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Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK) is the territory comprising Azad Jammu and Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan, regions captured by Pakistani forces during the 1947 invasion of the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir and subsequently administered by Pakistan in violation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 47, which called for Pakistan's withdrawal as a precondition for a plebiscite.[1][2] The area, spanning roughly 72,935 square kilometers, was part of Jammu and Kashmir, whose Hindu ruler Maharaja Hari Singh acceded to India on October 26, 1947, following tribal incursions backed by Pakistan's military, thereby integrating it legally into the Indian Union.[3][1] India views PoK as illegally occupied land essential to its sovereignty, a position reinforced by subsequent conflicts including the 1965 and 1999 wars, while Pakistan designates Azad Kashmir as a semi-autonomous entity and Gilgit-Baltistan as a de facto province without full constitutional rights, amid ongoing suppression of local demands for genuine self-rule or merger with Pakistan.[4][5] The region has experienced chronic underdevelopment, demographic engineering through settlement of non-Kashmiri populations, and use as a base for cross-border terrorism against India, fueling persistent unrest and protests against Pakistani administration, as evidenced by widespread demonstrations in 2024 over economic grievances and political marginalization.[1][5][3]Terminology and Overview
Definition and Etymology
Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK) denotes the portions of the former princely state of Jammu and Kashmir administered by Pakistan since the conclusion of the 1947–1948 Indo-Pakistani War, encompassing the regions officially termed Azad Jammu and Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan by Pakistani authorities.[6][7] This usage reflects the Indian government's position that these territories were unlawfully seized through a tribal invasion backed by Pakistani regulars in October 1947, prior to the Maharaja's accession to India on October 26, 1947.[8][9] The Government of India maintains that PoK constitutes integral Indian territory under illegal occupation, a stance reiterated in official statements such as those from the Ministry of External Affairs.[9] The etymology of "Pakistan-occupied Kashmir" traces to the immediate aftermath of the 1947 partition of British India and the ensuing conflict, when Indian discourse framed Pakistani advances into Jammu and Kashmir as an occupation rather than liberation.[10][11] The acronym PoK, standing for Pakistan Occupied Kashmir, gained prevalence in Indian political, media, and official parlance to underscore the contested nature of control, particularly after the 1949 ceasefire line (later the Line of Control) formalized the de facto division.[12] In Pakistani nomenclature, the primary administered area is designated Azad ("free") Jammu and Kashmir, a term adopted post-1947 to signify purported self-determination from Dogra rule, with Gilgit-Baltistan separately governed as a northern territory until its 1970 administrative reconfiguration.[2] This terminological divergence highlights the unresolved sovereignty dispute, with India's rejection of Pakistani claims rooted in the Instrument of Accession and UN Security Council resolutions calling for Pakistani withdrawal as a prerequisite for plebiscite.[8][9]Geographical Extent
The Pakistan-administered areas of the former princely state of Jammu and Kashmir, comprising Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK) and Gilgit-Baltistan (GB), cover a combined land area of approximately 86,268 square kilometers. AJK, the southern segment, spans 13,297 square kilometers and forms a narrow arc along the Line of Control (LoC) with Indian-administered territory.[13][14] GB, the northern segment, extends over 72,971 square kilometers and constitutes the bulk of the administered territory.[15][16] Geographically, these areas lie within the northwestern Himalayan and Karakoram ranges, characterized by steep valleys, high plateaus, and peaks rising from 2,000 meters to over 8,000 meters, including K2, the world's second-highest mountain at 8,611 meters in the Karakoram. AJK features lower Himalayan foothills with elevations up to 4,734 meters at Jamgarh Peak, interspersed with forested hills and river valleys, while GB encompasses more extreme alpine terrain, glaciers, and passes critical for regional connectivity, such as those along the ancient Silk Road routes.[3][17][18] The region's boundaries adjoin Pakistan's Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Punjab provinces to the west and southwest; the LoC separates it from Indian-controlled Jammu and Kashmir to the southeast and east; Gilgit-Baltistan borders Afghanistan's Wakhan Corridor to the northwest and China's Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region to the north and northeast, with additional limits against China's Tibet Autonomous Region adjusted by the 1963 Sino-Pakistani boundary agreement involving the Shaksgam Valley. Major rivers, including the Indus, Jhelum, and Neelum, traverse the terrain, shaping its hydrological extent and supporting limited arable land amid predominantly rugged, non-arable landscapes.[19][20][17]Historical Background
Pre-Independence Era
The princely state of Jammu and Kashmir was established on March 16, 1846, through the Treaty of Amritsar, by which the British East India Company sold the Kashmir Valley to Gulab Singh, the Raja of Jammu, for 7.5 million Nanakshahi rupees following their victory in the First Anglo-Sikh War. Gulab Singh, a Dogra Rajput, had previously expanded his influence under Sikh suzerainty, acquiring Jammu in 1820 and aiding the British against the Sikhs, which positioned him to consolidate the new state encompassing diverse regions including the western districts of Muzaffarabad, Mirpur, and Poonch—territories that later formed parts of Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK).[21] These western areas, part of the Jammu province, were predominantly Muslim-inhabited and bordered Punjab, fostering cultural and economic ties with Punjabi Muslim communities, with local economies reliant on agriculture, trade, and military service in the British Indian Army.[3] Under Dogra rule from 1846 to 1947, the state was governed as an autocratic monarchy with the Maharaja holding absolute power, advised by a council of ministers but without representative institutions until limited reforms in the 1930s.[22] In the PoK precursor regions, administration involved jagirdars and thakurs overseeing Muslim-majority populations, as in Poonch, where a hereditary Muslim jagir was maintained under Dogra oversight, though heavy taxation and corvée labor (begar) bred resentment among agrarian communities and demobilized World War II veterans denied pensions.[23] Muzaffarabad and Mirpur districts, integrated into the state's revenue system, saw Dogra officials imposing Hindu-centric policies that exacerbated ethnic and religious tensions in areas where Muslims formed over 90% of the population, contrasting with the Hindu-dominated Jammu core.[24] The northern frontier regions of Gilgit and Baltistan, incorporated into the state through military campaigns in the 1840s and 1860s, were administered semi-autonomously due to their rugged terrain and strategic border location.[25] Gilgit, conquered by Dogra forces in 1848 but unstable due to local tribal revolts, was ceded to British control in 1862 as the Gilgit Agency to counter Russian advances in Central Asia, with direct British administration from 1889 until a 1935 lease-back to the Maharaja that retained a British political agent until 1947.[26] Baltistan, similarly acquired amid conflicts with local Muslim rulers, remained under loose Dogra suzerainty with minimal central interference, preserving Shia and Ismaili communal structures amid sparse governance focused on tribute collection rather than development.[27] Socio-economic conditions across these areas reflected the extractive nature of Dogra rule, with land reforms favoring elite proprietors and Muslims bearing disproportionate burdens, fueling early political agitation by the 1930s through groups like the Jammu Muslim Conference, which highlighted discriminatory practices in western and northern districts.[28] British paramountcy provided external oversight via residents in Srinagar, enforcing treaties but not intervening in internal Hindu-Muslim frictions, which intensified as partition loomed in 1947.[29]1947 Partition and Tribal Invasion
The partition of British India into the dominions of India and Pakistan on August 15, 1947, required princely states such as Jammu and Kashmir—ruled by Hindu Maharaja Hari Singh over a predominantly Muslim population—to decide on accession to either dominion or, in theory, independence.[30] Hari Singh initially pursued a policy of non-alignment, signing standstill agreements on August 12, 1947, with both India and Pakistan to maintain existing administrative and economic relations pending a final decision.[31] Tensions escalated due to communal riots in Poonch district starting in August 1947, where Muslim rebels opposed Hari Singh's rule and Dogra forces' crackdowns, amid Pakistan's imposition of a trade blockade that disrupted essential supplies like food and kerosene to the state.[30] On October 22, 1947, an armed incursion began when approximately 20,000 Pashtun tribesmen (lashkars) from Pakistan's North-West Frontier Province and tribal agencies, equipped with modern weaponry and logistically supported by Pakistani military officers, crossed into Kashmir via the Jhelum Valley Road, rapidly capturing the town of Muzaffarabad after overcoming limited resistance from the state's 4,000-strong forces.[30] [32] The invaders, motivated by promises of loot and reports of anti-Muslim violence in Kashmir, engaged in widespread atrocities, including mass killings, rapes, and destruction of non-Muslim communities; estimates place civilian deaths during the initial advance at 35,000 to 40,000, primarily Hindus and Sikhs, with entire villages burned.[32] [33] Pakistani authorities, including tribal leaders and Frontier Province officials, orchestrated the operation covertly, denying direct state involvement while providing transport, arms, and intelligence; declassified accounts and eyewitness testimonies from participants later confirmed regular Pakistani army units embedded with the lashkars for command and control.[30] [34] As the tribesmen advanced toward Srinagar, reaching Baramulla by October 26 and causing panic in the capital, Hari Singh fled to Jammu and appealed for military assistance from India, which conditioned aid on formal accession.[30] On October 26, 1947, the Maharaja signed the Instrument of Accession, ceding defense, communications, and foreign affairs to India while retaining internal autonomy; India's Governor-General accepted it the next day, October 27.[35] [36] Indian troops were airlifted to Srinagar airfield on October 27, repelling the invaders from the valley and preventing its capture, though Pakistan subsequently committed regular forces, leading to their occupation of roughly one-third of the state, including areas that became Pakistan-occupied Kashmir.[30] [33] This invasion, framed by Pakistan as a spontaneous jihad against Hari Singh's "tyranny," marked the onset of territorial division along a de facto ceasefire line, with the tribesmen's undisciplined conduct—looting and halting advances for plunder—ultimately undermining their momentum against organized Indian defenses.[30][37]Indo-Pakistani War of 1947–1948
The Indo-Pakistani War of 1947–1948 arose immediately after the partition of British India on 15 August 1947, when the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir—geographically contiguous with both dominions but with a Muslim-majority population under Hindu Maharaja Hari Singh—delayed its decision on accession. Hari Singh initially pursued a standstill agreement with Pakistan for trade and communications while resisting pressure from Indian nationalists, but reports of attacks on Muslims in Jammu and delays in accession fueled unrest in the state's Poonch region, where demobilized Muslim soldiers from the British Indian Army protested Dogra taxation and rule.[38] On 22 October 1947, approximately 20,000 Pashtun tribesmen from Pakistan's North-West Frontier Province (now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa), organized into lashkars and supported logistically by Pakistani military officers, launched an invasion into Kashmir, advancing rapidly toward Srinagar while looting villages and prompting the flight of over 100,000 residents amid documented atrocities including killings and rapes.[39] [40] Faced with the collapse of state forces and the tribal advance reaching Baramulla by 25 October, Maharaja Hari Singh appealed to India for aid and signed the Instrument of Accession on 26 October 1947, formally integrating Jammu and Kashmir into the Indian Union subject to its defense, external affairs, and communications.[41] Indian forces, comprising the 1st Sikh Regiment and other units, were airlifted to Srinagar airfield on 27 October, repelling the invaders from the city outskirts in fierce fighting that prevented its capture; this intervention marked the war's escalation into direct Indo-Pakistani hostilities, with India notifying the United Nations of the accession's validity under the terms of partition for princely states. Pakistan denied official involvement, framing the incursion as a spontaneous tribal revolt against perceived Hindu oppression, though declassified accounts later confirmed coordination by Pakistani army elements under figures like Major General Akbar Khan.[38] [42] Throughout late 1947 and early 1948, Indian troops conducted counteroffensives, recapturing key positions such as Uri (November 1947) and pushing toward Muzaffarabad, while facing guerrilla tactics from tribal forces and Azad Kashmir rebels who had proclaimed a provisional government in October 1947. Pakistan maintained plausible deniability until May 1948, when it committed regular army units—estimated at 9 infantry brigades—to bolster the front, leading to stalemated battles in areas like Zoji La Pass (where Indian forces used tanks innovatively in high-altitude warfare to relieve Leh in November 1948) and Naushera. The United Nations Security Council, responding to Indian complaints of aggression, passed Resolution 39 on 20 January 1948 urging a ceasefire and establishing the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP); subsequent resolutions, including 47 on 21 April 1948, called for Pakistani withdrawal of tribesmen and nationals before demobilization of forces and a plebiscite under UN supervision, though implementation stalled over sequencing disputes.[40] [43] A formal ceasefire took effect on 1 January 1949 after UNCIP-mediated talks, solidifying frontlines into the Ceasefire Line (later redesignated the Line of Control in 1972), with India retaining approximately two-thirds of the territory—including the Kashmir Valley, Jammu, and Ladakh—and Pakistan controlling the remaining western third, roughly 84,000 square kilometers encompassing Mirpur, Muzaffarabad, and Gilgit-Baltistan. The Karachi Agreement of 27 July 1949, signed by military representatives, delineated this line for UN observers to monitor, dividing the region without resolving sovereignty claims.[44] [45] Casualties were significant: Indian official records report 2,226 soldiers killed and 7,870 wounded, alongside heavy losses among Jammu and Kashmir state forces (around 1,990 killed or missing); Pakistani estimates claim comparable figures, with India attributing higher enemy deaths (over 5,000) to the tribal phase's disorganized assaults.[46] The war entrenched the Kashmir dispute, with Pakistan administering its controlled areas as Azad Jammu and Kashmir and the Northern Areas, while India integrated its portion as a state, setting the stage for future conflicts amid unresolved UN-mandated plebiscite conditions requiring demographic preconditions that neither side fulfilled.[43]Political and Administrative Status
Indian Claim and Legal Basis
India maintains that the entirety of Jammu and Kashmir, including the territory known as Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK), constitutes an integral part of its sovereign territory based on the Instrument of Accession signed by Maharaja Hari Singh on October 26, 1947.[35][47] This document, executed amid an invasion by Pakistani-backed tribal militias that began on October 22, 1947, unconditionally transferred the princely state's defense, external affairs, and communications to the Dominion of India, with the Maharaja retaining internal autonomy.[35][48] Governor-General Lord Mountbatten accepted the accession on October 27, 1947, prompting the airlifting of Indian troops to defend the region, which India regards as the lawful response to the Maharaja's plea for assistance against aggression.[49] The Instrument's legal validity under the Indian Independence Act of 1947, which governed the lapse of paramountcy over princely states, forms the cornerstone of India's position, asserting that no subsequent events or territorial seizures by Pakistan in 1947–1948 altered this accession.[50] India contends that Pakistan's occupation of approximately 78,000 square kilometers of J&K territory—constituting PoK—represents an illegal aggression that violates international norms, as the state had already acceded before any plebiscite could be contemplated.[51] United Nations Security Council Resolution 47, adopted on April 21, 1948, reinforces India's stance by prioritizing the withdrawal of Pakistani tribesmen and nationals from J&K as the first step toward any plebiscite, a condition unmet by Pakistan, which India argues nullifies demands for a vote and upholds the accession's primacy.[52] Subsequent UN efforts, including those by the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan, reiterated this sequence—withdrawal preceding demobilization and plebiscite—but Pakistan's non-compliance, including its integration of occupied areas into administrative units like Azad Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan, has perpetuated the status quo from India's perspective.[53] On February 22, 1994, both houses of the Indian Parliament unanimously adopted a resolution reaffirming Jammu and Kashmir's integral status within India and demanding Pakistan's immediate vacation of occupied territories, cessation of support for terrorism, and respect for the Line of Control as a permanent boundary pending final settlement.[51][54] This resolution explicitly condemns Pakistan's actions as aggression and calls for the return of displaced persons and properties in PoK, encapsulating India's ongoing legal and diplomatic insistence on sovereignty over the region.[51]Pakistani Control and Governance
Pakistan administers the regions of Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK) and Gilgit-Baltistan (GB) as distinct entities separate from its provinces, maintaining their provisional status to preserve claims over the broader disputed territory pending a UN-mandated plebiscite.[55][56] Under Pakistan's 1973 Constitution, Article 257 stipulates that AJK's governance aligns with accession to Pakistan, while neither region holds full provincial status or representation in Pakistan's national parliament.[55] This framework ensures Islamabad retains authority over defense, foreign affairs, currency, and upper judiciary appointments, with federal oversight via the Kashmir Council in AJK and direct executive control in GB.[55][56] In AJK, governance operates under the 1974 Interim Constitution Act, which establishes a nominally autonomous structure including an elected legislative assembly of 53 members (45 directly elected, plus reserved seats for women, youth, and technocrats), a prime minister as executive head, and a president appointed by Pakistan's joint parliamentary committee.[55] The assembly legislates on residual matters not reserved for Pakistan, but the 2018 13th Amendment devolved limited powers while reinforcing federal veto through the Kashmir Council, comprising the AJK prime minister and Pakistani federal representatives.[57] Political parties affiliated with Pakistan's major groups, such as PML-N and PPP, dominate elections, as seen in the PPP's 2024 efforts to replace the AJK prime minister amid coalition shifts, holding 17 seats with PML-N support for a majority.[58] However, the constitution prohibits advocacy for independence or merger with Pakistan without plebiscite, curtailing dissent, and federal interventions, including military influence, undermine local autonomy during unrest, such as the May 2025 protests against wheat price hikes and electricity tariffs that prompted a communications blackout and school closures.[59][60] President Asif Ali Zardari responded in October 2025 by pledging reconciliation to address grievances.[61] Gilgit-Baltistan's governance, formalized by the 2018 Gilgit-Baltistan Order replacing the 2009 Empowerment Order, provides a legislative assembly of 33 members (24 directly elected, with reservations) and a chief minister, but operates under ad-hoc presidential ordinances without constitutional integration into Pakistan.[62] Pakistan appoints a governor who holds overriding powers, including ordinance issuance, while the region lacks voting rights in national elections and faces legal ambiguities that prioritize federal and military control over resources and security.[63] Reforms since the 1972 package under Zulfikar Ali Bhutto abolished feudal structures but entrenched centralized decrees, leading to persistent complaints of "obligations without rights," exemplified by 2025 rejections of bail for activists protesting taxation and land reforms amid state exploitation of legal liminality.[64][65][66] Army and intelligence agencies exert significant influence, continuing colonial-era restrictions adapted post-1948, fostering underdevelopment and resistance against perceived peripheral status.[67][68] Both regions experience governance marked by limited fiscal transfers—AJK receives about PKR 100 billion annually from Pakistan, GB less proportionally—coupled with corruption, infrastructure deficits, and suppression of pro-autonomy or independence voices under anti-sedition laws, as documented in international assessments of curtailed expression on territorial status.[56][69] This structure reflects Pakistan's strategic calculus to avoid full integration, which could undermine plebiscite claims, but has fueled local demands for constitutional parity, as evidenced by 2023-2025 protests and calls for reform.[70][55]Kashmiri Perspectives and Separatism
In Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK), Kashmiri perspectives on governance often center on demands for enhanced autonomy from Pakistani oversight, reflecting grievances over economic exploitation and limited self-rule despite the territory's nominal "azad" (free) status. Pakistani control extends to defense, foreign affairs, and currency, leaving AJK's legislative assembly with restricted powers, which fuels resentment among locals who view Islamabad's administration as neocolonial.[71] Protests in 2025, organized by the Jammu Kashmir Joint Awami Action Committee, highlighted these issues through a 38-point charter demanding reduced taxes, subsidies on essentials like wheat and electricity, abolition of official privileges, and constitutional reforms to devolve more authority to local bodies.[72] These actions underscore a perspective prioritizing functional self-determination over integration with Pakistan, with demonstrators clashing with security forces and prompting partial concessions from the AJK government on subsidies and tariffs.[73] Separatist sentiments in AJK occasionally advocate full independence rather than accession to Pakistan, though such views face suppression amid Pakistan's promotion of a pro-merger narrative. A 2009 survey by the UK-based Chatham House think tank found 44% of respondents in Pakistan-administered Kashmir favoring independence, with minimal support for joining Pakistan outright, indicating underlying dissatisfaction with the status quo.[74] Groups like the Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front have historically pushed for a sovereign Kashmir, but in AJK, activism more commonly manifests as rights-based movements critiquing resource plundering—such as hydropower projects benefiting Pakistan disproportionately—over overt militancy.[75] In Gilgit-Baltistan (GB), perspectives diverge further toward explicit separatist demands, driven by the region's provisional provincial status without full constitutional integration into Pakistan, leading to disenfranchisement and economic neglect. Balawaristan National Front factions have campaigned for independence, framing GB as distinct from Kashmiri-majority areas and resisting Pakistani assimilation. Recent protests, including those in 2024 against subsidy cuts on wheat, echoed AJK's calls for autonomy, with organizations like the Awami Action Committee demanding hydropower revenue shares and electoral reforms to address underrepresentation.[76] Historically, GB's 1947 revolt against Dogra rule briefly established an independent republic before aligning with Pakistan, a decision some locals now question amid ongoing exclusion from national parliamentary seats and resource inequities.[77] These movements highlight causal links between Pakistan's strategic prioritization of Kashmir disputes and local alienation, where promises of self-determination clash with enforced dependency.[78]Demographics and Society
Population Composition
The population of Pakistan-administered Kashmir, encompassing Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK) and Gilgit-Baltistan (GB), stood at approximately 5.54 million according to Pakistan's 2017 census. AJK recorded 4,045,366 residents across 13,297 km², yielding a density of 304 persons per km², while GB had 1,492,924 residents over 72,496 km², for a density of about 21 persons per km².[79][80] Religiously, the region is predominantly Muslim, exceeding 96% across both territories based on available estimates; AJK is nearly uniformly Sunni Muslim with a small Christian minority of around 4,500 individuals, while GB features a mix of Sunni (majority), Shia (significant in areas like Skardu and Nagar, historically over 50% but reportedly reduced through migration and settlement policies), and Ismaili communities, alongside minor Buddhist presence among some highland groups.[81][82][83] These figures draw from non-governmental trackers like Joshua Project, as Pakistan's census has not publicly disaggregated religion for these territories, potentially understating sectarian or minority shifts due to administrative incentives favoring a unified Islamic narrative.[84] Ethnically, AJK's composition includes Gujjars (the largest pastoral-agricultural tribe, comprising a substantial portion through nomadic and settled communities), Sudhans (a Rajput clan prominent in Poonch and Bagh), Jats, and smaller Kashmiri-speaking groups concentrated in the Neelum Valley; however, self-identified ethnic Kashmiris form a minority, with most residents tracing ancestry to Pahari or Potohari lineages akin to northern Punjabis rather than Valley Kashmiris, reflecting historical migrations and Dogra-era amalgamations.[85][86] In GB, diversity is greater due to terrain isolation, featuring Balti (Tibeto-Burman speakers in Baltistan), Shin (Dardic in Gilgit), Burusho (isolate language speakers), and admixtures of Pathans, Kashmiris, and Ladakhi-descended groups.[87] Pakistan lacks official ethnic censuses, complicating precise quantification, but linguistic proxies indicate fluid identities shaped by tribal endogamy over strict ethnic boundaries. Linguistically, AJK is dominated by Pahari-Potwari dialects (spoken by the majority, often classified under Western Punjabi continuum), alongside Gojri (among Gujjars), Kashmiri (limited to border valleys), Hindko, and Pashto minorities; Urdu serves as the official language.[88][89] GB employs Shina (Dardic, widespread), Balti (Tibetan-influenced), Burushaski (language isolate in Hunza), and Wakhi, underscoring ethnic fragmentation absent in official Pakistani portrayals emphasizing pan-Kashmiri unity. Urbanization remains low, at under 20% in AJK and even lower in GB, with remittances from overseas workers (notably Mirpuris in the UK) bolstering rural economies.[90]| Territory | Population (2017) | Density (per km²) | Primary Religious Groups | Major Ethnic/Linguistic Groups |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| AJK | 4,045,366 | 304 | Sunni Muslim (>99%) | Gujjars, Sudhans, Pahari-Potwari speakers |
| GB | 1,492,924 | 21 | Sunni, Shia, Ismaili (~95% total Muslim) | Balti, Shin, Shina/Balti speakers |