Carhart four-factor model
The Carhart four-factor model is an asset pricing framework developed by finance researcher Mark M. Carhart in 1997 to explain the cross-section of expected stock returns and evaluate mutual fund performance persistence, extending the Fama-French three-factor model by incorporating a momentum factor that captures the tendency of past winning stocks to outperform past losers.[1] The model posits that asset returns can be decomposed into exposure to four systematic risk factors, allowing for the identification of abnormal performance (alpha) after adjusting for these risks, and it has become a standard tool in empirical finance for performance attribution and anomaly testing.[1]
The model's mathematical formulation is given by the time-series regression equation:
R_{i,t} - R_{f,t} = \alpha_i + \beta_i (R_{m,t} - R_{f,t}) + s_i \cdot SMB_t + h_i \cdot HML_t + m_i \cdot PR1YR_t + \epsilon_{i,t}
where R_{i,t} - R_{f,t} is the excess return of asset or portfolio i in month t, \alpha_i represents the intercept or abnormal return, \beta_i, s_i, h_i, and m_i are the sensitivities to the respective factors, and \epsilon_{i,t} is the idiosyncratic error term.[1]
The four factors are constructed as follows:
- Market factor (RMRF): The excess return on a broad market portfolio (typically the value-weighted CRSP index) over the one-month Treasury bill rate, capturing overall market risk.[1]
- Size factor (SMB): The difference in returns between small-capitalization and large-capitalization stock portfolios, reflecting the historical premium for smaller firms.[1]
- Value factor (HML): The difference in returns between high book-to-market (value) and low book-to-market (growth) stock portfolios, accounting for the value premium.[1]
- Momentum factor (PR1YR): The difference in returns between portfolios of stocks with the highest and lowest returns over the prior 12 months (excluding the most recent month to avoid short-term reversal effects), capturing the momentum anomaly.[1]
Carhart's empirical application demonstrated that the model largely explains observed persistence in mutual fund returns through common factor exposures and trading costs, rather than superior stock-picking skill, with the momentum factor proving particularly effective in reducing pricing errors compared to prior models.[1] Since its introduction, the framework has been extensively validated and extended in international markets and across asset classes, influencing risk-adjusted performance metrics in investment management.
Overview
Definition
The Carhart four-factor model is a multifactor asset pricing framework designed to explain the cross-section of average stock returns by extending the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) and the Fama-French three-factor model through the incorporation of a momentum factor. This model posits that stock or portfolio returns can be attributed to exposures to four systematic risk factors: market risk, size, value, and momentum, rather than solely to market beta as in the CAPM. Unlike the CAPM, which relies on a single market risk premium to adjust for systematic risk, the Carhart model provides a more comprehensive risk adjustment by accounting for additional dimensions of return variation observed in equity markets.[1]
The primary purpose of the Carhart four-factor model is to decompose mutual fund or portfolio performance into contributions from these common risk factors, thereby distinguishing between returns driven by systematic risks and those potentially attributable to manager skill or alpha. By doing so, it helps mitigate the misattribution of performance to managerial ability when, in fact, much of the observed persistence in returns stems from factor exposures and costs rather than stock-picking expertise.
Originally developed to analyze U.S. equity mutual funds using data from NYSE, Amex, and Nasdaq stocks, the model has since been applied more broadly to global equity markets to evaluate performance and anomalies.[1]
The Carhart four-factor model extends the Fama-French three-factor model by incorporating a momentum factor, expressed through the following time-series regression equation:
r_{i,t} = \alpha_i + \beta_{i,MKT} (R_{M,t} - R_{f,t}) + \beta_{i,SMB} SMB_t + \beta_{i,HML} HML_t + \beta_{i,UMD} UMD_t + \epsilon_{i,t}
Here, r_{i,t} denotes the excess return on asset i in month t (i.e., the portfolio or fund return minus the one-month Treasury bill rate R_{f,t}); (R_{M,t} - R_{f,t}) is the excess return on the market portfolio; SMB_t (small minus big) captures the size premium; HML_t (high minus low) represents the value premium; and UMD_t (up minus down, or winners minus losers) measures the momentum premium. The coefficients \beta_{i,MKT}, \beta_{i,SMB}, \beta_{i,HML}, and \beta_{i,UMD} are the factor sensitivities (betas) for asset i, estimating its exposure to each systematic risk factor, while \epsilon_{i,t} is the idiosyncratic error term.[1]
The intercept term \alpha_i (alpha) measures the abnormal return of asset i after controlling for its exposures to the four factors; a statistically significant positive alpha indicates outperformance attributable to manager skill or selection, whereas an alpha of zero suggests returns are fully explained by factor exposures with no additional skill.[1]
The model is typically estimated using monthly excess returns for U.S. equities traded on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), American Stock Exchange (AMEX), and NASDAQ, drawn from sources like the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP).[1]
The formulation assumes a linear relationship between excess returns and the factors, with estimation via ordinary least squares (OLS) regression; while the factors are not strictly orthogonal, their correlations are accounted for in the model's cross-sectional explanatory power, and multicollinearity is generally low enough to yield reliable beta estimates.[1]
Historical Development
Fama-French Three-Factor Model
The Fama-French three-factor model was introduced by Eugene Fama and Kenneth French in 1993 to extend the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), which had been shown to inadequately explain cross-sectional variations in stock returns, particularly the size effect (smaller firms outperforming larger ones) and the value effect (high book-to-market ratio stocks outperforming low ones).[2] Their seminal paper, "Common Risk Factors in the Returns on Stocks and Bonds," proposed that these anomalies arise from exposure to common risk factors beyond the market beta, thereby improving the model's explanatory power for average returns.[2]
The model incorporates three factors: the market risk premium (MKT), representing the excess return of the market portfolio over the risk-free rate; the size premium (SMB, small minus big), which captures the return difference between portfolios of small-capitalization and large-capitalization stocks; and the value premium (HML, high minus low), which measures the excess return of high book-to-market (value) stocks over low book-to-market (growth) stocks.[2] The regression equation for an asset's excess return is given by:
R_{i,t} - R_{f,t} = \alpha_i + \beta_{i,MKT} MKT_t + \beta_{i,SMB} SMB_t + \beta_{i,HML} HML_t + \epsilon_{i,t}
where R_{i,t} is the return on asset i at time t, R_{f,t} is the risk-free rate, \alpha_i is the intercept, the \betas are factor sensitivities, and \epsilon_{i,t} is the error term.[2] This formulation posits that assets with higher loadings on SMB and HML should exhibit higher expected returns to compensate for their associated risks.[2]
Despite its advancements, the Fama-French three-factor model has limitations in capturing certain market anomalies, notably the momentum effect where stocks with strong past performance (winners) continue to outperform those with poor performance (losers).[3] This omission results in persistent nonzero alphas when applying the model to portfolios exhibiting momentum, as evidenced in studies of mutual fund performance where unexplained persistence arises from momentum strategies.[1]
Introduction of the Momentum Factor
Mark M. Carhart introduced the four-factor model in his seminal 1997 paper "On Persistence in Mutual Fund Performance," published in The Journal of Finance, which examined U.S. equity mutual funds from 1962 to 1993 using a survivor-bias-free sample of 1,892 funds.[4] Extending the Fama-French three-factor model, Carhart incorporated a momentum factor to address limitations in explaining persistence in fund returns, shifting the focus from managerial skill to systematic exposures.[4]
The momentum factor, labeled PR1YR (prior 1-year return), represents a zero-investment portfolio that buys stocks with high prior returns and sells those with low prior returns, typically sorted on the past 12 months' performance excluding the most recent month to mitigate short-term reversal effects.[4] Carhart added this factor because the Fama-French model alone could not fully capture the cross-sectional return variations driven by momentum, which may reflect behavioral biases such as investor underreaction to news or time-varying risk premiums not accounted for by size or value factors.[4]
By integrating momentum, Carhart's model attributes much of the observed persistence in mutual fund performance to style tilts toward common risk factors rather than genuine managerial skill.[4] This framework has become a standard benchmark for evaluating portfolio and mutual fund performance attribution in academic and practitioner settings.[4][5]
The Four Factors
Market Risk Premium
The market risk premium, often denoted as MKT or R_m - R_f, represents the excess return of the market portfolio over the risk-free rate. It serves as the foundational factor in the Carhart four-factor model, capturing the compensation investors demand for bearing systematic market risk. In practice, the market portfolio is proxied by the value-weighted return on all U.S. stocks listed on the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ exchanges, as compiled by the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP).[6]
The construction of this factor involves calculating the difference between the monthly value-weighted market returns from the CRSP database and the contemporaneous one-month Treasury bill rate, which acts as the risk-free rate proxy. This methodology, inherited from the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), ensures the factor reflects undiversifiable market-wide fluctuations rather than idiosyncratic risks. The resulting time series of excess returns is used in regressions to estimate an asset's beta, or sensitivity to overall market movements.[6][7]
Within the Carhart model, the market risk premium acts as the baseline exposure common to all assets, explaining the bulk of their return covariation with the broader economy. It typically accounts for 70-90% of the variation in returns for diversified portfolios, underscoring its role as the primary driver before adjustments for size, value, and momentum effects. Historically, in U.S. data from 1926 to 2023, this premium has averaged approximately 6-8% annually on an arithmetic basis, though its realization is marked by significant volatility, with standard deviations exceeding 20% in many periods.[8][9]
Size Premium (SMB)
The size premium, denoted as SMB for "small minus big," captures the excess return of small-capitalization stocks over large-capitalization stocks.[6]
This factor is constructed by sorting stocks based on their market equity (size) at the end of June each year, using the median market equity of New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) firms as the breakpoint to classify stocks as small or big. Small-cap portfolios include stocks below the median, while big-cap portfolios include those above; these are value-weighted within size groups and averaged equally across book-to-market classifications to isolate the size effect. The SMB return is then calculated as the difference between the average return of the small-cap portfolios and the average return of the big-cap portfolios, providing a zero-investment portfolio that goes long on small stocks and short on big stocks.[6]
The economic rationale for the size premium stems from the higher risk associated with small firms, which often face greater liquidity constraints, financial distress, and operational uncertainties compared to larger firms, leading to higher expected returns as compensation. This phenomenon was first documented as an empirical anomaly in the 1981 study by Rolf Banz, who analyzed U.S. stocks from 1936 to 1975 and found that smaller firms consistently delivered higher risk-adjusted returns than larger ones, challenging the predictions of the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM).[10]
Historically, the size premium has averaged approximately 2-3% annually from 1926 to the early 2000s, reflecting the outperformance of small-cap stocks. However, this premium has diminished significantly since the 1980s, averaging only about 0.7% annually from 1982 to 2018, and turning negative in certain recent periods due to factors like increased merger activity favoring larger firms and changes in business cycle dynamics.[11][12][13]
Value Premium (HML)
The value premium, captured by the HML (high minus low) factor in the Carhart four-factor model, represents the excess return of stocks with high book-to-market equity ratios (value stocks) over those with low ratios (growth stocks).[6] This factor extends the Fama-French three-factor model by incorporating valuation-based risk orthogonal to market, size, and momentum effects.[14]
HML is constructed using a double-sort procedure on size and book-to-market equity (BE/ME). At the end of June each year, stocks are first sorted into small and big groups based on the median market equity (ME) of NYSE-listed firms as of December of the prior year; book equity is taken from Compustat as the most recent fiscal year-end value before that December. Independently, NYSE breakpoints define low BE/ME (below the 30th percentile) and high BE/ME (above the 70th percentile). This yields four intersection portfolios: small low (S/L), small high (S/H), big low (B/L), and big high (B/H). Monthly value-weighted returns are then computed from July of year t to June of year t+1, with HML equaling half the sum of the high BE/ME portfolio returns minus half the sum of the low BE/ME returns:
HML = \frac{1}{2} (R_{S/H} + R_{B/H}) - \frac{1}{2} (R_{S/L} + R_{B/L})
HML = \frac{1}{2} (R_{S/H} + R_{B/H}) - \frac{1}{2} (R_{S/L} + R_{B/L})
where R denotes the portfolio return. Stock data are sourced from CRSP for market equity and returns, ensuring comprehensive coverage of NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ listings with available equity data.[6][14]
The rationale for the value premium blends risk-based and behavioral explanations. From a risk perspective, high BE/ME stocks are viewed as distressed, exhibiting persistent low earnings, higher financial leverage, and greater sensitivity to economic downturns, thus commanding higher expected returns as compensation for bearing this undiversifiable risk.[14] Behaviorally, investors tend to overreact to news, extrapolating strong past performance for growth stocks (low BE/ME) and bad news for value stocks (high BE/ME), leading to temporary mispricing that contrarian strategies exploit for superior returns.[15]
Historically, HML has delivered an average monthly premium of approximately 0.40%, or 3-5% annually, from 1963 to the early 1990s, establishing its significance in explaining cross-sectional stock returns.[14] However, this premium weakened substantially in the 2010s, with HML underperforming growth stocks amid a prolonged drawdown of -55% cumulatively from 2007 to mid-2020, the deepest since inception, partly due to the rise of intangible-heavy growth firms like technology leaders.[16]
Momentum Premium (UMD)
The momentum premium, commonly abbreviated as UMD (Up Minus Down) or MOM (Momentum), captures the tendency for stocks with strong recent performance to outperform those with weak performance in the subsequent period. This factor serves as the distinguishing addition to the Fama-French three-factor model, emphasizing cross-sectional differences in trailing returns rather than fundamental characteristics like size or value.[17]
The UMD factor is constructed using value-weighted portfolios formed on prior returns, independent of but often orthogonalized to size. At the end of each month t-1, all stocks are ranked based on their cumulative returns from month t-12 to t-2 (skipping the most recent month to avoid short-term reversal effects). The top 30% of stocks by prior return are designated as winners (U), and the bottom 30% as losers (D). To construct UMD, six portfolios are typically formed at the intersections of size groups (small and big, using the NYSE median market equity) and momentum groups (low, medium, high, using NYSE 30th and 70th prior-return percentiles). The factor return is then calculated as the average monthly return on the two high-momentum portfolios minus the average on the two low-momentum portfolios:
\text{UMD}_t = \frac{R_{\text{Small High}, t} + R_{\text{Big High}, t}}{2} - \frac{R_{\text{Small Low}, t} + R_{\text{Big Low}, t}}{2},
where portfolios are rebalanced monthly.[17][18]
The momentum anomaly underlying UMD was first systematically documented by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), who showed that zero-investment portfolios buying past winners and selling past losers generate economically significant returns, challenging market efficiency. Behavioral rationales attribute this to investor underreaction to new information, where prices gradually adjust as news slowly incorporates into stock valuations, or to herding behavior that amplifies trends through coordinated buying or selling.[19][20][21] Risk-based explanations posit that momentum compensates for systematic risks, such as slow information diffusion across investors or securities, where winners (often with positive news) and losers (with negative news) bear higher uncertainty until information fully propagates, leading to delayed price corrections.[22]
Empirically, the UMD premium has averaged approximately 6-8% annually in U.S. stocks over long horizons, with the strongest effects observed in intermediate-term (3-12 month) formations, though it exhibits pronounced crashes during market reversals when winners sharply underperform, as seen in early 2009 following the financial crisis.[23][24] This premium is most robust in the cross-section of individual stocks and complements other factors by capturing price-based persistence distinct from book-to-market effects.[19]
Empirical Evidence
Original 1997 Study
Mark M. Carhart's seminal 1997 study, "On Persistence in Mutual Fund Performance," examined the performance of U.S. equity mutual funds to assess whether observed persistence in returns reflected managerial skill or exposure to common risk factors. The analysis utilized a comprehensive dataset comprising 1,892 diversified equity mutual funds, covering monthly net returns from January 1962 to December 1993, constructed to be free of survivor bias by including both surviving and defunct funds.[1][25]
The methodology involved forming equally weighted portfolios of funds sorted by prior-year performance and conducting time-series regressions of these portfolios' excess returns on the Carhart four-factor model, which extends the Fama-French three-factor model by incorporating a momentum factor. The factor returns were sourced from Kenneth French's data library, enabling precise adjustment for exposures to market risk, size (SMB), value (HML), and one-year momentum (UMD). These regressions estimated alphas to measure abnormal performance net of factor risks, alongside loadings on each factor.[1]
Key findings revealed strong short-term persistence in raw fund returns, with top-decile funds outperforming bottom-decile funds by an average of 67 basis points per month. However, this persistence was largely attributable to systematic factor exposures rather than skill: the four-factor model explained nearly all of the cross-sectional variation in portfolio returns, rendering alphas close to zero across most deciles (e.g., the top decile's alpha was statistically insignificant at -12 basis points per month). The momentum factor played a particularly prominent role, accounting for approximately half of the return spread between top and bottom deciles and explaining most of the observed persistence; past winner portfolios exhibited a positive average momentum beta of 0.33, significant at the 1% level, indicating that high-performing funds tended to hold stocks with recent strong returns.[1][26]
These results challenged prevailing claims of active management superiority, demonstrating that apparent persistence stemmed primarily from style tilts—such as momentum exposure—rather than consistent outperformance through stock selection or market timing, net of expenses. The only residual persistence was concentrated in the underperformance of the worst funds, further underscoring the absence of widespread managerial skill in generating positive abnormal returns.[1]
Post-2020 Validations and Tests
Recent empirical studies have tested the Carhart four-factor model's applicability in various global markets post-2020, yielding mixed results that highlight its limitations in emerging economies. In Morocco, a 2022 analysis of Casablanca Stock Exchange data from 2002 to 2020 found that the four-factor model does not significantly outperform the Fama-French three-factor model in explaining cross-sectional stock returns, with similar pricing errors and adjusted R-squared values across both specifications.[27] Conversely, a 2025 study on Bursa Malaysia using size-sorted portfolios from 2011 to 2023 demonstrated the model's relevance, as the momentum factor contributed to improved explanatory power for smaller-cap stocks, though the overall premiums were modest.[28]
In developed markets like the United States, the model has shown persistence following the COVID-19 pandemic, particularly in performance attribution. A 2024 examination of U.S. consumer discretionary sector returns from 1963 to 2023 indicated that incorporating the momentum factor enhances the model's ability to attribute returns during volatile periods, reducing alpha estimates for portfolios compared to the three-factor benchmark.[29] In China, a 2024 study introduced a factor-momentum extension to the four-factor framework using A-share data from 1991 to 2022; Gibbons-Ross-Shanken (GRS) tests confirmed that this variant outperforms the standard Carhart model, with lower chi-squared statistics and better pricing of momentum anomalies.[30]
Despite these validations, challenges persist, including diminished premiums for size and momentum factors over the 2010–2020 period, where both exhibited negative average returns in U.S. and global equities, undermining the model's risk-premium assumptions.[31] The factors tend to perform better during crises, such as the 2008 financial meltdown and COVID-19 downturn, by capturing reversal patterns, but their instability across regimes questions long-term reliability.[32] Recent tests often rely on updated datasets from the Fama-French library, extended through 2023, to incorporate post-pandemic observations.
Applications
The Carhart four-factor model is widely applied in mutual fund performance evaluation by regressing a fund's excess returns against the market risk premium, size (SMB), value (HML), and momentum (UMD or PR1YR) factors to isolate the intercept, known as alpha, which represents the fund manager's skill net of factor exposures.[1] This approach has become standard in academic studies for assessing whether observed returns stem from active management or passive factor tilts.[33] Industry platforms like Morningstar also employ the model to adjust fund performance for these systematic risks, enabling investors to distinguish genuine outperformance from style-driven results.[34]
A key benefit of this regression-based evaluation is its ability to reveal style biases through the estimated factor betas, such as higher momentum betas in funds that chase recent winners, which can explain apparent persistence without implying skill.[1] For instance, growth-oriented funds often show elevated loadings on the momentum factor due to their tilt toward high-momentum stocks, while value funds may exhibit stronger HML betas; these exposures account for much of the cross-sectional variation in fund returns rather than alpha.[33] The model thus attributes persistence to "factor chasing" behaviors, where managers inadvertently or deliberately overweight prevailing factors like momentum, reducing the perceived evidence of superior stock-picking ability.[1]
Post-1997 applications of the model have consistently found average mutual fund alphas near zero, with estimates around 0.08% per month across diversified equity funds, indicating that most managers neither add nor subtract significant value after factor adjustments.[33] T-statistics for these alphas are typically low, such as 0.56 on average, underscoring the lack of statistical significance in outperformance claims.[33] A 2022 study applied the framework to 50 actively managed U.S. equity exchange-traded funds (ETFs) from 2018 to 2021 and found negligible alphas, while passive ETFs exhibit zero alpha by construction after factor adjustments, reinforcing its utility in evaluating low-cost vehicles.[35] This adjusted Jensen's alpha, interpreted via t-tests for significance (often requiring t > 2 for reliability), remains the core metric for benchmarking manager skill against factor benchmarks.[1]
Portfolio Management Strategies
The Carhart four-factor model guides factor investing by enabling portfolio managers to tilt allocations toward expected positive risk premia from market, size (SMB), value (HML), and momentum (UMD) factors, thereby constructing diversified strategies that capture these premia beyond broad market exposure.[36] For instance, investors can overweight small-cap value stocks with momentum characteristics to target SMB, HML, and UMD simultaneously, as seen in multifactor exchange-traded funds (ETFs) like the iShares MSCI USA Momentum Factor ETF (MTUM), which emphasizes UMD through selection of large- and mid-cap stocks with strong 6- and 12-month price performance.[37] This approach allows for systematic exposure to multiple factors, reducing reliance on single-factor bets and promoting long-term outperformance relative to cap-weighted benchmarks.[36]
In risk management, the model facilitates hedging specific factor exposures to mitigate unintended risks in portfolios.[38] It underpins smart beta strategies, where factor tilts are integrated into index-based products; for example, momentum overlays in 52-week high strategies use Carhart's UMD to enhance returns by rotating into recent outperformers while controlling for size and value effects.[36] These applications help isolate pure factor premia, as in long-short constructions that long momentum indices and short growth proxies, thereby lowering overall portfolio volatility.[36]
Modern implementations incorporate the model into robo-advisors, where algorithms adjust portfolios to factor exposures for personalized risk-adjusted returns, as evidenced by analyses of over 100 U.S. robo-advisor funds from 2015 to 2020 showing positive Carhart alphas for low-carbon tilted strategies.[39] Recent ESG integrations extend this by testing tilts with Carhart alphas; a 2024 study on UK equities constructed ESG-augmented five- and seven-factor models, finding improved explanatory power for returns when incorporating Bloomberg ESG scores alongside Carhart factors, supporting sustainable portfolio constructions that maintain factor premia.[40]
Such strategies often yield enhanced risk-adjusted outcomes, with factor-tilted portfolios like the S&P Europe 350 Momentum Index demonstrating a Sharpe ratio of 0.43 from 2001 to 2014, compared to 0.19 for the parent index, underscoring the model's role in boosting efficiency.[36] However, timing factor rotations remains challenging due to cyclical premia variations, requiring disciplined rebalancing to avoid underperformance during factor drawdowns.[38]
Criticisms and Extensions
Key Criticisms
One major critique of the Carhart four-factor model concerns data mining bias, where the identified factors—particularly size (SMB), value (HML), and momentum (UMD)—may represent overfitting to historical U.S. data from the 1960s to 1990s rather than robust, universal risk premia.[41] Academic researchers have documented over 300 potential factors in asset pricing literature, suggesting that many, including those in Carhart's framework, could arise from multiple testing and publication bias, requiring a t-statistic hurdle above 3.0 for new factors to account for such snooping.[42] This bias implies the model's factors are not necessarily generalizable beyond the specific sample period and market, as evidenced by the non-universal nature of premiums; for instance, the momentum factor has exhibited severe crashes during market downturns in 2008 and 2020, where prior winners sharply underperform, contradicting expectations of stable risk compensation.[43]
Another key theoretical criticism posits that the momentum factor (UMD) functions more as a behavioral anomaly stemming from market inefficiencies than a true risk premium, challenging the model's rational asset pricing foundation. Behavioral explanations attribute momentum profits to investor underreaction to news or overextrapolation of trends, rather than compensation for systematic risk exposure, as supported by experimental evidence showing professionals view momentum as mispricing rather than risk.[44][45] This perspective undermines the model's assumption that all factors capture priced risks, implying inefficiencies persist that rational models like Carhart's cannot fully explain without incorporating behavioral elements.
The model's factors also suffer from empirical instability over time, with the size and value premia notably fading or turning negative post-2010, eroding the reliability of the framework for contemporary applications. Studies indicate that size and value composites delivered negative returns during the 2010–2019 decade, contrasting their historical premiums, while multicollinearity among factors—such as correlations between SMB, HML, and market risk—complicates beta estimation and attribution of returns to specific risks.[46] This temporal variability suggests the factors may not represent enduring risk sources, reducing the model's predictive power in evolving market regimes.
Methodologically, the Carhart model's factor construction is sensitive to arbitrary choices in sorting breakpoints, portfolio weighting schemes (e.g., equal- versus value-weighting), and microcap handling, which can significantly alter premium estimates and lead to inconsistent results across implementations.[47] For example, varying the number of stocks in long-short portfolios or breakpoint criteria heavily influences SMB and HML performance, highlighting a lack of standardization that questions the model's robustness. Additionally, the model overlooks transaction costs in factor portfolio formation, which are substantial for momentum strategies involving frequent turnover, biasing gross return assessments and understating real-world implementation frictions.[48][49]
Modern Extensions and Alternatives
One prominent extension of the Carhart four-factor model is the Fama-French five-factor model, introduced in 2015, which augments the original three factors (market, size, and value) with profitability (robust minus weak, RMW) and investment (conservative minus aggressive, CMA) factors to better capture average stock returns patterns beyond momentum effects.[50] This model often outperforms the Carhart framework in contexts where momentum is less dominant, such as explaining cross-sectional returns driven by firm fundamentals like operating profitability and asset growth.[50]
Subsequent extensions have incorporated additional dimensions to address limitations in traditional factors. For instance, a 2023 human capital-based four-factor model, empirically tested in the Pakistani market, extends the Fama-French three-factor structure by adding a human capital factor derived from employee skills and labor quality metrics.[51] In emerging markets, a 2024 four-factor model based on factor momentum, tailored to China's A-share market, integrates a momentum factor applied to other risk factors (such as value and size) with a 7-12 month lookback period, revealing distinct momentum dynamics compared to U.S. patterns.[52] Similarly, ESG-integrated variants have emerged, with a 2024 study extending the Carhart model by adding an ESG risk factor (UMS for environmental, social, and governance dimensions) to evaluate its pricing power in European equities, showing improved explanatory ability for sustainable investment anomalies.[53]
As alternatives, the q-factor model, developed by Hou, Xue, and Zhang, provides an investment-based approach emphasizing market, size, investment-to-assets, and return-on-equity factors, which empirically subsumes many anomalies explained by Carhart's momentum while prioritizing profitability and conservative investment strategies.[54] Machine learning hybrids represent another avenue, such as a 2025 LSTM-based framework that combines long short-term memory neural networks with Carhart factors to forecast U.S. sector returns, enhancing predictive accuracy over standalone multifactor regressions by capturing nonlinear time-series dependencies in momentum and size effects.[55]
Comparative analyses highlight contextual trade-offs. The Carhart model retains advantages in momentum-heavy strategies, where its UMD factor captures short-term persistence better than the Fama-French five-factor's omission of explicit momentum.