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Election Systems & Software


Election Systems & Software, LLC (ES&S) is an company headquartered in , that develops, manufactures, and services hardware and software for election administration, including scanners, marking devices, and tabulation systems used in jurisdictions across the .
Founded in 1979 as American Information Systems Inc. and later merging with Business Records Corporation, ES&S has expanded through acquisitions and innovation to become the dominant vendor in the U.S. equipment market, with its systems handling for approximately half of voters.
The company's products, such as the DS200 high-speed scanner and AutoMARK marking device, emphasize paper-based with verifiable trails to support post-election verification, and all systems undergo certification testing for accuracy and .
ES&S systems have faced scrutiny in assessments and demonstrations revealing exploitable vulnerabilities, such as in software configurations and physical access points, leading to recommendations for enhanced safeguards like air-gapped networks and routine despite the company's implementation of encryption and multi-layer protections.

Company Overview

Founding and Corporate Profile

Election Systems & Software, LLC (ES&S) traces its origins to August 1979, when it was established as American Information Systems, Inc. (AIS) in . The company was founded by brothers Bob Urosevich and Ron Urosevich, alongside several former employees of Election Systems, following Westinghouse's withdrawal from the voting equipment market. Initially, AIS developed and supplied punch-card voting systems, such as the Votomatic, capitalizing on the need for reliable tabulation technology amid growing demands for accurate . In 1997, the firm rebranded to Election Systems & Software to reflect its expanded focus on integrated software solutions alongside hardware. Headquartered at 11208 Blvd. in , ES&S operates as a privately held . Ownership is held entirely by American entities, with the McCarthy Group and individual ES&S management members as principal stakeholders; the McCarthy Group initially partnered with the founders before assuming full control. ES&S specializes in manufacturing systems, management software, optical scan tabulators, ballot production, and tools, serving election administrators nationwide. The company's mission emphasizes delivering trusted, proven technologies to support integrity and efficiency.

Market Dominance and Economic Impact

Election Systems & Software (ES&S) maintains a dominant position in the U.S. equipment market, serving jurisdictions that encompass approximately 43.8% of the nation's registered voters, or over 83 million individuals, as of data compiled in 2021. This translates to presence in roughly 2,360 jurisdictions, making ES&S the largest vendor among an where it, , and Hart InterCivic collectively control about 90-92% of the market. The company's equipment is used in across nearly half of U.S. states, with particular strength in optical scan systems and ballot marking devices. ES&S's economic footprint includes an estimated annual revenue in the range of $100-150 million, derived from equipment sales, maintenance contracts, and services within an industry generating around $300 million yearly. Employing approximately 500-700 people primarily in Omaha, Nebraska, the firm benefits from recurring revenue streams where maintenance and support constitute about two-thirds of industry income, often locking jurisdictions into long-term dependencies due to high switching costs and proprietary systems. Procurement examples illustrate this scale: counties routinely spend millions on ES&S upgrades, such as Fairfax County's $6.5 million contract or Johnson County's $1.5 million outlay for new hardware. The company's market dominance exerts broader economic pressure on election administration, contributing to elevated costs amid limited competition and infrequent federal funding since the Help America Vote Act of 2002. High , including certification expenses exceeding $1 million per system and lengthy federal testing, favor incumbents like ES&S, stifling innovation and resulting in taxpayer-funded expenditures that are lumpy and tied to aging infrastructure replacements every 10-20 years. This structure has drawn criticism for enabling vendor practices such as litigation against competitors and lobbying to influence procurement, potentially inflating prices without commensurate improvements in reliability or security.

Historical Evolution

Early Precursors and Formation (1970s-1980s)

In the 1970s, the precursors to modern election tabulation systems emerged amid efforts to automate beyond mechanical levers and punch cards, driven by the need for faster, more accurate processing of paper ballots. Business Records Corporation (BRC), a Dallas-based subsidiary of Industries, developed the Optech optical mark-sense in the mid-1970s, enabling central-count tabulation of hand-marked ballots by detecting filled ovals or bubbles. This technology addressed limitations of earlier punch-card systems, which had been plagued by issues like hanging chads, though BRC's systems still required manual verification for ambiguities. American Information Systems (AIS) was founded in August 1979 in , by Bob Urosevich, who served as its president until 1992. AIS specialized in central-count ballot scanners, introducing hardware and software for aggregating votes from precinct-level paper ballots at county facilities, marking an early shift toward integrated election management tools. By 1982, became one of the first states to deploy AIS scanners officially for statewide elections, demonstrating their feasibility for large-scale use despite nascent concerns over software reliability in untested environments. The formation of what became Election Systems & Software (ES&S) occurred through the 1980 merger of AIS and BRC, combining AIS's scanning innovations with BRC's Optech line to create a unified provider of optical scan and tabulation services. This consolidation occurred amid growing demand for computerized systems following the punch-card failures in elections like Florida's 1960s recounts, though early implementations lacked standardized federal oversight, relying on state-level testing. The merged entity adopted the ES&S name in , solidifying its focus on hardware-software bundles for vote capture and reporting. During the , these systems expanded to over 30 states, prioritizing efficiency over direct-recording electronics, which remained experimental.

Expansion Through Acquisitions (1990s-2000s)

In 1997, Election Systems & Software (ES&S) was formed through the merger of American Information Systems (AIS), an Omaha-based developer of optical scan tabulation software founded in 1979, and Business Records Corporation (BRC), a firm specializing in punch-card voting systems. This consolidation combined complementary technologies, enabling ES&S to provide solutions that addressed diverse state requirements for tabulation and positioned the company as a leading vendor in the fragmented U.S. election equipment market. By integrating AIS's software expertise with BRC's hardware capabilities, ES&S rapidly expanded its product portfolio, including the Optech optical scanners derived from BRC's lineage, which became widely adopted for processing paper ballots. The merger facilitated ES&S's growth amid rising demand for automated voting systems in the late 1990s, as jurisdictions sought to replace manual counting amid disputes like the 2000 presidential election recount. ES&S leveraged the combined entity's scale to secure contracts in over 30 states by the early , emphasizing between punch-card and optical technologies during a transitional period before federal mandates shifted preferences. This expansion through technological amalgamation, rather than development, allowed ES&S to capture significant without the full costs of independent R&D duplication. In the mid-2000s, following the Help America Vote Act of 2002 which spurred upgrades to accessible voting systems, ES&S pursued further acquisitions to bolster its direct-recording electronic (DRE) offerings. A pivotal move occurred in when ES&S acquired , the election systems subsidiary of Diebold Inc., encompassing DRE machines like the AccuVote TSX used in multiple states and serving approximately 1,000 jurisdictions. The deal, valued at an undisclosed sum but involving assets generating tens of millions in annual revenue, aimed to unify ES&S's portfolio under a single vendor model but triggered U.S. Department of Justice antitrust scrutiny over reduced competition in a market already concentrated among few providers. In 2010, a settlement required ES&S to divest specific Premier assets, including and hardware inventory, to Hart InterCivic to preserve competitive options for election officials.

Recent Ownership and Management Shifts (2010s-Present)

In 2009, Election Systems & Software (ES&S) acquired , the voting systems division of Diebold Inc., for approximately $5 million, aiming to expand its market share in equipment. The U.S. Department of Justice challenged the deal under antitrust laws, citing concerns that it would reduce competition in the sale of direct recording electronic (DRE) voting machines, as ES&S would control over 70% of the U.S. market for such systems post-acquisition. In March 2010, ES&S agreed to a requiring divestiture of Premier's DRE assets, including the TSx and AccuVote-TSx machines, to Hart InterCivic Inc., while retaining optical scan and other non-DRE technologies from Premier. This partial integration bolstered ES&S's portfolio in scanner-based systems but preserved some market competition in voting hardware. Ownership of ES&S, historically private and employee-influenced, saw increased involvement from during the , with McCarthy Capital (also referred to as McCarthy Group) emerging as a key stakeholder alongside company management. By the mid-2010s, ES&S described itself as 100% American-owned by McCarthy Capital and individual management members, reflecting a recapitalization structure that provided without listing. This arrangement maintained operational continuity but drew scrutiny for limited transparency in private equity-backed election vendors, amid broader concerns over foreign dependencies rather than direct shifts. No major ownership changes have been publicly reported since, with McCarthy Capital retaining control into the 2020s. Management leadership transitioned in late 2014, when Tom Burt, then president and , was appointed CEO effective January 1, 2015, succeeding Aldo Tesi, who had led the company through the integration and earlier expansions. Burt's tenure emphasized federal and system modernization, including enhancements to election management software amid post-2016 election security debates. No subsequent CEO changes have occurred, with Burt remaining in the role as of 2025, focusing on operational reliability in high-volume U.S. elections.

Technological Framework

Core Hardware Components

Election Systems & Software (ES&S) employs a range of components centered on optical ballot scanners and assistive marking devices to facilitate paper-based , emphasizing verifiable records over direct recording. These systems integrate commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) elements with proprietary customizations to meet federal certification standards under the Voluntary Voting System Guidelines (VVSG). Core includes precinct and central tabulators for scanning hand-marked or machine-printed , alongside ballot marking devices (BMDs) for voters requiring assistance. The DS200 serves as a primary precinct scanner and tabulator, designed for deployment at polling places to scan and preliminarily tabulate ballots using technology. It supports both hand-marked optical ballots and those produced by BMDs, with capacity to process ballots in real-time during election day while generating auditable images for post-election verification. The device features a rugged, portable suitable for mobile precinct use and includes features like automatic ballot rejection for errors, ensuring high throughput without compromising accuracy. For central count operations, the DS850 high-speed scanner handles large volumes of absentee, mail-in, and provisional , capable of processing up to 300 double-sided 14-inch ballots per minute. This central tabulator employs advanced digital scanning to capture ballot images at high , enabling efficient aggregation of results from multiple precincts and integration with management software for reporting. Its design prioritizes speed and reliability in post- canvassing, with built-in safeguards against overcounting or misreads. Assistive hardware includes the AutoMARK Voter Assist Terminal, a BMD that allows voters with disabilities to independently mark via audio, tactile, or visual interfaces before printing a paper for scanning. The AutoMARK uses a with sip-and-puff or paddle mechanisms for input, producing scannable optical that maintain voter privacy and verifiability. Complementing this, the ExpressVote system combines selection with immediate paper generation and on-screen , reducing errors in complex races through programmable logic that mirrors precinct-specific layouts. Newer iterations, such as the DS300 scanner, extend these capabilities by supporting seamless tabulation across , , and central operations, incorporating enhanced imaging for diverse ballot sizes and formats. All ES&S hardware undergoes rigorous testing for durability, with components sourced through vetted supply chains to mitigate risks of tampering or failure in high-stakes environments.

Election Management Software

Electionware is the proprietary election management system (EMS) software developed by Election Systems & Software (ES&S) for preparing, administering, and reporting on elections. It provides an end-to-end platform for election officials to define election parameters, design ballots, configure voting equipment, process results, and generate reports, supporting jurisdictions handling complex elections with diverse ballot styles and precincts. The software operates on a hardened server environment within a closed network, enabling multi-user access for simultaneous tasks such as data entry and result loading while maintaining data integrity through enforced validation protocols. Key features include capacity for up to 15,000 ballot styles and nearly 10,000 precincts, multilingual support, and accommodations for , absentee ballots, overseas voting, and Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) compliance requirements. Its user interface incorporates an intuitive toolbar and workflow-based modules—such as Define for data capture, for ballot layout, Deliver for equipment setup, Results for tabulation and , and Reports for customized outputs—to streamline operations and reduce errors via reusable templates and import. The system uses a single to ensure uniformity across processes, facilitating quick adjustments for varying jurisdictional rules and types. In typical workflow, election administrators begin by importing and data, generating ballot proofs for , and programming devices like optical scanners or ballot marking devices with encrypted files via proprietary flash drives. Post-election, results from precinct tabulators or central count systems are loaded into the for of ambiguous , canvassing, and aggregation into official tallies, with capabilities for election night unofficial . Integration with ES&S tools, such as pollbooks and on Demand printers, allows seamless flow, while audit logs and hash validations support post-election verification. As of May 2024, Electionware emphasizes productivity enhancements like automated accuracy checks to handle high-volume elections efficiently.

Security Protocols and Federal Certifications

ES&S voting systems employ a multi-layered to mitigate risks of tampering, unauthorized access, and . The framework consists of six core layers: , which utilizes tamper-evident seals and locks on to detect and deter physical interference; system hardening, restricting devices to election-specific functions on locked-down computers that reject unauthorized USB drives and limit user privileges; and secure data handling, featuring audit logs that record every user action for forensic review. Additional layers include unique per-election encryption keys that ensure ballot definition files on programming media are validated before loading, preventing the use of altered USBs; cryptographic validation with (FIPS)-compliant modules to authenticate data transfers between components; and independent verification through testing by U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC)-accredited laboratories, confirming system resilience against simulated threats. These protocols extend to air-gapped networks for servers, role-based access controls limiting functionality by user type, and procedural safeguards like chain-of-custody documentation for and devices. All ES&S personnel complete annual training, contributing to a reported 100% compliance rate, while systems undergo pre-certification testing requiring zero errors in processing 1.5 million ballot positions consecutively. ES&S also maintains a vulnerability disclosure policy and collaborates with federal entities such as the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and (CISA) to align practices with national election security guidelines. Federal certifications for ES&S systems are administered by the EAC, which tests and approves hardware and software against the Voluntary Voting System Guidelines (VVSG), incorporating security benchmarks for encryption, access controls, and auditability. As of July 24, 2024, the EVS 6.5.0.0 system holds EAC under VVSG 1.0 (2005), marking the latest in a series of approvals dating back to EVS 5.0.0.0 on May 16, 2013. Over 20 ES&S variants, including modifications to EVS 6.0 through 6.4 series certified between 2018 and 2023, comply with these guidelines, which mandate protections against unauthorized modifications and ensure verifiable results. VVSG 1.0 emphasizes principles like software independence—allowing outcomes to be verified against paper records—and cryptographic integrity, tested via reviews and penetration attempts by independent labs. While VVSG 2.0, adopted by the EAC on February 10, 2021, introduces enhanced security principles such as risk-limiting audits and open-source components, ES&S fielded systems remain certified to VVSG 1.0, with ongoing development for VVSG 2.1 compatibility expected by 2025; EAC policy permits security patches and minor upgrades to VVSG 1.0 systems without full recertification. State-level approvals build on federal certifications, often incorporating additional logic and accuracy testing.

Deployment and Operational Use

Adoption in U.S. Jurisdictions

Election Systems & Software (ES&S) voting systems are deployed in approximately 1,531 counties across the , encompassing a broad range of hardware including ballot scanners like the DS200 and DS850, and ballot marking devices such as the ExpressVote and AutoMARK. These deployments support both precinct and central-count operations, often integrated with paper s for post-election auditing, aligning with federal recommendations following the Help America Vote Act of 2002 and subsequent security guidelines. ES&S equipment processes s in jurisdictions representing tens of millions of registered voters, with the company's ExpressVote units alone installed in over 1,400 locations by late 2019, facilitating verifiable paper records in high-volume settings. In states with decentralized election administration, such as , ES&S dominates adoption, with the majority of the state's 254 counties utilizing its EVS software, DS200 , and ExpressVote markers as of February 2025. Similarly, in , multiple counties employ ES&S systems for optical scanning and voter-assisted marking, contributing to the processing of millions of s in the 2020 general election. California counties including Merced and Modoc rely on ES&S EVS 6.0.4.2 for tabulation, while counties continue and use of ES&S 5.0 and 6.0 versions post-2023 reviews. This widespread county-level uptake reflects ES&S's compatibility with state-specific processes, though adoption decisions remain local, influenced by factors like cost, existing infrastructure, and compliance with auditable paper trails. Recent trends show increased integration of ES&S's paper-based technologies amid post-2020 emphases on risk-limiting audits and voter-verifiable records, with systems like the ExpressVote XL deployed for touchscreen-assisted ballot marking that produces scannable paper outputs. In , ES&S EVS 6.5.0.0 supports ExpressVote BMDs and absentee scanning, as certified for statewide use. Deployments in jurisdictions like , and , demonstrate scalability for urban areas, where high-speed scanners handle provisional and mail-in ballots efficiently during peak election periods. Overall, ES&S maintains a leading position among the three primary vendors—alongside and Hart InterCivic—collectively serving about 90% of the U.S. voting technology market, though exact voter coverage varies by election cycle and jurisdiction upgrades.

International Implementations

Election Systems & Software (ES&S) voting technologies have achieved limited deployment outside the , contrasting with their extensive use in over 40 U.S. states serving approximately 80 million registered voters as of 2016. The company's international efforts have primarily involved pilot programs and municipal contracts in , where regulatory environments and preferences for paper-based or hybrid systems have constrained broader adoption. No verified implementations in , Latin American, or other sovereign nations beyond these Canadian cases were identified in public records or official disclosures. In , ES&S supplied an internet voting system for municipal elections, marking the first major Canadian municipality to trial such technology. The system was deployed for advance polls in the 2003 election at a cost of $25,000, enabling remote voting via secure online portals integrated with ES&S software. Subsequent uses occurred in 2006 and 2010, with evaluations including voter surveys showing satisfaction rates above 90% and post-election audits confirming result accuracy through risk-limiting techniques. Markham negotiated a discounted rate from ES&S to facilitate these trials, highlighting the vendor's willingness to adapt U.S.-developed platforms for Canadian contexts, though scalability concerns and security debates limited expansion. Beyond internet voting, Markham awarded ES&S a in 2018 for optical scan vote tabulation services, including and for paper ballots in municipal elections. This involved ES&S's central count scanners and election management software, certified for accuracy in high-volume tabulation, with the sole-bidder status underscoring limited competition from other vendors in the region. These deployments demonstrate ES&S's capability for hybrid electronic-paper systems but have not led to province-wide or national adoption in , where prioritizes verifiable paper trails over fully electronic solutions. ES&S's international footprint remains modest, influenced by stringent foreign certification requirements, geopolitical sensitivities around U.S. vendors, and preferences for domestically developed systems in countries like those in the . For instance, while ES&S has explored bids in U.S. territories such as , no confirmed operational use outside was documented, reflecting a strategic focus on domestic markets amid ongoing U.S. scrutiny.

Integration with Paper-Based Auditing

Election Systems & Software (ES&S) voting systems facilitate integration with paper-based auditing by generating voter-verified paper records that serve as the official vote of record, enabling manual recounts, fixed-percentage audits, and statistical methods such as risk-limiting audits (RLAs). These systems, including ballot marking devices (BMDs) like the ExpressVote XL and AutoMARK, produce optically scannable paper ballots marked either by voters or assistively, which voters can inspect and verify before tabulation. The paper ballots are then processed through precinct or central optical scanners, such as the DS200 or DS850, which tabulate votes while preserving the physical ballots for post-election verification. In auditing processes, ES&S configurations support comparisons between the ballots and the cast vote records (CVRs) produced by the management software (), such as Electionware. For fixed-percentage audits, officials randomly select precincts or machines and manually the corresponding ballots against the machine-tabulated results to confirm accuracy. This integration aligns with federal guidelines under the Voluntary Voting System Guidelines (VVSG) , which emphasize auditable trails for enhancing integrity. ES&S systems are compatible with RLAs, which use statistical sampling of paper ballots to assess the likelihood of incorrect outcomes with a predefined , typically 5-10%. A U.S. held by ES&S (No. 11,276,262, issued March 22, 2022) describes methods for processing provisional ballots and conducting RLAs within their voting systems, allowing jurisdictions to retrieve and interpret paper records efficiently during audits. States like , which adopted ES&S equipment post-2020, have implemented RLAs using these paper-based components to verify electronic tallies, demonstrating practical deployment as of the November 2020 . Older direct-recording (DRE) systems like the iVotronic could optionally include voter-verified trails (VVPATs) via thermal printers, but ES&S has shifted toward hybrid -first models to address limitations in fully setups without durable records. This evolution ensures that processes remain grounded in tangible evidence, mitigating risks of undetectable discrepancies in electronic-only tabulation.

Performance Assessments

Documented Reliability in High-Volume Elections


Election Systems & Software (ES&S) voting systems, including the DS200 precinct scanners and DS850 central tabulators, have processed ballots in numerous high-turnout U.S. elections, with federal and state validations confirming operational reliability. The U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC) certifies ES&S's Electionware Voting System (EVS) suites after rigorous testing, including volume tests simulating millions of ballots to ensure tabulation accuracy above 99.95% under VVSG standards. These certifications apply to systems deployed in large jurisdictions, where ES&S equipment handles central counting for statewide races.
In the 2020 general , ES&S systems tabulated votes amid record turnout exceeding 159 million nationwide, with deployment in states like and . 's conducted a comprehensive procedural and forensic of the , reviewing ES&S-supported counties and affirming no irregularities in vote capture or tabulation processes that would undermine results. State examinations of ES&S EVS 6.1.1.0 prior to deployment verified and software performance without defects affecting high-volume accuracy. Post-election audits in ES&S-using jurisdictions further document reliability. In Wisconsin's 2024 audit, officials hand-counted over 327,000 ballots from ES&S-tabulated precincts, confirming machine results with discrepancies below statistical margins for equipment error. Logic and accuracy (L&A) tests, standard before elections, validate ES&S scanners like the DS200 against test decks representing high-volume scenarios, ensuring precise mark recognition and rejection of invalid ballots. Pennsylvania's certification of ES&S EVS 6.0.3.0 for statewide use included evaluations of tabulation integrity in dense urban counties. While certifications and audits provide empirical backing, field reliability in high-volume contexts relies on paper trails for risk-limiting audits (RLAs), which ES&S systems support via ballot images and cast vote records. Deployments in elections with over 10 million voters, such as Texas's 2020 contest, showed no systemic failures in official reviews, though isolated overvote issues in some optical scan setups highlight design sensitivities rather than core tabulation errors. Overall, documented performance aligns with EAC-tested thresholds, with error rates from misreads or jams under 0.1% in audited large-scale events.

Empirical Data on Accuracy and Error Rates

Certification testing by the U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC) under the Voluntary Voting System Guidelines (VVSG) requires voting systems to demonstrate high tabulation accuracy through rigorous accuracy testing, where systems must process large volumes of —often exceeding one million ballot positions—with errors confined to allowable thresholds, typically achieving zero detectable discrepancies in controlled tests. For instance, in EAC certification for Election Systems & Software's EVS 6.3.0.0, the system accurately tabulated 1,549,703 consecutive ballot positions without exceeding the target error rate, confirming reliable vote aggregation and reporting under simulated high-volume conditions. These standards prioritize error rates below 1 in 500,000 for vote recording and tabulation to minimize systemic faults in and software components. Post-election audits provide empirical validation of deployed systems' performance. In the 2020 U.S. , risk-limiting audits and hand recounts across 27 states, encompassing over 71 million votes, resulted in a net shift of approximately 0.007% in the presidential vote tally, with comparable negligible discrepancies in other federal and state contests. Michigan's statewide post-election audits of 250 jurisdictions in 2021 similarly affirmed tabulation integrity, identifying no widespread machine errors and attributing minor variances to human handling rather than software or hardware failures. Optical scan systems, predominant in U.S. jurisdictions, exhibited tabulation error rates below 0.1% in these audits, primarily involving ambiguous voter marks resolvable via paper ballots, underscoring the causal role of verifiable paper records in confirming software accuracy. Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) systems, lacking inherent trails in some configurations, show internal vote capture rates under 0.5% in usability studies, though challenges arise without audit trails; federal guidelines now mandate voter-verifiable for certified DREs to enable empirical auditing comparable to optical scans. Comparative analyses indicate that machine tabulation outperforms manual counting, with hand recounts introducing higher margins (up to 1-2% in complex ballots) due to human fatigue and interpretation variability, as evidenced by controlled experiments and recounts where machine results aligned closely with audited tallies after correcting clerical discrepancies. These collectively demonstrate that certified software and maintain rates orders of magnitude below levels that could materially affect outcomes, contingent on proper deployment, pre-election logic-and-accuracy testing, and post-election protocols.

Innovations Enhancing Voter Confidence

Voter-verified audit trails (VVPATs) enable users of machines to inspect a record of their selections prior to finalizing their , providing a mechanism for individual verification that mitigates doubts about electronic tabulation accuracy. This innovation emerged prominently after the 2000 U.S. presidential election controversies, with systems like the iVotronic incorporating VVPAT printers to generate durable slips. Analyses of the 2004 election revealed that voters on direct-recording electronic (DRE) machines equipped with VVPAT expressed markedly higher confidence in vote counting compared to those using paperless DREs, with confidence rates aligning closer to users. By 2025, federal guidelines and state laws have phased out most paperless systems, requiring records in over 40 states either via VVPAT or hand-marked ballots scanned optically, thereby reducing unverifiable voting to isolated jurisdictions. Risk-limiting audits (RLAs) leverage statistical sampling of paper ballots to confirm electronic results with a bounded probability of error, typically set at 5% or 10%, offering post-election assurance without full manual recounts in uncontested cases. Pioneered by , RLAs expand sampling until the reported outcome withstands scrutiny or evidence of discrepancy emerges, applicable only to systems producing auditable paper records. As of 2025, states including , , , and mandate RLAs for certain contests, while executed its inaugural statewide RLA following the May 2025 primary. Empirical implementations, such as 's audits since 2017, have consistently affirmed results efficiently, with average sample sizes under 5% of ballots, fostering trust through demonstrable statistical rigor despite occasional public misperceptions about small samples. Open-source election management software promotes by exposing to independent review, countering opacity in systems from vendors like Election Systems & Software. Projects from the OSET Institute and VotingWorks enable code audits by researchers and officials, potentially uncovering flaws preemptively and diminishing reliance on vendor assurances. Pilots, including Microsoft's ElectionGuard in U.S. jurisdictions, integrate cryptographic verifiability with software to allow voters and observers to confirm and tally integrity end-to-end. These approaches, while not yet dominant, have gained traction in transparency-focused reforms, with advocates citing reduced vulnerability to insider manipulation as a direct enhancer of voter confidence over closed-source alternatives.

Controversies and Scrutiny

Certification and Regulatory Disputes

The U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC) administers a voluntary federal certification program for voting systems, involving laboratory testing for standards like and accessibility, but lacks enforcement authority, leaving states to grant binding approvals based on their criteria. This decentralized framework has led to disputes over ES&S system compliance, including allegations of misrepresented certifications and post-deployment failures prompting revocations. In January 2020, election integrity advocates petitioned the EAC, claiming ES&S falsely advertised its DS200 ballot scanners as EAC-certified when equipped with modems, as the certified version prohibited such features to mitigate risks. The EAC subsequently investigated and, by August 2020, directed ES&S to correct website assertions that its systems were unhackable and results-transmission air-gapped, given evidence of modem use in deployed units. ES&S complied by updating disclosures, but critics argued the incident exposed gaps in federal oversight of vendor marketing. State-level regulatory actions have included revocations tied to operational shortcomings. On December 23, 2024, the decertified ES&S's ExpressPoll electronic pollbooks after glitches during the November 5, 2024, , where devices in County and elsewhere failed to verify voters accurately, leading to delays, duplicate voting attempts, and erroneous ballot distribution affecting thousands. This impacted over 60 counties reliant on the system, forcing rushed procurements of alternatives like Knowink devices at costs exceeding $7 million in alone. Judicial challenges have further highlighted certification validity concerns. In March 2024, Election Integrity LLC filed suit against the State Board of Elections, alleging ES&S systems deployed statewide operated without valid EAC certifications, contravening federal requirements and exposing elections to unverified software risks. The complaint cited expired or incomplete federal accreditations, though state officials defended ongoing compliance reviews. Technical flaws in processes have compounded disputes. Analyses of ES&S systems revealed inconsistencies in cryptographic functions, intended to confirm unaltered software from certified versions to deployment, with mismatches in up to 10% of tested units undermining claims of preservation. Such issues, documented in 2021 reviews, prompted calls for enhanced audits beyond EAC baselines. Broader regulatory tensions include antitrust enforcement affecting certification dynamics. In 2010, the Department of sued ES&S over acquisitions of competitors like Diebold Election Systems, arguing the moves created a near-monopoly supplying 70% of U.S. voting equipment and reduced incentives for rigorous adherence. The settlement required divestitures but left ES&S dominant, with ongoing critiques of lax vendor accountability in fragmented state regimes.

Alleged Vulnerabilities and Hacking Claims

Security researchers have demonstrated vulnerabilities in systems through controlled hacking exercises, such as those at the Voting Village, where participants accessed and manipulated machines from vendors like Election Systems & Software (ES&S) and using physical access and basic tools. In 27 (2019), hackers exploited flaws in ES&S equipment, including the DS200 tabulator, to alter vote tallies and bypass seals within hours, highlighting risks from outdated software and weak encryption. Similar demonstrations at earlier events, including 25 (2017), revealed that many systems lacked robust , allowing unauthorized changes that could go undetected without paper audit trails. J. Alex Halderman, a of at the , has testified and reported on specific weaknesses in Dominion's ImageCast X (ICX) ballot-marking devices, used in states like . In a 2023 security analysis, Halderman detailed how attackers with brief physical access could install malicious software via USB ports or s, reprogram ballot definitions, and delete logs, exploiting vulnerabilities like unencrypted ballot data and default credentials. During a January 2024 federal court demonstration in Curling v. Raffensperger, Halderman overwrote ICX using a common and a Bic pen to access hidden ports, enabling vote manipulation in under two minutes without triggering alarms. The U.S. (CISA) corroborated several of these issues in a 2022 advisory, rating vulnerabilities in Dominion Democracy Suite ICX versions 5.5-A through 5.17-B as high severity, including and improper authentication affecting vote capture and tabulation. Claims of broader hacking extend to ES&S systems, where researchers identified flaws in hash verification for ballot images, potentially allowing tampered data to pass integrity checks if hashes are precomputed incorrectly. Academic studies have outlined systemic risks in electronic voting, such as buffer overflows, SQL injection in voter databases, and reliance on proprietary code without independent verification, which could enable insider or supply-chain attacks. Post-2020 election allegations, including assertions of remote hacks altering results in multiple states, have been advanced by figures like Sidney Powell but lack empirical evidence of execution, with federal investigations finding no outcome-determinative exploitation despite attempted foreign probes. These demonstrations underscore physical and software weaknesses but emphasize that verifiable paper records and risk-limiting audits mitigate risks, as exploitation typically requires insider access rather than remote capabilities in air-gapped deployments.

Specific Election Incidents and Post-Mortems

In Antrim County, Michigan, during the November 3, 2020, general election, Dominion Voting Systems tabulators initially reported erroneous results showing Joe Biden leading by approximately 3,000 votes in a county that ultimately favored Donald Trump by over 4,000 votes. The discrepancy arose from a failure by county officials to update the clerk's reporting computer with the correct election definition file before initial tabulation, leading to misreported precinct totals; this human error was compounded by inadequate pre-election logic and accuracy testing, as required by state law. A subsequent hand recount of all 16,000 ballots matched the corrected machine totals exactly, confirming no alteration of voter intent by the software itself. Independent forensic analysis by University of Michigan professor J. Alex Halderman identified exploitable vulnerabilities in the Dominion systems, such as weak passwords and unpatched software, but attributed the incident solely to procedural lapses rather than malicious code execution or vote switching. Post-mortems emphasized the need for rigorous pre-election testing and chain-of-custody protocols, noting that multiple safeguards failed due to understaffing and inexperience at the county level. The 2006 U.S. House election in Florida's 13th Congressional District, encompassing Sarasota County, featured an anomalously high undervote rate of 14.9%—over 18,000 ballots registered no vote in the tight race between Democrat Christine Jennings and Republican Vern Buchanan—using ES&S iVotronic direct-recording electronic (DRE) machines without a voter-verified paper audit trail. Buchanan won by 369 votes amid allegations of touchscreen failures preventing vote registration, with voters reporting screens reverting or races not appearing; federal testing by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) on sampled machines detected intermittent hardware glitches, such as power supply instability and calibration drifts, but no systemic software bugs capable of suppressing votes en masse. Academic analyses, including touch-screen interaction studies, attributed the bulk of undervotes to poor ballot design—featuring a confusing "scroll wheel" interface and visually clustered non-contested races that obscured the congressional contest—rather than machine malfunctions, as undervote rates were lower in adjacent counties using optical-scan paper systems for the same race. A National Academies of Sciences panel concluded the precise causes remained indeterminate without paper records, underscoring DRE limitations in unverifiable elections; Jennings' lawsuit for a revote was dismissed, but the incident spurred Florida's 2007 mandate for paper trails in all systems. Other documented cases, such as isolated calibration errors in counties during the 2016 election using older ES&S and Hart InterCivic machines, involved manual adjustments needed for touchscreens but did not alter certified outcomes after corrections; post-election reviews by state officials found these stemmed from aging hardware rather than software flaws, with error rates below 0.1% in affected precincts. In Georgia's 2020 election employing ballot-marking devices, a risk-limiting of over 5 million ballots confirmed machine tabulations matched hand counts with discrepancies under 0.01%, though independent assessments later revealed potential vulnerabilities like unencrypted ballot images; no linked these to result changes, and procedural audits highlighted errors in handling as the primary issues in minor miscounts. Across these incidents, post-mortems consistently identify procedural failures and design shortcomings as root causes over inherent software unreliability, while advocating for auditable paper records to enable empirical verification. In 2010, the U.S. Department of Justice filed an antitrust lawsuit against Election Systems & Software (ES&S) following its 2009 acquisition of Premier Election Solutions, a subsidiary of Diebold Inc., which positioned ES&S as the provider of voting equipment for over 70% of U.S. registered voters. The complaint alleged that the merger substantially lessened competition in the market for direct recording electronic (DRE) voting machines and optical scan systems, potentially leading to higher prices, reduced innovation, and limited choices for election officials. To resolve the case, ES&S agreed to divest specific assets, including hardware and software for optical scan tabulators and certain DRE systems, to a third party, while also waiving noncompete agreements for affected employees to facilitate re-entry of competitors. This intervention addressed concerns raised by figures such as Senate Rules Committee Chairman Chuck Schumer, who warned that the deal could grant one company control over 75% of the voting machine market, raising flags over potential adverse impacts on election administration. Subsequent scrutiny has highlighted ongoing issues, with ES&S maintaining dominance in approximately half of U.S. jurisdictions as of 2019, attributed by analysts to oversight, high , and infrequent cycles that discourage new vendors. Critics, including election integrity advocates, have argued that this oligopolistic structure—shared with a few other vendors—stifles competition and innovation, though ES&S has defended its position by emphasizing rigorous testing and compliance with federal standards. Legal challenges to ES&S systems have primarily centered on certification processes, machine reliability, and voter verifiability. In , Citizens for Better Elections settled a in 2023 challenging the state's of the ES&S ExpressVote XL, a -marking device, after concerns over its paper verification features; the settlement affirmed the system's voter-verifiable paper trail but prompted enhanced scrutiny protocols. Similarly, in , Common Cause/NY and The Black Institute filed suit in November 2023 against the State Board of Elections, alleging improper of the ExpressVote XL due to deficiencies in verifiability, , and with state law requiring voter-verified paper records, describing it as an "expensive and below standard" system. In , a 2023 circuit ruling dismissed a challenge to ES&S s, with Tim Fox upholding the ExpressVote paper as voter-verifiable and rejecting claims of insecurity. Other disputes include a 2020 North Carolina by voting rights groups contesting the legality of ES&S's new electronic pollbooks and scanners for lacking adequate safeguards against errors and hacks, though the case focused on implementation rather than outright decertification. In 2020, the U.S. Election Assistance Commission ordered ES&S to cease misleading claims about its systems' security, following accusations of overstating protections against foreign interference. These cases often involve partisan divides, with Republican-led challenges in states like and Democratic-aligned groups in , underscoring debates over empirical testing versus perceived vulnerabilities, though courts have frequently upheld certifications backed by federal laboratory accreditation.

Broader Implications

Impact on Election Integrity Debates

The adoption of systems, including direct-recording electronic (DRE) machines and optical-scan tabulators, has significantly amplified public and scholarly debates on election integrity since the passage of the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) in 2002, which accelerated the shift from punch-card and lever machines to computerized alternatives following the 2000 recount. Critics argue that these systems introduce risks of undetectable manipulation due to , lack of verifiable paper trails in some DRE , and potential remote access points, as demonstrated in controlled exercises where experts compromised machines in under two minutes. For instance, in the 2020 incident, a tabulator initially reported erroneous results due to a in software during an update, which was corrected after a hand recount matched paper ballots, though the event fueled widespread allegations of systemic flaws. Such episodes have heightened scrutiny, prompting calls for nationwide paper ballot mandates and enhanced post-election audits to mitigate causal risks from software bugs or threats, independent of intent. Empirical assessments, however, reveal high operational reliability when layered safeguards are employed, with post- audits across multiple states showing net discrepancies in presidential vote tallies averaging just 0.007%, primarily from human errors in data entry rather than machine malfunctions or . The U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC) and (CISA) emphasize that certified systems undergo rigorous testing, including logic and accuracy checks, with no documented instances of altered outcomes from cyber intrusions in federal ; CISA's joint statement affirmed the as "the most in American history" based on forensic reviews and protocols. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) research further supports this by outlining cybersecurity frameworks that prioritize air-gapped networks and software-independent verification, reducing error rates to below 0.1% in high-volume deployments when paper records enable risk-limiting audits. These findings underscore a distinction between theoretical vulnerabilities—exploitable in lab settings but rare in isolated, offline environments—and practical integrity, where multi-factor redundancies like voter-verified paper audit trails (VVPAT) have empirically preserved outcomes. The debates have polarized discourse, with integrity concerns often framed through lenses of distrust in institutions, exacerbated by the 2020 election cycle's high-visibility lawsuits and vendor-specific claims against systems like and ES&S, despite court rulings finding no evidence of widespread irregularities. This has driven , including 20 states adopting mandatory risk-limiting audits by 2024 and federal investments via the 2022 Electoral Count to bolster processes, yet persistent skepticism persists among segments of the electorate, correlating with lower in electronic tabulation over hand-counted paper methods. Mainstream analyses, frequently from academia and advocacy groups with documented ideological tilts, tend to attribute heightened doubts to rather than addressing root causes like outdated software cycles, potentially understating the need for transparent audits to rebuild causal confidence in system resilience. Overall, these dynamics highlight a tension between innovation's efficiency gains and the imperative for auditable transparency to counterbalance software opacity in high-stakes democratic processes.

Criticisms of Media and Partisan Narratives

Media outlets aligned with Republican partisanship, such as , aired unsubstantiated claims that election software from companies like manipulated vote tallies in the 2020 U.S. presidential election, including allegations of algorithms flipping votes from to . These narratives, promoted despite internal Fox assessments deeming them false, contributed to Dominion's lawsuit against the network, resulting in a $787 million settlement on April 18, 2023, without admission of wrongdoing but highlighting the broadcast of unverified partisan assertions. Similar claims extended to other vendors like Election Systems & Software (ES&S), where assertions of foreign interference or backdoors lacked forensic evidence from post-election audits and hand recounts in states like and , which confirmed original results within margins under 0.5%. Mainstream media responses often categorized broader inquiries into system vulnerabilities as extensions of "the Big Lie" or conspiracy theories, conflating the absence of outcome-altering fraud with the nonexistence of exploitable flaws. For instance, despite University of Michigan professor J. Alex Halderman's 2023 federal court demonstration in Georgia—where he hacked a Dominion touchscreen machine in minutes to alter votes undetected—coverage in outlets like The New York Times and CNN emphasized that such exploits required physical access unlikely in widespread operations, while downplaying implications for jurisdictions lacking verifiable paper backups. This framing, critics contend, reflects a systemic reluctance in left-leaning institutions to amplify security critiques that could fuel Republican-led reforms, even as peer-reviewed analyses and events like DEF CON Voting Village have repeatedly exposed outdated software, weak encryption, and modem connectivity risks in ES&S and Dominion systems since 2017. The resultant partisan echo chambers exacerbate distrust, with a September 2024 Gallup survey revealing an 56-point gap in confidence: 84% of Democrats versus 28% of Republicans believing votes were accurately cast and counted in 2020. Both sides' narratives prioritize ideological reinforcement over empirical scrutiny—right-wing amplification of unproven rigging absent chain-of-custody breaches or statistical anomalies, and left-leaning media minimization of risks despite federal advisories like CISA's acknowledgment of potential supply-chain compromises—undermining causal focus on mitigable errors, such as the 1-2% rejection rates in optical-scan systems documented in Verified Voting analyses. This dynamic has stalled non-partisan advancements, like mandatory risk-limiting audits, as evidenced by only 20 states implementing them by 2024 despite recommendations from the National Academies of Sciences.

Future Directions and Reforms

Ongoing reforms emphasize the adoption of voter-verified paper ballots as a foundational , with nearly all U.S. jurisdictions now incorporating paper records for the majority of votes cast, enabling post-election verification. Legislative efforts, such as House Bill 4152 introduced in 2025, mandate hand-marked paper ballots for all to enhance verifiability and reduce reliance on direct-recording (DRE) systems without paper trails. Federal initiatives, including a March 2025 directing the preservation of through secure, auditable technologies, further prioritize paper-based systems over purely ones to mitigate software vulnerabilities. Risk-limiting audits (RLAs), statistical methods that confirm election outcomes by sampling ballots until a predefined risk of error is exceeded, represent a key reform for probabilistic assurance of accuracy without full recounts. As of 2025, states like have implemented RLAs via legislation such as Senate Bill 1232, which integrates them into state election processes while preserving traditional audits for certain contests. The National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine advocate RLAs paired with paper ballots to foster evidence-based elections, noting their ability to build public confidence through transparent, data-driven validation. Pilots and adoption continue to expand, with organizations like Verified Voting promoting RLAs to statistically bound the chance of incorrect outcomes to a low threshold, typically 5-10%. Open-source election software initiatives aim to increase transparency and community scrutiny, countering proprietary "black box" systems prone to undetected flaws. Projects like , an SDK developed with support, enable end-to-end verifiable elections through cryptographic protocols that allow voters to confirm their votes without compromising secrecy. The OSET Institute and advance nonpartisan, open-source hardware and software, such as ballot-marking devices, to facilitate auditable processes and reduce . Recommendations from the Open Source Voting Technology Assessment Committee (OSVTAC) in 2023 urged precinct-based paper ballots over machine-marked ones where possible, influencing ongoing state procurements for modifiable, inspectable codebases. Emerging technologies like for remain exploratory, with research highlighting potential for immutable ledgers and smart contracts to secure remote , but , voter , and challenges limit practical deployment. Studies as recent as 2025 underscore 's cryptographic strengths for tamper resistance yet caution against overreliance due to unproven large-scale performance and risks of centralization in node control. Reforms in , via updates to the Election Assistance Commission's Voluntary Voting System Guidelines (VVSG 2.0), incorporate principles for software , , and against threats, with proposed changes in 2023 emphasizing precise vote recording and auditability. These directions collectively prioritize empirical verifiability over untested innovations, aiming to reconcile technological efficiency with causal safeguards against fraud or error.

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