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USR PLUS


USR PLUS was a political alliance formed in 2019 between the (USR), an civic movement turned party, and the Freedom, Unity and Solidarity Party (PLUS), founded by former prime minister to promote liberal reforms.
The alliance positioned itself as a centrist, pro-European force emphasizing measures, institutional reform, and economic modernization, distinguishing itself from established parties accused of entrenched corruption.
In the 2019 elections, USR PLUS secured approximately 22% of the vote, winning eight seats and establishing itself as a significant opposition player.
It later participated in a 2020-2021 with the National Liberal Party (PNL) and the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (UDMR), holding key ministerial portfolios focused on development and European funds until withdrawing amid conflicts over prime ministerial succession and fiscal policies.
The alliance faced internal divisions, including leadership disputes that contributed to its dissolution by 2021, after which USR and PLUS merged into a unified USR party, though subsequent factionalism persisted.

Origins and Formation

Pre-Alliance Developments

The (USR) originated in 2016 as an extension of civic initiatives led by mathematician and activist , building on his 2015 founding of the Save Bucharest Union to address local corruption in urban development and heritage preservation. USR formalized as a national party emphasizing anti-corruption measures, institutional transparency, and adherence to the , amid public outrage over entrenched graft in parties like the (PSD), exemplified by high-profile cases such as the 2015 scandal that exposed regulatory failures and political negligence. In the December 11, 2016, parliamentary elections, USR captured 8.94% of the vote, securing 30 seats in the and 13 in the , a breakthrough that reflected voter alienation from the PSD's near-majority win (45.5%) and highlighted demand for outsider alternatives untainted by prior governance failures. The party's platform prioritized merit-based and , positioning it as a counter to in politics. The Freedom, Unity and Solidarity Party (PLUS) formed on December 15, 2018, under , who had served as technocratic from November 2015 to January 2017 following street protests against PSD-led corruption ordinances. Drawing from Cioloș's EU commissioner background and interim government's focus on fiscal discipline and anti-graft enforcement, PLUS sought to consolidate pro-reform, centrist voices opposed to PSD's electoral hegemony, advocating professional governance over partisan patronage without contesting standalone elections prior to partnering with USR.

Establishment of the Alliance

The USR-PLUS alliance was formally established on February 2, 2019, through a partnership between the (USR) and the Party of Liberty, Unity, and Solidarity (PLUS), specifically to unify anti-corruption opposition ahead of the May 2019 European Parliament elections. This move addressed the fragmentation of reformist votes, enabling a single list to challenge the dominance of the ruling (PSD), which had pursued policies perceived as weakening independent institutions. At the time, ranked 71st out of 180 countries in Transparency International's 2018 Corruption Perceptions Index with a score of 47 out of 100, reflecting persistent vulnerabilities that the aimed to tackle through coordinated . The partners aligned on priorities including the protection of against executive encroachments—such as PSD-backed emergency ordinances diluting prosecutions—and stronger adherence to rule-of-law standards, viewing these as essential for institutional integrity over clientelist practices. Initial joint efforts focused on public campaigns promoting systemic reforms grounded in competence and accountability, contrasting with Romania's patronage-driven , while navigating legal hurdles like a temporary electoral registration that was later overturned.

Ideology and Policy Positions

and Governance Reforms

USR PLUS advocated for bolstering the independence of Romania's National Anticorruption Directorate (DNA) to counter entrenched political interference in judicial processes, arguing that such protections were essential to prosecute high-level graft effectively. The alliance highlighted PSD-led initiatives from 2017 to 2019, including emergency ordinances and justice law amendments, which weakened prosecutorial tools and led to the dismissal of DNA chief Laura Codruța Kövesi in July 2018, as direct assaults on anti-corruption mechanisms. These changes correlated with overturned convictions of PSD figures, such as those involving abuse of office and bribery, undermining public trust and perpetuating cycles of impunity that stalled institutional reforms. To mitigate bureaucratic rent-seeking, USR PLUS promoted and mandatory transparency in public procurement, critiquing pre-2019 scandals where politically connected firms secured contracts through opaque tenders, resulting in documented losses exceeding €2 billion annually from irregularities like and favoritism. The party's 2020 priorities emphasized digitalization for real-time oversight of , aiming to dismantle clientelist networks that rewarded over merit in local and . Empirical from oversight reports underscored how such practices fueled Romania's lag in EU convergence, with USR PLUS prioritizing verifiable institutional fixes over symbolic gestures. The alliance framed as a causal driver of governance failures, evidenced by mayoral control over welfare distribution in rural areas to secure votes, which reports linked to persistent perceptions despite DNA successes. USR PLUS positioned itself against this normalization by supporting merit-based appointments and whistleblower protections, rejecting PSD and PNL tactics that embedded patronage in budget allocations, such as regional funds funneled through party channels.

Economic and Fiscal Stances

USR PLUS promoted centrist liberal economic policies emphasizing private sector-led growth, fiscal prudence, and reduced state intervention to address Romania's structural challenges, including persistent budget deficits and low productivity stemming from post-communist legacies. The alliance advocated maintaining the flat rate of 10%, introduced in 2005, as a means to incentivize and , opposing shifts toward taxation that could deter inflows amid EU fiscal constraints. This stance contrasted with the (PSD)'s redistributive approach, which prioritized subsidies and public spending expansions that contributed to Romania's budget deficit exceeding 9% of GDP in 2024, triggering EU excessive deficit procedures. To foster , USR PLUS called for of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), including simplified VAT collection mechanisms and elimination of taxes on certain low-income salary categories, aiming to reduce bureaucratic hurdles that hinder formation in a marked by underinvestment. These measures were positioned as realistic responses to Romania's brain drain, where skilled —exacerbated by inadequate development—has depleted the workforce, with studies linking it to persistent gaps in education quality reflected in Romania's 2022 scores of 428 in , 428 in reading, and 428 in science, well below the averages of 472, 476, and 485 respectively. Unlike PSD's state-heavy interventions, which empirical data associates with inflated deficits without commensurate growth, USR PLUS prioritized private initiative to counter inequality drivers like skill mismatches rather than unsubstantiated claims tying low taxes directly to widened disparities absent controls for confounding factors such as regulatory barriers. On fiscal matters, the alliance stressed expenditure rationalization over revenue hikes, critiquing PSD-influenced policies for inefficient fund absorption—Romania utilized only a fraction of its allocated recovery funds by mid-2025 due to procedural delays—and pushing for streamlined to maximize returns on cohesion and PNRR grants totaling over €30 billion. This approach aligned with demands for consolidation, as faced potential fund suspensions for non-compliance, underscoring the need for causal realism in linking fiscal profligacy to vulnerabilities like the 2024-2025 surge rather than external shocks alone. By favoring market mechanisms, USR PLUS sought to mitigate post-communist inefficiencies, such as over-reliance on payrolls, which bloated costs without addressing issues like the 20%+ skilled labor tied to domestic underinvestment.

Social and Cultural Policies

USR PLUS advocated for the recognition of civil unions for same-sex couples as part of broader protections, positioning itself as supportive of anti- measures in a where traditional predominate due to strong Christian influence. The alliance also pushed initiatives to combat against ethnic minorities, including communities, though systemic anti- prejudice persists in society. In , USR PLUS prioritized and , outlining commitments to protect natural resources and integrate ecological concerns into public priorities, reflecting a pro-European alignment with climate goals amid Romania's challenges with and . The alliance supported education reforms aimed at modernizing curricula, improving infrastructure, and enhancing teacher training to address Romania's lagging PISA scores and rural-urban disparities, while emphasizing merit-based access over ideological influences. These stances, however, faced criticism for diverging from empirical preferences, where polls indicate limited enthusiasm for rapid expansion of ; for instance, a 2023 ILGA-Europe survey found only 56% support for legal recognition of same-sex unions, with ranking near the bottom of EU countries for overall LGBTQ protections due to societal conservatism. Right-leaning commentators argued that USR PLUS's emphasis on cultural shifts, including secular pushes against church involvement in policy, alienated traditional voters, fostering a backlash that bolstered nationalist parties like AUR by highlighting a perceived elite disconnect from rural and faith-based constituencies.

Leadership and Internal Organization

Prominent Leaders

Nicușor Dan, a mathematician and civic activist born on December 20, 1969, in Făgăraș, founded the Save Romania Union (USR) in May 2016 as its initial president, drawing from his prior work with the Salvați Bucureștiul association established in 2000 to combat illegal urban developments and preserve Bucharest's heritage. His leadership emphasized evidence-based anti-corruption measures and rule-of-law reforms, positioning USR as an outsider force against entrenched political elites. Dan resigned from the party presidency in September 2017 amid disagreements over ideological direction but retained symbolic prominence, later securing the Bucharest mayoralty in the September 2020 elections with backing from the USR PLUS alliance after topping the first round with 42.8% of votes. Dacian Cioloș, an agronomist who headed Romania's technocratic government as from November 17, 2015, to January 4, 2017, founded the Freedom, Unity and Solidarity Party (PLUS) on December 15, 2018, and was elected its president with 99.17% support on January 26, 2019. As co-president of the USR PLUS alliance starting February 2, 2019, Cioloș leveraged his EU Commission experience (2009–2014 as ) to advocate for transparent governance and pro-European integration, guiding the alliance's strategy in the 2019 elections where it secured 22.42% of the vote and 14 seats. Dan Barna, a born July 10, 1975, was elected USR in 2017 with strong internal backing for his expertise in EU-funded project auditing and . Serving as co-president of USR PLUS alongside Cioloș from the alliance's inception, Barna was chosen as its unified presidential candidate via party congress vote on July 13, 2019, reflecting the alliance's preference for a candidate with prosecutorial experience in fraud cases during his tenure at the . He garnered 1,729,579 votes (5.72%) in the November 10, 2019, first round, underscoring USR PLUS's urban voter base mobilization despite limited national reach.

Party Structure and Factions

USR PLUS maintained a decentralized organizational framework rooted in the origins of its core components, USR and PLUS, which prioritized involvement over hierarchical control typical of legacy parties such as the . Candidate selection processes relied on internal congresses and member voting mechanisms, including online primaries, to nominate leaders and electoral lists, fostering transparency and reducing top-down impositions. This approach aimed to sustain cohesion by empowering local branches and activists, though it occasionally amplified disputes by amplifying diverse voices within the alliance. Emerging factions reflected tensions between the activist, protest-driven ethos of USR—emphasizing rapid mobilization against —and the more technocratic, policy-focused orientation of , which sought structured reforms. These divides intensified during 2020 merger negotiations, where debates over unification terms exposed strategic divergences, with advocates pushing for formalized to consolidate resources, while USR elements favored preserving to maintain ideological purity. Co-leadership by Dan Barna and initially bridged these groups, but underlying causal frictions—stemming from differing priorities on versus expertise—contributed to post-alliance fractures upon merger in 2021. Rapid membership expansion during the alliance period bolstered operational capacity but strained retention, as the broad ideological tent encompassing reformers, liberals, and diluted unified commitments and fueled factional pull. Local organizations operated with relative independence, enabling adaptive responses to regional issues, yet this inadvertently exacerbated internal challenges by allowing factional bases to entrench without central .

Electoral History

2019 European Parliament Elections

The USR-PLUS alliance contested the 2019 elections in Romania on 26 May 2019 as part of the broader Alliance 2020 USR-PLUS, emphasizing anti-corruption reforms, transparent use of EU funds, and stronger . The campaign highlighted systemic graft under the ruling , including documented misuse of European structural funds for political , and pledged mechanisms to prevent such abuses. Messaging resonated with professionals and , capitalizing on prior anti-government protests against judicial , which boosted turnout to 51.2%—the highest for EP elections in Romania since EU accession. The alliance secured 1,007,788 votes, or 22.36% of the valid ballots, earning 8 of Romania's 33 seats and finishing a narrow second behind the 's 22.49%. This result marked a breakthrough for the nascent partnership, reflecting anti-establishment momentum amid PSD scandals, with disproportionate support from voters under 35 who prioritized integrity over traditional . The seats positioned USR-PLUS as a key player in the group, formerly ALDE, advocating for rule-of-law enforcement and fiscal prudence in EU policy debates. Post-election, , the alliance's lead candidate and former Romanian , was elected president of on 19 June 2019, enhancing the group's influence on third-place matters like budget oversight and anti-corruption directives. His leadership underscored USR-PLUS's pro-EU orientation, though internal tensions later emerged over national versus European priorities. The outcome solidified the alliance's role as an opposition force, pressuring on fund absorption rates, where lagged at under 40% for 2014-2020 allocations due to graft risks.

Legislative and Local Elections (2016-2020)

In the December 11, 2016, parliamentary elections, the (USR) secured 8.94% of the valid votes for the , translating to 40 seats and establishing the party as a nascent force in the legislature. This result emerged against a backdrop of PSD-led governance marred by allegations and subsequent public protests, which amplified USR's appeal among voters seeking and transparency, though opposition fragmentation allowed PSD to claim a plurality with 45.5%. USR's earlier participation in the June 5, 2016, local elections yielded limited national success, with approximately 3.8% of votes for county councils, but it laid groundwork in centers like and through council seats and exposure of local graft. The party's emphasis on first-time candidacies from resonated in educated demographics, contrasting with entrenched parties' networks. The 2019 with streamlined anti-establishment messaging, mitigating prior . In the September 27, 2020, local elections, USR PLUS candidates captured key mayoralties, notably Dominic Fritz's victory in (40.52% of votes), alongside wins in and several county councils, drawing support from professionals alienated by scandals and economic mismanagement. These gains, concentrated in cities with levels, signaled a shift toward consolidated opposition amid ongoing revelations of . Despite the suppressing turnout to 31.8% in the December 6, 2020, parliamentary elections, USR PLUS expanded to 15.04% of the Chamber vote, earning 55 seats—a near doubling from USR's solo performance. This uptick, fueled by sustained rhetoric amid PSD's judicial interference attempts, demonstrated partial opposition unification, yet persistent fragmentation—evident in PNL's parallel 25% share—prevented a decisive anti-PSD majority.

Presidential and Subsequent National Elections

In the first round of the on , Dan Barna, the USR PLUS candidate, secured 14.19% of the valid votes, finishing third behind incumbent (37.82%) and (22.26%), and thus failing to advance to the runoff. This outcome, while reflecting USR PLUS's consolidation as an anti-corruption force among urban and younger voters, highlighted strategic shortcomings in campaign execution, such as insufficient outreach to moderate and rural electorates, which Barna acknowledged by assuming full responsibility and directing party support to Iohannis in the second round. The result underscored broader realignments, with USR PLUS drawing from and metropolitan turnout but struggling against established parties' networks in provincial areas. The 2020 parliamentary elections on December 6 marked a subsequent national contest where USR PLUS, building on its presidential momentum, obtained approximately 15% of the vote share for the amid record-low turnout of 31.8%, securing 43 seats and enabling entry into a governing . However, following the alliance's withdrawal from in 2021 over policy disputes, support eroded, evident in the 2024 parliamentary elections on December 1, where the rebranded USR garnered around 14%—fourth place behind PSD, AUR, and PNL—reflecting diminished appeal post-coalition fallout and intensified competition from far-right and centrist rivals. USR's electoral performance consistently reveals stark rural-urban divides, with vote shares concentrated in cities like (often exceeding 20%) due to higher educated, turnout, while rural counties yield under 10%, correlating with lower overall participation and preference for clientelist parties. In the annulled 2024 presidential first round on November 24, USR candidate Elena Lasconi echoed Barna's 2019 limitations, achieving a modest urban-driven result insufficient for advancement, prompting her resignation amid party infighting. These patterns link to causal factors like post-communist economic disparities, where urban professional classes align with USR's reformist agenda, but rural voters prioritize welfare promises from legacy parties.

Government Participation and Policy Implementation

Entry into Coalition Government

Following the parliamentary elections on December 6, 2020, in which the (PSD) secured 28.9% of the vote but failed to form a majority, the National Liberal Party (PNL), USR PLUS, and the Democratic Alliance of (UDMR) negotiated a coalition agreement to establish a pro-European government. The pact, finalized on December 22, 2020, allocated 55 seats from USR PLUS's electoral haul of 906,962 votes (15.37%) to the 234-seat majority in the , emphasizing governance reforms to counter PSD's prior dominance. The coalition's formation was driven by shared commitments to anti-corruption measures and institutional overhaul, as USR PLUS leaders cited the need to sustain the momentum from the 2019 ouster of PSD's government amid widespread protests over judicial interference and graft. Under the preceding PNL minority administration led by from October 2019, referrals to the National Anticorruption Directorate (DNA) had risen, with over 1,200 corruption cases prosecuted in 2020 alone, reinforcing USR PLUS's rationale for partnering to institutionalize such accountability rather than risk PSD's return. The agreement assigned USR PLUS five ministerial positions, including under Stelian Ion, who prioritized resuming high-profile investigations stalled during PSD rule, alongside roles in European Investments and Funds, Environment, and Development. Florin Cîțu of PNL was sworn in as on December 23, 2020, with the cabinet receiving parliamentary investiture by a 286-179 vote, marking initial cohesion amid the ongoing crisis. This stability enabled coordinated fiscal responses, including EU recovery fund negotiations, though underlying tensions over policy priorities emerged later.

Key Reforms and Legislative Achievements

During its tenure in the Cîțu Cabinet from December 2020 to September 2021, the USR-PLUS alliance, holding portfolios including justice and health, prioritized measures and responses amid the . In the justice sector, Minister Stelian Ion advanced efforts to dissolve the Section for Investigating Infractions within the Judiciary (SIIJ), a body criticized for shielding magistrates from probes, with lawmakers nearing approval of the dissolution bill he authored by March 2021. Ion also pursued an accelerated timetable for reforms under the EU's Cooperation and Verification Mechanism (CVM), focusing on and enforcement to meet benchmarks established since Romania's 2007 EU accession. In , USR-PLUS Health Minister oversaw early rollout phases, contributing to Romania's initially rapid uptake that aligned with paces in late 2020 and early 2021. The alliance supplemented national efforts with a dedicated information campaign launched in June 2021 to boost public uptake amid hesitancy. However, coverage stagnated, reaching only 33% of the population by September 2021—second-lowest in the , compared to the bloc's average exceeding 60%—due to factors including and logistical bottlenecks. Romania's mortality rate through August 2021 stood at approximately 1,790 per million, about 12% above the average. Proposed reforms in pensions and wages faced delays from fiscal constraints and vetoes, with no major legislative breakthroughs enacted before USR-PLUS's withdrawal. Economic shocks from the exacerbated budgetary pressures, limiting implementation of structural adjustments tied to recovery funds like the PNRR, which the helped negotiate but could not fully operationalize. Overall, the alliance's outputs showed modest progress in targeted areas like judicial restructuring, but empirical outcomes were constrained by the government's nine-month duration, internal disputes, and external crises, yielding limited enduring fiscal or impacts.

Withdrawal from Government

On September 1, 2021, Prime Minister dismissed Justice Minister Stelian Ion, a USR-PLUS member, citing Ion's opposition to judicial reforms and the Anghel Saligny National Program, a proposed €10 billion infrastructure initiative for local developments funded from the state budget. USR-PLUS viewed the program as lacking transparent allocation mechanisms, potentially enabling and through direct transfers to mayors without competitive bidding. In retaliation, USR-PLUS withdrew its support for Cîțu, accusing him of authoritarian tendencies and prioritizing PNL dominance over coalition agreements, and joined opposition party AUR in tabling a no-confidence motion against the . The no-confidence motion, debated in early September, ultimately failed to garner sufficient votes, as PNL lawmakers boycotted requirements and refused to cross party lines, leaving the Cîțu intact but in minority status. This outcome highlighted deep fissures in power-sharing, with USR-PLUS leaders like arguing that Cîțu's actions undermined anti-corruption commitments central to the coalition's formation, while PNL portrayed USR-PLUS as obstructive to economic recovery post-COVID. On , 2021, all USR-PLUS ministers tendered their resignations, formally exiting the coalition and plunging into a marked by repeated failed attempts. The withdrawal stemmed from escalating tensions over ambitions—Cîțu's bid to consolidate PNL clashed with USR-PLUS's insistence on equitable —and opportunity costs, as the facilitated PSD's return to via a 2021 coalition with PNL and UDMR, reversing USR-PLUS's earlier exclusion of the social democrats. Post-exit polls reflected voter trust erosion, with USR-PLUS support dipping to around 10-12% in October 2021 surveys amid perceptions of irresponsibility for government collapse during economic challenges, contrasting with pre-crisis levels near 15%. Critics, including PNL figures, attributed the move to USR-PLUS's inexperience in coalition compromise, enabling PSD's resurgence despite USR-PLUS's self-framing as a principled stand against graft.

Controversies and Criticisms

Internal Divisions and Leadership Struggles

The merger of USR and in 2021, following their since 2019, exacerbated underlying tensions between USR's grassroots, anti-establishment base and 's more technocratic, elite-oriented faction led by . These divisions stemmed from differing visions on party organization and strategy, with USR members viewing as imposing centralized control that diluted the original movement's decentralized ethos. The rivalry between Cioloș and USR leader Dan Barna intensified during the October 2021 internal elections for USR PLUS presidency. In the first round on September 25, Cioloș secured 46% of votes against Barna's 43.9%, leading to a runoff where Cioloș prevailed with 19,603 votes to Barna's 14,821, reflecting a narrow split in party membership support. Despite Cioloș's victory, Barna's faction retained influence in the party's national bureau, setting the stage for ongoing power struggles. Following USR PLUS's withdrawal from the coalition government in September 2021, internal purges and factional clashes escalated, including the exclusion of dissenting members and disputes over post-government reorganization. Cioloș's subsequent push for reforms, such as decentralizing party structures, was rejected by the Barna-controlled leadership in February 2022, prompting his resignation as president after just four months in office. This episode highlighted persistent rifts, with Cioloș accusing the party of blocking necessary changes to maintain elite dominance. By May 2022, Cioloș and four other MEPs—Ramona Strugariu, Dragoș Pîslaru, Alin Mituța, and Dragoș Tudorache—resigned from USR to establish the Renewing Romania's European Project (REPER), citing irreconcilable differences with the prevailing leadership and a desire to preserve reformist principles unhindered by internal sabotage. These departures, involving key figures from the PLUS wing, underscored the merger's failure to forge lasting unity, as evidenced by subsequent party congresses where factional voting patterns repeatedly favored Barna loyalists over broader renewal efforts.

Policy Shortcomings and Public Backlash

USR PLUS's advocacy for accelerated implementation of the , including ambitious targets, drew criticism for overlooking Romania's acute , where households allocated an average of 8.7% of their budgets to energy expenditures in 2021 and 32-45% of the faced affordability issues. This stance, aligned with funding priorities, alienated voters in coal-dependent industrial regions and rural areas reliant on traditional heating sources like wood, where 80% of rural households depended on such methods. Critics, including government officials, highlighted the potential negative impacts on the energy sector from rapid decarbonization without adequate transitional support, exacerbating vulnerabilities amid rising global prices. The alliance's uncompromising agenda, a core campaign pledge, intensified coalition frictions and was accused by opponents of fostering and judicial politicization, resembling "witch-hunts" against political rivals. This manifested in the 2021 dismissal of USR-affiliated Justice Minister Stelian Ion, which USR viewed as a of reform commitments but others saw as necessary to curb perceived overreach in investigations targeting legacy institutions. The resulting standoff contributed to the government's collapse on September 7, 2021, fostering public frustration over governance paralysis rather than tangible progress in curbing graft, despite USR's initial role in bolstering the National Anticorruption Directorate's mandate. Following the coalition exit, USR PLUS experienced a measurable erosion in public support, with polls reflecting disillusionment over unfulfilled pledges for systemic overhaul amid economic pressures including that climbed to approximately 5% in 2021. Analysts attributed this decline—from the alliance's 15.8% vote share in the December 2020 parliamentary elections to sub-15% ranges in subsequent surveys—to the gap between rhetorical commitments to efficiency and transparency and the empirical reality of limited legislative outputs during their nine-month tenure, compounded by the pandemic's strain on public services. This backlash underscored a broader voter toward reformist platforms that prioritized ideological purity over pragmatic delivery in a context of persistent structural challenges.

Relations with Other Political Forces

USR PLUS positioned itself as a staunch opponent of the (PSD), frequently denouncing it as emblematic of entrenched and post-communist patronage networks. This antagonism was evident in USR PLUS's support for no-confidence motions against PSD-led governments, such as the 2019 effort backed by the alliance alongside other opposition groups. The party's rhetoric emphasized PSD's alleged undermining of and norms, framing it as the "old guard" blocking reforms, though critics argued this stance sometimes overlooked PSD's voter base rooted in rural and working-class constituencies rather than mere graft. Despite this anti-PSD fervor, USR PLUS pursued pragmatic alliances with the National Liberal Party (PNL), entering a with PNL and the Democratic Alliance of (UDMR) following the December 2020 parliamentary elections. This partnership, formalized on December 22, 2020, aimed to oust from power and implement anti-corruption measures, yet it drew accusations of opportunism from purists within USR PLUS who viewed PNL as insufficiently reformist and tainted by similar establishment flaws. The alliance fractured in 2021 over fiscal policy disputes, leading to USR PLUS's withdrawal and highlighting tensions between ideological purity and power-sharing necessities. USR PLUS's fragmented approach to opposition coordination contributed to the rise of the far-right Alliance for the Union of Romanians (AUR) in subsequent elections. In the December 2024 parliamentary vote, pro-Western forces like USR (USR PLUS's successor entity) secured only fourth place with around 14% of seats, while AUR surged to second with nearly 18%, capitalizing on voter disillusionment amid divided anti-establishment sentiments. Analysts attributed this outcome to the opposition's inability to unify against dominance, with USR PLUS's earlier exits from coalitions exacerbating splits that funneled protest votes toward AUR's nationalist appeals. At the European level, USR PLUS aligned with the group in the , advocating reforms and pro-EU integration, as exemplified by Dacian Cioloș's leadership role until 2021. Domestically, however, this positioning fostered isolation, as evidenced by USR's exclusion from the PSD-PNL-UDMR coalition formed in December 2024, underscoring a disconnect between transnational networks and Romania's polarized national arena where broader pacts often prioritized stability over ideological consistency.

Merger, Dissolution, and Legacy

Merger Process and Rebranding

The merger process between Uniunea Salvați România (USR) and Partidul Libertate, Unitate și Solidaritate () began with a joint online congress on 15 August 2020, where delegates voted to unite the two parties into a single entity. This decision aimed to consolidate their shared and pro-reform platforms ahead of the December 2020 parliamentary elections, forming the Alianța USR . However, legal formalities delayed full integration, requiring court validation to dissolve and absorb its structures into USR. The merger was legally finalized on 16 April 2021, when the Court of Appeal approved the unification, creating the single party USR PLUS with integrated membership and statutes. This step resolved key hurdles, including reconciling differing internal governance rules and transferring PLUS's approximately 50,000 members into USR's framework, though some local branches faced delays in administrative alignment. The new entity retained the USR PLUS branding initially, reflecting a balanced , but internal tensions over leadership and policy priorities soon emerged. By late 2021, amid declining public support for the alliance amid government coalition strains, a national congress on 3 October 2021 voted to rebrand the party as simply USR, reverting to the original USR logo and effectively absorbing PLUS's identity. This shift, approved alongside the election of Dacian Cioloș as president, marked the de facto dissolution of the PLUS component, prioritizing USR's established brand over the joint nomenclature. The rebranding addressed perceptions of weakened cohesion but highlighted unresolved membership integration challenges, as PLUS loyalists expressed concerns over diluted influence.

Long-Term Impact on Romanian Politics

USR PLUS's emphasis on anti-corruption helped normalize it as a central tenet of viable political platforms in Romania, shifting discourse from sporadic scandals to institutional priorities like strengthening the National Anticorruption Directorate (DNA). This legacy persisted post-2021, with USR continuing to advocate for DNA independence amid ongoing prosecutions, though enforcement challenges revealed limits in uprooting entrenched practices. However, the alliance's withdrawal from the 2021 coalition government exemplified difficulties in sustaining partnerships, contributing to chronic instability that fragmented the opposition landscape. In the December 1, 2024, parliamentary elections, this fragmentation was evident as no party secured a majority, with leading at 22.4% in the Senate, followed closely by AUR at around 18%, PNL, and USR at 12.26%. USR's inability to forge enduring coalitions post-2021 allowed clientelist structures—rooted in and PNL dominance—to endure, preventing broader systemic overhaul despite isolated reforms like digitalization initiatives. USR PLUS's progressive-liberal overtones inadvertently accelerated a rightward voter shift, as disillusioned urban and youth supporters migrated toward nationalist alternatives amid perceived failures in delivering tangible change. AUR's surge to over 18% in votes exemplified this, capitalizing on sentiment USR initially harnessed but could not monopolize. Empirical evidence shows enduring institutional tweaks, such as enhanced laws from the 2021 government stint, yet no : corruption perceptions remained stable around 46/100 on the 2023 CPI, reflecting persistent networks. Overall, USR PLUS's net contribution lies in elevating reformist voices, but electoral volatility underscores its role in amplifying fragmentation rather than consolidating alternatives to traditional parties.

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