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El Al Flight 426

Flight 426 was a Boeing 707-458 passenger flight operated by Israel Airlines, hijacked on 23 July 1968 by three members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) en route from , , to , , and diverted to Dar El-Beida Airport in Algiers, Algeria. The hijackers, armed with pistols and grenades, overpowered the crew shortly after takeoff, marking the first and only successful of an aircraft in its history. The PFLP demanded the release of over 1,000 Palestinian prisoners held by , holding 22 passengers and 10 crew members as hostages after releasing 23 non- passengers within 24 hours and 10 women and children on 27 . The crisis endured for 39 days until 1 September 1968, when agreed to release 16 Palestinian prisoners in exchange for the remaining hostages and the aircraft, while freed the hijackers. No fatalities occurred, but the event initiated an era of PFLP-led aerial terrorism, prompting to pioneer stringent aviation security measures, including armed sky marshals and pre-flight profiling, which have prevented subsequent hijackings of its flights.

Background

Flight and Aircraft Details

El Al Flight 426 was a scheduled international passenger flight operated by Israel Airlines on July 23, 1968, departing London Heathrow Airport, , with an intermediate stop at Leonardo da Vinci–Fiumicino Airport, , , en route to Lod Airport (present-day Ben Gurion International Airport), . The flight carried 38 passengers and a crew of 10. The aircraft was a 707-458, registration 4X-ATA (manufacturer's 18070), manufactured in 1961. This variant of the 707 featured four engines and was employed by for long-haul routes, providing reliable service across and the prior to the incident.

Geopolitical Context and PFLP Origins

The defeat of , Jordanian, and Syrian forces by during the of June 5–10, 1967, profoundly altered the dynamics of the Arab-Israeli conflict, as seized the , , , and , displacing over 300,000 additional and exposing the military ineffectiveness of Arab states. This outcome fueled disillusionment with pan-Arab regimes and elevated non-state Palestinian actors, who increasingly pursued including cross-border raids and to challenge Israeli control and compel international attention to their cause. In the war's aftermath, groups proliferated, operating from bases in , , and , with tactics escalating from guerrilla incursions to high-profile operations aimed at undermining Israel's security and legitimacy. Amid this radicalization, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) was established in December 1967 by , a Greek Orthodox physician radicalized by the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, through the merger of the Palestinian wing of the with other leftist factions. Adopting a Marxist-Leninist framework, the PFLP positioned the Palestinian struggle as an anti-imperialist vanguard against , Western capitalism, and Arab reactionaries, rejecting any compromise with and advocating armed revolution to eradicate the state in favor of a secular, socialist entity encompassing historic Palestine. Unlike more nationalist PLO factions, the PFLP emphasized international solidarity, drawing Soviet and Chinese support while pioneering "external operations" such as aircraft hijackings to globalize the conflict, bypass Arab state constraints, and extract political leverage through hostage crises. The PFLP's emergence reflected broader influences, aligning Palestinian militancy with leftist insurgencies worldwide, but its tactics—deeming civilian targets legitimate for advancing revolutionary goals—marked a departure toward indiscriminate violence that prioritized spectacle over military efficacy. By mid-1968, this ideology culminated in the group's inaugural of El Al Flight 426 on July 23, exploiting vulnerabilities in international to divert the to , a post-independence sympathetic to anti-Israel causes despite its non-Arab alignment.

The Hijacking Event

Preparation and Boarding

![El Al Boeing 707-458 4X-ATA at London Heathrow, September 2, 1963][float-right] El Al Flight 426 operated on July 23, 1968, as a scheduled passenger service using a 707-458 with registration 4X-ATA, departing from Leonardo da Vinci–Fiumicino Airport in , , for Lod Airport (now Ben Gurion International Airport) near , . The flight carried 38 passengers and a crew of 10, consisting of pilots and cabin staff who conducted routine pre-departure checks, including , fueling, and passenger manifest verification. Boarding occurred at Fiumicino Airport under standard procedures of the time, which lacked advanced screening for weapons or suspicious behavior, as aviation s for political purposes were not yet a recognized threat requiring stringent measures. Among the passengers boarding were three members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), who had acquired tickets and concealed handguns—along with possibly a —to execute the shortly after takeoff. These individuals passed through routine check-in without detection, highlighting the vulnerabilities in pre-1968s protocols. The PFLP operatives, motivated by the organization's Marxist-Leninist ideology and goal of liberating through revolutionary violence, selected as a target symbolizing state interests. Following boarding, the aircraft doors were secured, and Flight 426 taxied for departure, with the crew unaware of the imminent threat posed by the armed passengers seated among the mix of tourists, pilgrims, and returning Israelis.

Mid-Flight Takeover

Shortly after departing from Rome's Leonardo da Vinci–Fiumicino Airport on July 23, 1968, El Al Flight 426, a 707-458 carrying 38 passengers and 10 crew members, was flying along Italy's western coast near when two of the three Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) hijackers forced their way into the . Armed with and a hand , the hijackers assaulted First Maoz Poraz, who attempted to disarm one of them but was struck with the pistol butt, resulting in severe bleeding. Trainee pilot Avner Slapak responded by disconnecting the , causing the to climb abruptly and momentarily disorient the intruders, but he reconnected it after threats of violence. Slapak further attempted to grab an overhead to simulate cabin depressurization and overpower the hijacker, but halted when the assailant pressed a to his neck and fired a shot—initially perceived as a blank—that struck a cockpit light above Slapak's head and jammed the weapon. The brandishing of the deterred additional resistance from the crew. With control secured, the hijackers ordered Captain Oded Abarbanell to divert the flight to Dar El Beïda Airport in , , approximately two hours away. One hijacker seized the radio and broadcast: "This is El-Assifa flight 707 to ," signaling the PFLP's claimed operation. The third hijacker remained in the passenger cabin to monitor and restrain the occupants, ensuring no interference during the takeover. No fatalities occurred in the struggle, though the swift use of firearms and explosives underscored the hijackers' preparedness and the crew's limited defensive options under pre-1968 protocols.

Diversion and Landing in Algeria

Following the takeover, the three hijackers, armed with pistols and grenades, stormed the cockpit and assaulted the first officer before demanding that Captain Oded Abarbanell divert the Boeing 707 to in . The captain, after an initial evasive maneuver to dislodge the intruders failed, re-engaged the and complied with the order to avoid endangering the 38 passengers and 10 crew members aboard. A radio was issued identifying the flight as "El-Assifa 707 to ," referencing the PFLP's military wing. The aircraft, which had departed Rome's Fiumicino Airport on July 23, 1968, altered course southward across the Mediterranean, covering approximately 1,000 kilometers to reach roughly two hours after the . It touched down at Dar El Beida (now Houari Boumediene International Airport) under the control of Algerian air traffic authorities, who cleared the landing despite the irregular circumstances. ![El Al Boeing 707-458, registration 4X-ATA, at London Heathrow in 1963][float-right] Upon landing, Algerian security forces took custody of the aircraft, impounding it on the tarmac and detaining all passengers and crew. The hijackers were permitted to disembark and were granted safe passage by the Algerian government, which aligned with the PFLP's anti-Israel objectives and refused Israeli requests for their extradition or the immediate release of the plane. Within 24 hours, 23 non-Israeli passengers were released and flown to Rome or France, while the remaining Israelis—primarily men, including seven crew members—were held as leverage for PFLP demands.

Hostage Crisis

Immediate Conditions Aboard the Aircraft

Shortly after takeoff from Rome's Fiumicino Airport on July 23, 1968, three members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), armed with and grenades, seized control of Flight 426, a Boeing 707 carrying 28 passengers and 10 crew members. One hijacker stormed the , pistol-whipped First Officer Maoz Poraz, inflicting severe head injuries that caused profuse bleeding, and pressed a pistol to Captain Uri Abarbanell's neck while threatening to shoot. A was fired, striking a cockpit light above the captain's head, with a second shot jamming in the weapon; the crew, fearing further violence, abandoned attempts to disorient the hijackers through erratic maneuvers. Passengers and crew were confined to their seats under armed guard amid a tense atmosphere marked by the hijackers' demands for diversion to , announced via radio as "El-Assifa flight 707 to ." The approximately two-hour flight proceeded under duress, with the hijackers—familiar with aviation routes—directing navigation while thwarting crew resistance efforts, such as cabin depressurization, through ongoing threats. No additional physical assaults on passengers occurred during the flight, though the open cockpit door exposed to the sounds of violence and gunfire. Upon landing at Dar El-Beida Airport in Algiers, the aircraft was impounded by Algerian authorities, who took custody of the hijackers and surrounded the plane with security forces. Within 24 hours, 23 non-Israeli passengers were permitted to disembark and were flown to Rome for release, leaving the 12 Israeli nationals—comprising five male passengers and seven crew members, including the injured first officer—detained as hostages under tight guard, initially confined to the aircraft or a nearby security base with restricted movement and minimal provisions. The detainees faced armed oversight, with reports of guards pointing weapons during basic activities, setting the stage for prolonged hardship.

Detention in Algeria

Upon landing at Dar El-Beida Airport in on July 23, 1968, Algerian authorities took custody of the aircraft, its three hijackers from the for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), and all 38 passengers and 10 crew members aboard Flight 426. The Algerian government, supportive of the PFLP's cause, refused immediate release of the plane or hostages, instead facilitating the hijackers' demands for prisoner exchanges while holding the captives under guard. Within 24 hours, 23 non-Israeli passengers were permitted to depart for , reducing the number detained. On July 27, Algerian officials authorized the release of 10 women passengers and members, along with three children, leaving 12 men—seven members and five passengers, including two employees—as the remaining hostages. These detainees were initially confined to a base, where conditions included limited food rations prompting a , constant by guards (including during personal needs like using the toilet), and routine interrogations by Algerian personnel that survivor accounts described as non-violent but psychologically taxing. Approximately two weeks into the standoff, the hostages were transferred to a private villa, briefly experiencing improved accommodations with meals prepared by a chef during a phase, before reverting to harsher constraints amid stalled talks. The detention lasted 39 days, marking it as the longest aircraft hijacking in history at the time, with no reported fatalities among the hostages despite the prolonged ordeal and fears of execution evoked by the environment reminiscent of imprisonment. Hostages relied on mutual support for morale, with one crew member, a survivor, helping to steady the group during interrogations and uncertainties. Algerian cooperation with the PFLP extended to broadcasting from the hijackers, amplifying demands for over 1,000 releases from , though the final resolution involved only a fraction of that number.

Negotiations and Resolution

Israeli Diplomatic Efforts

Following the hijacking of El Al Flight 426 on July 23, 1968, Israel initiated indirect diplomatic negotiations with Algeria, as the two nations lacked formal relations. Israeli officials coordinated through third-party channels, including neutral intermediaries, to secure the release of the 22 Israeli hostages (10 crew and 12 passengers) held in Algiers. Prime Minister Levi Eshkol's government explicitly rejected the hijackers' demands—backed by Algerian authorities—for the release of Palestinian prisoners in Israeli custody, viewing such concessions as setting a dangerous precedent for future terrorism. Instead, Israel emphasized the illegality of the act under international aviation law and pressed for the hostages' unconditional return. A key element of Israel's strategy involved leveraging economic pressure on via the international community. diplomats, in coordination with and global carriers, supported a boycott of Algerian airspace and services organized by the (IATA), which halted flights to and inflicted significant financial losses estimated in the millions of dollars daily. This measure, initiated shortly after the hijacking, amplified diplomatic isolation on , prompting internal reconsiderations in despite initial support for the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) hijackers. Concurrently, Jewish organizations such as the and lobbied foreign governments and applied moral suasion, reporting incremental progress in backchannel communications. These efforts culminated after 39 days of captivity, with the hostages released on , 1968, without any prisoner exchanges or direct payments to the hijackers. The Algerian government, facing mounting economic strain from the , facilitated the departure of the via a flight to , while granting asylum to the three PFLP perpetrators. The aircraft itself was returned separately to after El Al reimbursed Algeria approximately $5 million for claimed damages, framed as compensation rather than to avoid legitimizing the . This outcome underscored Israel's preference for sustained diplomatic and economic coercion over immediate capitulation, influencing subsequent hostage crisis responses.

Demands, Ransom, and Exchanges

The hijackers, members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), initially demanded the release of over 1,000 Palestinian prisoners held by , with Algerian authorities relaying and backing these demands during negotiations. Israel rejected the broad prisoner release but agreed to free 16 Palestinian prisoners as a limited humanitarian gesture to facilitate hostage return. No monetary ransom was paid by or for the hostages or aircraft, despite Algeria's initial refusal to return the 707 without compensation equivalent to its estimated $7 million value. The resolution hinged on international pressure, including a boycott organized by the International Federation of Air Line Pilots' Associations, which grounded flights to and strained its economy, prompting the release of remaining hostages on September 1, 1968, after 39 days. The aircraft was subsequently returned to , and the three hijackers were freed by Algerian authorities without facing prosecution. This exchange marked a precedent for using limited concessions and external economic leverage over capitulation to expansive terrorist demands.

Release of Hostages and Hijackers

The non- passengers, numbering approximately 23, were released on July 24, 1968, and repatriated to via a special flight arranged by Algerian authorities. On July 27, ten women passengers, along with three children and some crew members, were freed following initial negotiations, leaving 12 men—comprising seven crew members and five passengers—as the remaining hostages aboard the aircraft. The final group of 12 hostages was released on August 1, 1968, after agreed to pay a of $35,000 per hostage, totaling $420,000, and to exchange two Algerian diplomats detained in on espionage charges; the funds were transferred via Swiss bank channels under Algerian mediation. The three hijackers, members of the for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), were not extradited or prosecuted; instead, granted them political asylum, allowing them to remain in the country without facing immediate consequences for the hijacking.

Immediate Aftermath

Impact on Passengers and Crew

During the on July 23, 1968, the hijackers stormed the and assaulted first officer Maoz Poraz, but no fatalities or additional physical injuries occurred among the 38 passengers and 10 crew members. Twenty-three non- passengers were released within 24 hours of landing in and flown back to . Ten women, including likely some crew members, were freed on July 27. The remaining 12 males—five passengers and seven crew—endured 39 days of detention until their release on September 1, 1968. Initial conditions at an Algerian security base involved limited food supplies and constant armed surveillance, with hostages subjected to non-violent interrogations and restrictions such as escorted toilet visits. After about two weeks, the group was transferred to a private villa, though they were later returned to more austere settings under Algerian custody. The ordeal produced notable psychological strain, including acute anxiety and lasting post-traumatic reactions such as aversion to depictions of prisons or . Trainee pilot Avner Slapak recounted an initial adrenaline-driven attempt to resist the hijackers at gunpoint, followed by a prolonged recovery period without contemporary psychological support frameworks. Passenger Yonah Lichtman, a survivor, mitigated group distress by drawing on his prior experiences to reassure fellow captives.

Legal and Diplomatic Repercussions

The Algerian authorities detained the three hijackers without prosecuting them for the act, granting them protection in line with the country's support for Palestinian militant groups, despite the 1963 on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft requiring signatory states to either prosecute or extradite hijackers. The hijackers were permitted to depart following the resolution of the crisis, avoiding any legal accountability under Algerian jurisdiction. Diplomatic negotiations, conducted indirectly through third parties due to the absence of formal -Algeria relations, culminated in the release of the 12 remaining Israeli hostages and the Boeing 707 aircraft on September 1, 1968, after 40 days of captivity. In exchange, Israel authorized the release of 16 convicted Palestinian prisoners held in its custody, framed domestically as a humanitarian gesture rather than a direct ransom, though the concession faced criticism for potentially encouraging future hijackings. International pressure played a decisive role, with the International Federation of Air Line Pilots' Associations imposing a global on flights to Algerian airports, effectively isolating the country from networks until compliance. This underscored emerging norms against state complicity in hijackings, though no formal sanctions or legal proceedings were initiated against through bodies like the . The episode reinforced Israel's perception of as a sponsor of anti-Israel , exacerbating longstanding hostilities without altering the non-recognition status between the two nations.

Long-Term Impact

Changes in El Al Security Protocols

The hijacking of Flight 426 on July 23, 1968, by members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine represented the first successful seizure of an Israeli commercial airliner, prompting the Israeli government and to formalize and intensify aviation security protocols that had been developing informally amid rising threats. In direct response, Israel instituted comprehensive airport screening procedures in 1968, emphasizing risk-based passenger selection through ethnic and behavioral to preempt threats before boarding. These measures involved pre-flight interviews, observation of passenger demeanor for indicators of deception or nervousness, and targeted searches of high-risk individuals, diverging from universal screening in favor of intelligence-driven selectivity. El Al integrated these ground protocols with enhanced in-flight safeguards, including the deployment of armed undercover agents—often referred to as "heaven marshals"—trained in counter-terrorism tactics to intervene against hijackers. training was upgraded to include resistance techniques and threat recognition, while aircraft access points were fortified with reinforced doors and communication redundancies. The multifaceted approach, layering , technology, and armed response, yielded immediate results: between 1968 and 1979, Palestinian groups attempted 11 hijackings of Israeli planes, all of which failed due to these protocols. The enduring efficacy of these changes is evidenced by the absence of any successful since 1968, contrasting with the global wave of over 300 attempts from 1968 to 1972. Behavioral detection officers, deployed across terminals, continue to form a element, relying on empirical observation rather than solely technological scanners to identify anomalies, a practice refined from post-1968 implementations. This framework prioritized causal threat mitigation over procedural uniformity, attributing success to proactive informed by the specific vulnerabilities exposed in the Flight 426 incident, such as inadequate pre-departure vetting at foreign s.

Influence on Global Aviation Security

The hijacking of El Al Flight 426 on July 23, 1968, by members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) represented a pivotal shift toward politically motivated , diverting the Boeing 707 to and holding passengers for 39 days in exchange for prisoners and ransom. This event, as the first successful PFLP aircraft seizure, highlighted the strategic use of hijackings for publicity, leverage, and symbolic attacks on state symbols like Israel's national carrier, prompting international recognition of civil 's vulnerability to non-state actors beyond individual criminals. It contributed to a surge of 33 hijackings worldwide in 1968-1969, catalyzing early discussions on standardized countermeasures within bodies like the (ICAO). In response, elevated 's protection to a imperative, instituting layered protocols including behavioral passenger profiling, undercover armed sky marshals on flights, mandatory x-raying and explosive trace detection, and pre-flight intelligence vetting—measures that prevented any subsequent successful . These innovations, developed post-1968, diverged from reactive approaches elsewhere by emphasizing proactive over post-incident fixes, with agents conducting off-site surveillance at foreign departure points. Globally, 's model influenced airlines facing similar threats; for instance, U.S. carriers adopted armed marshals in the early 1970s amid escalating , while ICAO's 1970 —accelerated by events like this—mandated criminalization of unlawful seizures and state cooperation, laying groundwork for treaties. The incident underscored causal links between geopolitical conflicts and risks, shifting policy from responses to systemic defenses; by 1973, this momentum supported FAA mandates for metal detectors and magnetometers at U.S. airports, though remained contentious outside due to implementation variances. El Al's enduring zero-hijacking record since 1968 validated these methods' efficacy, earning emulation in high-risk regions and informing layered doctrines that prioritize and human judgment over uniform screening alone.

Legacy and Perspectives

Historical Significance in Aviation Terrorism

The hijacking of Flight 426 on July 23, 1968, by three members of the for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) marked the inaugural successful seizure of an commercial airliner, diverting the Boeing 707 from to to , . This event initiated a pattern of politically motivated aircraft hijackings targeting , leveraging civilian passengers and crew—10 hostages in this case—as bargaining chips to demand the release of Palestinian militants imprisoned in and . Unlike prior hijackings primarily driven by individual fugitives seeking asylum, the PFLP operation exemplified organized terrorism's exploitation of aviation's international mobility and media visibility to advance ideological goals, holding hostages for 40 days until concessions freed 14 prisoners. Historians identify the incident as heralding the "advent of air terrorism," shifting tactics from sporadic diversions to systematic, group-orchestrated assaults on as instruments of . The PFLP's success demonstrated 's vulnerability to low-resource operations—hijackers used concealed firearms smuggled aboard—prompting immediate countermeasures, including the establishment of dedicated units under oversight, which thwarted all 11 subsequent Palestinian attempts to hijack flights between 1968 and 1979. This response model influenced broader efforts, as the event underscored the need for pre-boarding screening and armed sky marshals, contributing to the evolution of global anti-hijacking protocols amid a surge in similar incidents during the late and . The hijacking's legacy endures in aviation terrorism's tactical playbook, where hostage exchanges set precedents for later operations by Palestinian factions and other groups, amplifying terrorism's coercive potential against state adversaries. Despite Algeria's facilitation of the hijackers' escape, the incident exposed diplomatic fault lines in host-state complicity, reinforcing causal links between ungoverned support for militants and escalated aviation threats, unmitigated by prevailing norms until reinforced multilateral conventions emerged.

Israeli and Palestinian Viewpoints

The Israeli government and public viewed the hijacking of El Al Flight 426 as an unprovoked act of terrorism by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), marking the onset of systematic aviation attacks against i targets. Officials emphasized that the operation targeted civilian passengers and crew, with the 39-day hostage ordeal—during which captives were held in under harsh conditions—exemplifying the PFLP's strategy of leveraging international sympathy for Palestinian grievances to coerce concessions from . This perspective framed the incident causally as an extension of broader Arab-i hostilities post-1967 , where non-state actors like the PFLP sought to undermine 's sovereignty through asymmetric violence rather than conventional warfare. Survivors and analysts, including pilot Yigael Slapak, later argued that yielding to hijacker demands perpetuated cycles of abduction, influencing 's reluctance to make blanket concessions in subsequent hostage crises. From the PFLP's standpoint, the represented a tactical in the armed struggle for Palestinian liberation, aimed at compelling to release detained militants by internationalizing the conflict and exposing alleged injustices. The group, a Marxist-Leninist faction rejecting negotiations in favor of revolutionary violence, demanded the freeing of over 1,000 Palestinian prisoners held by , viewing the operation—facilitated by Algerian support—as a legitimate strike against what they termed Zionist imperialism and occupation of . This rationale aligned with the PFLP's broader doctrine, established under founder , which prioritized high-visibility actions to rally global leftist support and pressure Western allies of , even as such tactics alienated moderate Palestinian elements and provoked retaliatory security reforms.

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