Fact-checked by Grok 2 weeks ago

Decadence

Decadence denotes a phase of cultural exhaustion in which established institutions and artistic forms persist amid widespread disbelief in their foundational principles, resulting in innovation without conviction and a preoccupation with novelty over substance.^[1] This condition manifests not as a depletion of energy or talent but as a profound disjunction between societal aims and the means to achieve them, often accompanied by material abundance and intellectual activity that fails to renew vitality.^[1] Historically invoked to describe the late Roman Empire's moral and political decay, exemplified by imperial excesses under figures like Heliogabalus, the term gained prominence in the late 19th century to label a self-conscious literary and artistic movement in France and Britain.^[2] Centered in the fin de siècle period, this Decadent movement rejected naturalism and positivist optimism, favoring instead themes of artificiality, sensuality, spiritual malaise, and the beauty found in deterioration, as expressed in works emphasizing the unnatural aspects of human experience.^[2] While critics viewed it as symptomatic of broader societal decline, proponents celebrated its aesthetic intensity and critique of bourgeois conventions, influencing subsequent avant-gardes through an ethos of "art for art's sake."^[2]

Etymology and Conceptual Foundations

Linguistic Origins and Evolution

The term "decadence" derives from the Medieval Latin decadentia, denoting "decay" or a state of deterioration, formed from the Late Latin dēcadēns, the present participle of dēcadere, meaning "to fall away" or "to decay," combining the prefix de- ("down" or "away") with cadere ("to fall").^[3] ^[4] This etymological root emphasizes a literal and figurative process of decline from a prior condition of vitality or elevation.^[5] In English, the word first appeared in the 1540s, initially signifying a "deteriorated condition" or general decay, borrowed via Middle French décadence, which itself emerged in the early 15th century.^[3] ^[4] By the 1620s, its usage had refined to describe a "process of falling away from a better or more vital state," often applied to moral, physical, or institutional decline.^[3] Early English instances remained sporadic, primarily in contexts of historical or ethical deterioration, as seen in Renaissance-era texts referencing societal or personal waning.^[6] The term's semantic evolution accelerated in the 19th century, shifting from broad connotations of decay to specialized applications in aesthetics and culture, influenced by French literary discourse.^[3] From 1852 onward, it denoted periods of artistic decline, modeled on French usage, and gained prominence as a descriptor for the fin de siècle movement, where it evoked deliberate refinement amid perceived civilizational exhaustion.^[3] The aesthetic sense crystallized in Théophile Gautier's 1868 preface to Charles Baudelaire's Les Fleurs du Mal, marking the first documented use of décadence to signify a sophisticated, introspective response to modernity's excesses rather than mere moral lapse.^[7] Between 1870 and 1880, "decadence" emerged as a proper noun for a self-identified literary and artistic school in France, emphasizing artificiality, sensuality, and pessimism, before extending as an adjective to critique or celebrate ornate styles in English contexts by the late 1880s.^[8] In the 20th century, the word's connotations bifurcated further: retaining its core sense of decline in historical analyses (e.g., Oswald Spengler's The Decline of the West in 1918, which invoked decadence as a phase of cultural senescence), while in popular usage acquiring positive associations with luxurious indulgence or hedonism, diverging from its original pejorative implications of falling.^[5] This dual trajectory reflects broader linguistic adaptation, where empirical observations of societal patterns informed metaphorical extensions, though modern applications often prioritize sensory excess over structural decay, as critiqued in philosophical works like Jacques Barzun's From Dawn to Decadence (2000), which traces the term's persistence in describing post-1500 Western cultural trajectories.^[5]

Definitions Across Disciplines

In philosophy, decadence denotes a physiological and spiritual weakening, characterized by an inversion of natural values, excessive introspection, and a loss of creative vitality, as Friedrich Nietzsche described it in his 1888 notes on the concept, viewing it as a necessary phase akin to decay in organic life that precedes renewal but signals exhaustion of higher instincts.^[9] Nietzsche contrasted it with robust health, associating it with symptoms like pity-driven egalitarianism and flight from reality into metaphysics or artifice.^[10] Historically, decadence refers to the internal erosion of societal structures following a peak of achievement, implying a downward trajectory marked by diminished energy and institutional failure, as seen in analyses of imperial declines where luxury and corruption supplanted discipline and innovation.^[11] For instance, some accounts attribute Rome's 5th-century collapse partly to such processes, involving moral laxity and economic parasitism amid territorial overextension.^[4] In sociological terms, decadence describes a breakdown in collective norms and cultural cohesion, often involving anomie, fatalism, and a retreat from standards of excellence, leading to social malaise and reduced communal efficacy.^[6] This manifests as institutional decay and a pervasive nostalgia for lost vigor, where societal reproduction falters due to eroded incentives for productivity and solidarity.^[12] Economically, decadence signifies stagnation after expansion, where growth in productive forces is fettered by monopolistic tendencies, recurrent crises, and misallocation toward unproductive consumption, as theorized in critiques of late capitalism dating to the early 20th century.^[13] It correlates with institutional sclerosis and demographic decline, prioritizing short-term gratification over long-term investment, resulting in diminished returns on capital and societal vitality.^[14] In literature and aesthetics, decadence emerged as a late-19th-century French-originated ethos emphasizing artificiality, sensory excess, and rejection of utilitarian norms, prioritizing perverse beauty and ennui over moral or progressive ideals.^[15] Writers like Joris-Karl Huysmans exemplified this through narratives of refined decay, where sophistication masks underlying sterility. Biologically and evolutionarily, decadence parallels degenerative phases in organisms or populations, where selective pressures favor ornamental or maladaptive traits over survival fitness, as observed in phenomena like exaggerated sexual displays in species that reduce offspring viability.^[16] This leads to a post-maturity decline, mirroring societal patterns where comfort erodes adaptive resilience.^[17]

Historical Manifestations

Ancient Civilizations

Greek observers of the ancient Near East frequently characterized empires like the Achaemenid Persians (c. 550–330 BC) as decadent, attributing their vulnerabilities to the corrosive effects of unchecked luxury and absolutist rule. Historians such as Herodotus described Persian society as softened by opulent habits, including the widespread use of silk, gold adornments, and eunuch-dominated courts, which allegedly fostered effeminacy and dependency on royal favor rather than personal valor. This portrayal contrasted sharply with Greek ideals of citizen-soldiers hardened by simplicity and self-reliance, suggesting that the empire's vast wealth from conquests undermined the martial discipline that initially built it, contributing to defeats like those at Marathon (490 BC) and Salamis (480 BC).^[18]^[19] In ancient Egypt, signs of decadence emerged prominently during the Late Period (664–332 BC), marked by pharaonic weakness, administrative corruption, and a detachment from the populace. Judicial records, such as the Abbott Papyrus (c. 1100 BC, though reflective of ongoing patterns), document widespread tomb robberies enabled by elite complicity, while foreign mercenaries—Nubians and Greeks—supplanted native forces, eroding national cohesion and military prowess. Priestly estates expanded to control up to one-third of arable land by the 26th Dynasty, diverting resources from state defense to temple luxuries and fostering nomarchal autonomy that fragmented authority, as seen in the failed resistance to Persian invasions under Cambyses II (525 BC). These internal decays, compounded by environmental stresses like reduced Nile inundations, rendered Egypt susceptible to conquest without invoking solely external causes.^[20]^[21] Mesopotamian powers, particularly the Neo-Assyrian Empire (911–609 BC), displayed decadence through elite overindulgence amid territorial overreach. Ashurbanipal's reign (668–627 BC) featured monumental libraries and artistic patronage in Nineveh, yet coincided with provincial revolts and reliance on brutal deportations to maintain control, signaling a shift from innovative administration to repressive excess. Archaeological evidence of palace extravagance, including imported luxuries from across the empire, paralleled declining troop morale and logistical strains, culminating in the coalition sack of Nineveh (612 BC) by Babylonians and Medes. This pattern underscores how initial vigor in conquest yielded to internal rot, where cultural sophistication masked eroding fiscal and demographic resilience.^[22]

Imperial Rome and Late Antiquity

In the Imperial Roman period, decadence manifested through elite indulgence in luxury, sexual excess, and erosion of traditional virtues, as chronicled by ancient historians like Suetonius and Cassius Dio, whose accounts, while potentially exaggerated for moralistic effect, drew from senatorial biases against "oriental" influences.^[23] Emperors such as Nero (r. 54–68 AD) exemplified this by prioritizing artistic pursuits and spectacles over governance, including the construction of the opulent Domus Aurea covering 80 hectares after the Great Fire of 64 AD, funded by debased coinage and confiscations. Commodus (r. 180–192 AD), son of Marcus Aurelius, abandoned stoic discipline for gladiatorial combats and deifications of personal indulgences, contributing to administrative neglect amid frontier pressures. These behaviors reflected a shift from republican austerity to imperial autocracy, where power concentration enabled personal vices over civic duty. The Severan dynasty (193–235 AD) intensified such patterns, with Emperor Elagabalus (r. 218–222 AD) imposing Syrian sun worship, marrying multiple times including to a Vestal Virgin, and reportedly engaging in public prostitution and self-castration desires, as detailed in Herodian's history, which portrayed him as undermining Roman piety and masculinity.^[24] His excesses, including banquets where guests suffocated under rose petals, symbolized detachment from military necessities during ongoing Parthian threats, leading to his assassination by Praetorian Guards at age 18.^[25] Ancient sources like Dio Cassius, writing under later regimes, amplified these for propaganda, yet archaeological evidence of imported luxuries from Emesa corroborates elite orientalism.^[26] The Crisis of the Third Century (235–284 AD) amplified decadence amid 26 claimants to the throne, hyperinflation peaking at 1,000% by 270 AD, and reliance on barbarian mercenaries, as fiscal strain from elite tax evasion and luxury imports eroded state capacity.^[27] Moral critiques in period texts, such as those lamenting easy divorce and adultery dissolving family structures, suggested broader societal laxity, though empirical data like declining birth rates (from 6 per woman in the Republic to under 4 by the 3rd century) linked more to lead poisoning and urbanization than vice alone.^[28] In Late Antiquity (284–476 AD), Diocletian's reforms (r. 284–305 AD) and Constantine's Christianization (r. 306–337 AD) aimed to restore order, yet persisted elite corruption rhetoric, with senators using "decadence" accusations against rivals amid barbarian integrations.^[29] Edward Gibbon's 18th-century analysis attributed decline to Christianity's pacifism sapping martial vigor, citing Theodosius I's (r. 379–395 AD) edicts enforcing orthodoxy while Western administration faltered, culminating in Romulus Augustulus's deposition in 476 AD.^[30] Modern scholarship, however, subordinates moral decay to material causes like climatic shifts and invasions, viewing decadence as elite symptom rather than systemic driver, with Eastern Empire's endurance underscoring resilience absent Western overextension.^[31]^[32]

Modern Historical Episodes

In the late 17th and 18th centuries, the French Ancien Régime under Louis XIV and Louis XV manifested decadence through the opulent isolation of the nobility at Versailles, where construction costs from 1669 to 1710 exceeded 2% of France's annual GDP equivalent, diverting resources from military and economic needs amid recurring famines like that of 1693-1694, which killed up to 2.5 million.^[33] This excess, including lavish entertainments and court intrigues, alienated the nobility from provincial realities and fueled resentment among the Third Estate, contributing causally to the financial crisis of 1780s—exacerbated by wars and poor harvests—that precipitated the Revolution of 1789.^[33] Contemporary observers like Voltaire critiqued the moral laxity, yet the regime's structural rigidity, prioritizing absolutist display over reform, evidenced vitality loss.^[34] The fin de siècle era around 1890-1914 in Europe, particularly France and Britain, reflected societal decadence via cultural pessimism, urban ennui, and aesthetic escapism amid industrialization's strains, with birth rates falling from 4.5 children per woman in 1870 to 3.0 by 1900 in France, signaling demographic stagnation.^[35] Intellectuals like Max Nordau in Degeneration (1892) diagnosed neurasthenia and moral fatigue as symptoms of civilizational overripeness, linking them to phenomena such as absinthe-fueled bohemianism in Paris's Belle Époque (1871-1914), where cabarets like the Moulin Rouge epitomized hedonistic distraction from imperial overextension and class tensions.^[36] This period's Decadent movement, emphasizing artificiality and sensation over progress, mirrored broader indicators like France's military unpreparedness, evident in the Dreyfus Affair (1894-1906), which exposed institutional corruption.^[37] The Weimar Republic (1919-1933) in Germany illustrated post-war decadence through cultural liberation juxtaposed against economic ruin, as hyperinflation peaked in November 1923 with the mark at 4.2 trillion per U.S. dollar, eroding middle-class savings and fostering desperation.^[38] Berlin's nightlife—cabarets, jazz, and sexual experimentation in venues like the Eldorado—drew conservative backlash for perceived immorality, with right-wing critics decrying it as Sodom-like amid 6 million unemployed by 1932.^[39] Hyper-modernism in art, from Bauhaus functionalism to Expressionist cabaret, masked political fragmentation (14 governments in 14 years) and demographic shifts, including a fertility rate drop to 1.7 by 1933, but historians note the "decadence" label was partly Nazi propaganda exaggerating urban vice to justify authoritarianism.^[40] Jacques Barzun, in analyzing 20th-century Western culture, framed such episodes as culminations of 500 years of emancipation leading to self-dismantling traditions, with post-1914 abstraction signaling creative exhaustion rather than renewal.^[41]

Philosophical and Theoretical Frameworks

Cyclical Theories of Civilization

Cyclical theories of civilization posit that societies and cultures follow recurring patterns of growth, maturity, and decay, rather than linear progress, with decadence manifesting as a phase of internal dissolution characterized by loss of vitality, moral enervation, and institutional rigidity. These frameworks, drawing from historical observation, attribute decline to endogenous factors such as eroded social cohesion, excessive materialism, and failure to adapt to challenges, often culminating in collapse or transformation. Proponents argue that empirical patterns across disparate civilizations—evident in records of ancient empires—support this view over progressive narratives, as no society has indefinitely sustained dominance without succumbing to predictable pathologies.^[42]^[43] One foundational model originates with the 14th-century Arab historian Ibn Khaldun, who in his Muqaddimah (1377) described dynastic cycles driven by asabiyyah, or tribal solidarity, which propels nomadic groups to conquer sedentary urban civilizations weakened by luxury and complacency. Typically spanning three to four generations, the cycle begins with hardy conquerors establishing rule through cohesion and austerity, but subsequent rulers indulge in opulence, taxation, and bureaucracy, eroding asabiyyah and inviting overthrow by fresher groups; decadence here appears as softened elites detached from productive masses, leading to inevitable downfall. Khaldun's analysis, grounded in North African and Islamic historical cases like the Almoravids and Almohads, emphasizes causal realism: urban refinement fosters effeminacy and division, rendering states vulnerable without external invasion.^[43]^[44]^[45] Giambattista Vico, in The New Science (1725, revised 1744), outlined a providential cycle of three ages—divine (theocratic, poetic), heroic (aristocratic, feudal), and human (democratic, rational)—progressing toward corruption and barbarism umana (refined savagery), followed by a ricorso or return to primitive vigor via catastrophe. Decadence emerges in the human age through skepticism, equity's overreach, and dissolution of hierarchies, mirroring cycles in Roman history from monarchy to empire's fall; Vico inferred this from linguistic and mythological evidence across cultures, rejecting linear enlightenment views as hubristic.^[46]^[47] In the 20th century, Oswald Spengler applied organic metaphors to eight high cultures in The Decline of the West (1918–1922), viewing each as a superorganism traversing spring-like cultural creativity, summer maturation, autumn transition to civilization (mechanistic, urban), and winter decline marked by Caesarism, materialism, and cultural sterility. Western (Faustian) civilization, per Spengler, entered this terminal phase around 1800, evidenced by imperialism, abstract finance, and megacities devoid of soul, paralleling late Rome's symptoms; he derived this from morphological analogies, not statistics, critiquing progressive historiography as Western parochialism.^[42]^[48] Arnold Toynbee's A Study of History (1934–1961) examined 21 civilizations through challenge-response dynamics, where growth stems from creative minorities surmounting difficulties, but breakdown occurs via élite schism and proletarian alienation, yielding a time of troubles and potential universal state before final disintegration or transfiguration. Decadence signals in internal proletarian revolts and loss of spiritual élan, as in Hellenistic Greece's failure against Persian threats; Toynbee, analyzing annals from Sumer to modern Europe, stressed voluntary self-determination over determinism, though critics note his moral teleology undervalues material causation.^[49]^[50] Pitirim Sorokin's Social and Cultural Dynamics (1937–1941) classified cultures by truth-perception: ideational (spiritual, ascetic), idealistic (balanced), and sensate (empirical, hedonistic), with prolonged sensate dominance—evident in Western art, values, and institutions since the Renaissance—breeding crisis through atomization, sensationalism, and ethical relativism. Decadence afflicts late sensate phases via crumbling empiricism's inability to address existential voids, prompting oscillation toward ideational renewal amid upheavals like world wars; Sorokin's quantitative indices of values across centuries substantiated the cycle, warning against assuming perpetual sensate viability.^[51]^[52]^[53]

Moral and Religious Perspectives

In moral philosophy, decadence is often conceptualized as a form of ethical deterioration wherein traditional virtues such as self-restraint, honor, and communal duty yield to hedonism, relativism, and self-indulgence, thereby weakening individual character and societal cohesion. Friedrich Nietzsche, in his analysis, portrayed decadence as a physiological and psychological affliction that manifests in life-denying impulses, including moral systems that exalt weakness, pity, and equality over vitality and hierarchy, ultimately limiting human potential.^[54] He specifically critiqued Socratic rationalism and certain ethical frameworks as decadent for suppressing instinctual drives in favor of abstract ideals.^[55] Religious traditions, particularly Christianity, interpret decadence through the lens of spiritual apostasy, where moral decline stems from rejecting divine commandments and substituting them with autonomous human standards, leading to widespread unrighteousness and cultural erosion. Theological observers argue that divorcing morality from its religious roots—viewing ethical lapses as mere behavioral deviations rather than sins against God—inevitably produces decadence, as evidenced by historical patterns of societal collapse following the abandonment of faith-based norms.^[56] This perspective holds that authentic virtue requires a transcendent anchor, without which indulgence proliferates and virtues atrophy.^[56] Conversely, Nietzsche lambasted Christianity itself as a "religion of decadence," contending that its emphasis on humility, forgiveness, and the valorization of suffering caters to the resentful and feeble, fostering a slave morality that inverts natural hierarchies and stifles creative power.^[57] From this vantage, religious doctrines promoting equalization and pity exacerbate decadence by pathologizing strength and ambition. Christian responses counter that such critiques overlook the empirical correlation between fidelity to scriptural ethics and civilizational endurance, as seen in prophetic warnings against moral laxity precipitating downfall, while secular alternatives invite unchecked vice.^[58] In broader Abrahamic contexts, Judaism and Islam similarly frame decadence as infidelity to covenantal laws—ranging from idolatry to ethical laxity—invoking divine retribution, though interpretations emphasize communal repentance over individualistic pathology.^[59]

Cultural and Artistic Expressions

The Decadent Movement in Literature and Art

The Decadent movement in literature and art flourished primarily in France during the fin de siècle period of the 1880s and 1890s, reacting against the materialism of positivism and the realism of naturalist fiction by exalting artificiality, sensory refinement, and aesthetic autonomy. Rooted in Théophile Gautier's advocacy of l'art pour l'art—first prominently expressed in the 1835 preface to his novel Mademoiselle de Maupin, where he argued that art should prioritize form and beauty over moral or utilitarian ends—the movement viewed creative expression as an end in itself, detached from societal norms.^[60]^[61] Charles Baudelaire's Les Fleurs du Mal (1857) laid foundational themes of urban alienation, eroticism, and the allure of decay, influencing later Decadents through its fusion of spleen and ideal beauty.^[62] Joris-Karl Huysmans' À rebours (1884), often regarded as the quintessential Decadent novel, depicts the reclusive aristocrat Jean des Esseintes' pursuit of synesthetic pleasures and exotic artifices, rejecting natural vitality in favor of cultivated perversity and hermetic refinement; the work's immersive catalog of sensory experiments epitomized the movement's inward turn and disdain for bourgeois convention.^[63]^[64] In visual arts, painters like Gustave Moreau evoked mythological reverie through opulent, jewel-toned canvases, such as Salome Dancing before Herod (1876), while Odilon Redon explored subconscious visions in charcoal drawings and pastels that blurred dream and reality, both artists praised by Huysmans for embodying Decadent sensibilities of mystery and excess.^[65] Félicien Rops contributed etchings and illustrations laden with erotic morbidity, as in Pornokratès (1878), which allegorizes vice through a blindfolded female figure led by a pig, symbolizing the triumph of base instincts over reason.^[66] The movement extended to England, where Oscar Wilde channeled its ethos in The Picture of Dorian Gray (1890), portraying the corruption of eternal youth through hedonistic indulgence, and Salomé (1893), a play reveling in biblical decadence and perverse desire; Wilde's public persona and trials amplified the association of Decadence with dandyism and defiance of Victorian morality.^[67] By the mid-1890s, the movement fragmented, absorbed into Symbolism and proto-modernism, yet persisted in its critique of naturalism and emphasis on elite sensibility, often critiqued for fostering escapism amid societal decline.^[68]

Aesthetics of Excess and Perversion

In decadent aesthetics, excess manifests as deliberate overindulgence in sensory pleasures, often to the point of revulsion or destruction, symbolizing the inversion of vitality into self-annihilation. Historical accounts of Roman Emperor Heliogabalus (r. 218–222 CE) describe banquets where flower petals cascaded from ceilings, burying diners alive in opulent suffocation, as recounted in the Historia Augusta, a late Roman biographical collection prone to exaggeration by senatorial critics yet corroborated in pattern by contemporaries like Cassius Dio.^[69] Such spectacles elevated luxury to a perverse art form, where abundance negated life itself.^[70] Perversion in these aesthetics entails the eroticization or normalization of taboo acts, framing deviance as refined sophistication amid civilizational ennui. Heliogabalus reportedly prostituted himself in the imperial palace, sought surgical sex change, and married a charioteer, acts framed by hostile sources as emblematic of Syrian import corrupting Roman mores, though their veracity is debated due to political bias against his Eastern cult.^[71] These behaviors, whether factual or propagandistic, influenced later decadent iconography, portraying rulers as priest-kings of inversion.^[69] Nineteenth-century artists revived these motifs to critique or embody modern decay. Thomas Couture's 1847 painting The Romans in the Decadence depicts inebriated patricians amid ruins, with nude women symbolizing moral lapse under the July Monarchy, using classical excess to warn of contemporary French corruption through visual overload of flesh and wine.^[72] Similarly, Félicien Rops's 1878 Pornokrates portrays a blindfolded nude led by a pig—emblem of base lust—past prostrate Muses, critiquing how pornography supplants pure art in fin-de-siècle Paris, blending Symbolist eroticism with decadent perversion of aesthetic hierarchy.^[73] In literature aligned with these visuals, authors like Joris-Karl Huysmans in À rebours (1884) aestheticize perversion through Des Esseintes's contrived sensations, from gemstone tortures to forced synesthesia, prioritizing artificial extremity over natural order as a bulwark against democratic vulgarity.^[74] This framework posits excess and perversion not as vices but as elite responses to entropy, though empirical analysis reveals them correlating with institutional fragility rather than causation, as seen in Rome's post-Heliogabalus instability.^[75] Scholarly interpretations, often from leftist-leaning academia, sometimes romanticize such aesthetics as subversive, overlooking their role in signaling vitality loss per cyclical theories like those of Oswald Spengler.^[76]

Societal and Economic Dimensions

Indicators of Vitality Loss

Demographic indicators provide stark evidence of vitality loss, as sustained below-replacement fertility rates signal a society's diminished capacity for self-renewal. Globally, the total fertility rate fell from 4.9 children per woman in the 1950s to 2.3 in 2023, with projections from the United Nations indicating a further decline to 1.8 by the end of the century.^[77] ^[78] In advanced economies, rates are even lower; the United States recorded a historic low of 1.6 births per woman in 2024, well below the 2.1 replacement level required for population stability absent immigration.^[79] This trend correlates with shrinking working-age populations and rising dependency ratios, where fewer producers support more dependents, straining resources and innovation.^[80] Economic metrics further reveal stagnation, with per capita growth decelerating despite technological advances, suggesting inefficient allocation of vitality toward productive ends. In the United States, labor productivity growth averaged just 0.8 percent annually from 2010 to 2018, a sharp slowdown from prior decades, contributing to broader economic inertia.^[81] Measured growth between quarters of identical unemployment rates halved from 3.2 percent per year in the 1950s–1960s to roughly 1.5 percent post-2000, even as innovation metrics like patents proliferated, implying diminishing returns on inventive effort.^[82] Regional dynamism indices show a long-term decline, with U.S. states experiencing a 31 percent drop during the Great Recession and only partial recovery by the 2020s, reflecting reduced business formation and labor mobility essential for adaptive vitality.^[83] These indicators interconnect causally: demographic contraction exacerbates economic pressures by eroding the labor base, while stagnant productivity fails to generate surpluses needed for societal renewal, forming a feedback loop of diminished vigor. Analyses linking such patterns to civilizational phases note that fertility collapse and growth slowdowns historically precede complexity loss in empires, as seen in population declines accompanying Roman and Mayan breakdowns.^[84] Empirical studies confirm that aging demographics amplify stagnation, with a 2016 econometric model estimating that one-child policies in contexts like China halved potential growth impacts through workforce shrinkage.^[85] Thus, vitality loss manifests not as abrupt collapse but as gradual erosion, verifiable through longitudinal data from institutions tracking these metrics.^[86]

Demographic and Institutional Decay

In Western societies, total fertility rates (TFR) have fallen persistently below the replacement level of 2.1 children per woman, signaling a demographic contraction that undermines long-term population sustainability. In the United States, the TFR reached 1.599 births per woman in 2024, the lowest on record, down from 1.621 in 2023 and reflecting a 22% decline since 2007 among women aged 15-34.^[87]^[88] In the European Union, the TFR averaged 1.38 live births per woman in 2023, with national figures ranging from 1.06 in Malta to 1.79 in France, and no country exceeding replacement levels as of 2025 projections.^[89]^[90] This "demographic winter" manifests in aging populations, with projections indicating that by 2050, over three-quarters of countries worldwide, including most Western nations, will fail to sustain population sizes without immigration.^[91] Empirical analyses attribute the decline not solely to economic factors like recessions or costs of child-rearing, which explain only partial variance; cohort data reveal rising childlessness and delayed childbearing amid stable or improving material conditions in high-income countries.^[92]^[93] Postponement of first births, driven by extended education and career prioritization, reduces completed family sizes, as evidenced by period TFR distortions in OECD nations.^[94] Family structure erosion compounds this, with U.S. divorce rates hovering at 40-50% of marriages and European crude divorce rates averaging higher in Western nations than in Asia or Latin America; out-of-wedlock births now exceed 40% in the U.S. and many EU countries, correlating with intergenerational fertility drops.^[95]^[96] Institutional decay parallels these trends, marked by eroding public trust and functional decline in core systems. Across OECD countries, 44% of respondents reported low or no trust in national governments in 2023, up from prior baselines, amid perceptions of inequality and policy inefficacy.^[97] Educational performance has regressed, with OECD PISA scores showing a 10-point drop in reading and 15-point decline in mathematics from 2018 to 2022, the largest in the program's history, affecting equity and skill acquisition in reading, math, and science.^[98]^[99] These indicators reflect institutional ossification, where bureaucratic expansion and responsiveness failures exacerbate demographic pressures, as low trust correlates with reduced civic participation and policy adherence needed for societal renewal.^[100]

Political and Ideological Applications

Conservative and Right-Wing Critiques

Conservative critiques of decadence emphasize the erosion of moral foundations, family structures, and cultural vitality in Western societies, attributing these to the abandonment of traditional Judeo-Christian values and the embrace of individualism and relativism. Jacques Barzun, in his 2000 book From Dawn to Decadence: 500 Years of Western Cultural Life, described the period from 1500 to the present as culminating in decadence, defined by three forces—emancipation, self-analysis, and primitivism—that fragmented social cohesion and prioritized personal expression over collective purpose. Barzun argued that this shift led to cultural exhaustion, where innovation stagnated amid excessive introspection and rejection of hierarchy, evidenced by declining artistic synthesis and rising abstraction in the arts since the mid-20th century.^[101]^[41] Building on such analyses, right-wing commentators like Ross Douthat have characterized contemporary America as a "decadent society," marked by economic stagnation despite technological prowess, institutional sclerosis, and cultural repetition without renewal. In his 2020 book The Decadent Society, Douthat cited metrics such as U.S. fertility rates falling to 1.73 births per woman by 2018—well below the 2.1 replacement level—and slowing productivity growth averaging 1.4% annually from 2005 to 2019, as signs of a high-material-wealth society trapped in low-vitality stasis. He contended that sexual revolution outcomes, including delayed marriage and rising singleness (35% of U.S. adults in 2019), exacerbate demographic decline, rendering societies vulnerable to external pressures.^[85]^[102] Victor Davis Hanson has extended these critiques to institutional decay, arguing in a January 2024 essay that recent events—such as university encampments tolerating violence in 2023-2024 and sanctuary jurisdictions releasing criminal non-citizens, contributing to over 100,000 fentanyl deaths in 2023—illustrate a broader cultural collapse where elites prioritize ideology over empirical reality and civic order. Hanson links this to the rejection of merit-based systems, noting affirmative action's role in producing underqualified leaders, as seen in aviation near-misses rising 25% in U.S. skies from 2011 to 2021 per FAA data, and warns that such decadence historically precedes civilizational vulnerability.^[103] Paleoconservative Patrick J. Buchanan, in The Death of the West (2001), framed decadence as demographic and moral suicide, projecting Europe's population halving by 2100 due to fertility rates of 1.4 and unchecked immigration eroding national identity. Buchanan attributed this to secular humanism supplanting faith, with U.S. church attendance dropping from 50% in the 1950s to 36% by 2000, and urged a revival of traditionalism to counter what he saw as self-inflicted decline, a view echoed in his 2011 Suicide of a Superpower amid rising no-fault divorce rates peaking at 50% of marriages in the 1980s. These perspectives collectively posit decadence not as inevitable but as reversible through recommitment to hierarchy, faith, and borders, countering narratives from biased academic sources that dismiss such concerns as reactionary.^[104]

Marxist and Leftist Interpretations

In Marxist theory, societal decadence is interpreted primarily as the inevitable decay of capitalism in its imperialist phase, where monopolies stifle productive development and foster parasitism rather than moral or cultural decline per se. Vladimir Lenin, in Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism published in 1916, argued that the transition from free competition to monopoly capitalism results in "parasitism and decay," with export of capital supplanting industrial growth, leading to rentier states and a bourgeoisie increasingly detached from production.^[105] This stage, Lenin contended, marks capitalism's "eve of the socialist revolution," as contradictions intensify without resolving through progressive expansion. Leon Trotsky extended this framework, describing the post-World War I era as an "epoch of imperialist decay" where capitalism's organic crisis prevents restoration of pre-war equilibrium, manifesting in chronic unemployment, militarism, and bureaucratic ossification. In The Death Agony of Capitalism and the Tasks of the Fourth International (1940), Trotsky asserted that this decay persists regardless of fascist or democratic forms, demanding proletarian overthrow rather than reform, as trade unions and parliaments become subordinated to monopolies. Trotskyist traditions, such as those in the Fourth International, maintain that uneven development exacerbates this decomposition, with wars and depressions as symptoms of a system unable to harness technological advances for human needs.^[106] The Frankfurt School, associated with leftist critical theory, reframed decadence through cultural lenses, viewing mass culture under capitalism as a mechanism of domination that erodes critical thought. Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, in Dialectic of Enlightenment (1944), critiqued the "culture industry" for standardizing art and entertainment into commodities, fostering passivity and conformity akin to assembly-line production, which they saw as symptomatic of enlightened reason's regression into myth under bourgeois rule.^[107] This interpretation posits cultural decadence not as elite excess but as systemic alienation, where spectacle supplants genuine expression, reinforcing capitalist ideology amid economic stagnation. Critics within this tradition, however, often prioritize superstructure analysis over empirical validation of base contradictions, reflecting ideological commitments to revolutionary potential despite capitalism's adaptive resilience post-1945.^[108]

Modern Analyses and Warnings

Evidence in Contemporary Western Society

In the European Union, the total fertility rate stood at 1.38 live births per woman in 2023, far below the 2.1 replacement level required for population stability without immigration, with national lows such as 1.06 in Malta.^[89] The United States reported a fertility rate of approximately 1.62 births per woman in 2023, continuing a multi-decade decline linked to delayed marriage and fewer partnerships forming.^[109]^[96] This pattern extends across Western nations, where marriage rates have fallen amid rising cohabitation and non-marital births, reducing the proportion of children raised in two-parent households.^[96] Health metrics underscore physical and psychological strain, with 16% of EU adults classified as obese in 2022 alongside 43% overweight, trends driven by sedentary lifestyles and dietary shifts that impair long-term vitality.^[110] In the US, life expectancy at birth dipped to 76.4 years in 2021 before partial recovery to 78.4 in 2023, hampered by drug overdoses exceeding 105,000 deaths in 2023, of which nearly 80% involved opioids.^[111]^[112] Youth mental health shows acute deterioration, with WHO data indicating a rise in problematic social media use among European adolescents from 7% in 2018 to higher levels by 2024, correlating with increased anxiety and depression rates up 29-164% in select Western countries since pre-pandemic baselines.^[113]^[114] Cultural shifts include accelerating secularization, with Pew Research finding 29% of US adults religiously unaffiliated in 2021, up from prior decades, and similar expansions of "nones" in Western Europe where half or more in countries like the Czech Republic report no affiliation.^[115]^[116] These trends, while sourced from government and survey data generally reliable for demographic tracking, may understate fertility pressures due to institutional incentives favoring optimistic projections amid policy debates on immigration and family support.^[89]^[111] Collectively, they signal eroded incentives for reproduction, family formation, and communal purpose, aligning with observable reductions in societal dynamism.

Potential Consequences and Causal Mechanisms

Decadence in advanced societies can precipitate economic stagnation by diverting resources from productive investment toward consumption and luxury, as observed in historical cycles where elite spending on non-productive assets correlates with diminished innovation and growth.^[117] This mechanism operates through reduced incentives for risk-taking and entrepreneurship amid material abundance, fostering a preference for stability over expansion, which in turn erodes technological advancement and competitiveness.^[85] Jacques Barzun described this phase as a "failure of nerve," where hypertrophy of prior cultural strengths—such as individualism and emancipation—leads to self-absorption and institutional exhaustion, culminating in potential revolutionary upheavals involving violent redistribution of power.^[41] Demographic consequences include fertility rates falling below replacement levels, as cultural shifts toward hedonism and delayed family formation undermine reproductive vitality, a pattern evident in late-stage civilizations like the Roman Empire, where social decay coincided with population stagnation and reliance on external labor. Causally, this stems from the prioritization of personal gratification over communal obligations, weakening family structures and social cohesion, which amplifies vulnerability to external pressures such as migration or conflict.^[84] Empirical correlations in modern contexts show decadent indicators—like rising luxury consumption and cultural ennui—aligning with institutional decay, including bureaucratic inefficiency and loss of public trust, heightening risks of systemic fragility.^[118] Politically, decadence fosters elite detachment from societal needs, promoting corruption and policy paralysis, as causal loops of complacency reduce adaptive capacity against threats like geopolitical rivals or environmental stressors.^[119] Oswald Spengler's morphology of history posits cultures transitioning to "civilization" phases marked by sterility and mechanization, where creative impulses wane, leading to defensive postures and eventual ossification rather than renewal.^[120] These dynamics, while not deterministic, manifest empirically in prolonged stasis periods, where high prosperity masks underlying entropy, potentially resolving through collapse or reinvigoration via external shocks.^[121]

Controversies and Counterarguments

Empirical Challenges to Decadence Narratives

Critics of decadence narratives argue that claims of profound societal stagnation overlook persistent economic expansion in Western economies. In the United States, real gross domestic product grew at an annualized rate of 3.8 percent in the second quarter of 2025, reflecting robust output amid technological integration and consumer spending.^[122] Annual GDP growth averaged approximately 2 percent from 2010 to 2023, with accelerations in recent years driven by sectors like information technology and healthcare, contradicting assertions of indefinite plateau.^[123] Similarly, euro area labor productivity per hour worked rose 0.9 percent cumulatively from late 2019 to mid-2024, supported by post-pandemic recovery and supply chain adaptations, though trailing U.S. gains.^[124] Technological innovation metrics further undermine exhaustion theses, as Western nations maintain high levels of inventive activity. Global patent applications reached 3.55 million in 2023, up 2.7 percent from the prior year, with the United States granting 323,410 patents—second only to China—and accounting for nearly a quarter of European Patent Office filings.^[125]^[126]^[127] Research and development expenditures reinforce this, with U.S. R&D intensity exceeding 3 percent of GDP in 2024 amid a surge in private-sector investments, while the EU averaged 2.26 percent, funding advancements in renewables and digital infrastructure.^[128]^[129] The U.S. continues to dominate high-impact scientific publications, with Europe hosting 35 economies in the global top 100 for research output, indicating sustained intellectual vitality rather than cultural repetition.^[130] Demographic and well-being indicators also present counterevidence, as Western societies demonstrate adaptability absent in historical collapses. Life expectancy in high-income countries remains elevated, with post-2020 recoveries in vaccination-driven health outcomes and fertility technologies offsetting low birth rates through immigration and policy responses.^[131] While youth happiness has dipped in U.S. and Western European rankings—contributing to overall score declines—aggregate life satisfaction correlates positively with income and health gains, with no empirical freefall in subjective well-being metrics across generations.^[132]^[133] These patterns suggest resilience via institutional adjustments, challenging decadence framings that prioritize qualitative malaise over quantifiable progress.^[134]

Ideological Biases in Interpretation

Conservative interpretations of decadence typically frame it as a consequence of moral relativism, erosion of traditional institutions, and prioritization of individual hedonism over collective vitality, viewing these as self-inflicted wounds that undermine societal resilience.^[59] Such perspectives, articulated by thinkers like Jacques Barzun in his 2000 analysis of Western culture's trajectory from the Renaissance to postmodernity, attribute decline to the exhaustion of creative energies and the repetition of exhausted forms, rather than external pressures alone.^[85] This view posits causal realism in cultural choices, where abandonment of first principles—such as ordered relations to family, community, and transcendence—leads empirically observable outcomes like reduced birth rates and institutional distrust, without relying on vague teleological narratives. Progressive and leftist interpretations, conversely, often reframe symptoms of decadence as artifacts of capitalist exploitation or patriarchal structures, denying intrinsic cultural decay by emphasizing economic determinism or portraying unconventional behaviors as liberatory progress.^[135] For example, Marxist-influenced critiques, as in analyses tracing decadence discourse from Nietzsche to Lukács, interpret cultural atomization under modernity as a byproduct of commodity relations rather than autonomous moral failure, thereby excusing or celebrating phenomena like sexual experimentation as resistance to bourgeois norms.^[136] This approach privileges systemic critiques over individual agency, often dismissing empirical indicators of vitality loss—such as stagnating technological breakthroughs since the 1970s or fertility rates below replacement levels in Western nations—as transient inequalities solvable through redistribution, without addressing causal mechanisms rooted in cultural shifts.^[85] These biases manifest in source selection and framing, with left-leaning dominance in academia and media leading to the marginalization of decadence warnings as "fascistic" or unscientific, despite their alignment with data on innovation plateaus and social fragmentation.^[137] Conservative accounts, while potentially overemphasizing nostalgia, draw on verifiable patterns like the correlation between cultural liberalization post-1960s and metrics of societal cohesion (e.g., rising divorce rates from 2.2 per 1,000 in 1960 to 5.2 in 1980 in the U.S.), whereas progressive denials frequently invoke optimistic historicism that underweights disconfirming evidence to sustain narratives of inevitable advancement.^[138] Attributions in leftist scholarship, such as those equating decadence rhetoric with right-wing panic, reveal a predisposition to protect egalitarian ideals from scrutiny, even as institutional biases—evident in the underrepresentation of non-progressive viewpoints in cultural studies—skew interpretations toward denialism.^[139] Empirical rigor demands cross-ideological verification, prioritizing data over ideological priors to discern whether observed declines stem from volitional cultural choices or purely material constraints.

References

[1]
A Definition Of Decadence - The American Conservative
Dec 6, 2012 · All that is meant by Decadence is “falling off.” It implies in those who live in such a time no loss of energy or talent or moral sense.
[2]
Decadence - Tate
Decadence generally refers to an extreme manifestation of symbolism which appeared towards the end of the nineteenth century and emphasised the spiritual, the ...
[3]
Decadence - Etymology, Origin & Meaning
Originating from French and Medieval Latin, "decadence" means a process of decline or decay, literally "falling away" from a better or vital state.
[4]
DECADENCE Definition & Meaning | Dictionary.com
First recorded in 1540–50; from Middle French, from Medieval Latin dēcadentia, from Late Latin dēcadent-, stem of dēcadēns “falling away” (present ...
[5]
'Decadent': Luxury or Decay? - Merriam-Webster
'Decadent' traces back to the Latin 'decadere,' meaning 'to fall,' and is etymologically linked to 'decay.' It developed its 'excess' connotations in the ...
[6]
Decadence | The Anarchist Library
The phenomenon of Decadence is best understood as the continuation and denouement of an earlier movement—Romanticism. Decadence and Romanticism are of a piece.<|separator|>
[7]
Decadence - Oxford Reference
The first use of the word 'decadence' in this aesthetic sense occurred in Théophile Gautier's 1868 preface to Charles Baudelaire's collection of poems Les ...
[8]
Origins of the Terms Decadent and Decadence - The Victorian Web
Dec 5, 2012 · Decadence became a proper noun with increasing currency sometime between about 1870 and 1880 and that shortly afterward it began to be applied as an adjective.
[9]
Nietzsche: 40 (March-June 1888) The concept of decadence.
Aug 13, 2016 · The phenomenon of decadence is as necessary as any increase and advance of life: one is in no position to abolish it. Reason demands, on the ...
[10]
[PDF] Brusseau Decadence/Rorty/Deleuze 1 - PhilArchive
Decadence in philosophy is truths dedicated to the intensification of thought. For decadents, the best truths don't primarily try to describe experience ...
[11]
DECADENCE Definition & Meaning - Merriam-Webster
Oct 8, 2025 · decadence presupposes a reaching and passing the peak of development and implies a turn downward with a consequent loss in vitality or energy.Missing: sociology | Show results with:sociology
[12]
The meaning of decadence - Reporteri.net
Apr 29, 2022 · Decadence is a stage of social collapse in which there is a breakdown of culture and civil institutions and other characteristics of a ...
[13]
Decadence | Marxist Dictionary
Decadence therefore means that once the periods of reconstruction following the great, generalized imperialist wars are over, the tendency to crisis acts in a ...
[14]
The Age of Decadence | American Enterprise Institute - AEI
Feb 7, 2020 · Following in the footsteps of the great cultural critic Jacques Barzun, we can say that decadence refers to economic stagnation, institutional ...
[15]
Decadence - Victorian Literature - Oxford Bibliographies
Mar 2, 2011 · Decadence, originating in mid-19th century France, is characterized by perversity, ennui, art for art's sake, transgressive sexuality, ...
[16]
Decadence, Darwinism, Science and Technological Modernity
Sep 24, 2020 · Such evolutionary 'decadence', he asserted, was 'inevitable and natural' since every organism passed 'from maturity by declining stages to ...
[17]
Evolution: Survival of the Fittest Versus "Decadence" - Earth.com
According to scientists, this phenomenon is known as “decadence” – the females are choosing beauty that actually harms the survival prospects of their own young ...
[18]
Power or decadence? Luxury under the Achaemenids, Athenians ...
May 17, 2023 · Numerous ancient Greek authors identify Persian luxury as a corrupting force that weakened their empire, hastening its decay.
[19]
Persian Influence on Greek Culture - Livius.org
Sep 16, 2020 · Moreover, in their historical writings, the Greek authors make it clear that the Persians are a mere bunch of decadent, effeminate barbarians, ...
[20]
What Caused Ancient Egypt's Decline? - History.com
Aug 10, 2022 · Ancient Egypt's decline was caused by a long drought, economic crises, foreign invaders, the murder of Ramses III, and the disintegration of ...
[21]
The Decline of Ancient Egypt - Students of History
Egypt's decline began around 1100 BCE due to loss of military power, lack of resources, political conflicts, climate issues, and economic unrest.
[22]
How Did the Almighty Assyrian Empire Fall? - TheCollector
Jan 14, 2022 · The Assyrian Empire ruled through brutal military force, so when it showed signs of instability and weakness, its enemies seized the opportunity ...
[23]
Decadence in Ancient Rome (Chapter 1)
The Romans had a difficult relationship with the kind of luxury and excess that we think of as indicators of moral and social decadence.
[24]
Elagabalus: The Most Eccentric Roman Emperor - History Cooperative
Mar 8, 2024 · A Clash of Divinity and Decadence: The Enigmatic Reign of Elagabalus. Elagabalus' reign is marked by extreme religious reforms and personal ...
[25]
Rome's forgotten emperor Heliogabalus - Roman - HistoryExtra
Mar 2, 2023 · Condemned for numerous sex scandals, religious controversies and eccentric behaviour, Heliogabalus's (sometimes called Elagabalus) reign of under four years ...<|separator|>
[26]
Roman Emperor Elagabalus: Scandal and Controversy - TheCollector
Jan 25, 2025 · In the late 19th century's Decadent movement, Elagabalus' excesses – manifest as his orientalism, ennui, and androgyny – saw him championed.
[27]
Causes of fall of Roman Empire - IMPERIUM ROMANUM
The British historian – Adrian Goldsworthy – saw the main reason for the fall of Rome in the military aspect. Endless civil wars for supremacy in the Empire, a ...<|control11|><|separator|>
[28]
Did moral decay destroy the ancient world? - Roger Pearse
Jan 17, 2014 · The idea that moral decay contributed to the Roman collapse is debated. Easy divorce and adultery dissolved social obligations, and the late ...
[29]
The Rhetoric of Corruption in Late Antiquity - eScholarship
The rhetoric of corruption served the traditional upper classes of the empire as a tool of fashioning self and group identity.
[30]
Gibbon's Decline & Fall of the Roman Empire
Jan 26, 2023 · Gibbon argues the Roman Empire fell due to the rise of Christianity, its negative effects, and the 'immoderate greatness' of the empire.
[31]
Fall of Rome - Common Theories and Causes - ThoughtCo
May 2, 2025 · Many believe Rome fell due to a mix of military problems, decadence, and Christianity's rise. · Economic problems like inflation and poor ...
[32]
The “Falls” of Rome: crises, resilience, and resurgence in late antiquity
Jul 14, 2022 · Like other cultural critics of his era, Gregory could be loud about the moral decay he saw spreading through his post-imperial world. But ...<|separator|>
[33]
How Versailles' Over-the-Top Opulence Drove the French to Revolt
Oct 29, 2019 · In the early morning of October 6, 1789, hundreds of starving, defiant women and men (some disguised as women) from Paris stormed the palace ...
[34]
The Pleasures of Versailles - Humanities West
In the court society of Versailles during the Ancien Régime, no two persons had equal rights and privileges. ... French Grandeur (and Decadence).<|separator|>
[35]
'Drooping with the Century': Fatigue and the Fin de Siècle
Fatigue in the late 19th century was linked to rapid social changes, seen as a sign of decline, and was considered a sign of a civilized society.
[36]
Hedonism, absinthe and Parisian decadence: La Belle Époque
Apr 18, 2017 · An era of great optimism that began at the end of the Franco-Prussian war in 1871 and ended at the outbreak of the First World War in 1914.
[37]
France: The Rise of Modern Decadence - Oxford Academic
Fin-de-siècle French decadence is one expression of the partial autonomy from political power in literature and the arts, both of which established their own ...<|separator|>
[38]
What Was Cultural Life in the Weimar Republic Like? - TheCollector
Dec 23, 2024 · The culture of the Weimar Republic represented a never-ending decadent feast amidst crushing poverty and post-war trauma.Missing: analysis | Show results with:analysis
[39]
Visual Essay: Free Expression in the Weimar Republic - Facing History
Aug 2, 2016 · Conservative and radical right-wing critics decried the new works of art as decadent and immoral. They denounced Weimar Germany as a new Sodom ...
[40]
The Mythical Decadence of Weimar Cabaret
Jan 7, 2021 · This 'long read' blog post argues that the decadence of Weimar cabaret has been grossly exaggerated, and that the common notion derives in large degree from ...<|separator|>
[41]
From Dawn to Decadence: 500 Years of Western Cultural Life (1500 ...
Nov 1, 2000 · Decadence may end in the explosion of a revolution, by which Barzun means the violent transfer of power and property in the name of an idea.
[42]
Culture and Civilization — Oswald Spengler's Approach to History
The reason, Spengler argued, is that these cultures produce similar patterns in that they follow successive stages of emergence, flourishing and decline. He ...Missing: decadence | Show results with:decadence
[43]
The Tragedy of Civilization: Ibn Khaldun's Muqaddimah
Mar 30, 2019 · Thus, Ibn Khaldun sought to understand why civilizations experience a “life cycle” of formation, growth, stagnation, and eventual decline. Third ...
[44]
Ibn Khaldun: The Dynamics of Civilization
Sep 2, 2025 · Ibn Khaldun's theory of the rise of great powers or dynasties rests on the principle of asabiyyah. He argued that solidarity among people ...
[45]
Rise and Fall of Civilisations: Ibn Khaldun's Historiography
Dec 7, 2016 · The central thesis of Ibn Khaldun then is that a ruler unites his virile Bedouin people with a common feeling of 'Asabiyyah and often comes to ...
[46]
Giambattista Vico - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Jun 11, 2003 · Since history itself, in Vico's view, is the manifestation of Providence in the world, the transition from one stage to the next and the steady ...
[47]
Introduction to Giambattista Vico | by Outis - LICENTIA POETICA
Jul 14, 2024 · In it, Vico proposes a cyclical theory of history, arguing that societies pass through distinct stages of development characterized by different ...
[48]
Oswald Spengler: Philosopher of Decline, Partisan of ...
Mar 25, 2023 · Not only did Decline of the West attempt to explain the past; its cyclic theory of historical cultures also notoriously promised to predict ...<|separator|>
[49]
Toynbee's Theory of Civilization - The Philosophy Room
May 6, 2024 · Toynbee argues that civilizations succumb to decline when they lose sight of the values, beliefs, and ideals that once animated their cultural and social ...Missing: decadence | Show results with:decadence
[50]
Toynbee and the Culture Cycle - Commentary Magazine
The effect of a moralizing approach to history can best be seen in Toynbee's treatment of the problem of “decline.” Decline, it turns out, sets in whenever a ...Missing: decadence | Show results with:decadence
[51]
How a Decadent Culture Makes Me Think Like Sorokin - First Things
Jan 19, 2015 · Sorokin was certain that the chaos and decadence of the sensate phase would soon give way to a new birth of ideational culture. I am not so sure ...
[52]
Culture in Crisis: The Visionary Theories of Pitirim Sorokin
Aug 19, 2010 · In the decadent stages of Sensate culture there is a frenzied emphasis on the new and the shocking (literally, sensationalism). Religious ...Missing: cycles | Show results with:cycles
[53]
'Birdman' and Sorokin on Our Sensate Culture
Apr 11, 2016 · According to Sorokin's social cycle (Ideational > Idealistic > Sensate > Decadence > Downfall > New Ideational or Idealistic Era), where ...<|control11|><|separator|>
[54]
[PDF] AN ANALYSIS OF NIETZSCHE'S CONCEPTION OF DECADENCE
Moreover, Nietzsche describes decadence as a physiological condition with psychological consequences that inclines those who suffer from it to be against life.
[55]
Nietzsche on the decadence of philosophers: an alternative to the ...
Aug 18, 2025 · On this view, Nietzsche sees philosophers as being unable to recognize that their value judgments are symptoms of a “decadent” type of life ...
[56]
https://banneroftruth.org/us/resources/articles/2006/morality-minus-religion-equals-decadence/
[57]
What does Nietzsche mean by religion of decadence?
Aug 9, 2017 · Nietzsche says that Christianity and Buddhism are both religions of decadence. What does this mean? Specifically, what are the hallmarks of such a religion?
[58]
Decadence and Christian Pessimism - Providence
Mar 13, 2020 · Douthat suggests that religious revival could be one remedy for our complacent decadence. But the tone and temper of that revival would need to ...Missing: Islam Judaism
[59]
Decadence and Its Critics - The Imaginative Conservative
Jul 20, 2025 · Decadence ultimately entails the process of falling away from the vision that orders man's relation to the divine, to the community, to the self, to nature.Missing: critiques | Show results with:critiques
[60]
[PDF] Théophile Gautier - H-France
Gautier, for his part, did not specifically mention the notion of “Art for Art's Sake” in his early 1830s diatribes against the philistines of that utilitarian ...
[61]
Decadence and Aesthetics (Chapter 7)
Both the stock figure of the aesthete and the aestheticism of 'art for art's sake' are classic decadent tropes with obvious sources in figures such as Théophile ...<|separator|>
[62]
Decadent movement in literature - Joris-Karl Huysmans
In France, where this movement began and has mainly flourished, it is Goncourt who was the first to invent a style in prose really new, impressionistic, a style ...
[63]
Against nature | Books | RA Collection - Royal Academy of Arts
Published in Paris in 1884, Joris-Karl Huysman's À Rebours, (Against Nature), was immediately received as a key work of fin de siècle "Decadent" literature.
[64]
Joris-Karl Huysmans' (1848-1907) novel À Rebours is published.
The title translates to Against Nature or Against the Grain. It is considered the embodiment of decadence, often associated with the Decadent Movement.
[65]
Decadence and the Visual Arts (Chapter 8)
Huysmans has Des Esseintes say that he found in Odilon Redon and Gustave Moreau the fulfilment of decadent sensibility; and Chapter VI of Against Nature ...<|control11|><|separator|>
[66]
Who Were the Most Famous Symbolists? | TheCollector
Oct 28, 2023 · Felicien Rops was a Symbolist closely associated with the Decadent movement in art and literature. Decadent art celebrated excess, artifice, and ...
[67]
The Decadent Movement: Lessons from Fin de Siècle Literature
The Decadent movement in literature emerged in the late 19th century, primarily in France and England, as a reaction against the prevailing cultural norms ...Missing: definition | Show results with:definition
[68]
[PDF] Decadent Histories - Assets - Cambridge University Press
The history of Decadence, that flowering of a mannered literary style that emerged in France during the Second Empire, and in the last two decades.<|separator|>
[69]
Mad emperors of Rome - The Art and Popular Culture Encyclopedia
Sep 2, 2013 · Elagabulus engaged in frequent homosexual perversions, such as prostituting himself in drag and marrying an enslaved chariot driver. He wasted ...
[70]
Top 10 sex scandals in ancient Rome - IMPERIUM ROMANUM
Sep 11, 2021 · Emperor Tiberius' perversions on Capri ... The last years of Tiberius' reign, which he spent in isolation on the island of Capri, are history.
[71]
The Roman Emperor Who Prostituted Himself In His Own Palace
Feb 7, 2017 · Usually when it comes to the madness and lechery of Rome's last emperors, we think of Caligula or Nero. Their sexual perversions were so extreme ...Missing: excesses | Show results with:excesses
[72]
Couture, Romans of the Decadence (video) - Khan Academy
Mar 27, 2014 · She is the soul of the painting, meaning the same Roman excesses that led to the decline of the empire can easily lead to our own decline if we use the power of ...
[73]
Pornocrates and The French Decadent Movement - Western CEDAR
Inherently, a work titled Pornocrates exudes scandal, intrigue, and allure. Created in 1878 by Felicien Rops, the gouache and pencil piece was displayed at the ...
[74]
Developments (Part II) - Decadence and Literature
Aug 12, 2019 · Corruption, degradation, perversion, decline, degeneration – all these terms belong to the conceptual constellation of 'decadence', a word ' ...
[75]
Performing Perversion: Decadence in Twentieth-Century Chinese ...
Performing Perversion: Decadence in Twentieth-Century Chinese Literature ... Decadent Movement in Literature,” repudiates the classic art that possesses “those
[76]
Decadence Rising: The Violence of Aestheticism (Part I)
... literary perversion that positions Wilde as a theorist of decentred subjectivity avant la lettre. ... perverse sexual aesthetics could thrive with impunity.
[77]
Fertility Rate - Our World in Data
Globally, the total fertility rate was 2.3 children per woman in 2023. This is much lower than in the past; in the 1950s, it was more than twice as high: 4.9.Births per woman · Why the total fertility rate... · Wanted fertility rate
[78]
[PDF] World Fertility 2024 - UN.org.
May 6, 2025 · The global fertility rate is projected to continue to decline, reaching the replacement level1 of 2.1 in 2050 and falling further to 1.8 births ...
[79]
U.S. birth rate hits all-time low, CDC data shows - CBS News
Jul 24, 2025 · The fertility rate in the U.S. dropped to an all-time low in 2024 with fewer than 1.6 children being born per woman, federal data released ...
[80]
Confronting the consequences of a new demographic reality
Jan 15, 2025 · Falling fertility rates shift the demographic balance toward youth scarcity and more older people, who are dependent on a shrinking working-age population.<|separator|>
[81]
The U.S. productivity slowdown: an economy-wide and industry ...
The slow growth observed since 2010 has been even more striking: labor productivity grew just 0.8 percent from 2010 to 2018. As the slowdown in labor ...
[82]
Why Has Economic Growth Slowed When Innovation Appears to be ...
May 1, 2018 · Measured between quarters with identical unemployment rates, U. S. economic growth slowed by more than half from 3.2 percent per year during ...Missing: metrics | Show results with:metrics
[83]
Dynamism in the West, Stagnation for Much of the Rest
May 17, 2023 · Economic dynamism fell by 31 percent in the average state over the Great Recession. A decade later, it had only recovered by 6 percent.
[84]
Societal collapse: A literature review - ScienceDirect.com
This article offers a systematic multidisciplinary review of the existing literature (361 articles and 73 books) and identifies five scholarly conversations.
[85]
Opinion | The Age of Decadence - The New York Times
Feb 7, 2020 · This demographic decline worsens economic stagnation; economists reckoning with its impact keep finding stark effects. A 2016 analysis found ...
[86]
Fertility rate, total (births per woman) - World Bank Open Data
Fertility rate, total (births per woman) · Survival to age 65, female (% of cohort) · Death rate, crude (per 1,000 people) · Contraceptive prevalence, any method ...Low & middle income · Low income · United States · Latin America & Caribbean
[87]
[PDF] Births: Provisional Data for 2024 - CDC
the United States in 2024 was 1,626.5 births per 1,000 women, an increase of less than 1% from the rate in 2023 (1,621.0); the rate declined by 2% per year ...
[88]
US fertility rate sank to new low in 2024 amid rise of “pronatalism ...
Jul 29, 2025 · The rate in 2023 was 1.621 and has now dropped further to 1.599 in 2024, the data show. This figure is far below the replacement rate of 2.1 ...
[89]
Fertility statistics - Statistics Explained - Eurostat
The total fertility rate stood at 1.38 live births per woman in the EU in 2023, ranging from 1.06 in Malta to 1.81 in Bulgaria. 29.8 years was the average age ...Almost 2 times fewer children... · Women in the EU are...
[90]
Mapped: European Fertility Rates by Country in 2025
Mar 2, 2025 · The population replacement threshold is a fertility rate of 2.1. In 2025, all of Europe, except one small nation, is well below that level.
[91]
The Lancet: Dramatic declines in global fertility rates set to transform ...
Mar 20, 2024 · By 2050, over three-quarters of countries will not have high enough fertility rates to sustain population size over time.
[92]
The Mystery of the Declining U.S. Birth Rate - Econofact
Feb 15, 2022 · The US birth rate has fallen by 20% since 2007. This decline cannot be explained by demographic, economic, or policy changes.
[93]
[PDF] Why Is Fertility So Low in High Income Countries?
This paper considers why fertility has fallen to historically low levels in virtually all high-income countries. Using cohort data, we document rising ...<|separator|>
[94]
Is Low Fertility a Twenty-First-Century Demographic Crisis? - PMC
Postponement is a major reason for contemporary low fertility. Demographers know that shifts in the timing of childbearing affect period fertility rates, but ...
[95]
Divorce Rates in the World [Updated 2024]
Oct 1, 2025 · Western societies (the US and Europe) traditionally have higher divorce rates than Asia and Latin America. For instance, the crude divorce rates ...Missing: breakdown | Show results with:breakdown
[96]
Marriages and Divorces - Our World in Data
How is the institution of marriage changing? What percentage of marriages end in divorce? Explore global data on marriages and divorces.
[97]
OECD Survey on Drivers of Trust in Public Institutions – 2024 Results
Jul 10, 2024 · In November 2023, a higher share of people (44%) across OECD countries had low or no trust in the national government than high or moderately ...
[98]
PISA 2022 Results (Volume I) - OECD
Dec 5, 2023 · This is one of five volumes that present the results of the eighth round of assessment, PISA 2022 ... Global and regional development trends.Indonesia · United States · Australia · Philippines
[99]
OECD PISA Results: Maths and reading skills in 'unprecedented drop'
Dec 21, 2023 · Compared to the last edition, in 2018, the mean performance in reading fell by 10 score points, while maths fell by nearly 15.
[100]
Trust in politics is in long-term decline around the world
Feb 19, 2025 · Citizens' trust in their political institutions has been falling around the world. This may not come as a shock to many.
[101]
A Masterpiece of Cultural History: Barzun's Dawn to Decadence
Jan 9, 2024 · From Dawn to Decadence is filled with key figures, major social and cultural movements, great books and ideas with momentous consequences.
[102]
The Decadent Society: Ross Douthat makes the case that America is ...
Feb 28, 2020 · A decadent society manifests forms of economic stagnation, institutional sclerosis, and cultural repetition at a high stage of wealth and technological ...
[103]
A Culture in Collapse - Victor Davis Hanson
Jan 8, 2024 · In the last six months, we have borne witness to many iconic moments evidencing the collapse of American culture. The signs are everywhere and ...
[104]
The Godfather of the Woke Right - The Atlantic
May 7, 2025 · The Godfather of the Woke Right: A 2011 book by Pat Buchanan shows the deep roots of today's right-wing illiberalism.<|separator|>
[105]
Lenin: 1916/imp-hsc: VIII. PARASITISM AND DECAY OF CAPITALISM
The rentier state is a state of parasitic, decaying capitalism, and this circumstance cannot fail to influence all the socio-political conditions of the ...Missing: decadence | Show results with:decadence
[106]
Leon Trotsky, Trade Unions in the Epoch of Imperialist Decay (1940)
Monopoly capitalism is less and less willing to reconcile itself to the independence of trade unions. It demands of the reformist bureaucracy and the labor ...
[107]
The Culture Industry: Enlightenment as Mass Deception
A chapter from Adorno and Horkheimer's Dialectic of Enlightenment on mass-production of culture.
[108]
Frankfurt School and Critical Theory
Some of the key issues and philosophical preoccupations of the School involve the critique of modernity and capitalist society, the definition of social ...
[109]
Total Fertility Rate 2025 - World Population Review
The fertility rate in Europe is relatively low overall, with no countries above 2.0, and has declined in recent years—which is, as stated previously, a global ...
[110]
Overweight and obesity - BMI statistics - Statistics Explained - Eurostat
In 2022, 43% of people aged 18 years or over were overweight and 16% were obese. Indeed, the number of overweight and obese people has been growing in recent ...
[111]
Mortality in the United States, 2023 - CDC
Dec 19, 2024 · In 2023, life expectancy at birth was 78.4 years for the total U.S. population—an increase of 0.9 year from 77.5 in 2022 (Figure 1, Table 1).
[112]
Understanding the Opioid Overdose Epidemic - CDC
Jun 9, 2025 · Approximately 105,000 people died from drug overdose in 2023 and nearly 80,000 of those deaths involved opioids (about 76%). The number of ...
[113]
Teens, screens and mental health - World Health Organization (WHO)
Sep 25, 2024 · New data from the WHO Regional Office for Europe reveals a sharp rise in problematic social media use among adolescents, with rates increasing from 7% in 2018 ...
[114]
The youth mental health crisis: analysis and solutions - PMC
The proportion of young people experiencing anxiety increased by 29–84% in the US (25, 26), 77–164% in Sweden (27, 28), 105% in Australia (20, 29), and 115% in ...
[115]
About Three-in-Ten U.S. Adults Are Now Religiously Unaffiliated
Dec 14, 2021 · Three-in-Ten US Adults Are Now Religiously Unaffiliated. Self-identified Christians make up 63% of US population in 2021, down from 75% a decade ago.
[116]
10 key findings about religion in Western Europe
May 29, 2018 · Rising shares of adults in Western Europe describe themselves as religiously unaffiliated, and about half or more in several countries say they ...
[117]
Three empirically based theories of national decline (book review ...
Aug 7, 2022 · The first theory of national decline comes from Ray Dalio's Principles for Dealing with the Changing World Order: Why Nations Succeed and Fail (2021).
[118]
Why societies grow more fragile and vulnerable to collapse as time ...
Apr 25, 2024 · Pre-modern states and civilisations became more prone to collapse as time passed – a pattern that holds lessons for today's ageing global ...Missing: empirical | Show results with:empirical
[119]
The dangers of decadence - UnHerd
Feb 15, 2021 · In every branch of the arts, for example, wicked people are glamourised, whereas the weak are portrayed as deserving nothing but contempt. This ...
[120]
An Introduction to Spengler's Decline - by Spergler Acolyte
Sep 5, 2023 · Spengler describes his work as a Morphology of History. By this he means the treatment of each separate culture as a living organism which is born, grows, ...Missing: mechanisms decadence
[121]
Collapse, environment, and society - PNAS
There were then two Islamic collapses in Mesopotamia, the first in the wake of the Arab Conquest at approximately 640 CE, the second beginning in the 10th ...
[122]
Gross Domestic Product | U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA)
Sep 26, 2025 · Real gross domestic product (GDP) increased at an annual rate of 3.8 percent in the second quarter of 2025 (April, May, and June), according to ...Notice · National GDP & Personal... · GDP Revision Information
[123]
U.S. GDP Growth Rate | Historical Chart & Data - Macrotrends
U.S. gdp growth rate for 2023 was 2.89%, a 0.38% increase from 2022. U.S. gdp growth rate for 2022 was 2.51%, a 3.54% decline from 2021. U.S. gdp growth ...
[124]
Labour productivity growth in the euro area and the United States
Between the fourth quarter of 2019 and the second quarter of 2024 labour productivity per hour worked increased by 0.9% in the euro area, whereas it increased ...
[125]
World Intellectual Property Indicators 2024: Highlights - Patents ...
In 2023, innovators worldwide filed 3.55 million patent applications, marking a 2.7% increase over 2022 (figure 1.1).
[126]
Patents by Country 2025 - World Population Review
China has the most patent grants with 798,347, followed by the United States (323,410), Japan (201,420), South Korea (135,180), and India (30,490).
[127]
Patent Index 2024 | epo.org
Overall, the top five countries of origin were the United States (-0.8%), which accounts for almost a quarter of all applications, followed by Germany (+0.4%), ...Insights 2024 · Key Figures · Top ApplicantsMissing: Western | Show results with:Western
[128]
End of Year Edition – Against All Odds, Global R&D Has Grown ...
Dec 18, 2024 · Globally, a total of nine countries exceeds the 3% R&D-to-GDP threshold, including the US, Belgium, Sweden, Japan, Switzerland, Austria, Germany ...
[129]
R&D expenditure - Statistics Explained - Eurostat
Sep 25, 2025 · In 2023, EU research and development expenditure relative to GDP stood at 2.26%, higher than in the previous year when it recorded 2.22%.
[130]
The United States Continues to Lead High-Impact Scientific ... - WIPO
Jul 31, 2025 · Europe leads the way, with 35 economies in the top 100 and 25 in the top 50, underscoring its deep and widespread research capacity.
[131]
[PDF] The 2024 Happy Planet Index
May 1, 2024 · On the other, a large fall in life expectancy in the USA (-1.9 years), lead to an overall fall in life expectancy for the North. 14 The spike ...
[132]
Gloomy youth pull US and western Europe down global happiness ...
Mar 21, 2024 · Rising unhappiness among younger people has caused the United States and some large western European countries to fall down a global ...
[133]
Happiness and Life Satisfaction - Our World in Data
Richer people tend to say they are happier than poorer people; richer countries tend to have higher average happiness levels; and across time, most countries ...The Link Between Happiness... · Life Satisfaction And... · Data Quality And Measurement
[134]
More People Globally Living Better Lives - Gallup News
Jul 28, 2025 · Most Regions See Increase in Wellbeing, While Northern America, ANZ and Western Europe See Declines. % Thriving (regional medians). Regional ...Wellbeing Falls In Northern... · Human Development Index Also... · Bottom Line
[135]
Malcolm Bull, The Decline of Decadence, NLR 94, July–August 2015
Aug 1, 2015 · They lent themselves equally to socialist interpretation.footnote In Marxism too, decadence was understood as an excess of individualism.
[136]
Decadence: The Theory of Decline or the Decline of Theory? Part I
6 Our task is to contribute to the revolutionary theory of the proletariat which neither orthodox Marxism nor anarchism represents. But the Marxist strand of ...
[137]
Why the Right Constantly Panics Over Societal 'Decadence'
Apr 1, 2024 · For Spengler, a decadent culture was one which had strayed from its founding ideals and degenerated into something lesser, and it is in that ...Missing: causal mechanisms
[138]
Stuck With Decadence – Law & Liberty - Ross Douthat
Mar 16, 2020 · New York Times columnist and commentator extraordinaire Ross Douthat talks about our decadent age with Richard Reinsch. Richard Reinsch:<|separator|>
[139]
Decadence, art and ideology - ThePrisma.co.uk
Sep 12, 2022 · “Decadence” is usually a term used by right-wing people to castigate individuals and societies with whom they disagree, and whose lifestyle ...Missing: biases interpretations