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Syrian Democratic Forces

The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) (Kurdish: حێزێن سوریا دەمۆکراتیک, romanized: Hêzên Sûriya Demokratîk; Arabic: قوات سوريا الديمقراطية, romanized: Quwwāt Sūriyyā ad-Dīmuqrāṭiyya; Syriac: ܚܝ̈ܠܘܬܐ ܕܣܘܪܝܐ ܕܝܡܩܪܛܝܬܐ, romanized: Ḥaylawotho d'Suriya Demoqraṭoyto) is a Kurdish-led alliance of predominantly local Arab, Assyrian, and other militias formed in October 2015 as the principal U.S.-partnered ground force in the multinational campaign against the Islamic State (ISIS) in Syria.^[1] With the People's Protection Units (YPG) providing its core fighting strength and command structure, the SDF—estimated at 40,000 to 100,000 fighters—controls approximately one-third of Syrian territory in the northeast, administering it through the U.S.-backed Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria.^[2]^[3] Backed by U.S. airpower, training, and equipment since its inception, the SDF played a decisive role in dismantling ISIS's territorial caliphate, including the liberation of Raqqa in 2017—ISIS's self-declared capital—and the final clearance of ISIS holdouts in Baghuz in 2019.^[4]^[5] These operations minimized direct U.S. troop involvement while enabling the territorial defeat of ISIS in Syria, though the group persists through insurgency and global affiliates.^[6] The SDF's reliance on the YPG, widely regarded as the Syrian affiliate of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)—a U.S.- and Turkish-designated terrorist organization with Marxist-Leninist roots and a history of attacks on Turkish civilians—has strained relations with Turkey, which views the SDF as an extension of the PKK threat on its border and has launched multiple cross-border offensives against it since 2016.^[7] U.S. support for the SDF, despite these ties, reflects pragmatic prioritization of counter-ISIS objectives over alliance with Turkey, though it has fueled tensions in NATO and complicated post-ISIS stabilization efforts amid ongoing Turkish-SDF clashes and SDF governance challenges including reported human rights abuses and resource extraction disputes.^[8]^[9]

Formation and Early Development

Establishment in October 2015

The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) were formally established on October 10, 2015, as a military alliance primarily comprising the Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG) and Women's Protection Units (YPJ), alongside smaller Arab, Assyrian, and Syriac contingents, including groups like the al-Sanadid Forces and Syriac Military Council.^[10]^[11] The announcement occurred during a press conference in Al-Malikiya, Hasakah Governorate, amid escalating Islamic State (ISIS) territorial advances in northern Syria following the YPG-led capture of Kobani earlier that year.^[10]^[12] This coalition emerged in the context of the Syrian civil war, where the YPG had proven effective against ISIS with U.S.-led coalition air support but faced limitations as a predominantly Kurdish force, prompting the inclusion of non-Kurdish elements to broaden appeal and secure greater international backing, particularly from the United States, which sought Arab-inclusive partners to counter ISIS without exacerbating ethnic tensions or alienating regional allies like Turkey.^[13]^[14] The SDF's stated objectives included defeating ISIS, protecting ethnic and religious minorities, and advancing a vision of a secular, democratic, and federalized Syria, though command structures remained dominated by YPG leadership from the outset.^[13]^[15] Two days after formation, on October 12, 2015, U.S. Central Command confirmed the SDF as a partner in the anti-ISIS coalition, signaling rapid endorsement and paving the way for enhanced military aid, including arms, training, and airstrikes, which contrasted with prior U.S. hesitancy to directly arm the YPG due to its affiliations with the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), designated a terrorist organization by the U.S. and Turkey.^[11]^[13] Initial estimates placed SDF strength at around 25,000-30,000 fighters, with Kurds forming the core, enabling coordinated operations in areas like the Jazira region and setting the stage for subsequent offensives.^[12]^[16] Despite the multi-ethnic framing, reports from establishment noted that Arab participation was limited initially, often comprising defectors or tribal militias rather than broad-based representation, reflecting pragmatic alliances over ideological unity.^[14]^[15]

Founding Groups and Initial Composition

The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) were formally announced on October 10, 2015, in Al-Malikiya, Hasakah Governorate, as a coalition aimed at combating the Islamic State (ISIS) and other jihadist groups in northern Syria.^[10] The formation integrated preexisting militias, with the Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG) and Women's Protection Units (YPJ)—established in 2011 and 2012 respectively by the Democratic Union Party (PYD)—serving as the core components and providing the majority of initial fighters and command structure.^[17] ^[13] These Kurdish forces, numbering tens of thousands by mid-2015, drew from PKK-trained veterans and local recruits, emphasizing a secular, leftist ideological framework rooted in the PYD's autonomy project in Rojava.^[11] To broaden ethnic representation and secure U.S. support, the SDF incorporated smaller Arab, Assyrian/Syriac Christian, Turkmen, and Armenian groups, including tribal militias like the al-Sanadid Forces (Shammar tribe) and early Arab factions under the "Syrian Arab Coalition" banner, such as Jaysh al-Thuwar and Burkan al-Chemal.^[18] Assyrian components, notably the Syriac Military Council (MFS) and Khabur Guards, contributed several hundred fighters focused on defending Christian enclaves along the Khabur River.^[19] This multi-ethnic structure was strategically engineered by U.S. advisors in late 2015, who recruited Arab locals to partner with YPG units for operations like the push toward al-Raqqa, though Kurds retained operational dominance with estimates of 40,000-50,000 YPG/YPJ personnel forming over 80% of the initial SDF strength.^[18] ^[20] Initial recruitment emphasized volunteers from northeastern Syria's diverse demographics, but the coalition's composition reflected geographic realities: predominantly Kurdish in Jazira and Kobani regions, with Arab integration accelerating in Arab-majority areas like the Euphrates Valley to legitimize territorial control.^[13] Foreign fighters, including from the International Freedom Battalion, joined in limited numbers, aligning with leftist or anti-ISIS causes but remaining marginal to the founding core.^[17] Despite the inclusive framing, analyses from military think tanks note that the YPG's hierarchical control and ideological vetting processes often subordinated non-Kurdish units, shaping the SDF's early cohesion around Kurdish-led tactics rather than fully decentralized multi-ethnic command.^[18]^[13]

Political Framework and Ideological Basis

The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) are politically anchored in the ideology of democratic confederalism, a framework articulated by Abdullah Öcalan, the imprisoned founder of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), which emphasizes decentralized, grassroots governance through local assemblies rather than state-centric authority.^[21]^[22] This model, influenced by American social ecologist Murray Bookchin's communalism, rejects nation-state separatism in favor of confederal networks prioritizing ecology, gender equality via concepts like jineology (women's science), and multi-ethnic participation, as implemented in the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES).^[23] The SDF's dominant Kurdish component, the People's Protection Units (YPG), and its political counterpart, the Democratic Union Party (PYD), explicitly draw from Öcalan's writings, which evolved from the PKK's original Marxist-Leninist separatism in the 1970s to this non-statist paradigm by the early 2000s.^[24] The SDF's political structure integrates with the Syrian Democratic Council (SDC), established in December 2015 as a representative body for the AANES, advocating a federal, decentralized Syria with autonomous regional councils handling local affairs while coordinating confederally on broader issues like defense and economy.^[13] This framework claims inclusivity across Kurds, Arabs, Assyrians, and other groups, with policies prohibiting ethnic or religious discrimination in recruitment and administration, though operational control remains heavily Kurdish-led through PYD-affiliated structures.^[25] In practice, governance in SDF-held areas features co-presidency systems mandating male-female leadership pairs and communal assemblies, but critics, including Turkish authorities, argue this masks centralized PYD authority akin to PKK hierarchies.^[26] Ties to the PKK underpin the ideology's origins and personnel flows, with the YPG/PYD sharing Öcalan's doctrinal texts and historical cadre exchanges; the PKK, designated a terrorist organization by the US, EU, and Turkey since the 1990s for its insurgent campaigns, views the SDF as an extension despite the latter's rebranding for international alliances.^[24]^[13] Turkey designates the SDF as a PKK proxy, citing ideological continuity and cross-border operations, which has led to military incursions like Operations Euphrates Shield (2016) and Olive Branch (2018) targeting SDF positions.^[27] While SDF leaders deny formal PKK subordination, overlapping membership and shared rejection of Turkish state policies persist, complicating Western support that prioritizes SDF's anti-ISIS role over ideological scrutiny.^[28] This framework's emphasis on secularism and feminism contrasts with surrounding Islamist or authoritarian actors but faces accusations of imposing Öcalan-centric indoctrination in controlled territories.^[29]

Organizational Structure and Composition

Military Components and Hierarchy

The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) are organized as a coalition of militias, with the Kurdish-led People's Protection Units (YPG) and Women's Protection Units (YPJ) forming the primary military components and operational backbone, estimated at 20,000 to 30,000 fighters.^[30] These units, rebranded from PKK-affiliated structures, handle most frontline combat, logistics, and training, relying on PKK-derived doctrines for hierarchy, discipline, and tactics, including specialized academies like the Martyr Sheelan Academy for female recruits.^[30] The YPG/YPJ dominate SDF decision-making despite the alliance's multi-ethnic framing.^[13] Supporting components encompass Arab-majority formations such as Jaysh al-Thuwar (Army of Revolutionaries), Deir ez-Zor Military Council, and Raqqa Brigades, alongside Assyrian/Syriac groups like the Syriac Military Council (MFS/Sutoro) and smaller entities including the Martyr Haroun Units and Anti-Terror Units.^[30] ^[31] Specialized elements, such as Hêzên Komandos for commando operations and engineering units like sappers, augment conventional forces.^[32] The total SDF fighting strength reached approximately 60,000 to 75,000 personnel by 2018, bolstered by U.S. advisory support, equipment, and air cover.^[30] ^[2] Command hierarchy centers on the General Commander-in-Chief, currently Mazloum Abdi (also known as Mazlum Kobani), a former PKK cadre who assumed leadership in 2017 following the death of predecessor Abu Layla.^[13] ^[2] Abdi oversees the Military Council, the supreme authority comprising representatives from foundational components like YPG/YPJ, Sutoro, and Arab militias, which directs strategy, recruitment, and integration.^[33] ^[32] Subordinate bodies include the General Command (9 to 13 members handling operational planning) and the Military Discipline Committee, enforcing internal rules amid reports of conscription and defections.^[30] This centralized yet coalition-based system reflects YPG/YPJ preeminence, with Arab and minority units often operationally subordinated to Kurdish command for cohesion against shared threats like ISIS.^[13]^[33]

Ethnic and Demographic Makeup

The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) incorporate fighters from multiple ethnic groups, primarily Kurds, Arabs, Assyrians (including Syriacs and Chaldeans), Turkmen, Armenians, and smaller numbers of Yezidis and Circassians. This multi-ethnic structure emerged from the integration of preexisting militias, with the Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG) and Women's Protection Units (YPJ) forming the foundational core, alongside Arab tribal forces, Assyrian militias like the Syriac Military Council, and other local groups. The alliance's composition reflects recruitment drives in diverse regions of northeast Syria, where Arab populations predominate in areas such as Raqqa (93% Arab) and Deir ez-Zor (80% Arab), leading to localized units like the Deir ez-Zor Military Council and Sanadid Forces, which draw heavily from Sunni Arab tribes.^[34]^[25]^[13] Despite the inclusion of non-Kurdish elements, the SDF maintains Kurdish dominance in its command hierarchy and ideological orientation, with top leadership, including overall commander Mazloum Abdi, being Kurdish. The YPG/YPJ, estimated to comprise the elite and most experienced fighters, originated from Kurdish self-defense forces affiliated with the Democratic Union Party (PYD), a group linked to the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). In 2017, a U.S. military commander reported that approximately 40% of SDF personnel were YPG Kurds, underscoring the Kurdish backbone at that stage of expansion.^[35]^[36]^[37] Quantitative breakdowns of ethnic proportions remain contested and lack independent verification from neutral observers, with total SDF strength estimated at 60,000 to 100,000 fighters as of recent assessments. Pro-SDF sources, such as a 2021 survey of 391 respondents conducted in alignment with SDF interests, claim 68.7% Arabs, 17.2% Kurds, 12.5% Christians, and 0.9% Yezidis, portraying an Arab-majority force to emphasize inclusivity and rebut characterizations as a purely Kurdish entity. However, analyses from Western policy institutes highlight persistent Kurdish overrepresentation in officer ranks and decision-making, even as rank-and-file recruitment from Arab areas has increased, suggesting the multi-ethnic framing serves strategic purposes in governing heterogeneous territories while the operational core retains Kurdish primacy.^[38]^[39]^[13]

Growth in Size and Recruitment Practices

The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) were established on October 10, 2015, initially comprising around 25,000 to 30,000 fighters, predominantly from the Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG) and smaller allied groups such as the Syriac Military Council.^[13] By mid-2017, following the incorporation of Arab-majority militias during operations like the Battle of Manbij, SDF strength had expanded to estimates of 40,000 to 50,000 combatants, bolstered by U.S.-led coalition training of over 8,500 fighters and the addition of local recruits from liberated areas.^[15] This growth continued through 2018-2019 amid campaigns against the Islamic State, with the SDF integrating tribal Arab forces in Deir ez-Zor and Raqqa, reaching peak estimates of 60,000 to 100,000 fighters by the territorial defeat of the caliphate in March 2019.^[40] As of 2024-2025, SDF forces are estimated at 50,000 to 100,000 members, with approximately 60-65% Arab and the remainder Kurdish or from minority groups, though exact figures vary due to fluctuating enlistments and desertions amid Turkish offensives and internal tensions.^[41]^[36] Recruitment initially relied on voluntary enlistment, drawing heavily from Kurdish communities in northern Syria and diaspora networks, with ideological appeals to democratic confederalism and anti-ISIS resistance.^[13] In 2016, the SDF-aligned Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) introduced a "Mandatory Self-Defence Duty" system, requiring military service for males and females aged 18 to 30 (with extensions to 40 in some cases), framed as communal obligation but criticized as de facto conscription.^[42] This policy facilitated expansion by mandating training periods of 45 days to six months, though implementation has involved checkpoints, house-to-house searches, and detentions for evasion, particularly targeting Arab populations in Deir ez-Zor and Raqqa.^[43] Reports from 2024-2025 document over 100 arbitrary arrests in a single week for conscription enforcement, exacerbating ethnic resentments and prompting local protests against perceived forced Arab integration into Kurdish-led structures.^[44]^[43] Child recruitment has persisted as a contentious practice, with the YPG—SDF's core component—documented recruiting minors under 18, including from displacement camps like al-Hol, despite a 2019 UN action plan pledging to end it.^[45] Human Rights Watch reported in October 2024 that Kurdish youth groups linked to AANES authorities continued enlisting children for transfer to SDF units, with cases of coercion and family separations.^[46] The Syrian Network for Human Rights and other monitors have verified hundreds of underage recruits annually through 2023, often via affiliated organizations circumventing parental consent, though SDF officials maintain such cases are isolated and not policy.^[47]^[48] These practices, while enabling force expansion, have drawn international condemnation and UN listings of YPG/SDF for grave violations against children in armed conflict.^[46]

Military Operations and Achievements

Campaigns Against ISIS (2015-2019)

The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), formed in October 2015 as a U.S.-backed multi-ethnic coalition primarily comprising Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG) and Arab militias, conducted ground offensives against the Islamic State (ISIS) in northern and eastern Syria, supported by coalition airstrikes, artillery, and special operations advisors. These campaigns, part of Operation Inherent Resolve, focused on isolating ISIS command nodes, disrupting supply routes, and recapturing urban centers, ultimately eliminating the group's territorial caliphate by March 2019. The SDF's operations relied heavily on U.S. airpower, which conducted thousands of strikes, enabling advances despite ISIS's use of improvised explosive devices, booby-trapped buildings, and human shields in densely populated areas.^[49]^[50] Initial post-formation efforts included the al-Thawrah offensive in November-December 2015, where SDF forces captured the Tishrin Dam and surrounding areas east of the Euphrates River, securing a bridgehead for further operations and severing ISIS logistics between Raqqa and Mosul. The Manbij offensive followed on May 31, 2016, with SDF units, including the Manbij Military Council, encircling and assaulting the city—a key ISIS transit hub—amid intense fighting that lasted until August 19, 2016, when the city fell after coalition strikes targeted ISIS reinforcements. This victory expelled ISIS from a strategic corridor connecting Aleppo to the Euphrates, though it involved significant civilian displacement and reports of coalition airstrikes causing collateral damage.^[51]^[52] The Raqqa campaign, launched June 6, 2017, targeted ISIS's self-proclaimed capital, with SDF forces—bolstered to around 30,000 fighters—isolating the city through envelopment operations and breaching its defenses by early October. Urban combat ensued, marked by ISIS mining infrastructure and executing civilians to deter surrender; the SDF declared Raqqa liberated on October 20, 2017, after clearing the last pockets, though the battle left much of the city uninhabitable due to destruction from artillery and airstrikes estimated at over 1,600 coalition sorties. SDF casualties exceeded 1,000 killed, while ISIS lost thousands, including foreign fighters; the operation also highlighted SDF recruitment of local Arabs to broaden its base beyond Kurdish core units.^[53]^[54]^[55] Post-Raqqa advances shifted southeast to Deir ez-Zor governorate in September 2018, where SDF forces crossed the Euphrates to assault ISIS holdouts along the river valley, capturing oil fields and towns like Hajin by December 2018 amid ambushes and counterattacks. The final push targeted Baghouz, ISIS's last enclave, involving siege tactics and mass surrenders of fighters and civilians from February to March 2019; on March 23, 2019, the SDF announced the capture of the village, ending ISIS's contiguous territorial control in Syria after expelling an estimated 80,000 fighters and affiliates over the campaigns. These operations reclaimed approximately one-third of Syrian territory previously under ISIS influence, though persistent insurgency threats remained due to the group's shift to clandestine cells.^[56]^[57]^[58]^[59]

Other Engagements and Territorial Gains

The Syrian Democratic Forces engaged in significant defensive operations against Turkish Armed Forces and Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) militias, primarily to counter incursions aimed at establishing buffer zones along the Syria-Turkey border. These conflicts, distinct from anti-ISIS campaigns, began intensifying in 2018 and have continued sporadically, resulting in territorial losses for the SDF in Kurdish-majority enclaves but also opportunities for limited counteroffensives and consolidations elsewhere.^[7]^[60] In January 2018, Turkey launched Operation Olive Branch targeting the SDF-controlled Afrin region, with Turkish forces and SNA proxies advancing against YPG-led units. By March 18, 2018, Turkish troops captured Afrin city after two months of fighting, displacing over 100,000 civilians and leading to SDF withdrawal to preserve forces for eastern fronts. This operation severed the Afrin canton from SDF-held territory, reducing overall control in northwestern Syria.^[61]^[62] Operation Peace Spring followed in October 2019, with Turkey and SNA forces crossing into northeastern Syria to capture a 30-kilometer-deep border strip. SNA units seized Tel Abyad and Ras al-Ayn by early November, displacing approximately 200,000 people and costing the SDF control over roughly 4,800 square kilometers, though a U.S.-mediated ceasefire and subsequent Russian-brokered deal with Damascus allowed SDF retention of areas east of the Euphrates River, including key oil fields. These losses fragmented SDF border holdings but preserved core territories around Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor.^[63]^[64] Post-2019 clashes with SNA persisted, particularly around Manbij and northern Aleppo, escalating after the December 2024 fall of the Assad regime. In late November to December 2024, during Operation Dawn of Freedom, SNA forces advanced in Aleppo Governorate, achieving temporary gains before a U.S.-mediated truce. SDF counteroffensives in December 2024 recaptured positions in eastern rural Aleppo, enabling deeper incursions by January 2025. Fighting continued through February 2025 near the Tishreen Dam and Qara Qozak Bridge, with over 100 combatants killed in intense two-day exchanges in early 2025. By April 2025, ongoing territorial disputes yielded mixed results, including SDF repulsion of SNA advances but no major net gains. August 2025 saw further SDF-SNA engagements repelling attacks by regime-aligned factions, culminating in a comprehensive ceasefire on October 7, 2025, following sectarian clashes in Aleppo neighborhoods like Sheikh Maqsoud. These engagements have constrained SDF expansion but reinforced control over resource-rich eastern provinces through defensive consolidations.^[65]^[66]^[67]

Effectiveness and Strategic Role in Defeating the Caliphate

The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) served as the primary ground partner for the U.S.-led Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS in eastern Syria, enabling the systematic dismantling of the Islamic State's territorial caliphate from 2015 to 2019. Formed in October 2015, the SDF integrated Kurdish-led People's Protection Units (YPG) with Arab and other local militias, providing the manpower necessary for offensives where the Syrian Arab Army proved ineffective or diverted by other conflicts. U.S. military assessments highlighted the SDF's role in liberating over 61,500 square kilometers of ISIS-held territory across Iraq and Syria by the end of 2017, accounting for approximately 98% of the caliphate's landmass at its peak. This progress relied on SDF ground advances synchronized with coalition airstrikes, which inflicted heavy casualties on ISIS fighters while minimizing the need for large-scale U.S. troop deployments.^[68]^[69] Key operations underscored the SDF's tactical effectiveness, particularly in urban and desert environments. In the Battle of Raqqa, ISIS's de facto capital, SDF forces, supported by coalition air and artillery, encircled and assaulted the city starting in June 2017, achieving liberation by October 20, 2017, after intense house-to-house fighting that killed or captured thousands of ISIS militants. Subsequent campaigns, including the Tabqa Dam assault in March 2017 and advances along the Euphrates to Deir ez-Zor, severed ISIS supply lines and secured strategic river crossings, compelling the group to retreat to isolated pockets. By December 2017, these efforts had reduced ISIS to less than 5% of its territorial holdings in Syria, with SDF units demonstrating resilience in sustaining momentum despite high casualties and ISIS's use of improvised explosives and human shields.^[4]^[70]^[58] Strategically, the SDF's multi-ethnic composition—incorporating Arab fighters to broaden local legitimacy—facilitated governance in recaptured areas and recruitment from Sunni Arab tribes disillusioned with ISIS governance, enhancing intelligence gathering and reducing insurgency risks. U.S. analyses, such as those from the RAND Corporation, emphasize that SDF-coalition integration amplified airpower's impact, allowing precision strikes to degrade ISIS command structures without committing Western ground troops en masse, a model that proved decisive in halting ISIS's 2014-2015 expansion. The final offensive against Baghouz in early 2019 exemplified this: SDF forces, backed by special operations advisors, overran the last caliphate holdout by March 23, 2019, capturing over 5,000 ISIS fighters and their families, effectively ending organized territorial control.^[71]^[57] However, SDF effectiveness was contingent on sustained coalition enablers, including intelligence, logistics, and fire support, revealing limitations in independent maneuver warfare against a peer adversary. Post-caliphate, U.S. evaluations noted persistent ISIS sleeper cells and the SDF's ongoing detention of 9,000 prisoners as evidence of incomplete eradication, underscoring the need for enduring stabilization to prevent resurgence. Despite these dependencies, the SDF's campaigns inflicted irrecoverable losses on ISIS leadership and resources, contributing causally to the caliphate's collapse by denying safe havens and forcing dispersal into insurgent operations.^[3]^[69]

Governance and Control in Northeast Syria

Territorial Administration and Institutions

The Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES), the civilian governing body in territories controlled by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), was formally established on July 16, 2018, through the Syrian Democratic Council (SDC). It administers approximately one-third of Syria's territory across seven regions, including Jazeera, Euphrates, Raqqa, Tabqa, and Deir ez-Zor, encompassing multi-ethnic populations of over 1 million Kurds and 1.5-2 million Arabs, alongside smaller Christian, Yazidi, and Turkmen communities.^[36] The governance model emphasizes decentralized, bottom-up decision-making via local communes and councils, guided by the 2023 Social Contract, which mandates co-presidency systems pairing men and women, often from different ethnic groups, in leadership roles.^[72] Key institutions include the SDC as the overarching political body, responsible for legislative functions and coordinating multi-ethnic representation, and regional executive councils handling local administration of services such as education, health, and utilities.^[36] Judicial affairs fall under the Judicial Council, which oversees social justice institutions and organizes the court system, while internal security is managed by the Asayish police forces operating alongside SDF military structures.^[72] A tri-lingual policy (Kurdish, Arabic, Syriac) applies to official communications and education, tailored to local demographics, though implementation varies by region. Municipal elections, intended to select representatives—three-fifths directly elected and two-fifths from appointed delegates—have been repeatedly postponed, with the latest delay to August 2024 amid internal disputes.^[72] Following the overthrow of the Assad regime in late 2024, the SDF and AANES entered negotiations with Syria's interim government, culminating in a March 10, 2025, agreement for SDF integration into state institutions while preserving local administrative frameworks.^[73] As of October 2025, AANES retains de facto control over northeast Syria, including resource-rich areas, but faces ongoing challenges from Turkish-backed incursions and Arab tribal unrest, prompting localized ceasefires such as the October 6 pact in Aleppo districts.^[74] This transitional phase has seen unified Kurdish demands for decentralization, with AANES proposing power-sharing models to align with national structures without fully dissolving autonomous institutions.^[72]

Economic Policies and Resource Management

The Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES), under the protection of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), has pursued an economic framework rooted in democratic confederalism, emphasizing cooperatives and communal resource distribution to foster self-sufficiency amid wartime constraints.^[75] This model, inspired by Murray Bookchin's social ecology and adapted by the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)-linked ideology, aims to replace capitalist structures with worker-managed enterprises, particularly in agriculture and light industry.^[76] In practice, however, central authorities exert significant control over key sectors, with cooperatives operating on approximately 5% of agricultural land—primarily former state holdings—while private farming persists on the majority.^[77] Resource management centers on the region's hydrocarbon assets, which constitute the bulk of AANES revenue; oil fields in Deir ez-Zor and Hasakah provinces, including Al-Omar and Rmeilan, account for over 90% of budgetary income as of 2021, generating estimates of $378 million annually from roughly 14,000 barrels per day (bpd) in production.^[78]^[79] Production has fluctuated between 40,000 and 80,000 bpd amid infrastructure damage, sanctions, and illicit sales, often at discounted rates of $16 per barrel to local markets or, starting in February 2025, to the Damascus government under interim supply agreements.^[80]^[81] These operations have faced accusations of systemic theft, environmental pollution from unrefined spills, and underinvestment, limiting output far below pre-war potentials of 378,000 bpd and depriving Syria of billions in lost revenue since 2017.^[79]^[82] Agricultural policies prioritize cooperatives for wheat, cotton, and livestock to ensure food security, with initiatives like urban farming in neighborhoods such as al-Sheikh Maksoud yielding modest returns for participants who retain 70-80% of sales proceeds.^[83] Yet, output remains hampered by Turkish border closures, Assad-era embargoes, and conflict-related disruptions, forcing reliance on cross-border trade with Iraq and informal smuggling networks.^[84] Industrial cooperatives in textiles and dairy supplement this, but overall economic diversification lags, with oil dominance exposing vulnerabilities to fluctuating global prices and geopolitical pressures, including U.S. Caesar Act sanctions that indirectly constrain formal exports.^[85]^[86] Reform efforts, such as 2020 price controls and local economic planning, seek to address tribal grievances and inflation but have yielded limited stability, as centralized oil revenues fund public services while fostering dependency and corruption risks in opaque management structures.^[87] By 2025, post-Assad shifts prompted SDF negotiations over resource handover, yet control retention has stalled national reconstruction, underscoring tensions between autonomous policies and broader Syrian integration.^[26]^[88] The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), through the associated Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (DAANES), have implemented social policies rooted in the ideology of democratic confederalism, emphasizing gender equality, ecological sustainability, and communal self-governance. These include mandatory co-presidency systems requiring one male and one female leader in institutions, quotas ensuring at least 40% female participation in governance bodies, and the establishment of all-female military units like the Women's Protection Units (YPJ). Education reforms mandate co-educational schooling with curricula promoting women's emancipation, multilingualism (including Kurdish, Arabic, and Syriac), and anti-sectarian values, while prohibiting religious education in public schools to foster secularism.^[89]^[31] Critics, including local Arab tribal leaders and Assyrian representatives, argue these policies impose a Kurdish-centric ideological framework that marginalizes non-Kurdish communities, such as through coerced adoption of Kurdish-language instruction and suppression of traditional religious practices. Assyrian Christian groups have reported the closure of private schools in 2018 for refusing to align curricula with DAANES standards, which prioritize jineology—a gender-focused ideology developed by the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)—over denominational education, effectively discouraging refugee returns and cultural preservation.^[90]^[91] Compulsory military service enforced by the SDF has disproportionately affected Arab and Assyrian youth, with reports of abductions and forced recruitment in areas like Deir ez-Zor, where Arabs constitute over 90% of the population, leading to resentment over perceived ethnic favoritism despite SDF claims of inclusivity.^[34] Allegations of demographic engineering center on claims that SDF forces have systematically altered population compositions in captured territories to bolster Kurdish influence. In 2015, YPG units—SDF precursors—razed over 200 homes in at least 11 Arab-majority villages northeast of Aleppo, such as Umm Jarrah, displacing around 100 families without evident military necessity, actions Amnesty International classified as potential war crimes under international humanitarian law. Turkish officials and Arab activists have accused the SDF of preventing Arab internally displaced persons (IDPs) from returning to Manbij and Raqqa post-ISIS liberation unless they pledge allegiance or pay reconstruction fees, while facilitating Kurdish settlement from other regions, thereby shifting demographics in Arab-dominated areas like Raqqa (93% Arab pre-war) and Manbij (predominantly Arab).^[92]^[93]^[34] SDF officials deny intentional engineering, asserting displacements resulted from anti-ISIS operations and that governance reflects the multi-ethnic reality of northeast Syria, where Arabs form the majority under SDF control. However, independent analyses note persistent Arab grievances over property confiscations—often justified as anti-ISIS measures—and underrepresentation in local councils, suggesting policies prioritize security consolidation over equitable reintegration. United Nations inquiries have found no evidence of widespread ethnic cleansing but documented arbitrary evictions and restrictions on movement, which exacerbate demographic imbalances in Kurdish favor.^[94]^[95]

International Support and Alliances

Partnership with US-Led Coalition

The partnership between the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the US-led Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS, operating under Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR), began in 2014 when US forces provided air support and advisory assistance to the People's Protection Units (YPG), the Kurdish core component of what would become the SDF, during the defense of Kobani against ISIS advances.^[96] This collaboration formalized with the establishment of the Combined Joint Task Force - OIR on October 17, 2014, aimed at enabling local partners to defeat ISIS through training, equipping, and intelligence sharing.^[97] The SDF was officially formed on October 10, 2015, as a multi-ethnic alliance to broaden US support beyond Kurdish forces and facilitate inclusion of Arab and other groups in anti-ISIS operations.^[20] US military aid to the SDF escalated in subsequent years, including direct airdrops of ammunition and small arms in June 2016 to support advances near Manbij, followed by the provision of AK-47 rifles, machine guns, and other equipment to YPG/SDF units starting in May 2017.^[98]^[99] Coalition advisors, primarily US special operations forces, embedded with SDF units to conduct joint training exercises, such as stress-fire drills in July 2019, enhancing tactical capabilities for urban combat and counterterrorism.^[100] By 2017, the Pentagon advocated for increased arms shipments, including heavier weapons and artillery support, to enable the SDF's offensive to capture Raqqa, ISIS's de facto capital.^[101] The partnership emphasized the SDF's role as the primary ground force partner for OIR, with US forces providing over 30,000 airstrikes in support of SDF-led campaigns from 2014 to 2019, contributing to the territorial defeat of the ISIS caliphate by March 2019.^[102] Approximately 900 US troops remained in northeastern Syria as of early 2024, stationed at SDF-controlled bases to advise on counter-ISIS remnants, detain thousands of ISIS fighters, and secure detention facilities holding over 9,000 militants as of July 2025.^[3] However, amid shifting dynamics following the fall of the Assad regime in late 2024, the US initiated a drawdown of hundreds of troops from Syria starting in April 2025, reflecting reduced combat requirements while maintaining a residual presence for stabilization and to prevent ISIS resurgence.^[103] This pragmatic alliance persisted despite the YPG's affiliations with the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), designated a terrorist organization by the US, prioritizing SDF effectiveness over broader geopolitical concerns with Turkey.^[51]

Relations with Turkey and Counterterrorism Designations

Turkey regards the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), predominantly composed of the People's Protection Units (YPG), as an extension of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), a militant group responsible for over 40,000 deaths in Turkey since 1984 through attacks on civilians and security forces.^[104] This perception stems from ideological, organizational, and leadership overlaps between the YPG and PKK, including shared Marxist-Leninist roots and cross-border operational ties, prompting Ankara to prioritize neutralizing SDF control along its 900-kilometer Syrian border to prevent a PKK sanctuary.^[7] Turkey has conducted multiple cross-border operations against SDF-held areas, beginning with Operation Euphrates Shield in August 2016, which captured Jarablus and al-Bab to disrupt ISIS and YPG advances; followed by Operation Olive Branch in January 2018, seizing Afrin from YPG control after three months of fighting that displaced over 100,000 civilians; and Operation Peace Spring in October 2019, targeting a 120-kilometer stretch east of the Euphrates River, resulting in the capture of Ras al-Ayn and Tal Abyad amid U.S. troop withdrawals.^[105] ^[7] These incursions have strained NATO ally relations, particularly with the United States, which has provided the SDF with over $500 million in military aid and embedded special forces advisors since 2015 to combat ISIS, creating friction as Washington distinguishes the YPG's anti-ISIS role from PKK terrorism despite Ankara's unified view.^[7] Post-2024 developments, including the fall of Bashar al-Assad's regime, have intensified demands for SDF disarmament or integration into Syrian state structures, with Turkey supplying weapons to Damascus in exchange for rights to target Kurdish forces and issuing deadlines for withdrawal from Manbij and Kobani by early 2025, amid ongoing drone strikes and clashes with Turkish-backed Syrian National Army proxies.^[106] ^[107] On counterterrorism designations, the PKK has been listed as a foreign terrorist organization by the United States since 1997, the European Union, and Turkey, enabling asset freezes and sanctions to curb its financing and operations.^[108] In contrast, neither the SDF nor YPG holds such a designation from the U.S. State Department, reflecting pragmatic support for their role in defeating ISIS's caliphate by March 2019, including the capture of 11,000 foreign fighters, though critics argue this overlooks PKK command structures within SDF ranks and enables indirect terrorist safe havens.^[108] ^[7] Turkey, however, equates the YPG with the PKK under domestic law, designating both as terrorist entities and justifying operations as legitimate self-defense against threats like cross-border attacks that killed dozens of Turkish personnel in 2023-2024.^[104] This divergence has led to U.S. assurances of eventual SDF transition away from PKK influence, but persistent Turkish skepticism, evidenced by vetoed NATO expansions and bilateral tensions, underscores the causal link between unresolved PKK-YPG ties and regional instability.^[109]

Interactions with Russia, Iran, and Regional Powers

The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) have engaged in pragmatic, albeit opportunistic, interactions with Russia primarily to counterbalance Turkish military threats, particularly following the partial U.S. troop withdrawal announced in October 2019. In mid-October 2019, SDF commanders reached an agreement allowing Syrian government forces, supported by Russian military police, to enter the strategically important cities of Manbij and Kobani to deter a Turkish offensive, filling the vacuum left by departing U.S. patrols.^[110] ^[111] This arrangement facilitated joint Russian-Turkish patrols under a subsequent Sochi memorandum on October 22, 2019, which required SDF-affiliated YPG forces to withdraw from a 30-kilometer border zone, enabling Russian forces to patrol previously SDF-held areas alongside Syrian border guards.^[112] ^[113] Tensions have persisted, including Russian jets harassing U.S. drones operating in SDF-controlled airspace in eastern Syria as recently as July 2023, reflecting ongoing competition over influence in the region.^[114] Relations with Iran have been predominantly adversarial, centered on territorial disputes in Deir ez-Zor province where SDF forces control oil-rich areas contested by Iran-backed militias and tribal proxies. In August 2024, Iran-supported militants launched attacks on SDF positions in Deir ez-Zor countryside, prompting SDF retaliatory operations that killed at least 20 regime-aligned fighters west of the Euphrates.^[115] ^[116] Similar clashes escalated in 2023–2024 after SDF arrests of local tribal leaders, including the head of the Deir ez-Zor Military Council, drawing in Iran- and Syrian regime-backed groups that displaced SDF from several villages.^[117] These confrontations underscore Iran's efforts, through proxies like Popular Mobilization Forces affiliates, to undermine SDF control over eastern Syria's resources and expand influence, with at least 16 pro-Iran fighters reported killed in related airstrikes in March 2024.^[118] Interactions with other regional powers remain limited and indirect, often shaped by shared anti-ISIS or anti-Iranian interests rather than formal alliances. Israel has conducted airstrikes targeting Iran-backed assets in SDF-held areas, indirectly bolstering SDF positions by weakening mutual adversaries, though no direct military coordination has been confirmed; Israeli analysts have advocated for potential strategic ties with the SDF to counter Iranian entrenchment in Syria.^[119] Saudi Arabia provided reported support to the SDF prior to Assad's ouster, including meetings in May 2018 to discuss military cooperation, motivated by Riyadh's opposition to Iranian influence.^[120] Post-Assad developments as of 2025 have seen Gulf states like Saudi Arabia and the UAE prioritize stabilization in Damascus, with indirect implications for SDF negotiations over integration into Syrian frameworks, but without explicit bilateral engagements documented. Jordan maintains border coordination with SDF forces to prevent ISIS incursions, leveraging shared interests in eastern Syria's stability, while ties with Iraqi Kurdish groups involve humanitarian and occasional operational cooperation across the porous Iraq-Syria frontier.^[121]

Controversies and Criticisms

Human Rights Allegations Including War Crimes

The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) have been accused of committing human rights abuses, including arbitrary and indefinite detentions, torture, and other ill-treatment of suspected Islamic State (ISIS) affiliates and civilians in northeast Syria. Following the territorial defeat of ISIS in March 2019, the SDF detained an estimated 56,000 individuals, including men, women, and children, many held without due process or fair trials in a network of prisons and makeshift facilities.^[122] ^[123] These detentions have resulted in hundreds of deaths from torture, disease, and neglect, with documented methods including severe beatings, stress positions, electric shocks, and sexual violence.^[122] ^[123] The United Nations has described these practices as systematic, affecting thousands in facilities like al-Sina'a Prison, where overcrowding and lack of medical care exacerbate fatalities.^[123] Child recruitment by SDF-affiliated groups constitutes a persistent violation, with mandatory conscription enforced on males aged 16 and older in SDF-controlled areas, often extending to younger children through linked youth organizations like the Revolutionary Youth Movement.^[124] ^[46] In 2024, Human Rights Watch documented cases of children as young as 12 being recruited for military training and frontline roles, despite SDF pledges to end the practice under a 2019 United Nations action plan.^[46] The Syrian Network for Human Rights reported over 150 arbitrary arrests by the SDF in May 2025 alone, including children, often on suspicion of dissent or ISIS ties, with detainees subjected to enforced disappearances and torture.^[125] ^[126] Conditions in displacement camps like al-Hol, housing over 40,000 ISIS-linked detainees including foreign nationals, have drawn international condemnation for abuses such as extrajudicial killings, forced separations of families, and inadequate protection from violence by guards or intra-camp attacks.^[127] ^[122] Rights and Security International reported instances of guards firing on residents and enabling coercion, contributing to at least 11,000 deaths in SDF facilities since 2019, many attributable to preventable causes amid resource shortages.^[128] ^[122] These actions raise concerns over potential war crimes, as prolonged arbitrary detention without judicial oversight violates international humanitarian law, though the SDF maintains such measures are necessary for security against ISIS resurgence.^[123]

Ties to PKK and Implications for Regional Stability

The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) maintain close ideological and operational ties to the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), a U.S.-designated foreign terrorist organization since 1997, primarily through the SDF's dominant component, the People's Protection Units (YPG). The YPG traces its origins to PKK offshoots established in Syria in the 1990s and 2000s, adopting the PKK's Marxist-Leninist framework and veneration of PKK founder Abdullah Öcalan as a guiding ideology. PKK training cadres have historically embedded within YPG ranks, providing command expertise and facilitating cross-border fighter movements between Turkey, Iraq, and Syria, with Turkish Kurds documented fighting alongside Syrian Kurds in SDF operations against the Islamic State.^[129]^[24]^[130] Despite U.S. distinctions—designating the PKK as terrorist but not the YPG or SDF due to their role in anti-ISIS campaigns—the organizational overlap persists, including shared command structures and logistical networks under the PKK's umbrella group, the Kurdistan Communities Union (KCK). PKK leadership has exerted influence over SDF decision-making, particularly in territorial expansion and governance in northeast Syria, where the SDF's de facto administration mirrors PKK models of democratic confederalism. This connection is evidenced by intercepted communications and defectors' accounts revealing PKK oversight of YPG/SDF military planning as recently as 2023.^[131]^[132]^[24] These ties undermine regional stability by fueling Turkish military interventions in northern Syria, as Ankara perceives the SDF-held areas as a PKK sanctuary threatening its 20 million Kurdish population and national sovereignty. Turkey has conducted multiple cross-border operations, including Operation Olive Branch in 2018 and Operation Peace Spring in 2019, displacing over 200,000 civilians and capturing key territories to disrupt a perceived PKK corridor from Iraq to the Mediterranean. Such actions exacerbate ethnic tensions, hinder post-Assad Syrian unification efforts, and strain U.S.-Turkey NATO relations, with Turkey conditioning normalization on SDF disarmament and PKK delinking—conditions unmet as of October 2025 despite PKK ceasefire overtures.^[133]^[134]^[135] The PKK-SDF nexus also complicates counterterrorism dynamics, enabling residual PKK activities to spill into Iraq and Syria while diverting resources from broader threats like ISIS resurgence, which exploited SDF-Turkish clashes in 2019 to stage jailbreaks freeing over 4,000 fighters. Regional powers like Russia and Iran exploit these divisions to advance influence, offering SDF mediation against Turkish pressure but tying it to concessions that perpetuate fragmentation. Efforts to sever ties, such as U.S.-brokered delinking talks in 2024, have faltered amid PKK demands for autonomy guarantees, perpetuating a cycle of instability that risks wider proxy conflicts amid Syria's transitional framework.^[136]^[132]^[137]

Internal Divisions and Treatment of Non-Kurdish Groups

The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), while nominally a multi-ethnic alliance comprising Kurds, Arabs, Assyrians, and other minorities, exhibit significant internal divisions stemming from Kurdish dominance in leadership and decision-making, particularly through the People's Protection Units (YPG). Of the SDF's estimated 100,000 fighters, approximately 65,000 are Arabs, yet command structures remain heavily Kurdish-led, fostering resentment among Arab factions who perceive marginalization in governance and resource allocation.^[40]^[13] Tensions with Arab tribes have manifested in recurrent clashes, especially in Deir ez-Zor province, where local Sunni Arab groups accuse the SDF of repression, corruption, and favoritism toward Kurdish interests. In July 2023, SDF forces launched operations against tribal militias in eastern Deir ez-Zor, resulting in the deaths of at least 90 individuals, including nine civilians, 57 Arab fighters, and 24 SDF members, prompting SDF withdrawals from several areas amid local protests.^[138]^[139] Similar unrest persisted into 2024 and 2025, with Arab tribal leaders denouncing SDF practices as discriminatory and contributing to an "end of forced coexistence," including the removal of Arab commanders like Ahmed al-Khbeil (Abu Khawla) from the Deir ez-Zor Military Council in August 2024 for alleged mismanagement.^[140]^[141] Forced conscription has exacerbated these divisions, disproportionately affecting non-Kurdish populations in Arab-majority areas like Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor. Between September 29 and October 5, 2025, the SDF conducted arbitrary detentions of at least 113 individuals, primarily young Arab men, to enforce recruitment amid fears of conflict with Syrian government forces, undermining fragile integration accords with Damascus.^[43]^[44] Earlier instances include the 2021 arrest of 34 teachers for conscription and ongoing raids in majority-Arab towns, which SDF justifies as targeting Islamic State cells but locals view as coercive control.^[142]^[143] Relations with Assyrian and other Christian groups reveal additional frictions, though less violent than Arab tribal conflicts. Assyrians have lodged complaints against the Kurdish-led administration for unequal treatment, including in security and cultural policies, despite SDF efforts to integrate Syriac Military Council units for protecting Christian villages around Tel Tamr and the Khabour River.^[144]^[145] These minorities, comprising about 12.5% of SDF fighters per surveys, often prioritize communal defense amid broader instability, but persistent grievances highlight the challenges of balancing Kurdish-centric command with multi-ethnic cohesion.^[146]

Recent Developments and Integration Efforts

Post-Assad Negotiations (2024-2025)

Following the rapid collapse of Bashar al-Assad's regime on December 8, 2024, with rebels seizing Damascus and Assad fleeing to Russia, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), controlling northeastern Syria, promptly engaged in exploratory talks with the interim authorities led by Ahmed al-Sharaa, formerly of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS).^[51] These initial discussions, held in late December 2024, centered on military coordination against residual Islamic State threats and potential SDF integration into a unified national framework, with SDF commander Mazloum Abdi meeting al-Sharaa to outline conditions for cooperation, including guarantees for Kurdish autonomy within a decentralized system.^[147] Abdi emphasized the SDF's role in defeating ISIS while seeking constitutional protections for ethnic minorities, amid U.S. encouragement for dialogue to prevent Turkish intervention or renewed jihadist advances.^[148] Negotiations intensified in early 2025, culminating in a formal agreement on March 10, 2025, between the SDF and the Syrian transitional government, pledging the SDF's merger into state military and civilian institutions by December 31, 2025.^[149]^[150] The deal, brokered partly through international mediators including Russia and the U.S., stipulated a nationwide ceasefire, handover of SDF-held oil fields to central control, and joint operations against ISIS remnants, while committing to integrate approximately 60,000 SDF fighters into a restructured Syrian army under Damascus oversight.^[151]^[152] Abdi confirmed the preliminary terms, describing them as a step toward national unity without full dissolution of SDF structures, though HTS-aligned officials pushed for complete absorption to centralize authority.^[51] By June 2025, a delegation from the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES), the SDF's civilian arm, convened with Syrian officials in Damascus on June 1 to address implementation hurdles, including resource sharing from eastern oil revenues—estimated at 80,000 barrels per day—and demobilization timelines.^[153] Progress stalled by late January 2025 over disagreements on governance models, with the SDF advocating federalism to preserve local councils managing diverse populations (Kurds, Arabs, Assyrians), while the transitional government, formalized on March 29, 2025, favored unitary control to avoid balkanization.^[2]^[154] Resumed talks in August and September 2025, hosted partly in Amman, yielded a roadmap for phased integration, including SDF withdrawal from key Arab-majority areas like Deir ez-Zor in exchange for minority rights assurances.^[155] As of October 2025, U.S.-facilitated discussions on October 8 produced a temporary truce amid sporadic clashes, reaffirming the March framework but deferring final decentralization details to constitutional drafting.^[156] Abdi and al-Sharaa advanced a joint integration plan on October 17, targeting full SDF embedding into national security forces, though tensions persist over PKK affiliations and Turkish demands for SDF demilitarization.^[157] Analysts note the talks' fragility, with the SDF leveraging U.S. bases (housing 900 troops) for leverage, while Damascus prioritizes revenue unification to fund reconstruction amid sanctions relief efforts.^[158]^[159]

Military Clashes and Ceasefire Agreements

In early October 2025, clashes intensified between the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and Syrian transitional government security forces in Aleppo's Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafiyah neighborhoods, involving artillery exchanges and ground assaults that killed at least one fighter and displaced residents.^[160] ^[161] The Syrian government accused SDF-aligned Kurdish fighters of initiating attacks on state positions, while the SDF claimed defensive actions against encroachments, amid stalled integration talks from March 2025 that envisioned SDF incorporation into national forces.^[67] ^[162] Syria's defense minister announced a comprehensive ceasefire on October 7, 2025, halting operations in Aleppo and redeploying forces to de-escalate, with both sides committing to mediation under U.S. and regional oversight to prevent broader escalation.^[163] ^[164] This truce followed similar violations, including mortar fire near Deir Hafer on October 22, underscoring fragile post-Assad dynamics where the SDF seeks autonomy guarantees against Damascus' centralization efforts.^[165] Earlier clashes occurred on August 4, 2025, when SDF units repelled government faction advances in northeast Syria, amid accusations of SDF expansionism by the transitional authorities.^[166] In parallel, SDF forces contended with Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) offensives launched November 30, 2024, under Operation Dawn of Freedom, which captured Manbij by February 2025 and triggered daily skirmishes at Tishrin Dam, displacing thousands without a formal ceasefire as of October 2025.^[167] ^[168] A localized truce in northeast Syria held into early March 2025 after intensified fighting, but periodic Turkish strikes on SDF targets persisted, reflecting Ankara's aim to dismantle perceived PKK extensions. These engagements highlight the SDF's dual-front pressures: negotiating integration with Damascus while defending against Turkish incursions, with ceasefires providing temporary halts but no resolution to underlying territorial disputes or ideological rifts.^[51]

Ongoing Integration into Syrian Transitional Framework

Following the collapse of the Bashar al-Assad regime in December 2024, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) entered negotiations with the emerging transitional government in Damascus, led by Ahmed al-Sharaa. On March 10, 2025, SDF commander Mazloum Abdi signed an agreement with Sharaa outlining the integration of SDF military units and affiliated civilian institutions into the Syrian state's security and administrative frameworks by the end of 2025.^[157]^[151] The deal included provisions for a nationwide ceasefire, constitutionally protected minority rights, and discussions on decentralized governance to accommodate regional autonomies in northeastern Syria.^[169]^[150] Implementation faced immediate hurdles, including disputes over the extent of decentralization and the SDF's ties to the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), which the transitional authorities viewed as a security threat.^[159] Clashes erupted between SDF forces and transitional government-aligned militias in northern Syria, notably sieges around Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafiyah neighborhoods in Aleppo during mid-2025, displacing thousands and straining the ceasefire terms.^[170] U.S.-mediated talks in Damascus yielded a temporary truce on October 7, 2025, expanding into a comprehensive ceasefire that halted active hostilities and recommitted both sides to integration timelines.^[171]^[156] By October 17, 2025, SDF leadership announced progress on a roadmap for merging its estimated 60,000-100,000 fighters into the national security apparatus, with initial steps including joint patrols in Deir ez-Zor and shared control of oil infrastructure revenues to fund reconstruction.^[157]^[172] However, the transitional government's constitutional declaration in July 2025 drew SDF criticism for insufficient protections against centralization, prompting delays in full civilian administration handovers.^[173] Mixed signals from Damascus, including demands for SDF disarmament without reciprocal Turkish border security guarantees, have fueled skepticism about genuine partnership versus absorption.^[174]^[175] External actors continue to influence the process: U.S. support, including ongoing coalition air presence, has bolstered SDF leverage in talks, while Turkish-backed Syrian National Army offensives in late 2024-early 2025 pressured the SDF toward compromise to avoid multi-front wars.^[176] As of October 2025, no final model for decentralized governance has been ratified, with ongoing U.S.-facilitated dialogues focusing on verifiable demilitarization benchmarks and revenue-sharing formulas amid economic pressures from sanctions relief tied to integration milestones.^[3]^[159] Analysts note that successful integration hinges on resolving PKK designations and ensuring non-Kurdish Arab tribes' representation to mitigate internal SDF divisions.^[152]

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[48]
SDF continues to recruit child soldiers, despite pledges to stop the ...
Sep 15, 2020 · Fawaz is one of the hundreds of children who have been recruited by the YPG and the Women's Protection Units (YPJ), the Kurdish-led militias ...
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ISIS has lost its final stronghold in Syria, the Syrian ... - CNN
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4.3. Areas under the control of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)
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Nov 8, 2019 · According to the agreement, the SDF would also pull back from now Syrian-controlled key towns close to the border, such as Manbij and Kobane.Missing: changes | Show results with:changes
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Feb 25, 2025 · As Syria's interim leader plans its future, Kurds in the north-east are battling Turkish-backed forces.
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Jan 1, 2018 · During 2017, over 61,500 square kilometers of territory was liberated from ISIS across Iraq and Syria, meaning “more than 98 percent of the land ...
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Dec 11, 2017 · Iraqi security forces and Syrian Democratic Forces have destroyed the idea of an Islamic State of Iraq and Syria 'Caliphate,' much work remains to be done ...
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Syrian Democratic Forces assault ISIS near Tabqah Dam
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[81]
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Feb 22, 2025 · Kurdish-led authorities in northeast Syria have begun providing oil from local fields they manage to the central government in Damascus.
[82]
SDF control of oil fields delays Syria's reconstruction efforts
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The Ramifications of the SDF Governance Plan for Raqqa Post-ISIS
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Kurdish Authorities in Syria Close Schools Run by Assyrian Christians
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4.5. Persons perceived to be opposing the SDF/YPG
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Gen. Paul Funk II, assumed authority of CJTF-OIR from XVIII Airborne Corps, on 05 September 2017.Iraqi Security Forces and Syrian Democratic Forces freed 155 ...
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Jul 20, 2019 · Coalition service members train partner forces with a live stress-fire range July 20, 2019, Syria. A stress-fire range is a rigorous ...
[101]
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WHO WE ARE - Operation Inherent Resolve
CJTF-OIR advises, assists and enables partnered forces until they can independently defeat Daesh in designated areas of Iraq and Syria.
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When, between January and March 2018, Turkey ran a second major military operation in Syria, Olive · Branch, directed at the Syrian Kurdish canton of Afrin, it ...<|separator|>
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Turkey May Launch Operation Against SDF If Integration Deal Fails ...
Sep 19, 2025 · Syrian President Sharaa has warned that Turkey may launch a military operation against the SDF if integration efforts fail by December.<|separator|>
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FTO designations play a critical role in our fight against terrorism and are an effective means of curtailing support for terrorist activities and pressuring ...Missing: SDF | Show results with:SDF
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Syrian government forces set to enter Kobani and Manbij in SDF deal
Oct 13, 2019 · A deal between the SDF, regime and Russia could see the Syrian Arab Army and pro-government militias enter Manbij and Kobani as early as Sunday ...
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Russian and Syrian troops fill void as US pulls troops out of Syria
Oct 15, 2019 · According to The Washington Post, Russia announced its forces were patrolling between Syrian and Turkish troops near Manbij.
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Oct 22, 2019 · Under the deal, Russian military police and Syrian border guards will first facilitate the withdrawal of Syrian Kurdish forces from the Turkish ...
[113]
Turkey, Russia reach deal for YPG move out of Syria border area
Oct 23, 2019 · After talks with Putin, Erdogan says Kurdish fighters will withdraw 30km (19 miles) from frontier within 150 hours.
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Russian jets harass US drone aircraft over Syria for the 2nd time in ...
Jul 5, 2023 · About 900 U.S. forces are deployed to Syria to work with the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces battling the Islamic State militants there.
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Iranian-backed militias attack SDF posts in Deir ez-Zor
Aug 6, 2024 · Iranian-backed militants attacked on Tuesday positions of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in the countryside of Deir ez-Zor in eastern Syria.
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Deir e-Zor civilians under fire as regime-backed groups attack the SDF
Aug 12, 2024 · On Monday, the SDF announced its Deir e-Zor Military Council conducted a “retaliatory” raid and killed 20 fighters at regime positions west of ...
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Eastern Syria After Assad
Dec 10, 2024 · In 2023–2024, the SDF fought against several Iran- and Syrian government-backed tribal militias, after the SDF arrested the Deir al-Zor Military ...
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Mar 27, 2024 · The watchdog on Tuesday reported that at least 16 pro-Iran militiamen were killed in unidentified airstrikes in Deir ez-Zor. Damascus blamed ...
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Mar 23, 2025 · The Kurds could become a major and reliable ally of Israel in Syria—one that is both strong and influential. This alliance would provide Israel ...
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Post-Assad Syria: Challenges, Opportunities, and the US Role in ...
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Humanitarian Cooperation Between Kurds in Iraq and Syria
Apr 17, 2020 · Kurds in Iraq and Syria have rivalries. Under duress, however, Kurds come together to manage the crisis. According to Bayan Abdul-Rahman: “We ...
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Syria: Mass death, torture and other violations against people ...
Apr 17, 2024 · People detained following the territorial defeat of the Islamic State (IS) armed group are facing systematic violations and dying in large ...
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[PDF] Aftermath: Injustice, Torture and Death in Detention in North-East Syria
Many of these detainees are held in inhumane conditions and have been subjected to torture or other ill-treatment, including severe beating, stress positions, ...<|separator|>
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2.6. Persons fearing forced or child recruitment by Kurdish forces
'Conscription' is mandatory for all male residents, both Syrian nationals and stateless Kurds, living in the territories under the Autonomous Administration, ...
[125]
At least 157 Arbitrary Arrests Recorded in Syria in May 2025 [EN/AR]
Jun 4, 2025 · SNHR also documented the Syrian Democratic Forces' detention ... arbitrary detention, enforced disappearance, and torture included in this report.
[126]
SNHR's Monthly Report on Arrests/Detentions in Syria - At least 127 ...
Oct 2, 2025 · ... Syrian Democratic Forces, including 6 children and 3 women. ... arbitrary detention, enforced disappearance, and torture included in this report.
[127]
Northeast Syria: Camp Detainees Face Uncertain Future
Feb 7, 2025 · Kurdish-run al-Hol camp, which holds relatives of suspected Islamic State group ... Over 9,000 detainees with alleged ISIS affiliation from ...
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The People's Protection Units' Branding Problem
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Evidence on Kurdish aspirations and the interests of the UK
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The impact of Turkish-Syrian normalization on the SDF
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Erdogan Demands SDF Complete Integration With Syrian Government
Oct 8, 2025 · SDF forces, which control parts of Syria's north and northeast, have clashed with Turkey and Syria's transitional government over demands for a ...
[136]
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Jun 3, 2025 · Unresolved questions over how the PKK's disbanding will impact the SDF in Syria is fuelling scepticism among some in Turkey that the ...
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Mar 17, 2025 · A renewed peace effort between the Turkish government and the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) has reignited hopes for a resolution to the four-decade-long ...
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Syria: Dozens killed in fighting between SDF and Arab tribesmen
Sep 5, 2023 · According to the SOHR, at least 90 people have been killed in Deir al-Zour, including nine civilians, 57 Arab fighters and 24 members of the SDF ...
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Syria: SDF fights rival Arab tribes for control of Deir Ezzor
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The End of a Forced Coexistence: Arab Tribes Turn Against the ...
Jul 11, 2025 · ... SDF as a unified Kurdish force, it is in fact a complex coalition. Alongside the YPG, it includes Arab formations such as the Sanadid Forces ...Missing: components | Show results with:components<|separator|>
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Deir ez-Zor: A Year of Unrest
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SDF militia forcibly conscripting teachers in Syria: Report - Al Jazeera
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Syrian army redeploys near SDF frontlines as tensions flare
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Future Uncertain for Christians in Syria: Assyrian Leader in Syria
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Christian fighters assigned to defend Assyrian communities in Syria
Kurdish-led forces in Syria on Sunday assigned the Syriac Military Council to protect Syrian Christian populations in Khabour and villages around the town of ...<|separator|>
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2022 Report on International Religious Freedom: Syria
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The New Syria and the Regional Balance of Power
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After Assad: The Future of Syria | The Washington Institute
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Kurdish-led SDF agrees to integrate with Syrian government forces
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Agreement between Syria's interim government and the Syrian ...
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US-brokered talks yield temporary truce between Syrian government ...
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SDF moves forward with integration into new Syrian security forces
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Oct 8, 2025 · Despite the positive discussions between the Syrian government and the SDF, Turkey remains a critical actor in this conflict.
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Governmental forces and SDF trade mortar fire on Deir Hafer frontline
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Violence Resurges in Syria After Armed Groups, Kurdish-Led SDF ...
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'We are part of Syria': Kurdish-led SDF fights for place in post-Assad ...
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