Fact-checked by Grok 2 weeks ago

Quickening

Quickening refers to the first detectable movements of a as perceived by the pregnant , typically felt between 16 and 22 weeks of and described as subtle flutters, bubbles, or pulses in the lower . Fetal activity actually commences much earlier, around 7 to 8 weeks post-fertilization, but these initial motions are too faint for maternal sensation until quickening occurs, with variations influenced by factors such as (earlier in subsequent pregnancies, around 13-16 weeks, versus 18-20 weeks for first-time mothers), maternal body type, placental position, and fetal activity levels. Historically, quickening marked a perceived of fetal vitality or in ancient and medieval thought, from Aristotle's view of it as the moment of animation to its role in traditions where it delineated legal protections for the unborn—rendering induced before quickening generally permissible or non-criminal in and early jurisdictions, while post-quickening procedures were treated as misdemeanors or felonies. This doctrine, rooted in pre-modern empirical limitations on detecting life rather than biological causation, persisted into the but eroded with advances in and revealing earlier developmental , leading to broader anti- statutes by the late 1800s that rejected quickening as the decisive criterion. In contemporary , quickening serves primarily as a reassuring clinical for assessing fetal well-being, prompting monitoring if movements deviate from norms, though it holds no legal bearing amid modern scientific consensus on from .

Biological and Physiological Aspects

Definition and Timing

Quickening denotes the first fetal movements perceived by the pregnant woman, often described as gentle flutters, gas-like bubbles, or light pulsing sensations within the . These movements arise from the 's neuromuscular development, enabling coordinated activity sufficient for maternal detection once the fetus measures approximately 10-15 cm in length. In uncomplicated pregnancies, quickening typically occurs between 16 and 22 weeks of gestation, calculated from the first day of the last menstrual period. Primiparous women (those experiencing their first pregnancy) generally report these movements later, around 18 to 24 weeks, due to less familiarity with sensations and thicker abdominal walls, whereas multiparous women may perceive them earlier, as soon as 13 to 16 weeks, from heightened awareness and thinner tissue layers. Variations in timing stem from physiological factors, including maternal (higher delays perception), placental location (anterior placentas attenuate movements, postponing quickening by 2-3 weeks), and . Although fetal motion begins internally around 7 to 9 weeks—evidenced by detection of twitching and rippling—it remains imperceptible until the second when amplitude increases. Absence of quickening by 24 weeks warrants clinical evaluation to rule out fetal distress or growth restriction.

Fetal Development Milestones

Fetal movements originate from the maturation of the neuromuscular system, with the earliest detectable activity observed via at 7 to 8 weeks of , manifesting as rudimentary flexions and extensions of the head, trunk, and limbs. These initial motions reflect the onset of functional neural circuits in the and , independent of higher cortical input. By 9 to 10 weeks, movements diversify to include yawns, stretches, and isolated limb actions, coinciding with the development of more coordinated myotomal activity and sensory feedback loops. At 11 to 12 weeks, behaviors such as opening, sucking, and swallowing emerge, indicating integration of cranial nerve functions and orofacial reflexes. Vigorous arm and leg extensions, along with tactile responsiveness, appear around 13 weeks, as the fetus grows to approximately 7-8 cm in length and skeletal muscles strengthen. Quickening, the maternal of these movements, typically occurs between 16 and 22 weeks of , when the reaches a size (about 10-15 cm ) sufficient to generate perceptible force against the uterine wall, overcoming . Multiparous women often report sensations as early as 16 weeks due to abdominal wall laxity and familiarity, whereas primiparous women sense initial flutters around 20 weeks. By 20 weeks, external by clinicians becomes feasible, confirming movement vigor as a viability indicator. Factors influencing perception timing include maternal , placental location, and , but these do not alter the underlying developmental sequence.

Clinical Monitoring and Health Indicators

Quickening, defined clinically as the initial perception of fetal movements by the pregnant woman, typically occurs between 16 and 22 weeks of and serves as a presumptive sign of and neuromuscular maturation. In multiparous women, these movements are often felt as early as 16 weeks, whereas primiparous women may not perceive them until 20 to 22 weeks due to differences in uterine sensitivity and . Healthcare providers routinely inquire about quickening during prenatal visits around 20 weeks to confirm maternal awareness of fetal activity, which correlates with fetal growth and strength. Clinical monitoring of quickening relies primarily on subjective maternal reports rather than tools, as it marks the onset of perceptible fetal motion before routine formalized begins around 28 weeks. Absence or significant delay in quickening, when expected based on and , prompts immediate assessment of fetal health, including of fetal heart tones via or real-time to verify cardiac activity and rule out demise. If viability is confirmed but movements remain absent, further surveillance such as a (NST) may evaluate fetal heart rate accelerations in response to motion, with at least three accelerations of 15 beats per minute lasting 15 seconds each in 20 minutes indicating reassuring status. As a , quickening reflects intact fetal neurological function and oxygenation, with signaling adequate for voluntary muscle activity detectable externally. Studies indicate that early patterns, including quickening, predict overall fetal , though reduced or absent activity at this stage can foreshadow compromise, such as , with up to 25% of reports of decreased motion linking to adverse perinatal outcomes. In high-risk pregnancies, earlier or intensified monitoring post-quickening—via scoring tone, breathing, and fluid volume—helps quantify risks, as persistent anomalies may necessitate interventions like antenatal corticosteroids or delivery planning. Concordance between maternal and ultrasound-detected movements is modest at around 37%, underscoring the need for clinical correlation rather than reliance on report alone.

Historical Context

Ancient and Medieval Interpretations

In , (384–322 BCE) interpreted quickening as the transition from a vegetative to a sensitive in the fetus, occurring approximately 40 days after for males and 80–90 days for females, marking the point when the acquired animal-like capacities for sensation and movement. This view, derived from empirical observations of embryonic development in animal dissections, influenced subsequent Western thought by positing staged animation rather than immediate at . Hippocratic texts (c. 5th–4th century BCE), while documenting pregnancy milestones such as fetal movement around the fourth month, emphasized physiological processes like menstrual retention forming the but did not philosophically equate quickening with soul infusion, focusing instead on humoral balances in . Roman interpretations, less philosophically detailed than ones, treated fetal development pragmatically under and . Roman jurists, such as those compiling the Digest (c. 533 under Justinian), penalized abortion based on the fetus's stage—distinguishing animatus (animated, post-formation) from informis (unformed)—with harsher penalties for later abortions implying awareness of viability or , though quickening as felt motion was not explicitly codified as a legal unlike in later . Medical writers like (1st–2nd century ) described quickening around 140–150 days as a of fetal , advising against inducing post-quickening due to maternal risks, reflecting a causal emphasis on observed vitality over metaphysical . Medieval Christian theology, synthesizing Aristotelian biology with biblical exegesis, largely adopted delayed ensoulment tied to quickening or formation. (1225–1274), in , argued for successive souls: vegetative at conception, sensitive (or "animal") at 40–80 days when the fetus resembles a living organism—often aligned with early quickening signs—and rational (human) upon bodily completion, viewing pre-quickening abortion as grave but not since the rational soul was absent. (354–430 CE) similarly endorsed Aristotelian stages, permitting early interventions before "vivification" (quickening) while condemning later ones, based on Exodus 21:22–23's distinction between accidental miscarriage and formed fetal harm. , as in Gratian's Decretum (c. 1140), reflected this by classifying pre-formation abortion as a lesser sin, with quickening serving as an empirical marker for animation, though debates persisted on exact timing due to variable reports of fetal motion. This framework prioritized causal development—form enabling soul—over immediate personhood, influencing ecclesiastical penalties until the .

Early Modern and Enlightenment Views

In , quickening was widely interpreted as the empirical sign of fetal vivification or , marking the transition from an unformed embryonic mass to a living being capable of voluntary motion, typically perceived by the mother between 14 and 18 weeks of . Medical texts and legal commentaries emphasized this event as the point at which became clinically and juridically recognizable, with pre-quickening stages often viewed as uncertain or non-viable due to the absence of observable activity. This perspective persisted from medieval precedents, rooted in Galenic and Aristotelian traditions that posited successive animations—vegetative, sensitive, and rational—culminating around quickening, though empirical limitations in prenatal observation reinforced its role as a pragmatic rather than a causal onset of life. William Harvey's De Generatione Animalium (1651) introduced rigorous dissection-based evidence from pregnant deer and other animals, demonstrating continuous generative processes and early organ formation, yet he retained quickening as the decisive marker distinguishing an inert "unformed mass" from animated life, thereby bridging traditional philosophy with emerging mechanistic anatomy. Harvey's work undermined strict preformationist or delayed hominization theories by highlighting developmental uniformity, but without modern imaging, quickening's tangible sensation remained the primary verifiable indicator of fetal autonomy in both medical practice and theological discourse. During the , obstetric advancements, including William Smellie's A Treatise on the and of (1754), incorporated detailed anatomical illustrations of fetal positioning and , affirming quickening as a key milestone for assessing viability while noting its subjective variability among women. Smellie and contemporaries like William Hunter emphasized man-midwifery techniques to confirm movements externally, yet uncertainties in early —such as ambiguous abdominal changes—sustained quickening's cultural and diagnostic primacy, even as rationalist critiqued soul-infused thresholds in favor of biological continuity observable post-conception. This era's shift toward empirical exposed quickening as a late-effect phenomenon dependent on prior physiological maturation, diminishing its metaphysical weight without fully displacing its practical utility in an age before precise embryological timelines.

English Common Law Foundations

In English , quickening—the first detectable movements of the in the womb, generally occurring between 15 and 18 weeks of —served as the critical distinguishing non-criminal from punishable offenses. Prior to quickening, induced abortion was not recognized as a crime, reflecting a legal that did not impute independent life to the until maternal of its activity. This distinction originated in medieval precedents influenced by views on fetal but solidified in secular by the 17th century, where pre-quickening procedures lacked statutory or judicial prohibition. Sir Edward Coke, in the Third Part of the Institutes of the (1628), formalized the rule by asserting that "life... begins in contemplation of as soon as [an] is able to stir in the mother's womb," rendering post-quickening abortion a but exempting earlier interventions from criminal liability. Coke differentiated this from the felony of murdering a born child, emphasizing that the absence of quickening precluded charges of or even serious , as the was not yet deemed viable in . His , drawing on earlier authorities like Bracton (c. 1250), treated pre-quickening acts as potential trespasses against the mother rather than offenses against the unborn. Sir William 's Commentaries on the Laws of (1765–1769) restated and popularized Coke's framework, describing the willful killing of a "quick" in rerum natura (in the course of nature) as a "great " or heinous , punishable by fine, , or , but not as unless the child was subsequently born alive and then killed. underscored that legal protections extended to the only upon , aligning with common 's empirical focus on observable signs of life rather than speculative , and he noted no equivalent for pre- abortions. This classification reflected causal realism in : harm to a non- did not equate to destroying independent life, as evidenced by the lack of prosecutions or indictments in reported cases before the . The common law's quickening doctrine persisted without statutory override until 1803, when Lord Ellenborough's Act first criminalized pre-quickening abortions as felonies, marking a shift from judge-made rules to legislative intervention amid changing medical and moral views. Throughout its dominance, the framework prioritized maternal testimony for establishing quickening, with judicial reliance on over abstract claims, ensuring that only post-quickening acts triggered state interest in fetal protection. In the American colonies, English governed , permitting procedures prior to quickening without criminal penalty while classifying post-quickening abortions as misdemeanors akin to the destruction of rather than . This framework persisted post-independence, as states adopted English through reception statutes specifying dates such as 1607 for or 1776 for others, absent contrary legislation, thereby embedding the quickening distinction into early American . Colonial records indicate rare prosecutions, primarily targeting post-quickening acts by untrained practitioners, reflecting a practical tolerance for pre-quickening interventions often managed through herbal remedies by midwives. Following ratification of the Constitution in 1788, the quickening doctrine remained the operative standard in the absence of statutory overrides, with courts interpreting fetal viability through maternal perception of movement, typically around 16-20 weeks gestation. A pivotal early affirmation occurred in 1812, when the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court dismissed charges against a physician for administering abortifacients before quickening, ruling that no crime existed under common law until fetal movement was felt, thereby reinforcing the doctrine's threshold for criminality. By the early , states began codifying the rule through targeted statutes, marking an evolutionary step toward explicit regulation while retaining quickening as the demarcation. Connecticut's law was the first, prohibiting post-quickening abortions as a criminal offense punishable by fine or imprisonment, though pre-quickening acts remained unaddressed. followed in 1829, elevating post-quickening abortions to status with penalties up to four years' imprisonment, while deeming pre-quickening attempts misdemeanors, thus adapting the inherited to emerging concerns over unregulated medical practices without fully abolishing the quickening benchmark. These enactments reflected a gradual formalization driven by medical professionalization and reports of maternal mortality, yet preserved the 's core distinction until broader reforms later in the century.

19th-Century Reforms and Decline

In , Lord Ellenborough's Act of 1803, formally the Malicious Shooting or Stabbing Act, established the first statutory ban on after quickening by prescribing the death penalty for administering substances or using instruments with intent to procure a once was felt, typically between 16 and 20 weeks . This legislation codified the distinction, treating pre-quickening abortions as misdemeanors while elevating post-quickening acts to capital felonies, driven by concerns over and public order amid the era's "" of harsh penalties. Subsequent reforms eroded this threshold. An 1837 amendment reduced post-quickening penalties to or , aligning pre- and post-quickening punishments more closely. The Offences Against the Person Act of further consolidated restrictions by criminalizing any attempt to procure a —whether by the pregnant woman or a —through or instruments, irrespective of quickening, with penalties up to ; it explicitly eliminated gestational distinctions, marking quickening's statutory obsolescence. In the United States, early 19th-century statutes mirrored English by prohibiting only after quickening, as exemplified by Connecticut's 1821 , the nation's first, which targeted post-quickening procedures to address perceived rises in illicit practices without challenging pre-quickening norms. By mid-century, however, physician-led campaigns accelerated reform; Horatio Storer, a gynecologist, initiated a national crusade in 1857 via the (AMA), decrying as unethical and dangerous, citing statistical claims of widespread fetal loss and maternal mortality from unregulated procedures. This advocacy, rooted in emerging embryological evidence of continuous fetal development from rather than abrupt at quickening, prompted legislative overhauls. Between 1860 and 1880, approximately 40 states enacted or amended laws to ban at all stages, often from or nidation, supplanting quickening's subjective criterion—which relied on maternal testimony and proved evidentiary challenges—with objective protections emphasizing and . The doctrine's decline stemmed from causal factors including professional medicine's consolidation, which prioritized standardized ethics over folk physiology; verifiable revealing by 6 weeks and pre-quickening; and practical legal hurdles, as quickening's variability hindered prosecutions. By century's end, Anglo-American had largely abandoned quickening, favoring earlier gestational safeguards amid declining tolerance for amid demographic anxieties and religious revivals.

Ethical and Philosophical Debates

Quickening in Personhood Arguments

In philosophical and ethical debates on fetal , quickening—the point at which a pregnant woman first perceives voluntary fetal movements, typically between 16 and 20 weeks —has been invoked as a indicating the fetus's transition to equivalent to a . Historically rooted in Aristotelian , this criterion posits that prior to quickening, the fetus possesses only a vegetative or animal soul, lacking the rational soul essential for full humanity; specified ensoulment at 40 days for males and 90 days for females, coinciding with perceived movement as evidence of sensitivity. This framework influenced medieval , where adopted a delayed hominization view, arguing that abortion before quickening does not constitute since the fetus is not yet fully ensouled, thereby granting it lesser protections. Proponents of quickening as a personhood marker in later ethical arguments emphasize its observable, experiential nature as signaling the fetus's capacity for independent action and potential , distinguishing it from earlier embryonic stages lacking detectable neural activity sufficient for or . In gradualist theories, quickening represents an incremental accrual of attributes—such as motor function and responsiveness—that cumulatively confer increasing rights, with some philosophers proposing it as a point for attributing full due to the mother's direct sensory confirmation of life. For instance, certain bioethical gradualism frameworks cite quickening's historical role in elevating the from mere potentiality to a being with interests that conflict with maternal post-perception. In contemporary discourse, particularly within ethics, quickening-based arguments have been advanced by some to justify trimester-like distinctions, aligning with pre-19th-century where pre-quickening interventions were not treated as feticide, reflecting a that personhood emerges with vivification rather than at fertilization. These positions, often drawn from historical precedents, contend that quickening provides a pragmatic, non-arbitrary boundary for balancing against , as the fetus's movements demonstrate a causal agency warranting legal recognition. However, such claims rely on phenomenological evidence rather than embryological data, which reveals fetal motility detectable via as early as 7-8 weeks, underscoring quickening's role as a subjective rather than objective ontological shift.

Criticisms of Quickening as a Moral Threshold

Critics of quickening as a threshold for fetal personhood maintain that it constitutes an arbitrary demarcation, lacking any substantive biological or philosophical justification for ascribing heightened status at that point. Historically rooted in pre-modern observations where was the earliest detectable sign of life, quickening—typically perceived between 16 and 20 weeks —fails to align with of human development commencing at fertilization, when a unique genetic entity forms. By the mid-19th century, medical advancements such as the enabled detection of fetal heartbeats as early as 6 weeks post-fertilization, revealing quickening as a late and perceptual event rather than a transformative onset of vitality, which prompted its legal abandonment in favor of broader protections. The subjective nature of quickening further undermines its viability as an ethical criterion, as the timing depends on maternal sensation, influenced by factors like , body mass, and placental position, leading to inconsistencies across pregnancies and individuals. Ultrasound imaging confirms spontaneous fetal movements from approximately 7 weeks , decoupling perceptible quickening from objective physiological activity and highlighting it as an observer-dependent artifact rather than a universal moral pivot. Ethicists arguing for at , such as those invoking the fetus's potential for rational agency, contend that no causal mechanism at quickening confers ; the entity remains a continuous throughout , rendering gestational thresholds like quickening philosophically incoherent absent of discontinuous . In moral philosophy, is critiqued for conflating phenomenological experience with , akin to historical errors in attributing based on visible motion, which modern has superseded with criteria like genomic uniqueness and . This arbitrariness mirrors critiques of later thresholds like viability, where shifting medical capabilities expose the instability of movement-based markers; physicians in the 19th century, through organizations like the , leveraged such evidence to advocate for protections from onward, viewing pre-quickening abortions as indistinguishable from . While some gradualist views propose incremental tied to developmental milestones, including quickening, these are challenged for lacking first-principles grounding in the inherent from its biological inception, prioritizing empirical continuity over perceptual happenstance.

Alternative Biological and Causal Criteria

Fertilization represents a primary biological alternative to quickening, marking the formation of a distinct through the fusion of gametes, resulting in a with a unique diploid and the intrinsic capacity for self-directed development toward maturity. This event establishes causal continuity, as the actively expresses genes and divides in a species-specific manner without external reorganization, distinguishing it from mere cellular aggregates or gametes. Proponents argue this confers full moral status from inception, grounded in the 's rational nature and teleological trajectory, rather than subjective perceptions like . Subsequent milestones, such as the detection of cardiac activity around 21-22 days post-fertilization (approximately 5-6 weeks ), provide objective indicators of integrated physiological function, including organized prior to quickening. Neurological development, including primitive EEG patterns by 6-8 weeks, further evidences emerging sensory-motor integration, challenging quickening's primacy as a for viability or . These criteria emphasize empirical in human ontogeny, where no abrupt ontological shift occurs at quickening, but rather incremental maturation of causal capacities like and response to stimuli. Viability, defined as the capacity for sustained ex utero (typically around 24 weeks with medical support), serves as another causal criterion favored by some clinicians, prioritizing relational and potential over earlier biological markers. However, this threshold is critiqued for conflating with irrelevance, as neonates and disabled individuals also require aid, and it varies with technological advances rather than fixed biology. Gradualist frameworks, prevalent in academic despite embryological of organismal unity from fertilization, propose escalating status tied to attributes like or relational bonds, though clinicians often reject pain perception as decisive in favor of viability. Causal underscores the embryo's active from fertilization, including epigenetic programming and self-organizing , as the foundational determinant of , obviating later perceptual events like quickening which reflect maternal rather than fetal . Empirical data from refute claims of mere "potentiality," affirming the zygote's actual powers for rational , unaltered by philosophical impositions of delayed status. While institutional biases in literature may incline toward later criteria to accommodate selective practices, primary sources in consistently affirm the human embryo's substantive identity and causal autonomy ab initio.

Modern Perspectives and Relevance

Scientific Advances Challenging Historical Views

Advances in and obstetric imaging have demonstrated that human commences at fertilization, establishing a , genetically distinct organism from the outset, rather than at the later stage of quickening. Standard embryology texts affirm that a new begins when and fuse, initiating continuous, organismal without discrete ontological shifts at perceptible movement. This view, supported by peer-reviewed biological research, contrasts sharply with pre-modern reliance on quickening—typically felt between 16 and 20 weeks —as the primary indicator of fetal animation, a limited by the absence of diagnostic tools. Ultrasound technology, refined since the , has revealed fetal milestones well before quickening, including detectable cardiac activity as early as 5-6 weeks post-fertilization, with heart rates progressing from approximately 110 beats per minute at 6.2 weeks to 159 beats per minute by 8 weeks. Spontaneous fetal movements, invisible to maternal sensation but observable via high-resolution imaging, emerge around 7 weeks, encompassing limb flexion, rotation, and general body shifts, patterns that evolve into coordinated behaviors by 9-10 weeks. Neural development further underscores continuity: the closes by week 4, thalamocortical connections form by week 7-8 enabling rudimentary , and electroencephalographic activity appears by week 8, predating quickening by months. These findings, derived from longitudinal studies and fertilization data, challenge historical demarcations by illustrating that quickening represents a subjective perceptual rather than a biological commencement. For instance, 4D captures early behavioral sequences—such as yawning, swallowing, and thumb-sucking—as early as 12 weeks, evidencing integrated neurobehavioral function independent of maternal detection. Genetic and epigenetic research reinforces this, showing totipotent post-fertilization yields a self-directing with species-specific developmental trajectory, unaltered by later events like quickening. Such empirical data, prioritizing observable cellular and physiological continuity over philosophical or sensory proxies, has shifted discourse toward fertilization as the empirical origin of , rendering quickening obsolete as a scientific criterion.

Post-Dobbs Legal Landscape

Following the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Dobbs v. on June 24, 2022, which held that the does not confer a right to and returned regulatory authority to the states, laws diverged sharply across the country. The Dobbs majority referenced historical traditions, observing that before quickening—typically detectable around 16 to 18 weeks —was not criminalized in early American jurisdictions, while post-quickening procedures faced increasing restrictions by the mid-19th century. This historical analysis supported the Court's view of longstanding state interests in regulating , but it did not endorse quickening as a modern legal standard. Post-Dobbs, state statutes overwhelmingly abandoned quickening as a criterion, opting instead for precise gestational timelines measured from the last menstrual period (LMP) or confirmed via , often tied to embryonic cardiac activity or viability thresholds informed by medical evidence. As of September 2025, 12 states enforce near-total bans on elective from or early , with exceptions only for life-threatening conditions, , or ; these include , , , , , , , , , , , and . An additional 6 states restrict most abortions after 6 to 12 weeks LMP—prior to quickening—including (6 weeks), (6 weeks), (6 weeks), and others like and (12 weeks post-ruling adjustments). Twelve states limit bans to post-viability (around 24 weeks), while 16 states and the District of Columbia impose no gestational restrictions, though some require or counseling. In rare instances, dormant pre-Roe statutes invoking quickening resurfaced amid the regulatory vacuum. Wisconsin's 1849 law, which prohibited "administering... any drug or substance" to procure miscarriage of a "quick child" (post-quickening fetus), led to a temporary halt in services after Dobbs due to prosecutorial threats, despite its original tolerance of pre-quickening procedures. A Dane County Circuit Court ruling on July 7, 2023, clarified that the statute targeted specific methods like poisoning rather than banning outright, allowing clinics to resume operations up to 20 weeks or viability under subsequent interpretations. The affirmed broader access in July 2024 by recognizing privacy protections under the state constitution, rendering the quickening-era language effectively obsolete. No other states currently enforce quickening-based limits; modern reforms in places like (repealed 1864 territorial ban in 2024) and (ballot-protected access) prioritize empirical fetal development markers over historical perceptual ones. This shift underscores a departure from quickening's subjective, movement-based threshold—reliant on maternal sensation without diagnostic tools—to objective criteria like ultrasound-verified (detectable at 5-6 weeks) or genetic viability from fertilization, reflecting embryological data unavailable to 19th-century lawmakers. Ongoing litigation, such as challenges to 15-week bans in states like , continues to test these limits, but quickening holds no prescriptive role, as evidenced by the absence of its mention in post-2022 enactments tracked by legislative bodies. Proponents of early restrictions argue they align with causal evidence of independent fetal and activity pre-quickening, while critics contend they exceed historical precedents cited in Dobbs.

References

  1. [1]
    Quickening In Pregnancy: First Movements & What To Expect
    Quickening is when a pregnant woman starts to feel fetal movement in her uterus. It feels like flutters, bubbles or tiny pulses.
  2. [2]
    Fetal Movement - StatPearls - NCBI Bookshelf
    ... quickening. One function of these movements is to alert the pregnant woman that she has a fetus growing in her uterus. Quickening often occurs between the ...
  3. [3]
    First Fetal Movement | Quickening in Pregnancy
    Some moms can feel their baby move as early as 13-16 weeks from the start of their last period. These first fetal movements are called quickening.
  4. [4]
    Quickening | Embryo Project Encyclopedia - Arizona State University
    Oct 30, 2007 · Quickening, the point at which a pregnant woman can first feel the movements of the growing embryo or fetus, has long been considered a pivotal moment in ...<|separator|>
  5. [5]
    Abortion in early America - PubMed
    In the British colonies abortions were legal if they were performed prior to quickening. In the French colonies abortions were frequently performed despite the ...
  6. [6]
    The Termination of the Quickening Doctrine: American Law, Society ...
    Apr 1, 1995 · By the end of the nineteenth century, the quickening doctrine was no longer the key to abortion law. The doctrine was dismantled for a variety of reasons.
  7. [7]
    Fetal Movement - WebMD: When You Feel Your Baby Kick
    You should feel your baby's first movements, called "quickening," between weeks 16 and 25 of your pregnancy. If this is your first pregnancy, you may not feel ...
  8. [8]
    Placental Site, Parity, and Date of Quickening - PubMed
    It is concluded that placental site influences quickening independent of parity and that it is a major factor in determining the stage at which fetal movements ...
  9. [9]
    Fetal development: The second trimester - Mayo Clinic
    Mar 18, 2025 · Halfway into your pregnancy, or 18 weeks after conception, you might be able to feel your baby's movements. This sometimes is called quickening.
  10. [10]
    Is it normal not to feel my baby's movements yet? - ScienceDirect
    Fetal movements are considered to start at about the 7th to 8th week of gestation. But maternal perception of the first fetal movement occurs long after ...
  11. [11]
    Ultrasound evaluation of fetal movements in pregnancies at risk for ...
    The first spontaneous movements of the fetus are detected by ultrasound at around 7 weeks post-menstrual age. The number and frequency of fetal movements ...
  12. [12]
    Studies in Fetal Behavior: Revisited, Renewed, and Reimagined
    We commemorate this work and provide historical and contemporary context on knowledge regarding fetal development, as well as results from our own research.
  13. [13]
    Fetal Movements in Pregnancy - News-Medical
    At the 14th – 20th week, a great event called quickening occurs. This is the first perception of fetal movement by the mother. Usually felt around 18-20 weeks ...Development Of Fetal... · Factors Which Interfere With... · Decreased Fetal Movements...<|control11|><|separator|>
  14. [14]
    Fetal development: MedlinePlus Medical Encyclopedia
    Aug 23, 2023 · This is called quickening, when mom can feel their baby's first movements. By the end of this time, your baby can swallow. Week 22. Lanugo ...
  15. [15]
    Antepartum Care in the Second and Third Trimester - NCBI - NIH
    Jul 18, 2024 · At approximately 20 weeks gestation, patients may begin to perceive fetal movement, also referred to as "quickening". ... pregnancy plans, ...
  16. [16]
    Fetal movements as a predictor of health - PMC - PubMed Central
    This review explores the available literature on the value of fetal movement analysis as a method of assessing fetal wellbeing.
  17. [17]
    Calculating pregnancy's duration in ancient greece. gestational, or ...
    Mar 6, 2017 · Hippocrates and Galen introduced a period between 270 and 280 days for a normal 9 month pregnancy, while Aristotle suggested more complex theories based on the ...
  18. [18]
    [PDF] An Historical Perspective on the Law of Personality and Status with ...
    Under Roman law, a monstrum was a grossly deformed fetus or child delivered by a woman and assumed to be without human form and intellect. The law of the Twelve ...
  19. [19]
    What Did St. Thomas Aquinas Believe about "Ensoulment?"
    Aquinas accepted the idea of formation, which he said occurs when a child receives a soul. But since abortion violates natural law whether or not the child has ...Missing: medieval interpretations
  20. [20]
    Images, science, and rights of the early modern fetus - PMC - NIH
    Jan 19, 2021 · English common law between the 16th and 18th centuries designated a pregnancy as “official” at the time of quickening, or about 14 to 18 weeks' ...
  21. [21]
    [PDF] The Cultural Context of Abortion Law in Early Modern England
    An examination of the law's cultural context in early modern England establishes that abortion before quickening generally was not "a serious crime,"'0 and the ...
  22. [22]
    1. Birth and the body | Giving Birth in Eighteenth-Century England
    58 For pregnant women, the changing shape of their bodies was only one element of the gradually intensifying physical and psychological experiences of birthing.<|separator|>
  23. [23]
    Hidden Truths of the Belly: The Uncertainties of Pregnancy in Early ...
    In early modern Europe, pregnancy was uncertain, with doubtful detection of a 'true fruit'. Women's bodies and language were often distrusted, and women were ...
  24. [24]
    Abortion in the USA and the UK - PMC - NIH
    From the 13th century to the early 19th century induced abortion was legal under English common law, before the onset of quickening at 15 to 18 weeks gestation.Missing: foundations | Show results with:foundations
  25. [25]
    [PDF] Abortion: Reform and the Law - Scholarly Commons
    6 An exception to the rule forbid- ding abortion after quickening developed rapidly in the common law; if the abortion was done in order to save the life of the ...
  26. [26]
  27. [27]
    [PDF] Equal Protection and the Unborn Child: A Dobbs Brief
    standing of “quick with child” was not dependent on a mid-pregnancy, maternally-felt. “quickening” is Blackstone's treatment of the plea of pregnancy in stay of ...
  28. [28]
    Untitled
    ” [Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England,. 394-395 (1769).] “Quickening” of the fetus (when a woman can feel the fetus first move in the uterus) ...<|separator|>
  29. [29]
  30. [30]
    Abortion in Colonial America: A Time of Herbal Remedies and ...
    Aug 22, 2022 · In May 1742 she started “taking the trade,” or an abortifacient to induce a miscarriage. The herbs, berries, and plants in the recipe were plentiful in New ...<|control11|><|separator|>
  31. [31]
    A Brief History of Abortion in the U.S.
    Oct 26, 2022 · Early 19th century and before. Abortion is legal in the U.S. until “quickening” · 1857. AMA campaigns to end abortion · 1860–80. At least 40 anti- ...
  32. [32]
    Abortion in the Nineteenth Century Through the Lens of Ann Lohman
    Feb 1, 2025 · On the other hand, providing an abortion after quickening was illegal; in New York State, abortion after quickening could be punished with a $ ...
  33. [33]
  34. [34]
    History of Abortion Law in the UK
    Initially, abortion was acceptable until 'quickening'. The 1967 Act legalized it, and the 1990 Act lowered the legal time limit to 24 weeks.Missing: foundations | Show results with:foundations
  35. [35]
    The first statutory prohibition of abortion: Lord Ellenborough's Act 1803
    An incident of the second trimester of pregnancy, quickening marks the first maternal perception of fetal movement. In associating the origin of life with ...
  36. [36]
    The Law of Abortion in England and Northern Ireland - Sage Journals
    The Offences Against the. Person Act of 1837 reduced the penalty for "post-quickening" abortion to transportation or imprisonment so that both varieties were ...
  37. [37]
    Horatio Robinson Storer (1830–1922) | Embryo Project Encyclopedia
    Sep 21, 2020 · Horatio Robinson Storer was a surgeon and anti-abortion activist in the 1800s who worked in the field of women's reproductive health and led ...
  38. [38]
    Horatio Robinson Storer and Physicians' Crusade Against Abortion
    Storer launched the crusade in 1857, in part to criminalize abortion and in part to bring respect to the medical field in a time when doctors were not highly ...
  39. [39]
    The Different Histories of Abortion in Europe and the United States
    Nov 26, 2012 · The U.S. and England, where quickening had carried the most legal weight, criminalized abortion during all stages of pregnancy by the late 1880 ...
  40. [40]
    [PDF] Foetal Personhood, Vagueness and Abortion - PhilArchive
    Among the possible candidates are 'conception, quickening, viability, consciousness, birth, self- consciousness,' etc.4 On one hand the issue of personhood ...
  41. [41]
    Pre-birth acquisition of personhood: Incremental accrual of attributes ...
    Quickening, –, Range varies, but fetal movement usually felt between 16 and 24 weeks EGA, May be deemed adequate to attribute full personhood, –, May attribute ...
  42. [42]
    When does the fetus acquire a moral status of a human being? The ...
    Jun 30, 2022 · Historically, “quickening,” when the pregnant individual feels fetal movement, at around four months or so, was thought to make all the moral ...Missing: arguments | Show results with:arguments
  43. [43]
    Answering the Arguments for Abortion Rights (Part Three)
    Quickening has traditionally referred to the first movement of the unborn felt by her mother. It was at this time in fetal development that some ancient, ...
  44. [44]
    [PDF] The Conception View of Personhood: A Review
    The conception view of personhood is based on the union of sperm and egg at conception, when full genetic material is established.
  45. [45]
    The Camouflaged Metaphysics of Embryos
    Apr 27, 2023 · Many pointed to a time of quickening, when the mother becomes aware of the fetus, thought to be around four months of pregnancy, as the starting ...
  46. [46]
    The Fight Over Abortion History - The New York Times
    May 4, 2022 · For decades after the founding of the United States, common law did not regulate abortion, or even recognize that abortion was happening at ...
  47. [47]
    Ethics - Abortion: When is the foetus 'alive'? - BBC
    This happens about a week after conception. this point is easy to identify; but this point is just as arbitrary as any other date. 'Quickening'. This is when ...
  48. [48]
    Is 'viability' viable? Abortion, conceptual confusion and the law in ...
    The theory that 'quickening,' the moment that fetal movement is first perceived, marked a morally significant moment in fetal development persisted throughout ...
  49. [49]
    Revisiting the argument from fetal potential - PMC - PubMed Central
    The argument from potential states that a fetus's potential to become a person with rational, self-conscious, autonomous, and moral agent capacity makes its ...
  50. [50]
    Is 'viability' viable? Abortion, conceptual confusion and the law in ...
    Oct 9, 2020 · The theory that 'quickening,' the moment that fetal movement is first perceived, marked a morally significant moment in fetal development ...
  51. [51]
    Embryonic human persons. Talking Point on morality and ... - NIH
    In this article, we provide some of the evidence that human embryos are indeed human beings and, as such, deserve a level of respect that is incompatible with ...
  52. [52]
    Clinicians' criteria for fetal moral status: viability and relationality, not ...
    Aug 21, 2024 · Clinicians view fetal moral status as based on viability, the ability to live outside the uterus, and not on the ability to feel pain.
  53. [53]
    [PDF] Science is clear: Each new human life begins at fertilization
    Jan 13, 2013 · Development begins with fertilization, the process by which the male gamete, the sperm, and the femal gamete, the oocyte, unite to give rise to ...
  54. [54]
    THE FACTS AND DOUBTS ABOUT BEGINNING OF THE HUMAN ...
    Thus, even in the absence of legal rights, there is no denying that the embryo constitutes the beginning of human life, a member of the human family.
  55. [55]
    Role of ultrasound in the evaluation of first-trimester pregnancies in ...
    The fetal heart rate gradually increases with gestational age from approximately 110 beats per minute (bpm) at 6.2 weeks to approximately 159 bpm at 7.6-8.0 ...Missing: quickening | Show results with:quickening
  56. [56]
    A Scientific View of When Life Begins - Lozier Institute
    Jun 11, 2014 · The conclusion that human life begins at sperm-egg fusion is uncontested, objective, based on the universally accepted scientific method of ...
  57. [57]
    The beginning of becoming a human - PMC - NIH
    May 6, 2024 · The first challenge to the 14-day rule arose in 2014 when a group of scientists used a morphogen to induce a cluster of human pluripotent stem ...
  58. [58]
    [PDF] 19-1392 Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization (06/24/2022)
    Jun 24, 2022 · Until the latter part of the 20th century, there was no support in American law for a constitutional right to obtain an abortion. No state ...
  59. [59]
    Summary State Abortion Laws: Protections and Restrictions
    Also, note that laws have been changing rapidly since the Dobbs decision. Ongoing litigation in several states will provide clarity on the enforcement of ...
  60. [60]
    How Wisconsin's 1800s-era abortion ban came to be - WPR
    Aug 7, 2023 · Under Wisconsin's original 1849 abortion ban, abortion was only illegal after quickening. The law deemed “the willful killing of an unborn quick ...<|control11|><|separator|>
  61. [61]
    Wisconsin's convoluted history of abortion laws
    Jul 1, 2024 · But in 2023, the decision to resume abortion services in the state came swiftly after a Dane County judge ruled that the 174-year-old law does ...
  62. [62]
    [PDF] 2025 WI 32 - Wisconsin Court System
    Jul 2, 2025 · And more recently, after Dobbs, the Supreme Court of Guam concluded that laws banning “partial-birth abortion,” regulating voluntary and ...
  63. [63]
    Abortion regulations by state - Ballotpedia
    Voters approved measures providing for a state constitutional right to abortion in Arizona, Colorado, Maryland, Missouri, Montana, New York, and Nevada.
  64. [64]
    [PDF] History, Tradition, and the Uncertain Future of a Nationwide Abortion ...
    After Dobbs, a nationwide abortion ban could be achieved through a federal statute or by arguing for fetal personhood under the Fourteenth Amendment.<|separator|>