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Omar al-Bashir


Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir (born 1 January 1944) is a Sudanese former military officer who seized power in an Islamist-backed military coup on 30 June 1989 and served as until formally assuming the on 16 October 1993, ruling until his ouster on 11 April 2019.
His three-decade tenure involved the implementation of strict law, hosting international terrorists including , prolonged civil wars that contributed to South Sudan's independence in 2011, and the conflict where government forces and allied militias were accused of systematic atrocities against non-Arab populations.
In 2009 and 2010, the issued warrants against al-Bashir for war crimes, , and in , making him the first sitting to face such charges, though rejected the court's and he evaded until his removal.
Amid and mass protests, the deposed him in 2019, leading to his imprisonment on charges of corruption and inciting violence, while ongoing domestic trials address the 1989 coup and other abuses.

Early life and military career

Birth and family background

Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir was born on 1 January 1944 in Hosh Bannaga (also rendered as Hosh Wad Banaqa), a rural village approximately 150 kilometers north of in northern , then under Anglo-Egyptian condominium rule. He originated from a modest family of the Ja'alin (al-Ja'aliyin) tribe, an Arab group historically associated with riverine communities along the in northern . The family's socioeconomic background was typical of rural agrarian households in the region, centered on subsistence farming amid the semi-arid conditions of the . Public details on his parents and siblings remain limited, with his father's name not widely documented in available records. This humble tribal and familial origin contrasted with al-Bashir's later ascent through military and political hierarchies.

Education and initial military service

Al-Bashir completed his secondary education in before joining the in 1960 at the age of 16. He underwent military training at academies in both , , and , , with the latter institution granting him a commission as a upon his graduation in 1966. Following his commissioning, al-Bashir served in initial postings within the Sudanese army, including units, and received further training in parachuting and armor operations. In 1973, as a lieutenant, he participated in the , deploying with a Sudanese contingent attached to forces against in the . Upon returning to later that year, he was promoted to captain and assigned to command roles in and brigades, marking the beginning of his rise through the officer ranks amid the army's post-war reorganizations.

Service in regional conflicts

Al-Bashir joined the in 1960 and graduated from the Sudan Military Academy in 1966, after which he pursued further training at a military college in , . In , as a in the Sudanese contingent attached to Egyptian forces, he participated in the [Yom Kippur War](/page/Yom Kippur War) against , contributing to the Arab coalition's initial advances across the before the conflict's eventual ceasefire on October 25. Upon returning to Sudan, al-Bashir received rapid promotions within the army, serving in various commands including airborne and armored units. By the early 1980s, amid the onset of the Second Sudanese Civil War in 1983, he led military operations in southern against the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) led by , focusing on counterinsurgency efforts in contested regions like the and areas. In 1981, he assumed command of an armored parachute brigade, which deployed in these campaigns to suppress rebel advances and secure government control over oil-rich territories. These operations involved intense ground engagements and aerial support, reflecting the Sudanese army's strategy of combining conventional tactics with militia auxiliaries against the SPLA's . Al-Bashir's experience in these conflicts honed his leadership in , though Sudanese government reports from the era emphasized tactical successes while independent analyses later highlighted high civilian casualties and displacement. By 1987, as a on the army's general staff, he continued overseeing southern front and planning, bridging regional deployments like the with domestic insurgencies.

Rise to power

Political instability under

assumed the role of following multiparty elections in April 1986, forming an initial coalition government comprising his Party, the (), the (), and several southern parties. This fragile alliance quickly unraveled amid persistent factionalism, with the withdrawing in August 1987 over disputes regarding appointments to the Supreme Council. A reconfigured emerged in May 1988, but internal rivalries and policy disagreements persisted, exemplified by the 's exit in November 1988 after Mahdi's tentative endorsement of a -Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) agreement proposing a cease-fire and suspension of law implementation. The Second Sudanese Civil War intensified under Mahdi's leadership, with the SPLM gaining control over significant southern territories while forces retained major urban centers such as , Wau, and . An informal cease-fire in May 1989 collapsed by , exacerbating strain and logistical failures, including unpaid soldier salaries and inadequate supplies. Peace initiatives faltered; although approved the DUP-SPLM framework in February 1989 under pressure from an army ultimatum, opposition from Islamist elements like the NIF and delays in convening a planned constitutional undermined progress. On March 11, 1989, dissolved the amid mounting discontent, further highlighting his administration's inability to stabilize or resolve the southern insurgency. Economic deterioration compounded these challenges, with , mounting , and food shortages driving widespread unrest. Riots erupted in 1988 against proposed price hikes on basic goods, forcing policy reversals, while the government's failure to secure agreements or expatriate remittances left debt rescheduling promises unfulfilled. Famine relief efforts, including the ' Operation Lifeline Sudan delivering approximately 100,000 metric tons of food aid in 1989, provided temporary mitigation but could not address underlying fiscal collapse or the civil war's drain on resources. Corruption scandals and personal rivalries within Mahdi's circles eroded public trust and military loyalty, portraying the regime as indecisive and ineffective in confronting 's multifaceted crises.

The 1989 coup d'état

On June 30, 1989, Brigadier General Omar al-Bashir, leading a faction of Sudanese Armed Forces officers aligned with Islamist elements, executed a military coup that overthrew the democratically elected government of Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi. The operation involved the rapid arrest of key political figures, including al-Mahdi, and the suspension of the constitution and parliament, with no reported casualties, rendering it a bloodless takeover. The coup was orchestrated in coordination with the (NIF), an Islamist organization led by , which had cultivated influence within the military to counter the perceived instability and corruption under al-Mahdi's coalition government. Al-Bashir, positioned as the nominal military leader, fronted the effort while NIF provided ideological and organizational backing, aiming to impose an Islamist agenda amid ongoing economic woes and civil unrest. Following the seizure of power, al-Bashir announced the formation of the Revolutionary Command Council for National Salvation (RCCNS), with himself as chairman, dissolving all and trade unions except those aligned with the new regime. The immediate aftermath saw the RCCNS justify the coup as necessary to restore order and combat corruption, though critics, including exiled opposition leaders, viewed it as a premeditated Islamist power grab that ended Sudan's brief democratic experiment. Al-Bashir later claimed full personal responsibility for the action during his 2020 trial, denying broader involvement by RCCNS members and expressing pride in leading the overthrow. This event marked the onset of three decades of authoritarian rule under al-Bashir, characterized by the entrenchment of Sharia-based and suppression of dissent.

Alliance with Hassan al-Turabi and the National Islamic Front

Following the 30 June 1989 military coup that ousted Prime Minister , Omar al-Bashir formed a with , the intellectual leader of the (NIF), an Islamist faction originating from the Sudanese . The NIF had secured third place in the 1986 elections with approximately 51 seats in parliament, positioning it as a significant political force advocating for comprehensive societal reform through Islamic principles. Al-Turabi, a Sorbonne-educated and , masterminded the coup's political framework, providing ideological direction while al-Bashir, as a career officer, commanded the military execution involving 10,000–15,000 troops and around 100 officers. This partnership divided roles effectively: al-Bashir served as the public face and enforcer through the Revolutionary Command Council for National Salvation (RCCNS), which dissolved parliament, banned , and purged the of perceived opponents, while al-Turabi directed the NIF's infiltration of state institutions to enforce "Islamisation from above." The NIF's ideology rejected secular governance in favor of an governed by , emphasizing moral and legal reforms to align with global Islamist revivalism. NIF cadres, often young professionals and affiliates, were appointed to key positions in ministries, security apparatus, and unions, enabling rapid consolidation of power despite the regime's initial facade of non-partisan . The alliance's early success hinged on mutual reinforcement: al-Bashir's martial authority neutralized immediate threats, such as assassination attempts and regional secessionist movements, while al-Turabi's network mobilized Islamist support and justified authoritarian measures as necessary for revolutionary purity. By 1991, this collaboration had formalized Sharia-based penal codes, including punishments like amputations and flogging, reflecting the NIF's vision of societal transformation, though implementation faced resistance in non-Arab, southern regions. Al-Turabi's influence peaked with his role as ideologue-in-chief, shaping policies that prioritized Islamist loyalty over technocratic competence, which later sowed seeds of internal factionalism.

Presidency (1989–2019)

Consolidation of power and formal presidency

Following the 30 June 1989 coup, Omar al-Bashir, as chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council for National Salvation (RCCNS), immediately suspended the 1985 Transitional Constitution, dissolved the national assembly, banned all political parties and trade unions, and detained hundreds of political opponents, including former and officers suspected of disloyalty, to eliminate immediate threats to the regime. These measures centralized authority under the RCCNS, which ruled by decree and suppressed through emergency powers, enabling al-Bashir to potential rivals within the and integrate allies from the (NIF) into key government and security positions. To legitimize its Islamist orientation, the regime appointed NIF leader as speaker of a new consultative council in , while al-Bashir consolidated control over the armed forces by promoting loyal officers and expanding the security apparatus, including the establishment of Popular Defense Forces militias drawn from Islamist supporters. This period saw the arrest of over 70 in 1990 for alleged coup plotting, further entrenching al-Bashir's dominance by neutralizing internal challenges. On 16 October 1993, al-Bashir dissolved the RCCNS, formally transitioning to civilian rule under a new and appointing himself , , and , thereby concentrating executive, legislative, and military powers in his office while retaining military governance. This move, nominally ending direct rule after four years, allowed al-Bashir to project democratic legitimacy ahead of planned elections, though critics noted the absence of independent judiciary oversight and continued suppression of opposition as hallmarks of authoritarian consolidation rather than genuine reform. In March 1996, he was "elected" with 75.7% of the vote in Sudan's first multi-candidate poll since 1969, but the process faced widespread condemnation for irregularities, including opposition boycotts and restrictions on campaigning, underscoring the formal presidency's roots in coerced political monopoly.

Implementation of Islamist policies and Sharia law

Following the 30 June 1989 military coup led by Omar al-Bashir, the Revolutionary Command Council for National Salvation (RCCNS) suspended the 1985 transitional constitution and dismissed the judiciary, paving the way for the imposition of -based governance in alliance with the (NIF) under . The regime reinstated the September Laws—originally enacted in 1983 under Jaafar Nimeiri—which codified punishments including of the right hand for , flogging (up to 100 lashes) for consuming alcohol or unmarried , stoning to death for by married persons, and combined with for highway robbery. These measures were expanded through a new Criminal Act adopted on 10 March 1991, which integrated principles across the penal code and applied penalties nationwide, with at least 30 documented for between 1991 and 1994. was criminalized with penalties up to by hanging or , though executions for this offense were rare; instead, enforcement often targeted suspected converts through arbitrary detention and forced recantations. Turabi, appointed attorney general in 1989 and speaker of the National Assembly in 1996, directed the Islamization of state institutions, including the establishment of special courts and the Popular Defence Force militias indoctrinated in Islamist ideology to enforce compliance. The regime created the Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice in the early 1990s, empowering morality police to conduct raids enforcing dress codes (e.g., mandatory for women), gender segregation, and bans on alcohol and non-Islamic media; violations resulted in public floggings, with thousands flogged annually in alone by the mid-1990s. Economic policies incorporated Islamic finance, such as mandatory (alms) collection through state chambers starting in 1990, which deducted 2.5% from bank savings and salaries to fund Islamist , while interest-based banking was prohibited. Education and society underwent forced Islamization: Arabic replaced English as the medium of instruction in 1990, curricula emphasized and from primary levels, and non-Muslim southern schools faced closure or conversion; by 1992, over 1,000 southern teachers were dismissed for refusing Islamic oaths. censorship intensified, with the 1996 Press and Publications requiring all content to align with "Islamic values," leading to the shutdown of outlets and the execution of Mohammed Talaat in 1990 for alleged apostasy-linked reporting. These policies, justified by the regime as restoring moral order amid civil strife, disproportionately affected non-Arabs and in the north, fostering resentment that fueled southern secessionism, though northern Islamist support bases like the NIF viewed them as authentic revival of Sudanese Islamic identity. Enforcement waned in practice after the 1998 split between Bashir and Turabi, but elements persisted until partial repeal in 2020 post-Bashir.

Economic policies, oil boom, and development initiatives

Following the 1989 coup, al-Bashir's regime implemented policies in the early 1990s, including of state enterprises and to attract foreign investment amid ongoing and international isolation. These measures aimed to stabilize and foreign exchange shortages by encouraging involvement, particularly in resource extraction, though implementation was inconsistent and marred by state favoritism toward regime allies. Commercial oil production began in 1999 after reserves were confirmed in the mid-1990s in the Muglad and Melut basins, with exports commencing via the pipeline to . Output escalated rapidly from 12,000 barrels per day () in 1998 to 63,000 in 1999, peaking at around 500,000 by 2008 prior to South Sudan's 2011 , which deprived of approximately 75% of its oil fields. This boom generated an estimated $70 billion in revenues from 1999 to 2011, driving average annual GDP growth above 7% in the and positioning among the world's faster-growing economies by 2010. Oil windfalls funded selective development initiatives, primarily in northern Sudan, including hydropower and irrigation projects to bolster agricultural output and electricity supply. The Merowe Dam, constructed from 2003 to 2009 with Chinese and Arab financing, generated 1,250 megawatts of power—doubling national capacity—and supported irrigated farming on over 1 million acres, though it displaced thousands of residents and faced criticism for opaque contracting. Al-Bashir promoted it as a cornerstone for and , part of a broader dam program that allocated billions to update infrastructure. Revenues also supported road expansions, such as upgrades to the Khartoum-Port highway, and agricultural mechanization schemes in the Gezira region, yet diversification into non-oil sectors remained limited, with funds disproportionately allocated to spending and patronage rather than equitable human development or export revival. Corruption in projects like Merowe diverted resources, undermining long-term gains and exacerbating regional disparities.

Management of civil wars and internal rebellions

Upon seizing power in June 1989 amid the ongoing (1983–2005), al-Bashir's regime pursued a strategy of sustained military confrontation against the /Army (SPLM/A), utilizing offensives, militia auxiliaries, and scorched-earth tactics to disrupt rebel supply lines and secure oil-rich southern territories. These operations, which included aerial bombardments and ground assaults, prolonged the conflict but faced SPLM/A gains and economic strain from war costs and . By the early 2000s, under pressure from declining battlefield advantages, oil revenue disputes, and IGAD-mediated talks initiated in 1994, al-Bashir's government engaged in substantive negotiations, yielding the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed on January 9, 2005, in Naivasha, Kenya, between the Government of Sudan and the SPLM. The CPA mandated an immediate ceasefire, power-sharing (with SPLM allocated 30% of national executive and legislative positions), equitable oil revenue distribution (50% to the south post-defined border demarcation), joint integrated military units, and a 2011 referendum on southern self-determination, which resulted in South Sudan's independence on July 9, 2011. Implementation challenges persisted, including disputes over Abyei and oil transit fees, but the accord ended large-scale north-south fighting, averting further mass displacement estimated at over 4 million during the war. In parallel, al-Bashir addressed lower-intensity rebellions in eastern , where the Eastern Front (comprising Beja Congress and Rashaida Free Lions) had launched attacks since 1994 over marginalization and resource neglect. The government negotiated the Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement on October 14, 2006, in , , incorporating rebel fighters into the national army and civil service, allocating development funds for infrastructure and services in the , , and Gedaref states, and granting the region vice-presidential representation. Al-Bashir hailed the deal as an African-led resolution, though critics noted uneven implementation amid persistent poverty. Post-2011 independence, al-Bashir's forces confronted holdout SPLM-N insurgents in and (the "Two Areas"), where 2010 elections had installed contested SPLM governors, sparking clashes in June 2011. The regime launched offensives employing artillery, air strikes, and ground troops to reclaim territory, declaring states of emergency in both regions—September 2, 2011, in Blue Nile and earlier in —while displacing civilians and restricting humanitarian access. In response to criticism and domestic calls, al-Bashir announced unilateral ceasefires, including a four-month halt in June 2016 covering the Two Areas, though sporadic fighting continued amid stalled talks. These measures reflected a pattern of combining with intermittent de-escalation to maintain control over peripheral regions.

Foreign relations and counterterrorism cooperation

During the early years of Omar al-Bashir's rule following the coup, Sudan pursued foreign relations aligned with Islamist ideologies, forging close ties with despite sectarian differences. Bashir's first official visit to occurred in December 1990, leading to Iranian military advisers and Revolutionary Guard personnel assisting Sudan's , along with significant arms exports from , which became Sudan's second-largest supplier during this period. Sudan also maintained relations with Saddam Hussein's , providing logistical support during the and later hosting Iraqi intelligence operatives. These alliances positioned Sudan as a hub for transnational Islamist networks, including the National Islamic Front's connections to groups in and elsewhere. Sudan hosted from 1991 to 1996, during which he established infrastructure, including training camps and businesses funding militant activities. Under mounting diplomatic pressure from the , , and —coupled with Sudan's economic isolation—al-Bashir ordered bin Laden's expulsion on May 18, 1996, requiring him to relinquish Sudanese citizenship and assets. This marked an initial pragmatic shift, though Sudan remained designated a U.S. state sponsor of terrorism in 1993 due to ongoing support for groups like and . Counterterrorism cooperation with the West intensified from the late 1990s, driven by 's desire to alleviate sanctions. A bilateral U.S.- dialogue on began in May 2000, involving intelligence exchanges. Following the September 11, 2001, attacks, provided extensive support to the CIA, including access to interrogated detainees and data on militant networks, which U.S. officials described as highly valuable despite the regime's record. This collaboration continued through al-Bashir's tenure, enabling operations against East African cells and contributing to 's partial sanctions relief in 2017, though full removal from the terrorism list occurred only in 2020 after his ousting. Such efforts reflected al-Bashir's strategy to balance Islamist domestic policies with survival amid international isolation, rather than a complete ideological reversal.

Elections, political opposition, and tensions with al-Turabi

Presidential and parliamentary elections held from 6 to 17 March 1996 marked the first under al-Bashir's post-coup constitutional framework, with al-Bashir securing re-election as president; however, major opposition groups, including the Umma Party and Democratic Unionist Party, boycotted the vote, denouncing it as a sham lacking genuine competition and transparency. Subsequent elections in December 2000 were similarly boycotted by leading opposition parties, which cited ongoing repression and absence of free expression as disqualifying the process. The April 2010 polls, advertised as Sudan's first multiparty elections in 24 years, saw al-Bashir claim 68.24% of the presidential vote amid widespread allegations of , voter , and ballot stuffing reported by international observers and domestic critics; while some opposition figures participated, key parties like withdrew, highlighting irregularities and insecurity in southern regions. In 2015, al-Bashir won with 94% of the vote in an election boycotted by and other major opponents, who argued the contest occurred under a that systematically curtailed political freedoms and access. Political opposition to al-Bashir's National Congress Party (formerly the ) was fragmented and severely constrained by security laws, arbitrary arrests, and bans on activities; traditional secular parties such as , led by , and the faced periodic dissolution threats and exile for leaders, while the coalition operated largely from abroad. Islamist dissent emerged post-split, including from the Popular Congress Party. Tensions between al-Bashir and his initial ideological partner, , escalated in the late 1990s over control of Islamist governance and parliamentary influence, culminating in al-Bashir dismissing al-Turabi as speaker in December 1999 after al-Turabi-backed constitutional amendments sought to curb presidential powers. Al-Turabi's subsequent formation of the Popular Congress Party as a rival Islamist faction led to his on 21 2001 on charges of undermining the and conspiring against the state, with detention extending over a year without trial; this purge solidified al-Bashir's dominance over the Islamist movement while al-Turabi's group allied with broader opposition efforts against the regime.

Military interventions abroad

In 2015, al-Bashir's government aligned with the Saudi-led coalition against Houthi forces in , severing longstanding ties with and deploying Sudanese troops as part of a strategic pivot toward for economic support. This marked 's most significant direct foreign engagement under al-Bashir, motivated by financial incentives including salary payments for troops, packages exceeding $3 billion, and loans to alleviate 's economic woes amid oil revenue losses post-South Sudan secession. Sudanese forces, numbering up to 15,000 at peak deployment primarily from the and later incorporating elements, were stationed mainly along the - border to secure logistics routes and conduct defensive operations rather than frontline assaults deep into . The deployment, initiated in March 2015 following Houthi advances and airstrikes, involved rotations of and support units, with reports of Sudanese casualties exceeding 500 by , though official figures were understated to minimize domestic backlash. Al-Bashir justified the intervention as a of Sunni interests and regional stability, aligning with Islamist ideologies, but critics within highlighted its role in exacerbating fuel shortages and as resources were diverted abroad. By late , amid mounting losses and protests, troop numbers began scaling back, though full withdrawal occurred only after al-Bashir's ouster in 2019. Beyond , al-Bashir's regime engaged in limited cross-border operations and support rather than sustained troop deployments abroad. In the 2000s, Sudanese forces conducted incursions into in response to rebel attacks, supporting Chadian opposition groups against President through and , escalating a conflict that displaced thousands along the Darfur-Chad border but stopped short of full invasion. Similar tensions with involved accusations of mutual rebel sponsorship, including Sudanese backing for Eritrean Islamist factions, yet no verified large-scale troop commitments occurred. These actions reflected al-Bashir's broader strategy of leveraging to Islamist allies in the , such as training camps for Somali militants in the , without formal interventions. Overall, foreign engagements strained Sudan's military resources, contributing to internal vulnerabilities exposed in the 2018–2019 uprising.

Corruption allegations and governance challenges

Al-Bashir's 30-year rule entrenched a kleptocratic system in which public resources, especially revenues, were diverted to sustain networks among loyalists, commanders, and family members, undermining effective and exacerbating economic crises. The National Congress Party, dominant under al-Bashir, controlled over 500 companies spanning extraction, , and , often through opaque contracts that prioritized political allies over merit or . This fostered , with institutions co-opted to target opponents rather than elites, contributing to Sudan's consistent low rankings on global indices, such as 172 out of 180 on Transparency International's in 2018. Oil revenues, peaking after discoveries in the mid-1990s, highlighted failures; between 1999 and 2011, the regime oversaw approximately $75 billion in oil income, much of which vanished into unaccounted channels amid , inflated , and off-budget diversions to fund security forces and cronies. Post-South secession in 2011, revenues plummeted from $11 billion in 2010 to $1.8 billion by 2012, yet fuel subsidies—intended for public welfare—enabled black-market profiteering by insiders, distorting markets and fueling that reached over 80% annually by 2018. Specific scandals included a 2016–2017 import scheme embezzling $230 million, illustrating how bureaucratic opacity and eroded public services like healthcare and . Allegations of personal enrichment targeted al-Bashir and his inner circle, with post-ouster investigations uncovering $113 million in cash hoarded at his residences, including euros and U.S. dollars, alongside admissions of receiving $25 million from as illicit gifts. Family members benefited from privatized assets; properties linked to relatives were confiscated in , and al-Bashir's second wife was convicted in for illegally amassing through regime-favored deals. These practices prioritized loyalty over institutional capacity, leading to chronic shortages, exceeding 20%, and bread riots that presaged the 2018–2019 protests, as economic stagnation from corrupt resource allocation hollowed out productive sectors. Governance challenges compounded by this included over-reliance on repressive apparatuses funded through parallel economies, such as gold , which bypassed formal budgets and weakened fiscal oversight. Centralized land allocation under al-Bashir enabled elite land grabs, displacing communities and stifling agricultural development, while military commercial ventures crowded out private enterprise, perpetuating inefficiency and dependency on foreign aid despite resource wealth. Al-Bashir's for —sentenced to two years for possessing foreign currency and illegal gains—affirmed long-standing claims, though critics noted trials focused narrowly on individuals amid broader systemic .

Major controversies

The Darfur conflict and counterinsurgency operations

The Darfur conflict erupted in February 2003 when rebel groups, including the Sudan Liberation Army/Movement (SLA/M) and the (JEM), launched attacks on government targets, such as airbases in and Geregre, citing long-standing political and economic marginalization of non-Arab ethnic groups like , Zaghawa, and Masalit by the Arab-dominated under President Omar al-Bashir. In response, Bashir's administration initiated operations involving the (SAF) and allied Arab nomadic militias known as , whom the government armed, trained, and directed to suppress the . These operations, which intensified from mid-2003 through 2004, featured coordinated assaults on over 400 non-Arab villages, involving aerial bombings by SAF aircraft followed by ground sweeps with Janjaweed horsemen and SAF troops, resulting in systematic destruction of homes, livestock, and crops through arson and pillage. Government directives, including orders from senior officials like (a local commissioner and leader) and Maj. Gen. Mahjoub Abdallah Khaled, explicitly instructed militias to "change the " of by targeting non-Arab populations, with evidence from intercepted communications and witness testimonies confirming high-level coordination from . Counterinsurgency tactics emphasized proxy warfare via to maintain for the , though joint operations blurred lines, as militias received weapons, ammunition, and logistical support from regular army units. By late 2004, these efforts displaced approximately 1.8 million people internally and drove over 200,000 into , with documented massacres in areas like Tawila (October 2003, hundreds killed) and Kailek (September 2003, entire villages razed). Bashir publicly denied orchestration of atrocities, framing violence as intertribal clashes exaggerated by rebels and Western media, and in 2004 ordered the disarming of — an edict largely ignored, as militias were instead partially integrated into official structures like the Popular Defense Forces and Border Intelligence Guards by . Independent estimates from the time, drawing on and survivor accounts, attribute 60,000 to 100,000 direct violent deaths between and , with total reaching 200,000-400,000 including and in camps; the Sudanese government contested these as inflated, claiming fewer than 10,000 deaths overall. Operations tapered after amid international pressure and peacekeeping deployment, but sporadic SAF-Janjaweed offensives continued into the late , notably in 2007-2008 against JEM advances, sustaining low-level ethnic targeting. The , in warrants issued against Bashir in 2009 and 2010, cited evidence of his overarching for war crimes, , and in , based on patterns of forcible displacement and intent to destroy non-Arab groups, though rejected jurisdiction and maintained the actions were legitimate . and reports, corroborated by UN inquiries, highlight the strategic use of militias to outsource violence, enabling the regime to prosecute the war without fully mobilizing the amid concurrent southern conflicts.

Human rights record and suppression of dissent

The al-Bashir regime, following the coup, swiftly purged the and security apparatus, executing at least 28 officers in April 1990 after a failed counter-coup attempt, with their bodies buried in a later exhumed in 2020. These executions followed expedited trials and were part of broader efforts to eliminate perceived threats, including the dissolution of all , trade unions, and professional associations deemed oppositional. Throughout the 1990s and 2000s, the government maintained systematic suppression of dissent through arbitrary arrests, prolonged detentions without trial, and torture of political opponents, journalists, and activists, often in facilities like Kober Prison, notorious for housing thousands of such detainees under harsh conditions. Security forces, including the (NISS), employed intimidation tactics such as surveillance, harassment, and enforced disappearances to silence critics, with reporting patterns of secret detention and physical abuse targeting members of banned parties, southern Sudanese, and Nuba civilians as early as 1992–1993. Freedom of expression and assembly were severely curtailed, with media outlets censored, independent newspapers frequently shuttered, and opposition rallies met with lethal force, including shootings and beatings that resulted in numerous protester deaths over the years. The regime's penal code incorporated charges punishable by death, leading to trials and executions of individuals accused of religious deviation, reinforcing Islamist controls over public discourse. U.S. State Department assessments documented ongoing arbitrary killings by security agents and the holding of undefined numbers of political prisoners, underscoring a consistent policy of prioritizing regime stability over .

International Criminal Court indictment

In March 2005, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1593 referred the situation in Darfur, Sudan, to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC), authorizing investigation into crimes against humanity, war crimes, and genocide allegedly committed since July 1, 2002. The referral imposed obligations on Sudan, despite its non-ratification of the Rome Statute, to cooperate with the ICC. On July 14, 2008, ICC Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo applied for an arrest warrant against Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir, alleging his responsibility for orchestrating atrocities in Darfur, including the mobilization of Janjaweed militias responsible for widespread killings, rapes, and village destructions. Pre-Trial Chamber I issued the first warrant on March 4, 2009, confirming five counts of crimes against humanity (murder, extermination, forcible transfer, torture, and rape) and two counts of war crimes (intentionally directing attacks against civilians and pillaging), based on reasonable grounds that Bashir bore command responsibility for acts causing at least 35,000 deaths and displacing over 2.5 million people. The chamber rejected genocide charges at that stage due to insufficient evidence of specific intent, though it noted the scale of destruction suggested possible genocidal elements. A second warrant followed on July 12, 2010, from Pre-Trial Chamber III, adding three counts of for allegedly intending to destroy ethnic , Masalit, and Zaghawa groups in whole or in part through killings, serious , and deliberately inflicting life conditions calculated to bring about physical destruction. This decision reversed the prior rejection, citing evidence from the prosecutor's investigation, including witness testimonies and patterns of targeted ethnic attacks documented in reports estimating 300,000 deaths from violence and related causes by 2008. rejected the warrants, deeming the politically motivated and biased toward Western interests, with President Bashir dismissing them as invalid and continuing international travel to non-cooperating states. The warrants prompted diplomatic fallout, as Bashir visited over 100 countries, including ICC state parties like and , which faced ICC scrutiny for failing to arrest him, leading to non-cooperation findings against those governments. resolutions urged non-enforcement, arguing the indictments undermined peace efforts and targeted African leaders disproportionately, though the ICC maintained its independence from such political considerations. Following Bashir's 2019 ouster, Sudanese transitional authorities arrested him domestically on corruption charges but refused ICC extradition, prioritizing national sovereignty and ongoing civil war dynamics over international obligations as of October 2025, leaving the case in pre-trial limbo with Bashir at large from the court.

Ousting from power

The 2018–2019 Sudanese protests

The 2018–2019 Sudanese protests erupted on December 19, 2018, initially sparked by the government's decision to triple the price of —a —from one to three pounds per loaf, following the slashing of import subsidies amid acute shortages and a . These economic measures were part of broader policies under President Omar al-Bashir's regime, which faced exceeding 80 percent and a devalued , exacerbating widespread and food insecurity affecting millions. Protests began in , a northern rail hub, with striking bus and train drivers and local residents chanting against price hikes, but rapidly spread to cities like , Damazin, and within days, drawing students, professionals, and ordinary citizens. By late December, economic grievances evolved into explicit political demands for al-Bashir's , fueled by three decades of authoritarian rule marked by , economic mismanagement, and repression. The Sudanese Professionals Association (), a of unions and professionals, emerged as the protests' informal coordinator, organizing marches and sit-ins while emphasizing non-violence and broad participation across ethnic and regional lines. Demonstrators waved the pre-1989 Sudanese flags, symbolizing rejection of al-Bashir's Islamist regime, and adopted slogans like "freedom, peace, and justice" to unite against his National Congress Party's grip on power. Security responded with lethal force from the outset, killing at least 40 protesters by early January 2019, including shootings and rammings, while arresting hundreds and imposing internet blackouts to curb coordination. Al-Bashir's regime intensified crackdowns in response, with the (RSF)—a paramilitary unit under his ally Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo ()—deployed alongside police to disperse crowds using , batons, and live ammunition. On February 22, 2019, facing mounting pressure, al-Bashir declared a nationwide , dissolved the national and provincial governments, and appointed military officers as governors, while postponing constitutional amendments that would have allowed him to extend his rule beyond 2020. These moves failed to quell the unrest; instead, protests surged, culminating in a massive outside the military headquarters in starting April 6, 2019, where tens of thousands camped, blockading roads and demanding civilian-led transition. Reports documented over 100 protester deaths by April, with groups attributing most to security forces' excessive force. The protests' persistence eroded al-Bashir's support within the security apparatus, as mid-level officers and elements of the sympathized with demonstrators amid fears of civil war-like escalation. On April 11, 2019, Defense Minister Awad Ibn Auf announced al-Bashir's removal in a bloodless coup, placing him under and establishing a Transitional Council (TMC) to rule for two years. This ouster marked the culmination of the protest movement's pressure, though the TMC's formation reflected the 's reluctance to fully cede power, setting the stage for further negotiations with the SPA-led Declaration of Freedom and Change Forces alliance.

Military coup and transition

On 11 April 2019, the Sudanese Armed Forces announced the removal of Omar al-Bashir from the presidency after 30 years in power, citing the need to address ongoing protests and economic instability. The military leadership declared a state of emergency, dissolved the national legislature and all provincial assemblies, suspended the constitution, and imposed a two-year transitional period without immediate elections. Bashir was detained at an undisclosed military facility shortly after the announcement, with the armed forces confirming his arrest to prevent further unrest. Borders and airspace were closed temporarily to maintain order. The Transitional Military Council (TMC) was established as the interim governing body, initially chaired by Lieutenant General , who had served as defense minister under and was a close associate of the ousted regime. pledged continuity with -era policies, including retaining the (NISS) and promising no cooperation with the on 's indictment, which drew immediate criticism from protesters demanding full civilian rule and accountability for past abuses. Sustained demonstrations, including sit-ins in , pressured the TMC; resigned after less than 24 hours on 12 April 2019, citing the need for unity, and was succeeded by Lieutenant General , the inspector general of the armed forces. Under Burhan's leadership, the TMC engaged in negotiations with the Sudanese Professionals Association (SPA) and other opposition groups representing the protest movement, mediated by the African Union and Ethiopia. Initial talks faltered over demands for dismantling the old regime's security apparatus and lifting bans on political parties, but by July 2019, an agreement was reached for a 39-month transition to civilian-led governance. This culminated in the formation of the Transitional Sovereignty Council on 21 August 2019, a hybrid body comprising five military members (chaired by Burhan for the first 21 months) and six civilians, alongside a civilian-led cabinet under Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok. The constitutional declaration outlined steps toward elections, security sector reform, and economic stabilization, though implementation faced delays amid lingering influence from Bashir loyalists.

Post-presidency (2019–present)

Arrest, detention, and domestic trials

Following his ouster on April 11, 2019, by elements of the amid widespread protests, Omar al-Bashir was arrested the same day and placed under military custody. The Transitional Military Council, which assumed power, initially held him in before formal charges were filed. In June 2019, al-Bashir was charged with , , and illegal possession of foreign currency exceeding $5 million and 7 million euros, allegedly acquired through illicit means during his presidency. His commenced in 2019, with prosecutors presenting evidence of undeclared wealth and gifts from foreign entities, including . On December 14, 2019, a court convicted him on these counts and sentenced him to two years in a low-security correctional and rehabilitation facility rather than a standard , citing his age and health. Separately, in July 2020, Sudanese authorities initiated a trial against al-Bashir for his role in orchestrating the 1989 military coup that brought him to power, charging him with , , and undermining the constitutional system, offenses punishable by death or under Sudanese law. During proceedings in December 2022, al-Bashir admitted his in the coup but denied for associated killings. The trial remained ongoing as of 2023, with no final verdict reported, amid Sudan's political instability. Al-Bashir's detention began at in following his corruption conviction, but he was later transferred to facilities for security reasons. In September 2024, due to deteriorating health, he was relocated to a -run hospital in Merowe, approximately 330 kilometers north of , for specialized care. As of October 2025, he remains in custody in a northern Sudanese detention facility, serving his corruption sentence while awaiting resolution of the 1989 coup case, with Sudanese authorities resisting demands for extradition.

ICC proceedings and extradition resistance

The (ICC) issued its first for Omar al-Bashir on 4 March 2009, charging him with 5 counts of (including , extermination, forcible transfer, , and ) and 2 counts of war crimes (including intentionally directing attacks against civilians and pillaging) committed in since 1 July 2002. A second warrant followed on 12 July 2010, adding 3 counts of for allegedly intending to destroy ethnic , Masalit, and Zaghawa groups through killing, causing serious bodily or mental harm, and deliberately inflicting conditions of life calculated to bring about physical destruction. These charges stemmed from ICC investigations into systematic atrocities during the Darfur conflict, referred to the Court by United Nations Security Council Resolution 1593 in March 2005, despite Sudan's non-ratification of the . Sudanese authorities immediately denounced the warrants as politically motivated and illegitimate, asserting national sovereignty and rejecting jurisdiction, a stance echoed by the (), which viewed the proceedings as targeting African leaders disproportionately. Al-Bashir continued state visits to member states, prompting multiple Pre-Trial Chamber decisions on non-cooperation; for instance, in May 2019, the Appeals Chamber ruled that violated its obligations by failing to him during a visit. Similar findings addressed non-arrests in (2015), (2016), and other states, underscoring enforcement challenges due to 's non-party status and diplomatic pressures. proposed alternatives, such as hybrid tribunals or domestic prosecutions under its own laws, arguing these could address accountability without external interference. Following al-Bashir's removal from power on 11 April 2019, the Transitional Military Council announced he was under arrest but explicitly refused extradition to the , opting for trials in Sudanese courts on charges including and the 1989 coup. The subsequent civilian-military transitional government signaled potential cooperation, with Prime Minister stating in February 2020 that handover to the was under review as part of broader efforts. In 2021, Foreign Minister Mariam al-Sadiq al-Mahdi declared cabinet approval to surrender al-Bashir and other indictees like Ahmad Harun, though no timeline was specified and the commitment faced domestic opposition from military elements and Islamists. These pledges stalled amid Sudan's political instability, including the 2021 military coup, with authorities prioritizing internal prosecutions—al-Bashir was convicted of in 2021, receiving a two-year sentence, but Darfur-related charges remain unaddressed domestically. As of October 2025, al-Bashir remains detained in , with ICC warrants unexecuted and the case stalled in pre-trial phase pending his arrest and transfer to . The ICC's 6 October 2025 conviction of militia leader Ali Muhammad Ali Abd-Al-Rahman for war crimes and has intensified pressure for Sudan's cooperation, including renewed demands for al-Bashir's alongside other fugitives like Abdelrahim . Sudanese officials continue to cite sovereignty concerns and ongoing civil war as barriers, while critics, including the AU, argue ICC selectivity undermines African judicial processes; nonetheless, UN Security Council briefings highlight persistent non-compliance as enabling impunity for victims.

Health issues and current status as of 2025

Following his ouster in April 2019, Omar al-Bashir, aged 81 as of 2025, has experienced multiple health setbacks attributed to advanced age, , and complications, prompting several transfers from detention facilities to medical care. In December 2022, his legal team successfully petitioned for hospitalization due to elevated and renal issues deemed life-threatening in prison conditions. By April 2023, amid clashes between Sudanese forces, he was relocated from Kober Prison to an army hospital on medical advice, alongside other former officials. In September 2024, al-Bashir's condition worsened, leading to his transfer from the Wadi Sidna military base near to Merowe Hospital, approximately 450 kilometers north of , for specialized treatment unavailable locally; his lawyer described the ailments as age-related complications and persistent high blood pressure, though not immediately critical. This move was requested by his defense team to address inadequate facilities at the detention site. As of mid-2025, al-Bashir remains in Sudanese custody, primarily under military oversight, with no reported release or death; arrest warrants for war crimes, , and persist without enforcement, as continues to resist extradition. Domestic trials for and related charges proceed intermittently amid the ongoing civil conflict, but his precise location and health updates beyond late 2024 are limited by restricted access and wartime disruptions.

Legacy assessments

Al-Bashir's legacy is predominantly characterized by authoritarian consolidation, ethnic conflicts, and economic mismanagement that exacerbated Sudan's fragmentation. During his 30-year rule from to 2019, he maintained power through a fusion of military control and Islamist ideology, suppressing and via security apparatuses that persisted post-ouster. This entrenched system contributed to the 2023 outbreak of civil war between the and , as both factions trace origins to Bashir-era militias and patronage networks. Analysts attribute ongoing instability to his regime's prioritization of regime survival over national cohesion, fostering parallel security structures that undermined on violence. Economically, al-Bashir's tenure saw initial gains from production in the , with Sudan experiencing industrialization booms, increased electrification, and annual domestic consumption growth of about 10 percent, fueled by exports reaching over 400,000 barrels per day by 2007. However, these benefits were unevenly distributed, hampered by , U.S. sanctions imposed in 1997 for links, and the 2011 of , which deprived of approximately 75 percent of revenues, triggering exceeding 100 percent by 2018 and widespread affecting over 50 percent of the population. Critics, including Sudanese protesters, viewed his economic policies as extractive, prioritizing elite enrichment and military spending over diversification or social welfare, culminating in bread shortages that ignited the 2018-2019 uprising. On , al-Bashir's rule is assessed as a era of systematic repression, including , arbitrary detentions, and extrajudicial killings to quash , with his responsible for hundreds of deaths during protests alone. The conflict from 2003, involving government-backed militias, resulted in an estimated 300,000 deaths and 2.7 million displacements, leading to his 2009 and 2010 indictments for war crimes, , and —charges he denied as politically motivated Western interference. Sudanese civil society and international observers, such as , highlight his legacy of impunity, where abuses against non-Arab ethnic groups and opposition figures normalized violence as statecraft. Internationally, al-Bashir positioned Sudan as a defiant actor against perceived , expelling in 1996 under U.S. pressure and aligning with for infrastructure investments, yet his early harboring of and Darfur policies isolated Sudan, culminating in pariah status and sanctions that stifled growth. Among some Islamist factions and nationalists, he is credited with resisting and preserving Sudanese sovereignty, though such views remain marginal amid broader Sudanese rejection evidenced by mass protests demanding his removal. As of 2025, with mired in conflict displacing millions, his legacy underscores the perils of personalized rule, where short-term power maintenance via divide-and-rule tactics yielded long-term societal rupture.

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