · It can be measured in real-world impacts, such as the rise of violent threats against elected officials. Since 2016, threats against members ...
[139]
Latest Vanderbilt Unity Index shows the U.S. continuing its trend ...
Feb 14, 2024 · The Congressional polarization score for the 118th Congress stayed constant—88.55—throughout 2023; that was up one point from the fourth quarter ...
[140]
[PDF] Political Polarization and Voter Turnout: A New Political Paradigm?
Jul 16, 2025 · Similar trends were seen in 2008 and 2020 with each having a voter turnout of 61% and 66%, respectively, along with an increase in polarized ...Missing: empirical | Show results with:empirical
[141]
Why depolarization is hard: Evaluating attempts to decrease ... - PNAS
Sep 23, 2025 · Affective polarization is a corrosive force in American politics. While numerous studies have developed interventions to reduce it, ...
[142]
The unexpected durability of political animosity around US elections
Sep 4, 2024 · The long-term stability of partisan animus and other indicators of affective polarization suggests that the partisan divide is ingrained in ...<|separator|>
[143]
[PDF] Political polarization in Europe 2025. Documentos de Trabajo N.º ...
They offer a scalable tool for empirical research and policy analysis. We find that political polarization in Europe has increased significantly since the ...
[144]
[PDF] POLARIZATION IN EUROPE - f o r u m - m i d e m . d e
The empirical basis for the results presented here is a survey conduct- ed by MIDEM in cooperation with YouGov Germany in 10 European. Union countries. Between ...
[145]
Affective polarization in Europe | European Political Science Review
Feb 8, 2024 · Affective polarization, a concept that originated in the USA, has increasingly been studied in Europe's multi-party systems.
[146]
ECPS Report: 2024 European Parliament Elections under the ...
Nov 2, 2024 · Ivaldi, Gilles & Zankina, Emilia (Eds). (2024). 2024 EP Elections under the Shadow of Rising Populism. European Center for Populism Studies ...
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EU elections: populist right makes gains but pro-European centre ...
Jun 9, 2024 · Far right celebrates in France, Germany and Austria, but mainstream centre parties on course to hold majority.
[148]
Germany's political polarization spills into the streets ahead of ...
An analysis of political violence in Germany amid increasing attacks on politicians and stark political divides. 17 February 2025.Missing: comparisons | Show results with:comparisons
[149]
Does political polarisation undermine democratic accountability ...
Sep 3, 2025 · This research underscores the detrimental effects of polarisation on ... negative consequences of political polarisation on ...
[150]
A new regime divide? Democratic backsliding, attitudes towards ...
Jan 15, 2025 · Our paper theorizes and empirically explores a positive linkage between democratic backsliding and deepening partisan affect that restructures ...<|separator|>
[151]
[PDF] Democracies Divided: The Global Challenge of Political Polarization
The authors in this volume examine nine case studies: Bangladesh, Brazil,. Colombia, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Poland, Turkey, and the United States. All are ...
[152]
Political Polarization in Three Regional Powers - V-Dem
Dec 19, 2024 · This week's graph shows the steep (Brazil, India) and gradual (Türkiye) increases in political polarization from 2000 to 2023.
[153]
Polarization in Brazil nears levels seen in the United States | Politics
Oct 17, 2025 · National polarization has intensified over the past two years, fracturing Brazilian society to a degree comparable to that of the United States.<|separator|>
[154]
Polarization, fragmentation, and democratic deconsolidation in ...
Recent developments in countries as diverse as Brazil, India, Hungary, Turkey, and the United States have raised fears that democracy may deconsolidate in some ...
[155]
A New Study Shows That Political Polarization Between Americans ...
Sep 25, 2024 · A New Study Shows That Political Polarization Between Americans Stays Consistent Before and After Elections. Neil Fasching and Yphtach Lelkes ...Missing: trends 2023-2025
[156]
Views of American politics, polarization and tone of political debate
Sep 19, 2023 · In many ways, Americans' emotions toward politics today are as negative as their evaluations of the country's political system.
[157]
Most say Republican, Democratic voters disagree on basic facts
Jul 30, 2025 · Eight-in-ten U.S. adults say Republican and Democratic voters not only disagree on plans and policies, but also cannot agree on basic facts.Missing: United | Show results with:United
[158]
[PDF] CROSS-COUNTRY TRENDS IN AFFECTIVE POLARIZATION
In our baseline analysis, we find that the United States exhibited the largest increase in affec- tive polarization over this period.
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[PDF] Affective polarization did not increase during the COVID-19 pandemic
We document trends in affective polarization during the COVID-19 pandemic. In our main measure, affective polarization is relatively flat between July 2019 and ...
[160]
[PDF] POLITICAL POLARIZATION LONG-TERM TRENDS AND ...
Research scope of this WP includes identifying the quantitative indicators for the comprehensive assessment of political polarization; review the secondary data ...
[161]
The promise and pitfalls of cross-partisan conversations for reducing ...
Jun 22, 2022 · We argue that such conversations can reduce affective polarization but that these effects are likely to be conditional on topic.
[162]
Cross-Partisan Conversation Reduced Affective Polarization for ...
Our results suggest that cross-partisan conversation can effectively reduce affective polarization among both Republicans and Democrats even in contentious ...Missing: dialogue | Show results with:dialogue
[163]
Cross-partisan discussions reduced political polarization between ...
Jan 5, 2024 · A recent study finds that encouraging partisans to discuss why they do not identify with the out-party, does not reduce affective polarization.
[164]
A Waste of Time? Partisan Deliberative Bias as a Barrier to Political ...
Jul 28, 2025 · Here, three studies examine the presence of partisan deliberative bias, its relationship to cross-cutting political talk, and potential pathways ...
[165]
Explanations of and interventions against affective polarization ...
Oct 15, 2024 · Our pilot experiment shows that correcting ingroup norm perception can reduce affective polarization. We elucidate the theoretical underpinnings ...
[166]
What Are the Solutions to Political Polarization?
Jul 2, 2019 · 1. Intergroup contact. The “contact hypothesis” suggests that getting to know each other can reduce prejudice between groups. · 2. Perspective ...
[167]
Study: ranked-choice elections don't reduce polarized voting | SF ...
Nov 6, 2018 · San Francisco State University Assistant Professor of Politics Jason McDaniel's research shows that ranked-choice voting does not reduce ...
[168]
Does Ranked-Choice Voting Reduce Racial Polarization?
RCV implementation does not seem to reduce the level of racially polarized voting for the overall electorate. The conclusion holds even after examining each ...
[169]
[PDF] Does Gerrymandering Cause Polarization? - Princeton University
Oct 23, 2006 · In panel b, some Democrats represent conservative districts while some. Republicans represent liberal ones. But Republican representatives ...
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Does Gerrymandering Increase Polarization? - Divided We Fall
Mar 17, 2022 · Rob Richie (FairVote) and Sean Theriault (University of Texas at Austin) debate the impact of gerrymandering on political polarization.
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A systematic review of worldwide causal and correlational evidence ...
Nov 7, 2022 · We conducted a systematic review of causal and correlational evidence (N = 496 articles) on the link between digital media use and different political ...
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Cognitive–motivational mechanisms of political polarization in social ...
Aug 1, 2022 · In this Review, we provide a conceptual framework for organizing the literature on mass political polarization that can help scholars and ...
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Research Shows There Are No Easy Fixes to Political Hatred
Sep 23, 2025 · These “treatments” included everything from correcting misperceptions about the rival party to encouraging conversations with opponents and ...