Fact-checked by Grok 2 weeks ago

Resolute Support Mission

The Resolute Support Mission (RSM) was a NATO-led, non-combat mission in that operated from 1 2015 until early September 2021, succeeding the (ISAF) and focusing exclusively on training, advising, and assisting the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) as well as relevant government institutions. Established at the invitation of the Afghan government and in coordination with the ' Operation , RSM sought to foster self-sustaining Afghan security capabilities capable of independently defending the country and safeguarding its population against internal threats. The mission involved contributions from Allies and operational partners, maintaining approximately 13,000 to 16,000 personnel primarily based in and regional training centers. RSM emphasized capacity-building in areas such as , budgeting, , , and force generation for the ANDSF, which included the Afghan National Army and , with the goal of transitioning full security responsibility to Afghan forces. While official reports highlighted progress in these domains, independent U.S. government assessments, including those from the , documented some improvements in fundamental capabilities but underscored ongoing deficiencies in logistics, sustainment, and overall effectiveness that hindered long-term viability. The mission's termination stemmed from Allies' April 2021 decision to withdraw forces by 1 May, aligned with the U.S.- Doha Agreement of February 2020 and a that no purely military solution existed, though this withdrawal precipitated the swift disintegration of the ANDSF and the Afghan government's collapse in August 2021, revealing the fragility of the trained forces absent continued external support.

Establishment

The Resolute Support Mission (RSM) was established as a non-combat -led operation following the conclusion of the (ISAF) mandate on 31 December , with political endorsement formalized at the Wales Summit on 4-5 September . At the summit, heads of state and , in consultation with the government, agreed to transition to a train, advise, and assist (TAA) mission aimed at enabling Afghan National Defence and Security Forces (ANDSF) self-sufficiency, reversing prior defense spending declines and committing to sustained alliance support for Afghanistan's stability. This decision built on earlier planning from the 2012 Chicago Summit, reflecting a U.S.-led shift under Obama from direct combat operations to advisory roles, while securing commitments from 39 allies and partners for over 11,000 troops to sustain the mission post-2016. Legally, RSM operated under a bilateral (SOFA) signed between and the Afghan government in on 30 September 2014, which provided the framework for troop presence, operational authority, and immunity provisions, ratified by Afghanistan's parliament thereafter. The further endorsed this arrangement through Resolution 2189, unanimously adopted on 12 December 2014, which welcomed the -Afghanistan agreement, authorized RSM's TAA activities in coordination with Afghan authorities, and emphasized the mission's role in supporting Afghan without direct combat engagement. The mission launched on 1 January 2015 at the explicit invitation of the Afghan government, underscoring its consensual political foundation amid ongoing threats.

Transition from ISAF

The transition from the (ISAF) to the Resolute Support Mission (RSM) was outlined in the Wales Summit Declaration on September 4, 2014, where Allied heads of state and government committed to establishing a non-combat mission focused on training, advising, and assisting Afghan national defense and security institutions to enable long-term self-sufficiency. This agreement followed the 2012 Chicago Summit's framework for gradually transferring security lead to Afghan forces, culminating in the full transition of responsibilities by December 2014. ISAF's mandate, which had encompassed operations since , formally concluded on December 28, 2014, with a handover ceremony at the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan headquarters in , attended by representatives from Allies and Afghan officials. At that point, ISAF's troop strength had drawn down from a peak of approximately 130,000 in 2012 to around 13,000, reflecting the phased reduction in direct engagement. RSM launched on , , as the successor , operating under a mandate renewed annually and emphasizing institutional capacity-building over combat roles. The shift prioritized advising at corps level and above, alongside support for Afghan security force logistics and sustainment, with initial troop commitments from 28 Allies and partners totaling about 12,000 personnel. This reconfiguration aimed to address persistent insurgent threats while avoiding indefinite foreign combat presence, though it faced challenges from ongoing attacks that tested Afghan forces' nascent independence.

Mandate and Objectives

Core Training, Advising, and Assistance Roles

The Resolute Support Mission (RSM) primarily conducted non-combat operations centered on training, advising, and assisting and Security Forces (ANDSF), including the (ANA) and (ANP), to enable them to independently maintain security against insurgent threats. These roles were executed through NATO-led structures such as the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) for institutional and eight regional , Advise, and Assist Commands (TAACs) embedded with Afghan units to deliver on-the-ground support. The mission's advising efforts targeted , , and sustainment capabilities without direct involvement in combat operations. Training initiatives under RSM focused on professionalizing ANDSF personnel through formal instruction in tactics, leadership, and specialized skills, often delivered at Afghan academies, training centers, and in-unit sessions led by coalition advisors. Advisors emphasized building capabilities in areas such as counter-improvised measures, , and aviation maintenance to reduce reliance on foreign support. By 2017, RSM had trained thousands of Afghan forces, enhancing their regional effectiveness through partnered exercises and equipment familiarization. Advising roles involved embedding coalition personnel at multiple echelons to mentor Afghan commanders on decision-making, , and integration, with a shift toward higher-level institutional advising at the Ministries of Defense and Interior for policy and resource management. Operational advising occurred at and levels via TAACs, where advisors facilitated planning and coordination, while tactical advising supported and kandak (battalion-equivalent) units in executing missions. This layered approach aimed to foster independent command structures, though challenges in advisor alignment persisted into 2020. Assistance components provided material and logistical support, including equipment sustainment and development, to bolster ANDSF operational readiness without assuming functions. RSM advisors assisted in reforming processes and air support integration, contributing to ANDSF capabilities like the 17,000-strong by mid-decade. These efforts were coordinated to align with Afghan-led operations, emphasizing long-term self-sufficiency over direct intervention.

Strategic Goals for Afghan Self-Sufficiency

The Resolute Support Mission (RSM), established in , pursued strategic goals aimed at fostering self-sufficiency primarily through non-combat training, advising, and assistance to the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) and key institutions. The core objective was to develop capable, sustainable ANDSF units and ministries capable of independently securing the country against internal threats, thereby enabling a transition from coalition dependency to -led security operations. This entailed building professional forces with effective command structures, logistics sustainment, and operational readiness, without direct involvement in combat roles. A primary focus was institutional capacity-building within the Afghan Ministries of Defense (MOD) and Interior (MOI), targeting "decisive enablers" such as leadership training, , , and equipment maintenance systems to achieve long-term . Advisors worked to align these efforts with Afghanistan's 2017 four-year roadmap for security and defense sector reforms, emphasizing affordable, sustainable force development that could operate with reduced international financial support—projected to cover up to 80% of ANDSF sustainment costs by 2024 under initial plans. At operational levels, goals included advising and commanders on planning, intelligence sharing, and tactics to enhance ANDSF effectiveness in contested areas. These objectives were framed as prerequisites for broader Afghan self-sufficiency, including governance stability and economic viability, with NATO committing to conditions-based withdrawal tied to verifiable progress in ANDSF autonomy. However, official assessments from the U.S. emphasized that self-sustainability required addressing systemic challenges like and attrition, which RSM sought to mitigate through targeted advisory programs rather than direct intervention.

Operational Framework

Deployment Scale and Locations

The Resolute Support Mission (RSM) began with approximately 13,000 personnel deployed in as of January 2015, drawn from Allies and partner nations focused on non-combat training, advising, and assistance roles. This force level increased to around 16,000 troops by 2017, following pledges from contributing countries to bolster capacity-building efforts for . The accounted for the majority of troops, contributing roughly 12,000 at the mission's start, which declined to about 8,500 by February 2020 in line with U.S. policy shifts toward reduced presence. Further U.S. adjustments reduced personnel to approximately 8,600 by mid-2020, reflecting ongoing transitions amid negotiations with the . RSM's deployments followed a hub-and-spokes operational framework to enable efficient advising across , with the central hub headquartered at Camp Resolute Support in and supported by . Four regional spokes extended this structure: Mazar-e Sharif in the north for northern command support, in the west, in the south, and Laghman in the east, targeting key population centers and security zones. Advisors and trainers were embedded with Afghan National Defense and Security Forces units at various levels, including provincial and district sites, though concentrations remained at secure bases to minimize risks while maximizing institutional training in urban and regional hubs. This dispersed yet centralized model facilitated coverage of Afghanistan's diverse terrain without large-scale combat patrols, adapting to the mission's advisory mandate until the withdrawal in July 2021.

Contributing Nations and Force Contributions

The Resolute Support Mission drew contributions from 36 NATO Allies and partner nations, with troop levels varying over the mission's duration from an initial approximately 13,000 personnel in 2015 to a peak of around 16,000 by 2017 before drawing down to roughly 9,500 by early 2021 amid U.S.-led reductions. The United States maintained the largest overall presence, though its RSM-specific commitment stood at 2,500 troops as of February 2021, reflecting a shift toward bilateral advisory roles outside the NATO framework. Other major NATO contributors included Germany (1,300 troops), Italy (895), the United Kingdom (750), and Turkey (600), while partners like Georgia (860) and Romania (619) provided significant numbers relative to their size. These forces were primarily focused on training, advising, and assisting Afghan National Defense and Security Forces, with contributions encompassing staff officers, trainers, logistics support, and units rather than combat roles. Troop numbers reported reflect each nation's total presence in supporting RSM objectives, based on self-reported data from contributing countries, and fluctuated due to national commitments, rotations, and security conditions. Smaller contributors, such as (99 troops) and (135), emphasized specialized advisory roles. Contributions from non-NATO partners like , , and highlighted broader international support for capacity-building, though their numbers were constrained by domestic political and resource limits. By mission's end in August 2021, rapid withdrawals synchronized with the U.S. exit reduced multinational forces to near zero, underscoring the mission's dependence on sustained allied commitments.

Command Structure and Key Leaders

The Resolute Support Mission (RSM) operated under NATO's military command structure, with the , Resolute Support (COMRS) serving as the senior operational authority in , dual-hatted as Commander of U.S. Forces- (USFOR-A). The COMRS reported to the of Joint Force Command , who in turn reported to the (SACEUR) at in , . This hierarchy ensured alignment with NATO's strategic direction while allowing theater-level flexibility for training, advising, and assisting Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF). Operationally, RSM's structure centered on a headquarters in Kabul, augmented by regional commands known as Train, Advise, and Assist Commands (TAACs). These included TAAC-Capital in Kabul for ministry-level support; TAAC-North in Mazar-e Sharif; TAAC-West in ; TAAC-South in ; and TAAC-East in . Each TAAC focused on corps-level advising for and police units, with specialized elements for air, , and . A critical subordinate command was the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A), headquartered in , which handled equipping, sustaining, and institution-building for the ANDSF, including budget oversight and infrastructure development. Successive COMRS provided continuity amid evolving conditions. U.S. Army General John F. Campbell, previously ISAF commander, led RSM from its inception on January 1, 2015, until handing over command on March 2, 2016. U.S. Army General then commanded from March 2, 2016, to September 2, 2018, emphasizing corps-level sustainability and countering resurgence. U.S. Army General assumed command on September 2, 2018, and led through the mission's drawdown, overseeing approximately 16,000 troops at peak and coordinating the final withdrawal announced in April 2021. Miller's tenure included dual oversight of CSTC-A, where leaders like U.S. Army Lt. Gen. James B. Rainey (from October 2018) directed ANDSF and training pipelines. Deputies, often multinational, supported COMRS in areas like civilian advising and logistics, with rotations from contributing nations such as and .

Key Activities and Achievements

Training Programs and Capacity Development

The Resolute Support Mission (RSM) implemented training programs through five regional Train, Advise, and Assist Commands (TAACs)—Capital, East, North, South, and West—embedded advisors with Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) units to deliver on-site instruction in tactics, leadership, and operations at and levels. These efforts emphasized practical advising over direct combat, with U.S. and personnel focusing on enabling ANDSF self-reliance in areas such as , , and command structures. Institutional capacity development targeted Afghan ministries of and interior, supporting reforms in force generation, recruiting, personnel , and specialized training for the Afghan via TAAC-Air. Programs included training for recruits, given that up to 80% of ANDSF personnel initially lacked basic reading skills, alongside courses in budgeting, , and to foster sustainable governance. By 2017, RSM advising contributed to the Afghan special operations forces reaching approximately 17,000 personnel, described by U.S. officials as the region's most capable due to enhanced equipping and partnering. Mobile training teams extended efforts to remote areas, providing targeted assistance in tactics and equipment from 2015 onward. However, SIGAR assessments noted persistent gaps in ANDSF sustainment, with high rates—averaging 20-30% annually—and undermining trained capabilities despite institutional inputs. GAO reports from 2018 indicated some progress in fundamental skills like aviation but highlighted incomplete on overall training outcomes.

Institutional Reforms and Support

The Resolute Support Mission (RSM) emphasized institutional capacity-building within the Afghan Ministries of (MoD) and Interior (MoI) as a core component of its non-combat mandate, aiming to foster self-sustaining governance over Afghan National and Security Forces (ANDSF) operations. Advisors embedded in these ministries provided training, advice, and assistance (TAA) on key functions such as , , budgeting, , and sustainment, with efforts structured around eight essential functions, including dedicated ministerial advisory teams. This support sought to transition ANDSF from combat dependency to independent institutional viability, as outlined in NATO's framework launched on January 1, 2015. By 2018, RSM intensified TAA to and leadership to enhance Kabul's posture, focusing on , , and command-and-control improvements amid persistent insurgent threats. NATO-led efforts included advising on national formulation and ministerial reforms to reduce and improve accountability, with progress reported in joint statements acknowledging advancements in institutions' capacity-building. For instance, U.S. of Defense assessments highlighted ongoing work to enable ministry-led planning and sustainment, though institutional weaknesses like payroll ghosting and procurement inefficiencies persisted despite advisory interventions. Quantifiable support included deploying specialized advisor teams—such as Ministry of Defense Advisors (MoDA)—to oversee reforms in areas like financial transparency and personnel systems, contributing to reported milestones like the Afghan government's assumption of greater budgeting responsibility by 2020. However, evaluations from the mission's duration, including NATO's own lessons-learned reviews, indicated that while tactical training advanced, deeper institutional reforms faced systemic barriers including ethnic factionalism and fiscal dependency on foreign aid, limiting long-term efficacy. These efforts represented a shift from direct combat support under ISAF to ministerial-level , though ultimate outcomes were constrained by internal dynamics.

Quantifiable Security and Governance Outcomes

The Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) operated below authorized strength throughout the (RSM), with actual personnel levels averaging 10-15% short of targets; for instance, in January 2018, assigned forces totaled about 313,000 against an authorized 352,000, reflecting chronic under-manning exacerbated by recruitment and retention challenges. rates hovered at 1.5-2% monthly during the early mission years, driven predominantly by (over 70% of cases) rather than battlefield deaths, which undermined and operational readiness despite RSM advising efforts. ANDSF casualties remained high, with Resolute Support estimating around 5,000 killed and 15,000 wounded in 2016 alone, and annual figures sustaining at 20,000-30,000 combined killed and wounded through much of the period, indicating insurgents maintained offensive momentum and ANDSF struggled to secure gains independently. SIGAR reports noted that such losses, coupled with low morale and incomplete training pipelines, prevented the development of self-sustaining forces capable of denying safe havens without coalition enablers. territorial influence expanded progressively, from controlling or contesting roughly 20-30% of districts in 2015 to over 50% by mid-2021, as measured by independent assessments tracking district-level dynamics, underscoring limited RSM impact on stabilizing contested areas. In , persisted as a core inhibitor, with 's score on Transparency International's stagnating at 15-16 out of 100 from 2015 to 2020, ranking it consistently among the world's most corrupt states (e.g., 174th out of 180 in 2018), despite RSM-supported initiatives like vetting procedures for ANDSF appointments. SIGAR found that graft in ministries of defense and interior diverted resources—such as fuel and "ghost soldier" payrolls—eroding institutional trust and operational effectiveness, with minimal verifiable reductions in high-level prosecutions or systemic reforms during the mission. Afghan government control over population centers and revenue collection weakened in parallel with trends, as shadow filled vacuums in rural districts, limiting central authority to urban enclaves by mission end.

Challenges and Criticisms

Persistent Security Threats and Casualties

The constituted the primary persistent security threat to the Resolute Support Mission (RSM), manifesting through sustained guerrilla tactics including ambushes, (IED) attacks, and on Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) bases where RSM advisors were embedded. The (ISIS-K), an emerging affiliate, amplified risks with high-profile suicide bombings and targeted strikes against , civilians, and minorities, particularly in eastern and northern provinces like Nangarhar and Kunar, where it vied for territorial control against both Taliban and ANDSF elements. These threats persisted unabated from RSM's inception in January 2015 through its termination in August 2021, undermining Afghan self-sufficiency goals by exploiting ANDSF vulnerabilities such as poor coordination and equipment shortages. Insider attacks, or "green-on-blue" incidents where personnel turned weapons on advisors, emerged as a acute risk to RSM's train-advise-assist model, eroding and operational . Notable examples include the 2015 killing of the first U.S. service member in RSM by an gunman; the May 2016 deaths of two soldiers in ; the June 2017 wounding of seven U.S. personnel in an attack claimed as insider by ; the March 2017 wounding of U.S. soldiers during advising; the 2019 shooting of advisors by border guards in ; and the July 2019 deaths of two U.S. service members in an apparent insider attack. Such events, though fewer than during the prior ISAF era, highlighted ongoing ideological infiltration and morale issues within ANDSF ranks, with attributing many to coercion or radicalization. Coalition casualties remained relatively low due to RSM's non-combat posture and measures, totaling approximately 100-150 hostile deaths across and partner nations from 2015 to 2021, a sharp decline from ISAF peaks but still indicative of embedded risks. In contrast, ANDSF forces endured devastating , with over 6,700 killed in the first 11 months of 2016 alone and annual rates exceeding 20,000 killed or wounded by 2017-2018, driven by territorial gains and ISIS-K bombings that outpaced RSM-enabled improvements in Afghan air support and . These disparities underscored causal factors like ANDSF desertions (peaking at 30-40% annually), in logistics, and insufficient will to hold contested areas, rendering persistent threats a core challenge to mission efficacy despite billions invested in .

Debates on Effectiveness and Sustainability

The Resolute Support Mission (RSM) aimed to foster self-reliant Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) through training, advising, and assisting, yet debates persist over its in building combat-ready units capable of independent operations. Proponents, including U.S. commanders, cited measurable such as improved ANDSF capabilities in areas like and , with coalition advisors embedding at various levels to enhance tactical proficiency. However, independent assessments from the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) emphasized systemic shortcomings, noting that despite training hundreds of thousands of personnel during the RSM period, operational was hampered by pervasive , including inflating reported strengths, and failures that prioritized over merit. By 2018, while ANDSF forces demonstrated some gains in holding key urban areas, Taliban control expanded to over half of 's districts, underscoring limited translation of training into sustained territorial control. Sustainability debates centered on the ANDSF's structural dependence on external support, rendering long-term viability questionable even before the 2021 withdrawal. Annual attrition rates, often exceeding 20% for the Afghan National Army due to desertions, , and inadequate pay, eroded force strength despite recruitment efforts, with SIGAR reporting that one-third of the army was lost between 2013 and 2016 alone—a trend persisting into the RSM era. Financially, the ANDSF required approximately $4-5 billion annually for operations, far beyond Afghanistan's domestic revenue capacity, leading to chronic underfunding, delayed salaries, and reliance on U.S.-provided like and air support, which masked underlying deficiencies. Critics, including evaluators, argued that RSM's focus on institutional advising overlooked entrenched networks within the Afghan government, which diverted resources and undermined morale, while NATO's non-combat mandate limited direct intervention against these issues. The rapid ANDSF collapse in August 2021, with many units surrendering without significant resistance after coalition departure, empirically validated concerns that was illusory without indefinite foreign backing, as nearly $90 billion in cumulative U.S. assistance failed to yield resilient institutions.

Role of Afghan Internal Dynamics

Endemic corruption within Afghan governance structures significantly hampered the Resolute Support Mission's (RSM) objectives of building sustainable security institutions, as funds allocated for training and equipping National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) were routinely diverted through patronage networks and ghost payrolls. The Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) documented that corruption eroded ANDSF morale and operational effectiveness, with officials fabricating personnel records to siphon salaries—estimated at up to 40% of payroll in some units—leaving troops unpaid and leading to widespread desertions. This systemic graft, rooted in pre-existing tribal and elite loyalties rather than merit-based systems, persisted despite RSM advisories on reforms, as leaders prioritized personal networks over , ultimately weakening force cohesion and . Political infighting at the highest levels exacerbated these challenges, with the 2014 formed after disputed elections between President and Chief Executive fostering parallel power structures that stalled unified on reforms. SIGAR assessments noted that this delayed cabinet formations and resource allocations critical to RSM-supported institutional development, such as and , as competing factions withheld to undermine rivals. By 2020, ongoing disputes over and power-sharing further fragmented governance, reducing Afghan ownership of RSM training programs and contributing to inconsistent implementation of advised strategies. Ethnic and tribal divisions compounded these issues within the ANDSF, where historical imbalances—such as Tajik and Uzbek overrepresentation in officer corps stemming from legacies—fostered resentment among Pashtun recruits, who comprised the heartland and were underrepresented despite recruitment quotas. SIGAR reports highlighted how these fissures led to factionalized units prone to ethnic-based mutinies and selective enlistment, undermining RSM efforts to create a national army; for instance, Pashtun rates remained high due to perceived and to tribal over central command. Illiteracy rates exceeding 80% in rural recruits amplified reliance on ethnic intermediaries for command, perpetuating over and rendering RSM's tactical advising vulnerable to internal . These dynamics, independent of external threats, revealed causal limits to foreign-led , as Afghan internal incentives favored short-term elite survival over long-term state-building.

Termination and Aftermath

Decision-Making and Withdrawal Timeline

The decision to terminate the Resolute Support Mission (RSM) stemmed from the ' bilateral negotiations with the , culminating in the Doha Agreement signed on February 29, 2020, which committed the U.S. to withdraw all its forces from by May 1, 2021, in exchange for Taliban pledges on counterterrorism and intra-Afghan talks. Although was not a direct party to the agreement, the alliance's presence in , including RSM, was predominantly U.S.-led and logistically dependent on American support, making NATO's continuation untenable without U.S. forces. Secretary General emphasized that the alliance would align its posture with the U.S., stating in early 2020 that NATO's mission would end if the U.S. departed. Following the of President , the U.S. administration conducted a review of the Agreement, citing insufficient compliance on violence reduction and prisoner releases but opting to proceed with withdrawal to end America's longest war. On April 14, 2021, Biden announced the full U.S. troop drawdown, reducing from approximately 2,500 personnel and completing evacuation by September 11, 2021—extending the original May 1 deadline by four months. Concurrently, NATO's issued a ministerial statement endorsing coordinated withdrawal, initiating RSM force reductions starting May 1, 2021, and targeting completion within a few months to avoid any attacks on allied troops during the process. The withdrawal proceeded amid escalating Taliban advances, with NATO allies drawing down troops in tandem: for instance, the U.S. reduced its RSM contingent to zero by July 2021, followed by remaining partners. All RSM forces were withdrawn by late August 2021, formally terminating the mission on September 1, 2021, as confirmed by after the U.S. completion on August 30. This timeline reflected a consensus-driven decision process, reliant on the U.S. bilateral framework rather than independent alliance-wide negotiations with stakeholders.

Rapid Collapse of Afghan Forces

The Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF), comprising approximately 352,000 authorized personnel as of early 2021 including the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP), demonstrated limited capacity to operate independently following the completion of the Resolute Support Mission in 2020 and the subsequent U.S.-led withdrawal. The Taliban's major offensive commenced on May 1, 2021, coinciding with the U.S. evacuation of Bagram Airfield, leading to the swift capitulation of district centers and provincial capitals; by August 6, cities such as Zaranj and Sheberghan had fallen, followed by Herat on August 12 and Kandahar on August 13, often with minimal combat as ANDSF units surrendered en masse or fled. Kabul itself surrendered on August 15, 2021, after President Ashraf Ghani fled the country, marking the effective dissolution of the ANDSF without a decisive battle for the capital. A primary causal factor was the ANDSF's structural dependency on U.S. and NATO-provided enablers, including , , , , , and , which Resolute Support had not fully transitioned to Afghan self-sufficiency despite years of advisory efforts; the abrupt of these capabilities—accelerated by the 2020 U.S.- Agreement and President Biden's extension to August 31, 2021—rendered forward bases untenable and induced operational paralysis. SIGAR assessments identified this as the single most critical precipitant, compounded by ANDSF attrition rates exceeding 100,000 personnel in the prior year due to desertions, casualties, and "" inflating payrolls through systemic that diverted billions in U.S. aid. Internal Afghan dynamics exacerbated the fragility: leadership at senior levels, including the Ministry of Defense and corps commanders, exhibited poor decision-making, ethnic favoritism (favoring northern Tajik and Uzbek elements over Pashtun recruits), and a reluctance to deploy reserves or reinforce threatened areas, fostering widespread demoralization and capitulation incentives offered by negotiators promising . psychological operations, leveraging the perceived inevitability of U.S. abandonment signaled by the Doha deal's prisoner releases and reduction in ANDSF operations, further eroded will to fight; units in provinces like Helmand and surrendered intact with equipment, contributing to a where collapsing rear areas isolated forward positions. Quantifiable indicators of pre-collapse weakness included the ANDSF's inability to hold more than 50% of centers without support by mid-2021, with casualty rates sustained at 20,000–30,000 annually prior to the offensive, underscoring that Resolute Support's training—while producing tactical proficiency in some units like commandos—failed to instill sustainable institutional resilience against and patronage-driven command structures. Post-collapse analyses by SIGAR and evaluators emphasize that these endogenous failures, rather than exogenous Taliban superiority alone, determined the rapidity of the unraveling, as exploited existing fissures rather than overpowering a cohesive .

Immediate Humanitarian and Strategic Consequences

The termination of the Resolute Support Mission in early September 2021, following the completion of troop withdrawals by , triggered a rapid humanitarian emergency in as the seized on August 15. Between August 14 and 30, U.S. and coalition forces evacuated approximately 124,000 individuals from amid chaotic scenes of desperation, including crowds storming the tarmac and fatalities from falls during attempted boardings. This exodus primarily involved Afghan allies, U.S. citizens, and vulnerable groups fearing reprisals, but left behind an estimated hundreds of thousands who had aided efforts and now faced targeted . The immediate post-takeover period saw acute food insecurity surge from over 30 percent of the beforehand to more than 40 percent, exacerbated by the freeze of Afghan central bank assets abroad and the collapse of international funding flows. Economic contraction deepened as banking systems halted, leading to cash shortages and a spike in ; UNHCR operations scaled up to assist over 916,000 in 2021 alone, with internal displacement reaching millions due to advances and reprisal killings. Vulnerable populations, particularly women, ethnic minorities, and former government officials, encountered swift restrictions on movement and employment, compounding risks of and in urban centers like where aid access was disrupted. Strategically, the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces—trained under RSM at a cost exceeding $88 billion in U.S. funding alone—disintegrated without sustained presence, ceding control to the in weeks despite numerical superiority and equipment advantages, highlighting failures in fostering independent operational resilience. The eroded 's deterrence posture, as evidenced by the 's unbroken offensive momentum post-July 2021, enabling affiliates to regroup and ISIS-K to exploit the vacuum for attacks like the airport bombing that killed 13 U.S. service members and over 170 . Regionally, it emboldened jihadist networks across and while straining alliances, with European partners criticizing the uncoordinated U.S.-led exit for undermining collective credibility and complicating future burden-sharing in interventions. The outcome validated pre- assessments of heightened terrorism export risks, as safe havens reemerged without enablers like RSM's intelligence-sharing infrastructure.

Legacy and Analysis

Long-Term Evaluations of Impact

Long-term evaluations of the Resolute Support Mission (RSM), primarily from U.S. oversight bodies like the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) and NATO's own Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre (JALLC), highlight its failure to foster sustainable Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) capable of independent operations. Despite training over 300,000 personnel and providing advanced equipment, the ANDSF collapsed within weeks of NATO's withdrawal in August 2021, as forces captured on August 15 after overrunning provincial capitals with minimal resistance. SIGAR's 2022 evaluation attributes this to systemic dependencies on U.S. enablers—such as airstrikes (reduced from 7,423 in 2019 to 1,631 in 2020) and —rather than genuine self-sufficiency, with Afghan forces rarely conducting independent missions during RSM. A core critique is the "mirror-imaging" approach, where U.S. and advisors modeled ANDSF structures on Western militaries ill-suited to Afghanistan's terrain, , and ethnic fractures, leading to inflated metrics like reported troop strengths of 352,000 in December 2020 that masked "" and actual effective forces estimated at 40,000–50,000. Over $88 billion in U.S. security assistance since 2002, including RSM's focus on institutional advising from 2015 to 2021, failed to instill ownership or combat readiness, exacerbated by short advisor rotations (6–12 months), inconsistent coordination among 36 contributors, and persistent siphoning funds—such as the $750 million annual salary support that sustained payrolls but not loyalty. 's JALLC review acknowledges these gaps, noting RSM's 2017 security roadmap emphasized leadership and but yielded limited enduring capabilities amid high ANDSF (up to 33% annually for the Afghan National Army). Post-2021 outcomes underscore negligible positive legacy in security and governance: consolidation enabled ISIS-K resurgence, with attacks like the August 26, 2021, airport bombing killing 13 U.S. service members and over 170 , while governance reverted to centralized theocratic control without the democratic institutions RSM indirectly supported. SIGAR analyses, drawing on empirical data over multiple administrations, emphasize causal factors like leadership failures under President Ghani—frequent command changes and no cohesive national strategy—over external variables, rejecting narratives of sudden in favor of predictable unsustainability from dependency and morale erosion post-U.S.- (February 2020). Independent evaluations similarly deem RSM's progress overstated, with limited effectiveness due to internal dynamics and inadequate adaptation to local realities. These assessments, prioritizing data from field reports and audits, contrast with potentially optimistic self-reviews by highlighting how input-focused metrics obscured outputs like operational independence.

Lessons for Future Interventions

The Resolute Support Mission (RSM) highlighted the limitations of sector assistance in environments lacking political and reforms. Despite over 300,000 Afghan National Defense and Forces (ANDSF) personnel and expending approximately $88 billion in U.S. funds alone on sustainment from 2015 to 2021, the ANDSF disintegrated rapidly after NATO's withdrawal in August 2021, underscoring that military capacity-building cannot compensate for internal , desertions, and leadership failures. Lessons emphasize the need for interventions to prioritize verifiable political preconditions, such as mechanisms and unified command structures, before scaling advisory efforts. A primary takeaway is the peril of decoupling security assistance from broader realities. RSM advisors embedded with ANDSF units reported persistent issues like "ghost soldiers" inflating payrolls by up to 40% in some units, diverting funds from operational readiness, yet U.S. and metrics focused on throughput—such as hours trained—rather than outcomes like combat effectiveness against Taliban incursions. Future missions should integrate real-time auditing and condition-based funding, withholding support until host-nation forces demonstrate self-sustained logistics and accountability, as evidenced by the ANDSF's collapse when external air support and contracting ceased. This approach aligns with causal factors like dependency on foreign enablers, which SIGAR identified as eroding ANDSF morale and capability over time. External sanctuaries for insurgents proved insurmountable without regional diplomatic leverage. The Taliban's resurgence, fueled by operations from Pakistan-based havens, outpaced RSM gains despite cross-border strikes; U.S. intelligence estimated 70-80% of Taliban attacks originated from Pakistan in 2018-2020. Interventions must precondition engagement on host-nation or ally commitments to seal borders and disrupt supply lines, avoiding the RSM-era reliance on ineffective negotiations like the 2020 Agreement, which excluded Afghan stakeholders and emboldened withdrawals. Sustainability demands realistic assessments over optimistic reporting. RSM's shift to non-combat advising in 2015 correlated with territorial control rising from 7% in 2015 to 47% by 2021, per U.S. estimates, revealing flaws in progress indicators that ignored qualitative factors like ethnic factionalism within the ANDSF. Planners for future operations should employ , on-ground validation of host capabilities, eschewing self-reported data prone to inflation, and build in phased drawdowns tied to empirical benchmarks such as offensive operations. Civil-military disconnects amplified failures, with RSM's focus on neglecting parallel reforms essential for loyalty. SIGAR audits found that $19 billion in direct ANDSF funding from 2015-2020 was undermined by unchecked executive interference in military appointments, leading to politicized commands. Holistic strategies must synchronize advisory roles across sectors, enforcing host compliance with merit-based systems to prevent the networks that precipitated surrenders in 2021.

References

  1. [1]
    Topic: Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan (2015-2021) - NATO
    May 30, 2022 · Resolute Support was a NATO-led, non-combat mission. The mission was established at the invitation of the Afghan government and in accordance ...
  2. [2]
    [PDF] Some Improvements Reported in Afghan Forces' Capabilities, but ...
    Oct 15, 2018 · Since the Resolute Support mission began in 2015, the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) have improved some fundamental ...
  3. [3]
    [PDF] Assessing the Capabilities and Effectiveness of the Afghan National ...
    Feb 12, 2016 · There are now less than. 13,000 U.S. and Coalition troops there as part of Resolute Support's train, advise, and assist mission. In SIGAR's ...
  4. [4]
    Wales Summit Declaration on Afghanistan : Issued by ... - NATO
    Sep 4, 2014 · The Resolute Support Mission should ideally, in consultation with the Government of Afghanistan, be supported by a United Nations Security ...
  5. [5]
    NATO reaffirms continued support to Afghanistan, 04-Sep.-2014
    Sep 4, 2014 · NATO Leaders at the Wales Summit reaffirmed on Thursday (4 September 2014) their commitment to supporting Afghanistan.
  6. [6]
    FACT SHEET: Wales Summit – NATO's Changing Role in Afghanistan
    Sep 4, 2014 · Resolute Support. At the Wales Summit, NATO Allies and partners reaffirmed their intent to conduct a non-combat train, advise, and assist ...
  7. [7]
    FACT SHEET: NATO's Enduring Commitment to Afghanistan
    Jul 9, 2016 · Thirty-nine NATO Allies and partners have thus far committed more than 11,000 troops to sustain the Resolute Support mission beyond 2016. The ...
  8. [8]
    [PDF] S/RES/2189 (2014) - Security Council
    Dec 12, 2014 · Mission provide a sound legal basis for Resolute Support Mission,. 1. Underscores the importance of continued international support for the.
  9. [9]
    Adoption of Resolution on Resolute Support Mission (Afghanistan)
    Dec 11, 2014 · The Council is expected to adopt a resolution on the Resolute Support Mission (RSM), a NATO mission designed to train, advise and assist Afghan security forces ...
  10. [10]
  11. [11]
    Inteqal: Transition to Afghan lead (2011-2014) - NATO
    Sep 15, 2022 · Launched in 2011, the transition process was completed by the end of 2014, when ISAF completed its mission. This target was set at the 2010 NATO ...
  12. [12]
    Transition ceremony kicks off Resolute Support Mission - NATO
    Dec 28, 2014 · ISAF's mission in Afghanistan (2001-2014). News. Transition ceremony kicks off Resolute Support Mission 28 Dec. 2014. Links. RS - Website of the ...
  13. [13]
    U.S. formally ends the war in Afghanistan - CBS News
    Dec 28, 2014 · The United States and NATO formally ended their war in Afghanistan on Sunday with a ceremony at their military headquarters in Kabul.<|control11|><|separator|>
  14. [14]
    ISAF's mission in Afghanistan (2001-2014) - NATO
    May 30, 2022 · A new, smaller non-combat mission (“Resolute Support”) was launched on 1 January 2015 to provide further training, advice and assistance to the ...
  15. [15]
    NATO agrees launch of Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan
    Dec 3, 2014 · Today we agree to launch the Resolute Support Mission on 1 January 2015. This new non-combat mission will train, advise and assist the ANDSF.
  16. [16]
    [PDF] Resolute Support Mission - NATO
    Mission: The Resolute Support Mission (RSM) is a NATO-led mission to train, advise and assist the Afghan security forces and institutions. The mission was ...
  17. [17]
    Resolute Support [NATO] - GlobalSecurity.org
    The NATO-led RS mission remains focused on training, advising, and assisting ... Personnel at each TAAC conduct training and provide advice and assistance ...
  18. [18]
    Resolute Support trains its people, improving advisor training
    Jun 26, 2017 · This holistic approach to training prepares new personnel for the SFA mission in Afghanistan with a focus on those who have come to advise key Afghan leaders.Missing: core roles
  19. [19]
    [PDF] Some Improvements Reported in Afghan Forces' Capabilities, but ...
    Oct 15, 2018 · U.S. and coalition advisors from Resolute Support focus on capacity building at the Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Interior, and ANDSF.
  20. [20]
    Resolute Support commander: More troops needed to break Afghan ...
    "As a result of our training, equipping and partnering, the 17,000-strong Afghan special forces are the best in the region," the general told the Senate panel.Missing: details | Show results with:details<|separator|>
  21. [21]
    Joint Statement on the Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan
    Jul 12, 2018 · Effective, professional, and self-sustaining Afghan forces will be better able to provide security for the country, create the conditions for a ...Missing: goals | Show results with:goals
  22. [22]
    [PDF] Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan - DoD
    Jul 1, 2020 · Figure 1 is derived from a NATO public website annotating U.S. Forces in support of. NATO Resolute Support Mission as of February 2020.
  23. [23]
    [PDF] Resolute Support Mission - NATO
    Mission: The Resolute Support mission (RSM) is a NATO-led mission to train, advise and assist the Afghan security forces and institutions. The mission was ...
  24. [24]
    [PDF] Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan
    Dec 1, 2019 · Resolute Support (RS) focused its advisory efforts on “decisive people, places and processes” that have the greatest impact on ANDSF development ...
  25. [25]
    NATO Eyes Troop Reductions in Afghanistan as U.S. Draws Down
    Feb 7, 2020 · The Trump administration's decision to eventually reduce its own forces from roughly 12,000 troops to around 8,500 has triggered a debate within ...
  26. [26]
    [PDF] John W. Nicholson, USA Nominee to Commander, Resolute Support ...
    These partnerships support efforts to work with the Afghan government to ensure progress towards the goal of a self-sufficient Afghanistan. Major Challenges ...
  27. [27]
    The continuing mission in Afghanistan | Article - Army.mil
    Apr 13, 2016 · The Combined Security Transition Command -- Afghanistan (CSTC-A), as part of the Resolute Support Mission, is the center-of-gravity organization ...
  28. [28]
    Change of Command at NATO-led Resolute Support Mission in ...
    Sep 2, 2018 · Today (2 September, 2018), General Austin Scott Miller assumed command of the NATO-led Resolute Support Mission from General John ''Mick'' ...Missing: succession | Show results with:succession
  29. [29]
    More Troops Needed to Break Afghan 'Stalemate' - Centcom
    Feb 9, 2017 · “As a result of our training, equipping and partnering, the 17,000-strong Afghan special forces are the best in the region,” the general told ...
  30. [30]
    Afghanistan: Mobile Train/Advise/Assist Team from the NATO-led ...
    Nov 7, 2018 · The NATO-led Resolute Support Mission includes mobile teams providing training, advice and assistance to more remote areas of Afghanistan, ...Missing: programs ANDSF examples
  31. [31]
    [PDF] Lessons From U.S. Security Sector Assistance Efforts In Afghanistan
    The Resolute Support Mission should create a command-and-control relationship among all elements of the advisory mission. This includes aligning the Train ...
  32. [32]
    [PDF] AFGHANISTAN - DoD
    Dec 12, 2018 · The main effort for the Resolute Support Mission in 2018 was to enhance Kabul security through an intensified TAA effort with MoD and the MoI.
  33. [33]
    [PDF] Train, Advise, and Assist Lessons from Resolute Support Mission
    Mar 21, 2022 · The Resolute Support Mission (RSM) was a NATO-led mission to train, advise, and assist the Afghan security forces and institutions.Missing: objectives | Show results with:objectives
  34. [34]
    [PDF] Operation Freedom's Sentinel, Report to the United States Congress
    Mar 3, 2018 · Based on the January 2018 data, the ANDSF actual strength is 38,272, or 11 percent, below its authorized strength. This shortfall, at a time ...
  35. [35]
    The Insider | InsideDefense.com
    The actual end strength for the ANDSF was 313,728 personnel as of Jan. 31, 2018, according to the addendum. U.S. Forces told SIGAR the error was due to their ...Missing: authorized period
  36. [36]
    [PDF] Afghanistan National Defense and Security Forces
    The follow-on, NATO-led Resolute. Support (RS) mission provides further training, guidance, and assistance to Afghan security forces and institutions. The U.S. ...
  37. [37]
    Operation Freedom's Sentinel and our continued security investment ...
    Oct 5, 2015 · It is important to underscore that over 70% percent of ANDSF attrition can be attributed to absenteeism--not battlefield casualties. ...
  38. [38]
    NATO Works To Reduce ANDSF Casualties | Afghanistan News
    Aug 26, 2016 · NATO Resolute Support findings revealed that 5000 Afghan security forces were killed and about 15000 others were wounded in the fight ...
  39. [39]
    [PDF] Lessons From U.S. Security Sector Assistance Efforts In Afghanistan
    Afghanistan, State recognizes NATO's Resolute Support Mission as the lead for security sector assistance.900. This is in large part due to State's limited ...
  40. [40]
    Mapping Taliban Control in Afghanistan - FDD's Long War Journal
    Created by Bill Roggio Interactive Click here to view the interactive Weekly time lapse video of the Taliban's Advance | Apr 13 to Sept 6, 2021.
  41. [41]
    Afghanistan - Transparency.org
    Afghanistan has a score of 17 this year, with a change of -3 since last year, meaning it ranks 165 out of 180 countries. Find out about key corruption issues in ...
  42. [42]
    [PDF] SIGAR 16-58-LL Corruption in Conflict: Lessons from the U.S. ...
    Our analysis reveals that corruption substantially undermined the U.S. mission in Afghanistan from the very beginning of Operation Enduring Freedom. We found ...
  43. [43]
    [PDF] The Afghan Government Made Progress in Meeting its Anti
    Nov 1, 2019 · In May 2018, SIGAR reported on the Afghan government's progress toward achieving anti- corruption reforms. SIGAR found that.
  44. [44]
    [PDF] SIGAR 23-05-IP Why the Afghan Government Collapsed
    Nov 1, 2022 · Finally, the Afghan government's high level of centralization, endemic corruption, and struggle to attain legitimacy were long-term contributors ...Missing: index | Show results with:index
  45. [45]
    Country Reports on Terrorism 2020: Afghanistan - State Department
    ... Taliban remained close. ISIS-K continued to perpetrate high-profile attacks against civilians, journalists, religious minorities, and members of the ...Missing: persistent | Show results with:persistent
  46. [46]
    [PDF] operation freedom's sentinel - Office of Inspector General
    Jun 30, 2018 · 15,997 coalition troops supporting the Resolute Support mission, as shown in Table 4.100 Of the 39 Resolute Support countries, 28–notably.
  47. [47]
    Blog Archive » Afghanistan 'Green-on-Blue' Insider Attacks
    The gunman was killed. This marks the first U.S. service member killed as part of the Resolute Support mission, which began Jan. 1 as Afghan National Security ...
  48. [48]
    Afghanistan: Nato soldiers killed in 'green-on-blue' attack - BBC News
    May 7, 2016 · Two Nato soldiers are killed in Afghanistan and a third wounded when attackers wearing Afghan security forces uniforms open fire on them, ...
  49. [49]
    7 U.S. Service Members Wounded In 'Insider Attack' In Afghanistan
    Jun 17, 2017 · It's the second "green-on-blue" shooting in Afghanistan in a week ... A tweet from the NATO-led Operation Resolute Support described it as an " ...
  50. [50]
    American soldiers wounded in Afghan 'insider attack' - Al Jazeera
    Mar 19, 2017 · So-called “green-on-blue” insider attacks by Afghan soldiers on international service members were a major problem several years ago, but now ...
  51. [51]
    Afghan forces open fire on NATO advisors at base in Herat
    Jan 2, 2019 · Two Afghan border guards opened fire on NATO Resolute Support mission advisors at the military base in Herat province in western Afghanistan.
  52. [52]
    Two Americans Killed in Apparent Insider Attack in Afghanistan - VOA
    Jul 29, 2019 · Two U.S. service members have been killed in action in Afghanistan in what appears to be an insider attack. The NATO-led Resolute Support ...<|separator|>
  53. [53]
    Insider attacks as one of the main threats to resolute support ...
    From July 2015, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) moved into the Resolute Support Mission (RSM) and started acting in the supporting role.Missing: major | Show results with:major
  54. [54]
    Map Of Coalition Countries That Lost At Least 1 Solider Helping US ...
    Mar 4, 2025 · In total there were 3,621 coalition deaths in Afghanistan, which includes deaths “In and Around Afghanistan,” but not deaths on soldiers on ...
  55. [55]
    [PDF] us costs to date for the war in afghanistan, 2001-2021
    Apr 15, 2021 · reported 6,785 Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) killed from January 1, 2016 to November 12, 2016, a rate of about 147 per ...Missing: statistics | Show results with:statistics<|separator|>
  56. [56]
    [PDF] AFGHANISTAN BEFORE THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COM
    We remain concerned about multiple critical factors, specifically the stability of the. Afghan government, ANDSF casualties, the influence of external actors on ...
  57. [57]
    [PDF] reconstructing the afghan national defense and security forces
    This report examines US security sector assistance to build the ANDSF, drawing lessons from the US experience since 2002, and the US was not properly prepared.
  58. [58]
    Lessons learned from 15 years in Afghanistan: SIGAR
    Oct 2, 2017 · The Afghan Special Forces is the only branch with low attrition and high re-enlistment rates. SIGAR cited that from 2013 through 2016, attrition ...
  59. [59]
    [PDF] INTERIM REPORT - NATO SFA COE
    May 12, 2022 · First, SIGAR found that no one country or agency had ownership of the. ANDSF development mission. Instead, ownership existed within a NATO-led ...<|separator|>
  60. [60]
    [PDF] Between wish and reality
    May 19, 2023 · Between 2015 and 2021, the NATO Resolute Support Mission (RSM) took place in Afghanistan. The mission focused on training, advising and ...<|control11|><|separator|>
  61. [61]
    [PDF] Reconstructing the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces
    Sep 23, 2017 · Our analysis revealed that the U.S. government was not properly prepared from the outset to help build an Afghan army and police force that was.
  62. [62]
    [PDF] What We Need to Learn: Lessons from Twenty Years of Afghanistan ...
    Source: Resolute Support, response to SIGAR data call, April 1, 2021, and June 12, 2021; Resolute Support, response to DOD OIG vetting, October 2019; U.S. ...
  63. [63]
    Afghanistan: The Future of the National Unity Government
    Apr 10, 2017 · The power dispute between President Ashraf Ghani and Chief Executive Officer Abdullah Abdullah is imperilling Afghanistan's fragile security ...
  64. [64]
    Resolving the Ghani-Abdullah impasse in Afghanistan | Brookings
    Mar 25, 2020 · His mission there did not center on the war against the Taliban, the peace process with the Taliban, or even the global coronavirus pandemic.
  65. [65]
    Afghan army struggles with ethnic divisions - NBC News
    Jul 27, 2010 · Despite ethnic quotas and recruiting drives, the Afghan army is still dominated by northern minorities who were oppressed by the Taliban.
  66. [66]
    NATO and Afghanistan
    Aug 31, 2022 · In January 2015, NATO launched the Resolute Support Mission (RSM) to train, advise and assist Afghan security forces and institutions to fight ...Pashto · Dari · Ukrainian · Russian
  67. [67]
  68. [68]
    Top U.S. commander in Afghanistan says steps to end ... - Reuters
    Apr 25, 2021 · Foreign force withdrawal is slated to begin on May 1, in line with an agreement with the Taliban in 2020.Missing: timeline | Show results with:timeline
  69. [69]
    NATO Allies decide to start withdrawal of forces from Afghanistan
    Apr 15, 2021 · NATO Allies decided on Wednesday (14 April 2021) to start withdrawing forces from the Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan by May 1.Missing: end timeline
  70. [70]
    The shocking speed of the Taliban's advance: A visual timeline
    Aug 16, 2021 · Just four months after President Biden announced he would withdraw the United States from Afghanistan, the Taliban has taken control of Kabul, ...
  71. [71]
    Lessons from the Collapse of Afghanistan's Security Forces
    Six themes emerge from a close examination of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces' (ANDSF) collapse in 2021.
  72. [72]
    Why Did the Afghan Army Evaporate? - RUSI
    Aug 18, 2021 · There are several reasons for the collapse of the Afghan army, but a duplicitous US negotiation with the Taliban was the most potent, and the insurgents ...
  73. [73]
    Deconstructing the Collapse of Afghanistan National Security and ...
    The rapid collapse of Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) in August 2021 was widely anticipated and due to its structural constraints and ...
  74. [74]
    [PDF] Deconstructing the Collapse of Afghanistan National Security and ...
    Aug 25, 2022 · ABSTRACT: The rapid collapse of Afghan National Defense and Security. Forces (ANDSF) in August 2021 was widely anticipated and due to its.
  75. [75]
    [PDF] OIG's Review of the Department of State's Evacuation of U.S. ...
    Sep 20, 2023 · According to Secretary Blinken, the U.S. government and its partners ultimately evacuated approximately. 124,000 individuals, including 6,000 ...
  76. [76]
    Taliban Takeover: Humanitarian Implications and ... - CSIS
    Aug 24, 2021 · In addition to the negative consequences Taliban control will have for the rights of women and minorities, the lack of meaningful capacity to ...
  77. [77]
    Afghanistan: Humanitarian Crisis Needs Urgent Response
    Sep 3, 2021 · Before the Taliban takeover, more than 30 percent of the country was facing acute food insecurity; now over 40 percent. In December 2020, the UN ...
  78. [78]
    Afghanistan Refugee Crisis Explained - USA for UNHCR
    Sep 10, 2025 · UNHCR stayed throughout the Taliban takeover and rapidly scaled up its operation, providing lifesaving support to over 916,000 people in 2021 ...
  79. [79]
    Instability in Afghanistan | Global Conflict Tracker
    After the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan in August 2021, the Taliban rapidly regained control of the country and the government in Kabul. Despite ...Missing: 2015-2021 | Show results with:2015-2021
  80. [80]
    [PDF] Preparing for the Consequences of Withdrawal from Afghanistan
    May 1, 2021 · Withdrawal will impact Intra-Afghan negotiations, governance, security, terrorism, regional dynamics, great power competition, human rights, ...
  81. [81]
    Operationally Agile but Strategically Lacking: NATO's Bruising Years ...
    May 2, 2022 · The return of the Taliban to power in 2021 defines a defeat for NATO, we argue. Defeat followed in part from NATO's strategy deficit.
  82. [82]
  83. [83]
    Results – Evaluation of the Dutch Contribution to Resolute Support
    The objective of the mission was to create a professional and self-reliant Afghan security apparatus that would be able to independently maintain security and ...