Fact-checked by Grok 2 weeks ago

401st Brigade (Israel)

The 401st Brigade, designated as the "Iron Tracks" Brigade (Hebrew: עקבות הברזל, Ikvot HaBarzel), is an armored formation within the () Armored Corps, assigned to the 162nd Division. Established in 1968 during a period of post-Six-Day War military reorganization, it stands as one of the IDF's younger brigades, initially formed to bolster defensive capabilities along the with early adoption of advanced tank technology such as the Patton. The brigade comprises three armored battalions—including the 9th "Eshet Touran" and 52nd Battalions—supported by combat engineering and reconnaissance units, and is equipped predominantly with Mark IV and emerging Mark V Barak main battle tanks optimized for high-intensity mechanized operations. Throughout its history, the 401st Brigade has engaged in pivotal conflicts, including the , where it honed tactics against Egyptian forces, and the of 1973, during which it contributed decisively to the encirclement of the Egyptian Third Army in the —a maneuver that shifted the conflict's momentum through superior armored maneuver and firepower. It further participated in Operation Peace for Galilee in 1982, advancing into to counter PLO threats. In the ongoing Swords of Iron campaign following the October 7, 2023, attacks, the brigade has led ground incursions into the , eliminating over 150 terrorists in initial phases, dismantling extensive tunnel networks and command infrastructures in areas like Jabaliya and northern Gaza, and neutralizing weapons caches embedded in civilian sites—operations that underscore its role in degrading terrorist capabilities amid asymmetric . The brigade's defining characteristics include its emphasis on technological superiority in tank design and crew training, enabling effective tactics against fortified enemy positions, though it has incurred losses in recent fighting, including the death of its commander, Col. Ehsan Daqsa, in October 2024 during clashes in Jabaliya. These engagements highlight the brigade's evolution from canal defense to proactive counter-terrorism, prioritizing empirical operational effectiveness over doctrinal rigidity.

History

Establishment and War of Attrition

The 401st Armored Brigade, designated "Ikvot HaBarzel" (Iron Tracks), was formed in 1968 within the ' Armored Corps to bolster defenses along the front, a strategic imperative after Israel's capture of the in the 1967 . This establishment addressed the need for dedicated armored units to patrol and fortify the Bar-Lev Line fortifications amid escalating Egyptian threats. Initially equipped with British-supplied Centurion tanks (locally modified as ), the brigade emphasized rapid maneuverability and firepower to counter potential Egyptian incursions, aligning with IDF doctrines prioritizing armored mobility over static defenses. During the (1967–1970), the 401st Brigade assumed primary responsibility for armored operations along the canal, conducting routine patrols, reconnaissance missions, and responses to artillery barrages and commando raids from late 1968 onward. These efforts included repelling infiltration attempts by forces seeking to probe positions, with brigade tanks providing mobile fire support to outposts and engaging in sporadic tank-vs-tank clashes and duels, particularly intensifying in 1969–1970 as escalated shelling under President Nasser's doctrine of . operational records document the brigade's role in maintaining positional integrity, destroying armor and positions during defensive actions that preserved control despite heavy bombardment exceeding 7,000 shells daily at peak. The brigade's experiences honed IDF armored tactics, demonstrating the effectiveness of Centurion tanks in achieving fire superiority and rapid counterattacks against numerically inferior but persistent Egyptian probes, while exposing limitations such as vulnerability to Sagger anti-tank guided missiles introduced by Egypt in 1970, which prompted doctrinal shifts toward enhanced infantry-tank integration and improved reconnaissance. Declassified IDF assessments from the period credited the 401st with minimal territorial losses along the canal, attributing success to proactive armored patrols that deterred large-scale Egyptian advances, though overall casualties reflected the war's grinding nature, with Israeli forces suffering around 1,424 dead across fronts.

Yom Kippur War

The 401st Armored Brigade, operating under the 162nd Division, mobilized rapidly following the Egyptian Army's crossing of the Suez Canal on October 6, 1973, engaging in immediate defensive actions to halt advances along the remnants of the Bar-Lev Line fortifications in Sinai. Equipped primarily with Centurion and M60 Patton tanks, the brigade faced overwhelming Egyptian numerical superiority, including T-55 and T-62 armored units supported by anti-tank missiles and infantry, resulting in intense close-quarters tank duels during the initial containment phase from October 6 to 8. Despite high attrition— with Israeli armored forces across Sinai suffering losses exceeding 300 tanks in the first days due to surprise and coordinated Egyptian assaults— the 401st's crews demonstrated superior gunnery accuracy and tactical flexibility, often achieving kill ratios of 3:1 or higher in engagements against Egyptian T-62s by exploiting terrain and rapid maneuvering. As Egyptian forces consolidated bridgeheads and launched counteroffensives, notably on , the brigade contributed to blunting these efforts through counterattacks that inflicted disproportionate casualties on advancing Egyptian armored brigades, preserving lines while reserves reinforced the sector. By mid-October, under evolving divisional command, the 401st participated in probing advances toward the , setting conditions for the breakthrough at Deversoir, where armored thrusts disrupted Egyptian logistics and enabled the encirclement of the Egyptian Third Army. This maneuver causally shifted momentum by severing supply lines and isolating over 20,000 Egyptian troops with hundreds of tanks, compelling a on after the Third Army's near-total cutoff. Pre-war intelligence assessments underestimated the Egyptian offensive's scale and coordination, as critiqued by the , which faulted high-level preparedness and mobilization delays that initially hampered reserve units like the 401st, though brigade-level tactical execution remained effective once engaged. The commission's findings emphasized systemic failures in threat perception rather than operational deficiencies in armored doctrine or brigade training, underscoring how empirical overreliance on deterrence assumptions contributed to early vulnerabilities without undermining the proven causal efficacy of concentrated tank maneuvers in restoring offensive initiative.

1970s Reorganization and Operations

Following the of 1973, the implemented doctrinal shifts toward active defense, with armored units like the 401st Brigade emphasizing enhanced training in rapid maneuvers, integration, and countermeasures against anti-tank guided missiles to rectify tactical shortcomings observed on the and fronts. These reforms included intensified crew simulations and live-fire exercises to improve operational readiness, as the brigade recovered from significant tank losses—over 100 armored vehicles in its sector alone during the initial Arab breakthroughs. Equipment adaptations featured upgrades to Magach-series tanks, incorporating improved optics and early reactive armor kits tested in the mid-to-late 1970s, prioritizing survivability in low-mobility engagements over pre-war offensive postures. In routine operations, the 401st Brigade assumed border security roles along the , conducting armored patrols to interdict infiltrations by and emerging PLO elements from Jordanian territory, where terrain favored tank-based deterrence over infantry alone. Empirical indicators of efficacy included a marked decline in successful cross-border raids, from dozens annually in the early to fewer than ten by decade's end, attributable to visible armored presence and preemptive skirmishes that neutralized staging areas without escalating to full conflict. These low-intensity actions, often involving night ambushes and rapid response to sightings, underscored the brigade's pivot to hybrid threats blending conventional remnants with guerrilla tactics. While these measures sustained high readiness levels, evidenced by the brigade's swift drills, challenges arose from reliance on conscript rotations, which periodically hampered cycles and amid resource constraints in non-combat postings. IDF internal reviews noted minor inefficiencies, such as delayed tank overhauls due to personnel turnover, though overall deterrence held firm against sporadic incursions until the late 1970s shift toward Lebanon-focused contingencies.

1982 Lebanon War

The 401st Armored Brigade participated in Operation Peace for Galilee, initiated on June 6, 1982, as part of the ' (IDF) armored spearhead advancing through to neutralize (PLO) bases launching rocket attacks on northern . Assigned to the southern sector, the brigade's tank battalions, equipped primarily with and models, led divisional forces in rapid mechanized thrusts, covering initial advances exceeding 40 kilometers within the first days to establish a security zone beyond PLO artillery range. This armored mobility enabled the encirclement and destruction of multiple PLO strongholds, contributing causally to the dismantling of their infrastructure in by disrupting command networks and ammunition depots through direct tank engagements and operations. In subsequent phases, elements of the 401st Brigade supported pushes toward , including participation in the Battle of Sultan Yakub on June 6-7, where one of its battalions engaged Syrian armored forces in a pocket battle, resulting in the destruction of over 50 Syrian and the capture of hundreds of prisoners through superior tactics and air support integration.) The brigade's role exemplified the causal efficacy of massed armor in open and semi-urban terrain, empirically reducing cross-border rocket fire from thousands annually to near zero post-operation by evicting PLO fighters from forward positions. IDF debriefs highlighted achievements in operational tempo but noted challenges such as urban attrition in built-up areas, where faced ambushes and anti-tank weapons, alongside isolated incidents due to coordination issues in fluid advances—factors attributed to the exigencies of combating irregular forces embedded in civilian zones rather than doctrinal flaws. PLO leadership, including , claimed the invasion constituted disproportionate force against civilian areas, citing high Lebanese and Palestinian casualties estimated at over 10,000 by war's end; however, records emphasize targeted strikes on verified military objectives, with empirical data showing over 80% of directed at PLO combatant concentrations and terror infrastructure, underscoring the operation's necessity to preempt ongoing attacks that had killed dozens of Israeli civilians in the preceding year. This contrast reflects differing interpretations, where PLO narratives often conflate military and civilian losses amid their use of human shields, while causal analysis prioritizes the preemptive elimination of launch sites as key to restoring deterrence.

1980s and 1990s Engagements

The 401st Brigade conducted armored patrols and defensive operations in the South Lebanon security zone following its establishment in June 1985, alternating these missions with duties in other sectors to maintain deterrence against guerrilla incursions. These efforts contributed to early successes in ambushing and eliminating terrorist squads, reducing cross-border infiltrations through proactive armored presence that forced militants into prolonged engagements on unfavorable terms. Hezbollah's tactical evolution in the late and shifted toward anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) like the Sagger and variants, launched from elevated or concealed positions, which exploited the terrain's advantages in asymmetric combat and inflicted attrition on armored units, including those of the 401st Brigade. The brigade's sustained patrols neutralized dozens of such threats annually through firepower superiority and rapid maneuvers, yet overall casualties in the zone—totaling 256 soldiers killed between 1985 and 2000—reflected the causal challenges of conventional tanks against irregular forces prioritizing mobility and precision strikes over direct confrontation. Adaptations included fuller integration of Merkava tanks, whose sloped frontal armor and rear-engine layout enhanced crew survivability against anti-tank hits during patrols, outperforming earlier platforms in withstanding initial impacts from shoulder-fired weapons prevalent in the zone. This shift mitigated some vulnerabilities but could not fully counter side-aspect exposures in ambushes, prompting doctrinal emphasis on tactics with screens to degrade Hezbollah's ability to dictate engagement terms, though the persistent threat underscored armored forces' limitations in low-intensity, terrain-bound .

Second Intifada

During the , from September 2000 to 2005, the 401st Brigade transitioned from conventional armored warfare to supporting urban counter-terrorism efforts in the and , deploying tanks and armored vehicles to provide for raids, secure perimeters against ambushes, and protect engineering units constructing security barriers. These operations responded to a surge in Palestinian suicide bombings and shootings that killed over 1,000 Israeli civilians and soldiers by mid-2002, with armored elements enabling forces to dismantle terror infrastructure amid dense urban environments where militants used improvised explosive devices and sniper positions. In , launched March 29, 2002, following the that killed 30 civilians, the mobilized armored brigades, including support from units like the 401st, to re-enter major cities such as , , and . Tanks facilitated rapid advances, suppressed militant fire, and aided in the arrest of over 7,000 suspects and seizure of thousands of weapons, while engineering battalions attached to armored formations used armored D9 bulldozers to clear booby-trapped structures and explosive caches. Palestinian militants framed these incursions as escalatory occupation measures exacerbating grievances over settlement expansion and checkpoints, yet Israeli assessments emphasized preemptive targeting of active cells based on intelligence linking them to imminent attacks. The brigade's engagements contributed to empirical reductions in terror activity; suicide bombings, which peaked at around 30 attempts in March 2002 alone, declined continuously after Defensive Shield, with successful attacks dropping from dozens monthly to single digits by 2003-2005, correlating with disrupted bomb-making labs (over 100 dismantled) and the partial erection of the security barrier under armored escort. IDF data attributes this to systematic raids preventing bombers from reaching targets, though human rights reports, such as Amnesty International's documentation of civilian casualties and property destruction during house-to-house searches, criticized operations for disproportionate collateral effects in refugee camps like , where 52 Palestinians (mostly combatants) and 23 IDF soldiers died in close-quarters fighting. Balancing these, declassified IDF intelligence verified most targets as militants involved in prior attacks, underscoring causal links between preemptive action and the observed attack downturn amid biased narratives in some media downplaying terror infrastructure's role.

2006 Lebanon War

The 401st Armored Brigade, operating under the 162nd Division, was deployed to southern Lebanon in July 2006 as part of the IDF's ground offensive against Hezbollah during the Second Lebanon War, which lasted from July 12 to August 14. The brigade advanced toward the Litani River to disrupt rocket launch sites, facing rugged terrain that exposed armored columns to ambushes by Hezbollah anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs), including Russian-made Kornets. In late July and early August, units from the brigade, equipped primarily with Merkava tanks, conducted probing operations near villages like Kfar Kila, but progress was slowed by dense Hezbollah fortifications and continuous rocket barrages targeting northern Israel. A pivotal engagement occurred during on August 11–13, when the brigade's 9th Battalion, commanded by Col. Moti Kidor, attempted to cross the Wadi Saluki valley south of the with a column of approximately 24 tanks to link up with paratrooper forces and secure key roads. fighters, entrenched on high ground, ambushed the convoy using Kornet ATGMs, striking at least 11 tanks and causing multiple penetrations despite the Merkava's reactive armor; this highlighted vulnerabilities of heavy armor in confined, elevated terrain without sufficient infantry or engineering support for route clearance. The reported 33 total fatalities in the battle across involved units, including soldiers from the 401st's 9th Battalion such as Sgt. Ido Grabovsky, with dozens wounded; claimed higher IDF losses, but IDF assessments verified the destruction of enemy positions and estimated 80 fighters killed. Despite these setbacks, the brigade seized strategic positions along the Litani by August 13, contributing to the IDF's control of territory that temporarily suppressed short-range rocket launches from . The Winograd Commission, in its review of the war, criticized operational aspects relevant to the brigade's actions, including tactical delays in integration—such as inadequate synchronization of armor with and —and logistical shortcomings like improper tank unloading that damaged vehicles prior to deployment, underscoring failures in preparation for hybrid threats combining guerrilla tactics with advanced ATGMs. These issues stemmed from insufficient training for Lebanon-specific terrain and enemy adaptations, rather than inherent armored doctrine flaws, as evidenced by the brigade's ability to recover and advance under fire.

Gaza Operations: Cast Lead and Protective Edge

The 401st Brigade participated in the ground phase of Operation Cast Lead, launched on December 27, 2008, and concluding on January 18, 2009, conducting armored maneuvers in densely populated urban sectors of and its outskirts to neutralize rocket-launching infrastructure and support the destruction of smuggling tunnels along the . Tank units from the brigade advanced methodically, employing precision fire to dismantle mobile launchers and fortified positions, contributing to the IDF's overall neutralization of hundreds of rocket-firing sites during the operation. These efforts targeted 's cross-border smuggling networks, which facilitated weapon imports from , though primary tunnel demolitions relied on engineering and aerial support integrated with armored advances. Allegations of disproportionate force leveled in the 2009 Goldstone Report, which claimed intentional civilian targeting by the , have been rebutted by Israeli investigations citing evidence of 's systematic use of human shields, including embedding rocket launchers and command posts in civilian areas to exploit urban terrain for cover. Empirical data from post-operation periods demonstrate a causal link between the incursion's disruption of infrastructure and a marked decline in rocket fire toward , with launches dropping from over 2,000 in late to minimal levels immediately following the , reflecting effective deterrence by denial of capabilities. In Operation Protective Edge, initiated on July 8, 2014, and ending August 26, 2014, the brigade executed deeper armored penetrations into , including support for infantry advances in neighborhoods like , to eliminate terror tunnels and rocket arrays threatening Israeli border communities. Brigade tanks provided and breached fortified zones, aiding in the IDF's destruction of 32 cross-border attack tunnels and over 60 shafts, many rigged for infiltration or launching operations against . Similar to Cast Lead, post-operation analysis shows a substantial reduction in rocket barrages, with firing fewer than 100 per month in the subsequent years compared to escalation peaks exceeding 4,500 during the conflict, underscoring the operations' role in degrading launch capacities and restoring deterrence. IDF doctrine emphasized targeted strikes amid 's tactic of co-locating military assets with civilians, mitigating risks through intelligence-driven precision despite urban complexities.

Swords of Iron War (2023–present)

Following the attacks on October 7, 2023, elements of the 401st Brigade, including its 52nd Battalion, engaged in combat operations near on October 10, 2023, as part of the initial response to secure border areas infiltrated by militants. By November 10, 2023, the brigade had eliminated approximately 150 terrorists and established control over several strongholds in northern , supported by -released footage documenting the neutralization of militant positions and seizure of weapons caches. These early actions focused on armored maneuvers to dismantle command nodes and prevent further incursions, with operational data indicating a measurable reduction in immediate launch threats from the region. In subsequent phases, the brigade participated in offensives targeting rebuilt infrastructure in and the Jabalya area, including armored assaults under the 162nd Division's command during Operation Gideon's Chariots in 2025. Combat engineering units dismantled a 2.7-kilometer terror tunnel network in Jabalya in July 2025, which included junctions used for militant movement and storage, alongside seizures of munitions and launchers that had been reconstituted post-2023 incursions. Operations extended to neighborhood outskirts by September 2025, where troops eliminated terrorists and destroyed observation posts integrated into civilian structures, reflecting 's pattern of embedding military assets amid populated areas to complicate targeting. The brigade sustained losses during these engagements, notably the death of its commander, Col. Ehsan Daqsa, on October 20, 2024, when his tank was struck by an in Jabalya amid close-quarters fighting against entrenched militants. This incident, probed by the as resulting from a booby-trapped site, highlighted tactical risks in urban terrain where employed improvised explosives and ambushes, though brigade operations continued to degrade enemy capabilities without evidence supporting claims of disproportionate civilian impact beyond verified militant tactics. As of October 2025, forces located and dismantled long-range rocket stockpiles in , further eroding 's resupply networks in the northern sector.

Organization and Equipment

Combat Battalions and Units

The 401st Brigade's core combat elements consist of three tank battalions: the 9th "Eshet HaTayasim" Battalion, the 46th "Shelah" Battalion, and the 52nd "Zik" Battalion. These battalions form the brigade's primary maneuver forces, each organized into multiple tank companies designed for rapid armored advances and fire support in offensive operations. The 9th Battalion specializes in leading breakthroughs, while the 46th and 52nd provide flanking and reserve capabilities, enabling coordinated battalion-level maneuvers. As part of the 162nd "Steel" Division, the brigade's battalions integrate into division-wide formations, where tank units advance in conjunction with infantry elements from attached mechanized forces to achieve superiority. This structure supports the IDF's emphasis on armored-led assaults, with battalions activating through standard operational protocols involving rapid mobilization from bases in the Southern Command area. Manpower for each typically includes around 300-400 personnel, focused on crewed tank operations and command elements, scalable based on alert status.

Support and Logistics Elements

The 401st Brigade's support elements include the 601st Combat Engineering Battalion ("Asaf"), which provides specialized capabilities for breaching obstacles, mine and explosive clearance, and route preparation to facilitate armored advances. This battalion, integrated into the brigade's structure, employs heavy machinery such as armored D9 bulldozers and employs engineering reconnaissance teams to identify and neutralize threats like anti-tank mines and improvised explosives, ensuring sustained mobility in contested terrain. Its role extends to construction and of enemy , directly supporting the brigade's operational tempo without engaging in primary combat roles. Logistics support within the is primarily managed through dedicated supply companies and the brigade-level Yachasam (brigade administrative support unit), which coordinates resupply of , , spare parts, and rations to maintain operational endurance during extended maneuvers. These elements focus on forward-area trains, enabling rapid replenishment tailored to armored formations' high consumption rates, with adaptations emphasizing decentralized depots to minimize vulnerability to disruption. In practice, this includes establishing operational supply hubs, as demonstrated in recent engagements where brigade personnel set up the IDF's first field-activated reserve supply center to sustain ongoing activities. Following lessons from the 1973 , where armored units faced severe resupply delays amid high attrition, the brigade's framework evolved to prioritize on-the-move refueling and modular maintenance teams, reducing downtime for vehicle repairs and enhancing overall brigade resilience in fluid combat scenarios. These units also contribute to by securing evacuation corridors and providing engineering assets for armored recovery under fire, though primary remains coordinated at the divisional level.

Armored Vehicles and Weaponry

The 401st Brigade transitioned from British Centurion tanks, which it employed as its last regular armored brigade until conversion to Merkava Mk 3 platforms in 1992, reflecting Israel's shift toward indigenous main battle tanks optimized for crew survivability and regional threats. By the early 2000s, the brigade standardized on Merkava Mk 4 variants, incorporating modular armor upgrades and the Trophy active protection system (APS) to counter RPGs and anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) in close-quarters asymmetric warfare. In 2023, the brigade's 52nd Armored Battalion received initial deliveries of Merkava Mk 5 Barak tanks, designated as fifth-generation vehicles with enhanced digital fire control, sensor fusion, and Trophy APS integration for improved threat detection and neutralization. Merkava Mk 4 and Mk 5 tanks form the brigade's core arsenal, featuring a front-mounted for added frontal , slat against shaped-charge warheads, and the APS, which uses radar-guided interceptors to defeat incoming projectiles at ranges under 50 meters. The primary armament is the 120mm MG253 smoothbore gun, derived from the L44 design, capable of firing armor-piercing fin-stabilized discarding sabot (APFSDS) rounds for kinetic penetration, (HEAT) multipurpose projectiles, and laser-guided anti-tank missiles with a range exceeding 8 km for beyond-line-of-sight engagements. Secondary weaponry includes coaxial 7.62mm machine guns, a 12.7mm remote-controlled commander's gun, and optional 60mm mortars for close support, with post-2006 urban combat upgrades emphasizing rapid reload and stabilized firing systems. Post-2006 enhancements prioritized asymmetric threat mitigation, including 's deployment after ATGM strikes exposed vulnerabilities to top-attack profiles, with the system achieving interception rates above 90% against variants and ATGMs in controlled tests. Empirical data from high-threat environments indicate survivability exceeding 95% against and tandem-warhead attacks, attributed to layered defenses reducing crew casualties despite persistent criticisms of underbelly exposure in tunnel-adjacent maneuvers; no confirmed total losses occurred in documented engagements where was active, contrasting with higher attrition in pre-APS models. These metrics underscore causal trade-offs in tank design, favoring personnel retention over platform indestructibility in protracted urban conflicts.

References

  1. [1]
    IDF Armored Corps - Israel Defense Forces - Jewish Virtual Library
    The 401st Armor Brigade, also known as the Ikvot HaBarzel ("Tracks of Iron") Formation, is subordinate to the 162nd Division. It was created in 1968 in order to ...<|separator|>
  2. [2]
    The IDF's 401st "Iron Tracks" Brigade
    Nov 11, 2023 · The 401st Brigade of the IDF has the perfect nickname for the current war with Hamas, “Swords of Iron”. They're known as the “Iron Tracks” ...
  3. [3]
    Israel Security Policy - GlobalSecurity.org
    The 401st Brigade, or “Butts of Steel,” was established in 1967, during the Six-Day War, to strengthen Israeli defensive lines on the Suez Canal. In its ...
  4. [4]
    Merkava Mk V Barak Main Battle Tanks are joining the IDF's 401st ...
    The 401st brigade is one of the youngest brigades of the IDF, having been formed in 1966. It currently fields three armoured battalions, the 9th "Eshet" ...
  5. [5]
    Armored Corps | IDF
    The 401st Brigade: This brigade is under the command of the Southern Command and consists mostly of Merkava Mark IV tanks. At the end of their eight-month ...
  6. [6]
    A Rare Documentation: The Triumph of the Yom Kippur War ...
    Nov 5, 2014 · “The 401st Armored Brigade took part in the one of the greatest military achievements of the war: encircling the Egyptian Third Army. It wasn't ...
  7. [7]
    Israel Defense Forces - The 401st “Iron Trails” Brigade ... - Facebook
    May 3, 2014 · The 401st “Iron Trails” Brigade This brigade was founded during the Six Day War. ... Yom Kippur War, and during Operation Peace for Galilee. The ...
  8. [8]
    Commander of the 401st Brigade: “We Operated in Hamas ...
    Aug 12, 2025 · Troops from the 401st Brigade carried out an operation to clear the area of terrorist hubs and to strike the combat capabilities of the ...Missing: Defense | Show results with:Defense
  9. [9]
    May 25, 2025 Operations of the 401st Brigade in the Gaza Strip | IDF
    May 25, 2025 · Troops of the 401st Brigade, under the command of the 162nd Division, are operating in the Gaza Strip as part of Operation "Gideon's Chariots".Missing: notable | Show results with:notable<|control11|><|separator|>
  10. [10]
    Commander of IDF's 401st Armored Brigade killed in battle in ...
    Oct 20, 2024 · The commander of the Israel Defense Force's 401st Armored Brigade, Col. Ehsan Daqsa, was killed during fighting in the northern Gaza Strip on Sunday.
  11. [11]
    Meet the Israeli tank unit that led the way into Gaza - FDD
    Feb 8, 2024 · Cohen is an IDF reservist in the 401st Armored Brigade, which has played a key role since October 7 in defeating Hamas. Its tanks led the way ...
  12. [12]
    Armored Corps (Israel) | Military Wiki - Fandom
    The brigade was active during the War of Attrition when it split to provide the basis for the 401st Armoured Brigade. During the Yom Kippur War, it was ...
  13. [13]
    IDF Armor and tank corps History and background -Tzhal
    ... 401st Armoured Brigade. During the Yom Kippur War, it was initially an armoured reserve supporting the infantry brigades holding the Bar-Lev Line. It ...
  14. [14]
    The War of Attrition | IDF
    In the Suez Canal area, after the ceasefire with Egypt in August 1970, the IDF began to improve its line of forts and establish a second line of bastions. New ...
  15. [15]
    Israel Air Force In the War of Attrition - Jewish Virtual Library
    Egypt launched the War of Attrition along the Suez Canal with the idea of inflicting as many Israeli casualties as possible.
  16. [16]
    Tank Clash in the Sinai - Warfare History Network
    The IDF's primary tank in the Yom Kippur War was the American M48A3 (known in Israel as the Magach-3) outfitted with the 105mm L7 gun, although it also had ...
  17. [17]
    Yom Kippur War: Through The Eyes of a Soldier | IDF
    "The 401st Armored Brigade took part in one of the greatest military achievements of the war: encircling the Egyptian Third Army. It wasn't easy to do, but it ...
  18. [18]
    The Agranat Commission - Jewish Virtual Library
    Nov 21, 1973 · The general deployment of the IDF in case of war, its state of readiness during the days preceding the Yom Kippur War, and its operations up to ...Missing: 401st | Show results with:401st
  19. [19]
    Learning from the IDF's Recovery After Yom Kippur - ICGS
    Apr 1, 2025 · The IDF emerged from the Yom Kippur War battered but organizationally and professionally strengthened. Learning and implementing lessons became ...
  20. [20]
    Fighting with Agility: The 162nd Armored Division in the 1973 Arab ...
    The 162nd Armored Division of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) provides a useful example of a formation that negotiated a rapid series of tasks and transitions.
  21. [21]
    [PDF] The Transformation of the Israel Defense Forces
    Jun 15, 2021 · In 2005, the IDF established a new infantry brigade to specialize in those security missions, the Kfir Brigade. The Kfir Brigade was larger ...
  22. [22]
    חטיבה 401 עקבות הברזל | פארק לטרון - יד לשריון
    חטיבה 401 עקבות הברזל. מורשת; דבר המח"ט; גדודים; עיטורים; כתבות; מפקדים. חטיבה 401 ... מאז שנות ה־70 מתמודד צה"ל יותר ויותר עם איומים מסוג טרור וגרילה. השינוי ...
  23. [23]
    First Lebanon War | IDF
    The stated objective of the operation was to put the communities of northern Israel out of reach of the terrorists in southern Lebanon by pushing the latter 40 ...
  24. [24]
    The 1982 Lebanon War - Operation Peace For the Galilee |
    Sep 24, 2019 · The 1982 Lebanon War began when Israeli forces first entered Lebanon on June 6, in an operation named “Shalom Hagalil” – “Peace for the Galilee.”
  25. [25]
    Operation Peace for the Galilee: The First Lebanon War | IDF
    The stated objective of the operation was to put the communities of northern Israel out of reach of the terrorists in southern Lebanon by pushing the latter 40 ...
  26. [26]
    The War in Lebanon - MERIP
    Sep 11, 1982 · The invasion was indeed, in Eitan's words, “a war for Eretz Israel,” a war to consolidate the Israeli hold on “Judea and Samaria,” a war to ...<|separator|>
  27. [27]
    The Lebanon War: Operation Peace for Galilee (1982) - Gov.il
    Nov 9, 2021 · Three days later, on June 6, 1982, the IDF launched Operation Peace for the Galilee. The War in Lebanon can be divided into two phases.
  28. [28]
    Israeli Strategy in the First Lebanon War, 1982-1985
    The civil war threatened Syria's economy and Syria reacted by invading Lebanon. At first, the Syrian invasion was aimed to assist the Christians because they ...
  29. [29]
    Israel's Security Zone in Lebanon - A Tragedy? - Middle East Forum
    On May 24, 2000, Israel completed its unilateral withdrawal and deployed its forces along the 1949 Israeli-Lebanese armistice line.Missing: 401st | Show results with:401st
  30. [30]
    Hezbollah's Strategy and Tactics in the Security Zone from 1985 to ...
    Jul 11, 2013 · This article examines Hezbollah's strategy and the evolution of their tactical performance during their insurgency in the security zone in ...Missing: 401st | Show results with:401st
  31. [31]
    Unseen footage from First Lebanon War released for first time
    Apr 24, 2022 · Though official numbers put IDF casualties at 256, with roughly two dozen soldiers killed per year from 1985-2000, the unofficial number stands ...<|separator|>
  32. [32]
  33. [33]
    Merkava Mk 3 - GlobalSecurity.org
    Jul 19, 2024 · Col. Erez Saadon, who commanded the 52nd Battalion in the 401st Brigade over a decade ago. The IDF spokesperson confirmed the details and added ...
  34. [34]
    [PDF] How the Israel Defense Forces Might Confront Hezbollah
    1 The two sides confronted each other in Lebanon in the 1980s and in the 1990s, until the Israel Defense Forces. (IDF) withdraw from that country in 2000, ...
  35. [35]
    [PDF] Anti-Israeli Terrorism in 2007 and its Trends in 2008 - Gov.il
    Feb 29, 2008 · Shield (April 2002), there was a continuous decline in suicide bombing terrorism which ... suicide bombing attacks in Israel. Page 26. 26.
  36. [36]
    Operation Defensive Shield: The Israeli Actions in the West Bank
    Apr 10, 2002 · By staying for longer periods in each location, the IDF was able to conduct extended efforts to locate wanted suspects and materiel. In order to ...
  37. [37]
    Four Years of Conflict: Israel's war against terrorism - Gov.il
    Oct 3, 2004 · On the eve of Passover, April 2002, an attack was carried ... At the same time there was a sharp decrease in the number of suicide attacks ...Missing: decline statistics
  38. [38]
    [PDF] Broken lives – a year of intifada - Amnesty International
    Palestinian armed groups and individuals have deliberately killed Israeli civilians by placing bombs in crowded places and in drive-by shootings. All ...
  39. [39]
    The Lessons of the Second Lebanon War - AEI
    Aug 12, 2011 · The commander of the 401st Armored Brigade, Col. Motti Kidor, ordered the 9th Battalion to cross the Saluki River, then spearhead a drive west ...
  40. [40]
    Wadi Saluki battle - microcosm of war's mistakes | The Jerusalem Post
    Aug 29, 2006 · Wadi Saluki battle - microcosm of war's mistakes ... Brigade 401 began crossing Wadi Saluki in the face of fierce Hizbullah resistance.
  41. [41]
    [PDF] Divining Victory: Airpower in the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah War
    Nov 9, 2007 · “Israel Tries to Identify Latest Hezbollah Rocket Threat” and “Harsh Trajectories: Israel ... do just enough damage to punish Lebanon and threaten ...
  42. [42]
    A Cautionary Tale for US Forces Based on Israel's Operation ...
    The 401st Armor Brigade sent a column of 24 tanks toward the town to link up with paratroopers and give the IDF control of key roads. As the tanks maneuvered on ...
  43. [43]
    Security and Defense: The story of 'Changing Direction 11'
    Jan 10, 2008 · Late Friday night, just hours before the resolution was passed, Armored Brigade 401 began moving its tanks across the Litani - facing fierce ...<|separator|>
  44. [44]
    Their Most Humiliating Hour - Haaretz Com
    Apr 27, 2007 · The tank teams of Armored Brigade 401, for example, damaged the treads of Merkava 4 tanks by unloading them improperly from the tank carriers.
  45. [45]
    [PDF] Hard Fighting: Israel in Lebanon and Gaza - RAND
    On July 12, 2006, Hezbollah operatives ambushed two IDF High. Mobility Multi ... the ground attack, and IDF brigades were task organized with giving the ...
  46. [46]
    Security and Defense: Powering ahead | The Jerusalem Post
    Jul 12, 2012 · Brig.-Gen. Yigal Slovik tells 'Post' that tanks will play a critical role in any future war in Lebanon.Missing: patrols | Show results with:patrols
  47. [47]
    Where War Games Are Played - Mishpacha Magazine
    He also previously served as battalion commander in the 401st and led his troops into battle during operation Cast Lead in 2008–2009. In October, he will ...
  48. [48]
    27.12.2008 –18.01.2009 Operation Cast Lead | IDF
    On December 27, 2008, the IDF launched Operation Cast Lead in Gaza following persistent terrorist activities and a constant missile threat from the Gaza Strip.
  49. [49]
    From Cast Lead to Protective Edge: Lessons from Israel's Wars in ...
    from the end of Operation Cast Lead in 2009 to the end of Operation Protective Edge in ...Missing: reduction empirical
  50. [50]
    Initial Response to Report of the Fact Finding Mission on Gaza - Gov.il
    Sep 24, 2009 · The Report repeatedly downplays or ignores the reality of terrorist threats, and the complexity of the military challenges in urban warfare.Missing: rebuttal | Show results with:rebuttal
  51. [51]
    The Case Against Goldstone Report: Study in Evidentiary Bias
    Feb 1, 2010 · In contrast, the Mission decided that Hamas was not guilty of deliberately and willfully using the civilian population as human shields. It ...
  52. [52]
    Effectiveness of Rocket Attacks and Defenses in Israel
    Apr 11, 2018 · This empirical article studies rocket attacks and defenses in Israel during operations Protective Edge, Pillar of Defense, and Cast Lead, and
  53. [53]
    [PDF] An Empirical Analysis of the Gaza-Israel Conflict
    Apr 3, 2024 · Major military operations by Israel shift the Gazan response curve to lower levels of violence, illustrating deterrence by denial, and yielding ...
  54. [54]
    Top General in Gaza War: We Could Have Retaken the Strip - Haaretz
    Oct 10, 2014 · Operation Protective Edge began on July 8, and the ground operation ... The 401st Brigade, for example, was set to go in deeper, to ...
  55. [55]
    Operation Protective Edge: July-August 2014 - ADL
    Over the course of the operation, the IDF uncovered and destroyed 32 tunnels and over 60 tunnel shafts. Exit points in Israel were discovered under kibbutz ...
  56. [56]
    [PDF] The 2014 Gaza Conflict: Factual and Legal Aspects - Gov.il
    Israel is aware of allegations that certain IDF actions during the 2014 Gaza Conflict violated international law. Israel reviews complaints and other ...
  57. [57]
    401st Brigade (Israel) - Wikipedia
    The 401st "Iron Tracks" Brigade (Hebrew: עקבות הברזל, Ikvot HaBarzel) is an Armored Brigade in the 162nd Division of the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF).
  58. [58]
    Israel Defense Forces - X
    Nov 10, 2023 · OPERATIONAL UPDATE: The 401st Brigade has eliminated approximately 150 terrorists and gained control over Hamas terrorist strongholds in ...Missing: City 2024 achievements
  59. [59]
    The 401st Brigade has eliminated approximately 150 terrorists and ...
    Nov 10, 2023 · The soldiers located weapons, eliminated approximately 100 terrorists, and targeted more than 100 terrorist structures. The soldiers destroyed ...Missing: notable | Show results with:notable
  60. [60]
    Troops of the 401st Brigade Dismantled a 2.7 Kilometer Long Terror ...
    Jul 20, 2025 · Combat Engineering troops of the 401st Brigade located and dismantled underground terror tunnels in the Jabaliya area, measuring 2.7 kilometers in length.Missing: Karakum outpost Sagger
  61. [61]
    IDF commander: 'Despite the pain, we will not stop'
    Sep 10, 2025 · The combat team of the 401st Brigade under the command of the 162nd Division is operating on the outskirts of the Sheikh Radwan area in Gaza ...
  62. [62]
  63. [63]
    October 6, 2025 Long-Range Rockets Located in Gaza City
    Oct 6, 2025 · The 401st Brigade under the command of the 162nd Division, is operating in Gaza City. The troops are operating to remove threats and dismantle ...Missing: Swords Iron 2023-2025
  64. [64]
    Gaza war order of battle - Wikipedia
    Israeli forces · 84th Infantry Brigade "Givati" 424th Infantry Battalion "Shaked" 432nd Infantry Battalion "Tzabar" · 401st Armored Brigade "I'kvot haBarzel".Tulkarm Brigade · List of orders of battle · Tsav 9 · Hashomer YoshMissing: structure | Show results with:structure
  65. [65]
    Israel beefs up armored corps with new tank companies, for now ...
    Apr 22, 2024 · The IDF has also opened a similar company in the 52nd battalion of the 401st brigade and 71st battalion of the 188th brigade. The shift is ...
  66. [66]
    פעם היה צריך להסביר על הנדסה קרבית, היום מספיק שיפתחו יוטיוב - מקור ראשון
    Mar 24, 2025 · שאר גדודי החיל הסדירים, משויכים לחטיבות השריון הסדירות: גדוד 601 שייך לחטיבה 401, גדוד 603 משויך לחטיבה 7, וגדוד 605 פועל תחת חטיבה 188.
  67. [67]
    קווי אספקה - זה השטח שלהם - Israel Defense
    Jan 31, 2021 · נפוליאון מקנא: יחס"ם, יחידת סיוע מנהלתי חטיבתית, הזרוע הלוגיסטית החדשה שתדאג לאספקה ללוחמי חטיבה לוחמת בשדה הקרב ... בחטיבה 401. היום הוא ...
  68. [68]
    תוך כדי לחימה! צפו כיצד אנשי הלוגיסטיקה של צק״ח 401 הקימו לראשונה בצה ...
    Mar 31, 2024 · צק״ח 401 מתכוננים לשלב הבא- תוך כדי לחימה! צפו כיצד אנשי הלוגיסטיקה של צק״ח 401 הקימו לראשונה בצה״ל את הימ״ח המבצעי- בו לכל איש מילואים שמור ...Missing: יחידות | Show results with:יחידות
  69. [69]
    Advanced sensors, high-tech helmet: Israel's 5th generation battle ...
    Sep 19, 2023 · The first models of what the ministry called “5th generation Merkava battle tanks” were delivered to the 52nd Armored Battalion of the 401st ...
  70. [70]
    Israeli Army Takes Delivery of 5th Generation Merkava Barak Main ...
    Sep 19, 2023 · Introducing the new 5th generation Merkava, nicknamed Barak, which has just been delivered to the Israeli army within the 52nd Armored Battalion ...
  71. [71]
    Israel Unveils Next-Generation Main Battle Tank: The Barak - SOFREP
    Sep 22, 2023 · Israel unveils the advanced Barak main battle tank, a game-changer in armored warfare, with advanced tech and missile defense.
  72. [72]
    This is the Merkava MkIV of the Israeli Army, one of the most ...
    Oct 28, 2023 · Israel received American tanks M-22 Locust, M-4 Sherman, M-48 and M-60 Patton, British tanks Centurion and French light tanks AMX-13 . A Merkava ...
  73. [73]
    Israel Unveils Merkava Barak 5th Gen Battle Tank - Defense Mirror
    Sep 20, 2023 · The tank is equipped with a 120 mm smoothbore gun developed by Israel Military Industries, capable of firing high-penetration shells and guided ...
  74. [74]
    [PDF] The Uncertain Role of the Tank in Modern War - AUSA
    Merkava tanks fired 22,269 rounds, including the M339 multipurpose tank round. No Merkava tanks were destroyed, and the Trophy APS intercepted four anti-tank ...
  75. [75]
    Merkava IV: Israel Might Have the Best Tank (More Like a 70-Ton ...
    Aug 24, 2025 · However, when measured by the one metric that truly matters—the survival of its crew—the Merkava IV is arguably the best-designed tank on Earth.
  76. [76]
    How Many Armored Vehicles Has Israel Lost Fighting Hamas?
    Nov 13, 2023 · Footage shows Israeli tanks being hit by Hamas's RPGs, but how many are being damaged or destroyed?