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Sinai Interim Agreement

The Sinai Interim Agreement, commonly referred to as Sinai II, was a bilateral disengagement accord signed on , 1975, between and in , under U.S. mediation, stipulating Israeli withdrawal from additional portions of the —including the strategic Gidi and Passes and the Abu Rudeis oil fields—in return for Egyptian deployment of limited forces closer to the and the creation of demilitarized buffer zones overseen by observers and American-operated early warning stations. This agreement built upon the initial 1974 disengagement following the 1973 , extending the UN-patrolled buffer and restricting Egyptian concentrations to approximately one infantry division in newly accessible Zone A, while Israel retained positions farther east but relinquished key terrain advantages. The accord's provisions included an Egyptian commitment to resolve disputes peacefully rather than through force, alongside U.S. assurances via a separate to facilitate implementation through technical monitoring teams—18 stations equipped with and staffed by civilians—marking an unprecedented U.S. involvement in verifying between adversaries. These measures aimed to reduce immediate risks by enforcing limitations and transparency, with gaining economic benefits from oil production resumption and securing a temporary stabilization of its southern front amid broader Arab-Israeli tensions. Historically, Sinai II represented a pragmatic interim step that eroded prospects for renewed , fostering diplomatic momentum that culminated in the 1978 and 1979 peace treaty, though it fell short of comprehensive peace by deferring final border and sovereignty resolutions. Negotiated through intense U.S. led by , the agreement faced domestic resistance, particularly from Rabin's coalition, which viewed the concessions as unbalanced without political commitments from , and from opposition figures wary of U.S. entanglement potentially constraining Israel's . In the U.S., congressional critics debated the executive agreements' implications, arguing they resembled treaties shifting American policy toward incentivizing further withdrawals without assured long-term gains, while Egyptian President leveraged the deal to bolster his domestic position and sideline Soviet influence. Despite these tensions, empirical outcomes validated its stabilizing effect, as no major hostilities recurred between the signatories, underscoring the causal role of enforced separations in mitigating escalation risks over ideological posturing.

Historical Context

Aftermath of the

The ended with United Nations Security Council Resolution 338, adopted on October 22, 1973, which demanded an immediate ceasefire to take effect within 12 hours and called for implementation of Resolution 242 through negotiations under UN auspices. Despite initial acceptance by both sides, mutual violations ensued, with Israeli forces advancing to encircle the Egyptian Third Army on the east bank of the , while Egyptian units attempted breakouts; a second ceasefire took effect on October 25, stabilizing front lines with Israel holding positions west of the canal and deeper into Syrian territory on the . These post-ceasefire clashes heightened tensions, prompting a U.S. nuclear alert (DEFCON 3) amid Soviet threats to intervene on Egypt's behalf. Casualties were severe, underscoring the war's intensity: suffered 2,691 soldiers killed and approximately 8,800 wounded, representing its costliest conflict since independence in terms of proportional losses. forces incurred around 15,000 deaths, with Syrian losses adding several thousand more, alongside massive equipment destruction— lost over 1,000 tanks and 200 aircraft, about 400 tanks and 100 aircraft. The war exposed vulnerabilities, including intelligence failures that underestimated Arab coordination, leading to the inquiry in , which criticized military and political leadership and contributed to Golda Meir's resignation in April 1974. In , President Anwar Sadat's strategy of a limited offensive succeeded in restoring national morale by breaching the Bar-Lev Line and ending the post-1967 stalemate, though at high cost, positioning him to seek diplomatic gains. Economically, the oil embargo, initiated October 17, 1973, against nations supporting (primarily the U.S. and ), slashed production by 5% monthly and banned exports, causing oil prices to quadruple from $3 to $12 per barrel by early 1974, triggering , , and shortages. This leverage amplified Arab diplomatic influence, compelling the U.S. to prioritize mediation to avert Soviet inroads and secure energy stability, as evidenced by massive U.S. airlifts of arms to during the (over 22,000 tons) balanced by subsequent pressure for concessions. The Peace Conference in December 1973 convened , , , , and superpowers but yielded no breakthroughs, highlighting entrenched positions—Israel demanded recognition and secure borders, Egypt insisted on full withdrawal—setting the stage for U.S. under .

The First Disengagement Agreement (Sinai I)

The First Disengagement Agreement between Egypt and Israel, known as Sinai I, was signed on January 18, 1974, marking the initial post-Yom Kippur War effort to separate the entangled forces on the Suez Canal front. Mediated exclusively by U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger via shuttle diplomacy from January 11 to 18, 1974—during which he traveled repeatedly between Egyptian President Anwar Sadat in Aswan and Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir in Jerusalem—the accord addressed core disputes over forward deployment lines, armored vehicle limitations, and security assurances, including Egyptian commitments to reopen the Suez Canal to non-military traffic and Israeli passage rights through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. This U.S.-brokered process excluded direct Egyptian-Israeli talks, relying instead on sequential concessions extracted by Kissinger to prevent collapse amid mutual distrust and domestic pressures in both nations. Under Article IV, Israeli forces redeployed east of specified Lines J and M, approximately 32 kilometers east of the in key sectors, while forces withdrew to positions west of Line E, enabling a limited with minimal armor to occupy a narrow strip on the canal's east bank. A UN-supervised was created between Lines E and J, devoid of combat forces from either side, to enforce disengagement and prevent accidental clashes. Adjacent limited armament areas between Lines E-F and J-K restricted tanks and to predefined ceilings—such as no more than 30 tanks in the forward zone—as outlined in the agreement's annexed protocol, aiming to degrade offensive capabilities while preserving defensive postures. Monitoring fell to the (UNEF II), whose mandate under Article V was renewed annually by the UN Security Council to patrol the , man checkpoints, and verify compliance; UNEF personnel, drawn from non-permanent Security Council members excluding the parties' allies, deployed rapidly post-signing to oversee the redeployments. A bilateral , chaired by the UN , facilitated coordination on implementation details, including for withdrawals completed by March 1974. Articles I-III reinforced UN Security Council Resolution 338 by prohibiting force or threats thereof, mandating strict observance on land, sea, and air, and framing the accord as a provisional measure toward comprehensive negotiations. The signing occurred at Kilometer 101 along the Cairo-Suez road, by Egyptian Third Army Commander Mohamed el-Gamasy and Israeli Southern Command head Major General , in the presence of UN and U.S. witnesses, underscoring the military's pivotal role amid ongoing battlefield tensions. Article VII ensured provisional access for non-military cargoes via the , though full reopening awaited later accords, while Article VIII positioned I as a foundational, non-prejudicial step in Peace Conference frameworks. Implementation proceeded without major incidents, stabilizing the front but leaving core territorial issues unresolved, as regained a foothold east of the canal for the first time since , bolstering Sadat's domestic standing despite Israel's retention of strategic heights.

Negotiation Process

US Shuttle Diplomacy Under Kissinger

Following the failure of multilateral talks at the Geneva Peace Conference in 1975, U.S. initiated a new round of in March 1975 aimed at securing a second Egyptian-Israeli disengagement agreement in the . This approach built on Kissinger's earlier successes in 1974 but encountered greater resistance, as Egyptian President sought significant Israeli withdrawals to demonstrate progress toward peace, while Israeli Prime Minister insisted on linking concessions to Syrian disengagement or firmer Egyptian commitments under UN Security Council Resolution 338. Kissinger's method involved personally ferrying detailed proposals and revisions between and over multiple trips, incrementally narrowing gaps on territorial lines, buffer zones, and arrangements without direct negotiations between the parties. Early shuttles stalled amid reluctance to cede strategic passes like and Gidi or return the Abu Rudeis oil fields, prompting President to announce a "reassessment" of U.S. policy on March 24, 1975, which included suspending further arms shipments to as leverage. This reassessment, lasting until June 1975, marked a rare public strain in U.S.- relations, with Kissinger warning of diminished American support if did not compromise, though it drew sharp rebukes from U.S. senators concerned over 's . By early summer 1975, congressional pressure—including letters from 76 senators urging resumption of aid—forced a U.S. policy shift, allowing shuttles to restart amid Sadat's willingness to accept interim steps short of full withdrawal. Negotiations accelerated in August 1975, with Kissinger securing Israeli agreement to pull back forces approximately 40 kilometers east of the , creating a wider UN , in exchange for U.S. assurances against oil embargoes and the establishment of American-monitored stations (three manned and three unmanned) within the zone to verify compliance. These U.S. side letters, exchanged on September 1, 1975, provided with diplomatic gains while reassuring of non-use of force and limited Egyptian military buildup. The intensive , spanning six months and involving repeated high-level revisions, culminated in the Sinai Interim Agreement (Sinai II) signed on September 4, 1975, in by Egyptian and Israeli representatives, with Kissinger as mediator. This outcome advanced U.S. influence in moderating Arab-Israeli tensions but highlighted the limits of step-by-step , as broader comprehensive remained elusive without Syrian involvement.

Israeli and Egyptian Stances

, under Prime Minister , prioritized security guarantees in the negotiations, demanding that any territorial concessions be paired with explicit Egyptian commitments to non-belligerency to prevent incremental encroachments or "salami tactics" that could rebuild Egyptian offensive capabilities. viewed the interim agreement as a potential step toward broader but insisted on political elements beyond mere disengagement, including Egypt's pledge to resolve disputes peacefully and abstain from using force, while expressing readiness to withdraw from significant Sinai areas like the Mitla and Gidi passes in exchange for verifiable restraints on Egyptian military buildup east of the . Domestic political pressures, including 's relatively weak coalition position following his June 1974 election, made Israeli negotiators cautious, leading to resistance against U.S. pressure for deeper withdrawals without reciprocal Egyptian political assurances. Egypt, led by President , sought substantial Israeli withdrawals to regain control over key strategic assets, specifically demanding evacuation from the and Gidi passes as well as the Abu Rudeis oil fields to demonstrate progress in reclaiming territory and bolster 's domestic standing after the 1973 . adopted a pragmatic stance, offering practical concessions on non-belligerency—such as commitments to peaceful , non-use of force, access for Israeli ships through the , and Egypt's non-participation in any Arab war against —without a formal public declaration to mitigate backlash from other Arab states. Egyptian proposals included joint monitoring stations manned by both sides and periodic adjustments to UN observer positions, aiming to limit Israeli presence while accepting temporary military restrictions in forward zones to facilitate U.S.-brokered talks. The divergent positions centered on the balance between territorial recovery and enduring security: emphasized long-term deterrence through enforced demilitarization and U.S.-backed verification mechanisms, rejecting full withdrawal without binding restraint, while focused on phased sovereignty restoration, conceding operational limits on its forces to advance negotiations amid economic pressures and the need to counter Soviet influence. These stances reflected causal realities of post-1973 vulnerabilities—'s fear of renewed offensives from regained positions and Sadat's strategy of incremental gains to build toward comprehensive peace without immediate full-scale confrontation.

Provisions of the Agreement

Territorial Withdrawals and Buffer Zones

The Sinai Interim , signed on , 1975, mandated withdrawal from key strategic positions in the western , including the Gidi and Passes, retreating to their eastern termini along designated lines J and M as depicted on the agreement's annexed map (scale 1:100,000, U.S. edition). This pullback vacated approximately 30-40 kilometers of territory eastward from the , encompassing oil fields such as Abu Rudeis and Ras Sudar, which Israel had controlled since the 1967 and partially reoccupied after the 1973 . Egyptian forces were positioned west of line E, restoring Cairo's administrative control over areas up to that demarcation, while redeployment of both sides was to occur within five months of the implementing protocol's signature. A UN-monitored was established between lines E and J to separate the opposing forces, devoid of any military presence except for UN Emergency Force (UNEF) personnel tasked with verification and inspections; this zone effectively converted the pre-existing buffer area into territory while preventing re-militarization. Adjacent limited-forces areas between lines E-F and J-K permitted restricted deployments west of the buffer—capped at eight battalions, 75 , 72 pieces with ranges not exceeding 12 kilometers, and no more than 8,000 personnel—ensuring no weapons could reach across to the opposing side's lines. UNEF's was extended annually to oversee compliance, with authority for on-site checks and reporting violations. Complementing these zones, an early-warning system was installed at the and Gidi Passes, operated by up to 200 U.S. civilian technicians under joint Egyptian-Israeli oversight, linked to U.S. flights conducted every 7-10 days to detect troop movements; data from these stations was shared bilaterally to build mutual verification without direct U.S. military involvement. South of line E and west of line M, no military forces were permitted, further demilitarizing the approaches to the . These arrangements aimed to reduce immediate threats of cross-canal incursions while preserving Israel's defensive depth east of the passes.

Military Limitations and Security Guarantees

The Sinai Interim Agreement established strict limitations on Egyptian military forces and equipment in the zones east of the Suez Canal to mitigate the risk of renewed aggression following the 1973 Yom Kippur War. Specifically, in the limited armaments area between lines E and F, Egypt was restricted to deploying no more than eight standard infantry battalions, 75 tanks, and 72 artillery pieces with a maximum range of 12 kilometers and caliber exceeding 120 mm, with total personnel capped at 8,000. Anti-aircraft missiles were banned within 10 kilometers east of line K or west of line F, and no new fortifications beyond predefined sizes were permitted between line A and line E. These constraints effectively limited Egypt to the equivalent of one understrength division in the forward zone, preventing a rapid offensive buildup while allowing defensive postures. Israeli forces, positioned east of lines J and M, faced reciprocal thinning in adjacent areas between J-K to ensure symmetry, though the primary focus was on curbing Egyptian capabilities given the geographic vulnerabilities exposed in prior conflicts. A demilitarized spanning between lines E and J was created, devoid of any military forces or equipment from either party, to serve as a physical separator reducing the immediacy of direct confrontation. The (UNEF) was tasked with patrolling this zone, conducting regular inspections, and verifying compliance, with its mandate renewable annually upon mutual consent. Further, no activity was authorized south of line E and west of line M, enforced through UNEF oversight. Both parties pledged to uphold an unconditional cease-fire on land, sea, and air, explicitly renouncing the threat or , military blockades, or para-military actions against each other, framing the conflict's resolution through negotiation rather than arms. Security guarantees were bolstered by U.S. involvement, including the operation of an comprising three watch stations and two surveillance stations in the , manned by up to 200 technicians at the former and 250 at the latter, equipped with sensors to detect troop movements or violations in . A U.S.- , signed concurrently on September 1, 1975, affirmed U.S. recognition of Israel's withdrawal from strategic passes as an "act of faith," committing to treat Israel's security needs responsibly and to consider military assistance requests favorably, while pledging not to negotiate with the PLO or compel to accept insecure borders. provided parallel assurances to the U.S. against initiating hostilities in coordination with or resuming a war of attrition, though these were non-binding and contingent on U.S. . A joint consultative commission, operating under UN auspices, was established to address implementation disputes, enhancing transparency and deterrence against unilateral breaches.

Monitoring and Observation Mechanisms

The Sinai Interim Agreement established a multifaceted monitoring regime to verify compliance with territorial withdrawals, military limitations, and cease-fire obligations, primarily involving the (UNEF) and U.S. civilian personnel. UNEF, whose mandate was extended annually from its prior role under the 1974 Disengagement Agreement, was tasked with controlling access to the between Lines E and J, maintaining checkpoints along roads and entry points, and conducting inspections to enforce armament restrictions and the absence of military forces in restricted areas. UNEF personnel also performed reconnaissance patrols and observation duties to prevent violations, with granted across the zones to facilitate real-time oversight. A novel element was the deployment of up to 200 U.S. civilian technicians to operate an , compensating for Israel's withdrawal from the strategic Gidi and Passes. These personnel managed flights conducted every 7-10 days, with photographic results distributed to , , and UNEF to detect potential buildups or movements. U.S. teams verified the functionality of equipment and reported any anomalies directly to the parties and the , ensuring impartial third-party validation amid mutual distrust. The agreement further permitted limited national surveillance stations for strategic early warning: one operated by and one by , each with up to 250 personnel equipped for visual and electronic monitoring, but restricted to for and subject to mutual . Additionally, three U.S.-operated watch stations, supported by unmanned fields in the passes, provided tactical alerts, integrating human oversight with technological means to enhance detection of incursions without relying solely on UN forces. These mechanisms, detailed in the agreement's annexes and a subsequent protocol, formed a layered framework that operated until the 1979 Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty superseded them.

Implementation

Ratification and Initial Steps

The Israeli Knesset approved the Sinai Interim Agreement on September 3, 1975, with a vote of 70 in favor, 43 against, and 7 abstentions, following a statement by Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin outlining its security implications. In Egypt, the agreement was ratified through executive action under President Anwar Sadat, with no formal parliamentary process required, reflecting the centralized decision-making of the regime. The accord was initialed on September 1, 1975, and formally signed on September 4, 1975, in Geneva by representatives of both nations, entering into force upon the subsequent signing of an implementing protocol. Initial implementation began with bilateral meetings in within five days of signing to draft the , which was to be finalized within two weeks to outline detailed redeployment procedures. The transfer of the Abu Rudeis oil fields from to control commenced within two weeks of the protocol's signature and was completed within eight weeks, marking the first economic asset handover under the terms. Broader force redeployments, including withdrawal to the eastern edges of the and Gidi Passes and the establishment of a UN-monitored buffer zone, were scheduled for completion within five months, with the (UNEF) retaining its mandate on an annual basis to oversee the process. A , operating under UN auspices, was promptly established to facilitate coordination, resolve disputes, and support UNEF operations, while existing U.S. flights continued to provide data shared with both parties and the UN. These steps laid the groundwork for phased military separations, with U.S. memoranda of agreement providing additional assurances on non-use of force and future negotiations, though initial focus remained on territorial and security adjustments rather than broader political commitments.

Israeli Withdrawal Timeline

The Israeli withdrawal from positions west of the , as stipulated in the Sinai I disengagement agreement signed on January 18, 1974, commenced on January 25, 1974, after preparatory work by military representatives. The process involved phased handovers to the (UNEF), with Israel evacuating its bridgehead on the canal's western bank while redeploying forces eastward into the , approximately 30-40 kilometers from the canal, to establish a . Egypt simultaneously thinned its forces east of the canal, limited to 18,000 troops with restrictions on armor and artillery. The withdrawal unfolded in four stages over roughly one month, supervised by UNEF observers to verify compliance and prevent violations. The first phase, involving initial evacuations and infrastructure handovers such as causeways and bridges, was completed in late . The second phase concluded on February 4, 1974, with Israeli forces vacating additional sectors along the western bank. The third phase ended on , transferring a 10-mile strip to UNEF control. The final, fourth phase saw the last Israeli units cross back into the via a on February 22, 1974, marking the end of the western bank occupation.
PhaseKey ActionsCompletion Date
FirstInitial evacuations and handover of forward positions west of the Late January 1974
SecondWithdrawal from central sectors of the February 4, 1974
ThirdEvacuation of a 10-mile strip along the bankFebruary 12, 1974
FourthFinal pullout from the remaining via to February 22, 1974
The full disengagement, including force redeployments and zone stabilizations, was verified as complete by March 3, 1974, within the agreement's 40-day limit from initiation. UNEF maintained observation posts in the and limited arms zones thereafter to adherence. Delays in earlier phases stemmed from logistical challenges, such as demolishing fortifications and coordinating with counterparts, but no major violations were reported during .

Reactions and Controversies

Israeli Domestic Debates

The Sinai Interim Agreement faced intense scrutiny within , reflecting deep divisions over territorial concessions and security risks following the 1973 . 's Labor-led government presented the deal as a pragmatic step toward stabilizing the Egypt-Israel front, emphasizing its contractual commitment to resolving disputes through negotiation rather than force, bolstered by U.S. monitoring mechanisms including civilian technicians at early-warning stations. argued that the new military lines preserved 's defensive depth, with enhanced armaments and strategic oversight compensating for withdrawals from the Gidi and Passes and the Rudeis oil fields, while expanding political horizons for broader peace. On September 3, 1975, the ratified the agreement by a narrow margin of 70 votes in favor to 43 against, with seven abstentions, underscoring the fragility of 's coalition, which included partial support from centrist and religious parties but fractured alignments within Labor and the (NRP). Opposition came primarily from the bloc, led by , who condemned the concessions as a "surrender by stages" that relinquished vital strategic assets—such as the passes critical for blocking armored advances—without a formal or end to the state of war. Begin and lawmakers asserted that the government lacked an electoral for such withdrawals, viewing the agreement as weakening Israel's post-1973 bargaining position and potentially inviting renewed aggression, especially given Egypt's military buildup allowances in limited zones. Independent , a former defense minister, joined the dissent, criticizing the deal's security implications despite his prior advocacy for disengagement. Public opinion polls indicated majority support for the "thinning out" of forces as a measure, yet remained unified in rejection, though internally divided on the intensity of protests, with militants pushing for stronger resistance. Rabin countered opposition rhetoric as undermining negotiations and public resolve, noting in Knesset debates that unchecked criticism had previously stalled talks in March 1975, while reaffirming the government's electoral pledge to pursue interim steps toward . Critics within and outside Labor, including some NRP members, echoed concerns over the agreement's interim nature, fearing it preempted comprehensive settlements and eroded deterrence against broader threats. The debates highlighted Israel's trauma, with proponents prioritizing diplomatic momentum and U.S. assurances against revisionist territorial maximalism that risked isolation.

Egyptian and Arab Responses

Egyptian President presented the Sinai Interim Agreement, signed on September 4, 1975, as a tactical success that recovered strategic territory in the , including the Mitla and Gidi Passes and the Abu Rudeis oil fields, without conceding full peace or recognition of . In a speech on September 5, 1975, Sadat rejected accusations of pursuing a separate peace, asserting that Egypt had declined offers for complete Sinai withdrawal in exchange for ending the state of war, insisting instead on comprehensive Arab-Israeli settlement. He emphasized the agreement's role in reducing immediate war risks while preserving Egypt's commitment to broader negotiations under UN Security Council Resolution 338. Within , the government framed the deal as advancing national interests by enabling economic reconstruction near the and securing assurances for future talks, though some domestic opposition viewed it as insufficient for total Israeli withdrawal. Sadat's administration highlighted the interim nature of the accord, which limited Egyptian military deployments in regained zones and introduced UN and monitoring, as a phased approach to reclaiming all occupied lands without premature diplomatic surrender. Other Arab states and leaders expressed significant reservations, perceiving the bilateral agreement as undermining unified Arab leverage against and risking Egypt's isolation from the Arab League's collective stance. Critics, including voices from and Palestinian groups, argued it prioritized Egyptian territorial gains over pan-Arab solidarity, potentially enabling that divided and weakened coordinated military pressure on . Arab commentators highlighted US commitments to supply with advanced weaponry—estimated at $2-3 billion—as tilting the balance further against Arab capabilities, fueling fears that the accord foreshadowed Egypt's defection from joint rejection of bilateral deals. This bilateral focus contrasted with prior Arab declarations, such as the 1967 Khartoum Resolution's prohibition on separate peaces, exacerbating tensions within the .

US Political Criticisms

The Sinai Interim Agreement elicited bipartisan criticism in the , particularly from , where opponents contended that the associated U.S. memoranda of agreement with and functioned as binding commitments akin to treaties, necessitating ratification rather than unilateral executive action. Critics such as Senators (D-SD), (D-IA), and (D-SD) argued that these assurances, including pledges to concert diplomatic action with and oppose alterations to the agreement's terms in the UN Security Council, imposed vague and open-ended obligations on the U.S. that could entangle it in future conflicts. A focal point of opposition centered on the administration's plan to station roughly 200 American civilian technicians in the to operate stations monitoring and compliance, an arrangement decried as an unprecedented peacetime deployment risking U.S. personnel in a militarized prone to escalation. During Foreign Relations hearings on October 6, 1975, former Under Secretary of State George Ball testified that congressional approval of the technicians would signal tacit endorsement of the broader U.S. assurances, potentially perpetuating a limited disengagement framework that impeded comprehensive Arab- peace negotiations while inviting an through ambiguous references to advanced weaponry like Pershing missiles. Other witnesses, including former of Paul Warnke and ex-Ambassador , labeled the commitments a "disaster" for binding to potentially escalatory policies without oversight. Pro-Israel legislators and analysts further criticized the agreement as emblematic of a concerning pivot in U.S. policy under , from staunch support for 's security to coercive pressuring territorial withdrawals that allegedly rewarded Egyptian aggression post-1973 without reciprocal demilitarization or recognition of . Senator (D-WA), a vocal for , highlighted risks to American interests amid the technician deployment and broader Mideast dynamics tied to oil dependencies. Additional objections raised fiscal burdens, with detractors noting the agreement's implicit demands for increased U.S. to both parties—totaling hundreds of millions in financing—without congressional appropriations review, exacerbating taxpayer costs amid post-Vietnam wariness of foreign entanglements. Despite these critiques, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee approved a on October 8, 1975, authorizing the technicians with language disclaiming endorsement of the underlying assurances, passing 13-2 with dissenting votes from Majority Leader (D-MT) and Senator Joseph R. Biden Jr. (D-DE), who cited fears of incremental U.S. military exposure reminiscent of . Amendments to declassify the secret memoranda, proposed by Senators Clark, Biden, and others, failed 59-32, underscoring persistent secrecy concerns but ultimately allowing implementation under the framework.

Legacy

Path to the Camp David Accords

The Sinai Interim Agreement, signed on September 4, 1975, represented a significant escalation in post-1973 Yom Kippur War disengagement efforts, with Israel withdrawing from the strategic Gidi and Mitla Passes in the Sinai Peninsula, approximately 40 kilometers east of the Suez Canal, in exchange for Egyptian commitments to non-aggression and the establishment of a UN-monitored buffer zone. This second disengagement accord, brokered through U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's shuttle diplomacy, introduced U.S. civilian technical teams to oversee early-warning stations in the passes, providing Israel with assurances against Egyptian rearmament without requiring full diplomatic normalization. The agreement's provisions for phased territorial concessions and American verification mechanisms demonstrated the viability of incremental confidence-building measures, fostering limited bilateral engagement—the first direct Egypt-Israel negotiations since 1948—and laying groundwork for future U.S.-facilitated talks by embedding Washington as a guarantor of security arrangements. Despite these advances, the Interim Agreement failed to catalyze broader progress toward a comprehensive settlement, as Egyptian President viewed the step-by-step approach as insufficient for recovering all territory captured in 1967, while Israeli Prime Minister prioritized linkage to peace commitments over further unilateral withdrawals. Stagnation persisted through 1976, exacerbated by U.S. election-year politics and Arab opposition to perceived Egyptian concessions, prompting to abandon in favor of dramatic unilateral action. On November 9, 1977, announced in Egypt's parliament his willingness to address Israel's in to pursue peace, a gesture realized on November 20, 1977, when he became the first Arab leader to visit , initiating direct high-level on mutual recognition and territorial issues. This initiative, driven by Sadat's domestic economic pressures and strategic isolation from Arab allies, shifted momentum from the Interim Agreement's framework toward bilateral Egyptian-Israeli talks, though deadlocks over linkage between and Palestinian issues soon emerged. The visit's diplomatic opening, combined with the precedent of U.S.-backed verification from Sinai II, enabled President to convene and new Israeli Prime Minister at from September 5 to 17, 1978. Over 13 days of intensive, secluded negotiations, the parties produced two frameworks: one outlining an Egypt-Israel with full Israeli withdrawal from in phases tied to normalization, and another for West Bank and autonomy negotiations involving and Palestinian representatives. The Accords built on Sinai II's model of territorial phasedown and U.S. oversight—extending withdrawal timelines to three years with multinational forces—but marked a departure by committing to a binding , reflecting 's insistence on comprehensive resolution over interim steps. This progression underscored how the 1975 agreement's tangible security gains had eroded mutual suspicions enough to sustain 's bold pivot, ultimately yielding the March 26, 1979, Egypt-Israel .

Long-Term Geopolitical Effects

The Sinai Interim Agreement, signed on September 4, 1975, established demilitarized buffer zones in the Sinai Peninsula monitored by United Nations forces, which significantly reduced the immediate risk of renewed hostilities between Egypt and Israel and set a precedent for phased territorial withdrawals tied to security assurances. This arrangement, involving Israel's retreat to the eastern edges of the Mitla and Gidi Passes, preserved strategic passes under Israeli control while allowing Egypt partial recovery of occupied territory, fostering incremental confidence-building that proved durable over decades. The zones' longevity, with minimal violations until security adjustments in the 2010s to counter Islamist threats, demonstrated the efficacy of enforced non-militarization in preventing escalation, as evidenced by the absence of major Egypt-Israel border conflicts since 1973. By signaling Egypt's willingness to pursue bilateral over unified Arab confrontation, the agreement eroded the post-1967 Arab rejectionist front, isolating within the and accelerating President Anwar Sadat's realignment toward the , which diminished Soviet influence in Egyptian foreign policy. This shift contributed to Egypt's expulsion from the following the 1979 —roots traceable to the 1975 interim steps—and prompted other Arab states to recalibrate strategies, indirectly channeling regional focus toward the Palestinian issue as Egypt's defection undermined collective military pressure on . Geopolitically, the agreement enhanced U.S. mediation leverage, culminating in the 1978 , where prior disengagement frameworks informed negotiations for full Sinai withdrawal and mutual recognition, marking the first Arab-Israeli and altering power dynamics by prioritizing over perpetual war. The interim accord's emphasis on U.S.-backed assurances, including a simultaneous Israel-U.S. pledging American support against threats, entrenched Washington's role as guarantor, enabling Israel to redirect resources from defense to other fronts like while securing Egypt's economic aid inflows exceeding $1.3 billion annually post-1979. Over the long term, these effects stabilized the Egypt-Israel border, with the (deployed 1981) upholding demilitarization provisions amid occasional strains, such as post-2011 allowances for expanded Egyptian deployments in to combat , yet preserving the core non-aggression framework that has averted interstate war for over 45 years. This outcome underscores the causal link between verifiable security mechanisms and sustained deterrence, contrasting with broader Arab-Israeli theaters where unresolved multilateral disputes persisted.

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