Fact-checked by Grok 2 weeks ago

Ben Bernanke

Ben Shalom Bernanke (born December 13, 1953) is an American economist and academic who served as the 14th Chair of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System from 2006 to 2014.^[1] Born in Augusta, Georgia, and raised in the small town of Dillon, South Carolina, Bernanke graduated summa cum laude with a bachelor's degree in economics from Harvard University in 1975 and earned a PhD in economics from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1979.^[2]^[3] Before his Fed tenure, Bernanke was a professor of economics and public affairs at Princeton University, where he chaired the economics department, and served as Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers from 2005 to 2006 under President George W. Bush.^[3] As Fed Chair, succeeding Alan Greenspan, Bernanke confronted the 2008 global financial crisis, implementing unconventional monetary tools such as near-zero interest rates and multiple rounds of quantitative easing—central bank purchases of long-term securities—to stabilize credit markets and support economic recovery.^[1] These interventions, which expanded the Fed's balance sheet dramatically, are attributed by proponents with averting a second Great Depression through empirical analysis of crisis transmission mechanisms, though detractors contend they fostered moral hazard, inflated asset prices, and contributed to persistent wealth disparities by disproportionately benefiting financial institutions and asset holders.^[4]^[1] Bernanke's academic contributions, particularly his seminal 1983 paper demonstrating how banking panics exacerbate recessions via credit contractions rather than mere monetary shocks, earned him a share of the 2022 Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences alongside Douglas Diamond and Philip Dybvig for foundational research on financial intermediation and crisis dynamics.^[4] Post-retirement from the Fed, he has held positions including distinguished senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, advised central banks globally, and co-authored works analyzing the crisis response, emphasizing data-driven policy over discretionary intervention.^[5]

Early Life and Education

Family Background and Childhood

Ben Shalom Bernanke was born on December 13, 1953, in Augusta, Georgia, to a Jewish family of modest means whose roots traced back to eastern European immigrants.^[2]^[3] His paternal grandfather, Jonas Bernanke, had emigrated from Austria and established a pharmacy business, while his maternal grandparents, Herschel and Masia Friedman, arrived from Lithuania around World War I.^[2] Bernanke's father, Philip, followed in the family trade as a pharmacist and owned the Jay Bee drugstore in Dillon, South Carolina, after the family relocated there in 1949 when Philip was a teenager; his mother, Edna, initially worked as a teacher before becoming a homemaker.^[6]^[7] As the oldest of three children in this entrepreneurial household, Bernanke grew up amid the practical demands of a family-run business in a rural Southern setting, fostering an ethos of self-reliance shaped by his parents' direct involvement in local commerce and community life.^[8] Bernanke spent his childhood and teenage years in Dillon, a small town of approximately 6,000 residents near the North Carolina border, where Jews formed a tiny minority among only a handful of families.^[2]^[8] The family participated in the modest local synagogue, with young Bernanke assisting in services during the 1960s, which underscored their cultural isolation in a predominantly Protestant region.^[9] He attended public schools, where encounters with antisemitism—such as schoolmates inquiring if he had horns—highlighted his status as an outsider, yet he excelled academically, particularly in mathematics and science, while nurturing interests in history and literature.^[10]^[2] This environment of rural simplicity and familial stability, combined with intellectual curiosity inherited from his parents' emphasis on reading and learning, laid the groundwork for Bernanke's later analytical mindset, blending empirical observation with historical awareness.^[7]^[2]

Academic Training and Early Influences

Bernanke earned a Bachelor of Arts degree in economics from Harvard University in 1975, graduating summa cum laude and as a member of Phi Beta Kappa.^[1]^[11] His senior honors thesis, which addressed the 1970s energy market crisis amid soaring oil prices and supply disruptions, secured Harvard's top undergraduate prize in economics.^[12] During his time at Harvard, Bernanke encountered key ideas in monetary economics through readings of Milton Friedman's works, marking his initial engagement with monetarist perspectives on policy and inflation dynamics.^[13] He pursued graduate studies at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, completing a Ph.D. in economics in 1979.^[1]^[11] His doctoral dissertation, titled Long-Term Commitments, Dynamic Optimization, and the Business Cycle, examined intertemporal contracting and optimization models relevant to macroeconomic fluctuations, reflecting MIT's emphasis on rational expectations frameworks.^[14] Bernanke's principal advisor was Stanley Fischer, whose guidance shaped his approach to incorporating forward-looking expectations and credibility in economic modeling.^[15]^[12] This training instilled a foundation in empirical analysis of business cycles and labor market rigidities, prioritizing data-informed mechanisms over purely theoretical constructs.^[16]

Academic Career

Teaching Positions and Research Focus

Bernanke joined the Stanford Graduate School of Business as an assistant professor in 1979, following his PhD from MIT, and advanced to associate professor before departing in 1985.^[2] In 1985, he moved to Princeton University as a professor of economics and public affairs, where he was promoted to full professor and served as chair of the economics department from 1996 to 2002.^[17]^[1] During his academic tenure, Bernanke shifted his research emphasis from traditional macroeconomic theory to empirical analyses of financial systems and historical crises, prioritizing data-driven examinations over purely abstract models.^[2] He focused on how banking panics, such as those during the Great Depression, disrupted credit flows and amplified economic contractions beyond initial shocks, arguing that failures in banking intermediation reduced lending and deepened downturns through impaired credit channels.^[18] This approach highlighted the non-neutral role of financial frictions in monetary policy transmission, where credit availability influences aggregate demand independently of interest rates. A core element of Bernanke's research was the development of the financial accelerator mechanism, which posits that deteriorations in firms' and households' balance sheets—due to asset price declines or leverage—raise borrowing costs and curtail investment, thereby intensifying business cycle volatility from underlying shocks.^[19] Empirical evidence from interwar banking data supported this framework, showing correlations between bank failures, credit contractions, and output drops that traditional models overlooked.^[20] Bernanke's work underscored causal links from financial distress to real economic outcomes, influencing subsequent macroeconomic modeling by integrating borrower net worth as a propagation channel.^[18]

Key Publications and Theoretical Contributions

Bernanke's seminal 1983 paper, "Nonmonetary Effects of the Financial Crisis in the Propagation of the Great Depression," published in the American Economic Review, contended that waves of bank failures and panics from 1930 to 1933 triggered a severe contraction in intermediated credit, exerting real effects on output and employment beyond those attributable to monetary contraction alone.^[21] Drawing on empirical data from U.S. banking statistics and regional economic indicators, the analysis demonstrated that counties with higher rates of bank suspensions experienced disproportionately larger declines in industrial production and payrolls, with banking disruptions accounting for up to two-thirds of the output drop in affected areas.^[21] This work challenged prevailing monetarist interpretations by isolating the causal role of disrupted financial intermediation in amplifying deflationary pressures and inhibiting investment, grounded in vector autoregression models linking deposit losses to lending reductions.^[22] In a series of collaborations with Mark Gertler, Bernanke advanced theories of financial frictions rooted in asymmetric information, particularly their 1989 paper "Agency Costs, Net Worth, and Business Fluctuations" in the American Economic Review, which modeled how adverse shocks to borrowers' balance sheets elevate agency costs—such as moral hazard and adverse selection—raising the external finance premium and curtailing credit availability.^[23] This framework introduced the "financial accelerator" mechanism, where initial economic downturns erode collateral values, intensifying credit constraints and magnifying cycles through endogenous feedback loops, supported by calibration to postwar U.S. data showing net worth fluctuations correlating with investment volatility.^[23] Their 1995 Journal of Economic Perspectives article, "Inside the Black Box: The Credit Channel of Monetary Policy Transmission," further elaborated that financial market imperfections amplify conventional interest-rate channels during periods of stress, as banks ration credit to riskier borrowers amid information asymmetries, evidenced by historical episodes of lending squeezes uncorrelated with reserve aggregates.^[24] These contributions critiqued Keynesian models' emphasis on aggregate demand shortfalls by prioritizing supply-side impediments in credit markets, positing that financial instability disrupts the efficient allocation of capital, with empirical backing from interwar banking data indicating persistent real effects from intermediation failures rather than deficient spending alone.^[25] Bernanke compiled much of this research in his 2000 book Essays on the Great Depression, which integrated econometric evidence to argue that breakdowns in banking systems prolonged economic contractions via heightened lending premia and reduced intermediation, without invoking discretionary interventions as a baseline solution.^[25] The analyses consistently highlighted verifiable causal pathways from asset fire sales and deposit runs to output gaps, underscoring the economy's vulnerability to endogenous credit dynamics over exogenous policy lapses.^[25]

Government Roles Prior to Fed Chairmanship

Council of Economic Advisers Tenure

Ben Bernanke was sworn in as Chairman of the President's Council of Economic Advisers (CEA) on June 21, 2005, serving until January 31, 2006.^[3] In this position, he advised President George W. Bush on domestic and international economic policy, focusing on sustaining growth following the 2001 recession and amid rising energy prices.^[3] The CEA under Bernanke prepared the annual Economic Report of the President, which highlighted real GDP growth of 3.5 percent for 2005—above the historical average—and the addition of about 2 million payroll jobs.^[26] Bernanke's testimony and reports emphasized productivity-driven expansion and the benefits of pro-growth fiscal policies, including the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts, which empirical analysis showed stimulated investment and labor supply while partially offsetting deficit increases through dynamic revenue effects.^[26] He critiqued excessive regulatory burdens as a drag on incentives and efficiency, advocating policies that preserved market flexibility to support long-term productivity gains.^[27] These positions aligned with the administration's supply-side orientation, prioritizing evidence from historical tax reforms over static deficit projections. Regarding the housing sector, Bernanke acknowledged localized risks but downplayed fears of a national bubble, attributing price increases to fundamentals such as low interest rates, income growth, and high homeownership rates nearing 69 percent.^[28] In congressional testimony, he stated that home price rises had been moderate nationwide and lacked signs of unsustainability, reflecting data limitations that did not yet indicate an imminent bust.^[28] This assessment, grounded in contemporaneous metrics, informed advisory input on broader economic stability without advocating preemptive interventions.^[29]

Federal Reserve Board Service

Ben Bernanke was appointed to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System by President George W. Bush on August 5, 2002, and served until June 21, 2005, during Alan Greenspan's chairmanship. In this role, he participated in monetary policy deliberations amid the post-dot-com recovery, emphasizing risks of deflation and advocating for preemptive measures to maintain price stability.^[30] Early in his tenure, Bernanke delivered a prominent speech on November 21, 2002, titled "Deflation: Making Sure 'It' Doesn't Happen Here," warning of deflationary pressures following the 2001 recession and stock market decline. Drawing on historical episodes like the Great Depression and Japan's 1990s stagnation, he argued that the Federal Reserve possessed ample tools, including unconventional measures, to combat deflation if nominal interest rates approached zero.^[30] This perspective influenced the Fed's decision to maintain low interest rates, with the federal funds rate held at 1.25% through mid-2003, prioritizing avoidance of deflation over immediate tightening despite emerging signs of credit expansion. Regarding asset price dynamics, Bernanke expressed skepticism in an October 15, 2002, address about central banks reliably identifying and puncturing bubbles via monetary policy, contending that such interventions risked unnecessary economic slowdowns and that post-bubble cleanup was preferable.^[31] As housing prices accelerated from 2002 onward, he supported the Federal Open Market Committee's gradual rate increases starting in June 2004—from 1% to 5.25% by 2006—aiming for a "soft landing" to curb inflation without derailing growth, consistent with empirical evidence of the Great Moderation's stability. However, in testimony before the Senate in October 2005, shortly after leaving the Board, Bernanke downplayed a national housing bubble, stating prices were "unlikely to continue rising at current rates" but expected residential investment to remain robust.^[28] Critics, including later analyses, have faulted Bernanke's stance for underestimating leverage buildup in mortgage markets and contributing to policy continuity under the "Greenspan put"—the expectation of Fed intervention to support asset prices—which empirically extended accommodative conditions fostering housing excesses.^[32] Data from the period show household debt-to-income ratios rising from 85% in 2002 to over 120% by 2005, alongside subprime lending growth, yet Fed minutes reflect debates favoring measured tightening over aggressive hikes that might have constrained the bubble earlier. Bernanke's focus on deflation risks and productivity-driven growth, while grounded in contemporaneous indicators, has been critiqued for insufficient attention to sectoral imbalances, as subsequent events demonstrated the vulnerabilities of unchecked credit expansion.^[33]

Federal Reserve Chairmanship

Appointment and Early Tenure

President George W. Bush nominated Ben Bernanke to serve as Chairman of the Federal Reserve on October 24, 2005, to succeed Alan Greenspan whose term ended on January 31, 2006.^[34] The U.S. Senate confirmed Bernanke on January 31, 2006, following hearings that highlighted his academic expertise in monetary policy and experience on the Federal Reserve Board since 2002.^[35] He was sworn in as the fourteenth Chairman on February 1, 2006, inheriting an economy characterized by sustained growth from the mid-1990s, low unemployment around 4.6 percent, and emerging signs of rising inflation amid a peaking housing market.^[1] In his early tenure, Bernanke emphasized enhancing the Federal Reserve's transparency and communication to improve public understanding of monetary policy decisions, a priority he outlined in initial speeches and testimonies.^[36] While the Fed did not formally adopt an explicit inflation target until 2012, Bernanke's pre-chairmanship advocacy for inflation targeting influenced an implicit long-run objective near 2 percent, aimed at anchoring expectations amid data showing core inflation pressures building in 2006.^[37] The Federal Open Market Committee, under his leadership, raised the federal funds rate from 4.25 percent to 5.25 percent in four quarter-point increments between January and June 2006, pausing thereafter as growth moderated but before subprime mortgage stresses became prominent.^[38] Bernanke's early public statements, such as his March 2006 remarks on the yield curve, reflected caution about potential economic imbalances while maintaining the accommodative stance inherited from Greenspan, with real interest rates remaining relatively low by historical standards.^[39] Unemployment stayed low, but indicators like accelerating home price growth and loosening lending standards in subprime markets received limited emphasis in FOMC deliberations during this period, contributing to critiques that policy overlooked building financial vulnerabilities.^[40]

Response to the 2008 Financial Crisis

In March 2008, amid deteriorating liquidity at Bear Stearns, the Federal Reserve under Bernanke's chairmanship facilitated its acquisition by JPMorgan Chase. On March 16, the Fed authorized financing through a special purpose vehicle, Maiden Lane LLC, to backstop $30 billion in Bear Stearns' assets, preventing an immediate disorderly failure that could exacerbate funding stresses across investment banks. ^[41] ^[42] This intervention drew on Bernanke's prior research demonstrating how credit market disruptions transmit to real economic activity via reduced lending and investment. ^[43] The collapse of Lehman Brothers on September 15, 2008, triggered widespread panic, with interbank lending seizing and asset prices plummeting. In response, the Fed rapidly expanded lender-of-last-resort operations, including broadening the Primary Dealer Credit Facility—initially launched after Bear Stearns—to provide short-term loans against a wider range of collateral, peaking at nearly $130 billion in usage by late September. ^[44] Bernanke coordinated with Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson to urge Congress for fiscal support, testifying that without intervention, the crisis risked systemic breakdown akin to the 1930s. ^[45] This culminated in the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of October 3, 2008, authorizing $700 billion for the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) to recapitalize banks and purchase distressed assets. ^[46] Empirical outcomes supported the stabilization intent: U.S. GDP contracted by 4.3% peak-to-trough, far short of the Great Depression's 27% drop, with banking panics averted through these liquidity injections and capital support, preventing a deeper deflationary spiral. ^[47] ^[48] Yet the selective application—rescuing Bear Stearns but not Lehman—fostered perceptions of ad-hoc favoritism toward large, systemically vital institutions, prioritizing short-term stability over consistent rules that might enforce market discipline and deter leverage buildup. ^[49] ^[50] Critics contended this approach signaled implicit guarantees for "too-big-to-fail" entities, potentially amplifying moral hazard by reducing incentives for prudent risk management among major banks. ^[51]

Implementation of Quantitative Easing

With the federal funds rate at the zero lower bound by December 16, 2008, Ben Bernanke directed the Federal Reserve toward quantitative easing (QE) as an unconventional tool to inject liquidity, lower long-term interest rates, and fulfill the dual mandate amid stalled recovery.^[52] QE operated primarily through large-scale purchases of securities, aiming to influence yields via the portfolio balance channel, where reduced supply of safe assets prompted investors to reallocate toward riskier holdings, thereby easing credit conditions.^[53] The inaugural round, QE1, was announced on November 25, 2008, authorizing up to $500 billion in agency mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and $100 billion in agency debt to target dysfunctional mortgage markets and reduce borrowing costs for housing.^[54] Purchases began in January 2009, and the program expanded on March 18, 2009, to include $750 billion more in MBS, $100 billion in agency debt, and $300 billion in longer-term Treasuries, culminating in a balance sheet expansion to about $2.3 trillion by June 2010.^[54] Empirical analyses, including event studies around announcements, show QE1 lowered 10-year Treasury yields by approximately 50-100 basis points, elevated equity prices, and increased refinancing volumes, with interest rate declines accounting for 25-45% of the refinancing surge while bank balance sheet adjustments drove the rest, supporting modest lending growth.^[55] QE2 followed on November 3, 2010, committing to $600 billion in longer-term Treasury purchases over eight months to combat elevated unemployment nearing 10% and near-zero inflation, ending in June 2011 without further balance sheet growth beyond reinvestments.^[56] This round further compressed term premiums and yields, contributing to stock market gains of around 5-10% in announcement windows and aiding GDP growth estimates of 0.5-1.5 percentage points cumulatively across QE episodes under Bernanke.^[53] To extend stimulus without net expansion, Operation Twist was launched on September 21, 2011, involving $400 billion in sales of short-term Treasuries matched by purchases of longer-term ones, later extended by $267 billion in June 2012, flattening the yield curve by 10-20 basis points on long-end rates.^[57] These actions empirically transmitted via reduced duration risk and signaling, fostering wealth effects that boosted consumption among asset owners but amplified wealth disparities, as stock and bond price rises disproportionately accrued to upper-income households holding 80-90% of financial assets, even as employment gains provided broader benefits.^[58]^[59] Overall, QE under Bernanke expanded the Fed's holdings from under $1 trillion pre-crisis to over $4 trillion by his 2014 departure, with transmission evident in lower rates but side effects including distorted risk-taking and uneven distributional impacts favoring capital over labor income.^[56]

Second Term and Policy Challenges

President Barack Obama nominated Bernanke for a second term as Federal Reserve Chair on August 25, 2009, and the Senate confirmed him on January 28, 2010, by a 70-30 vote, with the swearing-in occurring on February 3, 2010.^[60]^[61] This reappointment came amid ongoing economic recovery from the 2008 crisis, with Bernanke facing challenges including the 2011 U.S. debt ceiling impasse and spillovers from the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis. During the 2011 debt ceiling crisis, Bernanke repeatedly warned Congress that failing to raise the $14.3 trillion limit by August 2 could precipitate a "major crisis," potentially damaging U.S. creditworthiness, spiking interest rates, and harming global markets.^[62]^[63] The eventual resolution via the Budget Control Act averted default, but the episode contributed to market volatility and a subsequent U.S. credit rating downgrade by S&P in August 2011. Concurrently, the Eurozone crisis exerted downward pressure on U.S. asset prices and confidence; Bernanke noted in 2012 testimony that European financial stresses had reduced U.S. stock prices, elevated corporate borrowing costs, and restrained domestic spending and investment.^[64] The Federal Reserve monitored these risks closely and stood ready to provide dollar liquidity swaps to foreign central banks if transatlantic funding strains intensified.^[65] To enhance policy predictability amid anchored inflation near 2% but sluggish growth—with real GDP expanding at only 1.6% in 2011 and unemployment averaging 8.9%—the FOMC introduced calendar-based forward guidance in August 2011, committing to maintain the federal funds rate near zero at least through mid-2013.^[66]^[67] This shift from qualitative to date-specific language aimed to lower long-term interest rates and support recovery, though it underscored the zero lower bound constraints on conventional policy. Bernanke's May 22, 2013, congressional testimony signaled a potential tapering of asset purchases if economic data continued improving, stating the Fed "could take out some of that accommodation" by moderating the pace of quantitative easing.^[68] This announcement provoked the "Taper Tantrum," with the 10-year Treasury yield surging from 1.94% to over 2.5% within months, alongside equity market declines and capital outflows from emerging economies.^[69] The episode highlighted markets' reliance on sustained Fed balance sheet expansion and intensified debates over exit strategies, as policymakers grappled with balancing recovery support against risks of financial instability from policy normalization.^[70]

Controversies and Policy Critiques

Bailout Decisions and Moral Hazard

During the 2008 financial crisis, Federal Reserve interventions under Bernanke, including emergency lending facilities, were defended as necessary to prevent a systemic collapse akin to the Great Depression, where U.S. real GDP contracted by approximately 30% from 1929 to 1933.^[71] In contrast, the Great Recession saw a peak-to-trough GDP decline of 4.3%, attributed in part to these liquidity measures that stabilized credit markets and averted deeper contraction.^[72] Bernanke argued that such actions provided a credible backstop to lending while minimizing moral hazard through targeted, short-term support rather than open-ended guarantees.^[19] Critics from market-oriented perspectives, including economists like John Taylor, contended that these bailouts entrenched moral hazard by signaling implicit government guarantees to large institutions, subsidizing excessive risk-taking and perpetuating the "too big to fail" problem.^[19] Empirical evidence supports this view: post-crisis reforms notwithstanding, systemically important banks maintained elevated leverage ratios, with global too-big-to-fail institutions continuing to benefit from reduced funding costs due to perceived state backing, as measured by credit default swap spreads and equity valuations.^[73]^[74] This persistence encouraged ongoing high-risk behavior, as banks grew larger relative to GDP without proportional deleveraging, undermining incentives for prudent capital management.^[75] From other quarters, including progressive economists, the interventions were faulted for prioritizing Wall Street stability over Main Street recovery, with quantitative easing disproportionately inflating asset prices—such as stocks and housing—benefiting asset holders while real wages stagnated for broader households.^[76] QE programs, which expanded the Fed's balance sheet by trillions from 2008 onward, transmitted effects primarily through portfolio rebalancing that boosted equity valuations by an estimated 20-30% in initial rounds, exacerbating wealth inequality as the top income quintiles captured most gains without corresponding broad-based employment or wage growth.^[58]^[59] Although Bernanke maintained that structural factors, not monetary policy, drove long-term inequality trends, causal analyses indicate QE's asset channel widened the wealth gap, with net effects increasing inequality metrics like the Gini coefficient for wealth in affected economies.^[58]^[77]

Specific Interventions and Transparency Issues

On September 16, 2008, the Federal Reserve, under Chairman Ben Bernanke, extended an emergency loan of up to $85 billion to American International Group (AIG) to prevent its collapse amid liquidity strains from credit default swap (CDS) obligations.^[78] ^[79] ^[80] The facility, authorized under Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act, provided AIG with an 18-month credit line at Library of Congress rates plus spreads, in exchange for a 79.9% equity stake and other collateral.^[78] ^[81] AIG ultimately repaid the loans in full, yielding the Federal Reserve a profit of approximately $17.7 billion across its AIG-related facilities by 2012.^[82] ^[83] However, the bailout's structure obscured AIG's extensive CDS exposures, estimated at hundreds of billions in notional value tied to mortgage-backed securities, which were not fully disclosed to the public prior to the intervention, contributing to perceptions of inadequate transparency regarding risks to counterparties like Goldman Sachs.^[84] ^[85] ^[86] The Federal Reserve also played a regulatory role in facilitating the merger of Merrill Lynch into Bank of America, announced on September 15, 2008, as Merrill faced acute losses from subprime-related assets.^[87] The transaction, valued at $50 billion in Bank of America stock, was reviewed and approved by the Federal Reserve under the Bank Holding Company Act in November 2008, following standard antitrust and stability assessments.^[87] ^[88] Bernanke later testified that he had no direct involvement in negotiating the deal but affirmed the Fed's oversight ensured its prudential soundness.^[87] ^[89] Allegations emerged that Bank of America executives, aware of Merrill's accelerating fourth-quarter losses exceeding $12 billion by late November 2008, withheld this material information from shareholders ahead of the December 5, 2008, approval vote, prompting shareholder lawsuits settled for $2.43 billion in 2013.^[90] ^[91] ^[92] Transparency concerns intensified with the 2014 revelation during an AIG-related trial that Bernanke had used the pseudonym "Edward Quince" for internal email communications during the crisis, including discussions on the AIG bailout rationale with officials like then-New York Fed President Timothy Geithner.^[93] ^[94] These emails, part of broader Federal Reserve and New York Fed document releases under FOIA requests, exposed private deliberations on intervention thresholds and counterparty payments, such as the decision to reimburse AIG's CDS counterparties at par value without discounts, which critics argued prioritized select institutions over public accountability.^[95] ^[96] ^[97] The pseudonym's use, listed in the Fed's internal directory, underscored gaps in real-time disclosure of decision-making processes amid the urgency of the financial turmoil.^[98]

Long-Term Economic Consequences

The Federal Reserve's prolonged near-zero interest rates and quantitative easing programs from 2008 to 2014 under Bernanke distorted intertemporal price signals, channeling credit toward unproductive or speculative uses such as leveraged corporate buyouts and extended real estate developments, thereby planting seeds for later inflationary imbalances.^[99]^[100] This malinvestment pattern, consistent with Austrian business cycle theory's emphasis on artificial credit expansion leading to resource misallocation, contributed to suppressed productivity growth and heightened system leverage that amplified the 2021–2022 inflation episode when supply constraints and fiscal expansions interacted with pre-existing distortions.^[101]^[102] Corporate debt as a share of GDP rose from 52% in 2007 to 74% by 2014, reflecting incentives for overborrowing rather than efficiency-enhancing investments, which delayed necessary deleveraging and structural adjustments.^[103] These policies also widened wealth disparities by disproportionately boosting asset prices accessible mainly to affluent households, as QE directly purchased securities and indirectly fueled equity and housing market rallies.^[104] The U.S. wealth Gini coefficient, measuring distribution across the full population, climbed from 0.81 in 2007 to 0.84 by 2013 amid post-crisis asset recovery concentrated among the top quintile, which captured nearly all stock market gains.^[105]^[59] This channel hindered broader economic reforms, such as labor market restructuring or innovation incentives, by enabling zombie firms to survive on cheap debt, thereby perpetuating low real wage growth for non-asset owners and entrenching dependence on monetary accommodation over fiscal or supply-side measures.^[58] Although the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 expanded regulatory scrutiny to curb systemic vulnerabilities, it coincided with greater banking sector concentration, as smaller institutions faced compliance burdens that accelerated mergers and exits, elevating the top five banks' share of total U.S. banking assets from 40% in 2007 to 46% by 2014.^[106] This trend amplified too-big-to-fail risks, with implicit guarantees persisting despite capital requirements, as evidenced by continued reliance on emergency facilities in later stresses like 2023 regional bank failures.^[107]^[108] Overall, such outcomes underscore how crisis-era interventions, while stabilizing short-term liquidity, deferred resolution of underlying fragilities, fostering a more concentrated and hazard-prone financial structure.^[109]

Economic Perspectives

Insights on Banking Crises and Depressions

Bernanke's seminal 1983 analysis demonstrated that the banking panics of 1930–1933 propagated the Great Depression through nonmonetary channels, primarily by disrupting credit allocation and raising borrowing costs independent of money supply contractions.^[110] Empirical evidence from U.S. data during this period showed that waves of bank failures—over 9,000 institutions collapsed, representing about 40% of total banks—led to a sharp reduction in intermediation efficiency, as surviving banks curtailed lending due to balance sheet impairments and heightened risk aversion.^[21] This credit crunch amplified deflationary pressures and output declines, with regressions indicating that financial distress accounted for a significant portion of the economic contraction beyond Federal Reserve policy errors.^[111] In his broader research, Bernanke emphasized banks' role as financial accelerators in business cycles, where panics trigger self-reinforcing loops of asset liquidation and liquidity shortages.^[112] Drawing on historical episodes like the 1930s, he argued that disrupted intermediation elevates the premium on external finance, constraining investment and consumption even when monetary aggregates remain stable.^[113] This framework, grounded in vector autoregression models of banking data, posits that vulnerabilities in liquidity provision—such as maturity transformation—turn localized shocks into systemic depressions.^[114] Bernanke's contributions, recognized in the 2022 Nobel Prize shared with Douglas Diamond and Philip Dybvig, highlighted empirical links between bank failures and crisis depth, complementing theoretical models of runs driven by depositor coordination failures.^[112] His work showed that U.S. banking collapses in the early 1930s prolonged the downturn by impairing credit flows, with cross-country comparisons underscoring how weaker financial systems exacerbated output losses.^[115] Critics contend that this emphasis on credit amplifiers overemphasizes post-crisis stabilization while underplaying moral hazard incentives embedded in fractional-reserve systems, where expectations of lender-of-last-resort interventions encourage excessive risk-taking ex ante.^[116] Such views, often from economists skeptical of central banking, argue that Bernanke's causal attribution to panics neglects how regulatory distortions and implicit guarantees foster the very fragilities his models describe, prioritizing intervention over structural reforms to align banker incentives with long-term stability.^[117]

Monetary Policy Principles

Bernanke has advocated for inflation targeting as a core principle of monetary policy, emphasizing its role in anchoring expectations and promoting economic stability. In a 2003 speech, he highlighted how explicit inflation targets enhance transparency and accountability, drawing on international experiences where such frameworks reduced inflation volatility.^[118] Empirical studies co-authored by Bernanke, including a 1999 NBER working paper, analyzed cross-country data showing that inflation-targeting regimes correlate with lower and more stable inflation rates compared to non-targeting central banks.^[119] He supported the Federal Reserve's adoption of a 2 percent longer-run inflation goal in January 2012, arguing it balances the risks of deflation—evidenced by historical episodes like Japan's lost decade—against moderate inflation that facilitates relative price adjustments without distorting economic signals.^[120] Regarding policy conduct, Bernanke endorsed rules-based approaches as benchmarks to constrain discretion, rather than rigid adherence that ignores real-time data or crises. He critiqued strict interpretations of the Taylor rule, noting in 2015 Brookings commentary that mechanical rules failed to account for forward-looking inflation expectations or unconventional conditions, such as the zero lower bound during 2008-2014.^[121] Instead, he promoted "constrained discretion," where rules like modified Taylor prescriptions guide decisions but allow flexibility for shocks, as outlined in his responses to debates with John Taylor.^[122] This framework aligns with the Fed's dual mandate of price stability and maximum employment, requiring systematic balancing rather than prioritizing one objective. Post-2008, Bernanke shifted emphasis toward employment amid subdued inflation, but cautioned on the Phillips curve's flattening—observed in data showing weak inflation responses to unemployment gaps—implying reduced trade-offs but heightened risks of misjudging natural rates.^[123] Bernanke acknowledged risks from prolonged accommodation, including asset price distortions, yet defended unconventional tools like quantitative easing (QE) when traditional policy exhausted. In a 2002 speech, he argued monetary policy is ill-suited to preempt bubbles due to identification challenges and transmission lags, preferring post-bubble cleanup via aggressive easing to avert depressions, supported by historical analyses of the Great Depression.^[31] During his tenure, he maintained QE mitigated greater deflationary harms, citing empirical outcomes like stabilized Treasury yields and GDP growth rebounds, while noting central banks' profitability from asset purchases offset fiscal costs.^[124] This pragmatic stance prioritized causal evidence from crisis responses over theoretical bubble-pricking, though he stressed vigilant monitoring to avoid moral hazard.^[125]

Fiscal Policy and Structural Reforms

Bernanke consistently advocated for reforms to entitlement programs like Social Security and Medicare to mitigate fiscal imbalances driven by demographic pressures. In an October 2006 speech, he warned that the retirement of baby boomers would sharply increase program costs, projecting that Social Security and Medicare outlays could rise from 8% of GDP in 2006 to over 12% by 2030 without adjustments, imposing unfair burdens on younger workers through higher taxes or reduced benefits.^[126] Trustees' reports corroborated this, forecasting Social Security's Old-Age and Survivors Insurance trust fund depletion by 2033, after which benefits would cover only 77% of scheduled payments, and Medicare's Hospital Insurance fund exhaustion by 2026, limiting payouts to 89%. Post-crisis, in April 2010 testimony, Bernanke reiterated that sustaining these programs requires politically challenging choices, such as raising retirement ages, means-testing benefits, or increasing payroll taxes, to avert a broader fiscal crisis that could crowd out private investment and hinder growth.^[127] He argued against delaying action, noting that advanced economies like Japan illustrate risks of prolonged high debt without productivity gains, where public liabilities exceeding 200% of GDP have trapped growth below 1% annually since the 1990s despite low interest rates.^[128] On fiscal multipliers and austerity debates, Bernanke rejected exaggerated claims of stimulus efficacy in normal conditions, estimating in 2012 that multipliers for government spending typically range from 0.5 to 1.0, implying limited bang-for-buck compared to tax cuts or supply-side incentives that boost labor participation and innovation.^[129] He favored deficit reduction through entitlement restructuring and pro-growth tax reforms over indefinite spending, cautioning that unchecked deficits could trigger debt spirals if interest rates rise, as r-g dynamics (interest rate minus growth) turn adverse without offsetting productivity surges.^[130] This stance aligned with empirical evidence from post-2008 recoveries, where structural barriers like entitlement growth, not short-term austerity, prolonged sluggish output.^[124]

Post-Fed Career and Legacy

Brookings Institution and Advisory Roles

In February 2015, following his tenure as Federal Reserve Chairman, Ben Bernanke joined the Brookings Institution as a Distinguished Fellow in the Economic Studies program, a position he continues to hold.^[11] In this role, he has focused on research and analysis of monetary policy frameworks, producing reflective works such as his 2015 memoir The Courage to Act: A Memoir of a Crisis and Its Aftermath, which chronicles the Federal Reserve's response to the 2007–2008 financial crisis based on internal deliberations and decision-making processes.^[11] He followed this with 21st Century Monetary Policy: The Federal Reserve from the Great Inflation to COVID-19 in 2022, an empirical examination of U.S. monetary policy evolution, emphasizing data-driven lessons from inflation targeting and unconventional tools amid low interest rates. Bernanke's Brookings tenure has included advisory contributions to international central banking, such as evaluations of policy transmission in emerging markets, where he has highlighted empirical evidence of vulnerabilities in capital flow management and the need for robust lender-of-last-resort functions during crises.^[131] These insights draw on cross-country data showing that premature tightening in developing economies exacerbates output losses, contrasting with advanced economies' experiences under flexible inflation targeting.^[132] He has also critiqued threats to Federal Reserve independence, arguing from historical precedents that political interference undermines policy credibility and economic stability. For instance, Bernanke has referenced data from the 1970s, when President Richard Nixon's pressure on Fed Chair Arthur Burns contributed to loose monetary policy, fueling double-digit inflation rates averaging 7.1% annually from 1973 to 1982 and subsequent recessions.^[133] In a 2025 co-authored piece, he warned that eroding central bank autonomy through direct executive influence risks repeating such cycles, supported by econometric studies linking independence indices to lower inflation volatility across OECD countries since the 1980s.^[133]^[134]

Nobel Prize Recognition

In 2022, Ben Bernanke was awarded the Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel, sharing it with Douglas Diamond and Philip Dybvig, for research demonstrating how banking crises can propagate and deepen economic downturns.^[112] The Nobel committee highlighted Bernanke's empirical analysis of the Great Depression, which showed that bank failures and credit contractions amplified the initial downturn through non-monetary channels, such as reduced lending capacity independent of monetary policy.^[4] This work, the committee argued, provided theoretical foundations for preventing financial panics, influencing central bank strategies during the 2008 global financial crisis to maintain liquidity and avert systemic collapse.^[112] Bernanke's insights, drawn from historical data on 1930s banking panics, informed Federal Reserve actions under his chairmanship, including lender-of-last-resort operations and quantitative easing, which the committee credited with mitigating a repetition of past errors.^[112] Empirical evidence supports a relatively contained U.S. GDP contraction of 4.3% from peak to trough during the Great Recession, compared to over 20% in the Great Depression.^[72]^[135] Proponents attribute this disparity partly to proactive financial stabilization, avoiding the credit freezes that exacerbated 1930s output losses.^[112] Critics, however, contend that the award implicitly endorses bailout mechanisms that foster moral hazard, as government interventions signal reduced consequences for excessive risk-taking by financial institutions, potentially incentivizing future instability.^[136]^[137] Alternative analyses question the causal attribution of milder outcomes solely to Bernanke's research-applied policies, noting confounding factors like fiscal stimuli, international coordination, and pre-existing regulatory buffers that also moderated the 2008 downturn's severity.^[138] These dissenting views emphasize that while the theoretical contributions are valuable, empirical validation of policy efficacy remains debated, with long-term risks of distorted incentives unaddressed in the prize rationale.^[139]

Recent Reviews and Public Commentary

In April 2024, Bernanke published an independent review of the Bank of England's forecasting and model-building practices, commissioned in July 2023, identifying significant shortcomings in the integration of economic data, over-reliance on outdated models, and inadequate use of staff expertise for empirical analysis.^[140] The report recommended enhancements to forecasting infrastructure, including better data processing tools and modular modeling approaches to incorporate real-time evidence more effectively, alongside improved communication strategies to convey uncertainty and alternative scenarios transparently to policymakers and the public.^[141] These proposals aimed to foster greater empiricism in monetary policy by prioritizing data-driven adjustments over rigid theoretical frameworks.^[142] In May 2025, Bernanke proposed specific reforms to Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) communications, suggesting the quarterly release of staff economic forecasts to provide clearer guidance on policy projections and reduce ambiguity in forward guidance.^[132] Presented at the Federal Reserve's Thomas Laubach Research Conference, the proposal critiqued existing practices for insufficient transparency on internal analyses of inflation paths and potential policy errors, advocating for structured disclosures that highlight baseline assumptions and risks to enhance market understanding and accountability.^[143] This built on empirical observations from past cycles, where miscommunications exacerbated volatility, emphasizing the need for communications aligned with verifiable data rather than vague narratives.^[144] Throughout 2024 and into 2025, Bernanke commented on the U.S. economy's resilience amid Federal Reserve tightening, noting second-quarter 2024 GDP growth at 3% annualized and declining inflation primarily attributable to supply shocks from the COVID-19 pandemic and Ukraine war rather than persistent demand pressures.^[145] ^[146] He cautioned against over-tightening monetary policy, highlighting downward revisions in growth and inflation forecasts but underscoring the economy's avoidance of recession through adaptive fiscal measures and labor market strength.^[147] In January 2025 discussions, including at the American Economic Association meetings, Bernanke analyzed potential inflationary effects of proposed tariffs and tax cuts, arguing they might not materialize as expected due to offsetting supply-side dynamics and historical precedents.^[148] ^[149] These views stressed causal realism in attributing inflation persistence to transient shocks, urging data-dependent policy to prevent unnecessary economic drag.^[150]

Personal Life and Honors

Family and Private Life

Bernanke married Anna Friedmann on May 29, 1978, whom he met on a blind date while she was a senior at Wellesley College.^[6] Friedmann, born in Rome to immigrant parents, later worked as a public schoolteacher.^[6] The couple has two children: a son, Joel, born in 1982, and a daughter, Alyssa, born in 1986.^[2] Bernanke and his family have maintained a low public profile throughout his career, in contrast to some predecessors.^[151]

Awards and Academic Honors

Bernanke held the Guggenheim Fellowship and the Alfred P. Sloan Research Fellowship during his early academic career, supporting his research on economic history and monetary policy.^[11]^[1] He was elected a Fellow of the Econometric Society in 1997, recognizing his contributions to econometric methods in macroeconomics.^[152] In 2001, he became a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, an honor for distinguished scholars in various fields.^[11] Bernanke was also appointed to the National Academy of Sciences, affirming his scholarly influence on economic research.^[2] In 2016, Princeton University awarded him an honorary Doctor of Laws degree, citing his leadership during the financial crisis and academic legacy.^[153] His work on the Great Depression, particularly empirical analyses of banking panics, has garnered extensive citations, with key papers exceeding 10,000 references in economic literature, underscoring its foundational role in understanding financial crises.^[11] These recognitions highlight Bernanke's pre-policy academic stature, independent of his later public service roles.

References

[1]
Ben S. Bernanke - Federal Reserve History
Bernanke was born in Augusta, Georgia, and grew up in Dillon, South Carolina. He received a bachelor's degree in economics in 1975 from Harvard University ( ...
[2]
Ben Bernanke – Biographical - NobelPrize.org
Iwas born December 13, 1953, in Augusta, Georgia, but spent my childhood and teenage years in Dillon, South Carolina. Dillon, a town of about 6,000 people, lies ...
[3]
Biography of Dr. Ben S. Bernanke
Jun 21, 2005 · Dr. Bernanke was born on December 13, 1953, in Augusta, Georgia. He received a BA in economics in 1975 from Harvard University (summa cum laude) and a Ph.D. in ...
[4]
Ben Bernanke – Facts – 2022 - NobelPrize.org
Bernanke's research shows that bank crises can potentially have catastrophic consequences. This insight illustrates the importance of well-functioning bank ...
[5]
Ben Bernanke awarded Nobel Prize in economics | Brookings
The Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences awarded the Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel 2022 to Ben Bernanke.
[6]
Is Ben Bernanke Having Fun Yet? - The New York Times
May 15, 2010 · Bernanke's father, was born in Washington Heights, and the family moved in 1941 to Dillon, S.C., where it opened the Jay Bee drugstore ...Missing: background childhood parents
[7]
Ben Bernanke - Person of the Year 2009 - TIME
Dec 16, 2009 · His mother Edna was a teacher; his father Phil was a pharmacist. Ben inherited their love of learning. "He always wanted me to read to him," ...Missing: childhood | Show results with:childhood
[8]
Fed Nominee Bernanke Was Molded By Upbringing in Small-town ...
Nov 18, 2005 · Born in Augusta, Ga., one of three children, Bernanke grew up among only a handful of Jewish families in Dillon, where his parents ran a ...
[9]
Ben Bernanke in charge of the Federal Reserve - Morashá
In the first half of the 60s, Ben Shalom Bernanke, son of Phillip and Edna, was a teenager who helped with services at the small synagogue in Dillon, a city ...Missing: background parents
[10]
Schoolmates asked if I had horns, recalls Bernanke
Oct 2, 2015 · In new memoir, the ex-Federal Reserve chair describes growing up as a Jewish outsider in South Carolina.Missing: Mormonism conversion
[11]
Ben S. Bernanke - Brookings Institution
Dr. Bernanke was born in December 1953 in Augusta, Georgia, and grew up in Dillon, South Carolina. He received a Bachelor of Arts degree in economics ...
[12]
Ben Bernanke: The Right Man at the Right Time - ECONS.ONLINE
Dec 16, 2022 · His principal faculty advisor at MIT was Stanley Fischer (future first deputy managing director of the IMF from 1994 to 2001, chairman of the ...Missing: PhD | Show results with:PhD
[13]
The education of Ben Bernanke - The New York Times
Jan 17, 2008 · Ben Bernanke's first exposure to monetary policy was reading the works of Milton Friedman, the Nobel laureate. That was 30 years ago, when ...Missing: mentors | Show results with:mentors
[14]
Long-term commitments, dynamic optimization, and the business ...
Long-term commitments, dynamic optimization, and the business cycle. Author(s). Bernanke, Ben ... Thesis (Ph. D)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept.
[15]
[PDF] FORMER FED CHAIRMAN BEN BERNANKE REFLECTS ON HIS ...
Feb 10, 2016 · ... graduate school – you didn't mention Stan Fischer, who was my thesis adviser, Ph.D. adviser in at MIT. People probably know he's now the ...
[16]
Ben Bernanke PhD '79 awarded a share of the Nobel Prize in ...
Oct 10, 2022 · Ben Bernanke, who earned his PhD from MIT in 1979, has been named a co-winner of the 2022 Nobel Prize in economic sciences.
[17]
Ben Bernanke, former Princeton professor and economics ...
Oct 10, 2022 · Ben Bernanke, a Princeton professor of economics and public affairs from 1985 to 2002, chairman of the economics department from 1996 to 2002, and founder of ...Missing: influences mentors
[18]
[PDF] Ben S Bernanke: The financial accelerator and the credit channel
Jun 15, 2007 · The only difference is that the financial accelerator focuses on the ultimate borrowers. – firms and households – whereas financial ...
[19]
[PDF] Evidence from the Global Financial Crisis - Brookings Institution
In the financial accelerator model of Bernanke and Mark Gertler (1989), endogenous deterioration of the net worth of borrowers in an economic downturn, and ...
[20]
[PDF] Banking, Credit, and Economic Fluctuations - Nobel Prize
Bernanke, Ben. 1983. “Nonmonetary Effects of the Financial Crisis in the Propaga- tion of the Great Depression.” American Economic Review 73 (3): 257–76 ...
[21]
Nonmonetary Effects of the Financial Crisis in the Propagation ... - jstor
23The effect of bank failures on credit outstanding is somewhat exaggerated by the fact that the credit con- traction measure includes the loans of suspending ...
[22]
https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.73.3.257
[23]
https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.79.1.14
[24]
Inside the Black Box: The Credit Channel of Monetary Policy ...
Inside the Black Box: The Credit Channel of Monetary Policy Transmission by Ben S. Bernanke and Mark Gertler. Published in volume 9, issue 4, pages 27-48 of ...
[25]
https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691118208/essays-on-the-great-depression
[26]
[PDF] Economic Report of the President - GovInfo
Feb 13, 2006 · In 2005, the Nation's real gross domestic product (GDP) grew 3.5 percent for the year, above the historical average. About 2 million payroll ...
[27]
THE OUTLOOK FOR THE ECONOMY AND FOR POLICY
THE OUTLOOK FOR THE ECONOMY AND FOR POLICY. By Ben S. Bernanke Chairman, President's Council of Economic Advisers at the National Association for Business ...Missing: reports | Show results with:reports
[28]
Bernanke: There's no housing bubble to go bust - NBC News
Oct 27, 2005 · Ben S. Bernanke does not think the national housing boom is a bubble that is about to burst, he indicated to Congress last week.Missing: CEA | Show results with:CEA
[29]
THE ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: By Ben Bernanke, Chairman ...
Oct 20, 2005 · The US economy is in the midst of a strong and sustainable economic expansion. Over the past four quarters real GDP has grown at a 3.6 percent rate.
[30]
Speech, Bernanke --Deflation-- November 21, 2002
Nov 21, 2002 · By moving decisively and early, the Fed may be able to prevent the economy from slipping into deflation, with the special problems that entails.Missing: 2002-2005 | Show results with:2002-2005
[31]
FRB Speech, Bernanke -- Asset-price "bubbles" and monetary policy
Oct 15, 2002 · Most seriously, it permitted a severe deflation in the price level, which drove real interest rates sky-high and greatly increased the pressure ...Missing: 2002-2005 | Show results with:2002-2005<|separator|>
[32]
How the Greenspan and Bernanke Fed Created Bubbles
Oct 31, 2017 · During the Greenspan-Bernanke reign, and contrary to the Fed's claims, the central bank overreacted to both real and perceived crises and ...Missing: soft landing 2002-2005
[33]
[PDF] Global Saving Glut, Monetary Policy, and Housing Bubble
Bernanke (2005, 2007, 2009, 2010, 2011), a Distinguished Fellow at Brookings. Institution and former Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve.Missing: tenure hikes
[34]
President Appoints Dr. Ben Bernanke for Chairman of the Federal ...
Oct 24, 2005 · President George W. Bush announces his nomination of Ben Bernanke, right, to replace Alan Greenspan, left, as Chairman of the Federal Reserve.
[35]
Ben S. Bernanke sworn in as fourteenth Chairman of the Board of ...
Feb 1, 2006 · Ben S. Bernanke on Wednesday became the fourteenth Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the Chairman of the ...
[36]
[PDF] Ben S Bernanke: The Federal Reserve - looking back, looking forward
Jan 3, 2014 · In less than a month my term as Fed Chairman will end. Needless to say, my tenure has been eventful – for the Federal Reserve, ...
[37]
The History and Future of the Federal Reserve's 2 Percent Target ...
Jun 15, 2023 · The 2 percent target was officially adopted in January 2012 under the leadership of then- Chair Ben Bernanke. More on: United States · Federal ...
[38]
Federal Funds Rate History 1990 to 2025 – Forbes Advisor
Sep 18, 2025 · Rate Change (bps), Federal Funds Rate. Jun. 29, 2006. +25. 5.25%. May. 10, 2006. +25. 5.00%. Mar. 28, 2006. +25. 4.75%. Jan. 31, 2006. +25. 4.50 ...
[39]
Reflections on the Yield Curve and Monetary Policy
Mar 20, 2006 · At less than 4-3/4 percent, that yield is not much above the target federal funds rate of 4-1/2 percent and, indeed, is about even with yields ...
[40]
Semiannual Monetary Policy Report to the Congress
Jul 19, 2006 · US Senate Chairman Bernanke presented identical testimony before the Committee on Financial Services, US House of Representatives, on July 20, 2006.
[41]
Developments in the financial markets - Federal Reserve Board
Apr 3, 2008 · Chairman Ben S. Bernanke ... Over the following weekend, JPMorgan Chase agreed to purchase Bear Stearns and assumed Bear's financial obligations.
[42]
The Federal Reserve's Balance Sheet: An Update
Oct 8, 2009 · In March 2008, following a sharp deterioration in funding conditions and the near failure of the investment bank Bear Stearns, the Federal ...
[43]
Some Reflections on the Crisis and the Policy Response
Apr 13, 2012 · This unstable dynamic was operating in full force around the time of the near failure of Bear Stearns in March 2008, and again during the ...
[44]
Which Dealers Borrowed from the Fed's Lender-of-Last-Resort ...
May 10, 2017 · After Lehman, borrowing rose sharply to a peak of almost $130 billion in late September 2008, before tailing off as market conditions improved.
[45]
Troubled Asset Relief Program and the Federal Reserve's liquidity ...
Nov 18, 2008 · The legislation that created the TARP put in place a Financial Stability Oversight Board to review the actions of the Treasury in administering ...
[46]
Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) - Treasury
The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 established OFS within the Office of Domestic Finance at the Department of the Treasury to implement TARP.
[47]
The Crisis and the Policy Response - Federal Reserve Board
Jan 13, 2009 · Those measures, together with analogous actions in many other countries, likely prevented a global financial meltdown in the fall that, had ...
[48]
Bernanke: Fed actions prevented a depression - Washington Times
Mar 28, 2012 · “The Great Depression informed the Fed's actions ... the Fed chairman is delivering his last lecture addressing the 2008 financial crisis.
[49]
So Why Did the Fed Let Lehman Fail? - American Enterprise Institute
Jul 18, 2016 · Economist Laurence Ball argues that the Bernanke Fed had the legal authority to have saved Lehman Brothers back in 2008.
[50]
Ben Bernanke Led the Fed During the Global Financial Crisis
Oct 10, 2022 · Bernanke's track record on the crisis included controversy. The Fed and Treasury Department allowed Lehman Brothers to fail, which Mr. Bernanke ...
[51]
[PDF] Governmental Intervention in an Economic Crisis
Critics of the government's interventions worry that the prospect of government rescues creates moral hazard because creditors of a major bank expect the bank ...
[52]
Monetary Policy since the Onset of the Crisis - Federal Reserve Board
Aug 31, 2012 · Bernanke, Ben S. (2003). "Some Thoughts on Monetary Policy in Japan," speech delivered at the Japan Society of Monetary Economics, Tokyo ...
[53]
[PDF] The New Tools of Monetary Policy American Economic Association ...
Jan 4, 2020 · First, although the weaker effects on asset prices found in event studies of later rounds of. QE could be the result of the calmer market ...
[54]
Timeline: Fed's Bernanke saw U.S. economy through turbulent times
Jan 29, 2014 · November 25, 2008 - Fed launches first round of quantitative easing, or QE1, with plans to buy up to $500 billion in mortgage-backed securities ...
[55]
[PDF] How Quantitative Easing Works: Evidence on the Refinancing ...
Importantly, we find that the QE1-induced reduction in interest rates can only explain about 25–45% of the observed increase in the refinancing volume, meaning ...
[56]
[PDF] Did Quantitative Easing Work? - Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia
As former Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke quipped in 2012, “Well, the problem with QE is it works in practice, but it doesn't work in theory.” So what is the ...
[57]
What Was the Fed's Operation Twist? - The Balance
Jun 25, 2019 · The Fed later launched QE3 and announced that it would remain in effect until unemployment fell to 6.5 percent or inflation rose to 2.5 percent.
[58]
Monetary policy and inequality - Brookings Institution
Jun 1, 2015 · The claim that Fed policy has worsened inequality usually begins with the (correct) observation that monetary easing works in part by raising asset prices, ...
[59]
[PDF] Did Quantitative Easing Increase Income Inequality?
Critics have argued that by raising asset prices, near-zero interest rates and QE have significantly contributed to increases in inequality, while practitioners ...
[60]
Ben S. Bernanke formally sworn in to second term as chairman of ...
Feb 3, 2010 · Chairman Bernanke began his second term on February 1 following his confirmation by the Senate on January 28 and a hearing on December 3 by the ...
[61]
U.S. Senate confirms Bernanke for a second term
Jan 28, 2010 · The Senate voted 70-30 on Thursday to reappoint Bernanke amid criticism of his judgment ahead of the financial crisis and his support for ...
[62]
Fed Chief Warns of 'Major Crisis' If Debt Ceiling Not Lifted - Bloomberg
Jul 13, 2011 · Federal Reserve Chairman Ben S. Bernanke told Congress that a failure by Congress to raise the nation's $14.3 trillion debt limit would lead ...
[63]
Under Questioning from Reed, Bernanke Warns Government ...
Jul 14, 2011 · He has warned that failing to raise the $14.3 trillion U.S. debt ceiling by August 2nd would hurt the economy, wipe out Americans' savings, ...
[64]
The European Economic and Financial Situation
Mar 21, 2012 · In the United States, these pullbacks decreased stock prices, increased the costs of issuing corporate debt, and reduced consumer and business ...Missing: impact | Show results with:impact
[65]
Bernanke says Fed to act if Europe crisis deepens | Reuters
Jun 7, 2012 · He told Congress the Fed was closely monitoring "significant risks" to the U.S. recovery from Europe's debt crisis but struck a decidedly ...
[66]
Communication and Monetary Policy - Federal Reserve Board
Nov 19, 2013 · In August 2011, the Committee introduced a specific date into its guidance ... Although the date-based forward guidance appears to have affected ...
[67]
The Federal Reserve and Monetary Policy Communications
Jan 17, 2018 · ” In August 2011, this qualitative forward guidance changed to calendar-date guidance when the FOMC said it anticipated an exceptionally low ...
[68]
What does the Federal Reserve mean when it talks about tapering?
Jan 27, 2022 · In Congressional testimony on May 21, 2013, Fed Chair Ben Bernanke gave the first public signal that a taper was on the horizon. “If we see ...Missing: details | Show results with:details
[69]
No taper tantrum this time? - FRED Blog
Aug 30, 2021 · ... 2013. On May 22, 2013, Federal Reserve Chair Ben Bernanke announced that the Fed would start tapering asset purchases at some future date ...Missing: details | Show results with:details
[70]
Don't Look to the 2013 Tantrum for the Effect of Tapering on ...
Aug 10, 2021 · In May 2013, then-Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke first suggested that the Fed would begin reducing its program of asset purchases—Treasuries and ...Missing: details | Show results with:details
[71]
Great Recession vs. Great Depression: How They Compare
Over that period, real GDP fell by about a third, 36.2%. The unemployment rate touched over 25%, peaked out at 25%. And the price level fell by about a third, ...
[72]
The Great Recession and Its Aftermath - Federal Reserve History
In September, Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy, and the next day the Federal Reserve provided support to AIG, a large insurance and financial services ...
[73]
[PDF] Tackling too-big-to-fail banks: Have the reforms been effective?
Jul 9, 2020 · Before the 2008 financial crisis, banks that were considered to be too-big-to-fail in effect enjoyed an implicit subsidy from the state. This is ...
[74]
Twelve Years after the Financial Crisis—Too-big-to-fail is still with us
The too-big-to-fail problem remains due to the inability to resolve systemically important institutions without significant fallout for the financial system.
[75]
Too-Big-To-Fail: Why Megabanks Have Not Become Smaller Since ...
A financial institution becomes 'too-big-to-fail' when it grows so large that its failure threatens the integrity of the financial system and of the national ...
[76]
Wall Street, Main Street, and Wages After the Bailouts | Brookings
Dec 15, 2011 · The average wage rose more rapidly in each financial industry than in the economy as a whole since the economic recovery began.
[77]
Quantitative Easing and Wealth Inequality: The Asset Price Channel
Feb 8, 2023 · For the majority of the countries under review, expansionary QE via asset prices leads to net wealth inequality increases when measured using ...Introduction · The macroeconomic effects of... · Heterogeneity in returns to...
[78]
Press Releases - Federal Reserve Board
The Federal Reserve Bank of New York to lend up to $85 billion to the American International Group (AIG) under section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act.
[79]
Actions Related to AIG - FEDERAL RESERVE BANK of NEW YORK
In September 2008, the Federal Reserve extended credit to American International Group, Inc. (AIG) to preserve the stability of an already fragile U.S. ...
[80]
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB122156561931242905
[81]
Government Assistance for AIG: Summary and Cost - Congress.gov
On September 16, 2008, the Fed announced, after consultation with the Treasury Department, that it would lend up to $85 billion to AIG over the next two years.
[82]
AIG | Eye on the Bailout | ProPublica
The Federal Reserve ultimately realized a profit of about $17.7 billion from its role in AIG's bailout.
[83]
Fed says taxpayers earned $17.7 billion from AIG bailout
Aug 24, 2012 · The New York Fed said the final sale of its AIG-related securities resulted in a $6.6-billion profit, which was added to gains of about $11 ...Missing: repayment | Show results with:repayment<|separator|>
[84]
The Fall of AIG: The Untold Story | Institutional Investor
Apr 7, 2010 · By selling something that became known as “credit default swaps” to nervous investors, AIG agreed to pay off the defaulted debt at 100 cents on ...
[85]
The great untangling - The Economist
Nov 6, 2008 · A lack of disclosure on CDS exposures has frequently led the market to overestimate risks: had it been realised that settlement payments on ...
[86]
Goldman had $20 billion in AIG CDS exposure: Willumstad | Reuters
Oct 7, 2008 · Goldman Sachs had purchased $20 billion worth of protection from American International Group in the credit default swap market, ...
[87]
Acquisition of Merrill Lynch by Bank of America
Jun 25, 2009 · On September 15, 2008, Bank of America announced an agreement to acquire Merrill Lynch. I did not play a role in arranging this transaction and ...Missing: facilitation | Show results with:facilitation
[88]
Acquisition of Merrill Lynch by Bank of America : Testimony before ...
As with similar transactions, the transaction was reviewed and approved by the Federal Reserve under the Bank Holding Company Act in November 2008. It was ...Missing: facilitation | Show results with:facilitation
[89]
Bernanke testifies to panel on BofA-Merrill deal | Reuters
Jun 25, 2009 · "I believe that the Federal Reserve acted with the highest integrity throughout its discussions with Bank of America regarding that company's ...
[90]
How Bank of America Execs Hid Losses -- In Their Own Words
Jun 4, 2012 · A suit reveals how Bank of America knew about big losses at Merrill Lynch before the companies merged but didn't tell shareholders.
[91]
Merrill Losses Were Withheld Before Bank of America Deal - CNBC
Jun 4, 2012 · The suit, filed on behalf of Bank of America shareholders, asserts that the bank's executives misled them by not disclosing Merrill's mounting ...
[92]
Merrill Lynch Takeover by Bank of America - Seven Pillars Institute
This case study on financial ethics discusses the Merrill Lynch takeover by Bank of America in 2008 that resulted in a $2.43 billion class-action lawsuit.
[93]
Email alias of former Fed chair Bernanke comes out in AIG trial
Oct 10, 2014 · Aka: Ben Bernanke, the former chairman of the U.S. Federal Reserve. Lawyers during the trial identified Quince as Bernanke in the email. The ...
[94]
https://www.wsj.com/articles/bernanke-used-pseudonym-in-emails-during-crisis-1412903443
[95]
New York Federal Reserve Bank/AIG Bailout Documents
Apr 21, 2016 · The documents produced by the New York Fed tell the story of an insider-friendly transaction planned and executed in secret.Missing: internal | Show results with:internal
[96]
Ben Bernanke used a secret identity to send emails during the ...
Oct 9, 2014 · Bernanke adopted the alias Edward Quince in a series of emails with colleagues about the precarious financial situation insurance giant American International ...
[97]
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/how-edward-quince-helmed-fed-through-2008-crisis-2014-10-09
[98]
https://www.wsj.com/articles/BL-REB-28353
[99]
Grading Bernanke: A Symposium | American Enterprise Institute - AEI
... low interest rates, which generate malinvestment in capital goods sectors such as housing. Because this capital investment is not backed by real savings ...
[100]
[PDF] Rethinking Credit Risk under the Malinvestment Concept: The Case ...
Low interest rates, low credit risk, and excessive loan growth create malinvestment in the economy. Banks suffer from nonperforming loans because of ...
[101]
Here's Why the Fed Plan Is Failing: We're All Austrians Now - CNBC
Nov 23, 2010 · Top that off with the very public criticism of Ben Bernanke's zero-interest rate plus quantitative easing policy. While much of this is ...
[102]
Factors of global inflation in 2021–2022
Oct 3, 2023 · Global inflation in 2021-2022 was caused by an imbalance between increased demand and supply constraints, supported by fiscal stimulus and low ...
[103]
Calling a recession and blaming it on interest rates
Jul 31, 2022 · According to Chancellor, ultra low interest rates led to 'malinvestment' and thus low productivity. It's true that much of the investment made ...
[104]
How Federal Reserve Quantitative Easing Expanded Wealth ...
Jun 25, 2015 · Looking at economic trends globally also offers insight into links between quantitative easing and wealth inequality. According to new research ...<|control11|><|separator|>
[105]
Wealth Disparities before and after the Great Recession - PMC - NIH
Based on PSID data (top row), the Gini coefficient – a measure of inequality across the entire distribution – rose from 0.81 in 2003 to 0.83 in 2007 and to 0.89 ...
[106]
Dodd-Frank Made the Largest Banks Larger While Suffocating ...
Jul 24, 2019 · “It was Dodd-Frank and the resulting 400 new financial regulations that have forced consolidation in the financial services industry. “It is my ...Missing: concentration 2008
[107]
Did the Dodd-Frank Act Make the Financial System Safer?
Feb 19, 2017 · Two aims of the Dodd-Frank Act were to improve large banks' resiliency and reduce the impact of their failures or material weaknesses.
[108]
[PDF] Systemic Risk after Dodd-Frank - Scholarship Archive
Section 956 of the Dodd-Frank Act authorizes federal banking and securities regulators to adopt rules restricting the ability of executive officers, employees, ...
[109]
The Impact of the Dodd-Frank Act on Financial Stability and ...
Jan 1, 2017 · This article assesses the benefits and costs of key provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act that strengthened regulation following the financial crisis.
[110]
Non-Monetary Effects of the Financial Crisis in the Propagation of ...
Jan 1, 1983 · We argue that the financial disruptions of 1930-33 reduced the efficiency of the credit allocation process; and that the resulting higher cost ...
[111]
Nobel Lecture: Banking, Credit, and Economic Fluctuations
I present evidence that financial distress and disrupted credit markets were important sources of the Great Depression of the 1930s and the Great Recession of ...
[112]
The Prize in Economic Sciences 2022 - Press release - NobelPrize.org
Oct 10, 2022 · Among other things, he showed how bank runs were a decisive factor in the crisis becoming so deep and prolonged.
[113]
[PDF] NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES NON—MONETARY EFFECTS ...
NON—MONETARY EFFECTS OF THE FINANCIAL. CRISIS IN THE PROPAGATION OF THE GREAT DEPRESSION. Ben S. Bernanke. Working Paper No. 10514. NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC ...
[114]
The Great Depression - Federal Reserve History
Bernanke, like other economic historians, characterized the Great Depression as a disaster because of its length, depth, and consequences. The Depression lasted ...
[115]
[PDF] Prize lecture: Banking, Credit, and Economic Fluctuations
Dec 8, 2022 · The Depression saw a near-collapse of banking and credit markets in the United. States and other countries (Bernanke, 1983). About 40 percent of ...
[116]
[PDF] Moral Hazard and the Financial Crisis
Unlike him, however, I believe that moral hazard is a (much) underrated prob- lem: moral hazard played a central role in the events leading up to the crisis, ...
[117]
The Courage to Refuse | Cato at Liberty Blog
Oct 31, 2015 · According to Bernanke's own summary of that dictum, central bankers faced with a crisis should “lend freely at a high interest rate, against ...Missing: critiques | Show results with:critiques
[118]
FRB Speech, Bernanke--A perspective on inflation targeting
Mar 25, 2003 · Bernanke, Ben, and Frederic Mishkin (1997). "Inflation Targeting: A New Framework for Monetary Policy?" Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol.Missing: biography | Show results with:biography<|separator|>
[119]
[PDF] Inflation Targeting: A New Framework for Monetary Policy?
The adoption of inflation targeting is often linked with changes in the laws or administrative arrangements associated with the central bank. Typically ...
[120]
Alternatives to the Fed's 2 percent inflation target - Brookings Institution
Jun 7, 2018 · In 2012, at the urging of then-Chair Ben Bernanke, the Fed formally and publicly announced that they were targeting a 2 percent inflation rate.
[121]
The Taylor Rule: A benchmark for monetary policy? | Brookings
Apr 28, 2015 · Ben Bernanke explains why he disagrees with John Taylor's characterization of the Fed's monetary policies and why the Fed should not use the ...
[122]
Taylor On Bernanke: Monetary Rules Work Better Than 'Constrained ...
May 4, 2015 · In a recent blog post Ben Bernanke criticized the use of rules-based monetary policy in which the central bank endeavors to set the instruments ...
[123]
[PDF] Ben S Bernanke: Inflation expectations and inflation forecasting
Jul 10, 2007 · To the extent that the Phillips curve may have flattened, inflation will now tend to be more stable than in the past in the face of ...Missing: breakdown | Show results with:breakdown
[124]
[PDF] MONETARY POLICY IN A NEW ERA Ben S. Bernanke Brookings ...
Oct 2, 2017 · The general thesis that independent central bankers have longer horizons, and are thus ... the Fed near its inflation and unemployment objectives.Missing: undergraduate | Show results with:undergraduate
[125]
Ben Bernanke defends quantitative easing, seeks to define his ...
Jan 16, 2014 · Asked if the Fed's efforts to fuel growth are creating asset-price bubbles, Bernanke said the Fed is “extraordinarily sensitive” to risks of ...
[126]
The Coming Demographic Transition: Will We Treat Future ...
Oct 4, 2006 · The Coming Demographic Transition: Will We Treat Future Generations Fairly? Chairman Ben S. Bernanke ... Social Security and Medicare together.
[127]
Achieving Fiscal Sustainability - Federal Reserve Board
Apr 27, 2010 · Choices regarding Medicare, Social Security, and other spending programs cannot be made in a vacuum but must be combined with decisions ...
[128]
[PDF] Some reflections on Japanese monetary policy - Brookings Institution
May 24, 2017 · Bernanke, Reinhart, and Sack (2004) found that forward guidance and asset purchases seemed less effective in Japan than in the United States. 3 ...
[129]
Testimony by Chairman Bernanke on economic outlook and policy
Jun 7, 2012 · Fortunately, avoiding the fiscal cliff and achieving long-term fiscal sustainability are fully compatible and mutually reinforcing objectives.
[130]
Speech by Chairman Bernanke on fiscal sustainability
Jun 14, 2011 · We cannot reasonably expect to grow our way out of our fiscal imbalances, but a more productive economy will ease the tradeoffs that we face.Missing: post- comments
[131]
Ben S. Bernanke - European Central Bank
Ben S. Bernanke is a Distinguished Fellow in Residence with the Economic Studies Program at the Brookings Institution and also serves as a Senior Advisor to ...<|separator|>
[132]
Improving Fed communications: A proposal from Ben Bernanke
May 16, 2025 · Former Fed chair Ben Bernanke reviews the Fed's current communications practices and offering two tangible suggestions for improvement.
[133]
Ben Bernanke and Janet Yellen: The Fed Must Be Independent
Jul 21, 2025 · Political pressure interferes with a mandate to work for stable prices and maximum employment.
[134]
Why is the Federal Reserve independent, and what does that mean ...
Mar 17, 2025 · Independence means that the Fed can set interest rates without interference from Congress or the White House even if politicians are unhappy with Fed policy.Missing: critiques | Show results with:critiques
[135]
The U.S. Labor Market During and After the Great Recession
The Great Depression was substantially larger, involving a decline of over 20 percent of GDP and a rise in unemployment rates of about twenty percentage points ...
[136]
https://www.barrons.com/articles/ben-bernanke-deserve-nobel-prize-51665755565
[137]
The Problem with Bernanke's Nobel Prize - InvestSMART
Oct 12, 2022 · ... moral hazard' – insurance would undermine bankers' sensitivity to risk. This dilemma is still unresolved. But today's quandary is trickier ...
[138]
Nobels and financial crises - The Grumpy Economist
Oct 14, 2022 · Bernanke pointed out that banks matter. In the Great Depression, banks failed, and there was nobody left who knew how to make new loans. The ...
[139]
[PDF] FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION AND THE ECONOMY - Nobel Prize
Oct 10, 2022 · The result was a severe credit crunch affecting primarily households, farms, and small businesses, and this deepened and prolonged the Great ...
[140]
Forecasting for Monetary Policy making and communication: A Review
Apr 12, 2024 · In July 2023 the Court of the Bank of England announced that Dr Ben Bernanke would lead an independent review into the Bank's forecasting ...
[141]
Forecasting for monetary policy making and communication at the ...
Apr 12, 2024 · Response of the Bank of England to the Bernanke review of forecasting for monetary policy making and communication at the Bank of England.<|control11|><|separator|>
[142]
Why did the Bank of England need a review of its forecasting record?
May 31, 2024 · The Bank of England seriously underestimated the impact that the energy crisis following Russia's invasion of Ukraine would have on UK inflation.
[143]
[PDF] Improving Fed Communications: A Proposal - Federal Reserve Board
Improving Fed Communications: A Proposal. Ben S. Bernanke. Distinguished Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution. May 16, 2025. Page 2. The FOMC's ...
[144]
Bernanke on Federal Reserve Communication
Jun 4, 2025 · Ben Bernanke (Nobel '22) offers some ideas in “Improving Fed Communications: A Proposal,” presented at the Fed's Second Thomas Laubach Research Conference.Missing: improvements | Show results with:improvements
[145]
Yellen, Bernanke see the US economy avoiding a recession
Sep 26, 2024 · Their comments come as fresh data on economic growth showed the latest second quarter gross domestic product estimate was 3% annualized growth ...
[146]
[PDF] Pandemic and War Inflation: Lessons from the International ...
The inflation surge in the U.S. and abroad was set in motion by two global events: the. COVID-19 pandemic and Russia's invasion of Ukraine. The exceptional ...
[147]
Inflation's persistence, the Fed and expansionary fiscal policy
Sep 2, 2025 · Research at 10 central banks confirmed Bernanke and Blanchard's findings that shortages and price shocks drove the initial surge in global ...
[148]
Trump's policies may not prove inflationary, Bernanke, others say
Jan 6, 2025 · President-elect Donald Trump's plans to broaden tariffs, cut taxes and curb immigration may not prove as inflationary as early analysis had suggested.
[149]
Inflation and the Macroeconomy - The Grumpy Economist
Jan 4, 2025 · ... 2025 American Economic Association annual meetings, with Jason Furman, Ben Bernanke, and Christina Romer.<|control11|><|separator|>
[150]
A Look at Recent Inflation through the Lens of a Macroeconomic ...
Jan 6, 2025 · For instance, former Fed Chair Ben Bernanke and Olivier Blanchard argued that inflation was primarily driven by external price shocks ...<|separator|>
[151]
In First Crisis on the Job, Bernanke's About-Face Is Weighed
Aug 20, 2007 · He and his wife, Anna, a public high school teacher in Washington, lead a low-key private life, in contrast to Mr. Greenspan and his wife ...
[152]
Current Fellows | The Econometric Society
Ben S. Bernanke, Brookings Institution, elected 1997. Ernst Berndt, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Sloan School of Management, elected 1994. Douglas ...
[153]
Princeton awards six honorary degrees
May 31, 2016 · Princeton awards six honorary degrees ; Bernanke. Ben Bernanke, Doctor of Laws ; Foner. Eric Foner, Doctor of Humane Letters ; Hu. Shuli Hu, Doctor ...