Fact-checked by Grok 2 weeks ago

DF-4

The DF-4 (Dong Feng-4), NATO-designated CSS-3, is a two-stage, liquid-fueled, transportable ballistic missile developed by China as an intermediate-range to intercontinental system capable of delivering a single nuclear warhead with a yield of 1-3 megatons.^[1]^[2] First tested in the early 1970s and entering operational service with the People's Liberation Army Rocket Force in 1980, the DF-4 provided China with an early strategic nuclear deterrent option, featuring a maximum range of 4,500-5,500 kilometers from silos or mobile launchers adapted from the DF-3 platform.^[1]^[3]^[4] Measuring 28 meters in length with a launch weight of 82,000 kilograms and a payload capacity of approximately 2,200 kilograms, its storable liquid propulsion enabled rapid fueling but required significant logistical support compared to later solid-fueled designs.^[1]^[5]^[6] While most DF-4 units have been retired in favor of more advanced missiles like the DF-5 and DF-31 series, a single brigade near Lingbao remains active, highlighting its historical role in China's nuclear posture amid ongoing modernization efforts.^[4]^[7]

Development

Origins and Early Design

Development of the DF-4 intercontinental ballistic missile commenced in 1964 as part of China's nuclear deterrence program, with the primary objective of targeting U.S. military bases in Guam.^[1] This initiative paralleled efforts on the DF-3 intermediate-range missile and was driven by geopolitical tensions, including U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War and the need to extend China's strategic reach beyond regional threats.^[8] On July 15, 1965, the First Academy convened the initial meeting for the DF-4 chief designer to outline development parameters, marking the formal start of engineering work under resource constraints following the cessation of Soviet technical assistance in 1960.^[8] The DF-4 adopted a two-stage liquid-fueled configuration to achieve intercontinental ranges, building on indigenous adaptations of earlier Soviet-influenced designs while prioritizing storable propellants for operational feasibility.^[9] Engineers selected unsymmetrical dimethylhydrazine (UDMH) as fuel paired with nitric acid as oxidizer, reflecting the technological limitations of the era that favored hypergolic combinations over cryogenic alternatives despite challenges like corrosiveness and handling risks.^[1] This choice enabled relatively rapid fueling and launch preparation compared to non-storable systems, though it necessitated robust corrosion-resistant materials and stringent storage protocols to mitigate propellant instability. The design emphasized simplicity and reliability, with the first stage derived from scaled-up components akin to the DF-3 to leverage existing production infrastructure for medium-to-long-range capabilities.^[2]

Key Milestones and Testing Phases

Development of the DF-4 intercontinental-range ballistic missile commenced in 1965, driven by the need to counter U.S. ballistic missile submarine patrols operating from Guam.^[1] Following the 1969 Sino-Soviet border clashes, the program was redesigned to extend range toward targets like Moscow.^[1] The first flight test occurred on November 1969 at the Jiuquan Satellite Launch Center but failed due to second-stage separation malfunction, necessitating iterative engineering adjustments to ensure reliable staging.^[1] A successful launch followed on January 30, 1970, at Jiuquan, validating basic flight stability after the prior fixes.^[1] This progression highlighted empirical trial-and-error in scaling propulsion and structural integrity from intermediate-range Dong Feng systems like the DF-3, which provided foundational engine technology.^[2] Further validation came with a full-range test in November 1970 at the Northeast Missile Test Base in Jilin Province, demonstrating capability beyond 5,500 km through refined trajectory control and reentry vehicle performance.^[1] Subsequent tests in the early 1970s addressed remaining challenges in guidance precision and reentry stability, building toward operational readiness via repeated prototyping and failure analysis.^[2] The DF-4 achieved initial operational capability in 1980, following comprehensive validation of silo-based launch procedures and overall system reliability.^[1]^[2] Early deployments were limited, with only four missiles operational by 1984, reflecting cautious rollout amid ongoing refinements to fueling and accuracy issues inherent to liquid-propellant designs.^[2]

Technical Specifications

Physical and Structural Features

The Dong Feng-4 (DF-4), designated CSS-3 by NATO, is a two-stage, liquid-propellant intercontinental ballistic missile with a length of 28 meters, a diameter of 2.25 meters, and a launch weight of 82,000 kilograms.^[1]^[5] Its first stage employs storable hypergolic propellants, necessitating specialized handling infrastructure due to the missile's dimensions and fueling requirements.^[10] Structurally, the DF-4 relies on silo basing in reinforced concrete facilities for static stability during the extended launch preparation, which includes fueling and erection processes.^[11] Transportation occurs via specialized rail systems or modified transporter-erector-launchers derived from DF-3 designs, though the missile's size constrains road-mobile operations in contrast to later solid-fueled systems like the DF-31.^[2] Early deployments involved open launch pads requiring extensive site preparation, including gantry structures for vertical positioning.^[2]

Propulsion and Flight Profile

The DF-4 utilizes a two-stage, liquid-propellant rocket motor system employing storable hypergolic propellants for both stages, enabling reliable ignition without pre-ignition sequencing but introducing handling hazards due to their chemical properties.^[12] The oxidizer is red fuming nitric acid (RFNA), which provides high energy density through its strong oxidizing capability, paired with unsymmetrical dimethylhydrazine (UDMH) as the fuel; this combination reacts spontaneously upon contact, simplifying engine start-up but generating toxic fumes and corrosive byproducts that demand specialized protective measures during loading.^[9]^[1] The first stage features a clustered engine configuration derived from the DF-3 missile's design, consisting of four parallel YF-1A thrust chambers integrated into a YF-2A assembly, producing a total vacuum thrust of approximately 1,224 kN to overcome atmospheric drag and initiate vertical ascent.^[12]^[13] This setup delivers the necessary impulse for initial velocity buildup, with the multi-chamber approach distributing thermal loads and enhancing redundancy, though it increases mechanical complexity compared to single-chamber alternatives. The second stage employs a single YF-3 engine delivering 290 kN of vacuum-optimized thrust, featuring a longer expansion nozzle ratio to exploit reduced ambient pressure for improved specific impulse—typically 10-20% higher than sea-level designs—allowing efficient payload acceleration to intercontinental velocities after staging.^[14] Flight commences with ground-based fueling, a process requiring roughly two hours due to the propellants' volume (estimated at tens of tons per stage) and safety protocols, during which the missile remains in an open or semi-exposed posture at silo or tunnel entrances, heightening susceptibility to surveillance and preemptive attack.^[2] Post-fueling, the first-stage motors ignite sequentially or simultaneously to generate liftoff thrust exceeding vehicle weight, burning for about 120-150 seconds to reach staging altitude and velocity, followed by hot separation and second-stage ignition in the upper atmosphere.^[12] The resulting ballistic trajectory yields a nominal range of 5,500 km with a 2,200 kg payload, extendable to 7,000 km via depressed profiles that minimize apogee height (around 800-1,000 km) for greater efficiency against distant targets, or reducible via lofted paths with elevated apogees to shorten boost-phase detectability and complicate midcourse interception, albeit at the expense of reduced maximum reach due to gravitational losses.^[1]^[2] This flexibility underscores causal trade-offs in liquid propulsion: superior delta-v from staged expansion ratios enables payload delivery over vast distances, yet the corrosive and carcinogenic nature of RFNA/UDMH—requiring corrosion-resistant tanks and ventilation—constrains alert postures, favoring pre-positioned storage over rapid-response deployment seen in later solid-propellant systems.^[9]

Guidance, Accuracy, and Payload

The DF-4 utilizes an inertial guidance system for navigation during flight.^[2] This approach relies on onboard gyroscopes and accelerometers to track position and velocity relative to launch point, without mid-course corrections from external references such as stellar or satellite updates documented for later Chinese systems.^[2] Resulting accuracy is quantified by a circular error probable (CEP) of approximately 1.5 km, indicating that 50% of warheads would land within that radius of the target under nominal conditions.^[1]^[2] Alternative estimates place the CEP at around 1.2 km, reflecting open-source analyses of test data and design parameters from the missile's development era.^[12] The DF-4 carries a single warhead in its payload compartment, with no verified capability for multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRV).^[2]^[1] Payload capacity supports a nuclear warhead weighing approximately 2,200 kg and yielding between 1 and 3 megatons TNT equivalent, optimized for high-explosive strategic effects against hardened or area targets.^[2]^[1]^[12] While Chinese ballistic missile programs have explored penetration aids such as decoys or chaff to counter defenses, specific integration on the DF-4 remains unconfirmed in declassified assessments, limiting it to basic reentry vehicle deployment.^[15] The reentry vehicle features a conical or blunt-body design with ablative materials for thermal protection, prioritizing passive heat dissipation during hypersonic atmospheric interface over active maneuverability, consistent with liquid-fueled ICBM constraints of the 1970s.^[1]

Operational History

Deployment and Basing

The DF-4 entered operational service with the People's Liberation Army Rocket Force in November 1980, following successful range demonstrations, with initial deployments limited to a small number of missiles in hardened underground facilities.^[16] By the mid-1980s, estimates indicate approximately 20 to 30 DF-4 missiles had been fielded in total, reflecting China's emphasis on a minimal but survivable strategic deterrent amid resource constraints.^[2] These deployments prioritized protection against preemptive strikes, utilizing tunnel and cave complexes in mountainous regions rather than open silos, which allowed missiles to be stored securely and rolled out to launch positions only during alert periods.^[17] Early basing concepts explored rail-mobile options in the mid-1970s to enhance mobility and reduce vulnerability, but these were abandoned in favor of fixed, hardened underground sites under high mountains, deemed more cost-effective and better suited to the missile's liquid-fueled design requiring stable storage conditions.^[17] This approach improved survivability by leveraging natural terrain for concealment and blast resistance, though it tied missiles to specific geographic locations potentially identifiable through persistent intelligence surveillance.^[2] Facilities were concentrated in central and western provinces, with support infrastructure including ventilation, power, and access tunnels to facilitate periodic inspections without exposing the missiles.^[17] As a liquid-propellant system using storable but corrosive fuels like nitric acid and unsymmetrical dimethylhydrazine, the DF-4 demanded extensive peacetime maintenance, including dedicated fueling crews trained to handle toxic propellants and specialized equipment for leak detection and component replacement.^[18] This logistical burden consumed significant personnel and resources, with missiles requiring de-fueling and re-storage cycles that could take hours, limiting rapid response compared to later solid-fuel designs.^[19] Underground basing mitigated some environmental degradation from propellants but necessitated robust corrosion-resistant infrastructure, further straining operational readiness in remote areas.^[18]

Major Operational Tests

Following deployment in the late 1970s, the DF-4 underwent periodic operational firings from the Taiyuan Satellite Launch Center to confirm silo compatibility, storage stability, and full-range performance under combat-like conditions. These tests, primarily conducted in the 1980s and early 1990s, focused on validating the missile's ability to launch from hardened underground silos after prolonged readiness postures, addressing challenges inherent to its hypergolic liquid propellants that required careful management to prevent degradation. Specific launch dates remain classified, but such exercises ensured the system's integration into China's strategic arsenal amid evolving basing infrastructure.^[1]^[3] A publicly acknowledged major operational test occurred on August 24, 2017, when the People's Liberation Army Rocket Force launched a DF-4 from Taiyuan into the western Pacific, marking a rare demonstration of the missile's enduring capabilities despite its obsolescence relative to solid-fueled successors. The flight verified the two-stage liquid-fueled design's reliability over its estimated 5,500-7,000 km range, with no reported anomalies in trajectory or reentry phases. This test underscored ongoing maintenance efforts for legacy systems, as the DF-4's storable propellants, while advantageous for rapid response, impose logistical strains from potential corrosion and volatility during extended silo dwell times.^[20]^[21] Public records indicate no confirmed failures in DF-4 operational tests, reflecting stringent pre-launch protocols and the missile's robust engineering heritage from Soviet-influenced designs. However, analyses of liquid-fueled ICBMs highlight inferred reliability risks from propellant hypergolic reactions degrading over decades in storage, necessitating frequent inspections and potential refurbishments to mitigate ignition uncertainties. These tests collectively provided empirical validation of the DF-4's role in deterrence without transitioning to newer platforms.^[3]^[1]

Strategic Role

Capabilities and Targeting

The DF-4 achieves a maximum range of 5,500 km when carrying its standard 2,200 kg payload, consisting of a single nuclear warhead with an estimated yield of 3.3 megatons.^[1] This configuration allows the missile to threaten U.S. assets within the western Pacific, including military bases on Guam approximately 3,000 km from potential launch sites in central China.^[22] With full warhead loading, the DF-4's reach extends to potential targets in the western Aleutian Islands of Alaska, but falls short of Hawaii or the continental United States, where distances exceed 7,000 km from mainland China.^[23] Range-payload trade-offs further constrain its lethality against distant hardened or dispersed U.S. targets, as reducing warhead weight to extend range diminishes explosive power and overall deterrent credibility in countervalue strikes on population centers.^[2] As a storable-liquid-fueled missile, the DF-4 benefits from high propellant energy density, enabling its intercontinental-class performance in a two-stage design.^[24] However, operational requirements for erecting the missile and fueling it prior to launch—typically necessitating 30 minutes to several hours and multiple support vehicles—severely limit its utility in first-strike scenarios.^[25] This preparation vulnerability contrasts with solid-fuel successors, rendering the DF-4 more oriented toward retaliatory countervalue deterrence rather than prompt preemptive capabilities against mobile or alerted adversaries.^[19] China's peak deployment of approximately 20-25 DF-4 missiles in the late 1980s and 1990s formed the core of its early long-range nuclear posture, offering minimal assured destruction potential against select high-value targets before the DF-5's wider reach.^[26] This limited inventory emphasized qualitative threats from megaton-class yields over quantitative coverage, prioritizing survival in silos or caves to ensure second-strike reliability amid technological constraints.^[27]

Integration into Nuclear Doctrine

The DF-4 entered service in the late 1970s and early 1980s, marking China's transition from medium-range missiles to intercontinental capabilities within its nuclear doctrine of assured retaliation, a concept rooted in Mao Zedong's emphasis on minimal forces to counter nuclear blackmail from superpowers like the United States. This integration reflected causal responses to U.S. interventions, such as the Taiwan Strait crises of the 1950s and perceived threats during the Vietnam War, where China's limited arsenal necessitated extending deterrence beyond regional targets to include U.S. assets in the Pacific.^[17]^[28] The missile's deployment aligned with the People's Liberation Army's (PLA) strategic evolution under Deng Xiaoping, who refined Mao-era minimalism by formalizing no-first-use principles while prioritizing retaliatory credibility over expansive warfighting options.^[29] By the 1980s, the DF-4 reinforced China's minimum deterrence posture, enabling a shift from Soviet-focused regional threats to global reach amid the Soviet Union's decline and rising U.S. post-Cold War primacy, with its range of approximately 5,500 kilometers allowing targeting of key U.S. military installations.^[1]^[17] This bolstered the doctrine's core tenet of maintaining a small, survivable arsenal sufficient for second-strike punishment, deterring coercion without matching adversaries' scale.^[30] The DF-4 thus supported Deng's strategic adjustments, emphasizing qualitative improvements in penetration and reliability to sustain deterrence amid technological gaps with the U.S.^[31] In developing China's nuclear triad, the DF-4 anchored the land-based component, complementing early H-6 bombers and nascent Type 092 submarines, though its silo-based configuration constrained mobility and heightened vulnerability to counterforce strikes.^[32]^[17] This role underscored the PLA's incremental triad buildup, prioritizing land-leg redundancy for doctrinal resilience despite sea- and air-based limitations at the time.^[33] China's doctrinal opacity regarding DF-4 operational status, warhead pairings, and alert levels has persisted, complicating third-party verification and arms control dialogues by preserving ambiguity as a deterrent multiplier.^[32]^[34] Official declarations maintain the missile's alignment with no-first-use and minimum levels, yet undisclosed silo numbers—estimated at around 20 by 2016—hinder assessments of retaliatory assurance.^[35]

Limitations and Criticisms

Technical and Reliability Issues

The DF-4 relies on storable liquid propellants, specifically unsymmetrical dimethylhydrazine (UDMH) as fuel and nitrogen tetroxide (N₂O₄) as oxidizer, which are hypergolic but highly corrosive to missile components and infrastructure.^[14] This corrosiveness necessitates extensive maintenance to prevent degradation of tanks, valves, and nozzles, often resulting in erosion over time that can lead to leaks or structural failures if not addressed.^[36] The inability to store the missile in a fueled state exacerbates these issues, requiring a pre-launch fueling process that typically takes approximately two hours, during which the system remains vulnerable to detection and preemptive attack.^[2] Early development tests highlighted inherent reliability challenges, including a November 1969 launch failure where the second stage failed to separate, and repeated nozzle extension breaks during engine hot-fire tests.^[1] ^[14] Propellant instability contributes to potential launch delays or aborts, as the reactive nature of hypergolics can cause premature ignition or incomplete mixing, compounded by decades of aging silos and gantries prone to corrosion-induced faults. The system's maintenance demands, driven by these chemical interactions, have historically diverted significant resources from the People's Liberation Army Rocket Force, reflected in a sparse test cadence since initial deployments in the 1970s.^[14] Accuracy limitations further underscore operational constraints, with the inertial guidance system yielding a circular error probable (CEP) of approximately 1,500 meters, rendering the DF-4 unsuitable for counterforce targeting of hardened military sites and confining its utility to less precise countervalue strikes against urban areas.^[2] This inaccuracy, combined with liquid-fueled vulnerabilities, diminishes overall system dependability in high-stakes scenarios compared to solid-propellant alternatives, though empirical data on recent failure rates remains classified.^[1]

International Security Concerns

The DF-4's silo-based deployment has raised concerns regarding its survivability in potential conflicts with the United States, contributing to perceived asymmetries in Sino-U.S. nuclear deterrence. As a liquid-fueled ICBM requiring hours of preparation time, the DF-4 is vulnerable to preemptive strikes by U.S. conventional prompt global strike (CPGS) systems, such as hypersonic glide vehicles capable of reaching targets worldwide within an hour.^[37]^[38] Analysts note that U.S. advancements in precision-guided munitions and intelligence could neutralize DF-4 silos before launch, undermining China's second-strike credibility and incentivizing escalation in crisis scenarios.^[39] China's opacity surrounding the DF-4's operational status, numbers, and upgrades—unlike the verifiable disclosures under U.S.-Russia treaties like New START—has fueled international arms race dynamics. Beijing's refusal to participate in multilateral arms control frameworks exacerbates mistrust, prompting U.S. responses such as the 1980s Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) and ongoing missile defense enhancements to counter perceived Chinese buildup.^[40]^[41] This lack of transparency distorts deterrence calculations, as evidenced by U.S. assessments highlighting China's undeclared silo expansions without corresponding data on DF-4 inventories or retirement timelines.^[42] Potential technological spillovers from DF-4 development have heightened tensions in the Indo-Pacific, particularly amid Taiwan Strait contingencies. Historical Chinese transfers of ballistic missile components to proliferators like Pakistan and Iran, derived from Dong Feng series expertise, raise fears of indirect enhancements to regional threats, even as DF-4 itself targets continental ranges.^[26] Upgrades extending the DF-4's payload to multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) could alter escalation ladders, complicating U.S. extended deterrence commitments to allies and prompting preemptive posturing in flashpoints like the Taiwan Strait.^[1]^[43]

Current Status and Legacy

Operators

The Dong Feng-4 (DF-4) intercontinental ballistic missile is operated solely by the People's Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF), the strategic missile branch of the People's Liberation Army, which falls under the direct operational control of the Central Military Commission of the People's Republic of China.^[5]^[2] At its peak in the early 2000s, the PLARF deployed approximately 25 DF-4 missiles, with total production limited to around 30 units organized into a small number of dedicated brigades.^[1]^[2] Current operational numbers have declined sharply amid modernization efforts, leaving an estimated handful of missiles in limited service for training and reserve roles, with no fully active DF-4-equipped brigades identified in recent assessments.^[25] The DF-4 has not been exported, and no foreign military operates the system.^[2]

Phase-Out and Successors

The DF-4, as China's inaugural liquid-fueled ICBM, faced obsolescence due to its lengthy fueling process, vulnerability to preemptive strikes, and logistical demands, prompting a gradual transition to more survivable solid-propellant systems starting in the early 2000s.^[1] By around 2000, approximately 25 DF-4 launchers remained operational, but projections anticipated full retirement between 2001 and 2005, supplanted by the road-mobile DF-31, which offered rapid launch readiness and reduced detectability.^[1] This shift aligned with broader People's Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF) priorities for enhanced second-strike capabilities amid expanding U.S. missile defenses.^[44] Subsequent upgrades extended limited DF-4 utility into the 2010s for training and potential silo-based roles, but by the mid-2020s, it had been largely decommissioned in favor of advanced variants like the MIRV-capable DF-41, which boasts greater range, payload flexibility, and mobility.^[45]^[46] The DF-4's phase-out underscored strategic imperatives for modernization, including evasion of satellite surveillance and quicker response times, as liquid-fueled designs proved increasingly mismatched against peer adversaries' precision strike networks.^[47] Despite its retirement, the DF-4's deployment marked China's entry into the ICBM era in the 1980s, providing foundational data on long-range propulsion and reentry that informed the PLARF's expansion to an estimated 500 nuclear warheads by 2024, predominantly on solid-fueled platforms.^[45] This legacy persists in doctrine emphasizing assured retaliation, though successors prioritize hypersonic integration and silo dispersal over the DF-4's fixed, high-yield profile.^[44]

References

[1]
DF-4 - Missile Threat - CSIS
The DF-4 is a two-stage, transportable, liquid-fueled IRBM/ICBM with a range of 4,500-5,500 km, carrying a 1-3 MT nuclear warhead. It entered service in 1980.
[2]
Dong Feng-4 (CSS-3) - Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance
The Dong Feng 4 (DF-4) is a two-stage, inter-continental ballistic missile (ICBM) with a range of 4,500-7,000 km. [1] The DF-4 employs a DF-3 launcher with ...
[3]
DF-4 ICBM - China Nuclear Forces - GlobalSecurity.org
Oct 18, 2021 · The Dongfeng 4 missile is an important model for succession and succession. Its successful development is of great significance.
[4]
DF-4 (Dongfeng 4) Chinese Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile
Jul 9, 2024 · The DF-4 is a two-stage, transportable, liquid-fueled IRBM/ICBM that entered service in 1980. One brigade remains operational near Lingbao, ...
[5]
Dongfeng (DF) Ballistic Missiles, China - Army Technology
Aug 15, 2022 · The DF-4 measures 28m in length and 2.25m in diameter, and weighs 82,000kg at launch. It has an effective range of up to 5,500km and can ...Df-41 Missile Details · Df-31 Missile Details · Df-5 Missile Details
[6]
Dongfeng DF-4 / CH-SS-3 - Ballistic Missile - GlobalMilitary.net
Jun 6, 2025 · Warhead, Nuclear ; Diameter, 2,250 mm (88.6 in) ; Span, 2,740 mm (107.9 in) ; Length, 28,050 mm (1104.3 in) ; Weight, 82,000 kg (180,779 lb).
[7]
ICBM Archives - Federation of American Scientists
One type (DF-4) has reload capability, so the number of available missiles is a little higher: 75-100 missiles. That number has also remained stable for the ...
[8]
DF-4 ICBM - China Nuclear Forces - GlobalSecurity.org
Oct 18, 2021 · On July 15, 1965, the first meeting of the chief designer of Dongfeng No. 4 was held at the First Academy. The meeting discussed the development ...
[9]
DF-4 - China Nuclear Forces - GlobalSecurity.org
Oct 18, 2021 · Especially the Dongfeng 4 missile was designed as China's first two-stage liquid Medium and long-range ground-to-ground missiles, each stage ...
[10]
DF-4 - China Nuclear Forces - Nuke
Jun 3, 2000 · Configuration, Two Stage ; Length [meters], 28 ; Diameter [meters], 2.25 ; Mass [kilograms], 80,000 ; Guidance, Inertial.
[11]
[PDF] CHINESE MISSILE ENCYCLOPEDIA SECTION II - CIA
the two operating CSS-3 silos and are presumed therefore to be storing at least some missile airframes, and some GSE. Similar tunnels and caves with rail ...
[12]
DF-4
Maximum range: 4,760 km (2,950 mi). Number Standard Warheads: 1. Warhead yield: 3,300 KT. CEP: 1.19 km (0.73 mi). Boost Propulsion: Storable liquid rocket, ...Missing: specifications | Show results with:specifications
[13]
DF-4 / CSS-3 - China Spaceflight - WordPress.com
Jun 14, 2019 · Chinese intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM). Two-stage, liquid-propellant, 4700 km range, single thermal nuclear warhead.
[14]
DF-4 ICBM - China Nuclear Forces - GlobalSecurity.org
Oct 18, 2021 · The technical command responsible for the first test was Ren Xinmin. The test of Dongfeng-4 is not only related to the successful development ...Missing: milestones | Show results with:milestones
[15]
The Pentagon's Annual Report on Chinese Military
Aug 17, 2018 · ... warheads to maximize penetration aids on the missiles. The DOD report mentions a “defense industry publication has also discussed the ...
[16]
[PDF] The Great Leap? China's Ballistic Missile Programme - IFSH
Jan 10, 2025 · The. DF-3 entered service in 1971, and an improved version, the DF-3A, underwent its first test in 1985, achieving operational status in 1987.
[17]
Making Sense of China's Missile Forces - NDU Press
Feb 5, 2019 · While some of these missiles were in development from the early 1960s, in March 1965 China established a plan to develop four missiles in 8 ...
[18]
Nuclear notebook: Chinese nuclear forces, 2020
Dec 7, 2020 · China's force of approximately 20 liquid-fueled, silo-based ICBMs continues to be upgraded, but their lengthy fueling process makes them ...
[19]
Worldwide Ballistic Missile Inventories | Arms Control Association
DF-4 (CSS-3) · Retiring, 5,500+ km, Liquid. DF-5 (CSS-4, Mod 1), Operational, 12,000 km, Liquid. DF-5A (CSS-4, Mod 2), Operational, 13,000+ km, Liquid. DF-5B ( ...
[20]
China Conducts DF-4 ICBM Test - Missile Threat - CSIS
Aug 24, 2017 · On August 24, China test fired a Dong Feng 4 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). The test was carried out from the Taiyuan Satellite Launch Center, in ...
[21]
Chinese People's Liberation Army Rocket Force Flight Tests Older ...
Aug 25, 2017 · The test of a DF-4 is notable since the missile is China's oldest intercontinental-range system, with an estimated range of 5,500 to 7,000 ...
[22]
[PDF] China Report - Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control
The liquid-fuel DF-3, tested in. 1966, more than doubled the DF-2's range to 3,000 kilometers. The DF-3 engines are used in the DF-4 missile and to power ...
[23]
Map Shows Reach of China's Nuclear-Capable Missiles - Newsweek
Jun 19, 2024 · The transportable, solid-fueled Dong Feng (East Wind) 4 is a ground-based missile with a range of 2,796 to 3,417 miles, placing Hawaii and the ...
[24]
https://www.astronautix.com/d/df-4.html
[25]
[PDF] People's Liberation Army Rocket Force Order of Battle 2023
Jul 10, 2023 · DF-5 pattern silos. The number of DF-5 silos will more than double over the next three years from 18 to at least 48 operational missile silos.Missing: transport | Show results with:transport
[26]
China: Ballistic and Cruise Missiles - EveryCRSReport.com
Aug 10, 2000 · DF-5A ICBM. Development of the DF-5A (CSS-4) ICBM involved overcoming challenges of new technical requirements before the first full-range testMissing: milestones | Show results with:milestones
[27]
Understanding the People's Liberation Army Rocket Force
The CEP for China's first nuclear missile, the DF-3A, was four ... DF-4/CSS-3. A liquid-fueled ICBM carrying a 3.3-megaton nuclear warhead, the ...
[28]
China's Nuclear Doctrine: Debates and Evolution
Jun 30, 2016 · China's nuclear doctrine is the product of four different schools of thought: the self-defensive nuclear doctrine, the minimum nuclear deterrence doctrine,<|separator|>
[29]
[PDF] THE NUCLEAR DOCTRINE AND FORCES OF THE PEOPLE'S ...
Ideology and propaganda have played the decisive role in Chinese nuclear strategy since Mao's time. This propaganda was intended for both external and internal ...
[30]
China's Transition to a More Credible Nuclear Deterrent - jstor
73 China's designations for its land-based ballistic missiles begin with DF (dongfeng, or “east wind”). Western designations use CSS (Chinese surface-to-surface ...
[31]
[PDF] The Evolution of Chinese Nuclear Strategy and Force Structure
Both leaders embraced the idea of deterrence through assured retaliation, in which a small number of survivable weapons would be enough to retaliate and impose ...
[32]
[PDF] V. Chinese nuclear forces - SIPRI
Sep 13, 2024 · As of January 2022, China maintained an estimated total stockpile of about. 350 nuclear warheads. This estimate is higher than the 'low200' ...
[33]
[PDF] China's Nuclear Forces: Moving beyond a Minimal Deterrent
China is expanding, modernizing, and diversifying its nuclear forces, developing a nuclear triad, and may become a nuclear peer of the US. Its arsenal could ...
[34]
China Displays Modernized Nuclear Forces | Arms Control Association
Oct 1, 2025 · This new missile was grouped with other nuclear systems—such as the Dongfeng-31-BJ ICBM; the sea-launched ballistic missile, Julang-3; and the ...Missing: doctrine | Show results with:doctrine
[35]
Full article: Chinese nuclear forces, 2016 - Taylor & Francis Online
Jun 13, 2016 · China continues to maintain one brigade of the DF-4 (CSS-3) ICBM. This two-stage, liquid-fueled missile was first deployed in 1980 and can ...
[36]
How reliable are all the old ICBMs for 'deterrence' purposes? - Quora
May 21, 2017 · The DF-4wasfirst deployed in the 1970's and uses a liquid fuel that cannot be stored in the missile itself because of its corrosive properties.
[37]
Report to Congress on Conventional Prompt Global Strike and Long ...
Jan 10, 2019 · Conventional prompt global strike (CPGS) weapons would allow the United States to strike targets anywhere on Earth in as little as an hour.
[38]
Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress
Aug 27, 2025 · The United States has actively pursued the development of hypersonic weapons as a part of its conventional prompt global strike program since ...
[39]
[PDF] CSBA - Speeding Toward Instability?
May 1, 2023 · CSBA is an independent institute promoting debate on national security, focusing on threats to US security and how hypersonic weapons might ...
[40]
Keeping Pace with the Times: China's Arms Control Tradition, New ...
Aug 1, 2025 · China's lack of transparency has, to some extent, exacerbated U.S. concerns, potentially fueling an arms race.87 Four years after commercial ...
[41]
China's Nuclear Ambitions, the Implications for India, and the Future ...
Aug 16, 2023 · China's lack of transparency both in its nuclear arsenal and overall nuclear doctrine has been a cause for concern in many parts of the world.
[42]
The China Dilemma - Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation
Nov 13, 2023 · There is no incentive for China to engage in any transparency or arms control dialogue while it can avoid scrutiny this way. Assessing China's ...Missing: DF- | Show results with:DF-
[43]
China's Nuclear Forces Continue to Expand - The Diplomat
China has gone through significant expansion and modernization of its nuclear forces as well as enhancing the size of its arsenal.
[44]
[PDF] Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic ...
Dec 18, 2024 · This report covers the PLA's military-technological development, Chinese security strategy, US-China engagement, and topics like PLA forces, ...
[45]
Chinese nuclear weapons, 2024 - Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
Jan 15, 2024 · In total, these discoveries suggest that China is constructing 320 new silos for solid-fueled ICBMs across the three fields of Yumen, Hami, and ...
[46]
China military watch | The Strategist
Aug 20, 2021 · The DF-41 is a road-mobile, solid-fuelled ICBM that can carry several nuclear warheads as multiple independent re-entry vehicles (MIRVs).
[47]
[PDF] Chinese nuclear weapons, 2024 - Federation of American Scientists
Jan 15, 2024 · China has also further expanded its dual-capable DF-26 intermediate-range ballistic missile force, which appears to have completely replaced ...