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Causal theory of reference

The causal theory of reference is a philosophical account in the that posits the reference of terms, especially proper names and terms, is fixed through an initial "baptism" or naming event and subsequently maintained via a historical chain of communication originating from that event, rather than through associated descriptive meanings or senses. This theory, primarily developed by in his 1972 lectures published as , challenges the earlier descriptivist view—associated with and —that names refer via uniquely identifying descriptions known by speakers. Kripke argued that proper names are rigid designators, referring to the same object in all possible worlds where it exists, with reference preserved by causal links rather than contingent descriptions, as illustrated by thought experiments showing how names like "" could retain reference even if historical details are forgotten or mistaken. Hilary Putnam extended the causal framework to natural kind terms in his 1975 essay "The Meaning of 'Meaning'," applying it to words like "" or "," where reference is determined by the underlying microstructure (e.g., H₂O for ) discovered through scientific investigation, rather than superficial appearances or speaker intentions. Putnam's famous demonstrates this externalist aspect: on a duplicate with XYZ instead of H₂O, "" would refer differently despite identical descriptions, emphasizing that meaning and reference depend on causal connections to the actual world, including division of linguistic labor where non-experts defer to specialists. This approach underscores , implying that a term's extension is not fully determined by facts internal to the speaker's mind. The theory has influenced subsequent debates, spawning variants such as Gareth Evans's causal descriptivism, which incorporates some descriptive elements into the causal chain, and Michael Devitt's robust causal theory emphasizing reference borrowing from linguistic communities. Despite its prominence—endorsed by most philosophers since Kripke's work—it faces criticisms, including challenges to the rigidity of reference in cases of reference change (e.g., "" shifting referents historically) and concerns about indeterminacy in causal chains without anchoring descriptions. Overall, the causal theory marks a shift toward historical and social dimensions of meaning, impacting fields like metaphysics, , and .

Historical Origins

Saul Kripke's Account

developed the foundational version of the causal theory of reference in a series of lectures delivered at in 1970, which were later published as the book in 1980. In this work, Kripke proposed that proper names function not as abbreviations for definite descriptions, as suggested by the descriptivist views of and , but as rigid designators that refer to the same individual in every in which that individual exists. This rejection of descriptivism emphasizes that the meaning of a name is not conveyed through a cluster of identifying properties known to speakers, but through a direct referential link to the bearer, independent of any associated descriptions. Central to Kripke's account is the concept of an initial "," an event in which a name is introduced and fixed to an object, either through direct (pointing to the object) or via a used at that moment to identify it, such as dubbing a newborn baby "" in the presence of the child or based on a casual to the parents' choice. From this baptism, is propagated through a causal-historical : subsequent speakers inherit the reference by relying on the linguistic practices and communications of prior users in the chain, without needing to possess or endorse any specific identifying descriptions about the . This mechanism ensures that the name maintains its link to the original object across generations, even if individual speakers hold erroneous beliefs or have incomplete knowledge about it. A key example illustrating this process is the name "Gödel," which Kripke uses to demonstrate how reference persists via the historical chain rather than descriptive content. Suppose a community believes "Gödel" refers to the mathematician who proved the incompleteness theorems, but in fact, another person proved them and switched papers with the real , who did not contribute the work. Most speakers would still use "Gödel" to refer to the actual mathematician through the unbroken causal chain from his , not the false description of being the prover. Kripke's framework has profoundly influenced by providing tools to analyze necessity and possibility with precision, as rigid designators allow statements like " is " to express necessary truths when the names corefer, and it has bolstered essentialist views about identity across possible worlds.

Keith Donnellan's Role

Keith Donnellan's seminal paper, "Reference and Definite Descriptions," marked a significant departure from traditional descriptivist accounts of reference by introducing a distinction between two primary uses of s: referential and attributive. In the referential use, a speaker employs a definite description not to convey a general proposition about whoever satisfies the description, but to pick out a specific individual they have in mind, often through a direct perceptual or causal link, even if the descriptive content is inaccurate or incomplete. For instance, at a social gathering, a speaker might point to a man holding a and say, "Smith's murderer is mad," intending to refer to that particular individual based on the and , regardless of whether the man actually committed the or the glass contains rather than what the speaker assumes. This use highlights how reference can succeed independently of the truth of the associated description, relying instead on the speaker's intention tied to a causal connection with the referent. Donnellan's analysis laid early groundwork for the causal theory by emphasizing that successful in the referential mode depends on a chain of causal relations linking the speaker's utterance back to the intended object, rather than on descriptive satisfaction alone. He argued that such causal connections—whether through , , or prior acquaintance—enable the description to function as a device for directing attention to the object, allowing communication to proceed even when the speaker's beliefs about the description are false. In contrast, the attributive use treats the description as a predicate that identifies its bearer solely by the it denotes, asserting something about whatever uniquely fits that property, without presupposing a specific individual in the speaker's mind. This distinction challenged Bertrand Russell's unified , which analyzed them uniformly as quantificational expressions, by drawing on ordinary language intuitions to show that referential uses are pragmatic phenomena integral to how speakers actually refer. Donnellan's contributions provided crucial empirical motivation for the emerging causal theory, predating and influencing Kripke's more formalized account in the early 1970s. Kripke explicitly engaged with Donnellan's ideas in his 1977 paper "Speaker's Reference and Semantic Reference," acknowledging the distinction while refining it to separate speaker's intentions from semantic rules, and extending causal chains to proper names. Donnellan's focus on everyday referential practices offered a linguistic that complemented Kripke's philosophical arguments against descriptivism. This work emerged amid the 1960s intellectual shift in of language, as thinkers moved away from the descriptivist legacy of —epitomized by and others—toward views emphasizing historical and causal factors in meaning, with Donnellan contributing from his position at during this period.

Core Mechanisms

Initial Reference Fixing

In the causal theory of reference, initial reference fixing occurs through an event known as a "" or "," where a name is introduced and linked to its referent in a historical context. This baptism typically involves direct acquaintance with the object via , such as pointing and declaring "This is ," or through a brief, contingent description like "the greatest man who studied under " in the case of the philosopher . The act establishes the name's referent without embedding a full set of descriptive properties into the name's meaning, allowing the reference to be anchored independently of the speaker's or community's subsequent beliefs about those properties. The role of this baptism is to serve as the origin point for the name's reference, from which subsequent uses derive their connection to the object through a causal-historical chain of communication. Unlike descriptivist theories, where reference depends on satisfying a cluster of attributes, the baptism fixes the referent rigidly, ensuring the name denotes the same object across possible worlds regardless of whether initial descriptions hold true. For instance, the name "Hesperus" was fixed by ancient observers dubbing the evening star visible in a particular position, later discovered to be Venus, demonstrating how the reference persists even if the descriptive anchor (e.g., "the evening star") proves incomplete or misleading. A historical example of baptism for a geographical feature is the naming of , where British surveyors in 1865, led by , officially dubbed "Peak XV" as "" in honor of after measuring it as the world's highest peak, fixing the reference through and survey data rather than exhaustive properties. This act anchors the name to the specific mountain, even if later discoveries challenge associated descriptions, such as debates over its exact height or indigenous names like Chomolungma. Theoretically, initial reference fixing enables successful reference in cases where speakers lack knowledge of unique identifying properties, as the baptism decouples the name's denotation from comprehensive descriptions that might fail or vary. This approach addresses descriptivism's shortcomings by prioritizing the causal link established at baptism over ongoing attribute satisfaction. Subsequent propagation of the reference occurs via the community's transmission of the name, maintaining the link to the original referent.

Causal Chain Propagation

In the causal theory of reference, the propagation of a name's occurs through a causal-historical chain that connects a speaker's use of the name to the initial or event. Speakers intend to refer to the same object or individual as previous users of the name, relying on a continuous link of communication that traces back to the original -fixing act. This chain ensures that the name retains its across generations, provided the communicative intentions preserve the connection to the initial . The mechanism of this propagation hinges on causal connections, such as and among speakers, which transmit the without requiring accurate or complete descriptive knowledge of the . succeeds as long as the speaker's use is part of a historical chain causally linked to the original , even if intervening descriptions are mistaken or incomplete. For instance, a may utter a name intending to borrow its from the community, thereby extending the chain forward in time. A notable example illustrating the potential dynamics of this chain is the name "," which originally referred to a portion of the mainland in the but later shifted to denote the nearby through a series of miscommunications and causal links among speakers. In the pure causal theory, however, such chains are intended to preserve the original through communal , though real-world shifts highlight the role of historical transmission in determination. This process underscores the social dimension of reference, where the causal chain is maintained by the linguistic community rather than isolated individuals. Individual errors or incomplete understandings do not necessarily sever the chain if the broader community's communicative links to the initial remain intact, allowing reference to propagate reliably through and shared usage.

Philosophical Motivations

Critique of Descriptivism

Descriptivism, as advanced by Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Russell, posits that proper names function as abbreviated definite descriptions, where the meaning and reference of a name like "Aristotle" derive from associated descriptions such as "the pupil of Plato who taught Alexander the Great." Under this view, the referent of a name is the unique object satisfying the descriptive content linked to it by speakers, ensuring that names convey cognitive significance beyond mere denotation. A central critique of descriptivism from the causal theory of reference highlights the problem of and : speakers can successfully refer using a name without knowing or even believing the true descriptions typically associated with its bearer. For instance, many contemporary speakers might ignorantly believe that was not the of the incompleteness theorems or erroneously attribute that achievement to him, yet they still refer to the historical Gödel via the name, as descriptivism would otherwise shift to the actual author if the description fails. This challenges the theory's claim that hinges on the satisfaction of such descriptions, since empirical facts about speakers' knowledge do not disrupt successful naming. Another issue arises from the multiplicity of descriptions: no single, unique set of descriptions adequately captures the meaning of a name across all speakers in a linguistic . Different individuals might associate varying or conflicting descriptions with the same name—such as one speaker linking "" to his biological works and another to his ethics—yet collective reference persists without a unified descriptive core, undermining descriptivism's reliance on a shared, description-based semantics. Furthermore, names can secure even when associated descriptions fail to pick out a unique individual, as speakers defer to communal usage rather than verifying descriptive uniqueness. Saul Kripke's arguments in emphasize that names are not synonymous with any cluster of descriptions, evidenced by substitution failures in belief contexts. For example, the identity " is " (both referring to ) is an informative discovery rather than a trivial , as it would be if the names were equivalent to the same descriptive content like "" or "," since speakers can believe one without believing the other. This reveals that names contribute their referents directly to propositional attitudes, not via descriptive mediation. These critiques marked a historical shift in 20th-century analytic philosophy, moving from the dominant Frege-Russell descriptivism—endorsed by figures like P.F. Strawson—to causal theories of reference emerging prominently in the 1970s with Kripke's work.

Support for Externalism and Rigidity

The causal theory of reference, as developed by Saul Kripke, provides a foundation for the concept of rigid designation, according to which proper names and certain natural kind terms function as rigid designators that refer to the same object or kind in every possible world in which that object or kind exists. Unlike non-rigid descriptions, which may pick out different referents across modal contexts—such as "the inventor of the heat engine," which could refer to James Watt in the actual world but to someone else in a counterfactual scenario where another individual invented it—rigid designators maintain fixed reference, ensuring that identity statements involving them, if true, are necessarily true. For instance, the names "Hesperus" and "Phosphorus" both rigidly designate Venus, making the statement "Hesperus is Phosphorus" metaphysically necessary, even though it was discovered empirically. This rigidity is enabled by the causal mechanisms of fixing and propagation in Kripke's , where an initial "" establishes a direct link to the , and subsequent uses preserve that link through a historical of communication, independent of descriptive content in speakers' minds. By grounding in external causal-historical relations rather than internal mental descriptions, the supports , the view that the meaning and of terms depend not solely on a speaker's internal states but on factors in the external world, such as the causal connections to the . This externalist implication underscores how can succeed even if speakers lack detailed of the 's , as the causal ensures continuity across contexts. A key philosophical motivation arises in and the , where rigid designation allows for necessary truths, such as the identity " is H₂O," which is fixed by causal chains to the actual substance in our world and holds necessarily across possible worlds, despite being empirically discovered rather than known a priori. This framework bolsters , the doctrine that objects and natural kinds possess essential properties— like for —that are discoverable only through empirical investigation, not analytic definition. Consequently, it resolves modal puzzles, such as counterfactual scenarios in scientific theorizing, by clarifying how s remain stable, enabling precise evaluation of necessities and possibilities without reliance on varying descriptions.

Variations and Extensions

Application to Natural Kind Terms

The causal theory of reference, initially developed for proper names, was extended by to terms in the 1970s, such as "" or "," where reference is fixed not by descriptive content in the speaker's mind but by causal connections to paradigmatic samples of the kind. In this framework, the term's meaning is determined by an initial "" linking the word to a sample— for instance, "" was baptized to the clear liquid found in Earth's lakes and rivers, which turned out to be H₂O— followed by a causal chain of communication that preserves the across uses. This approach posits that terms function like rigid designators, referring to the underlying essence or structure of the kind wherever it occurs, independent of superficial appearances. Putnam emphasized an indexical component in the semantics of these terms, suggesting that "water" effectively means "that substance which is the same as this" (pointing to a sample), incorporating both a causal-historical element and a to experts for or partial descriptions. This allows for externalist semantics, where the full meaning of the term extends beyond what any individual knows, relying instead on the community's causal links to the world. For scientific and terms, reference is thus secured through expert practices, such as laboratory identification, rather than requiring speakers to possess complete definitions; ordinary users to these causal chains without needing to grasp the full . A key illustration of this theory is Putnam's , where an identical Earth-like planet () has lakes filled with a substance chemically distinct from H₂O, called , which appears and behaves like but differs in molecular structure. On , "water" refers to H₂O via the causal chain from historical samples, but on Twin Earth, the same linguistic practices yield a term referring to , demonstrating that meanings are not confined to internal mental states ("meanings ain't in the head") but depend on environmental and causal factors. This experiment underscores how the causal theory enables natural kind terms to track real-world essences, supporting a division of linguistic labor where non-experts contribute to through communal transmission.

Hybrid Descriptive-Causal Theories

Hybrid descriptive-causal theories, emerging in the 1970s and refined in subsequent decades, integrate descriptive elements to address limitations in determination while preserving causal chains as a core mechanism. These hybrids aim to combine the externalist strengths of causal theories with the disambiguating power of descriptions, particularly for cases where multiple causal links might compete or where initial fixings lack sufficient specificity. One early proponent was Gareth Evans, who in his 1973 paper "The Causal Theory of Names" developed a causal descriptivist account. Evans argued that for a name to refer, speakers must possess a that identifies the causal chain leading back to the , such as dominance relations where the is the dominant source of the name's use in the community. This ensures that reference is not indeterminate in complex scenarios, like when multiple entities could initiate a chain, by requiring partial descriptive anchoring to select the appropriate historical link. David proposed a form of causal descriptivism in which is determined by a cluster of descriptions, including causal ones that link the to its through historical chains, selected to maximize informational content and referential stability. In this view, eligible referents are those that best fit both the causal-historical connections and non-causal properties, prioritizing natural kinds over arbitrary groupings to resolve indeterminacy. For instance, suggests mixing causal descriptions—such as being the causal source of utterances of the —with other predicates to ensure the referent aligns with the "joints in nature," thereby enhancing the theory's fit with empirical reality. Michael Devitt developed a hybrid framework in his 1981 work, where initial reference fixing (or "grounding") relies on descriptive content associated with the term at its introduction, while subsequent reference borrowing operates through causal chains from speaker to speaker. This allows descriptions to play a role in establishing the during , after which causal propagation takes over, but with provisions for descriptive constraints to disambiguate ambiguous chains—such as when multiple objects could serve as grounding sources. Devitt's approach thus treats names as having a causal mode of overall, yet incorporates descriptive "prompting" to select among possible causal paths, ensuring remains determinate even in complex linguistic communities. The primary motivation for these hybrid theories is to mitigate the indeterminacy inherent in pure causal accounts, particularly in scenarios like ambiguous baptisms where multiple entities might sustain a causal chain from the initial use, leading to unclear reference assignment. By incorporating descriptive elements, hybrids provide criteria for selecting the intended without reverting fully to internalist descriptivism, thus maintaining externalism while handling cases of referential overlap or error. In the 1990s and , Devitt further refined his theory to emphasize community-wide , where speakers borrow not only causally but also through shared descriptive understandings that stabilize chains across a linguistic group, as explored in collaborative works on language and reality. This evolution, often termed causal descriptivism, extends the hybrid model to broader applications, including how communities defer to experts for term usage, addressing gaps in earlier causal theories regarding collective maintenance.

Criticisms and Challenges

Objections to Causal Chains

Gareth Evans presented a influential critique of the causal chain theory, arguing that it is overly simplistic because it fails to incorporate the role of speaker intentions and contextual factors in determining . In his example of the name "," introduced stipulatively as a rigid designator for "the inventor of the ," Evans contends that successful reference depends not merely on a causal link back to an initial , but on the speaker's descriptive intent to identify the individual satisfying that condition. Without such intentional guidance, the causal history alone cannot ensure that the name picks out the intended , as the chain might connect to irrelevant or multiple sources. A related objection concerns the indeterminacy inherent in causal chains, where multiple possible causal sources can link to a term, leaving the reference undetermined without further specification. For instance, when grounding a term like "" on a sample, the sample may instantiate several overlapping kinds (e.g., H₂O, , ), and the causal connections to each could qualify as valid chains, raising the question of which one fixes the . This ambiguity, known as the qua-problem, suggests that pure causal relations are insufficient for determinate fixing. Defenders of the causal theory, such as Michael Devitt, have responded to these concerns by emphasizing the role of dominant intentions within the linguistic community to resolve indeterminacy and select the appropriate chain. According to Devitt, is sustained through networks of causal links (d-chains) reinforced by communal practices and perceptual groundings, allowing community-wide intent to disambiguate cases like Evans' "" by prioritizing the intended descriptive category over alternative causal paths. An additional challenge to the causal theory arises from its difficulty in accounting for the cognitive significance of identity statements, such as " is ," where the names corefer to but differ in informational content due to their distinct causal origins and modes of . While descriptivism naturally explains this difference through varying associated descriptions, the causal approach struggles to capture why substituting coreferring names alters cognitive impact, as the chains alone do not encode such distinctions.

Issues with Reference Failure and Change

One prominent challenge to the causal theory of reference arises in cases of reference failure, where no actual object exists to initiate or sustain a causal chain. Consider the name "," coined by astronomer in 1859 to denote a supposed inside Mercury's , posited to account for observed perturbations in Mercury's motion; however, no such was ever discovered. In the causal framework, the absence of a real means the name lacks a grounding and thus fails to refer, yet the theory struggles to systematically explain why subsequent uses propagate this failure without descriptive constraints to filter non-referring chains. R. M. Sainsbury contends that purely causal accounts cannot adequately account for such non-reference, as they presuppose a successful link to an existent object and thus require supplementation from descriptivist elements to handle empty names coherently. A related issue involves unintended changes in reference, where errors or miscommunications in the causal chain redirect the name to a different object. The historical trajectory of "" exemplifies this: the name originally referred to a part of the African mainland in the 13th century, but erroneously applied it to the nearby island in his travel accounts, causing later users to associate it with the island through a mistaken causal link. As the name propagated via maps and reports, its reference shifted entirely to the island, severing the original chain. This case, analyzed by Gareth Evans, poses a difficulty for the causal theory, as it allows accidental hijackings to alter reference without speaker intent, undermining the theory's reliance on faithful chain transmission. Tyler Burge's development of social externalism further illuminates how communal practices can facilitate such shifts, emphasizing that reference determination depends not just on individual causal histories but on broader social and linguistic norms, which may introduce variability or error in name usage. Post-2000 , including Robin Jeshion's examination of predicative uses, highlights ongoing limits of the in fictional or amended contexts, such as negative existentials like "Vulcans do not exist," where the absence of a complicates truth-conditional evaluation without additional semantic resources. To address these problems, proponents have proposed theories that integrate descriptive conditions as filters to block erroneous chains or to resolve empty cases, ensuring stability by combining causal origins with partial descriptive content. Alternatively, strict Millian adherents maintain that failed causal links result in straightforward null , treating non-referring names as semantically defective without needing further mechanisms, thereby preserving the theory's commitment to direct denotation.