Fact-checked by Grok 2 weeks ago

Donbas

The Donbas, or Donbass (from ), constitutes an industrial heartland in , primarily spanning the and oblasts along the Donets River, where extensive deposits underpin a legacy of and that propelled Soviet-era production. The region's features some of the world's gassiest coal seams, with reserves exceeding 100 billion tonnes concentrated in the Donets Basin, enabling historical output peaks that accounted for roughly 30% of the USSR's coal in the mid-20th century before declining due to exhaustion and inefficiency. Economically, pre-2014, the Donbas contributed around 15% to Ukraine's GDP through , chemicals, and sectors, though chronic underinvestment and from unregulated extraction eroded its viability. Demographically, the area housed about 6.5 million residents before the 2014 conflict, with ethnic forming a slim (56-58%) alongside a substantial minority (38%), and serving as the primary amid a post-industrial fabric shaped by Soviet-era . This bilingual, Russified profile, coupled with economic stagnation and resentment toward Kyiv's centralization, fostered latent regionalism that erupted in 2014 following the Revolution, as initial seizures of administrative buildings were led by Russian operatives including Igor Girkin (Strelkov), a former FSB officer who had participated in operations in Crimea, alongside local elites and armed groups driven by fears of cultural marginalization and oligarchic overreach, proclaiming the and People's Republics. The ensuing war pitted Ukrainian forces against separatist militias backed by arms, advisors, and troops—disguised as "volunteers"—resulting in over 14,000 deaths, mass displacement, and a frozen frontline until Russia's 2022 escalation, which secured full control and prompted sham referendums for annexation, unrecognized beyond Moscow's allies.

Geography

Physical Features and Boundaries

The Donbas, also known as the Basin, constitutes a geological centered on the Donets Coal Basin, encompassing significant portions of Ukraine's Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts while extending marginally into Russia's . The basin covers an area of approximately 60,000 km², defined by its coal-bearing strata that form the core physical feature underlying the region. This extent historically aligns with broader delineations around 50,000 km² focused on the productive coal fields in . The terrain of the Donbas features predominantly flat to undulating steppe plains, part of the larger Pontic steppe, with elevations typically ranging from 100 to 300 meters above sea level and soils dominating the surface. River systems, notably the Seversky Donets—which originates in Russia's and flows southeast through the region for about 950 km within —provide the primary hydrological features, draining a basin of 98,900 km² overall and carving valleys that interrupt the otherwise level landscape. Tributaries such as the Luh, , and Kalmius further dissect the area, contributing to a network that has influenced local . Geologically, the region is marked by folded and faulted rocks, with seams varying from bituminous in the west to in the east, embedded in a synclinal structure up to 120 km wide. Boundaries include the River to the north, transitioning westward into the Lowland, southward toward the Lowland, and eastward along the Ukraine-Russia state border, where the absence of major topographic barriers—such as mountains or dense forests—has enabled seamless geographical continuity and cross-border connectivity.

Major Cities and Urban Centers

The urban landscape of Donbas features densely populated industrial cities planned under Soviet directives to house and support a proletarian near mines and mills, with residential high-rises and zones in close proximity to maximize efficiency in operations. These centers, concentrated in and oblasts, collectively supported a pre-2014 regional exceeding 6 million, fostering high and specialized infrastructural roles tied to resource and . Donetsk, the administrative hub of the region, had approximately 930,000 inhabitants before 2014 and served as the primary node for and distribution, anchored by large-scale plants and mining complexes integrated into the city's Soviet-era layout. Its transport infrastructure, including key rail junctions, formed part of Donbas's exceptionally dense railway network—the most extensive in —designed to haul bulk commodities eastward toward markets and ports. Luhansk, with a pre-2014 population of over 400,000, functioned as a machine-building center, particularly for locomotives and essential to the region's rail-dependent and industrial expansion. Urban development emphasized connectivity, with factories and worker accommodations zoned to facilitate rapid workforce mobilization for manufacturing tied to the broader Donbas and economy. Horlivka, population around 257,000 in 2013, exemplified mining-focused urbanization as a major production site, where high-rise residential blocks were constructed adjacent to shafts and processing facilities to sustain continuous extraction operations. This pattern of industrial zoning and rail-linked high-density housing underscored Donbas's role as a cohesive proletarian-industrial corridor, optimized for output over expansive suburban sprawl.

History

Origins and Early Development (Pre-20th Century)

The Donbas region, encompassing the River basin in , originated as part of the vast Pontic-Caspian known as the Wild Fields (Dikoye Pole), a frontier zone of sparsely inhabited by successive waves of Turkic and Iranian tribes such as the and later from the 13th to 16th centuries. This area served as a buffer between sedentary polities to the north and the to the south, characterized by seasonal raids and minimal permanent settlement due to its arid grasslands and lack of natural defenses. Settlement accelerated in the 16th century with the arrival of Cossack groups fleeing feudal obligations in Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth territories, establishing semi-autonomous military communities (stanitsas) for raiding and defense against Tatar incursions. Primarily of Ukrainian (Ruthenian) origin dominated the western Donbas, while , with stronger ties to Muscovite Russia, influenced the east, creating a cultural borderland that facilitated trade routes but also intermittent conflicts. By the 18th century, Russian imperial expansion incorporated the Wild Fields through fortified lines like the Southern Defensive Line (1760s), promoting agricultural colonization by state peasants and retired soldiers, which transformed marginal into arable land via serf labor and land grants. Early resource extraction laid proto-industrial foundations, with coal outcrops first systematically noted in the Donets Basin during geological surveys in the early 1720s near , initially exploited on a small scale to fuel salt refineries in and rudimentary forges. Saltpeter () production, vital for , emerged in the 17th–18th centuries around Bakhmut's saline deposits, drawing limited artisanal miners but yielding modest output due to primitive techniques and logistical isolation. These activities attracted an ethnic mix of farmers and herders, military settlers, and residual Tatar communities engaged in herding, though permanent populations remained under 100,000 by the late , constrained by raids and poor until early 19th-century rail connections.

Industrialization under Russian Empire and Soviet Union (Late 19th Century–1991)

The industrialization of the Donbas began in earnest during the late 19th century under the Russian Empire, fueled by the region's rich coal deposits and the expansion of rail infrastructure following the emancipation of serfs in 1861, which enabled labor mobility and foreign investment. Welsh engineer John Hughes established a major ironworks and collieries in 1870 near the present-day site of Donetsk, initially naming the settlement Yuzovka after himself, which introduced advanced deep-shaft mining techniques previously limited to shallow operations. This venture, supported by approximately 100 Welsh workers and families, marked the start of heavy industry in the area, with the steel plant producing rails for the empire's growing railway network and attracting further European capital for mine development. Under Soviet rule from the onward, the Donbas was nationalized and transformed into a cornerstone of the USSR's through the s, which prioritized and steel output to support rapid urbanization and military needs. The first plan (1928–1932) emphasized extraction in the Donets Basin, leading to a surge in mine construction despite inefficiencies and purges of local managers during the Great Terror, which disrupted operations but did not halt expansion. By the 1940s, the region supplied a significant portion of Soviet , though production was interrupted by Nazi from 1941 to 1943, during which retreating Soviet forces demolished industrial assets to deny them to the invaders, resulting in extensive damage estimated at billions in rubles equivalent. Postwar reconstruction, prioritized in the Fourth (1946–1950), restored and expanded facilities, with output rebounding to prewar levels by the early 1950s through centralized resource allocation. Coal production in the Donbas peaked during the at approximately 200 million metric tons annually, accounting for a substantial share of the SSR's total and underpinning steelworks like those in and that fed the Soviet economy's demands for armaments and . This era saw and deeper , but at the cost of worker , with frequent accidents due to outdated safety protocols and overexploitation of seams. The influx of laborers, predominantly Russian-speakers from other Soviet republics, swelled the urban population and shifted the linguistic composition toward Russian dominance in industrial centers, as usage declined amid Russified workplaces and education. Soviet policies emphasized output over , leading to including widespread from unchecked factory emissions, river contamination from mine tailings, and land subsidence from exhausted shallow deposits, which foreshadowed later economic vulnerabilities without adequate mitigation. Human costs included reliance on coerced labor during shortages, exacerbated by Stalin-era repressions that targeted miners and engineers, though direct deployments were more prevalent in remote Soviet basins than in the Donbas core. These factors, driven by central planning's disregard for local conditions, yielded short-term gains but sowed seeds of depletion by 1991.

Post-Independence Period (1991–2013)

Following Ukraine's in 1991, the Donbas region, long the industrial core of the Soviet economy, faced acute economic dislocation as state subsidies evaporated and market transitions faltered. surged above 1,000% annually in the early , crippling enterprises and resulting in widespread wage arrears for miners and steelworkers, with many companies delaying payments for months or substituting goods for salaries. production, which had peaked at over 200 million tons yearly under Soviet planning, plummeted as unprofitable mines closed en masse—more than 100 by the mid-—exacerbating in a region dependent on . Ukraine's overall GDP contracted by nearly 50% from 1990 to 1994, with Donbas suffering disproportionately due to its export-oriented and sectors' vulnerability to lost Soviet markets and global price shocks. Privatization efforts in the late and early , intended to restructure state assets, instead entrenched and concentrated control among a few oligarchs, particularly in Donbas. Assets like mills and energy firms were often auctioned at undervalued prices amid opaque processes, enabling figures such as to amass dominance over the region's economy; by the early , Akhmetov-controlled entities like oversaw roughly 80% of Ukraine's output, much rooted in Donbas facilities. This "oligarchic " prioritized short-term extraction over investment, yielding persistent inefficiencies and regional grievances over unequal wealth distribution, as local workers saw limited benefits from privatized profits. Linguistically, remained the dominant language of daily communication and media in Donbas throughout the period, reflecting the region's ethnic Russian plurality and Soviet-era , with surveys indicating over 70% of residents using Russian as their primary tongue by the 2000s. Politically, this aligned with pro-federalist leanings, as Donbas voters consistently backed candidates advocating greater regional and closer ties to ; in the 2010 presidential election, secured over 90% support in and oblasts, favoring policies like expanded local governance powers that contrasted with Kyiv's centralizing tendencies. Demographic strains intensified amid economic hardship, with net outmigration exceeding 500,000 from Donbas between 1991 and 2013, primarily young workers seeking opportunities elsewhere in or abroad, contributing to an aging population where the share of those over 60 rose above 20% by the late . Aging Soviet-era , including coal mines with outdated and support systems, saw neglected maintenance and recurrent safety lapses—such as explosions claiming dozens of lives annually—unaddressed due to funding shortages and prioritization of output over upgrades. These factors fostered simmering discontent over economic marginalization and unmet regional needs under unitary .

Demographics and Society

Ethnic and Linguistic Composition

The Donbas region, encompassing Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, exhibited a diverse ethnic composition as recorded in Ukraine's 2001 census, the most recent comprehensive nationwide enumeration. In Donetsk Oblast, ethnic Ukrainians constituted 56.9% of the population (approximately 2.74 million people), while ethnic Russians accounted for 38.2% (about 1.84 million). Greeks formed the next largest group at 1.6%, followed by smaller minorities including Belarusians (0.9%), Tatars (0.4%), and Armenians (0.3%). In Luhansk Oblast, ethnic Ukrainians comprised 58.0% (around 1.47 million), with ethnic Russians at 39.0% (991,800), Belarusians at 0.8%, and Tatars and Armenians each at 0.3%. These figures reflected a post-Soviet stabilization of demographics following earlier shifts. Linguistically, the region was predominantly Russian-speaking despite the ethnic Ukrainian majority. The 2001 census indicated that 74.9% of Donetsk Oblast residents reported as their native language, compared to 24.1% for . In , 68.8% declared as native, with 30.0% citing . This disparity was particularly pronounced in urban areas, where Russian speakers formed overwhelming pluralities or majorities, driven by historical industrialization patterns. The ethnic Russian presence expanded significantly during the Soviet era through targeted industrialization and labor migrations. In 1926, ethnic Ukrainians made up about 60% of the Donbas population, with only 639,000 ethnic Russians; by 1959, the Russian share had risen substantially due to influxes of workers from Russian Soviet republics to fuel and , a process often described as contributing to via demographic engineering. Post-1991 independence, the population remained relatively stable at around 6.5 million until the 2014 conflict triggered massive displacements, with approximately 2 million residents fleeing as refugees by 2022, reducing the combined oblast populations to under 4 million under Ukrainian control. Surveys prior to the highlighted fluid and regionally oriented identities, with many residents prioritizing Donbas-specific loyalty over rigid ethnic binaries. A poll in the region showed limited support for outright separation, with respondents more inclined toward enhanced regional autonomy within , underscoring mixed self-identifications that blended citizenship, use, and local Donbas affiliation rather than exclusive allegiance to national ethnic categories.

Religious Landscape

The religious landscape of Donbas is dominated by Eastern Orthodox Christianity, reflecting the broader patterns in eastern Ukraine, where adherence is divided between the (OCU), granted in 2019, and the of the Moscow Patriarchate (UOC-MP), which maintains historical ties to despite declaring independence in 2022. Pre-2014 surveys indicated that a majority of Orthodox believers in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts affiliated with the UOC-MP, influenced by the region's Russophone population and Soviet-era ecclesiastical structures. The Soviet Union's militant atheism, enforced through decades of church closures, clergy persecution, and state propaganda from the onward, suppressed religious practice across the industrial Donbas, fostering a legacy of particularly strong among the working-class mining communities. Post-1991 saw a revival of , with Protestant denominations—such as and Pentecostals—experiencing growth through missionary activities in the deindustrializing region, though they remain a minority compared to adherents. This expansion built on underground networks that survived Soviet repression, providing social services and community support in areas of economic hardship. , once prominent due to the Pale of Settlement and industrial-era Jewish settlements, has sharply declined; approximately 30,000 resided in Donbas before the 2014 conflict, diminished further by post-Soviet emigration waves to and elsewhere, driven by economic instability and antisemitic undercurrents. A small Muslim community persists, larger than in most Ukrainian regions outside , tied to Tatar and other ethnic groups. Amid the secular mining culture—characterized by shift work, labor unions, and materialist worldviews inherited from Soviet industrialization—religion serves as a source of community cohesion, with Orthodox parishes and emerging Protestant groups offering moral frameworks and mutual aid networks that counterbalance the atomizing effects of industrial decline. However, residual atheism remains evident, with surveys showing lower regular church attendance in Donbas than in western Ukraine, attributable to the entrenched rationalism of technical professions and historical state indoctrination.

Social Structure and Migration Patterns

The social structure of the Donbas region has long been dominated by a proletarian , forged through its role as a hub of including and . Miners and industrial laborers constituted the core demographic, with trade unions exerting significant influence on local politics and , particularly evident in militant strikes during the late Soviet era and early that challenged economic policies and demanded better wages and conditions. This class composition fostered a centered on labor , though it also entrenched hierarchical dynamics between skilled tradespeople and management in state-dominated enterprises. Gender imbalances persisted due to the male-intensive nature of extractive industries; in , men overwhelmingly filled roles involving physical labor and hazardous conditions, leading to a higher proportion of male workers in centers and contributing to skewed local sex ratios. structures typically reflected working-class patterns, with households common amid high-density housing, though multi-generational arrangements occurred in response to economic pressures and limited ownership under Soviet legacies. Prior to 2014, patterns were driven by job opportunities in , drawing workers from rural and other Soviet republics to Donbas cities for in expanding mines and factories during the mid-20th century boom. The 2014 conflict radically altered these flows, prompting large-scale displacement: over 1.5 million residents from and oblasts became internally displaced persons within , while substantial numbers—estimated at around 1.4 million from occupied areas—migrated to and acquired there between 2014 and 2021. By 2025, the region's population had approximately halved from pre-2014 levels of roughly 6.5 million, reflecting sustained outflows to government-controlled , , and amid insecurity and economic disruption. Education in Donbas emphasized technical and vocational training tailored to industrial demands, with high enrollment in programs for , , and related fields, producing a skilled but limiting broader academic pathways. Social mobility remained constrained by chronic economic stagnation, dependency on declining heavy sectors, and regional isolation, hindering transitions to professional or entrepreneurial roles despite individual qualifications.

Economy

Core Industries and Resource Base

The Donbas region's economy is anchored in and , which have historically formed its resource base. Coal reserves in the Donets Basin, the core of Donbas, are estimated at approximately 34 billion metric tons, predominantly and bituminous types suitable for . These reserves underpin the extraction of high-quality coking coal essential for steel production, with mining operations concentrated in deep seams averaging 300 to 1,200 meters. Coal production evolved from manual methods in the late to extensive during the Soviet period, enabling output to surge from 27 million tons in 1940 to peaks exceeding 200 million tons annually by the through powered supports, , and automated face equipment. However, geological challenges including thin seams, high gas content, and faulted strata led to persistent inefficiencies, with labor productivity stagnating despite technological inputs due to aging and suboptimal systems. Post-Soviet efforts focused on selective modernization, such as for thin seams under 1 meter, but overall reliance on deep-shaft techniques limited scalability. Metallurgy complements coal through integrated plants like Azovstal in Mariupol and the Donetsk Metallurgical Plant, which utilize local coking coal to produce pig iron and steel via blast furnaces and open-hearth processes. These facilities scaled capacity under Soviet five-year plans, achieving steel outputs that intertwined Donbas production with broader Soviet supply chains, including exports of metallurgical coke to Russian markets for mutual industrial fueling. Prior to 2014, the Donbas heavy industries contributed roughly 15% to Ukraine's GDP, driven by coal-metallurgy symbiosis that accounted for over 90% of regional output value.

Economic Challenges and Decline

Following the in 1991, the Donbas region's production plummeted by more than 50% due to sharp declines in demand, outdated , and insufficient in modernization. State-owned mines, reliant on subsidies to cover chronic losses, suffered from systemic mismanagement, with subsidies often diverted through corrupt practices in procurement and operations. By 2013, this had resulted in persistent unprofitability across the and sectors, exacerbating and regional economic stagnation without effective restructuring. Coal mining safety remained critically deficient, characterized by frequent methane explosions attributable to inadequate ventilation and monitoring systems. In March 2000, a gas blast at the Severnaya mine in killed at least 80 miners, one of multiple incidents that year contributing to hundreds of annual fatalities across Ukraine's mines. The Zasyadko mine in experienced deadly explosions in 2002 (20 deaths) and November 2007 (101 deaths), highlighting rates as high as five fatalities per million tonnes of extracted, far exceeding global standards. Environmental degradation intensified from unchecked industrial emissions and waste, with contaminating rivers and through leaching from exposed seams. Coke chemical plants, integral to the steel industry, released pollutants including and , correlating with elevated respiratory illnesses and cancer rates in local populations. Abandoned and unmaintained mines further risked flooding, amplifying releases and while perpetuating soil and toxicity independent of operational output.

Strategic Economic Value

The Donbas region holds substantial reserves of hard , accounting for over 56 percent of Ukraine's total, alongside significant deposits of and potential rare earth elements, positioning it as a critical node in global energy and critical minerals supply chains. The Shevchenkivske lithium field in , with unconfirmed reserves exceeding 500,000 tons, represents one of Europe's largest untapped deposits, vital for production in electric vehicles and technologies. Pre-2014 conflict, the region's and industries contributed approximately 25 percent of Ukraine's industrial output and around 30 percent of national exports, generating revenues estimated at $28 billion annually from and activities. Russia's territorial gains in Donbas since 2014, intensified after the 2022 invasion, have enabled the redirection of coal extraction toward markets, with vessels exporting over 40,000 tons of coking coal from occupied in 2024-2025 alone. This control disrupts 's , as Donbas anthracite was a primary domestic source, and allows to secure low-cost inputs for its metallurgical sector while denying access to integrated supply chains historically linked to . authorities estimate losses equivalent to 20-30 percent of due to severed Donbas operations, exacerbating vulnerabilities in steel production and . The region's economic interdependence with , rooted in Soviet-era pipelines, rail networks, and market orientations, imposes high separation costs, as reconfiguration demands substantial in alternative and technologies. Russian state entities have exploited this asymmetry, purchasing Donbas at discounted rates post-blockade, yielding rents that bolster Moscow's leverage in . Consequently, Donbas's resource base fuels Russian irredentist rationales by promising enhanced self-sufficiency in for and power generation, amid Western sanctions on Russian exports.

Culture and Identity

Cultural Heritage and Influences

The cultural heritage of Donbas is predominantly shaped by its rapid industrialization from the late onward, which fused proletarian labor themes with Soviet-era artistic expressions emphasizing heroism and industrial might. Soviet and frequently depicted the region's mines as symbols of transformative worker power, with local unions of proletarian writers in the – producing works that aligned with broader Soviet narratives of class struggle and productivity, portraying Donbas as the "furnace" of socialist progress. These motifs echoed Maxim Gorky's advocacy for rooted in the lived experiences of laborers, influencing regional stories of miners' endurance against harsh subterranean conditions. Folk artistic traditions reflect this industrial-multicultural milieu through song and dance ensembles, such as the Donbass State Academic Song and Dance Ensemble founded in 1937, which performed choreographed pieces evoking mining rhythms and communal life. Vocal works like Vladimir Vysotsky's 1967 "Incident at the Mine Shaft," narrated from an ex-convict miner's viewpoint, encapsulated the cynicism and resilience of Donbas underground labor, drawing on patterns adapted to factory and pit hazards. Similarly, satirical songs such as "They Say that Here in the Donbass" highlighted living conditions in mining settlements, serving as informal critiques within permitted cultural bounds. Soviet monumental architecture and , including statues to WWII liberators and industrial pioneers like those in Donetsk's parks, functioned as markers of collective achievement, often blending neoclassical forms with depictions of miners and steelworkers. These sites preserved a visual legacy of the region's role in Soviet , even as post-Soviet prompted artistic explorations of ruination, as seen in projects juxtaposing archival posters with contemporary derelict factories. After Ukraine's independence in 1991, cultural media in Donbas revived expressions incorporating , a mixing grammatical structures with , prevalent due to historical migrations of Russian-speaking workers into Ukrainian-speaking locales. This linguistic hybrid informed local theater, , and broadcasts, authentically capturing the speech of mining communities and countering standardized norms from , though it faced criticism as non-standard amid national language policies.

Regional Identity and Symbols

The inhabitants of the Donbas region have fostered a distinct self-perception as "Donbashtsy," marked by a sense of resilience shaped by the demands of and , coupled with widespread bilingualism in and languages. This identity highlights a pragmatic, working-class ethos distinct from the more rural, nationalistic orientations prevalent in , where Ukrainian-language usage and anti-Russian sentiments are stronger. Surveys conducted prior to 2014, such as those by the International Institute of Sociology, revealed lower attachment to a unitary in the Donbas compared to other regions, with many residents favoring to accommodate local linguistic and cultural practices. Polls from the early , including data analyzed in academic studies, showed that while outright garnered minimal support—typically under 10% in and oblasts—a significant portion of the preferred or autonomous arrangements over centralized from . This regional divergence manifested in electoral patterns, with eastern voters consistently backing parties advocating special status for the Donbas, contrasting with western preferences for unitary nationalism and . Such preferences stemmed from historical Soviet-era industrialization that reinforced Russian-language dominance and economic self-reliance, fostering alienation from policies perceived as imposed by distant, culturally dissimilar elites. In the context of 2014 autonomy movements, regional symbols proliferated, including flags for and that incorporated black stripes symbolizing coal deposits alongside red for historical Cossack and labor heritage, evoking aspirations for . These emblems, often paired with the St. George ribbon as a marker of Soviet victory narratives, underscored a hybrid identity blending local pride with ties to cultural spheres. Analysts contend that Kyiv's subsequent emphasis on a monolithic national narrative, sidelining documented pro-Russian affinities and regional leanings evident in pre-2014 polling, exacerbated perceptual divides rather than bridging them through accommodation.

The Donbas Conflict

Prelude and Outbreak (2014)

Following the Revolution, which culminated in the ouster of President on February 22, 2014, protests intensified in the predominantly Russian-speaking Donbas region, encompassing and oblasts. Large rallies in and voiced opposition to the interim government in , viewing it as the product of an unconstitutional coup rather than a legitimate revolution. Key grievances included fears of cultural marginalization, exacerbated by the Verkhovna Rada's February 23 repeal of the 2012 law on regional languages, which had granted official status to in areas where it predominated, and concerns over rising influence from Ukrainian nationalist groups associated with the uprising. Economic factors, such as Donbas's industrial dependence on Russian markets and perceptions of 's pro-Western pivot as a threat to regional jobs, further fueled discontent among ethnic Russians and Russian-speakers, who comprised over 70% of the population per 2001 census data. Pro-Russian rallies on March 1, 2014, demanded greater autonomy for Donbas and closer ties with . By March 6, protesters occupied the Regional State Administration (RSA) building, raising Russian flags and barricading entrances, with parallel seizures of administrative offices in . Pro-Russian activist declared himself "people's governor" of on March 7 and called for a on federalization to protect . Ukrainian security forces, including the , cleared the RSA occupation by March 6-7, arresting Gubarev and others, but protests continued amid reports of clashes injuring dozens. These early actions reflected local demands for reflecting the region's Russophone demographics and to centralized shifts perceived as discriminatory, though observers noted varying turnout and the of organized agitators in escalating occupations. On April 6-7, armed groups reoccupied the Donetsk RSA, proclaiming the (DPR) and citing concerns over cultural and linguistic policies. A similar declaration followed in on April 7, announcing the (LPR) under leader , citing concerns over cultural and linguistic policies. Pre-referendum surveys in March-April 2014, including those by Ukrainian and international pollsters, revealed significant but contested support for : approximately 60-70% favored federalization or expanded regional powers within , while outright polled at 20-30%, with higher figures in rural areas; these results, drawn from samples of over 1,000 respondents, underscored demands for amid grievances but fell short of the near-unanimous autonomy endorsements claimed in later separatist polling. The government responded on April 13, 2014, when the National Security and Defense Council authorized an anti-terrorist operation (ATO) to reclaim seized buildings and neutralize armed militants, which acting President announced on April 14 via decree as a counter to terrorism threatening national sovereignty. This prompted separatist mobilization as Ukrainian forces moved into Donbas, initiating armed clashes near and in mid-April.

Separatist Declarations and Referendums

On April 7, 2014, the self-proclaimed (DPR) declared independence from following protests against the post-Euromaidan government in . The (LPR) followed suit on April 27, 2014, stating similar reasons related to central authority and cultural policies. These declarations followed armed occupations of administrative buildings by pro-Russian militants, with escalating tensions after Ukrainian "anti-terrorist operations" began in mid-April. Separatist authorities in both regions announced referendums on "state " for May 11, 2014, organized by commissions under DPR and LPR control without oversight from law or monitors. Ballots posed a single on supporting sovereignty acts for the respective "people's republics," held in uncontrolled conditions without Ukrainian legal procedures or international observation, with reports of irregularities including armed guards at stations, multiple , and no voter registers. Official results claimed 89.07% approval in with 75% turnout and 96.2% in with 81% turnout, though independent verification was impossible due to chaos and lack of transparency. Pre-2014 surveys indicated limited support for separation, with polls showing 20-30% preference for closer ties or autonomy with in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, rising sharply after events and perceived crackdowns on Russian speakers. A Kyiv International Institute of Sociology poll in April 2014 found about one-third favoring in the regions, though only one-fifth explicitly for joining , indicating regional preferences for greater autonomy amid federalization debates. The Ukrainian government rejected the referendums as unconstitutional and conducted under coercive conditions during active conflict, publicly criticizing the process. Russia did not formally recognize the referendums but called for dialogue, while providing de facto humanitarian and military aid to separatists. Western governments and the EU stated the votes violated Ukraine's sovereignty, with no international body recognizing the outcomes; the OSCE declined observation due to security risks and procedural concerns. Separatist leaders asserted the results reflected local support for greater autonomy, which Ukraine disputed as externally orchestrated.

Minsk Agreements and Stalemate (2014–2021)

The Minsk Protocol of 5 September 2014 created a ceasefire and political roadmap for eastern Ukraine, signed by representatives of Ukraine, Russia, the OSCE, and Donbas separatists. It included provisions for an immediate bilateral ceasefire, OSCE monitoring, withdrawal of illegal armed formations, decentralization of power with special status for certain Donetsk and Luhansk areas, and amnesty for conflict participants. A supplementary memorandum on 19 September specified parameters for heavy weapons withdrawal and buffer zones. Ceasefire breaches occurred within weeks, including separatist assaults on Donetsk Airport that persisted into October. Renewed fighting around led to Minsk II, a 13-point package agreed on 12 February 2015 by the leaders (, , , ) and Trilateral Contact Group. Key provisions included an immediate comprehensive from 15 February; withdrawal of heavy by both sides to create a 50-140 km ; OSCE verification with and monitoring; exchanges; constitutional reforms granting special status to Donbas; restoration of Ukrainian after local elections; and holding elections under Ukrainian law with separatist input on modalities. Disagreements centered on the sequencing of security and political obligations. Implementation faltered amid mutual non-compliance, resulting in a low-intensity stalemate by 2021 due to incomplete implementation on all sides. Ukraine enacted partial decentralization laws in 2015 but resisted special status without prior security guarantees, citing ongoing separatist armament and Russian influence. Separatists and Russia countered that political reforms must precede border measures, blocking elections and amnesty while maintaining de facto control. No comprehensive heavy weapons withdrawal occurred, with OSCE reports indicating recurrent deployments violating pullback lines. The OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM), active from 2014 to 2022 and expanded post-Minsk, documented ceasefire compliance along the line of contact, recording annual tallies in the tens of thousands of violations, often involving small-arms fire and near the . Monitoring was limited by repeated denials of by , restrictions in separatist areas, electronic jamming of UAVs, and unarmed status preventing . In March 2017, a nationalist-led blockade of rail lines to separatist territories preceded 's formal trade embargo, disrupting cross-line industry and idling factories reliant on supplies and markets. Analysts estimated GDP losses for at 1-2%, with heightened separatist dependence on aid reinforcing separation between the parties. From 2014 to 2021, roughly 14,000 people were killed, including over 3,400 civilians, as fighting shifted from major battles in 2014-2015 to sporadic without territorial shifts. Diplomatic formats like and Trilateral talks produced localized disengagements, such as in Stanytsia Luhanska (2019-2020), but lacked enforcement mechanisms for durable implementation, sustaining the stalemate.

Escalation with Full-Scale Invasion (2022–Present)

Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022, with Russian authorities stating objectives including the protection of the Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republics in the Donbas, demilitarization, and denazification. After initial advances toward Kyiv and Kharkiv faced resistance, Russian forces redirected primary efforts to the Donbas to seize remaining Ukrainian-controlled areas in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. This escalation shifted the conflict from low intensity since 2014 to widespread fighting involving artillery, mechanized assaults, and urban sieges that resulted in widespread infrastructure damage and, according to international estimates, tens of thousands of military casualties in the first year. From March to May 2022, Russian and allied forces besieged Mariupol, a key Donbas port city, encircling Ukrainian defenders and capturing the city after the surrender of the Azov Regiment at the Azovstal steel plant. This established a land corridor linking Crimea to the Donbas but diverted resources from other fronts. In June and July, Russian forces captured Severodonetsk and Lysychansk, securing control of all of Luhansk Oblast for the first time since 2014. These advances stalled amid Ukrainian counterattacks and logistical challenges, leading to attritional combat. The Battle of Bakhmut intensified from August 2022 through 2023, with Wagner Group forces leading assaults involving human-wave attacks and extensive artillery use, resulting in prolonged urban fighting. Wagner forces declared Bakhmut captured on 20 May 2023, though clearing operations continued, depleting Russian units and contributing to internal discord, including the group's mutiny. Ukraine's 2023 counteroffensive, launched in June, achieved limited gains near Robotyne outside Donbas but did not relieve pressure on the eastern front amid entrenched Russian defenses. In 2024, Russian forces captured on 17 February amid reported Ukrainian ammunition shortages, followed by incremental advances threatening the logistical hub of . conducted a limited incursion into Russia's on 6 August 2024, which Ukrainian officials described as an effort to draw Russian reserves, initially seizing areas estimated at several hundred to 1,000 square kilometers according to Ukrainian sources, but Russian counteroffensives, supplemented by North Korean units according to Western intelligence, forced Ukrainian withdrawals by early 2025. As of October 2025, Russian forces continued incremental advances in , consolidating control over an estimated two-thirds of the Donbas, amid Western estimates of over 950,000 total Russian casualties and approximately 400,000 military killed or wounded since 2022.

Russian-Speaking Population Grievances and Self-Determination Claims

The Donbas region, encompassing and oblasts, has a predominantly Russian-speaking population. By the 2001 census, over 70% of residents in these areas reported as their native . was commonly used in daily communication, , and alongside , despite its formal status as the state language. Historical data indicate the ethnic share increased from about 25% in 1926 to 29% by 1959, with many ethnic adopting as their primary amid and cultural shifts. Grievances intensified after the 2014 Maidan Revolution when interim authorities revoked the 2012 Law on Principles of State Language Policy on February 23, 2014. That law had granted regional co-official status in Russian-majority areas, including Donbas. The revocation sparked local protests citing concerns about cultural autonomy. The 2019 Law "On Ensuring the Functioning of the as the State Language," adopted April 25 and effective from July 16, expanded requirements for in , , and , including proficiency tests for civil servants. Critics among Russian speakers viewed these provisions as disadvantaging the region's bilingual practices. Local surveys and separatist narratives framed the policies as cultural suppression, consistent with pre-2014 polling data showing 30% of Donbas residents favoring federal to safeguard within , as opposed to the centralized unitary model. OSCE monitoring reported over 3,400 civilian deaths from cross-line shelling between 2014 and 2021. These developments contributed to security concerns among some in the Russian-speaking community. Self-determination claims were expressed in the May 2014 referendums organized by the self-proclaimed and People's Republics. The organizers reported turnouts of 75-89% and 89-96% votes for . Western analyses often highlight fraud allegations and Russian involvement. Organizers framed these outcomes as reflecting some local support for greater regional authority. Pre-2014 polls indicated up to 58% support in the region for enhanced regional powers or to address linguistic and economic disparities, rather than outright . These preferences were often discussed in relation to the region's historical ties to Russian language and culture. Local critics interpreted post-Maidan shifts in governance and significant changes to language policy as disadvantaging Russophone regions. Some empirical polling indicated dissatisfaction with Kyiv's unitary approach even among residents preferring to remain .

Ukrainian Government Policies and Counter-Narratives

Following the 2014 outbreak of conflict, the Ukrainian government enacted laws, passed on April 9, 2015, and signed by President on May 15, 2015, mandating the removal of Soviet-era monuments, renaming of over 500 cities and villages (including in and oblasts), and bans on communist symbols and propaganda. These measures aimed to align with standards by eradicating totalitarian legacies. In Donbas, where Soviet nostalgia and Russian cultural ties were prevalent, critics argued that they diminished regional heritage; this implementation occurred amid ongoing hostilities. In 2019, Ukraine passed the Law on Ensuring the Functioning of the as the State Language, effective July 16, 2019, requiring Ukrainian in , , , and services, with phased implementation for minority languages like . This policy sought to strengthen national unity and counter influence post-Crimea annexation. It raised concerns among Russian-speaking populations in eastern regions, including government-controlled parts of Donbas, where had dominated daily and professional communication; stated that 2022 amendments could impose potential restrictions on minority language use in private sectors. Economically, a of separatist-held Donbas territories began informally in January 2017 with veterans blocking lines to seized enterprises, which the formalized on , 2017, via a and Defense Council decree halting trade and transport with non-government-controlled areas until businesses were returned. framed this as a security measure against separatist asset , which had disrupted Ukraine's and exports, but it significantly reduced economic ties to the region's industries, leading to factory shutdowns and job losses estimated in tens of thousands on both sides of the . The Ukrainian government states that the Donbas conflict constitutes Russian-orchestrated , with separatist entities serving as proxies for Moscow's geopolitical aims, rather than organic . This position is supported by documented Russian military involvement, such as in the January-February 2015 , where Ukrainian forces reported encounters with regular Russian troops and equipment beyond separatist capabilities, supported by intercepted communications and post-battle evidence of Russian units. Under the (signed September 2014 and February 2015), the Ukrainian government implemented ceasefires and heavy weapons withdrawals where feasible and passed limited laws in 2015 without Donbas-specific provisions, while resisting the granting of "special status" autonomy to separatist-controlled areas absent prior withdrawal of Russian troops and proxies; the government argued that such concessions would legitimize foreign aggression and undermine sovereignty, and this sequencing issue, combined with separatist non-compliance on elections and prisoner exchanges, contributed to stalled progress. These policies were presented as measures to maintain and were followed by the recapture of about half of contested areas by 2021 through and diplomatic means.

Humanitarian Consequences and War Crimes Allegations

From 2014 to 2021, UN and independent monitoring estimated approximately 3,400 civilian deaths and over 7,000 civilian injuries in Donbas. Monitoring reports attribute many incidents to shelling and mines used by both Ukrainian government forces and Russian-backed separatists. The UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) documented around 14,000 total deaths, including military personnel, over this period, of which around 3,400 were civilians (per OHCHR), approximately 4,400 Ukrainian military personnel, and about 6,500 Russian-backed separatist fighters, based on aggregated estimates from government reports and monitoring groups. OHCHR and OSCE monitoring prior to 2022 noted violations by all parties, including arbitrary detentions and shelling of civilian objects, underscoring mutual accountability amid biased reporting from state-affiliated sources on both sides. Following Russia's full-scale invasion in February 2022, civilian casualties in Donbas increased, with OHCHR reporting tens of thousands more deaths and injuries in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts from intensified artillery, airstrikes, and urban combat, though precise regional breakdowns remain challenging due to access restrictions. The conflict displaced over 1.5 million people internally from Donbas by 2016, primarily to other parts of Ukraine. Many remained in protracted displacement amid ongoing hostilities and disrupted local economies in affected areas. By 2022, this figure had contributed to Ukraine's total of around 1.8 million registered internally displaced persons (IDPs) from the east. These IDPs faced vulnerabilities including limited access to housing, healthcare, and employment. Infrastructure devastation has compounded humanitarian crises, with widespread destruction of residential areas, hospitals, and utilities in cities like Donetsk and Mariupol, leaving millions without reliable electricity, water, or sanitation. Many abandoned coal mines in the region have flooded unchecked since 2014. This has released toxic heavy metals and radioactive contaminants into groundwater and rivers. Such releases pose potential long-term environmental and health risks, including soil erosion and respiratory diseases. Allegations of war crimes, and violations of human rights and international humanitarian law have targeted both sides, although the United Nations International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine stated that "Russian armed forces are responsible for the vast majority of the violations identified, including war crimes." The International Criminal Court (ICC) has investigated allegations of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide in Donbas since 2013, including unlawful killings, torture, and forced transfers. On 17 March 2023, the ICC issued arrest warrants for Russian President Vladimir Putin and Maria Lvova-Belova for the war crime of unlawful deportation and forcible transfer of Ukrainian children (a crime against humanity) from occupied areas, including Donbas regions. Ukraine has documented approximately 20,000 children forcibly transferred from occupied areas including Donbas to Russia, where reports indicate reeducation and militarization in over 200 facilities identified by Yale Humanitarian Research Lab; only a small fraction have been repatriated, consistent with ICC investigations of these acts as war crimes. Reports describe Russian forces using filtration camps (a term originating from Soviet and Russian usage since World War II, widely adopted in media, NGO, academic, and observer reports but qualified as "so-called" by UN humanitarian agencies, which describe them as centers for arbitrary detention, torture, and enforced disappearances), involving interrogations, forced deportations, and documented mistreatment as noted by UN experts and human rights groups. These affected hundreds of thousands in occupied Donbas territories. Ukrainian forces faced evidence-based claims of using cluster munitions in populated areas during 2014 offensives, causing indiscriminate civilian harm prohibited under international humanitarian law, while Russian forces have extensively used them, including killing hundreds of civilians, with hundreds of attacks recorded in only the first months of the full-scale invasion.

References

  1. [1]
    Donbass' Roots of Violent Division: Geography, History, Culture
    Apr 20, 2014 · The word Donetsk refers to the Donetsk coal basin, which stretches roughly from the Dnipropetrovsk region in Ukraine to the Rostov region in ...
  2. [2]
    Basin evolution and coal geology of the Donets Basin (Ukraine ...
    Jan 1, 2012 · Coal mines in the Donets Basin are among the gassiest in the world. The average methane content of coal is 14.7 m³/t, but numerous seams have ...
  3. [3]
    Ukraine | powering transition in Europe - Euracoal
    Ukraine has considerable reserves of coal and lignite, estimated at 32.0 billion tonnes in the Donetsk coal basin (by far the most significant).Missing: Donets | Show results with:Donets
  4. [4]
    https://kyivindependent.com/why-does-russia-want-donbas-6-things-to-know-about-region-ukraine-is-being-pressured-to-give-up/
  5. [5]
    [PDF] First All-National Population Census: historical, methodological ...
    In the period between the first and last post-war census an urban population increased in all regions of Ukraine: In Donbas – by 13-. 19 percent ...
  6. [6]
    [PDF] Domestic Sources of the Donbas Insurgency - PONARS Eurasia
    The armed conflict in Donbas resulted from a complex interplay of structural and agency-based variables.Missing: empirical | Show results with:empirical
  7. [7]
    https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2014/11/21/russias-igor-strelkov-i-am-responsible-for-war-in-eastern-ukraine-a41598
  8. [8]
    [PDF] Why the Donbas War Was Never “Civil”
    Apr 12, 2024 · Commentators across the globe continue to publicly conceptualize and label the 2014–2022 confrontation in Donbas as a “civil war”. The “ ...
  9. [9]
    The Donets Basin (Ukraine/Russia): coalification and thermal history
    The basin lies mainly in the Ukraine with the eastern part of the coal field extending into Russia. The basin fill contains Devonian pre- and syn-rift rocks and ...
  10. [10]
    Donbas Region, Ukraine - World Atlas
    Mar 8, 2022 · The Population Of Donbas. As of the 2001 census, about 58% of the population of Luhansk Oblast and 56.9% of the population of Donetsk Oblast ...
  11. [11]
    Ukraine Geography - CountryReports
    Ukraine is mainly a vast plain with no natural boundaries except the Carpathian Mountains in the southwest, the Black Sea in the south, and the Azov Sea in the ...
  12. [12]
    Petroleum geology and resources of the Dnieper-Donets Basin ...
    A small southeastern part of the basin is in Russia. The basin is bounded by the Voronezh high of the Russian craton to the northeast and by the Ukrainian ...
  13. [13]
    THE CENTRAL DONETS BASIN [DONBAS], ITS MAJOR CITIES ...
    ... Russia border in the east into Russia's Rostovskaya Oblast' (see Figure 1). The Russian or eastern Donbas consists of four districts (raiony) of Rostov ...
  14. [14]
    https://www.researchgate.net/figure/THE-CENTRAL-DONETS-BASIN-DONBAS-ITS-MAJOR-CITIES-AND-LOCAL-AUTHORITIES-Notes-In_fig1_339013569
  15. [15]
    Donbas | Map, Region, Ukraine, & War - Britannica
    The Donbas is a large mining and industrial region of southeastern Europe, notable for its sizable coal reserves. The industrial area of the Donbas includes ...
  16. [16]
    Donetsk | Facts, Region, & Occupation - Britannica
    Oct 16, 2025 · With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Donbas became a major industrial engine of the economy of independent Ukraine. The region ...
  17. [17]
    [PDF] The Iron Leviathan - International Centre for Defence and Security
    Dec 1, 2024 · since the 1800s, while the Donbas has by far the densest railway network in Ukraine due to its large heavy industry output (see Figures 2a and ...
  18. [18]
    Luhansk - Ukraine
    Feb 24, 2023 · It was one of the largest cities in the east of Ukraine, with a population of over 400,000 people. On March 9, 2014, a Shevchenko-fest was held ...Missing: pre- | Show results with:pre-
  19. [19]
    Luhansk | Ukraine, Map, & Population - Britannica
    There also have been food and timberworking industries. Luhansk has teacher-training, medical, agricultural, and machine-building institutes. Pop. (2001) ...
  20. [20]
    Gorlovka - Megaconstrucciones.net English Version
    In 2001, the city's population was 292,000, which declined to 256,714 by 2013. Economic activity is predominantly coal mining and the chemical industry. The ...
  21. [21]
    East Ukraine's European roots and the myths of Putin's Russian World
    Jul 13, 2020 · For centuries, the Donbas region in eastern Ukraine was part of the “Wild Fields”, a vast swathe of sparsely populated borderlands stretching ...
  22. [22]
    Ukraine's Donbas, Where Putin Sowed the Seeds of War
    Sep 17, 2022 · The Donbas region used to be part of what the Russians called “Dikoye Polye,” or the Wild Field. Even today, driving in past millions of ...The Wild Field · The Unraveling · The Days AheadMissing: expansion | Show results with:expansion<|control11|><|separator|>
  23. [23]
    Donbas Region: How the Cossacks Tamed the Wild Steppe
    Jul 1, 2019 · Historically, Donbas was part of the Wild Steppe in the south and east of modern Ukraine. In ancient times, it did not have a clear boundary.Missing: 16th- | Show results with:16th-
  24. [24]
    https://ukraineworld.org/en/articles/ukraine-explained/donbas-region-how-cossacks-tamed-wild-steppe
  25. [25]
    https://realmofhistory.com/2022/06/16/facts-cossacks-don-zaporozhian/
  26. [26]
    [PDF] System of Remuneration in the Coal Mines of the Ukrainian Soviet ...
    "DITUMINOUS coal deposits were first discovered at the beginning of the 1720s in the present Donets basin in South-Eastern Ukraine and their industrial ...
  27. [27]
    (PDF) Who discovered the Donetsk coal basin and when it was ...
    Dec 30, 2022 · It has been proven that the falsifications of Russia and the USSR regarding the history of the first discovery of coal in the Donbass have been ...Missing: 1720s | Show results with:1720s
  28. [28]
    [PDF] History Journal of Contemporary
    Aug 17, 2014 · 67 Lithuania never controlled the Donbas. However, as with the Ukrainian case, the Cossack era is crucial in refuting 'the myth that Russians ...
  29. [29]
    Hughesovka; a Welsh Connection to Ukraine
    While mining took place in Donbas in the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries, it wasn't until the Russian Empire revised fiscal policy and ...
  30. [30]
    Hughesovka: The city founded by Welsh migrants - BBC
    Jun 29, 2017 · But in 1870, John Hughes and about 100 workers and their families sailed in eight ships to Russia. They built an iron works and collieries ...
  31. [31]
    Yuzovka: The Ukrainian City Founded by a Welsh Industrialist
    Feb 24, 2022 · It is a less well-known fact that Donetsk emerged in 1870 as a Welsh industrial exclave called Yuzovka, sometimes also spelt Hughesovka.
  32. [32]
    Europe's Donbas: How Western Capital Industrialized Eastern Ukraine
    Mar 14, 2019 · In 1913, the share of foreign capital reached 70% of total coal mining in Donbas and 86% of total ore mining in the Kryvyi Rih basin.
  33. [33]
    The Donbass | SpringerLink
    ... Five-Year plan, the Great Terror, took place. The Donbass case may be extreme, but it is a case extremely revealing of centre-local relations in the 1930s.
  34. [34]
    Stalinist Terror in the Donbas: A Note - jstor
    Donbas Coal was a giant inidustrial organization which in 1938 consisted of some 22 trusts and 277 mines. An almost identical document is also found in ibid., ...Missing: era | Show results with:era
  35. [35]
    Rare Photos Capture Donbas Reconstruction After World War II
    May 22, 2024 · Images held in a U.S. archive capture the years of work it took to rebuild Ukraine's Donbas region the last time it was devastated by war.
  36. [36]
    As Russian Forces Roll into Eastern Ukraine, Putin Grabs ... - Forbes
    Feb 23, 2022 · Production output peaked in the 1970s at around 200 million tons. Reserves of class A, B, and C coal were put at 57.5 billion tons in 2000.
  37. [37]
    [PDF] The Soviet Coal Industry - Princeton University
    Soviet coal production increased steadily between 1970 and 1975, growing approx- imately 16 million metric tons (mmt) per year. The Tenth Five Year Plan (FYP) ...
  38. [38]
    In Ukraine's Donbas, ten years of war and Russification - France 24
    Apr 8, 2024 · Just prior to the outbreak of the conflict in 2014, the Donbas was "a blighted region where the population was impoverished and greatly missed ...Missing: major | Show results with:major
  39. [39]
    Ukraine's environment is a victim of Russian geopolitics. (Again.)
    Sep 8, 2023 · The rapid industrialization pursued by the Soviet Union ingested high volumes of natural resources and spewed pollution into the environment— ...Missing: neglect | Show results with:neglect
  40. [40]
    Donbas In The 1990s: How It Defined Ukraine's Future - Kyiv Post
    In the first years of independence, Ukraine experienced hyperinflation, with prices rising by 1,000% per year. Companies did not pay workers their salaries for ...
  41. [41]
    The Underachiever: Ukraine's Economy Since 1991
    Mar 9, 2012 · Official GDP collapsed by almost half from 1990 to 1994, and slow decline continued throughout the decade.
  42. [42]
    In Donetsk, A 'Self-Made' Oligarch Learns To Play Nicely With Others
    Apr 11, 2014 · Now, with Yanukovych's ouster and an at least nominal commitment in Kyiv to weed out corruption at the roots, Akhmetov is undoubtedly ...Missing: 2000s | Show results with:2000s
  43. [43]
    Honest History 2: Where, why Ukrainians speak Russian language ...
    Apr 6, 2018 · Only 14 percent consider Russian to be their native language, while 17 percent said they were native speakers of both Ukrainian and Russian.
  44. [44]
    The Russian Factor in Ukraine's 2010 Presidential Elections
    Jan 14, 2010 · Russian political technologists openly worked for one candidate (Viktor Yanukovych), while Moscow allegedly sought to poison the opposition ...
  45. [45]
    Ukraine's Donbas Stumbling Blocks
    Sep 29, 2023 · During the first years of Ukraine's independence, Donbas went through rapid and poorly controlled deindustrialization, which destroyed lifestyle ...
  46. [46]
    When coal production was measured in human lives | Nord.no
    Jul 7, 2023 · Over time, coal mining became a crucial industry, particularly in the Donbas region, which is home to some of Ukraine's largest coal reserves. A ...
  47. [47]
    National composition of population | Donets'k region
    State Statistics Committee of Ukraine ; Greeks. 77.5, 1.61 ; Belarussians. 44.5, 0.92 ; Tatars. 19.2, 0.40 ; Armenians. 15.7, 0.33 ; Jews. 8.8, 0.18 ...
  48. [48]
    National composition of population | Luhans'k region
    Between 1989 and 2001, number Ukrainians decreased 0.7%,and their part among other citizens of Ukraine has increased by 6.1 percentage points. Russians are the ...
  49. [49]
    Ethnic and Social Composition of Ukraine's Regions and Voting ...
    Mar 10, 2015 · To date, there has been a single census in 2001 ... The other is eastern Ukraine, but more specifically the two far eastern oblasts of Donetsk and ...
  50. [50]
    Most common native language in Ukraine in the 2001 census - Reddit
    Jun 7, 2024 · Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts are 74.9% and 68.8% Russian-speaking, respectively. Cities and urban areas in the east are overwhelminly Russian- ...
  51. [51]
    Demographic Engineering: How Russia is Turning Population into a ...
    Aug 21, 2025 · In 1926, 639,000 ethnic Russians lived in Donbas, while Ukrainians made up 60% of the population. By 1959, the ethnic Russian population had ...Missing: composition | Show results with:composition
  52. [52]
    Conflict in Ukraine's Donbas: A Visual Explainer
    The armed conflict in Eastern Ukraine started in 2014. Between then and early 2022, it had already killed over 14,000 people. Over the course of eight years, ...
  53. [53]
    Researching Public Opinion in Eastern Ukraine | The Harriman ...
    ... Donbas region would have supported separation from Ukraine in order to join Russia. Yet only about one-third of the population living in Donbas supported ...
  54. [54]
    2023 Report on International Religious Freedom: Ukraine
    According to the same survey, the 60.8 percent of respondents who identify as Orthodox Christians divide their affiliation as follows: 42.2 percent OCU ( ...
  55. [55]
    Religious Life On the Rise in Ukraine, With Enormous ...
    Jun 6, 2024 · The Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate has lost more than 1,000 parishes and even more believers to the autocephalous Orthodox ...
  56. [56]
    The Great Myths 10: Soviet Atheism - History for Atheists
    Jan 31, 2021 · New Atheists have tried to argue atheism had nothing to do with any mass murder and oppression in the Soviet Union. Both arguments are wrong.
  57. [57]
    Roots of the Donbass Wars - by Peter Nimitz - Nemets
    Mar 4, 2023 · Intensely persecuted in the Soviet period, Protestantism has been spread by active missionary efforts since 1991. Understanding the problems ...
  58. [58]
    2019 Report on International Religious Freedom: Ukraine
    According to VAAD, before the Russian aggression in eastern Ukraine, approximately 30,000 Jews lived in the Donbas region (Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts). Jewish ...
  59. [59]
    2022 Report on International Religious Freedom: Ukraine
    ... Donbas region (Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts). Jewish groups estimate between 10,000 and 15,000 Jewish residents lived in Crimea before Russia's purported ...Read a Section: Ukraine · Section I. Religious Demography · Section II. Status of...
  60. [60]
    The Legacy of the Soviet Union and Religion - Glimpse from the Globe
    Feb 13, 2024 · The Soviet Union's legacy with religion is long and complicated, but ultimately, the regime failed to eradicate religion and force secularization.
  61. [61]
    https://www.glimpsefromtheglobe.com/regions-and-religions/the-legacy-of-the-soviet-union-and-religion/
  62. [62]
    The Donbas Miners - Wavell Room
    May 21, 2025 · Donbas miners were especially militant. Here they allied with Rukh, a Ukrainian nationalist movement. When Soviet miners mounted another major ...Missing: structure | Show results with:structure
  63. [63]
    The Donbass protests you haven't heard of - Euromaidan Press
    Jan 29, 2016 · At that time there was a system of state trade unions, but it did not serve the interests of the working class. So the miners created an ...Missing: social | Show results with:social
  64. [64]
    [PDF] An Overview of Women's Work and Employment in Ukraine
    gender pay gap in Ukraine. Recently, with nearly 25% the over-all gap was quite large. Across industries the gap by far largest in mining, but –with over 25 ...Missing: Donbas imbalance
  65. [65]
    The “Russian Minority in Donbas” and the History of the Majority
    In Soviet Ukraine, Ukrainian was intended to be the majority language. But in urbanized, predominantly Russian-speaking Donbas, it was regarded as the language ...
  66. [66]
    Internally Displaced Persons - Russo-Ukrainian War
    At least 1.5 million people from Donetsk and Luhansk are displaced in Ukraine since 2014, illustrating the human impact this eight-year crisis has already ...
  67. [67]
    Patterns of Internal and External Migration (2014–2022) - jstor
    Feb 24, 2022 · An estimated 1.4 million Ukrainian citizens from the occupied territories of Donbas received Russian nationality between 2014 and 2021.94 As ...
  68. [68]
    [PDF] The Economics of Winning Hearts and Minds - World Bank Document
    From a. Ukrainian GDP perspective, investments in the Donbas GCAs play a more prom- inent role under both the status quo and reintegration scenarios. Reducing ...
  69. [69]
    [PDF] A Short Overview on Vocational Education and Training in Ukraine
    The following article deals with the current state of vocational education and training as well as with planned reform projects and those already being ...
  70. [70]
    Ukrainian Coal Market | Sadovaya Group
    Ukraine holds the 7th largest coal reserves in the world – 34 billion tones and 3rd largest anthracite coal reserves – 5.8 billion tones.Missing: tons | Show results with:tons
  71. [71]
    Energy security – Ukraine energy profile – Analysis - IEA
    Ukraine's abundant coal reserves account for more than 90% of the country's fossil fuel reserves. ... Coal production in the Donbass basin has been severely ...Missing: Donets | Show results with:Donets
  72. [72]
    On the way to decline: the development of the Donbass coal-mining ...
    Output and productivity increased through mechanization and new capacity was regularly put into operation. However, worsening geological and working conditions ...
  73. [73]
    Donugi - technical development of mines in the central Donbass ...
    Oct 1, 1986 · Mechanization has been greatly increased, including, for example, the introduction of pneumatic chocks, the KGU-D powered mining ... TECHNOLOGY ...Missing: evolution | Show results with:evolution
  74. [74]
    Modern experience of low-coal seams underground mining in Ukraine
    This article analyzes the experience in the development of very low and low-coal seams with 0.7–1.0 m thickness, as well as advanced technological solutions.
  75. [75]
    Donetsk Metallurgical Plant - Global Energy Monitor - GEM.wiki
    Jun 24, 2025 · Donetsk Metallurgical Plant (original plant, start year 1872) has since then become a rolling mill and does not produce crude iron or steel.
  76. [76]
    https://www.gem.wiki/Donetsk_Metallurgical_Plant
  77. [77]
    the economic significance of donbas: provincial shares relative to ...
    The overall significance of the Donbas economy for post-Soviet Ukraine has steadily declined, from a 17.3% share of Ukraine's GDP in 1996 to 14.5% in 2013.
  78. [78]
    Ukrainian economy overshadowed by war
    Oct 8, 2014 · Donbas, Ukraine's most industrialised region, had a 16% share of the country's GDP in 2013 and generated around 25% of its exports[2].Missing: pre- | Show results with:pre-
  79. [79]
    [PDF] the real price of coal
    Collapse of the Soviet Union had devastating consequences for Donbas. A sharp decrease in industrial production led to a drop in demand for coal. During deep ...
  80. [80]
    Analysis: Problems In Ukraine's Coal Industry Run Deep - RFE/RL
    Feb 9, 2005 · Analysis: Problems In Ukraine's Coal Industry Run Deep. February 09, 2005 ... The corruption-prone cycle of "coking coal-coke-steel" is ...Missing: mismanagement | Show results with:mismanagement
  81. [81]
    2018 Investment Climate Statements: Ukraine - State Department
    It also continues to struggle with years of corruption and government mismanagement ... in Ukraine. In the non-government controlled areas in the Donbas ...
  82. [82]
    Gas Explosion In Coal Mine In Ukraine Is Fatal to 80
    Mar 12, 2000 · In April 1998, a methane explosion at a mine in Donetsk, Ukraine's eastern coal capital, killed 63 coal workers. In May 1999, a methane ...
  83. [83]
    More than 50 killed in Ukraine coal mine blast - The Guardian
    Nov 19, 2007 · Twenty miners were killed in an explosion in the same mine in 2002. About 80 were killed in another explosion at the Barakova coalmine in ...
  84. [84]
    Death toll climbs to 82 in Ukraine mine disaster | World news
    Mar 12, 2000 · Experts have calculated that five miners die in Ukraine for every million tonnes of coal extracted. The Donbass coal industry employs more ...
  85. [85]
    Are abandoned mines flooding in Ukraine's Donbas region? - CEOBS
    Apr 27, 2020 · Mine flooding can cause pollution, increase methane emissions and lead to ground subsidence. In this blog, Eoghan Darbyshire investigates a ...
  86. [86]
    How rich is Donbas? The Ukrainian coal and mineral hub that Putin ...
    Aug 17, 2025 · Donbas is exceptionally rich in natural resources, making it a crucial economic and strategic hub for Ukraine. According to the 2025 CIRSD ...
  87. [87]
    Russia Seizes Key Lithium Field in Challenge for U.S.-Ukraine ...
    Jun 27, 2025 · Russian forces have seized control of a valuable lithium deposit in the Donetsk region of eastern Ukraine, depriving the country of a critical asset.
  88. [88]
    The Mineral Wars - How Ukraine's Critical Minerals Will Fuel Future ...
    Russia's military interventions reflect a strategic intent to secure valuable coal, steel, and agricultural assets in eastern and southern Ukraine, thereby ...
  89. [89]
    Mapping Ukraine's rare earth and critical minerals - Al Jazeera
    Feb 28, 2025 · The Shevchenko Field of Lithium Ores, one of Ukraine's biggest lithium deposits, is located in a rural settlement in Donetsk.
  90. [90]
    Donbas: What's Ukraine Losing—Industrial Hub, Breadbasket or Both?
    Jul 7, 2022 · 1 and 7 among Ukrainian constituent territories in terms of the size of their populations, jointly accounting for 14% of Ukraine's GDP in that ...Missing: contribution | Show results with:contribution
  91. [91]
    Russian Attacks Crush Factories and Way of Life in Ukrainian Villages
    Apr 21, 2024 · In 2013, the year before Russia's military intervention in the east began, mines and factories in the Donbas region earned $28 billion, ...
  92. [92]
    Investigation: How Russia steals Ukraine's trillion-dollar mineral ...
    Jun 17, 2025 · In 2024-2025 these two vessels exported more than 40,000 tons of coking coal from the port in Mariupol, according to Ukrainian intelligence.
  93. [93]
    [PDF] Evidence from the Russia-Ukraine Conflict - Boston University
    Aug 12, 2025 · ... Donbas by the time sanctions were imposed, with coal mines reportedly owned by the same traders who were given control over importing Donbas ...
  94. [94]
    Losing Donbas leaves Kyiv more exposed to Moscow's economic grip
    Aug 20, 2025 · The Donbas is Ukraine's beating economic heart, where coal mining and steel production are the main drivers of economic growth.
  95. [95]
    Donbas shows how geology and strategy are closely interconnected
    Aug 25, 2025 · The conflict in Donbas highlights the intricate link between geology and strategy, with the region's rich mineral resources, including coal and ...Missing: interdependence | Show results with:interdependence
  96. [96]
    https://www.downtoearth.org.in/mining/donbas-shows-how-geology-and-strategy-are-closely-interconnected
  97. [97]
    Bakhmut-Kyiv-Prague: Industrialization, Literary Modernism and ...
    Mar 7, 2025 · The magazine was published by the Union of Donbas proletarian writers as a part of All-Russian association of proletarian writers. The ...<|separator|>
  98. [98]
    [PDF] the donbass as a space
    The essay is about several Soviet films that show the Donbass as a space of labor heroism, a site in the memory of the Great Patriotic War, and contradictory ...
  99. [99]
    [PDF] Polemics of the Russian and Soviet Literary Left
    The workers were for their part passionate about the need to express them- selves. As one worker from a train depot Gorky cites in the article puts it: “I ...Missing: motifs | Show results with:motifs
  100. [100]
    Song and dance Ensemble "Donbass"
    The Donbass Ensemble, which celebrated its 85th anniversary in 2022, is one of the most sought-after collectives demonstrating the highest mastery of folk ...
  101. [101]
    https://kursal.ru/en/repertoire/event-ansambl-pesni-i-tantsa-donbass/
  102. [102]
    https://soviethistory.msu.edu/1991-2/miners-strike-of-1991/miners-strike-of-1991-music-2/incident-at-the-mine-shaft-1967/
  103. [103]
    Monument to the Liberators of the Donbass, Donetsk, Ukraine
    Sep 30, 2012 · The memorial is located beside the Donbass Arena football stadium in the Lenin Komsomol Park at the northern edge of the city centre.<|separator|>
  104. [104]
    'Industrial Heaven': A Ukrainian Instagram account digs deeper into ...
    May 4, 2021 · It is an allusion to the myth of the “socialist heaven” that the Soviet propaganda used to represent Donbas. This region was oversaturated ...
  105. [105]
    Surzhyk: Wherever It Was Sowed, It Will Grow - Medium
    Sep 30, 2024 · Surzhyk is a Ukrainian–Russian pidgin commonly spoken in most of eastern and southern Ukraine's rural areas. Kateryna Ustiuhova.Missing: dialect media
  106. [106]
    Brian Milakovsky: How Ukraine's new language law will affect Donbas
    Apr 30, 2019 · Ukrainian is common only in some rural areas, and even here it is usually mixed with Russian in the surzhyk dialect. ... language and culture.
  107. [107]
    Chapter 12: The Ongoing Language Discussion in Ukraine
    The wave of language activism strengthened after Euromaidan and continued to grow after the annexation of Crimea and rise of Russian aggression in Donbas.
  108. [108]
    Full article: War and identity: the case of the Donbas in Ukraine
    Mar 29, 2018 · This paper traces the political identities of the inhabitants of a region at war – the Donbas – on the basis of original survey data.
  109. [109]
    91. Dr. Greta Uehling – Understanding The Donbas: Identity, People ...
    The Donbas has a unique regional identity, which means that it perceives itself as different from the rest of Ukraine. That's important because the stories you ...
  110. [110]
    Attitude to the unitary state and separatism in Ukraine
    May 22, 2014 · ... Donbas: 69,7% of Donbas population either do not plan to vote or have not decided yet whom to vote for in the presidential elections on May 25, ...
  111. [111]
    Full article: What Political Status Did the Donbas Want? Survey ...
    Oct 7, 2024 · This article reports original survey data collected in both parts of the divided Donbas region of Ukraine on the eve of Russia's full-scale invasion in ...
  112. [112]
    The Rise and Fall of Ukraine's Faustian Bargain | Territory and ...
    Thus, a poll in early 2015 showed that half of the populations of Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, and Zaporizhia in the southeast and 70 percent of those in Donbas ...
  113. [113]
    Language, Status, and State Loyalty in Ukraine
    Crimea and core Donbas are the two areas of Ukraine with the greatest concentration of ethnic Russians. The correlation, however, should not be confused with a ...
  114. [114]
    Symbolism in Donetsk | Vostok Cable - WordPress.com
    May 29, 2014 · It combined the tricolor of the People's Republic, the shield and sword of the former KGB – now the FSB in Russia – and the Saint George Ribbon.
  115. [115]
    Something to believe in: signifiers, symbols and Russia's national ...
    Feb 15, 2022 · Terms like 'Great Patriotic War' and 'Russian world' carry a heavy symbolic load and are imbued with meanings that adapt to serve political goals.
  116. [116]
    Ukrainian National Identity: The "Other Ukraine" - Wilson Center
    Local identities, in Wilson's view, may also be salient in Ukraine. In particular, he points to the Donbas and southern Ukrainian identities as prevalent forces ...Missing: differences | Show results with:differences
  117. [117]
    [PDF] Conflict in Ukraine: A timeline (2014 - eve of 2022 invasion)
    Aug 22, 2023 · Luhansk regions of eastern Ukraine (the Donbas) in 2014. Fighting between Russian-supported separatists and Ukrainian government forces has ...
  118. [118]
    https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-9476/CBP-9476.pdf
  119. [119]
    Chronology of the conflict - Civicmonitoring
    Beginning April 2014. Separatist forces occupied the official buildings in Donetsk and Luhansk regions, including Donetsk city administration and Luhansk ...
  120. [120]
    How 'eastern Ukraine' was lost - openDemocracy
    Jan 14, 2016 · On that day, several thousand protesters occupied the Donetsk regional administration building, raising the Russian state flag above it. The ...
  121. [121]
    [PDF] What Political Status Did the Donbas Want? Survey Evidence on the ...
    This article reports original survey data collected in both parts of the divided Donbas region of Ukraine on the eve of Russia's full-.
  122. [122]
    Nine years ago, Russia unleashed war in Donbas
    Apr 13, 2023 · On April 13, 2014, the Ukrainian parliament's speaker and acting president of Ukraine, Oleksandr Turchynov, announced the beginning of an Anti- ...
  123. [123]
    War in Donbass: Key Moments From Eight-Year Conflict
    On 13 April, the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine signed off on the start of an 'anti-terrorist operation' (ATO) in Donbass, with acting ...
  124. [124]
    Donetsk People's Republic (DNR) - GlobalSecurity.org
    On 21 February 2021, Russian President Vladimir Putin recognized the independence of Donetsk and Luhansk people's republics (DPR and LPR), ...Missing: details | Show results with:details<|separator|>
  125. [125]
    Separatists Claim Victory In East Ukraine Self-Rule Vote - RFE/RL
    May 11, 2014 · Pro-Russian fighters vote during an independence referendum at their position in the eastern Ukrainian city of Slovyansk on May 11.Missing: details | Show results with:details
  126. [126]
    Ukraine rebels hold referendums in Donetsk and Luhansk - BBC News
    May 11, 2014 · Pro-Russian separatists in eastern Ukraine hold "self-rule" referendums, as BBC correspondents observe chaotic scenes at polling stations.
  127. [127]
    The farce of the 'referendum' in the Donbas
    May 14, 2014 · On 11 May pro-Russian separatists organised a 'referendum' on the sovereignty of the Donetsk and Lugansk regions, the results of which (89.07% and 96.2% ...
  128. [128]
    Ukraine: pro-Russia separatists set for victory in eastern region ...
    May 12, 2014 · Kiev defends military's 'anti-terrorist operations' as rebels say 90% of vote is in favour of 'people's republics' in Donetsk and Luhansk.
  129. [129]
    Ukraine crisis: Donetsk region asks to join Russia - The Guardian
    May 12, 2014 · Request comes just two hours after referendum results show 90% voted for independence from Ukraine.<|separator|>
  130. [130]
    Ukraine Separatists Claim 89 Percent Voted for 'Independence' of ...
    May 12, 2014 · She said the Russian leadership must know that if it continues to destabilize eastern Ukraine and disrupt presidential elections later this ...Missing: details | Show results with:details
  131. [131]
    Protocol on the results of consultations of the Trilateral Contact ...
    Sep 5, 2014 · Protocol on the results of consultations of the Trilateral Contact Group, signed in Minsk, 5 September 2014. Publisher: Organization for Security and Co- ...Missing: details | Show results with:details
  132. [132]
    Protocol on the results of consultations of the Trilateral Contact ...
    Sep 5, 2014 · This agreement establises a 12-point roadmap as follows: ensure an immediate bilateral ceasefire; carry out decentralisation of power, allowing temporary local ...Missing: details | Show results with:details
  133. [133]
    Memorandum of 19 September 2014 outlining the parameters for ...
    Sep 19, 2014 · Memorandum of 19 September 2014 outlining the parameters for the implementation of commitments of the Minsk Protocol of 5 September 2014.Missing: details | Show results with:details
  134. [134]
    Ukraine, Russia, and the Minsk agreements: A post-mortem | ECFR
    Feb 19, 2024 · The Minsk agreements were signed by Ukraine, Russia, and the OSCE special representative in September 2014 and February 2015.
  135. [135]
    [PDF] Package of measures for the Implementation of the Minsk agreements
    1. Immediate and comprehensive ceasefire in certain areas of the Donetsk and Lugansk regions of Ukraine and its strict implementation starting from 00.00 AM ( ...
  136. [136]
    Ukraine ceasefire: New Minsk agreement key points - BBC News
    Feb 12, 2015 · 1. Immediate and full bilateral ceasefire · 2. Withdrawal of all heavy weapons by both sides · 3. Effective monitoring and verification regime for ...Missing: text | Show results with:text
  137. [137]
    The Minsk Conundrum: Western Policy and Russia's War in Eastern ...
    May 22, 2020 · The Minsk agreements rest on two irreconcilable interpretations of Ukraine's sovereignty: is Ukraine sovereign, as Ukrainians insist, ...
  138. [138]
    In the Shadow of the Minsk Agreements
    Feb 10, 2025 · The Minsk Agreements contained a weak ceasefire monitoring framework and no effective means to facilitate the parties' compliance, such as by ...
  139. [139]
    [PDF] Ceasefire violations - OSCE
    Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine. Trends and observations. Ceasefire violations (CFVs). 93,902 ceasefire violations. 2. Kramatorsk. DONETSK. REGION.
  140. [140]
    [PDF] Lessons from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM ... - GPPi
    Apr 1, 2025 · In many ways, this plan is riddled with significant disadvantages and risks. But, in the current political climate, it may be the only feasible ...
  141. [141]
    Achievements and Limitations of the OSCE's Special Monitoring ...
    The only case where the OSCE has mandated an armed mission regards Nagorno-Karabakh in a future situation to oversee a peace deal.
  142. [142]
    Peace in Ukraine (III): The Costs of War in Donbas
    Sep 3, 2020 · The war in Ukraine's Donbas plunged an economically troubled region into ruin. A 427km front line cuts through what used to be the most densely ...
  143. [143]
    wiiw Opinion Corner: Economic effects of Donbas trade blockade
    Jun 1, 2017 · All in all, the trade ban makes the chances of any future reintegration (which is the cornerstone of the Minsk-II agreement) even lower, ...
  144. [144]
    [PDF] Conflict-related civilian casualties in Ukraine1
    Jan 27, 2022 · In total, from 14 April 2014 to 31 December. 2021, OHCHR recorded 1,242 civilian casualties caused by mine-related incidents, ERW handling and ...
  145. [145]
    [PDF] OHCHR, Report on the human rights situation in Ukraine
    Civilian casualties during the entire conflict period ... conflict in eastern Ukraine, 2014-2021,. Annex. I, available at https://www.ohchr.org/Documents ...
  146. [146]
    War in Ukraine | Global Conflict Tracker - Council on Foreign Relations
    Sep 15, 2025 · In September 2022, Ukrainian forces made strong advances in the northeast and mounted a revitalized southern counteroffensive. Ukraine retook ...
  147. [147]
    Russia Invades Ukraine: A Timeline of the Crisis
    The invasion began in the eastern Ukrainian territory of Donbas. Zelenskyy declared martial law in Ukraine and officially broke diplomatic ties with Russia.
  148. [148]
    Mariupol has fallen to Russia. Here's what that means for Ukraine
    May 18, 2022 · On April 21, Russian military officials declared victory in Mariupol after capturing the rest of the city. The humanitarian situation inside the ...
  149. [149]
    The Fall of Bakhmut – Casimir Pulaski Foundation
    May 25, 2023 · On May 20, 2023, on the one year anniversary of the fall of Mariupol, Wagner Group leader Yevgeny Prigozhin declared that Bakhmut had officially been captured ...Missing: outcome | Show results with:outcome
  150. [150]
    The battle for Ukraine's Bakhmut: A timeline - Al Jazeera
    May 20, 2023 · May 10, 2023 – Ukraine's ground forces commander says Russian units in some parts of Bakhmut have retreated by up to two kilometres. May 19, ...Missing: outcome | Show results with:outcome
  151. [151]
    Russia takes Avdiivka from Ukraine, biggest gain in nine months
    Feb 18, 2024 · The fall of Avdiivka is Russia's biggest gain since it captured the city of Bakhmut in May 2023, and comes almost two years to the day since ...
  152. [152]
    Kursk offensive: A timeline of Ukraine's attack and Russia's fightback
    Mar 12, 2025 · August 6, 2024: Ukrainian troops smash across the border in the biggest foreign attack on Russia since World War Two. The incursion hands ...
  153. [153]
    Ukraine's retreat from Kursk appears to mark end of audacious ...
    Mar 14, 2025 · The Ukrainian retreat from the Kursk region, carried out in stages over the past two weeks, appears to mark the end of one of the most audacious and surprising ...
  154. [154]
    https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/mar/14/ukraine-kursk-retreat-russia-incursion-peace-negotiations
  155. [155]
    Russia's Battlefield Woes in Ukraine - CSIS
    Jun 3, 2025 · Russia will likely hit the 1 million casualty mark in the summer of 2025—a stunning and grisly milestone. Overall, a high of 250,000 Russian ...Missing: credible | Show results with:credible
  156. [156]
    https://www.csis.org/analysis/russias-battlefield-woes-ukraine
  157. [157]
    How Russia Russified the east of Ukraine - Ukraїner
    Dec 22, 2022 · By using the name “Donbas”, Russia designates the territory of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, singles it out, and sets up the rest of Ukraine ...
  158. [158]
    Language policy in Ukraine - Wikipedia
    Some exemptions were provided for the official languages of the European Union and for minority languages, with the exclusion of Russian, Belarusian and Yiddish ...2012 Law on the Principles of... · Lviv Oblast · 2019 Law on Protecting the...
  159. [159]
    Ukraine passes language law, irritating president-elect and Russia
    Apr 25, 2019 · Ukraine's parliament approved a law on Thursday that grants special status to the Ukrainian language and makes it mandatory for public sector workers.
  160. [160]
    Law of Ukraine “On ensuring the functioning of Ukrainian as the ...
    Oct 20, 2020 · The Law of Ukraine “On ensuring the functioning of Ukrainian as the state language” was passed by the Ukrainian parliament on 25 April 2019.
  161. [161]
    [PDF] Results of national poll conducted in terms of “Initiating the ...
    On the other hand, the rest (58%) would like Donbas to remain in Ukraine: 30% - as an autonomous constituency within federal. Ukraine and the other 30% in ...
  162. [162]
    War in Donbas - Wikipedia
    A March–April 2014 national survey found 58% of locals favouring autonomy within Ukraine and 31% secession.Timeline · Donbas Battalion · Timeline of the war in Donbas... · Valery BolotovMissing: empirical | Show results with:empirical
  163. [163]
    Ambivalence on Ukraine's 'De-Communisation' Process
    Dec 14, 2023 · On 15 May 2015, President of Ukraine, Petro Poroshenko signed the Decommunisation Laws which accelerated the removal of communist statuettes and ...
  164. [164]
    Escape from empire: Ukraine's post-Soviet national awakening
    Jul 7, 2021 · ... Donbas. Ukraine's decommunization laws also had the effect of decisively distancing the country from Soviet era and contemporary Russian ...Missing: impact | Show results with:impact
  165. [165]
    [PDF] Decommunization in Post-Euromaidan Ukraine - PONARS Eurasia
    In the end, Ukraine's decommunization efforts may turn out to have a modest yet significant effect: the successful shedding of the Soviet symbolic legacy. A New ...
  166. [166]
    New Language Requirement Raises Concerns in Ukraine
    Jan 19, 2022 · A new legal provision on the use of the Ukrainian language, part of a broader state language law, raises concerns about protection for minority languages.
  167. [167]
    Battling for Linguistic Freedom Amidst the Ukraine-Russia War
    Sep 11, 2024 · Regarding daily usage, 46.9% used mostly or only Ukrainian, 31.8% said Russian, and 20.8% said they used both equally. Ten months after the ...
  168. [168]
    Ukraine announces economic blockade of rebel-held areas | News
    Mar 15, 2017 · Kiev demands rebels hand back businesses they seized before cargo traffic with separatists-held areas can resume.
  169. [169]
    The Donbas Blockade: Another blow to the Minsk peace process
    Jun 2, 2017 · In January 2017, some veterans of Ukraine's ... blockade and transformed a rogue operation into official Ukrainian government policy.
  170. [170]
    Hiding in plain sight: Putin's war in Ukraine - Atlantic Council
    Oct 15, 2015 · Hiding in Plain Sight: Putin's War in Ukraine provides irrefutable evidence of direct Russian military involvement in eastern Ukraine.
  171. [171]
    The Facts speak for themselves re Russia's military involvement in ...
    Nov 2, 2018 · There is considerable evidence that Russian forces were directly involved in that battle, with the proof including a Russian state award ...
  172. [172]
    War, diplomacy, and more war: why did the Minsk agreements fail?
    Why did the Minsk process fail? When it comes to the underlying causes of the parties' failure to implement the Minsk agreements, the available sources allow ...
  173. [173]
    Ukraine: AOAV explosive violence data on harm to civilians
    Feb 24, 2024 · Between 2014 and 2021, AOAV recorded 5,242 deaths and injuries in Ukraine, including 2,704 civilians and 2,538 armed actors and security ...
  174. [174]
    All reports - UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine - ohchr
    With at least 1,674 civilian casualties (286 killed; 1,388 injured), the number of civilian casualties continued to rise in July, setting a new record for ...Children and armed conflict · Protection of civilians · Detention and prisoners of war
  175. [175]
    Humanitarian situation during the war in Donbas - Wikipedia
    A May 2014 report by the United Nations said there had been an alarming deterioration in human rights in territory held by Russian separatists.<|control11|><|separator|>
  176. [176]
    Understanding forced internal displacement in Ukraine: insights and ...
    Sep 15, 2022 · In many instances, Donbas pensioners simply registered as IDPs on the government-controlled areas of Donetska and Luhanska, regularly travelling ...
  177. [177]
    Ukraine's war-torn Donbas region is on the verge of environmental ...
    May 16, 2021 · Across the Donbas, neglected and abandoned mines are filling with toxic groundwater, environmentalists warn.Missing: impact | Show results with:impact
  178. [178]
    War-related environmental disaster in Ukraine
    Oct 16, 2018 · So the impacts of environmental neglect due to warfare in the Donbas are expressed in both geophysical processes—such as subsidence and ...<|control11|><|separator|>
  179. [179]
    Ukraine - | International Criminal Court
    ICC investigations opened: 2 March 2022. Focus: Alleged crimes committed in the context of situation in Ukraine since 21 November 2013.Ukraine · Jurisdiction In The General... · Suspects
  180. [180]
    Reports of Russian Federation Forces Putting Ukrainian Civilians in ...
    Sep 7, 2022 · Persistent allegations of forced displacement, deportation and so-called “filtration camps” run by the Russian Federation and affiliated local forces are “ ...
  181. [181]
    “We Had No Choice”: “Filtration” and the ... - Human Rights Watch
    Sep 1, 2022 · The 71-page report, “'We Had No Choice': 'Filtration' and the War Crime of Forcibly Transferring Ukrainian Civilians to Russia,” documents ...
  182. [182]
    Ukraine: Widespread Use of Cluster Munitions - Human Rights Watch
    Oct 20, 2014 · While it was not possible to conclusively determine responsibility for many of the attacks, the evidence points to Ukrainian government forces' ...
  183. [183]
    Ukraine Used Cluster Bombs, Evidence Indicates
    Oct 20, 2014 · The Ukrainian Army appears to have fired cluster munitions, a weapon banned in much of the world, into the heart of Donetsk, according to ...
  184. [184]
    OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (closed)
    The SMM was an unarmed, civilian mission, operating on the ground 24/7 Ukraine. Its main tasks were to observe and report in an impartial and objective manner ...
  185. [185]
    Russia's Igor Strelkov: I Am Responsible for War in Eastern Ukraine
    Interview where Igor Strelkov (Girkin) claims personal responsibility for igniting the conflict in eastern Ukraine in 2014.
  186. [186]
    Situation in Ukraine: ICC judges issue arrest warrants against Vladimir Putin and Maria Alekseyevna Lvova-Belova
    Official ICC press release announcing arrest warrants for the war crime of unlawful deportation and forcible transfer of children from occupied Ukraine.
  187. [187]
    Ukraine's Stolen Children: Inside Russia's Network of Re-education and Militarization
    Yale Humanitarian Research Lab report identifying over 200 facilities used for reeducation and militarization of Ukrainian children.
  188. [188]
    Conflict in Ukraine's Donbas: A Visual Explainer
    International Crisis Group provides an overview of the Donbas conflict, including casualty estimates from 2014 to early 2022.
  189. [189]
    UN Commission has found an array of war crimes, violations of human rights and international humanitarian law
    Press release from the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) on findings of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine, attributing the vast majority of violations, including war crimes, to Russian armed forces while noting violations by Ukrainian forces.
  190. [190]
    Intense and Lasting Harm: Cluster Munition Attacks in Ukraine
    Human Rights Watch report documenting Russian armed forces' use of cluster munitions in Ukraine, causing hundreds of civilian casualties and damaging civilian objects.