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Circulation of elites

The circulation of elites is a foundational theory in elite theory, developed by Italian economist and sociologist Vilfredo Pareto (1848–1923), positing that all societies are ruled by a small minority of elites distinguished by superior abilities in governance, innovation, or force, and that these ruling elites inevitably decline and are supplanted by new elites emerging from the broader population through processes of competition, social mobility, and often violent upheaval.^[1]^[2] Pareto argued that elites are not static but subject to a natural "circulation" driven by the differential qualities of individuals, where stagnation in the ruling class—due to complacency, loss of martial spirit, or over-reliance on cunning—creates opportunities for more vigorous challengers to seize power, as evidenced in historical shifts like the fall of aristocratic regimes to entrepreneurial or military newcomers.^[3] Central to the theory are Pareto's distinctions between "residues" (innate human impulses) and "derivations" (rationalizations), with elites characterized by combinations of lions (those favoring direct force and tradition) and foxes (those relying on intellect, persuasion, and adaptability); successful circulation often involves a shift from fox-dominated elites, which grow decadent through excessive theorizing, to lion-like ones that restore order via coercion.^[4]^[5] The theory underscores the inevitability of hierarchy and rejects egalitarian ideals as illusions, emphasizing that democratic forms merely mask elite rule, with true change arising from the internal dynamics of elite renewal rather than mass participation.^[6] While influential in explaining revolutions and regime changes—such as the replacement of feudal elites by bourgeois ones in early modern Europe—Pareto's framework has faced critiques for underemphasizing institutional constraints on elite mobility and over-relying on psychological typologies, though empirical studies of power distributions continue to affirm the persistence of concentrated elite control across societies.^[2]^[7]

Theoretical Foundations

Vilfredo Pareto's Core Theory

Vilfredo Pareto developed the theory of elite circulation as a foundational explanation for social and political dynamics in his 1916 work Trattato di Sociologia Generale, translated as The Mind and Society. He defined elites as the individuals of superior qualities—excelling in abilities relevant to power, such as intellect, energy, and cunning—who form the apex of societal hierarchies across domains like politics and economics.^[8] This superior class represents a small minority capable of governance, distinct from the masses, with Pareto's empirical analyses of distributions (e.g., 80% of wealth held by 20% in observed cases like Italian land ownership) illustrating the inherent inequality that sustains elite formation.^[9] Within this framework, Pareto distinguished the ruling elite, which exercises direct control over society, from the non-ruling elite, a reserve of talented individuals outside power who possess latent potential for ascent. Circulation occurs as a natural, cyclical mechanism: vigorous non-ruling elites or rising elements from lower strata displace enfeebled ruling elites through superior adaptation and force, averting total societal collapse while perpetuating stratification.^[8] Pareto grounded this in observable patterns of regime persistence and overthrow, emphasizing causal processes of elite vitality over ideological constructs like universal equality. Pareto rejected egalitarian democratic doctrines as deceptive facades for elite rule, asserting that no system eliminates hierarchy; instead, power remains concentrated among the capable few, with "democracy" merely reconfiguring elite competitions under universal suffrage illusions.^[10] He famously characterized history as a "graveyard of aristocracies," wherein every elite eventually decays through complacency, failed innovation, and internal weakening, yielding inevitably to fresher replacements.^[8] This process affirms inequality's endurance, as replacement reinforces rather than eradicates elite dominance.^[10]

Distinction Between Ruling and Non-Ruling Elites

In Vilfredo Pareto's sociological framework, the elite stratum of society bifurcates into a ruling elite—those individuals who directly or indirectly exercise substantial control over governance and resource allocation through mechanisms of force, persuasion, or administrative dominance—and a non-ruling elite, comprising capable persons endowed with analogous superior qualities yet relegated outside the corridors of power.^[4]^[8] This demarcation underscores that elite status derives not merely from incumbency but from inherent aptitudes in intellect, energy, and volitional persistence, with the non-ruling segment functioning as a latent cadre primed for potential ascension when ruling incumbents falter. Pareto's empirical observation of universal social stratification posits that societies inexorably segregate into an elite minority, characterized by elevated psychic states enabling leadership and adaptation, and a numerically dominant mass exhibiting comparatively inferior capacities in directive and innovative faculties.^[11] The ruling elite monopolizes de facto authority by leveraging these superior traits to navigate power equilibria, while the non-ruling elite, often emergent from the masses' fringes, embodies untapped potential that disrupts stasis through selective infiltration, thereby perpetuating inequality as a causal structural imperative rather than an artifact of contrived equity.^[12]^[13] Central to this binary is the role of residues—enduring psychological manifestations of human instincts, particularly Class II residues evincing persistence and resistance to change—which disproportionately animate elites, fortifying ruling cohesion via traits like doctrinal adherence and coercive efficacy, independent of ephemeral rationalizations or institutional facades.^[14]^[15] Non-ruling elites, similarly residue-rich, harbor analogous drives but lack the entrenched networks, positioning them as vectors for renewal absent the encumbrances of incumbency-induced complacency.^[16] This distinction repudiates illusions of undifferentiated meritocracy, affirming that power accrual hinges on verifiable differentials in volitional endowments, observable across historical polities irrespective of ideological veneer.^[17]

Lions and Foxes as Elite Archetypes

Pareto, drawing on Machiavelli's distinction in The Prince between the lion's force and the fox's cunning, classified ruling elites into two primary archetypes based on their predominant modes of governance and psychological residues.^[18]^[19] Lions embody elites who rely on strength, tradition, and direct coercion, corresponding to Class II residues of persistence that prioritize stability, hierarchy, and resistance to change.^[18] These elites, exemplified conceptually by military aristocracies, excel in rigid, centralized systems where overt power maintains order amid scarcity or threat, but their aversion to innovation—"do not depend to any great extent upon ingenious combinations"—renders them vulnerable to decay over time.^[18] In contrast, foxes represent elites driven by Class I residues of combinations, employing intellect, deception, opportunism, and adaptive strategies to navigate complexity.^[18] Such elites, akin to bureaucratic or financial classes, thrive by manipulating social and economic networks, co-opting rivals, and innovating amid prosperity, but their "conservatives today, liberals tomorrow" flexibility often fosters individualism and skepticism toward force.^[18] Foxes ascend when lion dominance ossifies, exploiting inefficiencies through superior cunning rather than brute strength. This typology drives elite circulation through cyclical alternation: fox elites displace sclerotic lions via innovative circumvention of established power, yet fox-led systems erode into corruption and fragmentation, creating conditions for lion resurgence via forceful reimposition of order.^[18]^[19] Pareto observed this as a pendulum-like shift between "crystallised" (lion-favoring austerity) and "individualised" (fox-favoring growth) social states, an empirical pattern rooted in residue distributions rather than moral superiority of either archetype.^[18] The framework highlights causal dynamics of elite replacement without prescribing normative ideals, emphasizing observable tendencies in how elites maintain or lose dominance.^[20]

Mechanisms of Circulation

Processes of Elite Decay and Replacement

In Pareto's framework, elite decay arises primarily from internal mechanisms that erode the qualities enabling initial ascent, such as the predominance of residues favoring persistence and tradition over innovation and enterprise. Ruling elites, having consolidated power, increasingly rely on hereditary succession and nepotism, sidelining merit-based recruitment of capable individuals from non-elite strata.^[21] This closure fosters incompetence, as positions are filled by less vigorous kin rather than those demonstrating superior aptitude or drive, leading to a progressive dilution of governing effectiveness.^[22] Such decadence manifests in elites' shift toward self-preservation, where maintenance of privileges supersedes adaptive governance or response to societal challenges. Pareto attributed this to a dominance of conservative residues, causing elites to avoid risks, resist innovation, and prioritize stability, rendering them brittle against perturbations. Empirical observation of historical ruling classes supports this, as unchecked internal entropy—manifest in bureaucratic ossification and aversion to talent infusion—undermines resilience, independent of external egalitarian ideals which Pareto dismissed as illusory derivations rather than causal drivers.^[23] Replacement occurs when ambitious elements from the non-ruling elite, possessing higher concentrations of dynamic residues, exploit these vulnerabilities to seize control. These challengers ascend through mechanisms including revolutionary upheavals, military coups, or insidious infiltration, capitalizing on the incumbent elite's weakened capacity to defend its position.^[22] Pareto emphasized that such transitions affirm the inevitability of hierarchical governance, as no society escapes elite formation; rather, circulation ensures renewal via competition among unequally endowed actors, debunking notions of permanent stasis or universal equality as contrary to observed patterns of human stratification. This process underscores causal realism in social dynamics, where elite churn stems from differential abilities and motivations, not abstract justice or mass volition.

Role of Residues in Elite Dynamics

In Vilfredo Pareto's framework, residues represent the unchanging psychological residues manifesting human sentiments, serving as the elemental drivers of non-logical actions and social phenomena, including elite behavior, rather than transient environmental influences.^[11] These residues, detailed in his 1916 Trattato di Sociologia Generale (translated as The Mind and Society), are classified into six types, with Classes I and II holding primacy in explaining elite dynamics due to their influence on adaptability and stability.^[11] By positing residues as innate constants, Pareto grounds elite circulation in universal human dispositions, positing that variations in their predominance predict shifts in ruling class composition independent of ideological or materialist determinism.^[14] Class I residues, or residues of combinations, embody an instinct for associating disparate elements, fostering innovation, intellectual experimentation, and strategic cunning—qualities that define "fox-like" elites who ascend by devising novel solutions to exploit weaknesses in incumbents.^[14] These residues drive speculators and reformers, enabling them to challenge rigid structures through fraud, persuasion, or adaptive policies, thus fueling the upward mobility essential to elite renewal.^[11] In contrast, Class II residues, known as persistence of aggregates, promote adherence to existing forms, group loyalty, and resistance to alteration, underpinning "lion-like" elites who sustain power via tradition, coercion, and institutional inertia but often devolve into conservatism that hampers responsiveness.^[14] Such persistence manifests in rentier classes and traditionalists, providing short-term stability yet predisposing elites to decadence as external pressures demand combinatorial flexibility.^[11] The interplay of these residues causally governs circulation: ruling elites initially balanced but increasingly dominated by Class II traits rigidify, diminishing their capacity to counter threats from below, where Class I-rich challengers proliferate.^[4] This imbalance precipitates decay, as over-reliance on persistence stifles innovation, rendering societies stagnant and vulnerable to replacement by dynamic outsiders whose combinatorial residues afford superior cunning and adaptability.^[4] Pareto thus attributes circulation not to random upheaval but to predictable residue-driven patterns, where failure to integrate sufficient Class I elements invites inexorable elite turnover.^[11]

Interplay of Force, Cunning, and Innovation

In Pareto's typology, elites characterized by lions—those relying on force, tradition, and coercion—effectively consolidate power during periods of stability but become vulnerable when rigidity prevents adaptation to emerging challenges.^[11] Conversely, foxes, who predominate through cunning, persuasion, and intellectual maneuvering, exploit this decay by undermining established derivations and social equilibria, facilitating the initial phases of elite displacement.^[4] This dynamic interplay underscores that neither archetype sustains dominance indefinitely; force alone fosters complacency, while cunning without enforcement invites instability, as observed in the cyclical patterns Pareto derived from historical residues of human action.^[18] Innovation emerges as a core attribute of fox-like elites, rooted in the "residue of combinations" (Class I residues), which propels adaptive strategies such as novel social formulations, rhetorical innovations, and experimental derivations that erode incumbent power structures.^[11] These innovations serve as the engine of circulation by enabling non-ruling elites to generate persuasive ideologies and tactical alliances, yet they often culminate in speculative excesses—overreliance on abstract scheming without grounded enforcement—leading to internal elite fragmentation unless tempered by lion-like persistence (Class II residues).^[8] Pareto emphasized that such residues drive renewal through disequilibrium, where combinatorial instincts disrupt but require eventual forceful stabilization to prevent collapse into anarchy.^[4] Empirical patterns in elite theory suggest that successful circulations arise from the integration of force and cunning, averting the extinction risks of pure archetypes: lion elites ossify and fall to innovative challengers, while unalloyed foxes dissipate power through unchecked experimentation.^[24] This blend fosters adaptive equilibria, where innovation injects vitality without necessitating broad societal mobilization, countering interpretations of historical change as democratizing progress rather than elite self-perpetuation.^[11] Pareto's analysis posits that optimal elite persistence hinges on this synthesis, as isolated dominance by either force or innovation historically correlates with accelerated replacement cycles, preserving hierarchy amid flux.^[18]

Historical Evidence

Ancient and Feudal Examples

In ancient Rome, the initial patrician elite, rooted in martial tradition and hereditary privilege, was gradually displaced by plebeian challengers through persistent political agitation and legal innovations during the Conflict of the Orders, spanning approximately 494 to 287 BCE. Plebeians, initially excluded from high offices and burdened by debt, organized secessions—such as the first in 494 BCE—and secured concessions like the creation of tribunes with veto power, access to consulships by 367 BCE, and eventual equality in magistracies under the Lex Hortensia in 287 BCE, thereby integrating new elements into the ruling class via adaptive strategies rather than brute force.^[25]^[26]^[27] This pattern recurred in the empire's decline, where a sclerotic senatorial and equestrian elite, weakened by internal corruption and military reliance on foederati, yielded to Germanic warlords emphasizing raw military prowess; by 476 CE, Odoacer, leader of the Heruli and Sciri, deposed the last Western emperor Romulus Augustulus, establishing barbarian kingdoms that supplanted Roman administrative elites across Italy, Gaul, and Hispania with fresh ruling strata drawn from tribal chieftains.^[28] In feudal Europe, the 14th- to 16th-century transition in Italian city-states exemplified the supplanting of land-based warrior nobility—dependent on feudal levies and chivalric force—by mercantile and bureaucratic families leveraging trade networks and fiscal acumen; in Florence, for instance, ancient noble lineages like the Uberti faded amid Guelph-Ghibelline strife and economic shifts, while "new men" from banking houses such as the Medici ascended through guild control, loans to rulers, and diplomatic cunning, amassing political dominance by the late 1300s.^[29]^[30] Vilfredo Pareto, drawing from genealogical records of such aristocratic extinctions in Italian history, encapsulated this dynamic in his observation that "history is a graveyard of aristocracies," underscoring how ruling families recurrently ossify and are overtaken by vigorous non-elites rising through differing residues of persistence or experimentation, as evidenced in the short lifespans of Florentine patrician houses documented in medieval notarial archives.^[9]^[19]

Revolutionary Transitions in Modern History

The French Revolution, commencing with the Estates-General convening on May 5, 1789, and escalating through the storming of the Bastille on July 14, 1789, exemplified elite circulation as the ossified aristocratic elite—reliant on hereditary privilege and force—was supplanted by a bourgeois class leveraging economic innovation and rhetorical cunning.^[31] This shift aligned with Pareto's framework, where declining "lions" (force-oriented rulers) yielded to ascending "foxes" (cunning innovators), as the Third Estate's National Assembly abolished feudalism on August 4, 1789, dismantling noble privileges while elevating merchant and professional strata to political dominance.^[32] Yet, the bourgeois ascendancy proved unstable; by November 9, 1799, Napoleon Bonaparte's Brumaire coup restored forceful governance, culminating in his imperial coronation on December 2, 1804, and the creation of a new nobility drawn from military and administrative loyalists, thus reverting to lion-like consolidation amid revolutionary chaos.^[33] Similarly, the Russian Revolution of 1917 accelerated elite replacement, with the Bolshevik seizure of power on October 25, 1917 (Julian calendar), overthrowing the Tsarist autocracy and Provisional Government, thereby eradicating the imperial nobility and installing a revolutionary vanguard as the new ruling elite.^[34] Initial Bolshevik rule under Lenin embodied fox residues through ideological agitation and organizational dexterity, as evidenced by the party's growth from 24,000 members in February 1917 to over 200,000 by October, enabling control via soviets and the Cheka secret police.^[35] This evolved into Stalinist dominance by the late 1920s, marked by the Great Purge (1936–1938), which executed or imprisoned approximately 700,000 party members and officials, entrenching a coercive apparatus that prioritized force over persuasion, mirroring Pareto's lion archetype in suppressing internal rivals and enforcing collectivization on 93% of farmland by 1937.^[36] These upheavals underscore an empirical pattern wherein revolutions propel elite decay and swift substitution rather than achieving proclaimed mass equality; in France, post-revolutionary land distribution favored bourgeois purchasers, with noble estates auctioned to 40,000 new owners by 1793 but consolidating under Napoleonic meritocrats, perpetuating hierarchical rule.^[31] In Russia, Bolshevik promises of proletarian equity yielded a nomenklatura elite by the 1930s, controlling 80% of industrial output through centralized planning, contradicting Marxist teleology of class abolition while validating Pareto's insistence on perpetual elite governance via adaptive residues.^[37] Such dynamics reveal causal mechanisms of elite renewal through crisis, where mass mobilization serves as a vehicle for non-ruling elites' ascent, not egalitarian dissolution of power structures.^[38]

Circulation Versus Static Aristocracy

Pareto argued that attempts to maintain a static aristocracy through hereditary succession lead to inevitable decline, as elites lose the adaptive qualities necessary for governance amid changing circumstances.^[39] Hereditary systems foster inbreeding, which dilutes the energetic residues—such as innovation and resilience—that initially propelled elites to power, resulting in complacency and detachment from societal realities.^[39] In Pareto's framework, this stasis contrasts sharply with circulation, where competitive replacement by fresher, more capable strata injects vitality, preventing ossification and ensuring elite functionality through ongoing selection of superior talents.^[40] Empirical patterns across societies demonstrate that no aristocracy has endured indefinitely without renewal or overthrow, as static elites succumb to internal decay and external challenges from rising non-elites.^[39] Pareto observed this in historical transitions, where fixed hierarchies invite disruption precisely because they stifle the natural churn that sustains inequality without collapse.^[23] Such dynamics affirm a causal process akin to selection among governing classes, where vitality arises not from rigid preservation but from the displacement of enfeebled incumbents by those better attuned to exigencies of force, cunning, or circumstance.^[40] This rejection of static ideals challenges notions of perpetual noble hierarchies, often idealized in conservative thought as stabilizers of order, by highlighting how they empirically provoke the very circulations they seek to avert.^[39] Circulation, by contrast, maintains hierarchy's realism—elites rule, but only transiently—through mechanisms that reward competence over bloodline, averting the stagnation that dooms unchanging aristocracies to replacement.^[23]

Empirical Patterns in Elite Mobility

Empirical analyses of political elites in Western Europe from 1945 to 2015 reveal legislative turnover rates averaging 30-50% per election cycle, reflecting partial replacement amid incumbency advantages and party loyalty structures. These figures indicate substantial individual mobility into elite positions, yet core networks—such as interlocking directorates among economic and political leaders—persist across generations, with only marginal shifts in overall power concentration.^[41] For instance, in post-communist Central and Eastern European parliaments from 1990 to 2022, turnover hovered around 50% per election, driven by institutional instability rather than broad democratization, underscoring that replacement often reinforces rather than dismantles entrenched alliances.^[42] Patterns of elite mobility exhibit marked variation by contextual stability: crises accelerate turnover, while prolonged peace correlates with stagnation. Wars and regime upheavals, such as those following World War II, prompted elevated replacement through mechanisms like purges, emigration, and mortality; in France and Italy, for example, up to 40-60% of pre-war political elites were sidelined post-1945 due to collaboration trials and ideological realignments.^[43] Conversely, in stable welfare states like those in Scandinavia and post-1980s Western Europe, elite ingress slows, with intergenerational persistence in power elites exceeding 60-70% via familial, educational, and professional homophily, challenging assumptions of meritocratic openness.^[41] Academic datasets on parliamentary recruitment confirm lower volatility in high-welfare contexts, where social safety nets and regulatory continuity favor incumbent reproduction over disruptive ascent.^[44] Vilfredo Pareto's framework aligns with these observations, positing that elite circulation adheres to an 80/20 dynamic wherein a minority fraction (approximately 20%) of actors sustains disproportionate influence (80%), with turnover facilitating renewal without eroding oligarchic control. Empirical validations in historical elite studies support this asymmetry: mobility episodes replace decadent subsets but preserve systemic dominance, as seen in persistent wealth and network concentrations post-turnover events.^[39] This pattern prioritizes elite vitality over egalitarian diffusion, evident in data where upward individual trajectories—e.g., 10-20% non-elite entrants per cycle—coexist with 80% retention of decision-making loci by prior insiders. Such findings counter narratives of inherent opportunity in modern democracies, highlighting barriers like credentialism and patronage that confine circulation to calibrated limits.

Critiques and Alternative Perspectives

Methodological and Empirical Challenges

Critics of Pareto's circulation of elites theory have highlighted its limited testability, primarily due to the difficulty in operationalizing and quantifying the core concepts of residues—innate psychological dispositions toward persistence (Class I) or innovation and adaptation (Class II)—which underpin elite types like "lions" and "foxes."^[4] These residues are posited as non-volitional traits influencing elite efficacy, yet lack standardized metrics for empirical measurement, rendering the theory vulnerable to charges of unfalsifiability akin to ad hoc explanations in social science.^[45] Twentieth-century sociologists, including those extending Mosca's critiques, argued that Pareto's framework resists modern econometric validation, as it does not generate precise, hypothesis-driven predictions amenable to statistical hypothesis testing or large-N datasets on elite traits.^[46] Empirical challenges further compound these issues, with sparse longitudinal data on elite composition, recruitment, and displacement across societies, complicating efforts to distinguish circulation from mere incremental mobility or stasis.^[23] Studies attempting formalization have noted the absence of derived statements that are empirically testable in principle, as elite cycles span generations and resist controlled experimentation, often relying instead on qualitative historical inference prone to selection bias.^[47] Notwithstanding these methodological hurdles, the theory retains descriptive potency through its alignment with observed patterns of elite turnover, as evidenced in empirical analyses like Harold Lasswell's examinations of power elites, which document recurrent replacement of ruling groups via skill-based competition rather than perpetual entrenchment.^[48] Pareto's model has demonstrated predictive utility in forecasting instability from elite decay, such as the ossification of adaptive residues preceding revolutionary upheavals, where declining elites' failure to innovate correlates with rapid displacement by rising challengers—outcomes that static aristocratic or egalitarian paradigms fail to anticipate without invoking unobservable equalizing forces.^[37] This causal emphasis on verifiable elite behaviors and historical correlations privileges the theory's realism over untestable alternatives, even absent granular quantification, by elucidating mechanisms of power transfer grounded in human action rather than idealized stasis.^[49]

Comparisons with Marxist and Pluralist Views

Pareto's theory of elite circulation posits that power transitions occur through the replacement of one ruling elite by another, driven by qualities such as cunning or force, rather than the Marxist vision of proletarian revolution leading to the permanent dissolution of elites and a classless society. Marxist doctrine, as articulated by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels in The Communist Manifesto (1848), anticipates that historical materialism culminates in the proletariat's triumph, abolishing class exploitation; however, Pareto argued that such upheavals merely inaugurate new elites, as evidenced by the Soviet Union's post-1917 development of the nomenklatura—a privileged bureaucratic stratum that controlled appointments, resources, and decision-making, effectively replicating elite privileges under communist ideology. This pattern refutes Marxist expectations of elite eradication, as the nomenklatura, numbering around 1.5 million by the 1970s, formed a cohesive ruling class insulated from mass accountability, per analyses of Soviet power structures.^[50] In contrast to pluralist theories, which portray power as dispersed among competing interest groups and institutions enabling broad participation—as advanced by Robert Dahl in Who Governs? (1961)—Pareto emphasized elite concentration and agency, where non-elites remain peripheral to core governance. Empirical investigations, such as the 2014 study by Martin Gilens and Benjamin Page analyzing 1,779 U.S. policy issues from 1981 to 2002, demonstrate that economic elites and organized business interests exert disproportionate influence on outcomes, with average citizens' preferences holding negligible impact when diverging from elite views, thus undermining pluralist claims of equilibrated competition. Centralized elite dynamics are further illustrated in corporate spheres, where CEO turnover reflects circulation: median tenure among S&P 500 firms fell to 4.8 years by 2022, signaling rapid elite replacement amid performance pressures rather than diffused stakeholder equilibrium.^[51]^[52] Pareto's framework thus aligns more closely with observable causal patterns of elite self-perpetuation and renewal, prioritizing psychological residues and strategic adaptation over Marxist class determinism or pluralist fragmentation, which falter against data revealing persistent power asymmetries despite ideological facades of equality or dispersion. Academic assessments, including those evaluating 20th-century verdicts on elite versus Marxist models, affirm elite theory's explanatory robustness in capturing governance realities beyond normative democratic ideals.^[53]

Debates on Elite Reproduction Over Circulation

Scholars debating Pareto's theory of elite circulation have highlighted evidence of elite reproduction through intergenerational mechanisms, such as nepotism in elite educational institutions, which sustains power networks and slows the predicted churn between ruling classes.^[54] In the United States, legacy admissions at Ivy League universities confer substantial advantages; for instance, applicants from the wealthiest 1% with legacy status are five times more likely to gain entry to Ivy Plus colleges compared to non-legacy peers with similar qualifications.^[55] This practice, rooted in alumni family ties and donor influence, exemplifies how "fox-like" elites—characterized by cunning and adaptability—perpetuate dominance via institutional barriers rather than relying solely on forceful replacement by "lions," fostering a hybrid persistence that tempers pure circulation.^[56] Critics from structuralist perspectives, including Marxist-influenced analyses, argue that such reproductive strategies exacerbate inequality by embedding elite status in familial and economic capital, undermining Pareto's emphasis on inevitable elite turnover driven by residues of innovation and force.^[11] Empirical patterns in admissions data support this view, showing legacies comprising 10-15% of Ivy League enrollees despite representing a fraction of applicants, often prioritizing relational ties over meritocratic selection.^[57] However, these critiques overlook causal dynamics where elites' adaptive reproduction prevents systemic decay, as full stasis remains rare; instead, networks enable controlled renewal, ensuring governance competence absent in mass uprisings. Counterarguments emphasize that exogenous shocks still enforce partial circulation, as seen in the 2008 financial crisis, where financial firms experienced elevated CEO turnover rates—higher than in non-financial sectors—amid institutional failures and bailouts, displacing some incumbents while others adapted through regulatory capture.^[58] This event, triggering the collapse of firms like Lehman Brothers and government interventions, illustrates how crises compel selective replacement without total elite overthrow, aligning with Pareto's cycle but moderated by modern institutional resilience.^[59] Left-leaning narratives framing reproduction as unmitigated oligarchy fail causal scrutiny, as elites' self-perpetuation via nepotism and alliances empirically sustains societal function, averting the instability of undifferentiated mass rule.^[6]

Modern Applications and Implications

Post-Communist and Global Elite Shifts

Following the collapse of communist regimes in 1989, Eastern European societies experienced substantial elite circulation as entrenched nomenklatura were supplanted by new economic actors empowered by market liberalization and privatization programs. In Russia, the 1992 voucher privatization scheme initially distributed shares broadly, but the 1995-1996 loans-for-shares auctions enabled a cadre of entrepreneurs—such as Boris Berezovsky, Roman Abramovich, and Mikhail Khodorkovsky—to acquire controlling stakes in major state assets like Yukos oil and Sibneft, often at fractions of their value, thereby forming an oligarchic class that dominated key industries by the late 1990s.^[60]^[61] This shift exemplified Pareto's distinction between "foxes" (the adaptable, ideological communist elites) and "lions" (forceful, property-controlling newcomers), with the latter leveraging institutional voids to consolidate power amid economic turmoil that saw GDP plummet by over 40% from 1990 to 1998.^[62] Cross-national studies of post-communist elite recruitment in countries like Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic reveal patterns of partial circulation, where former communist officials comprised 20-40% of early transitional elites but were progressively marginalized by entrants from business and dissident backgrounds, with parliamentary turnover rates exceeding 50% in initial post-1989 elections.^[63]^[64] In Eastern Germany after reunification, elite replacement was particularly stark, with over 70% turnover in administrative positions by 1994, driven by market integration rather than ideological continuity.^[65] These dynamics validate aspects of Pareto's theory by demonstrating how non-resilient elites yield to vigorous successors in periods of systemic rupture, countering narratives—prevalent in left-leaning academic analyses—that frame the era primarily as elite reproduction exacerbating inequality without acknowledging the causal role of reform-induced mobility.^[66] Globalization amplified elite circulation beyond regional transitions by enabling transnational mobility of high-skilled "knowledge entrepreneurs" in sectors like technology and finance, who transfer innovations across borders and displace localized incumbents. From the 1990s onward, liberalization of capital flows and skilled migration policies facilitated the rise of global talent pools, with migrants from emerging economies contributing to elite renewal in host countries; for instance, Indian and Chinese tech professionals filled over 60% of Silicon Valley's engineering roles by the early 2000s, fostering firm-level innovation gains estimated at 10-20% productivity boosts.^[67]^[68] This process underscores market-driven selection of adaptive elites, as quantified in studies showing net positive knowledge spillovers from such mobility, which Pareto's framework anticipates through the differential residues of innovation-oriented versus tradition-bound groups.^[69] Academic sources emphasizing persistent inequality in these shifts often overlook this empirical renewal, reflecting institutional biases toward redistribution-focused interpretations over evidence of competitive displacement.^[70]

Populism as Elite Circulation in Contemporary Politics

In contemporary politics since 2010, populist movements have manifested as a resurgence of "lion-like" elites—characterized by direct, nationalist, and forceful approaches—challenging the entrenched "fox-like" bureaucratic and technocratic establishments, aligning with Pareto's theory of elite circulation driven by the decadence of ruling classes.^[71]^[72] This dynamic reflects anti-establishment waves where voter discontent with globalization, immigration policies, and institutional inertia propels outsiders into power, displacing incumbents reliant on cunning adaptation rather than resolute action. Empirical patterns show these shifts occurring through electoral upheavals rather than violent revolutions, maintaining hierarchy while refreshing elite composition to avert total capture by any single faction.^[73] The 2016 U.S. presidential election exemplified this circulation, as Donald Trump's victory—securing 304 electoral votes and 46.1% of the popular vote—elevated a counter-elite skeptical of federal bureaucracy and international alliances, supplanting the post-2008 establishment dominated by policy experts and lobbyists.^[71]^[72] Similarly, the Brexit referendum on June 23, 2016, passed with 51.9% voting to leave the European Union, leading to the replacement of pro-integration leadership with figures prioritizing national sovereignty, thereby illustrating lion resurgence against supranational fox networks.^[73] In both cases, the incoming elites emphasized border control and economic protectionism, drawing support from working-class demographics alienated by prior governance models.^[74] Across Europe in the 2010s and 2020s, right-wing nationalist parties have gained ground, displacing centrist coalitions through successive elections, as seen in Italy where Brothers of Italy increased from 4.4% in 2018 to 26% in 2022, enabling Giorgia Meloni's government to prioritize migration restrictions and fiscal conservatism over EU-aligned technocracy.^[75] In Hungary and Poland, such parties have held power since the mid-2010s, achieving vote shares exceeding 40-50% in national contests and reshaping administrative elites toward cultural preservation and state interventionism.^[75] These shifts, documented in analyses of 46 populist executives globally since 1990, demonstrate partial elite turnover—often 20-40% in cabinet and policy apparatuses—without dismantling core power structures, affirming circulation's role in adapting to societal pressures like economic shocks from China imports.^[76]^[74] Such circulations mitigate risks of elite ossification by introducing competitive renewal, yet they reinforce stratified governance as new lions consolidate authority through popular mandates, countering narratives from displaced establishments that frame these changes as existential threats to liberal institutions.^[77] Mainstream commentary often portrays populism as anti-democratic, but this resistance aligns with fox-like incumbents defending privileges amid evident voter realignments, as evidenced by sustained populist incumbency without systemic collapse in analyzed cases.^[71]^[78] The endurance of this pattern underscores Pareto's insight into elite adaptability, preventing stagnation while channeling mass energies into hierarchical stability rather than egalitarian disruption.

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[PDF] The Circulation of Financial Elites - Open Research Online
In this chapter, I first set out what I think is helpful about Pareto's account of the circulation of elites that can shed light on contemporary financial elite ...Missing: scholarly articles
[8]
Vilfredo Pareto - Elites - Hans Zetterberg
The propositions constituting Pareto's theory of the circulation of the elites ... The Mind and Society, translated by A. Livingston and A. Bongiomo, 4 vols ...Missing: definition | Show results with:definition
[9]
Vilfredo Pareto - The Decision Lab
―Vilfredo Pareto, The Mind and Society. Pareto is most well-known for his 80/20 rule, which he developed in 1906 after a mathematical observation of Italy's ...
[10]
Vilfredo Pareto: A Return to the Libertarian Roots of Elite Theory
Jun 12, 2025 · Vilfredo Pareto's work in uncovering the truth about elites—how they gain power, and how they lose it—is essential to any fight for liberty ...<|control11|><|separator|>
[11]
Pareto Principle, Elites & Social Efficiency - Sociology Guide
Unlike Marxist class theories, which emphasize economic structures, Pareto's elites are defined by their capacity to dominate, regardless of the social system.Missing: top percentage
[12]
Vilfredo Pareto's Theory of Elites - Scraps from the loft
Feb 20, 2022 · Pareto's theory of elites posits that society is always governed by a minority of individuals who possess the power and resources to rule.
[13]
A Layman's Introduction to Elite Theory - The Miskatonian
Nov 20, 2023 · “History can be described as the graveyard of aristocracies (elites).” This quote from influential political theorist Vilfredo Pareto, one ...
[14]
Pareto's Concept of Residues: Meaning, Characteristics and ...
Residues are intermediary between sentiments and concomitant behaviour. These are related to human instincts but not synonymous with them.Missing: maintenance | Show results with:maintenance
[15]
Elite Theories: Mosca, Michels, and Pareto - Sociology OWL
Pareto's Psychological Approach: Pareto emphasized superior psychological attributes or “residues” of elites. He distinguished between “lions” (ruling by force) ...<|control11|><|separator|>
[16]
[PDF] elite theories of pareto, mosca and michels
He does not redefine the concept of elite, he took Pareto's theory of circulation of elites and modified it. ... The Mind and Society. A Treatise on General.
[17]
2.2.2. Elite, Ruling Elite, Patronalism, and Informality
Following Vilfredo Pareto's classical theory of elites,[4] we can divide elite groups themselves into two general categories: non-ruling elites and the ruling ...
[18]
The lion and fox animal spirits of Machiavelli and Pareto
The present paper draws on the “lion” and “fox” animal spirits, whose inspiration for Pareto's psychologistic sociological project we clarify from Chapter ...
[19]
Pareto's two types of elites: lions and foxes — Remains of the Day
Apr 9, 2017 · The first, whom he called the “foxes”, are those who dominate mainly through combinazioni (“combination”): deceit, cunning, manipulation and co ...
[20]
Film Theory: Elites–Pareto (Political and Social)
Oct 16, 2022 · According to Pareto, there is a tendency for elites with one psychological orientation, such as lions, to alternate with more creative but ...
[21]
The circulation of elites: How the ruling class falls
Feb 27, 2023 · The circulation of elites: How the ruling class falls. Auron ... (Pareto, "Compendium of General Sociology," p. 279.) A closed elite ...
[22]
MacIntyre: The circulation of elites: How the ruling class falls
Feb 27, 2023 · The circulation of elites is an inescapable part of every society. A wise ruling class that seeks to maintain a healthy society will strike a ...
[23]
Pareto's Theory of Elite Cycles: A Reconsideration and Application
... Elite Integration in Stable Democracies: A Reconsideration,' European Sociological Review 7 (1991). Judt, Tony. Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945 (New ...
[24]
Elusive elites | Eurozine
May 14, 2025 · Borrowing from Niccolò Machiavelli (1469–1527), Pareto used the metaphor of 'foxes' and 'lions' to describe the interplay between conservative ...
[25]
Conflicts of the Orders Patrician and Plebeian - ThoughtCo
Apr 29, 2025 · Since the patricians needed the physical bodies of the plebeians as fighting men, the plebeian secession was a serious problem. The patricians ...
[26]
https://www.historyskills.com/classroom/ancient-history/anc-conflict-of-the-orders-reading/
[27]
Rome's Transition from Republic to Empire
Oct 18, 2024 · until 494 B.C.E., when a strike orchestrated by the plebeians resulted in the establishment of the Concilium Plebis, or the Councilof the Plebs.<|separator|>
[28]
Who Were the Barbarian Successor Kingdoms of the Western ...
Apr 27, 2023 · The barbarian successor kingdoms were the Vandals, Visigoths, Ostrogoths, and Franks, which emerged after the fall of the Western Roman Empire.
[29]
https://historyguild.org/italy-during-the-renaissance/
[30]
The socio-economic and cultural factors leading to the Renaissance
Decline of Feudalism and Rise of the Merchant Class. The feudal system, characterized by a rigid social hierarchy and land-based economy, began to decline ...
[31]
The Bourgeois Revolution in France (1789-1815) on JSTOR
It asserts that in 1789, a massive popular uprising allowed the middle class to assume power by overthrowing the political and social order of theancien régime.
[32]
Circulation of Elite: Pareto with Top 15 Important Questions
Aug 29, 2025 · The Concept of Circulation of Elite. The circulation of elite is the process through which ruling classes are gradually replaced by others from ...
[33]
The long and short reasons for why Revolution broke out in France ...
The Revolution resulted from a struggle for power between the old feudal nobility, whose status was based on the ownership of land, and the bourgeoisie.
[34]
An Evolving Elite | The Soviet Elite from Lenin to Gorbachev
The year 1917 effectively eliminated the elite of tsarist Russia and put Bolshevik revolutionaries in its place. As we saw in Chapter 1, they included both ...
[35]
The Soviet Political Elite 1917-1922 - jstor
that the 240,000 members of the Bolshevik Party will not be able to rule Russia ... ... produced strains within the new political elite: between 'Old Bolsheviks' ...
[36]
Elite Circulation in Russia from the Russian Imperial Era to the ...
This paper contributes to Elite Theory within the context of regime change, focusing on Imperial Russian Aristocrats post-1917 Bolshevik Revolution.
[37]
The Hidden Truth About Revolutions & The Circulation of Elites
Jun 24, 2025 · Foxes: These are the rulers who rely on cunning, manipulation, and innovation. They're adaptable, often skilled in rhetoric and persuasion, and ...
[38]
The Political Economy of Revolution and Institutional Change - jstor
We explore the impact of revolutions on institutional change by focusing on two major types of revolutions, namely the elite revolution and the mass revolution.
[39]
[PDF] Vilfredo Pareto as a Forerunner of Management
Jun 7, 2023 · The paper starts by reviewing some Pareto concepts and constructions. ... circulation of elites” as a way to explain changes in government and ...Missing: scholarly | Show results with:scholarly
[40]
Skeptics of Democracy and Defenders of Freedom | RealClearHistory
Jan 12, 2021 · Pareto, too, believed that “popular representation” was a fiction; he used the term “so-called democratic governments.” In all societies, he ...
[41]
[PDF] The social immobility of the European power elite A comparative ...
Sep 28, 2024 · This paper investigates the socio-demographic, educational and professional features of European power elite members. (henceforth international ...
[42]
The Determinants of Parliamentary Turnover in Central and Eastern ...
Mar 16, 2024 · A descriptive analysis showed that the average level of turnover in post-communist countries was approximately 50% for each election, although ...
[43]
Elite mobility and continuity during a regime change - Matsumoto
Jan 31, 2023 · We analyze the impact of the regime change from two aspects: (1) the composition of elites or elite membership and (2) the internal hierarchy ...
[44]
Transformational party events and legislative turnover in West ...
Jul 27, 2020 · This paper examines the influence of party change on party-level legislative turnover. Analyzing a novel dataset tracking 251 parties in eight West European ...
[45]
A critique of Pareto's Contribution to the Theory of a Political Elite
of Vilfredo Pareto and of Gaetano Mosca2. Pareto, who systematized and developed ... government, and a non-governing elite, comprising the rest"4. This.
[46]
(PDF) The Elite Theory in the Context of Public Policy Making
Nov 4, 2023 · The theory is accused of not being empirical. However ... elite. group. Elite theories-Pareto and Mosca assume the elite group is homogenous.
[47]
toward formalization and extension - of pareto's theory - jstor
11-54 in Scritti Sociotogici di Vilfredo Pareto, Giovanni Busino, ed ... : the "governing elite" and the "non-governing elite." This interest brings ...
[48]
The Study of Elites - jstor
Meanwhile, Harold Lasswell's pleas for the accumulation of precise empirical data presaged a new departure. Such data over the past thirty years have been ...Missing: validation | Show results with:validation
[49]
Pareto's theory of elite cycles: A reconsideration and application
Multycomponent cyclicity in mothly cuicides(period T=18,46 and 198 months was found and close close similarity with heliogeophysical activity (HGA) suggested by ...
[50]
(PDF) From Soviet Nomenklatura to Russian Élite - ResearchGate
Nov 6, 2007 · PDF | REVOLUTIONS, for Pareto, were above all a matter of elite change.1 And for many there was a revolution in this sense in Eastern Europe ...
[51]
Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and ...
Sep 18, 2014 · As to empirical evidence concerning interest groups, it is well established that organized groups regularly lobby and fraternize with public ...
[52]
2024 CEO Transitions: The measure of the market - Spencer Stuart
We see this trend across most segments, with average tenure between 2021 and 2024 declining from 11.2 to 8.3 years among the S&P 500 and from 10.3 to 9.9 among ...
[53]
Elite Theory versus Marxism: The Twentieth Century's Verdict [2000]
Consequently, democratic theories have not achieved the explanatory force and scope of the Marxist and elite theories; they have served more as a normative ...
[54]
The impact of legacy status on undergraduate admissions at elite ...
Aug 9, 2025 · We conclude with a discussion of our study's implications for understanding the role of family relationships and nepotism in today's ...
[55]
https://www.wsj.com/us-news/education/legacy-college-admissions-preferences-backlash-772c88be
[56]
[PDF] The impact of legacy status on undergraduate admissions at elite ...
Empirical evidence on legacy admissions preferences confirms that these students ... The curse of nepotism. The Economist. Retrieved. September 2, 2009 from http ...
[57]
Legacy Admissions: An Insidious Form of Racial Discrimination
Oct 12, 2022 · About 10 to 15 percent of students at Ivy League universities are the children of alumni ... nepotism. [2] Joe Pinsker, “The Real Reasons Legacy ...
[58]
[PDF] Corporate Governance in the 2007-2008 Financial Crisis - FDIC
Figure 1 shows that financial firms exhibited higher CEO turnover rates than those of non-financial firms in the 2007-2008 crisis period, while in the 2004- ...Missing: elite sector
[59]
How the 2008 Financial Crisis Affected the Banking Sector
The financial crisis that began in 2008 decimated the banking sector. A number of banks went under, others had to be bailed out by governments and still others ...<|separator|>
[60]
From Soviets to oligarchs: Inequality and property in Russia, 1905 ...
Nov 9, 2017 · The rise of private property in Russia. The major change that occurred between 1990 and 2015 is of course the transition from communism to ...
[61]
[PDF] Privatization and Piratization in Post-Communist Russia
PRIVATIZATION AND PIRATIZATION IN POST-COMMUNIST RUSSIA. ✦. 429. Gusinsky, and Khodorkovsky for presumed tax evasion and other “economic crimes.” The oligarchs ...
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Circulation or Reproduction of Elites during the Postcommunist ...
Communist elite and is likely to block the revolutionary transformation of society. While during the late 1940s the old Communist elites opted for "reds ...
[63]
Circulation or reproduction pf elites during the postcommunist ...
Circulation or reproduction pf elites during the postcommunist transformation of Eastern Europe. Introduction. Published: October 1995. Volume 24, pages 615 ...
[64]
[PDF] ELITES IN CENTRAL-EASTERN EUROPE
turnover rates which, 15 years after the start of post-communist democratisation, have only once (in the fourth democratic election in Hungary) sunk under ...
[65]
Elite Change After Communism: Eastern Germany, the Czech ...
See Iván Szelényi and Szonja Szelényi, “Circulation or Reproduction of Elites During the Postcommunist Transformation of Eastern Europe,”Theory and Society 24 ( ...
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(PDF) On the Elites in the Eastern European Post-Communist ...
On the Elites in the Eastern European Post-Communist Polities. Political Elites in the Eastern European Political Regimes after the Fall of the Berlin Wall.
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The International Mobility of Talent: Types, Causes, and ...
The economic potential of globalization is ultimately dependent on the international mobility of highly talented individuals that transfer knowledge, new ...
[68]
The Gift of Global Talent: Innovation Policy and the Economy
This chapter explores the data around global talent flows and some of the economic implications of an employer-driven immigration approach.
[69]
Book : The International Mobility of Talent - UNU-WIDER
These talented elite often originate from developing countries and migrate to industrial economies. Many return home with new ideas, experiences, and capital ...
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(PDF) Global Economic Elites? The Globalization-Hypothesis and its ...
Mainstream globalization theories suggest that as the sovereignty of nation states is diminished the importance of multinational corporations (MNCs) increases.
[71]
The counter-elite gambled on Trump and won - New Statesman
Dec 4, 2024 · W hen Vilfredo Pareto wrote that history is “a graveyard of aristocracies”, he meant the observation to apply to all ruling elites.<|separator|>
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Circulation of Elites - A Patient Cycle
Jul 1, 2024 · Basically, it says there's a cycle by which vigorous people rise to power, hold it for a spell through a healthy balance of different impulses, ...
[73]
Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of Populism: Economic Have-Nots and ...
Rising support for populist parties has disrupted the politics of many Western societies. What explains this phenomenon? Two theories are examined here.
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[PDF] Economic Nationalism: US Trade Policy vs. Brexit
In this article, it is shown that both events were a response to the China import shock, which in turn led to a dramatic rise in populism resulting in a ...
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European populist parties' vote share on the rise, especially on right
Oct 6, 2022 · In both Hungary and Poland, right-wing populist parties have surged to power, making enormous gains in the last two decades.Missing: displacement | Show results with:displacement
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Populists in Power Around the World - Tony Blair Institute
Nov 7, 2018 · The report identifies 46 populist leaders or political parties that have held executive office across 33 countries between 1990 and today.
[77]
Using Elite Theory to Elucidate the Shapes and Stakes of Populist ...
The opposition between the ruling minority elite and the ruled masses conceived in populism is a core point in Vilfredo Pareto's (1963) and Gaetano Mosca's ( ...
[78]
High Tide? Populism in Power, 1990-2020 - Tony Blair Institute
Feb 7, 2020 · Global populism is holding steady near its all-time high, and cultural populism has become its most prevalent form.Missing: 20-30% | Show results with:20-30%<|control11|><|separator|>