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New START

The New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), formally known as the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, is a bilateral agreement signed on April 8, 2010, in Prague by U.S. President Barack Obama and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, which entered into force on February 5, 2011.^[1]^[2] The treaty establishes verifiable limits on deployed strategic nuclear warheads to no more than 1,550 per side, deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments to 700, and total deployed and non-deployed launchers of ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers to 800.^[1]^[2] It includes robust verification mechanisms, such as up to 18 on-site inspections annually, data exchanges on forces, and notifications of significant events, aimed at enhancing strategic stability by reducing the risk of miscalculation and arms race dynamics between the two largest nuclear powers.^[1] Extended by five years in 2021 to February 5, 2026, the treaty achieved significant reductions from pre-existing levels but faced challenges, including Russia's suspension of participation announced by President Vladimir Putin on February 21, 2023, in response to alleged U.S. unfriendly actions related to the Ukraine conflict, which halted inspections and notifications while Russia pledged to respect numerical limits.^[1]^[3]^[4] As of October 2025, with expiration imminent and no follow-on negotiations underway despite Russia's recent proposal for a one-year extension contingent on U.S. reciprocity, New START's demise risks eroding transparency and potentially spurring unconstrained nuclear modernization on both sides.^[5]^[6]

Historical Context and Negotiation

Predecessor Treaties

The lineage of bilateral U.S.-Russian arms control agreements preceding New START began with the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty I (START I), signed on July 31, 1991, between the United States and the Soviet Union, which mandated reductions to no more than 6,000 accountable strategic nuclear warheads, 1,600 deployed and non-deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and 4,900 ballistic missile launchers by January 1, 2003.^[7]^[8] START I entered into force on December 5, 1994, after the Soviet Union's dissolution required protocols incorporating Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine as successors, and it established a comprehensive verification regime including on-site inspections, data exchanges, and telemetry monitoring that provided foundational lessons for subsequent treaties by demonstrating the feasibility of intrusive mutual oversight amid post-Cold War transparency.^[9] Building on START I, the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty II (START II), signed on January 3, 1993, by U.S. President George H.W. Bush and Russian President Boris Yeltsin, sought deeper cuts to 3,000-3,500 accountable warheads and banned multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) on ICBMs to eliminate destabilizing first-strike incentives, while requiring the download of MIRVed SLBMs and deployment of all warheads on submarines or bombers.^[10] The U.S. Senate ratified START II in January 1996, but Russia conditioned its ratification on U.S. adherence to the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty; although the Russian Duma approved it in April 2000, the treaty never entered into force due to U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty in 2002, leaving unresolved issues like MIRV prohibitions that later influenced New START's flexible counting rules for downloaded warheads rather than outright bans.^[11]^[12] The Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT), also known as the Moscow Treaty, signed on May 24, 2002, by U.S. President George W. Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin, served as a transitional measure requiring each side to reduce operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads to 1,700-2,200 by December 31, 2012, but it omitted detailed counting rules, sub-limits on delivery vehicles, or a dedicated verification mechanism, relying instead on residual START I provisions until that treaty's 2009 expiration.^[13]^[14] SORT entered into force on June 1, 2003, after swift U.S. and Russian ratifications, yet its brevity—spanning just 500 words—and lack of binding reductions beyond deployed warheads highlighted gaps in transparency and compliance assurance, prompting negotiations for New START to reinstate rigorous, treaty-specific inspections and address the impending void left by SORT's sunset.^[15] These predecessors collectively drove a trajectory of declining warhead ceilings from over 10,000 per side under earlier SALT accords, but persistent hurdles in ratification, verification atrophy, and adaptation to technological shifts underscored the need for a successor with updated, enforceable constraints.^[16]

Drafting and Signature

Negotiations for New START commenced on April 1, 2009, when U.S. President Barack Obama and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev issued a joint statement in London agreeing to negotiate verifiable reductions in strategic offensive arms as a successor to START I, whose verification regime expired on December 5, 2009.^[17] This initiative aligned with the Obama administration's policy to reset U.S.-Russia relations amid post-Cold War dynamics and the prior expiration of formal verification under the 2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT).^[18] Intensive talks unfolded over the following year in Geneva, with high-level interventions resolving delays from concurrent protocol development.^[18] Major disputes centered on verification details, including telemetry sharing from missile tests, where Russia pressed for broader access and the U.S. sought limitations to safeguard technologies; the compromise restricted exchanges to up to five launches per side annually, far less comprehensive than under START I.^[19]^[18] Bomber counting rules posed another challenge, with the final agreement attributing one warhead per heavy bomber to account for their routine non-nuclear configuration, preserving flexibility for both nations' nuclear triads.^[19] Russia expressed concerns over U.S. conventional prompt global strike capabilities potentially mimicking nuclear launches and undermining parity, leading to a provision where such systems on strategic ballistic missiles would count against limits, though the treaty preamble noted their strategic stability implications without imposing outright bans.^[19] These resolutions reflected U.S. emphasis on verifiable limits amid Russia's aging arsenal and Russian insistence on equal treatment without excessive cuts.^[18] The treaty was signed on April 8, 2010, by Obama and Medvedev at Prague Castle, selected for its association with Obama's prior call for nuclear disarmament.^[20]^[18]

Core Provisions

Limits on Strategic Nuclear Forces

The New START Treaty imposes central limits on the deployed strategic offensive arms of the United States and Russia to foster strategic stability by capping the most escalatory elements of their nuclear arsenals, thereby reducing incentives for an unchecked arms race in intercontinental-range systems while preserving mutual deterrence. These limits focus exclusively on strategic weapons—those capable of striking targets across continents—prioritizing reductions in deployed warheads and delivery vehicles over total stockpiles.^[2]^[21] The treaty caps deployed strategic nuclear warheads at 1,550 for each party, alongside restrictions on delivery systems: no more than 700 deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments; and no more than 800 total ICBM and SLBM launchers, plus heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments, whether deployed or non-deployed.^[2]^[22] These aggregate numbers reflect a deliberate design to constrain operational forces at high alert, limiting the immediate warfighting potential in a crisis without prohibiting modernization or reserve capabilities.^[21] Counting rules under New START introduce flexibility compared to prior treaties by treating each deployed heavy bomber as equivalent to one warhead for the 1,550 limit, irrespective of its actual payload capacity, which can reach 16 to 20 warheads per bomber.^[2]^[22] Similarly, for launchers, multiple warheads on a single missile (multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles, or MIRVs) count toward the deployed warhead ceiling based on the number deployed, but the launcher itself counts as one unit. This approach simplifies accounting and permits bombers—typically not loaded in peacetime—to serve dual conventional-nuclear roles without inflating counts, though it has drawn criticism for potentially understating total destructive capacity, as the actual warhead total on bombers could exceed the limit by hundreds.^[23]^[21] Notably excluded from these limits are non-strategic (tactical) nuclear weapons, which fall outside the treaty's scope, as well as non-deployed stockpiles and certain conventional systems. This omission permits Russia to retain a significant advantage in tactical nuclear forces, estimated in the thousands compared to the U.S. arsenal of hundreds, emphasizing the treaty's narrow focus on strategic parity rather than comprehensive disarmament.^[24]^[25] The limits entered into force on February 5, 2011, following ratification, with both parties required to achieve full compliance within seven years, by February 5, 2018, through phased reductions monitored via data exchanges.^[1]^[26]

Verification Regime

The New START Treaty establishes a verification regime comprising on-site inspections, data exchanges, notifications, and exhibitions to monitor compliance with limits on strategic offensive arms. Each party conducts up to 18 on-site inspections annually, divided into Type One inspections at facilities hosting deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), or heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments, as well as sites undergoing conversions or eliminations, and Type Two inspections at air bases or other locations with non-deployed systems.^[2] These inspections allow inspectors to confirm the number of deployed warheads, launchers, and bombers through physical verification, including reading unique identifiers affixed to delivery vehicles.^[1] In addition to inspections, parties exchange detailed notifications on missile launches, facility activities, and system movements, supplemented by biannual data exchanges providing comprehensive updates on strategic forces, including aggregate numbers and specific attributions of warheads to delivery systems.^[27] A key feature involves unique identifiers (UIDs), alphanumeric codes permanently applied to each ICBM, SLBM, and heavy bomber, which are shared in notifications and data exchanges and verified during inspections to track individual items and prevent undetected relocations or warhead swaps.^[1]^[28] The regime also mandates limited telemetry data exchanges for certain missile flight tests, providing digital recordings to assess throw-weight and warhead configurations, though Russian objections during negotiations restricted full access compared to the more extensive requirements under the earlier START I Treaty.^[29] Relative to predecessors like START I, New START streamlines verification by reducing inspection quotas from 28 to 18 per year, eliminating some tagging and exhibition requirements, and emphasizing UIDs and notifications to lower costs while adapting to post-Cold War force structures, thereby facilitating ongoing transparency without the administrative burdens of prior accords.^[2]^[30] While designed to foster mutual confidence through intrusive access and real-time information sharing, the regime's effectiveness hinges on reciprocal participation, exposing vulnerabilities to data asymmetries where one party withholds cooperation. Russia's suspension of the treaty on February 21, 2023, halted all on-site inspections and notifications, ending U.S. access to Russian facilities after mutual COVID-19 pauses since 2020, and underscoring the system's dependence on goodwill rather than enforceable coercion amid asymmetries in monitoring capabilities.^[4]^[3] This interruption revealed inherent limits, as satellite reconnaissance and open-source intelligence cannot fully replicate on-site verification of warhead counts or covert modernizations, potentially enabling discrepancies exploitable by a non-compliant party with superior opacity in its nuclear infrastructure.^[31]^[4]

Duration, Flexibility, and Exceptions

The New START Treaty entered into force on February 5, 2011, establishing an original duration of ten years, with a scheduled expiration on February 5, 2021.^[1] The agreement included a provision allowing both parties to extend the treaty by mutual consent for no more than five additional years before its initial expiry.^[32] In January 2021, the United States and Russia exercised this option, agreeing to a five-year extension that set the new termination date as February 5, 2026, without further extensions possible under the treaty's terms.^[2] ^[33] To accommodate operational needs and phased reductions, the treaty incorporated flexibility clauses, including a ceiling of 800 total deployed and non-deployed intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM), and heavy bomber launchers, exceeding the 700 limit on deployed systems and thereby permitting the retention of up to 100 "banked" non-deployed launchers.^[34] ^[35] Conversion processes further enhanced adaptability, allowing parties to modify ICBM or SLBM launchers or heavy bombers through verifiable procedures that could reclassify them outside treaty-counted categories, such as rendering bombers unequipped for nuclear armaments.^[34] ^[36] These mechanisms supported compliance during the seven-year reduction period mandated after entry into force, by enabling strategic force structuring without immediate dismantlement of excess infrastructure.^[21] Key exceptions preserved leeway for ongoing capabilities development, as the treaty imposed no restrictions on research, development, testing, or evaluation (RDT&E) of strategic offensive arms, nor on modernization efforts conducted within overall numerical limits.^[2] Article V explicitly permitted such activities, facilitating parallel sustainment and upgrades—like U.S. life-extension programs for existing systems and Russian deployment of new missile types—provided aggregate ceilings were not exceeded.^[2] These provisions presumed continued reciprocal verification and geopolitical stability to maintain effective limits, yet their efficacy eroded amid mutual suspensions of on-site inspections and broader trust breakdowns following Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine, rendering long-term enforceability precarious despite short-term reductions achieved.^[37] ^[38]

Ratification and Early Implementation

United States Ratification

The New START Treaty was signed by U.S. President Barack Obama and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev on April 8, 2010, in Prague, and transmitted to the U.S. Senate for advice and consent to ratification shortly thereafter.^[39] The Senate Foreign Relations Committee held extensive hearings from May to November 2010 during the 111th Congress, examining the treaty's provisions amid domestic debates over verification, missile defense implications, and nuclear modernization.^[40] Republican senators, including Jon Kyl and James Inhofe, expressed concerns that the treaty's preamble language on the "interrelationship" between strategic offensive arms and missile defenses could constrain U.S. defensive deployments, potentially limiting systems like ground-based interceptors in Europe.^[41] They also criticized reduced telemetry data sharing compared to START I, arguing it hampered verification of Russian warhead loadings during flight tests, and sought assurances for robust funding of the U.S. nuclear triad amid perceived Russian advantages in non-strategic forces.^[42] The Obama administration addressed these issues through certifications committing over $180 billion to nuclear modernization over a decade, including upgrades to submarines, bombers, and warheads, while asserting the treaty imposed no legal limits on U.S. missile defenses.^[43] In response to Republican demands, the administration agreed to protocols enhancing on-site inspections and data exchanges, though critics maintained these concessions were insufficient given Russia's history of asymmetries, such as exceeding tactical nuclear limits outside the treaty's scope.^[44] The ratification occurred in a lame-duck session post-midterm elections, where Republicans had gained seats but faced pressure to avoid portraying obstructionism on national security. On December 22, 2010, the Senate approved the resolution of ratification by a 71-26 vote, surpassing the two-thirds threshold with support from 13 Republicans alongside Democrats.^[45] The resolution incorporated 18 conditions and understandings, including declarations that the treaty must not impair U.S. abilities to defend against limited ballistic missile attacks or modernize strategic forces, and required future certifications on Russian compliance with telemetry and conversion of launchers.^[46] This framework enabled entry into force on February 5, 2011, after Russian ratification, while embedding safeguards against perceived vulnerabilities, though some conservatives critiqued the parity as overly concessional given empirical disparities in delivery systems and Russia's modernization pace.^[47]

Russian Ratification

The Russian State Duma approved the New START Treaty in its third reading on January 25, 2011, with 350 votes in favor, 96 against, and one abstention.^[48] The Federation Council, the upper house of parliament, unanimously endorsed the ratification the following day, January 26, 2011. President Dmitry Medvedev signed the ratification into law on January 28, 2011, following the U.S. Senate's approval on December 22, 2010.^[49] The treaty entered into force on February 5, 2011, after the exchange of instruments of ratification between the two nations.^[1] Russia's ratification process occurred amid the Medvedev-Putin tandem leadership, where President Medvedev advanced the treaty as part of a broader "reset" in U.S.-Russia relations, emphasizing mutual strategic stability during Russia's post-2008 economic recovery.^[50] Domestic support in the Duma reflected a consensus view that the treaty provided reciprocal limits on U.S. forces, preventing an imbalance rather than representing a unilateral concession, given Russia's existing sub-limits on deployed warheads prior to the agreement.^[48] However, the ratification legislation included interpretive statements conditioning the treaty's long-term viability on U.S. restraint in missile defense deployments, asserting that unchecked American systems could undermine the strategic parity the treaty sought to preserve.^[51] Early post-ratification commentary from Russian officials highlighted concerns over U.S. conventional capabilities, particularly plans for Conventional Prompt Global Strike systems deployable on strategic platforms, which Moscow argued could erode nuclear parity by complicating verification and enabling non-nuclear strikes indistinguishable from strategic launches.^[52] These reservations, voiced during and immediately after Duma debates, signaled a conditional commitment, foreshadowing tensions as Vladimir Putin, then prime minister, assumed the presidency in 2012 and adopted a more skeptical posture toward arms control amid perceived U.S. advancements in precision-guided conventional munitions.^[53]

Initial Compliance and Data Exchanges

The New START Treaty entered into force on February 5, 2011, initiating a verification regime that included biannual exchanges of data on strategic offensive arms, along with notifications of changes in deployments and other activities. These exchanges provided detailed aggregate numbers on deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), heavy bombers, and associated warheads, enabling mutual monitoring of progress toward the treaty's central limits of 1,550 deployed warheads, 700 deployed launchers, and 800 total launchers by February 5, 2018. The initial data exchange, conducted shortly after entry into force, established baselines above the limits, with subsequent updates documenting steady reductions; for instance, the September 1, 2017, exchange reported the United States with 1,393 deployed strategic warheads on 660 deployed launchers.^[1]^[54] Implementation proceeded through on-site inspections, with each party entitled to conduct 18 annually—10 Type One inspections at sites with deployed systems to verify warhead and launcher counts, and 8 Type Two inspections at non-deployed facilities. From 2011 to 2017, these activities confirmed declarations with only minor discrepancies attributable to counting rules, such as the treaty's allowance for simulation-based verification of warhead numbers on missiles rather than physical disassembly. Aggregate notifications supplemented inspections by tracking launcher movements and conversions, offering transparency greater than under prior agreements like Moscow Treaty SORT, where no such formal mechanisms existed. By late 2017, both parties had verifiably reduced forces well below initial levels, positioning them to meet the 2018 deadline without major procedural hurdles.^[1]^[35] Early challenges included occasional Russian limitations on access to specific inspection sites due to security concerns and U.S. reservations about the precision of simulation methods for warhead attribution, which relied on declaratory data rather than direct observation. Nonetheless, these issues did not impede overall adherence, as biannual data consistently demonstrated symmetric cuts and procedural cooperation, with over 200 inspections completed collectively by each side by the end of 2017. This phase affirmed the treaty's verification efficacy in fostering confidence amid ongoing strategic modernization efforts.^[55]^[54]

Strategic Forces Under the Treaty

Pre-Treaty US and Russian Arsenals

Prior to the signing of New START on April 8, 2010, the United States maintained approximately 1,968 deployed strategic nuclear warheads across a balanced triad of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and heavy bombers equipped for nuclear missions. These warheads were distributed on roughly 798 strategic delivery vehicles, adhering to the 2002 Moscow Treaty (SORT) limit of no more than 2,200 operationally deployed strategic warheads. The U.S. arsenal prioritized accuracy, survivability, and reliability, with fixed-silo-based Minuteman III ICBMs carrying single warheads or multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs), Trident II SLBMs on Ohio-class submarines providing sea-based second-strike capability, and B-52H and B-2 bombers offering flexible air-delivered options with gravity bombs and air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs). Russia's pre-treaty strategic forces featured an estimated 2,600 total strategic warheads, with around 2,200 operationally deployed under SORT constraints, reflecting a heavier emphasis on land-based ICBMs compared to the U.S. triad.^[56] Approximately 1,100 warheads were deployed on 331 ICBMs of six types, including aging Soviet-era systems like the SS-18 Satan (heavy MIRV-capable) and SS-19 Stiletto, which accounted for a significant portion of Russia's MIRVed capabilities but suffered from reliability issues and maintenance challenges due to their age.^[57] SLBMs on Delta-class submarines and Tu-95 and Tu-160 bombers supplemented the force, though submarine and bomber components were less modernized, contributing to qualitative disparities where Russia's numerical focus on MIRVs aimed to offset lags in precision guidance and overall system upkeep.^[57] Key asymmetries extended beyond strategic forces: Russia maintained a substantial advantage in nonstrategic (tactical) nuclear weapons, with estimates of about 2,000 such warheads across artillery, short-range missiles, and naval systems, versus the U.S.'s roughly 500 nonstrategic warheads, primarily air-delivered and with many in inactive storage.^[57] Both nations pursued modernization programs covertly within treaty bounds, including U.S. efforts on life-extended Minuteman IIIs and future Columbia-class submarines, and Russian deployments of RS-24 Yars ICBMs and Bulava SLBMs, setting the stage for parity-oriented limits that preserved rough equivalence despite U.S. edges in technological sophistication.^[56]

Post-Entry Reductions and Modernization

Both the United States and Russia achieved compliance with New START's central limits by February 5, 2018, seven years after the treaty's entry into force, reducing deployed strategic warheads to no more than 1,550, deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) to no more than 700, and total deployed and non-deployed launchers and heavy bombers to no more than 800.^[1]^[2] These reductions involved the retirement or conversion of legacy systems, with the United States deactivating older B-52H bombers by removing nuclear armaments and converting them to conventional roles, while Russia downloaded warheads on its R-36M2 (SS-18 Satan) ICBMs from up to 10 to fewer per missile—typically four—to align with the deployed warhead ceiling.^[58]^[59] Concurrent with numerical compliance, both parties pursued extensive modernization of their strategic forces within treaty parameters, which permitted upgrades to existing delivery systems and development of new types as long as they adhered to counting rules for deployed items. The United States advanced the Columbia-class SSBN program to replace aging Ohio-class submarines, with construction of the lead boat (USS Columbia) beginning in 2021 and initial deployment targeted for the early 2030s, enhancing stealth and payload capacity without exceeding launcher limits.^[60] Similarly, the B-21 Raider stealth bomber entered low-rate initial production by 2023, designed to carry both conventional and nuclear munitions as a future heavy bomber counted under New START rules.^[60] Russia similarly modernized aggressively, deploying RS-24 Yars (SS-27 Mod 2) mobile ICBMs starting in the mid-2010s, with over 150 operational by 2023, replacing older SS-25 and SS-27 systems while maintaining MIRV capabilities within warhead caps.^[61] The Borei-class (Project 955) and improved Borei-A submarines were commissioned post-2011, including Knyaz Vladimir in 2019 and subsequent vessels like Knyaz Oleg by 2022, equipped with RSM-56 Bulava SLBMs to sustain sea-based deterrence.^[62] Deployed warhead numbers remained stable near the 1,550 limit through 2022, with U.S. figures around 1,419 in 2020 and Russian declarations at 1,447, reflecting a post-reduction plateau rather than further drawdowns.^[1] However, qualitative enhancements proliferated, such as Russia's Avangard hypersonic glide vehicle deployed atop modified SS-18 or UR-100N ICBMs by 2019, which maneuvers at speeds exceeding Mach 20 to counter missile defenses—capabilities not constrained by New START's focus on quantitative delivery vehicle and warhead counts.^[63] This shift emphasized technological efficiency over sheer numbers, allowing both sides to preserve or augment effective strike potential despite numerical caps.^[64]

Compliance Disputes and Violations

The United States Department of State has documented multiple instances of Russian non-compliance with New START verification obligations, primarily involving restrictions on on-site inspections and failures in data transparency. Following a mutual suspension of inspections in March 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic, Russia refused to resume them despite U.S. proposals in 2022, effectively blocking U.S. inspector access to declared facilities from August 2022 onward.^[26]^[65] This violated Protocol Part Five, which mandates up to 18 annual inspections to confirm deployed systems and warheads. Without such access, U.S. assessments could not independently verify Russian declarations, increasing uncertainty about actual force levels. Russia further ceased providing required notifications on launcher movements, deployments, and facility changes after February 28, 2023, breaching Article VII and Protocol Part Four provisions for timely bilateral exchanges to enable verification.^[26] Biannual data updates on aggregate numbers of strategic systems halted from March 1, 2023, preventing confirmation of adherence to central limits on deployed warheads (1,550), launchers (700 deployed), and total launchers (800).^[26] Federation of American Scientists estimates indicated Russia maintained approximately 1,549 deployed strategic warheads as of September 2022, near the cap, but post-2023 opacity raised concerns of potential exceedance through unreported loading or conversions.^[61] Additional disputes involved telemetry data from ICBM and SLBM launches exceeding 5,500 kilometers, where Russia declined to negotiate exchange formats for 2023 tests, contravening Article IX obligations for transparency on missile performance.^[26] The U.S. did not invoke formal dispute resolution under Article XV due to risks of reciprocal Russian restrictions, underscoring the treaty's vulnerabilities to unilateral obstruction. In contrast, U.S. compliance reports confirmed adherence to numerical limits through verifiable eliminations, such as six Minuteman III ICBMs in 2024, though countermeasures mirrored Russian verification cessations from March 2023 to maintain parity.^[26]^[65] These patterns highlighted systemic Russian obfuscation, eroding the treaty's empirical foundations without evidence of parallel U.S. breaches.

Domestic and International Debates

US Political Controversies

The ratification of New START exposed significant partisan rifts in U.S. politics, with the Obama administration and Democratic leaders portraying the treaty as essential for verifiable reductions in strategic nuclear forces and enhanced stability, while many Republicans warned it would undermine U.S. deterrence by constraining missile defense and ignoring verification gaps. The Senate approved the treaty on December 22, 2010, by a 71-26 margin, requiring 13 Republican votes alongside unanimous Democratic and independent support to meet the two-thirds threshold.^[47]^[66] Opponents, including Senate Republicans led by figures like Jon Kyl, demanded explicit commitments to modernize U.S. nuclear forces and raised alarms over the treaty's preamble, which they interpreted as linking offensive arms limits to restrictions on U.S. missile defense deployments in Europe.^[67]^[68] Prominent Republican critics amplified these concerns during the 2010 lame-duck session and subsequent hearings. Mitt Romney, in a July 2010 Washington Post op-ed, condemned the treaty for effectively limiting U.S. strategic nuclear capabilities and missile defense programs, arguing it rewarded Russian obstructionism on verification while failing to address broader threats.^[69] Senate deliberations, spanning over 20 hearings and 700 questions from senators, focused on Russian compliance risks, with Republicans citing Moscow's past violations of arms control pacts and insisting on robust on-site inspections to prevent cheating—provisions they viewed as insufficient despite administration assurances.^[70]^[41] The Trump administration's 2019-2020 review intensified scrutiny, rejecting a simple five-year extension set to expire in February 2021 and conditioning any renewal on including China in trilateral talks, given Beijing's unchecked nuclear expansion.^[71] Critics highlighted that New START's bilateral caps—limiting deployed warheads to 1,550 per side—imposed asymmetric burdens on the U.S., as China's arsenal, estimated in contemporaneous assessments to potentially reach 500-1,000 warheads by the 2020s, grew without reciprocal limits, effectively enforcing unilateral U.S. restraint amid multipolar competition.^[72]^[73] Conservative analysts, such as those at the Heritage Foundation, argued the treaty enabled Russian force modernization under looser constraints while eroding U.S. qualitative edges in deterrence.^[44] These debates underscored elite divisions over strategic parity versus superiority, with proponents emphasizing empirical reductions in U.S.-Russian arsenals as a net security gain, while skeptics contended the treaty's focus on countable warheads overlooked qualitative advancements in Russian hypersonics and ignored China's buildup, potentially weakening extended deterrence commitments to allies.^[67]^[74]

Russian Perspectives

Russian officials, particularly under President Dmitry Medvedev, framed the New START Treaty upon its 2010 signing as a cornerstone for achieving verifiable reductions in strategic nuclear arsenals and restoring parity between Russia and the United States following the Soviet Union's dissolution, when disparities in force structures and verification had favored the U.S.^[75] Medvedev emphasized the treaty's role in fulfilling mutual objectives for lower warhead and launcher limits—1,550 deployed warheads and 700 deployed launchers per side—while enabling ongoing modernization without stringent constraints on force exercises or upgrades, a flexibility absent in prior agreements like START I and II.^[76] This portrayal served propagandistic purposes, positioning Russia as a proponent of "peaceful" nuclear policy and international stability, contrasting with alleged Western aggression and reinforcing domestic narratives of reclaimed great-power status.^[76] Moscow consistently critiqued U.S. missile defense deployments, such as the Aegis Ashore systems in Romania and Poland activated in 2016 and 2018, as direct threats to the treaty's strategic balance by potentially intercepting Russian ICBMs, thereby incentivizing preemptive responses.^[77] Russian statements accused these systems, alongside U.S. conventional prompt global strike programs, of eroding mutual assured destruction principles, with Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov arguing in multiple forums that such capabilities undermine parity by allowing non-nuclear attacks on strategic assets.^[77] These critiques portrayed U.S. actions as aggressive expansions beyond offensive arms limits, justifying Russia's conditional approach to transparency and inspections. From an internal strategic viewpoint, New START afforded Russia a decade-plus window to advance asymmetric capabilities, including the Avangard hypersonic glide vehicle first combat-deployed on an SS-19 ICBM in December 2019, which evaded treaty restrictions by counting as a single warhead payload rather than a novel system requiring separate accounting.^[78] This enabled upgrades to penetration aids and maneuverability against defenses without reciprocal U.S.-style constraints on Russian tactical nuclear forces or non-strategic developments, aligning with Moscow's doctrine prioritizing survivable second-strike options over symmetrical reductions. Lavrov's public remarks tied ongoing compliance to U.S. restraint on NATO eastward expansion—citing 14 new members since 1999 as violations of post-Cold War assurances—revealing adherence as leverage rather than absolute commitment, contingent on addressing perceived existential threats.^[79]

Broader Geopolitical Criticisms

The New START treaty's bilateral framework between the United States and Russia has been criticized for excluding rising nuclear powers, particularly China, whose arsenal expanded unchecked during the treaty's duration. At the time of New START's entry into force in 2011, China possessed an estimated 250 nuclear warheads; by mid-2024, this had surpassed 600 operational warheads, with U.S. Department of Defense projections indicating over 1,000 by 2030.^[80] ^[81] This omission allowed Beijing to modernize and diversify its forces without reciprocal constraints, shifting the global nuclear balance toward multipolarity and undermining the treaty's stabilizing intent in a world beyond U.S.-Russian dyad.^[82] From a deterrence perspective, the treaty's caps on deployed strategic warheads at 1,550 per side perpetuated mutual vulnerability between the U.S. and Russia while disregarding the unique demands of U.S. extended deterrence obligations to allies, such as NATO members in Europe. Critics contend that these limits constrained U.S. flexibility to signal resolve against non-signatory threats, potentially eroding alliance credibility as adversaries like China and Russia perceived American strategic forces as artificially bounded amid their own expansions.^[83] Heritage Foundation analyses argue that New START signaled U.S. restraint, emboldening rivals by prioritizing bilateral parity over broader superiority needed to deter multifaceted aggression.^[84] Empirically, while U.S. and Russian reductions under New START contributed to a decline in global stockpiles from Cold War peaks, the post-2011 period saw stabilization and rises elsewhere, with total inventories hovering around 12,000–13,000 warheads by 2025, driven by Chinese growth and modest increases in India, Pakistan, and North Korea.^[85] ^[81] This outcome challenges the treaty's efficacy in a multipolar environment, as bilateral caps failed to address proliferation dynamics, fostering perceptions of U.S. vulnerability. In response, some experts advocated trilateral negotiations incorporating China to impose verifiable limits across major powers, with proposals including phased reductions or freezes tailored to arsenal disparities.^[86] Others urged U.S. withdrawal from constraints to enable rebuilding technological edges, such as hypersonic defenses and prompt global strike capabilities, arguing that unilateral flexibility better preserves deterrence against uncooperative actors.^[84] These views highlight the treaty's rooted assumption that U.S.-Russian bilateralism alone suffices, a notion increasingly untenable amid empirical shifts in global nuclear posture.

Suspension, Extension Efforts, and Expiration

Failed Extension Negotiations (2021–2022)

Following the successful five-year extension of New START agreed on February 3, 2021, which prolonged the treaty until February 5, 2026, U.S. President Joe Biden and Russian President Vladimir Putin met at the Geneva summit on June 16, 2021, to initiate bilateral consultations on strategic stability. These talks aimed to explore a framework for future arms control measures beyond New START's expiration, including potential revisions to its parameters or negotiations for a successor agreement encompassing emerging technologies like hypersonic systems. The U.S. emphasized preventing an arms race through verifiable limits on strategic offensive arms, while Russia advocated for broader discussions incorporating non-strategic nuclear weapons and constraints on U.S. missile defenses, which Moscow viewed as undermining strategic parity.^[87]^[88]^[89] Expert-level dialogues commenced in July 2021 but quickly stalled amid Russian insistence on linking progress to geopolitical concessions. In December 2021, Russia submitted draft treaties to the U.S. and NATO demanding enforceable guarantees against further alliance enlargement, particularly barring Ukraine's membership, alongside reductions in NATO forces and infrastructure in Eastern Europe since 1997. U.S. officials rejected these as extraneous to arms control, arguing they sought to dictate alliance decisions rather than address mutual nuclear risks, and declined substantive engagement on NATO-related demands. This impasse highlighted Russia's strategy of conditioning nuclear restraint on territorial security assurances, rendering standalone extension or replacement of New START infeasible without resolving Ukraine and NATO disputes.^[90]^[91] Verification mechanisms under the extended treaty faced practical breakdowns, with on-site inspections—suspended since March 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic—failing to resume despite U.S. proposals for modified protocols to address health and parity concerns. Data exchanges on strategic forces persisted, with the final biannual exchange occurring on September 1, 2022, providing aggregate figures on deployed warheads and launchers. However, escalating tensions, including U.S. sanctions and reciprocal diplomat expulsions reducing onsite access, eroded mutual confidence, as Russia cited unequal conditions for inspections while the U.S. accused Moscow of obstructing verification. By early 2022, these failures underscored how bilateral nuclear dialogue had become subordinated to wider conflicts, precluding de-escalatory outcomes independent of resolved geopolitical frictions.^[92]^[93]^[94]

Russian Suspension (2023)

On February 21, 2023, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced Russia's suspension of participation in the New START Treaty during his address to the Federal Assembly.^[95] He framed the move as a retaliatory measure against perceived U.S. hostility, specifically citing American military aid to Ukraine and the AUKUS pact's implications for nuclear-powered submarines, which Russia viewed as eroding strategic parity.^[4] Putin asserted that the West's actions aimed to deliver a "strategic defeat" to Russia, making continued treaty implementation untenable, particularly verification activities like on-site inspections amid the Ukraine conflict.^[95] ^[96] Russia specified that the suspension would not constitute withdrawal, with Putin emphasizing adherence to the treaty's central limits on deployed strategic warheads, launchers, and bombers, but halting all data notifications, telemetric information exchanges, and facilitation of U.S. inspections effective February 28, 2023.^[95] ^[97] This built on Russia's prior refusal to permit inspections since August 2022, citing COVID-19 protocols and geopolitical tensions, effectively dismantling the treaty's transparency mechanisms as an escalation in the hybrid dimensions of the Ukraine war.^[4] The United States immediately rejected the suspension as legally invalid under treaty terms, which lack provisions for unilateral pause, and affirmed its intent to remain in compliance while calling for Russia's return to obligations.^[65] In response, on June 1, 2023, the U.S. enacted countermeasures, including ceasing notifications to Russia on modifications to strategic systems and withholding certain telemetric data, mirroring Russia's non-cooperation and rendering the accord functionally inert—or in a "zombie" state—until its scheduled expiration on February 5, 2026.^[65] ^[98] This mutual suspension heightened opacity in strategic force postures, diminishing verifiable confidence without altering numerical ceilings.^[4]

Recent Developments and Proposals (2024–2025)

In 2024, the New START Treaty remained in a state of suspended implementation following Russia's 2023 actions, with no on-site inspections conducted by either party, depriving the U.S. of direct verification of Russian strategic forces. The U.S. State Department reported ongoing Russian non-compliance, including refusals to permit data exchanges and notifications required under the treaty, which hindered mutual assessments of adherence to deployment limits. Russian deployments of Borei-A class ballistic missile submarines continued, with the commissioning of the fifth such vessel in July 2025 raising concerns about potential pressure on the 700 deployed launcher cap, though Russian officials maintained that overall forces stayed below central limits.^[26]^[99] By early 2025, with the treaty's February 5, 2026 expiration approaching, no formal negotiations for a follow-on agreement had resumed, amid mutual recriminations over compliance and broader geopolitical tensions. In September 2025, Russian President Vladimir Putin proposed a voluntary one-year extension of the treaty's central quantitative limits on deployed strategic warheads and launchers beyond the expiration date, conditional on reciprocal U.S. adherence without requiring full treaty revival or inspections. Putin described the offer as a stabilizing measure but later stated it would be "no big deal" if rejected by the U.S., signaling limited Russian concessions.^[100]^[101]^[102] The U.S. response under the Trump administration expressed skepticism toward the proposal's viability, citing persistent Russian violations such as denied access and opaque modernization efforts, which eroded trust in voluntary restraints. Discussions between Trump and Putin in August 2025 reportedly touched on strategic stability, with hints of potential renegotiation, but U.S. officials prioritized verifiable compliance over short-term extensions. The Arms Control Association warned that post-expiration unconstrained buildups could escalate risks, estimating that without limits, both sides might expand toward 2,000 or more deployed warheads, though Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov stressed that any progress required U.S. initiative to address perceived Western obstacles.^[38]^[5]^[103]

Assessments of Impact

Empirical Reductions Achieved

The New START Treaty established central limits of no more than 1,550 deployed strategic warheads, 700 deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments, and 800 deployed and non-deployed ICBM, SLBM, and heavy bomber launchers for each party.^[2]^[1] These provisions entered into force on February 5, 2011, requiring reductions from pre-existing force levels, with full compliance due by February 5, 2018.^[1] By the 2018 deadline, both the United States and Russia had verifiably met the warhead limit of 1,550 deployed strategic warheads, as confirmed through biannual data exchanges, notifications, and on-site inspections.^[104]^[2] This achievement marked an approximately 30% reduction in deployed strategic warheads from the 2,200 ceiling set by the 2002 Moscow Treaty.^[16] Cumulatively, New START contributed to overall strategic arsenal cuts exceeding 85% from Cold War peaks, when U.S. and Soviet deployed strategic warheads numbered over 10,000 each in the 1980s.^[105] The treaty's verification measures, including up to 18 on-site inspections per year per side and telemetric information sharing, provided empirical confirmation of declared data on warhead loadings and force structures, fostering transparency and mutual assurance of parity in deployed forces.^[1]^[2] These mechanisms enabled each party to monitor reductions directly, such as verifying the conversion or elimination of excess launchers, thereby stabilizing numerical equivalence and permitting resource reallocation—for instance, the U.S. redirected savings from retiring older systems toward conventional force enhancements and strategic modernization programs.^[1] Notwithstanding these tactical gains, the limits addressed reductions from already diminished post-Cold War baselines rather than total inventories, applying solely to actively deployed strategic systems while exempting non-deployed reserve stockpiles, which each side maintained at approximately 2,000–3,000 warheads.^[81]

Strategic Drawbacks and Deterrence Implications

The New START Treaty's limits on deployed strategic launchers (700) and warheads (1,550) constrained U.S. nuclear modernization by necessitating force structure adjustments that prolonged reliance on aging systems like the Minuteman III ICBM, even as the Sentinel replacement program faced delays due to integration with existing caps.^[106] ^[107] These restrictions reduced U.S. upload potential on reserve warheads, limiting flexibility to respond to proliferating threats without breaching verifiable limits.^[108] In contrast, Russia leveraged the treaty's definitions to accelerate deployment of non-countable systems, including hypersonic glide vehicles like Avangard mounted on SS-19 ICBMs and Kinzhal air-launched missiles, which evade limits on traditional strategic delivery vehicles.^[109] ^[110] Russia's suspension of New START implementation on February 21, 2023, ended on-site inspections and telemetric data sharing, eroding verification mechanisms and amplifying mistrust, as the treaty's transparency benefits proved insufficient to deter non-compliance amid ongoing geopolitical tensions. U.S. assessments post-suspension indicate Russia likely adhered to warhead caps through 2023 but halted notifications, raising unverified risks of exceeding launcher and warhead aggregates, with evidence of expanded deployments in systems like Sarmat ICBMs placing forces above numerical limits by October 2025. ^[111] This empirical breakdown demonstrated that violations' strategic costs—loss of mutual restraint and heightened opacity—outweighed gains from prior reductions, as Russia's actions prioritized asymmetric advantages over reciprocal limits. The treaty's bilateral focus implicitly signaled U.S. self-imposed restraint while non-participants like North Korea conducted multiple ICBM tests (e.g., Hwasong-17 in November 2022) and Iran advanced uranium enrichment to near-weapons-grade levels by 2024, fostering perceptions of uneven global deterrence dynamics.^[108] Such constraints diminished the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence commitments to allies, as reduced upload margins and verifiable parity with Russia complicated assurances against regional aggressors like China, whose nuclear arsenal expanded beyond 500 warheads by 2024 without similar limits.^[108] ^[112] Prioritizing disarmament over robust force posture thus risked causal weakening of deterrence stability, as adversaries exploited the resulting asymmetries in capability and resolve.

Legacy for Future Arms Control

The expiration of New START on February 5, 2026, underscores the limitations of bilateral nuclear arms control frameworks in an era of rising multipolar competition, as evidenced by China's unchecked expansion of its nuclear forces, with estimates projecting up to 1,500 warheads by 2035 absent any constraints on Beijing.^[113]^[85] This growth exposes the naivety inherent in U.S.-Russia-only treaties, which fail to account for third-party actors eroding strategic parity and incentivizing unchecked buildups elsewhere.^[84] Russia's 2023 suspension of treaty obligations, including on-site inspections, further illustrates that such agreements provide only tenuous pauses in escalation rather than robust barriers to aggression, particularly when one party perceives tactical advantages in non-compliance amid ongoing conflicts.^[4] Lessons from New START advocate for future regimes emphasizing rigorous, technology-resilient verification mechanisms—such as satellite-based monitoring over human inspections vulnerable to suspension—to enforce compliance in adversarial contexts, while expanding participation to include emerging nuclear powers like China for genuine risk reduction.^[114] Prioritizing U.S. qualitative superiority through unrestricted modernization, rather than numerical parity, aligns with deterrence imperatives, as empirical data from prior treaties show bilateral caps disproportionately constraining American innovation without reciprocal restraint from revisionist states.^[84] Unilateral U.S. reductions, often romanticized in arms control advocacy, carry higher risks of vulnerability than measured buildups calibrated to adversary threats, given asymmetries in intent—Russia's invasions and China's territorial coercions versus defensive U.S. postures.^[115] Looking ahead, the post-2026 absence of limits portends an unconstrained arms competition between the U.S. and Russia, potentially exacerbated by China's arsenal growth, unless Washington leverages advantages in emerging technologies like hypersonics and AI-driven systems to sustain credible deterrence without treaty dependencies.^[116]^[117] Narratives framing this as a symmetric "new Cold War" overlook aggressor-driven asymmetries, where Russian and Chinese expansions precede U.S. responses, rendering bilateral revival untenable without multilateral enforcement that privileges verifiable U.S. leads.^[118]^[84]

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Presidential Address to Federal Assembly - President of Russia
Feb 21, 2023 · Vladimir Putin delivered his Address to the Federal Assembly. The ceremony took place in Gostiny Dvor, Moscow. February 21, 2023. 13:50.Missing: English | Show results with:English
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Putin: Russia suspends participation in last remaining nuclear treaty ...
Feb 21, 2023 · President Vladimir Putin said on Tuesday that Russia was suspending its participation in the New START treaty with the United States that limits the two sides' ...
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Russia Suspends New START - Arms Control Association
Mar 1, 2023 · Russian President Vladimir Putin announced his decision last month to suspend the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START).
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US retaliates for Russia's suspension of New START treaty by ...
Jun 2, 2023 · The Biden administration is retaliating for Russia's suspension of the New START nuclear treaty, announcing Thursday it is revoking the visas of Russian ...
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The Russian Navy commissions the fifth of its new Borei-A class ...
Jul 25, 2025 · The Russian Navy commissions the fifth of its new Borei-A class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines into service ... 2024 and ...<|control11|><|separator|>
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Russia welcomes Trump's remark on Putin's offer to ... - Reuters
Oct 6, 2025 · Putin in September offered to voluntarily maintain for one year the limits on deployed strategic nuclear weapons set out in the New START Treaty ...
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Russia's Putin says 'no big deal' if US won't extend nuclear warhead ...
Oct 10, 2025 · Russia has said it is willing to voluntarily extend the warhead limits defined in the New START treaty, which expires in February, if the US is ...<|separator|>
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Putin says 'no big deal' for Russia if US declines to extend nuclear ...
Oct 10, 2025 · Russia has said it is willing to voluntarily extend the warhead limits defined in the New START treaty, which expires in February, if the United ...Missing: footing | Show results with:footing
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Beware Russia Bearing Arms Control Gifts - RUSI
Oct 3, 2025 · An agreement to limit deployed strategic nuclear forces accountable under the New START Treaty would bound something like 95% of US nuclear ...<|separator|>
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[PDF] The New START Agreement
Treaty Suspension. Russian President Vladimir Putin declared in late February 2023 that Russia was “suspending” its participation in New START. He framed the ...<|separator|>
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Why Nuclear Arms Control Matters Today
... reduced U.S. and Russian arsenals by 85 percent from Cold War peaks. The ... The most urgent task is renewal of the New START agreement before it expires on Feb.
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[PDF] Explaining the DOD and DOE Roles in the U.S. Nuclear Enterprise
2 Nuclear weapon modernization efforts were further constrained after the signing of the New Strategic Arms Reduction. Treaty (New START) in 2010 between the ...
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[PDF] GAO-25-108466, ICBM Modernization: Air Force Actions Needed to ...
Sep 10, 2025 · No. 11-205. Among other things, the New START limits Russia and the United. States to 700 deployed ICBMs, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, ...Missing: constraints | Show results with:constraints
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Keith B. Payne and Mark B. Schneider, Deterrence Requirements ...
Jun 5, 2025 · The approximately 2,200 total potential upload under New START is possible because of the Treaty's very lenient counting rules that apply to ...
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[PDF] Strategic Arms Control beyond New Start - Johns Hopkins APL
– A bomber can carry purely conventional weapons of any range without counting against New START limits if that bomber is not equipped to carry any nuclear ...
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New START does not address hypersonic missiles
Feb 24, 2023 · In this study, we will explore the New START (Strategic Arms Reduction) Treaty, its recent extension and the missing link of hypersonic missiles in the Treaty.Missing: convenient | Show results with:convenient
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Time To End New Start | | khq.com
Oct 10, 2025 · This places Russia above the New START limits. And there is mounting evidence of other Russian missile and warhead deployments that exceed ...
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Not a New START, But a Bad START - The Heritage Foundation
Sep 13, 2010 · Besides the peculiarity of allowing Russia to build up, the drawdown on our side could have an effect on our ability to fight conventional wars ...
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How big will China's nuclear arsenal get? - Defense One
Aug 6, 2025 · Open-source estimates say China has built about 100 warheads per year since 2023. At that rate, it would take Beijing 31 more years, or until ...
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[PDF] U.S. Options for Post-New START Arms Control with Russia - RAND
Russia's nearly 2,000 NSNWs pose a direct challenge for U.S. allies because nearly all the allies are within these weapons' range. NSNWs, for which Russia has ...
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Michaela Dodge, Next Steps in Arms Control? Lessons from ...
Mar 4, 2025 · The State Department's treatment of New START compliance issues illustrates why those who negotiate arms control agreements and those who are ...
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https://www.justsecurity.org/116786/the-future-of-arms-control-time-for-a-new-strategic-framework/
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The Future of Arms Control: Time for a New Strategic Framework
Jul 11, 2025 · With New START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) standing as the last surviving pillar of a Cold War-era arms control architecture, it is ...
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Kroenig quoted in the Wall Street Journal on New-START Treaty
Oct 14, 2025 · He argues against extending the New START arms control agreement in order to expand the US nuclear arsenal to compete with China. China, not ...