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Fire and movement

Fire and movement, also referred to as fire and maneuver, is a fundamental offensive tactic in infantry operations where one element or individual delivers suppressive fire to neutralize or distract the enemy, allowing another element to advance to a more advantageous position while maintaining momentum toward the objective. This technique ensures that movement is always protected by fire, preventing the unit from becoming decisively engaged without achieving superiority, and is executed by alternating roles between suppressing and maneuvering elements to close with and destroy the enemy.^[1] At the squad or fire team level, fire and movement is typically conducted through bounding overwatch, in which teams or buddies leapfrog forward in short rushes—such as 15- to 50-meter bounds—while the stationary element provides continuous suppression using automatic weapons, grenades, or other fires to fix the enemy in place. The squad leader maintains control by positioning near a designated base fire team, directing the pace, direction, and orientation to adapt to terrain, enemy disposition, and available cover. This method relies on principles of mutual support, fire superiority, and speed to minimize casualties and exploit vulnerabilities, forming the basis of small-unit assaults in both U.S. Army and Marine Corps doctrine. Variations include individual buddy rushes for close-quarters or platoon-level coordination for larger advances, always prioritizing suppression to enable safe relocation.^[1]^[2] The evolution of fire and movement in U.S. military tactics traces back to post-World War II doctrinal shifts, with early influences from conventional warfare emphasizing combined arms and firepower coordination in manuals like FM 100-5 (1949). The Korean War (1950–1953) reinforced a focus on attrition through massed fires against human-wave attacks, adapting the tactic for defensive and limited offensive maneuvers amid rugged terrain. By the 1960s, the Reorganization Objective Army Division (ROAD) concept and FM 7-20 (1962) integrated fire and movement into flexible, mechanized operations, prioritizing mobility with vehicles like the M113 armored personnel carrier. The Vietnam War (1965–1972) further refined it through airmobile assaults, as seen in the 1st Cavalry Division, where helicopters enabled rapid insertion and coordinated fire-maneuver to "find, fix, and finish" elusive enemies, though firepower often dominated over pure maneuver. Post-Vietnam, FM 100-5 (1976) formalized active defense, blending fire and movement with emerging technologies for high-intensity conflicts, solidifying its role in modern combined-arms warfare.^[3]

Fundamentals

Definition and Purpose

Fire and movement is a fundamental infantry tactic in military operations, defined as the coordinated application of suppressive fire by one element to neutralize or fix the enemy, enabling another element to maneuver forward or to a flanking position with reduced exposure to hostile fire.^[4] This approach represents the infantry's primary method for engaging in close combat, where effective fires must be synchronized with purposeful movement to achieve decisive results, as fire alone proves indecisive without advancing forces to exploit it.^[4] The primary purpose of fire and movement is to gain and maintain fire superiority, thereby degrading the enemy's ability to observe, orient, and respond effectively while positioning friendly forces for advantage.^[4] By pinning down opponents through suppression, it minimizes casualties from return fire and facilitates the seizure of key terrain or objectives.^[4] This tactic inherently involves high-level components such as a suppression phase to control the enemy and a maneuver phase to close the distance, ensuring neither occurs in isolation.^[4] Key benefits include enhanced mobility for assaulting elements, disruption of enemy cohesion through created dilemmas, and the concentration of combat power to deliver surprise and shock.^[4] It allows forces to overwhelm vulnerabilities with sudden, violent action, preserving momentum toward mission accomplishment.^[4] Fire and movement emerged as a critical response to the stalemating effects of static trench warfare, restoring balance between firepower and maneuver in modern combat.^[5]

Core Principles

The principle of mutual support is fundamental to fire and movement, requiring fire teams to maintain overlapping sectors of fire and positions that enable them to cover each other's advances and prevent any element from becoming isolated during maneuvers.^[4] This ensures continuous protection, as trail elements must retain the capability to support lead elements, fostering coordinated actions that mitigate risks from enemy counterfire.^[4] Fire superiority forms the cornerstone of effective suppression, where the intensity and accuracy of outgoing fire must overwhelm the enemy to neutralize their ability to observe, aim, or return effective fire.^[4] This is achieved through deliberate rates of fire, such as the sustained rate for crew-served weapons like the M240B machine gun at 100 rounds per minute, which allows prolonged suppression without excessive ammunition expenditure or barrel wear.^[4] Formations such as the vee or line maximize firepower projection to the front, enabling overwatching elements in bounding overwatch to pin down threats while others advance.^[4] Terrain utilization emphasizes selecting positions that provide cover, concealment, and optimal fields of fire to enhance safety and effectiveness during operations.^[4] Units prioritize covered and concealed routes to evade detection, adjusting formations to leverage micro-terrain features for protection against enemy observation and fire, thereby maximizing the tactical advantages of the environment.^[6] Command and control relies on the squad leader to orchestrate transitions between fire and movement elements, using clear signals and maintaining visual contact to synchronize actions.^[4] This involves designating a base squad for directional control and issuing concise commands to enforce fire discipline, ensuring all elements understand their roles in sustaining momentum.^[4] Risk assessment evaluates factors such as enemy strength, visibility conditions, and unit fatigue to determine the tactic's feasibility, integrating hazard identification and mitigation into planning.^[4] Leaders apply METT-TC analysis to avoid high-danger areas or implement rapid crossing techniques with security, balancing operational needs against potential vulnerabilities to maintain overall mission success.^[6]

Tactical Execution

Suppression Phase

The suppression phase of fire and movement tactics begins with the fire element establishing positions that provide optimal fields of fire, cover, and concealment to deliver suppressive fire over the enemy's position, often using grazing fire to maximize coverage and effectiveness.^[4] These positions are selected based on factors such as terrain reference points (TRPs), line-of-sight analysis, and mission variables (METT-TC), with machine guns like the M240B or rifles positioned to target key enemy weapons or personnel within effective ranges up to 800 meters.^[4] Initiation occurs upon leader command or enemy detection, employing fire commands that specify alert, target location, description, method of engagement, ammunition type, and execution to ensure precise delivery.^[4] As of ATP 3-21.8 (2024), these procedures emphasize adaptability to peer threats. Suppressive fire incorporates specific types to maintain pressure while conserving resources and avoiding weapon overheating. Tracer rounds, typically in a 4:1 ball-to-tracer ratio, are used for initial adjustment, target designation, and observation of fire effects.^[4] Rapid fire—delivering 100-200 rounds per minute in 10-12 bursts of 2-3 seconds each—is employed at the outset for high-volume impact, transitioning to sustained fire at 50-100 rounds per minute in 6-9 bursts of 4-5 seconds for prolonged suppression without excessive barrel wear.^[4] This combination ensures the enemy remains pinned, adhering to core principles like mutual support where overlapping sectors from multiple weapons prevent gaps in coverage.^[4] The phase lasts until the enemy is effectively suppressed, often event-driven rather than time-based, though initial bursts may span 1-2 minutes before assessment; duration is dictated by the maneuver element's needs or phase lines.^[4] Signals to shift or lift fire include leader commands, hand-and-arm signals (e.g., "cease firing"), radio communications, pyrotechnics, smoke, or prearranged visual cues, ensuring coordination without exposing the fire team.^[4] Common errors in this phase include overexposure of the fire team through poor positioning, leading to vulnerability, or insufficient fire volume from inadequate target prioritization, which allows enemy counterfire.^[4] Additional pitfalls involve fratricide risks from imprecise fire control measures or emptying ammunition into a single target, reducing overall effectiveness.^[4] Success is measured by indicators such as minimal enemy return fire, personnel seeking cover, halted movement, or suppressed weapons systems, confirming the enemy's inability to engage effectively and enabling safe maneuver.^[4] These metrics ensure fire superiority is achieved without unnecessary escalation.^[4]

Maneuver Phase

The maneuver phase of fire and movement tactics involves the repositioning of the assault element to exploit the suppressive fire provided by the base-of-fire team, enabling the unit to close with and gain a positional advantage over the enemy.^[4] This phase relies on coordinated movement techniques such as bounding overwatch, where teams alternate between advancing and providing cover in successive or alternate bounds, or flanking routes executed through short rushes of 5 to 15 meters to minimize exposure time.^[4] These methods allow the maneuvering team to advance incrementally while the fire element maintains suppression, ensuring the enemy remains pinned and unable to effectively respond.^[4] As of ATP 3-21.8 (2024), bound lengths are typically 50-100 meters, adjusted by METT-TC. Movement during this phase emphasizes a balance of speed and stealth tailored to the terrain and threat level, with soldiers employing low crawls for concealed approaches that reduce silhouette and noise, or short sprints when cover is immediately available to cover ground rapidly.^[4] Integration with covering fire is critical, as the base-of-fire team delivers suppressive volumes—such as rapid initial rates from machine guns transitioning to sustained fire—to neutralize enemy positions, with the maneuvering element occasionally halting briefly to return aimed fire if contact intensifies, thereby preserving overall momentum.^[4] Units typically maneuver to within 50 to 100 meters of the objective before transitioning to assault preparations, maintaining this spacing between elements to facilitate overwatch and coordination.^[4] Key challenges include sustaining spatial orientation in complex terrain, avoiding dead spaces where enemy fire cannot be suppressed by using overlapping fields of observation or additional assets like grenadiers, and clearly signaling phase transitions through standardized procedures such as hand-and-arm signals, pyrotechnics, or radio communications to prevent friendly fire incidents or loss of synchronization.^[4]

Assault Phase

The assault phase represents the culmination of fire and movement tactics, where the assault element closes with and destroys the enemy once fire superiority has been achieved during prior phases.^[4] This phase emphasizes rapid execution to exploit the suppression of enemy forces, transitioning from the maneuver phase's approach to direct engagement on the objective.^[7] Transition to the assault begins with prearranged signals from the platoon or squad leader, indicating when suppression fire should cease or shift to allow the assault element to advance without interference. These cues include verbal commands such as "AT MY COMMAND, FIRE" or "FOLLOW ME," arm and hand signals (e.g., palm down for cease fire), pyrotechnics like flares or smoke, radio calls, whistles, or infrared devices for low-visibility conditions.^[4]^[8] The support element, typically providing base-of-fire from machine guns or crew-served weapons, lifts or shifts fires to the flanks or beyond the objective upon receiving the signal, enabling the maneuver teams to converge safely.^[4] During the assault, fire and movement teams advance using bounding overwatch or individual rushes, closing to within grenade or close-range firing distance to clear enemy positions. Assault elements deploy in wedge formations or use 3- to 5-second rushes, supported by suppressive fire from designated teams, while employing hand grenades to neutralize covered or fortified spots before final engagement with aimed rifle fire or bayonets in extreme close quarters.^[8]^[4] Convergence on the objective masses combat power, with squads maneuvering to seize key terrain on the far side, often incorporating obscurants like smoke for added protection during the final push. As of TC 3-21.76 (2025), emphasis remains on violence of action in peer threat environments.^[4] Upon reaching the limit of advance, the assault element secures the objective by establishing a base of fire to hold the ground against counterattacks, positioning key weapons systems with assigned sectors for 360-degree security. The support element then displaces forward to join, consolidating the position through reorganization tasks such as redistributing ammunition, repositioning personnel, and preparing for follow-on missions or withdrawal.^[8]^[4] Local security is immediately set at the objective rally point, with leaders issuing reports on liquid, ammunition, casualties, and equipment to maintain operational readiness.^[4] To mitigate casualties, doctrine stresses speed and violence of action, minimizing exposure by using cover, concealment, and rapid bounds to limit time under potential enemy observation or fire—typically executing assaults in short, controlled movements to reduce vulnerability. Aid and litter teams, directed by the platoon sergeant, conduct triage and evacuate wounded using tactical combat casualty care principles, prioritizing extraction to casualty collection points under covering fire.^[8]^[4] Failure in the assault phase is indicated by the enemy breaking suppression, such as through renewed effective fire or reinforcements, prompting leaders to issue fragmentary orders to revert to the suppression or maneuver phase, deploy for renewed base-of-fire, or break contact if fire superiority cannot be regained.^[4]^[8] In such cases, units fall back to alternate plans, including withdrawal to a rally point, to avoid decisive engagement without advantage.^[8]

Historical Evolution

Origins in Early Warfare

The origins of fire and movement tactics can be traced to ancient warfare, where rudimentary forms of suppressive projectile fire supported close-quarters assaults. In the Roman Republic, legions employed the pilum, a weighted javelin designed to penetrate shields and disrupt enemy formations, thrown in coordinated volleys just prior to engagement. This was followed by a rapid charge using the gladius, a short thrusting sword optimized for stabbing in tight melee. At the Battle of Zama in 202 BC, Scipio Africanus's legions exemplified this approach against Hannibal's Carthaginian forces; after neutralizing the initial elephant charge through spaced maniples, the infantry advanced, hurling pila to disorder the enemy lines before closing with gladii to shatter the opposing infantry. This sequence represented an early precursor to fire and movement, leveraging ranged disruption to enable a decisive maneuver, though limited by the pilum's one-use nature and reliance on disciplined unit cohesion. During the medieval period, archers began to fulfill a more explicit suppressive role, pinning heavy cavalry to facilitate infantry or archer advances. The English longbow, with its superior range and rate of fire compared to continental crossbows, allowed massed volleys to target advancing knights, sowing chaos in their ranks and impeding their momentum. A pivotal example occurred at the Battle of Agincourt in 1415, where Henry V's outnumbered forces positioned longbowmen on the flanks of a muddy, narrowed field, protected by stakes. The archers unleashed devastating arrow storms from up to 250 yards, killing and wounding hundreds of French knights, whose heavy armor and the terrain bogged down their charge, preventing effective counterattacks and enabling English men-at-arms to counter-maneuver against the disorganized survivors. This adaptation highlighted the tactic's potential in asymmetric engagements, where missile fire could neutralize armored superiority, though it remained terrain-dependent and vulnerable to enfilading threats. In the early modern era, the advent of firearms refined these concepts through pike and shot formations, where musketeers provided covering fire for pikemen advances. During the Thirty Years' War (1618–1648), armies like Gustavus Adolphus's Swedish forces integrated deeper, more flexible battalions with alternating pike and musket blocks, allowing musketeers to deliver preparatory volleys that weakened enemy lines before pikemen charged to exploit the gaps. This marked a shift toward organized suppression, with musket fire—though inaccurate beyond 100 yards—serving to demoralize and thin opponent ranks, facilitating the shock of pike thrusts in close combat. However, the tactic's maturity was hindered by inherent limitations: muskets required 20–30 seconds to reload under ideal conditions, exposing firers to counterattacks during vulnerable intervals, while poor powder quality, complex loading procedures, and communication challenges in noisy, smoke-filled battlefields often disrupted timing and coordination between fire and advance elements. These pre-modern iterations laid the groundwork for later developments, influencing 18th- and 19th-century line infantry doctrines that emphasized disciplined volley fire. As bayonets supplanted pikes, linear formations evolved from pike-and-shot hybrids, prioritizing sustained musket barrages to suppress foes before bayonet charges, thereby transitioning rudimentary fire support into more systematic maneuver enablers.

Development in 20th Century Conflicts

The development of fire and movement tactics in World War I marked a pivotal shift from static trench warfare, as German forces adapted infiltration methods during trench raids to counter stalemates. Stormtrooper units, formalized by 1918, employed small, independent groups armed with grenades, machine guns, and light weapons to rapidly penetrate enemy lines, bypassing strongpoints and using suppressive fire to enable flanking maneuvers. This approach emphasized speed and shock to overwhelm defenders, isolating resistant sections for follow-up forces, and represented an early doctrinal evolution toward decentralized, squad-level execution.^[9] Technological advancements in automatic weapons further refined these tactics by enabling sustained suppression. The American M1918 Browning Automatic Rifle (BAR), weighing 19 pounds and firing .30-caliber rounds at 120-150 per minute, provided portable base-of-fire support for advancing riflemen, allowing squads to maintain mobility while pinning enemies during assaults. Similarly, the German MG42 machine gun, with its 1,550-rounds-per-minute rate and quick-change barrels, delivered intense, continuous fire that disrupted enemy responses, supporting squad maneuvers in fluid engagements across European and North African theaters.^[10]^[11] World War II saw the formal codification of fire and movement in U.S. doctrine through the 1944 Infantry Field Manual FM 7-10, which standardized the tactic into distinct phases: establishing fire superiority with intense, accurate suppression from automatic rifles, machine guns, and mortars; successive maneuvers by bounds under covering fire; and a final assault after lifting supporting fires. The manual prescribed platoon advances in echelons, with one element suppressing while others rushed forward 50-100 yards, emphasizing coordination via signals to achieve enfilade fire and flank protection. This framework integrated light machine guns for oblique fire and 60-mm mortars for defiladed targets, enhancing tactical flexibility in varied terrain. In the Pacific theater, these principles were applied during island-hopping campaigns, where U.S. Marines and Army units conducted amphibious assaults under naval and air bombardment to seize key atolls like Tarawa and Guadalcanal. Fire and movement proved essential in dense jungle and coral terrain, with squads using BARs and mortars to suppress Japanese bunkers while maneuvering in bounds to outflank defenses, often transitioning to close-quarters assaults after isolating strongpoints. This adaptation minimized exposure to entrenched fire, enabling incremental advances that secured airfields and isolated larger garrisons like Rabaul.^[12] The Korean and Vietnam Wars necessitated further adaptations for jungle environments, shifting emphasis to squad-level execution amid limited visibility and enemy ambushes. In Korea, U.S. Army units informally divided 9-man squads into fire teams around two BARs for bounding overwatch, allowing one team to suppress with automatic fire while the other maneuvered to flank North Korean positions. U.S. Marines, by contrast, employed 13-man squads with three fire teams, each centered on a BAR. Vietnam refined Army tactics with the 11-man squad structure—two 5-man fire teams each led by an M60 gunner—enabling small units to "find, fix, and finish" enemies by establishing organic fire superiority before calling artillery, as seen in operations where squads outflanked bunkers using grenades and small arms after initial suppression. Jungle challenges often required pulling back for external support, reducing direct assaults and prioritizing maneuver sustainability.^[13]^[14] Post-World War II doctrinal shifts transitioned from platoon-centric tactics to fireteam emphasis, driven by lessons from Korea and Vietnam that favored decentralized maneuver. The 1956 Army Squad Infantry Research Study formalized the 11-man squad with two balanced fire teams, enhancing fire and movement by distributing automatic weapons for independent bounding actions. This evolution, confirmed in the 1969 Infantry Rifle Unit Study, optimized squad lethality and flexibility, replacing rigid platoon formations with adaptable teams capable of sustaining suppression and assault in contested terrain.^[13]

Post-Cold War Adaptations

Following the end of the Cold War, fire and movement tactics underwent significant refinements during the 1991 Gulf War, where coalition forces integrated air support to enhance suppression phases in vast desert maneuvers. The Fire Support Coordination Line (FSCL) was employed to delineate boundaries between ground artillery and air operations, allowing synchronized deep strikes against Iraqi forces while enabling rapid ground advances. For instance, the U.S. VII Corps extended its FSCL up to 80 kilometers ahead of forward troops on February 27, 1991, facilitating air interdiction that neutralized Republican Guard units and supported armored maneuvers without risking friendly fire. This approach, building on 20th-century AirLand Battle concepts, demonstrated how aerial suppression could shape the battlefield for decisive ground exploitation.^[15]^[16] In the counter-insurgency operations of Afghanistan and Iraq during the 2000s, U.S. doctrine adapted fire and movement to IED-heavy environments by emphasizing dispersed formations and population-centric security to mitigate ambush risks. Units like the 1st Cavalry Division in Sadr City (2004) dispersed into small combat outposts, combining suppressive fire with local intelligence gathering to clear routes and deny insurgents safe havens. The 2007 Surge in Baghdad further refined this through Joint Security Stations, where brigade combat teams partnered with Iraqi forces for quicker maneuver phases, reducing violence by 60% in key districts via integrated kinetic and non-kinetic actions. These tweaks, outlined in FM 3-24 (2006), shifted from massed advances to agile, intelligence-driven movements that prioritized survivability over overwhelming force.^[17]^[18]^[19] Technological advancements post-1990s, including night vision devices and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), bolstered fire control by providing persistent surveillance and precision targeting during suppression and maneuver. Night vision goggles, combining image intensification and thermal imaging, enabled 24-hour operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, allowing forces to maintain fire superiority and execute movements under cover of darkness, as seen in the 2011 Abbottabad raid. UAVs like the MQ-1 Predator and RQ-7 Shadow delivered real-time ISR, directing artillery and Hellfire strikes while scouting enemy positions ahead of advancing units; in Iraq's 2008 Sadr City operations, Shadows logged thousands of hours supporting dispersed infantry advances against militias. These tools extended the effective range of fire and movement, reducing exposure to threats in asymmetric settings.^[20]^[21] NATO's doctrinal updates in the post-Cold War era, such as the 2019 revision to Allied Joint Publication 3 (AJP-3), incorporated hybrid threats into fire and movement frameworks, stressing integrated responses to blended conventional and irregular challenges. AJP-3 emphasizes multi-domain synchronization, where suppression incorporates cyber and information operations alongside kinetic fires to counter actors employing disinformation and subversion. This evolution reflects lessons from operations in the Balkans and Middle East, promoting faster transitions between phases to address elusive non-state elements.^[22]^[23] Urban sprawl and non-state actors presented ongoing challenges, demanding accelerated phase transitions in fire and movement to navigate dense environments where traditional massed tactics falter. In megacity battles like Mosul (2016-2017), coalition forces faced improvised defenses in high-rise structures, requiring rapid shifts from suppression to assault amid civilian intermingling, which prolonged operations and heightened collateral risks. Non-state groups exploit urban anonymity for ambushes, compelling adaptations like decentralized small-unit maneuvers to maintain momentum against dispersed threats. These dynamics underscore the need for doctrinal flexibility in post-Cold War conflicts. In the Russia-Ukraine war (2022–present), fire and movement has evolved further with widespread drone integration for suppression and reconnaissance, enabling precise strikes and real-time adjustments to bounding overwatch in contested trench and urban settings.^[24]^[25]^[26]

Variations and Applications

Infantry and Small Unit Tactics

In infantry and small unit tactics, fire and movement is fundamentally applied at the dismounted squad and platoon levels, where units typically consist of 9-man rifle squads divided into two 4-man fireteams, each built around a two-man buddy system to enable coordinated suppression and maneuver under fire.^[27] The buddy system pairs soldiers—often a rifleman and an automatic rifleman or grenadier—allowing one to provide covering fire while the other advances, ensuring mutual support and rapid response in close-quarters engagements.^[28] This structure scales from fireteam-level operations, where pairs or teams bound forward in short increments, to platoon-level actions involving 30-40 soldiers arrayed in formations such as the wedge, which positions the platoon leader at the apex with squads fanning out to the flanks for balanced firepower and control during advances.^[29] Weapon roles are distinctly assigned to optimize the tactic's phases of suppression and maneuver: standard-issue rifles, such as the M4 carbine, equip maneuvering elements for precise, aimed fire during bounds, while squad automatic weapons (SAWs) like the M249 provide sustained suppressive fire to pin down enemies, typically positioned in the base-of-fire team to deliver high-volume 5.56mm rounds at rates up to 800 per minute.^[30] In a standard squad, each fireteam includes one SAW gunner whose role is to establish fire superiority, enabling the rest of the unit to close on the objective without exposing themselves to effective return fire.^[31] Terrain dictates adjustments to movement techniques and bound lengths in fire and movement, with open fields requiring longer overwatch distances and dispersed formations to minimize vulnerability to observed fire, whereas wooded or restrictive areas necessitate shorter bounds—often 50-100 meters—and tighter intervals, such as the file formation, to leverage cover while maintaining mutual support.^[32] For instance, in dense vegetation, squads reduce the standard 10-meter wedge spacing to 5 meters or less, prioritizing concealment over speed to avoid detection, as outlined in U.S. Army doctrine emphasizing the use of natural features for successive or alternate bounding overwatch.^[31] A representative case study of fire and movement in action occurs during a squad's reaction to a near ambush on patrol, as detailed in infantry battle drills: upon enemy contact within 50 meters, the fireteam in the kill zone immediately returns fire and assumes a base of fire using SAWs and rifles to suppress the attackers, while the trail fireteam maneuvers via successive bounds to flank and neutralize the threat, often resolving the engagement within minutes by forcing the ambushers to break contact or suffer casualties.^[33] This drill integrates the tactic's suppression and maneuver phases as building blocks, allowing the squad to transition from defense to offense without requiring higher support.^[27]

Combined Arms Integration

In combined arms operations, fire and movement tactics scale beyond infantry units by integrating armored, artillery, and air assets to deliver synchronized suppression and maneuver across broader fronts, enabling decisive advances against conventional forces. Armored elements, such as main battle tanks, provide mobile direct fire suppression to fix enemy positions while allowing infantry to bound forward, often in overwatch formations where tanks engage targets at ranges up to 2,500 meters to develop the situation without exposing dismounted troops.^[34] For instance, Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicles (IFVs) execute bounding overwatch, alternating fire and movement with tanks to maintain momentum, with infantry leading to clear obstacles and direct tank fire onto identified threats.^[34] Artillery coordination extends the reach of suppression through indirect fires, delivering high-volume barrages to degrade enemy capabilities before close assaults, achieving at least 3% casualties or materiel damage to disrupt defensive fires.^[35] Systems like 155-mm howitzers and Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (MLRS) employ precision-guided munitions, such as Excalibur rounds with less than 10-meter circular error probable, to target high-value assets while fires cells at brigade level synchronize impacts with phase lines and coordinated fire lines to protect advancing maneuver elements.^[35] Air integration, particularly via close air support from rotary-wing assets like AH-64 Apache helicopters, pins enemy forces during ground advances by delivering rapid, standoff strikes with Hellfire missiles, responding faster than ground-based alternatives to suppress threats in real time.^[36] Apaches operate in joint air attack teams, coordinating with ground units to maintain suppression overhead while infantry maneuvers, using laser designation for precision against armored targets within 8-10 kilometers.^[36] Synchronization challenges in these operations center on precise timing to prevent friendly fire, addressed through combined arms rehearsals that sequence fires with maneuver offsets, such as maintaining 100-meter separations in dusty conditions or 500-meter phase lines to shape enemy movement.^[37] Fire support coordination measures, including final coordination lines, ensure assets like artillery and aircraft shift fires only after ground elements clear danger close zones, typically 600-800 meters ahead of troops.^[37] Mechanized assaults in conventional warfare exemplify this integration, as seen in the 1991 Gulf War's Battle of Medina Ridge, where the U.S. 1st Armored Division's 2nd Brigade combined M1 Abrams tanks and Bradley IFVs in bounding advances, supported by MLRS indirect fires and AH-64 Apaches delivering Hellfire strikes, destroying over 300 Iraqi armored vehicles in a single engagement with minimal U.S. losses.^[38] Similarly, during the VII Corps "Great Wheel" operation, synchronized armored maneuvers with artillery preparation and A-10 close air support enveloped Republican Guard units, capturing vast territory over 100 hours through layered suppression that fixed enemies for decisive strikes.^[38]

Urban and Asymmetric Warfare

In urban warfare, fire and movement tactics are adapted to the constraints of dense, three-dimensional environments, where buildings provide cover for defenders and limit fields of fire. Suppression phases are shortened to brief, precise bursts to avoid alerting additional enemies or causing excessive structural collapse, while maneuver emphasizes small-team room-to-room clearing to minimize exposure on streets. A key technique is mouse-holing, where soldiers use explosives like satchel charges or Bangalore torpedoes to breach interior walls, allowing movement between adjacent structures without exposing teams to open doorways or windows. This approach, detailed in U.S. Army doctrine, enables fire teams to advance while maintaining suppressive fire from covered positions, reducing the risk of ambushes in close quarters.^[39]^[40] These adaptations were evident in the Second Battle of Fallujah in November 2004, where U.S. Marines and Army units employed combined arms fire and movement to clear insurgent-held buildings. Suppression relied on direct fire from tanks and infantry weapons, with over 1,600 main gun rounds and 121,000 small-arms rounds fired in the initial days to pin defenders, followed by infantry maneuvers through breached walls and deliberate room clearing using grenades and shoulder-launched munitions. Engineers supported by creating entry points, countering insurgents' own mouse-holing for evasion, though the operation damaged over 60% of buildings and resulted in approximately 800 civilian deaths despite pre-battle evacuation efforts. Restricted maneuver space, including narrow alleys and rubble, heightened risks of friendly fire and prolonged engagements.^[41]^[42] In asymmetric warfare against guerrilla forces, fire and movement shifts toward stealth and precision to prevent alerting reinforcements, prioritizing infiltration over high-volume fire that could draw larger enemy responses. Operations emphasize quiet advances, such as dismounted patrols using covered routes and minimal suppressive fire, to exploit the guerrillas' reliance on mobility and local knowledge. Non-lethal options like flashbang grenades are integrated for suppression in civilian-dense areas, disorienting occupants during entries without lethal overmatch. The 1993 Battle of Mogadishu exemplified these challenges, where U.S. Task Force Ranger used helicopter insertions for stealthy blocking positions but faced rapid militia mobilization via signals like burning tires; flashbangs were deployed to control crowds and support extractions, though roadblocks and RPG ambushes in confined streets led to 18 U.S. fatalities. Collateral damage remains a primary risk, as indirect fire in populated zones can cause indiscriminate civilian harm through blast effects and debris, complicating rules of engagement and post-conflict stability.^[43]^[44]^[45]

Modern Doctrine and Training

Contemporary Military Guidelines

Contemporary military guidelines on fire and movement emphasize coordinated suppression and maneuver at the tactical level, adapted to modern operational environments across major militaries. In the United States Army, Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 3-21.8 (updated January 2024, Change 1 June 2025), provides the doctrinal foundation for infantry platoons and squads, stressing the squad-level execution through fireteam roles and seamless phase transitions. Fireteams alternate between base-of-fire and maneuver elements, with the automatic rifleman and grenadier delivering sustained suppressive fire using weapons like the M249 SAW and M203 grenade launcher to enable the rifleman's advance, while the team leader directs transitions based on mission, enemy, terrain, troops, time, and civil considerations (METT-TC). Phase transitions—such as from movement to suppression, then assault—require clear fire commands, use of terrain for cover, and integration of direct and indirect fires to maintain superiority, as outlined in battle drills like react to contact and assault an enemy position.^[46] British Army doctrine integrates fire and movement into urban scenarios through training requirements focused on close-quarters battle and built-up area operations. These guidelines direct units to employ bounding overwatch and suppressive fire to navigate complex terrain, prioritizing mutual support and minimal exposure to avoid civilian risks. Fireteams use section attacks with one element fixing the enemy via small-arms and grenade fire while the other maneuvers to flank, adapting formations like the diamond for restricted visibility and incorporating vehicle-mounted support for enhanced mobility. As of 2025, this aligns with the 20-40-40 warfare doctrine, which emphasizes integrated fires, unmanned systems, and maneuver in high-tech environments.^[47] Russian military guidelines retain Soviet legacies, particularly Marshal Georgy Zhukov's emphasis on deep maneuver and massed fires, influencing Spetsnaz manuals for special operations. Contemporary adaptations in the Russian Ground Forces' field manuals, such as those analyzed in U.S. Army ATP 7-100.1 Russian Tactics (April 2025), prescribe fire and movement through platoon-level assaults where one subunit provides continuous artillery and machine-gun suppression to cover the advance of motorized rifle elements, echoing Zhukov's combined-arms tactics from World War II. These maneuvers prioritize rapid penetration and exploitation, with fire adjustment via forward observers to disrupt enemy cohesion in high-intensity engagements, incorporating lessons from the Ukraine conflict such as drone-enabled targeting.^[48] International standards for UN peacekeeping adapt force use to low-intensity conflicts, as codified in the Capstone Doctrine (2008, reviewed 2010). Guidelines restrict force to self-defense and mandate protection, emphasizing calibrated responses to deter threats while enabling patrol movements in volatile areas and coordination with local forces to maintain consent-based operations. Tactical execution, including any overwatch or suppressive elements, remains under the purview of contributing states.^[49] Emerging 2020s trends incorporate artificial intelligence (AI) for fire adjustment, enhancing doctrinal precision across militaries. U.S. Army initiatives, such as AI-enabled targeting in the decide-detect-deliver-assess cycle, use algorithms to predict enemy positions and optimize suppressive fire trajectories in real-time, reducing adjustment times during maneuvers. Similar integrations in artillery systems automate fire support planning, aligning with broader AI doctrines like Air Force Doctrine Note 25-1 (April 2025), which guides adaptive suppression to support movement without human delay.^[50]^[51]

Training and Simulation Methods

Training for fire and movement tactics begins with basic drills on live-fire ranges, where soldiers practice phase coordination through exercises such as 100-meter bounding overwatch, alternating between suppression fire from one element and advancement by another to simulate tactical advance under contact.^[52] These drills emphasize individual movement techniques like high crawls, low crawls, and 3- to 5-second rushes, progressing to fire team-level bounding to ensure synchronized suppressive fire and maneuver without exposing the moving element.^[53] Simulation technologies have advanced to support realistic practice without live ammunition risks, with the U.S. Army's Synthetic Training Environment (STE) providing virtual reality systems for squad-level tactics, including urban scenarios where soldiers rehearse fire and movement in immersive, mixed-reality settings post-2020 implementations.^[54] The Dismounted Soldier Training System complements this by enabling fully immersive computer-simulated dismounted operations, allowing teams to execute bounding overwatch and react to contact in varied environments.^[55] Evaluation of proficiency relies on metrics such as time to objective in maneuver drills and suppression effectiveness scores, measured during live-fire exercises to assess hit probabilities and coverage overlap, with dynamic assessments incorporating physical metrics like jump height and landing stability to predict performance in fire and move tasks.^[56] These evaluations ensure units meet standards for collective tasks, focusing on scalable benchmarks rather than exhaustive data. Training progresses from individual skills—such as reflexive fire and stance during basic combat training—to full squad maneuvers in field exercises, building through fire team wedges and files to platoon-level attacks integrating suppressive and assault elements.^[57] This layered approach aligns with contemporary guidelines, enabling seamless transition to complex operations. A key challenge in these methods is achieving realistic stress inoculation to mimic combat physiology without real danger, addressed through stress-induced drills combining physical exertion like sprints and burpees with weapons handling to build resilience and decision-making under fatigue.^[58] Such techniques, drawn from stress inoculation training protocols, enhance performance by gradually escalating stressors while maintaining safety.^[59]

References

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