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Ballot

A ballot is a device or process employed to record votes in elections, originally consisting of small balls cast secretly into urns and now encompassing paper slips, marked cards, or digital interfaces designed to conceal individual preferences from observers.^[1] The term originates from the Italian ballotta, denoting a diminutive ball used in anonymous voting assemblies, with precedents in ancient Greek and Roman practices where pottery shards or tokens served similar functions to mitigate coercion.^[2] The modern secret ballot system, which provides voters with standardized forms prepared by election authorities and marked privately, emerged in the mid-19th century, first adopted comprehensively in South Australia in 1856 to curb electoral bribery and intimidation prevalent under open voting methods.^[3] Ballots vary by jurisdiction and electoral design, supporting formats from simple candidate selection in first-past-the-post systems to preference rankings or party lists in proportional schemes, while electronic variants have proliferated since the late 20th century, though paper-based records persist for auditability and dispute resolution.^[4]^[5] Their integrity underpins democratic legitimacy, as flawed designs or handling—evident in historical disputes over ambiguous layouts—can undermine vote accuracy and public trust, necessitating rigorous verification protocols.^[6]

Etymology and Origins

Linguistic Evolution

The term "ballot" entered the English language in the 1540s, denoting a small ball employed in secret voting procedures, derived from Italian pallotte or ballotte, the diminutive form of palla meaning "ball," reflecting the historical use of such objects as voting counters.^[7] This Italian root traces further to Vulgar Latin palla, akin to words for spherical objects across Romance languages, with the voting connotation emerging from practices in medieval Italian city-states like Venice, where colored balls (pallotte nere for negative votes and pallotte bianche for affirmative) facilitated anonymous decisions in assemblies as early as the 13th century.^[2] ^[8] By the late 16th century, around the 1580s, the word's meaning evolved in English to encompass not only the physical ball but also the secret vote itself, extending from the concrete artifact to the abstract process of concealed suffrage, influenced by contemporaneous French ballotte (a small colored ball for urn voting) that paralleled Italian usage.^[7] This semantic broadening mirrored the transition from oral or raised-hand voting—prone to intimidation—to secretive methods, with "ballot" increasingly denoting the act of casting such a vote by the verb form emerging in the 1550s.^[9] In parallel, the noun shifted to include paper-based equivalents by the same period, as printed slips replaced balls in expanding electoral contexts, adapting the term to denote any voting instrument ensuring privacy.^[2] Over subsequent centuries, "ballot" solidified in English as a generic term for election voting documents or systems, detached from its original globular connotation, with the Oxford English Dictionary recording persistent associations with secrecy and proportionality in 17th-18th century citations from parliamentary and guild contexts.^[10] This evolution reflects broader linguistic patterns in political terminology, where object-derived words (e.g., from Latin tabella for "tablet" in earlier Roman voting) generalize to procedural nouns, though "ballot" uniquely retained its etymological link to anonymity amid 19th-century reforms promoting uniform paper ballots.^[8] Modern usages, such as "secret ballot" codified in international standards by the late 19th century, preserve this core emphasis on voter protection against coercion.^[2]

Ancient and Pre-Modern Forms

In ancient Athens during the 5th century BC, citizens employed ostraca—fragments of pottery inscribed with the name of a potential exile—for voting in the ostracism process, a democratic mechanism to temporarily banish individuals deemed threats to the state if at least 6,000 votes were cast.^[11] This method, introduced around 487 BC, allowed anonymous expression of public sentiment without direct confrontation. Jurors in Athenian courts also used secret ballots, initially pebbles (psephoi) and later bronze tokens or disks from the 5th to 3rd centuries BC, where voters inserted tokens into ballots to indicate guilty or acquittal verdicts while preventing premature revelation. Ancient Roman voting initially relied on oral declarations in assemblies, but the Lex Gabinia of 139 BC mandated secret ballots using wax tablets (tabellae) for consular elections to curb elite intimidation. Subsequent laws—the Lex Cassia (137 BC) for judicial votes, Lex Papiria (131 BC) for tribal assemblies, and Lex Coelia (107 BC) for plebeian council—extended this to legislative matters, with voters inscribing candidate names or symbols on tablets within fenced enclosures.^[12] These reforms aimed to enhance voter autonomy amid growing factionalism, though patrician influence persisted through voting order by wealth-based centuries.^[12] The term "ballot" derives from the Italian ballotta (diminutive of palla, "ball"), denoting small balls used for secret voting in medieval Italian republics, particularly Venice from the 13th century onward.^[7] Voters deposited colored balls—typically white for approval and black for rejection—into boxes during elections for doges and councils, a system facilitating anonymity in oligarchic deliberations.^[7] This practice influenced the modern concept of balloting, emphasizing concealed preferences to mitigate coercion, and persisted in European clubs and societies into the early modern era under terms like "blackballing" for exclusion.^[7]

Historical Development

Early Adoption in Democracies

In ancient Athens, the cradle of direct democracy, ballots first emerged as a mechanism for collective decision-making in the 5th century BCE. The practice of ostracism, instituted around 508 BCE by Cleisthenes as a democratic safeguard against internal threats, involved eligible male citizens inscribing the name of a suspected tyrant or influential figure on ostraca—fragments of pottery shards—during an annual vote held in the assembly.^[13] The process required a quorum of at least 6,000 valid ballots for an exile of ten years to take effect, with the first recorded ostracism occurring in 487 BCE against Hipparchus, brother of the deceased tyrant Hippias; this method prioritized preemptive civic protection over judicial punishment, reflecting causal concerns about power concentration eroding democratic equality.^[11] Archaeological excavations in the Athenian Agora have unearthed over 11,000 such ostraca, many bearing names like Themistocles (ostracized in 471 BCE), providing empirical verification of widespread participation among the roughly 30,000-40,000 eligible voters.^[11] Secret balloting extended to judicial contexts shortly thereafter, enhancing anonymity to counter bribery and elite coercion in jury trials. By the late 5th century BCE, large panels of up to 501 or 1,001 citizen-jurors—selected by lot from a pool exceeding 6,000—cast votes using bronze disks or pebbles marked with symbols for acquittal or conviction, inserted into ballot boxes at the end of proceedings.^[14] This reform, likely post-416 BCE amid revelations of judicial corruption during the Peloponnesian War, ensured verdicts reflected aggregate juror independence rather than external pressures, as each juror received matching tokens to prevent substitution.^[15] Surviving artifacts from the Agora, including pierced bronze balls designed for one-way insertion, demonstrate the mechanical sophistication aimed at verifiable, tamper-resistant outcomes in a system where majority rule determined guilt without appeals.^[14] While assembly votes often relied on acclamation or hand-shows for efficiency in large gatherings of thousands, the targeted use of ballots in ostracism and courts underscored early democratic recognition of anonymity's role in mitigating factionalism and undue influence, principles rooted in empirical observations of human incentives under public scrutiny.^[14] These practices, confined to male citizens excluding women, slaves, and metics (comprising about 80-90% of Athens' 300,000 population), exemplified causal realism in governance: ballots formalized dissent without disrupting daily direct participation, sustaining the regime until ostracism's decline after 416 BCE amid strategic abuses.^[11] Later Greek poleis, such as Syracuse under Timoleon in the 4th century BCE, adopted similar exilic voting, but Athens' innovations set precedents for ballot-based accountability in participatory systems.^[15]

Secret Ballot Reforms (19th Century)

The secret ballot was introduced during the 19th century to mitigate electoral abuses such as bribery, intimidation, and coercion, which thrived under open voting systems like viva voce declarations or party-issued, colored ballots that allowed verification of votes.^[16]^[17] In these prior methods, employers, landlords, and political bosses could pressure voters or confirm compliance with bought votes, undermining free choice.^[18] The reform shifted to government-printed, uniform ballots marked privately by voters, ensuring anonymity and reducing traceability.^[19] South Australia pioneered the secret ballot in 1856 for its legislative council elections, implementing it alongside universal male suffrage for those over 21, making it the world's first such democratic system.^[3] Voters received official ballots, marked preferences in screened compartments, and deposited them without disclosure, a design credited to returning officer William Boothby to curb colonial graft amid gold rush-era population influxes.^[20] This model spread rapidly to other Australian colonies, with Victoria adopting it in 1857, New South Wales in 1858, Queensland in 1859, and Tasmania in 1856, fostering cleaner elections by detaching votes from party-supplied tickets.^[21] In the United Kingdom, persistent corruption—evidenced by over 1,000 election petitions from 1832 to 1868 documenting bribery in one-third of contests—drove reform efforts from Chartist campaigns onward.^[22] The Ballot Act 1872, passed under Liberal Prime Minister William Gladstone, required secret voting for all parliamentary and municipal elections using printed ballots marked in private polling stations.^[23] Post-1872, reported bribery cases plummeted, with by-elections like Pontefract's in 1872 showing orderly, coercion-free processes compared to prior violence.^[24] The United States lagged, retaining traceable party ballots until the 1880s, when urban machines and Gilded Age industrialists exploited them for control, as seen in verifiable vote-buying schemes.^[25] States adopted the "Australian ballot"—official, secret-marking forms—starting with Massachusetts in 1888 for municipal races and statewide by 1889, followed by Kentucky's voice-to-ballot shift in 1891.^[26] By 1896, 39 states had implemented it, slashing election-day fraud and weakening bossism, though enforcement varied and some rural areas resisted until the early 1900s.^[25]^[16] These reforms collectively prioritized voter autonomy over patronage, though critics like Jeremy Bentham initially opposed secrecy for eroding public accountability in favor of hidden preferences.^[27]

20th Century Technological Shifts

The widespread adoption of mechanical lever voting machines marked a significant early 20th-century shift from hand-marked paper ballots, enabling voters to pull levers corresponding to candidates, which mechanically recorded votes on counters within a sealed booth for enhanced privacy and speed. These devices, patented in the late 19th century, saw broader implementation across U.S. jurisdictions by the 1920s and 1930s, with over half of American elections utilizing them by the 1960s to mitigate fraud risks associated with manual counting and party-printed ballots.^[28]^[29] Punch-card ballot systems emerged in the mid-1960s as a computational advancement, with the Votomatic system—developed by Joseph P. Harris—first deployed in U.S. elections in 1964, allowing voters to punch holes in pre-perforated cards that were then tabulated by computer readers. This technology facilitated centralized counting for larger populations, reducing tally times from days to hours, and gained traction in states like California and Illinois by the 1970s, comprising about 25% of U.S. voting systems by the 1980s.^[30]^[31] Optical scan systems, introduced in the late 1960s and refined through the 1970s, represented a hybrid paper-electronic approach where voters filled in bubbles or ovals on ballots using pens or pencils, which were fed into scanners for automated reading via photocell technology. By 1988, these machine-counted paper ballots accounted for nearly half of U.S. voters, offering a verifiable paper trail absent in pure mechanical systems while improving accuracy over punch cards, which were prone to chads (partial perforations) from stylus misalignment.^[32]^[33] These innovations collectively addressed scaling challenges for post-World War II electorates but introduced new vulnerabilities, such as equipment calibration errors, prompting ongoing federal standards development by century's end.^[34]

Post-2000 Digital Transitions

The Help America Vote Act (HAVA), enacted on October 29, 2002, allocated approximately $3.9 billion in federal funds to U.S. states to replace outdated punch-card and lever voting systems with more reliable technologies, including direct recording electronic (DRE) machines and optical-scan systems, following the contested 2000 presidential election recount in Florida.^[35]^[36] By 2006, over 80% of U.S. voters used either DREs or optical-scan ballots, marking a rapid shift toward computerized tabulation to reduce human error in counting and improve accessibility for disabled voters through features like audio interfaces and larger displays.^[37] DRE systems, which allow voters to select choices via touchscreens with votes stored electronically without initial paper output, proliferated in states like California and Georgia post-HAVA, but faced criticism for lacking verifiable paper trails, enabling potential software vulnerabilities and undetectible alterations.^[38] Security analyses, including demonstrations by computer scientists, revealed that many DRE models could be compromised via malware insertion or supply-chain attacks, with no routine audits possible absent voter-verified paper audit trails (VVPAT).^[39] In response, states began mandating VVPAT by the late 2000s; for instance, California's 2007 top-to-bottom review led to the decertification of several DRE models, prompting a partial reversion to paper-based systems with electronic assistance.^[40] By the 2010s, cybersecurity threats, including foreign interference attempts documented in 2016, accelerated a hybrid shift: most U.S. jurisdictions adopted ballot-marking devices (BMDs) that produce verifiable paper ballots for scanning or hand audits, with over 95% of voters using paper records by 2020.^[5] This evolution prioritized auditability over full digitization, as empirical tests showed paper trails enable risk-limiting audits to statistically confirm electronic tallies with high confidence.^[41] Internationally, Estonia pioneered remote internet voting (i-voting) in its 2005 local elections, using national ID-cards for cryptographic authentication and allowing votes via personal computers, with turnout via this method reaching 51% in the 2023 parliamentary election.^[42]^[43] The system employs end-to-end verifiability, where voters can check encryption without revealing choices, though critics note risks of vote-buying or device coercion absent in-person safeguards.^[44] Other nations, such as Brazil and India, expanded electronic voting machines (EVMs) post-2000 for efficiency in large-scale elections—Brazil's DREs tabulated 135 million votes in 2018 with reported speed gains—but trials of remote digital voting in places like Switzerland and the U.S. military have been curtailed due to hacking vulnerabilities and lack of scalable security.^[45] Overall, post-2000 transitions emphasized hybrid models blending digital interfaces with physical records to balance usability against tampering risks, as full electronic systems without backups remain prone to unresolvable disputes in adversarial environments.^[46]

Types of Ballots

Paper Ballots

Paper ballots consist of printed sheets on which voters manually mark their selections using pens or pencils, typically by filling bubbles, checking boxes, or writing names. These ballots serve as the foundational medium for recording votes in many electoral systems, allowing for direct voter interaction without reliance on electronic interfaces. They can be counted manually by election officials or fed into optical scanners for automated tabulation, providing a physical artifact that voters can inspect before submission.^[47]^[48] The primary advantage of hand-marked paper ballots lies in their provision of a voter-verified paper audit trail (VVPAT), enabling post-election audits and recounts to confirm results independently of software. Empirical studies indicate that systems incorporating paper records reduce risks of undetectable manipulation compared to direct-recording electronic (DRE) machines lacking such trails, as the tangible record resists remote hacking and allows verification against machine outputs. For instance, in jurisdictions using optical-scan paper ballots, risk-limiting audits have demonstrated high accuracy in matching reported tallies to actual marks, with error rates below 0.5% in controlled tests. However, manual counting of paper ballots introduces human error; analyses of hand-count audits in U.S. elections from 2006 to 2020 found discrepancy rates of 1-2% due to fatigue, misinterpretation of marks, or arithmetic mistakes, far exceeding machine-assisted counts at under 0.1%.^[49]^[50]^[51] Worldwide, paper ballots remain prevalent, with over 80% of countries employing them as the primary in-person voting method as of 2020, often combined with scanners for efficiency. In the United States, approximately 70% of votes in the 2020 presidential election were cast on paper ballots processed via optical scanners, contributing to robust audits in states like Georgia where hand recounts confirmed machine results within 0.01%. Drawbacks include vulnerability to physical tampering during storage or transport, as well as voter errors from ambiguous designs—exemplified by the 2000 Florida "butterfly ballot," which caused over 10,000 overvotes due to misaligned punch cards, though modern standards mandate clearer layouts. Proponents of full hand-counting, often citing distrust in machines, overlook scaling challenges; simulations show that counting millions of ballots manually could take weeks and yield error rates up to 5% in high-volume precincts, as observed in small-scale trials.^[52]^[53]^[54] Despite these issues, paper ballots' simplicity and auditability underpin recommendations from election security experts for hybrid systems where machines tabulate but paper serves as the authoritative record. International bodies like the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe endorse paper-based voting for its transparency, provided chain-of-custody protocols are stringent, as lapses in handling have led to disputes in elections from Brazil (2018) to India (2019). Transitioning away from paper entirely risks unverifiable outcomes, yet over-reliance on manual processes sacrifices speed and precision without commensurate integrity gains, per comparative analyses of 50+ elections.^[55]^[56]

Optical Scan and Machine-Readable Ballots

Optical scan ballots consist of paper forms pre-printed with candidate names and response areas, such as ovals or checkboxes, where voters manually mark their selections using pens or pencils; these marked ballots are then fed into optical scanners that detect the marks via light reflection or absorption to tabulate votes electronically.^[57]^[58] Machine-readable ballots encompass this optical scan method along with other formats like punch cards or barcoded sheets designed for automated processing, though optical scan has become predominant due to its balance of simplicity and verifiability.^[32] Development of optical scanning technology began in the 1960s with early mark-sense systems adapted from standardized testing, achieving practical use in elections by the 1970s when scanners capable of reading voter-marked paper were deployed in select U.S. jurisdictions.^[58] By 1988, nearly half of U.S. voters cast ballots via machine-counted paper systems, including optical scans, surpassing mechanical lever machines in adoption.^[32] The Help America Vote Act of 2002 accelerated nationwide shift to optical scan systems post-2000 Florida recount issues with punch cards, mandating accessible voting aids and leading to replacement of older technologies in most states by 2006.^[59] As of 2018, optical scan equipment was used in the majority of U.S. local election jurisdictions, often paired with ballot marking devices for accessibility.^[60] These systems offer advantages in auditability, as the physical paper ballots serve as a verifiable record for manual recounts or risk-limiting audits, reducing reliance on potentially hackable software alone—a feature emphasized in post-2000 reforms for software independence.^[61] Empirical studies indicate high accuracy when ballots are properly marked, with scanner error rates below 0.1% in controlled tests, though real-world residual vote rates (undervotes plus overvotes) averaging 1-2% in presidential elections signal usability challenges like voter confusion over complex layouts.^[62] Disadvantages include susceptibility to stray marks or faint fills causing miscounts, as demonstrated in analyses of overmarked ballots where scanners rejected up to 5% in edge cases without human adjudication.^[63] Central-count models, where ballots are transported to a single facility for scanning, enhance uniformity but introduce chain-of-custody risks, while precinct-count variants allow on-site tabulation for faster preliminary results.^[60] In contemporary U.S. elections, optical scan systems process ballots for approximately 50% of voters as of 2020, with states like Georgia employing them statewide alongside hand audits to confirm machine tallies, yielding residual vote rates under 1% in well-designed implementations.^[63]^[50] Internationally, similar machine-readable optical systems are used in countries like Canada and parts of Europe for efficient counting, though adoption varies due to preferences for hand-counted paper in smaller elections.^[58] Certification by bodies like the U.S. Election Assistance Commission ensures compliance with standards for accuracy and security, including encryption of tabulation data and resistance to physical tampering.^[59]

Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) Ballots

Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) ballots utilize touchscreen or similar electronic interfaces where voters directly select candidates or options, with choices recorded and stored digitally in the machine's memory, often without generating a contemporaneous paper record. These systems, distinct from optical scan methods that interpret marked paper ballots, allow for programmable ballot presentation and immediate tabulation. Basic DRE implementations lack a voter-verified paper audit trail (VVPAT), rendering vote verification reliant solely on the machine's software and hardware integrity.^[64]^[65] DRE technology developed in the late 20th century, with early prototypes appearing in the 1980s, but gained prominence in the United States after the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) of 2002 allocated over $3 billion to modernize voting equipment following the punch-card controversies of the 2000 presidential election. By the mid-2000s, DREs were deployed in approximately 80% of registered voters across 37 states, often replacing lever machines and punch cards to enable features like multilingual ballots and assistance for voters with disabilities. Adoption was driven by promises of efficiency, with machines capable of processing votes in seconds and reducing undervotes compared to paper systems. However, implementation varied, with some jurisdictions adding VVPAT printers to produce verifiable paper receipts, though these add-ons proved unreliable in practice due to jamming and incomplete records.^[66]^[67] Proponents highlight DRE advantages in usability and speed: touchscreen interfaces minimize marking errors, support audio ballots under the Help America Vote Act's accessibility mandates, and facilitate centralized counting that cuts tabulation time from days to hours. Empirical data from early deployments, such as in Georgia's 2002 primaries, showed lower residual vote rates—unintended undervotes or overvotes—around 1-2% versus 3-5% for punch cards. Yet these benefits hinge on unproven software assumptions; without paper, recounts depend on potentially alterable electronic logs, undermining causal chains of verification.^[68]^[65] Security flaws have dominated critiques, with independent analyses exposing systemic risks from outdated operating systems (e.g., Windows 2000), weak encryption, and physical access vulnerabilities. A 2006 Brennan Center for Justice report, drawing from 28 experts, identified threats like malware insertion via memory cards, undetectable vote flipping, and denial-of-service attacks feasible within minutes by low-skill adversaries. Princeton researchers demonstrated this on Diebold AccuVote-TS machines, crafting a self-propagating virus that silently altered votes and evaded detection, exploiting unpatched code and default passwords—flaws persisting despite certifications. No widespread election hacks have been empirically confirmed, but the absence of auditable trails precludes verification, amplifying risks from insiders or supply-chain compromises, as evidenced by 2017 DEF CON demonstrations hacking multiple DRE models.^[38]^[69] In response, states like California (2007 decertification), New York, and Illinois banned or restricted paperless DREs, requiring VVPAT or hand-marked paper by law; by 2020, only five states relied solely on non-auditable DREs for significant portions of votes, down from over 30 a decade prior. Federal guidelines from the Election Assistance Commission and NIST emphasize risk-limiting audits impossible without paper, prompting transitions to ballot-marking devices that produce verifiable outputs. Remaining DRE use often incorporates printers, but critics argue even these fail to fully mitigate software opacity, where empirical testing reveals persistent bugs altering tallies in 1-5% of simulated scenarios. This shift reflects recognition that electronic recording, absent tangible verification, invites unverifiable errors or manipulation, prioritizing auditable physical records for causal accountability in democratic processes.^[70]^[38]^[71]

Mail-In and Absentee Ballots

Mail-in ballots and absentee ballots enable eligible voters to cast votes without appearing in person at a polling place, typically by mailing completed ballots to election officials. Absentee ballots originated as a method for voters with specific excuses, such as military service, illness, or travel, to participate remotely, while mail-in ballots often refer to no-excuse options available to any registered voter in jurisdictions permitting universal mail voting.^[72]^[73] In states like Pennsylvania, the distinction persists: absentee requires justification, whereas mail-in does not, though the ballots themselves are functionally identical once issued. Many states, however, use the terms interchangeably, treating both as forms of vote-by-mail systems.^[74] The practice traces to the U.S. Civil War era, when several states, including Union and Confederate ones, allowed soldiers to vote absentee via mail to accommodate frontline service, with Ohio providing pre-printed envelopes for the 1864 presidential election.^[75] Civilian absentee voting expanded gradually; Vermont became the first state to permit it without military exemption in 1896, followed by broader adoption during World War II, when all states enabled it for service members, resulting in about 3.2 million absentee ballots cast.^[76]^[77] Oregon pioneered universal mail-in voting in 2000 after voter approval, conducting all elections by mail thereafter.^[76] Expansion accelerated in the 1980s and 1990s as states eased restrictions, with significant growth during the 2020 COVID-19 pandemic, when temporary laws in over 30 states broadened access.^[78] Voters typically request a ballot via application to their local election office, receiving it by mail with instructions, a secrecy envelope to conceal selections, and an outer return envelope for signature verification. Completed ballots must be returned by mail, drop box, or in-person before deadlines, often 7-8 days post-election in states allowing postmark grace periods.^[79] Security protocols include unique barcodes for tracking, signature matching against voter records (rejecting mismatches at rates of 0.8-2% per state), and bipartisan review of challenged ballots.^[80] The U.S. Postal Service handles delivery under federal oversight, with protocols to prevent tampering, though chain-of-custody breaks can occur in transit or during third-party collection permitted in some states.^[81] By 2024, eight states operated full vote-by-mail systems sending ballots automatically to all active voters, while 28 others allowed no-excuse absentee/mail-in requests; nationwide, mail ballots comprised 30.3% of turnout, down from 43% in 2020 amid reduced pandemic measures.^[82]^[83] Rejection rates averaged 1.2%, often due to late arrival or signature issues, higher than in-person voting but comparable to prior cycles when adjusted for volume.^[84] Concerns over integrity focus on potential for fraud, as ballots leave direct supervision, enabling risks like coercion, duplication, or unauthorized harvesting where allowed. Empirical studies, including analyses of over 1 billion votes from 2006-2018, find fraud incidence below 0.0001% in mail voting, with no evidence of systemic issues altering outcomes.^[78]^[79] However, databases document over 1,500 proven election fraud cases since 1982, with absentee/mail-in involved in about 25%, including instances of ballot stuffing and forgery, such as the 2022 conviction of a Wisconsin official for submitting fake absentee ballots.^[85] These cases, while rare relative to volume, highlight vulnerabilities in excuse-free systems lacking voter ID requirements, prompting reforms like stricter verification in Georgia post-2020.^[86] Proponents emphasize layered safeguards mitigate risks, but critics argue low detection rates may understate problems, given incentives for undetected abuse in high-stakes contests.^[80]^[87]

Design and Usability

Layout and Formatting Principles

Layout and formatting principles for ballots emphasize clarity, legibility, and simplicity to minimize voter confusion and errors, ensuring that voters can accurately express their intent without undue cognitive burden.^[88] These principles, developed through usability testing and empirical studies, prioritize functional design over aesthetic complexity, as poor layouts have historically led to overvotes, undervotes, and disputed outcomes, such as the 2000 U.S. presidential election in Palm Beach County where a butterfly ballot's misaligned punch holes confused thousands of voters.^[89] Guidelines from bodies like the U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC) stress that ballots must guide voters through races sequentially, with distinct sections for instructions, contests, and options, using shading or color to delineate boundaries without relying on color alone for comprehension.^[90] Typography forms a core element, recommending sans-serif fonts such as Arial or Helvetica in a single style throughout to promote uniformity and readability; serif fonts like Times New Roman are avoided due to their lower legibility in dense formats.^[88] Font sizes should minimum 12-point for printed optical-scan ballots and 25-point for touchscreen interfaces, with lowercase letters preferred over all caps, as the former facilitate faster word recognition and reduce scanning errors.^[90] Text alignment defaults to left-justified, eschewing centering which disrupts eye flow and increases misreads, particularly in multi-column layouts.^[91] ![Ballot from a 2021 local election in the United Kingdom, using first-past-the-post. Voters choose one candidate.](./assets/Ballot_paper_for_the_2021_United_Kingdom_local_elections_(Coventry,_Westwood_ward) Information hierarchy guides prominence: ballot titles and contest headers receive bolding or larger sizes, followed by candidate names in equal weight to prevent bias, with party affiliations subordinate and less emphasized.^[88] Instructions must employ plain language in short, active-voice sentences, limited to two languages per ballot, positioned at race starts or column ends, and supplemented by line drawings rather than photographs for marking methods.^[90] Navigation aids like sequential numbering and icons (excluding partisan symbols) further assist, especially in multi-page or electronic formats, while ample white space prevents clutter and allows for write-in fields or error review prompts.^[91] These standards, informed by iterative testing across U.S. jurisdictions, demonstrably lower residual vote rates—uncounted ballots due to errors—by fostering intuitive interfaces adaptable to systems like first-past-the-post or ranked-choice, though implementation varies by jurisdiction and requires proofing against vendor errors.^[88] For complex proportional systems, layouts incorporate party lists or candidate groupings without overwhelming density, maintaining vertical flow to mimic natural reading patterns.^[90] Overall, adherence correlates with higher voter confidence and fewer invalidations, as evidenced by post-election audits linking design flaws to disenfranchisement.^[89]

Accessibility and Voter Error Reduction

The Help America Vote Act of 2002 mandates that each polling place provide at least one voting system enabling voters with disabilities to cast ballots privately and independently, including features such as audio interfaces, tactile controls, and magnification for visual impairments.^[92] These requirements align with the Americans with Disabilities Act, which prohibits discrimination in polling place access and ensures accommodations like curb cuts, ramps, and accessible machines for voters with mobility, sensory, or cognitive challenges.^[93] Voluntary Voting System Guidelines (VVSG) 2.0, adopted in 2021 by the U.S. Election Assistance Commission, further specify accessibility standards for voting systems, including support for assistive technologies like screen readers and adjustable contrast to accommodate low vision or blindness.^[94] Ballot designs that reduce voter errors emphasize clarity to minimize undervotes (unintended abstentions) and overvotes (invalid multiple selections), with studies showing that layout flaws can increase residual vote rates by 1-2% or more, potentially altering close election outcomes.^[95] For instance, the 2000 Palm Beach County butterfly ballot, featuring misaligned punch holes across two pages, led to an estimated 2,000-4,000 erroneous votes for Reform Party candidate Pat Buchanan instead of intended Democratic votes for Al Gore, as evidenced by precinct-level vote patterns and voter affidavits.^[96] Empirical research confirms that full-face ballots, which list all races sequentially without party columns, reduce errors compared to fragmented or party-lever designs by improving candidate recognition and selection accuracy, particularly in high-information races.^[97] Usability guidelines from the Election Assistance Commission, informed by human factors research, recommend principles such as logical race ordering (federal to local), sufficient white space between options (at least 0.5 inches), sans-serif fonts sized 12-14 points, and explicit instructions to prevent confusion in ranked-choice or multi-column formats.^[98] Pre-election usability testing, including cognitive walkthroughs and voter simulations, has demonstrated error reductions of up to 50% in prototypes by identifying issues like ambiguous shading or crowded layouts before deployment.^[88] For accessible ballots, integration of ballot marking devices (BMDs) with audio review and verification steps further lowers error rates for disabled voters, ensuring verifiable paper trails while maintaining privacy, as required under federal standards.^[99]

Standardization Efforts

The Help America Vote Act (HAVA), enacted on October 29, 2002, represented a major U.S. federal effort to standardize voting systems, including ballots, following the 2000 presidential election's punch-card and design flaws that contributed to overvotes and undervotes exceeding 2% in some Florida counties.^[35] HAVA required states to adopt voting systems allowing voters to verify and correct selections privately before finalizing, mandated accessible ballot marking devices for disabled voters, and established provisional voting to address eligibility disputes, aiming to reduce errors to under 0.5% nationally.^[100] It created the U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC) to oversee compliance and develop voluntary standards, replacing outdated systems in all states by 2006 with federal funding exceeding $3 billion.^[101] The EAC's Voluntary Voting System Guidelines (VVSG), first adopted in 2005 as VVSG 1.0 and updated to VVSG 2.0 in February 2021, provide detailed specifications for ballot usability and integrity, including requirements for high-contrast text (at least 70% contrast ratio), sans-serif fonts sized 10-14 points, and logical sequencing of races to minimize voter confusion.^[102] VVSG 2.0 emphasizes 13 high-level principles, such as auditable paper records for all votes and support for multiple ballot types (e.g., optical scan), with testing protocols ensuring ballots resist tampering and enable hand recounts matching machine tallies within 0.1% margin.^[94] These guidelines, developed with input from the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), are voluntary but influence state certifications, with 40 states requiring EAC-accredited testing labs for systems handling over 90% of U.S. ballots by 2020.^[101] Additional U.S. efforts target specific design elements to curb biases and errors, such as randomizing or rotating candidate order on ballots to neutralize positional voting advantages, where top-listed candidates historically receive 1-5% more votes in lab and field studies.^[103] The EAC's polling place materials guidelines recommend lowercase text for better legibility (up to 20% faster reading speeds) and icons for non-English speakers, while the American Bar Association's 2021 resolution urges uniform hand-count standards for paper ballots, defining overvotes as invalid and undervotes as abstentions unless intent is clear from marks.^[90] ^[104] Despite these, standardization remains incomplete due to state autonomy, with variations in ballot curing rules—e.g., 41 states allow provisional ballot fixes for signature mismatches, but deadlines range from 3 to 14 days—prompting calls for federal uniformity.^[105] Internationally, ballot standardization is fragmented, with no binding global protocols; instead, bodies like the Council of Europe's 2002 Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters advocate verifiable, secret ballots but defer designs to national laws, as seen in the EU's varying formats from Austria's party-list slips to Australia's preferential ranking sheets.^[106] Organizations such as International IDEA promote best practices like machine-readable formats for efficiency, but adoption is voluntary, with over 100 countries using paper ballots without unified specs as of 2023.

Voting Methods Compatible with Ballots

Plurality and First-Past-the-Post

![Ballot from a 2021 local election in the United Kingdom, using first-past-the-post. Voters choose one candidate.](./assets/Ballot_paper_for_the_2021_United_Kingdom_local_elections_(Coventry%252C_Westwood_ward) In plurality voting systems, commonly termed first-past-the-post (FPTP), voters select a single candidate from a list in a single-member district, and the candidate with the most votes wins the seat, even without an absolute majority.^[107] This method employs straightforward ballots that list candidates' names, typically allowing voters to indicate their choice by marking an "X" beside one option, facilitating rapid manual or machine counting.^[108] Such design minimizes voter confusion and error, as no ranking or multiple selections are required, making it compatible with paper, optical scan, or electronic formats.^[107] FPTP ballots prioritize simplicity over expressiveness, often grouping candidates by party affiliation with party logos or colors for visual clarity, though independent candidates appear without such markers.^[109] In practice, this format supports quick tallying, as votes are counted per candidate without redistribution, enabling results on election night in many jurisdictions.^[108] For instance, in the United Kingdom's House of Commons elections, ballots feature columns for party-endorsed and independent candidates, with voters marking one cross in a box opposite their choice.^[109] Widely adopted for national legislatures, FPTP is used in countries including the United Kingdom, United States (for congressional districts), Canada, and India (for the Lok Sabha).^[110] Empirical data shows it tends to produce single-party majorities conducive to stable governance, as the system favors larger parties through vote concentration in key districts.^[111] However, it can amplify disparities between vote shares and seat allocations; for example, in Canada's 2019 federal election, the winning Liberal Party secured 33.1% of votes but 46.9% of seats under FPTP rules.^[107] Critics argue FPTP ballots encourage strategic voting due to the "spoiler effect," where similar candidates split votes, potentially electing less preferred winners, though proponents counter that the binary choice per ballot enhances accountability by linking representatives directly to local majorities.^[111] Standardization in ballot layout, such as uniform font sizes and positioning, reduces invalid votes, with studies indicating error rates below 1% in well-designed FPTP implementations.^[108] Overall, the system's ballot compatibility underscores its efficiency for large-scale elections, though ongoing debates highlight trade-offs in representativeness versus decisiveness.^[111]

Ranked-Choice and Instant Runoff

Ranked-choice voting (RCV), often implemented as instant-runoff voting (IRV) for single-winner elections, enables voters to indicate preferences by ranking candidates numerically on the ballot, typically marking "1" for first choice, "2" for second, and so on.^[112] In the tabulation process, if no candidate secures a majority of first-preference votes, the candidate with the fewest votes is eliminated, and those ballots are redistributed to the voters' next-ranked choice; this elimination and redistribution continues until one candidate achieves over 50% support among continuing ballots.^[113] This method is compatible with paper ballots, where voters fill in ovals or write numbers beside candidate names, facilitating optical scanning or manual counting, though software is required for automated redistribution in machine-readable formats.^[114] Ballot design for RCV emphasizes clarity to minimize errors, including prominent instructions, visual examples of valid rankings, and sufficient space for all candidates, as partial rankings can lead to ballot exhaustion—where votes cease redistribution upon reaching an unranked or exhausted preference, effectively discarding 5-15% of ballots in observed implementations.^[114] ^[115] Overvotes, such as ranking the same number for multiple candidates, render ballots invalid under strict rules, contributing to higher residual (invalid or exhausted) vote rates compared to plurality systems, particularly among lower-education voters.^[116] Empirical data from San Francisco's RCV elections since 2004 show residual rates of 2-8%, exceeding plurality benchmarks, though proponents argue this reflects incomplete rankings rather than systemic flaws.^[117] Adopted nationally for lower-house elections in Australia since 1918 and Ireland since 1922, RCV has been implemented in U.S. jurisdictions including Maine for federal and state elections starting in 2018 primaries and Alaska's 2022 general election, where it altered outcomes by eliminating early frontrunners and redistributing votes.^[118] ^[119] In New York City's 2021 mayoral race, RCV produced a winner with broader second- and third-choice support, but tabulation delays exceeded 8 hours due to complexity, prompting legislative repeal efforts.^[120] Studies indicate RCV reduces "spoiler" effects from similar candidates but can fail monotonicity—where increasing support for a candidate paradoxically causes loss—and may not consistently elect majority-preferred winners, as evidenced by Burlington, Vermont's 2009 repeal after IRV selected a candidate opposed by a plurality.^[121] ^[122] While RCV aims for majority support without costly runoffs, evidence from U.S. cities shows mixed representativeness gains, with some increased candidate diversity in San Francisco but no uniform moderation of polarization or extremism.^[123] Counting integrity relies on verifiable paper trails for audits, yet manual verification of rankings amplifies labor demands, with errors in redistribution reported in 10-20% of hand-counts in early Australian implementations before mechanization.^[124] Overall, RCV's ballot compatibility hinges on precise voter instructions and robust tabulation, but empirical residual vote disparities highlight usability challenges not fully mitigated by design refinements.^[125]

Proportional Representation Systems

Proportional representation (PR) systems employ ballots designed to translate vote shares into seats allocated proportionally across parties or candidates, typically in multi-member districts, contrasting with single-winner methods like first-past-the-post that award all seats to the plurality vote-getter.^[126] These ballots facilitate voter choice among parties or ranked preferences, enabling mechanisms such as party lists or transferable votes to achieve proportionality while minimizing wasted votes.^[127] In party-list PR, the most straightforward variant, ballots present voters with a selection of political parties, where marking one party contributes to that party's vote total, and seats are distributed proportionally using methods like the d'Hondt formula.^[128] Closed-list systems, as in Austria's 2017 legislative election, restrict voter input to party choice, with candidates selected from pre-ranked party lists determined internally.^[129] Open-list variants allow votes for specific candidates within parties, influencing intra-party rankings, though this increases ballot complexity and voter cognitive load.^[130] Thresholds, such as the 4% national minimum in some systems, prevent minor parties from gaining seats, ensuring stability.^[128] Mixed-member proportional (MMP) systems combine local constituency ballots with compensatory party-list votes to balance local representation and overall proportionality. Germany's federal elections use dual ballots: one for a single candidate in a single-member district via plurality, and another for a statewide party list that adjusts seat totals to match national vote shares, as implemented since 1953 with refinements like the 5% threshold.^[131] This hybrid yields parliaments where party seat shares closely mirror second-vote proportions, though overhang and leveling seats have addressed disproportionalities, with reforms in 2023 capping district seats at 630 total Bundestag members.^[132] Single transferable vote (STV), a candidate-centered PR method, uses ballots where voters rank candidates numerically in multi-seat constituencies, transferring surplus votes from elected candidates or reallocating eliminated ones until seats fill. Ireland's Dáil Éireann employs STV since 1921, with ballots listing all candidates for 3-5 seat districts, requiring voters to number preferences sequentially to avoid invalidation.^[133] This system promotes proportionality—evident in Ireland's 2020 election where seats aligned within 2-3% of first-preference vote shares—while allowing independent candidates viability absent in list systems.^[134] Quota calculations, typically Droop quota, determine election thresholds, with software or manual counts handling transfers.^[135] Empirical data from PR-adopting nations show reduced vote-seat disparities compared to majoritarian systems; for instance, Germany's MMP averaged a 2.5% Gallagher index of disproportionality from 1953-2021, versus higher figures in single-member systems.^[132] However, PR ballots demand higher voter education, with STV invalidation rates reaching 2-5% in Irish elections due to incomplete rankings.^[134]

Security and Verification Mechanisms

Chain-of-Custody Protocols

Chain-of-custody protocols in elections establish documented procedures to track the handling, transfer, storage, and security of ballots, ensuring their integrity from issuance through tabulation and retention. These protocols create a verifiable paper trail that records each point of access or movement, minimizing opportunities for unauthorized interference or loss. By requiring multiple witnesses, tamper-evident seals, and detailed logs, they provide evidentiary support for audits, recounts, and legal challenges, demonstrating continuous control by authorized personnel.^[136]^[137] Core elements include restricting the number of individuals handling ballots to reduce errors and requiring dual signatures—typically from bipartisan observers representing different political parties—for every transfer or access. Ballots are stored in sealed containers with serialized tamper-evident seals, such as numbered zip-ties or security tape, and any seal breakage or replacement must be logged with justifications, dates, times, and witness approvals. Transportation between sites, such as from polling places to central counting facilities, mandates pre- and post-transfer inspections of condition and counts, often using bonded carriers for third-party involvement to maintain accountability.^[136]^[138]^[137] For mail-in and absentee ballots, protocols extend to the full lifecycle: documentation begins with ballot printing and issuance, tracking requests against received envelopes via barcodes or worksheets that verify voter applications before processing. Returned ballots are reconciled daily, with outer envelopes logged upon receipt, separated under observation, and inner secrecy envelopes sealed before batching for scanning. Drop box collections require timed logs of openings, bipartisan verification of contents, and immediate resealing, while all steps incorporate risk-limiting audit compatibility by preserving scan order. Personnel undergo mandatory training on these procedures, emphasizing legal compliance with state and federal standards, such as those outlined by the U.S. Election Assistance Commission.^[136]^[138] Common forms include precinct ballot certification logs recording initial counts and seal numbers, tabulator closing sheets for post-election equipment, and dedicated absentee ballot worksheets with checkboxes for verification stages. Breaches, such as undocumented access, can invalidate materials in audits, underscoring the protocols' role in empirical validation of election outcomes.^[136]^[137]

Voter Identification Requirements

Voter identification requirements authenticate the identity of individuals casting ballots to prevent impersonation, ineligible voting, and related fraud, ensuring ballots reflect legitimate voter intent. These protocols link the voter to the ballot through verifiable personal details, typically enforced at polling sites for in-person voting or via envelope annotations for mail-in ballots. In jurisdictions without such checks, reliance shifts to signatures, affidavits, or poll worker attestation, which offer weaker safeguards against identity substitution.^[139]^[140] In the United States, requirements differ by state and voting method. For in-person voting, 36 states as of September 2025 require or request identification, categorized by the National Conference of State Legislatures into strict photo ID (e.g., Arkansas, Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, Mississippi, Ohio, Tennessee, Wisconsin, where government-issued photo like a driver's license is mandatory, with provisional ballots for non-compliance), non-strict photo ID (e.g., Florida, allowing alternatives if photo unavailable), and non-photo ID (e.g., utility bills or affidavits in states like Arizona). The remaining 14 states and Washington, D.C., impose no ID demand, depending on verbal affirmation or witness vouching. Post-2020 reforms expanded strict measures; for instance, Texas Senate Bill 1 (2021) mandates photo ID presentation, upheld in court in 2025.^[139]^[141]^[142] Absentee and mail-in ballots, which comprised 46% of 2020 votes, primarily use signature verification against registration files in 47 states, per NCSL data, with mismatches triggering challenges. Eight states require witnesses or notaries, while others like Texas and Kentucky demand an ID number (e.g., driver's license or partial Social Security number) on the envelope for cross-checks. Few mandate photocopied ID due to privacy and administrative burdens, though non-compliance rates for signature matches reached 1-2% in some 2020 audits, prompting enhanced biometric or digital verification pilots.^[143]^[144]^[142] Proponents cite empirical cases of fraud prevented or prosecuted under ID rules; the Heritage Foundation's database logs over 1,500 convictions since 1982, including dozens of in-person impersonations (e.g., a 2012 Pennsylvania case where a man voted as his deceased mother) avertable by photo matching. A 2019 NBER study of Florida and Michigan data found strict ID reduced invalid in-person ballots by up to 2% without broad turnout drops. Critics, including the Brennan Center for Justice—an organization opposing such laws—argue fraud remains rare (less than 0.0001% of votes per some analyses) and ID erects barriers, though peer-reviewed reviews like a 2020 election law journal assessment detect no consistent suppression beyond 1-2% in minority-heavy areas, offset by free ID issuance in 35 states. Internationally, 80% of democracies mandate ID for ballot access, from Canada's photo-plus-address proof to France's national ID card, correlating with low reported impersonation without documented turnout collapse.^[85]^[145]^[146]

Auditing and Recount Procedures

Auditing procedures in ballot-based elections involve systematic verification of vote tabulation accuracy by manually inspecting a subset or all paper ballots against electronic counts, ensuring equipment malfunctions, human errors, or procedural deviations are detected. These processes typically occur after initial certification and require voter-verifiable paper records, as electronic-only systems preclude meaningful audits. Post-election tabulation audits (PEAs) compare hand counts of randomly selected ballots or precincts to machine-reported totals, with discrepancies prompting expanded reviews or full recounts.^[147]^[148] Risk-limiting audits (RLAs), a statistically rigorous subset of PEAs, limit the probability—often to 5% or 10%—of certifying an incorrect outcome by drawing escalating random samples of ballots until the reported results are statistically confirmed or refuted. Developed by statisticians and election experts, RLAs prioritize high-impact ballots and use metrics like the "risk limit" to determine sample size, which expands if hand counts diverge significantly from machine tallies.^[149]^[150]^[151] As of 2025, 19 U.S. states mandate or permit RLAs, with implementations in Colorado since 2017 confirming outcomes via ballot sampling without full manual tallies in most cases.^[152] RLAs demand bipartisan observers, secure chain-of-custody for ballots, and predefined protocols to minimize bias, though their effectiveness relies on transparent software and sufficient paper trails.^[153] Recount procedures re-examine all ballots in a contest, distinct from audits by aiming to resolve close margins rather than statistically sample. In the U.S., recounts are authorized in 45 states, triggered automatically if victory margins fall below thresholds like 0.5% (e.g., Georgia) or 0.25% (e.g., Minnesota), or via candidate/voter requests often requiring deposits to cover costs, refundable if outcome changes.^[154]^[155] Procedures include machine re-tabulation followed by manual adjudication for ambiguous marks, governed by state codes defining "vote" criteria such as voter intent over strict ovals.^[156] Bipartisan teams recount under observation, with observers allowed to challenge rulings, though state laws limit scope to cast ballots excluding provisional or absent challenges.^[157] Empirical data from 2020 U.S. elections, encompassing audits across multiple states, demonstrate high fidelity in ballot tabulation, with aggregated discrepancies shifting net presidential margins by approximately 0.007%—negligible relative to certified results.^[158] Such findings underscore audits' role in causal validation of processes, though incomplete paper trails in some jurisdictions limited scope, highlighting prerequisites for robust verification.^[159]

Controversies and Integrity Challenges

Historical Instances of Manipulation

In the 19th century United States, political machines such as New York City's Tammany Hall routinely engaged in ballot manipulation through practices like ballot box stuffing, voter intimidation, and repeat voting by immigrants and transients under the control of party bosses.^[160] These tactics, prevalent in urban elections from the 1830s onward, allowed machines to inflate vote totals; for instance, during the 1868 presidential election, Tammany operatives reportedly added thousands of fraudulent votes in New York by coercing or bribing naturalized citizens to vote multiple times.^[161] Such manipulations thrived under open voting systems, where ballots were publicly printed by parties rather than standardized, enabling bosses to distribute pre-marked tickets and discard opponents' votes.^[162] The disputed 1876 U.S. presidential election exemplified widespread ballot irregularities in Southern states, where Democratic majorities were accused of suppressing Republican votes through violence and fraudulent counting, while Republicans faced counter-allegations of ballot tampering in key districts.^[163] In Florida, Louisiana, and South Carolina—collectively holding 19 electoral votes—conflicting returns arose from dual sets of electors submitted amid claims of miscounted ballots and intimidation of Black voters, with investigations revealing instances of ballot substitution and exclusion of valid votes.^[164] An Electoral Commission, established by Congress on January 29, 1877, ultimately awarded all disputed votes to Rutherford B. Hayes by an 8-7 partisan vote, resolving the crisis but highlighting the vulnerability of paper ballots to partisan control over tabulation without independent verification.^[165] In the 1960 U.S. presidential election, Chicago's Democratic machine under Mayor Richard J. Daley orchestrated ballot fraud in Illinois, including "graveyard voting" where deceased individuals' names appeared on rolls and votes were cast on their behalf, contributing to John F. Kennedy's narrow 8,858-vote margin in the state.^[166] A partial recount of nearly 500,000 ballots in Cook County revealed discrepancies, with Republican challenger Richard Nixon gaining fewer votes than Democrat Benjamin Adamowski despite documented fraud cases like duplicate registrations and absentee ballot forgery, though the scale's impact on the national outcome remains debated due to Nixon's decision not to pursue full legal challenges.^[167] These instances, substantiated by grand jury probes and journalistic investigations, underscored persistent risks in machine-dominated urban areas even after the adoption of secret ballots, where custody chains and voter rolls were inadequately secured.

2020 U.S. Election Disputes

Following the November 3, 2020, U.S. presidential election, President Donald Trump and his supporters raised disputes in battleground states including Arizona, Georgia, Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin, alleging irregularities in mail-in ballot processing, inadequate voter verification, exclusion of poll watchers, and vulnerabilities in electronic voting systems.^[168] These claims centered on the unprecedented expansion of mail-in and absentee voting amid the COVID-19 pandemic, which increased turnout to over 159 million votes, with mail-in ballots comprising about 43% of total votes.^[169] Specific allegations included unsecured drop boxes, failure to match signatures on mail ballots, late-night additions of ballots without oversight (e.g., a surveillance video from Georgia's State Farm Arena showing ballot containers handled after observers departed), and software issues in Dominion Voting Systems machines.^[170] Officials in Georgia attributed the video incident to standard procedure after a water leak delayed counting, but critics questioned the lack of real-time transparency.^[171] The Trump campaign and allies filed 62 lawsuits contesting results, seeking to invalidate ballots or compel recounts; courts dismissed or rejected nearly all, citing procedural barriers like laches (untimeliness) or lack of standing, though some reached merits and found no evidence of fraud at scale.^[172] ^[168] One partial success occurred in Pennsylvania, where a federal judge ordered provisional ballots for voters affected by undated mail envelopes, but it affected fewer than 10,000 votes and did not alter the outcome.^[169] Federal agencies, including the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), declared the election "the most secure in American history," with no substantiated systemic manipulation.^[170] Verified fraud cases remained rare; the Heritage Foundation's database logs about 1,400 proven instances nationwide since the 1980s, with 2020 examples limited to isolated absentee ballot abuses (e.g., a New Jersey man submitting his deceased mother's ballot) insufficient to sway state results.^[85] Recounts and audits in disputed states largely upheld certified results favoring Joe Biden. In Georgia, a machine recount narrowed Biden's margin from 13,928 to 12,670 votes, followed by a risk-limiting audit and manual tally that confirmed the outcome with minor adjustments for overvotes and damaged ballots, leading to recertification on December 7, 2020.^[173] ^[171] Michigan's Antrim County experienced a 6,000-vote reporting error due to human calibration mistake on tabulators, quickly corrected with no fraudulent intent, as affirmed by a state Senate report.^[158] Arizona's Maricopa County audit, commissioned by the Republican-led Senate and conducted by Cyber Ninjas—a firm lacking election expertise—reviewed 2.1 million ballots and identified chain-of-custody gaps and deleted election files but concluded Biden's victory, with his margin expanding slightly from 10,457 to 10,943 votes amid methodological flaws like unsubstantiated claims of 57,000+ questionable ballots.^[174] ^[158] Despite these validations, disputes highlighted vulnerabilities: Pennsylvania's Supreme Court later ruled in 2022 that no-excuse mail voting under Act 77 violated the state constitution, retroactively questioning 2020 procedures, though not invalidating results.^[169] Broader empirical reviews, including a 2025 PNAS analysis of audits across states, found vote discrepancies under 0.007%, affirming accuracy but noting risks from rapid rule changes without legislative approval.^[158] Mainstream media and academic sources often emphasized dismissal of claims, yet conservative critiques pointed to observer affidavits (over 1,000 in Michigan alone) alleging restricted access and unverified ballots, fueling persistent skepticism despite lack of outcome-altering proof.^[168] These challenges culminated in the January 6, 2021, Capitol events but did not prevent electoral vote certification for Biden on January 7, 2021.^[170]

Mail-In Expansion Risks and Fraud Cases

The expansion of mail-in voting in the United States, accelerated by the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, heightened risks to ballot integrity by increasing the volume of ballots handled outside supervised polling environments. Prior to 2020, mail-in ballots constituted about 25% of votes in presidential elections; that year, they surged to approximately 43%, with over 65 million cast, as states like Pennsylvania, Michigan, and Wisconsin adopted or broadened no-excuse absentee provisions. This shift amplified opportunities for vulnerabilities, including forgery, unauthorized collection (ballot harvesting), and coercion, as ballots traverse unsecured postal channels without real-time oversight or mandatory voter ID verification in many jurisdictions. Chain-of-custody protocols, while present, face practical challenges in tracking individual ballots from voter to tabulation, with federal assessments identifying risks such as interception during transit and inadequate preprocessing safeguards.^[175]^[176] Empirical evidence highlights how these risks manifest in fraud when safeguards like strict signature matching or bipartisan review are inconsistently applied. A 2020 report from the U.S. House Committee on Administration detailed mass mail-in's dangers, noting that without robust verification—such as photo ID requirements—ballots become susceptible to manipulation, with historical data showing higher rejection rates (up to 1-2% in some states) due to mismatched signatures or incomplete forms, potentially masking undetected fraud. Studies and audits, including those from the Election Assistance Commission, underscore that while baseline fraud rates remain low (under 0.0001% in audited samples), the sheer scale of expansion creates outsized potential for impact, as even small percentages equate to thousands of illicit votes in close races.^[176]^[136] Proven fraud cases post-expansion demonstrate these vulnerabilities in action. In North Carolina's 9th Congressional District in 2018, absentee ballot irregularities— including systematic harvesting and submission by operatives—led state election officials to withhold certification and order a redo election after finding evidence of over 400 potentially fraudulent ballots, resulting in convictions for participants in related 2016 and 2018 schemes. In Paterson, New Jersey's May 2020 city council race, a judge nullified results after uncovering widespread mail-in tampering, with nearly 20% of ballots discarded amid charges against Councilman Michael Jackson and others for fraudulently handling and casting votes, prompting a full revote.^[177]^[178]^[179]^[180] Further convictions affirm ongoing issues. In 2023, New Jersey resident Kim Taylor was found guilty on 52 counts for a scheme involving fraudulent absentee ballot requests and casting in the 2020 general election, exploiting lax oversight to submit votes on behalf of ineligible individuals. The Heritage Foundation's database, compiling over 1,400 documented election fraud convictions as of 2023, includes dozens categorized as fraudulent absentee/mail-in use—such as duplicate submissions and false registrations—spanning multiple states and illustrating how expansion without enhanced verification (e.g., universal ID) enables such acts, even if detection relies on post-hoc investigations. These instances, while not indicative of systemic overthrow, reveal causal pathways where mail-in proliferation lowers barriers to localized manipulation, particularly in urban areas with high absentee rates and limited auditing resources.^[181]^[182]^[85]

Ongoing Reforms and Empirical Evidence (2020-2025)

Following the 2020 U.S. presidential election, at least 19 states enacted 34 restrictive voting laws by 2022, many focused on bolstering ballot integrity through enhanced verification for mail-in and absentee voting, amid concerns over expanded no-excuse absentee access during the COVID-19 pandemic.^[183] These included requirements for voter identification on mail ballot envelopes, such as photocopies of IDs or witness signatures, implemented in states like Florida, Georgia, and Texas to address potential impersonation risks.^[143] By 2023, 36 states mandated some form of photo or non-photo ID at polls, with post-2020 expansions in Arkansas, Idaho, and Kentucky strengthening penalties for ballot mishandling and requiring bipartisan chain-of-custody documentation for transported ballots.^[139] Georgia's 2021 Election Integrity Act (SB 202), signed March 25, 2021, exemplifies these reforms by mandating signature verification for all absentee ballots, limiting unmanned drop boxes to early voting periods, and authorizing risk-limiting audits—procedures that statistically sample ballots to confirm results with high confidence.^[143] Similar measures in Arizona's 2022 law (SB 1480) prohibited off-site early ballot drop-off without ID and expanded audit requirements, while Texas's SB 1 (2021) required tracking codes on mail ballots and rejected those without matching signatures or IDs.^[183] These changes responded to documented vulnerabilities, such as unsecured drop boxes and lax verification in 2020, though left-leaning analyses like those from the Brennan Center frame them primarily as access restrictions rather than security enhancements.^[183] Empirical data on fraud incidence post-reforms remains limited but indicates persistence of isolated cases despite low overall rates. The Heritage Foundation's database, tracking prosecuted election fraud from 2020-2024, logs over 1,500 proven instances nationwide, including 200+ absentee ballot fraud convictions, such as a 2022 Pennsylvania case involving 25 illegal mail votes and a 2023 Michigan scheme with 1,500 fraudulent registrations—none outcome-altering in federal races but highlighting vulnerabilities in mail systems.^[85] A Brookings Institution analysis of state records from 25 elections (covering millions of ballots) found fraud rates below 0.0001% in most jurisdictions, with absentee ballots comprising a disproportionate share of violations when they occur, supporting causal links between unverified mail voting and higher risk.^[184] Audits and studies provide mixed evidence on reform impacts. Georgia's 2020 hand recount and risk-limiting audit confirmed Biden's win by 11,779 votes with no widespread discrepancies, yet post-reform 2022 audits detected minor errors in 0.1-0.5% of ballots, attributable to signature mismatches rejected under new rules.^[143] MIT Election Data and Science Lab surveys from 2022-2024 show rising public support for ID requirements (up 10-15% among Republicans) and verification, correlating with higher voter confidence in states like Florida, where turnout remained stable post-SB 90 (2021) despite stricter mail rules.^[185] However, peer-reviewed analyses, such as those in electoral integrity reports, note that while reforms reduce theoretical risks like double-voting (e.g., via centralized databases in 20+ states by 2024), they have not eliminated all non-citizen voting incidents, with 75 cases prosecuted 2020-2023 per federal data.^[186] Mainstream academic sources often underemphasize these due to institutional biases favoring expansive access, yet first-principles evaluation underscores that verifiable identity chains prevent causal pathways to fraud more effectively than reliance on post-hoc prosecutions.^[184]

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Provides an overview of voting equipment used nationwide, the standards that voting machines are held to, and the process for testing and certifying that ...<|separator|>
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Help America Vote Act - U.S. Election Assistance Commission
The Help America Vote Act (HAVA) of 2002 was passed by the United States Congress to make sweeping reforms to the nation's voting process.
[36]
The Help America Vote Act Of 2002 - Department of Justice
May 15, 2024 · On October 29, 2002, President Bush signed the "Help America Vote Act of 2002," (HAVA), Pub. L. No. 107-252, 116 Stat. 1666 (2002) into law
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The Help America Vote Act: 20 Years Later
Jun 1, 2022 · It's no secret that the delay in determining the 2000 presidential victor put election administration on the federal agenda for the first ...
[38]
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Mar 1, 2022 · A joint analysis from the Brennan Center and Verified Voting finds that replacing aging voting equipment will cost hundreds of millions of dollars.
[39]
Hacking the Vote: It's Easier Than You Think
Professor J. Alex Halderman has made a career studying electronic voting security. His research has changed the concept of stolen elections from theory to ...Missing: DRE | Show results with:DRE
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[41]
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Apr 21, 2023 · Voting uses technologies that range from hand-counted paper ballots to electronic voting machines resembling bank ATMs.
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Electronic voting (i-voting) allows votes to be cast via the Internet. To vote electronically, a voter needs their ID-card and a secure computer with an ...
[43]
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[44]
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[45]
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Ballot papers are the centrepiece of any election because they provide a physical record of how people voted. Page 2. voters and represent a powerful democratic ...<|separator|>
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Voting uses technologies that range from old-fashioned hand-counted paper ballots to new(er)-fangled electronic voting machines that resemble ATMs.
[49]
Paper Ballots Helped Secure the 2020 Election — What Will 2022 ...
May 10, 2022 · When selections are recorded on paper, voters can easily verify that their ballot accurately reflects their choices. Paper ballots also ...
[50]
Voting Has Never Been More Secure Than It Is Right Now
Nov 2, 2024 · Most Americans now vote with optical scanners, which process marked selections on paper sheets. In the 2020 presidential election, Georgia's ...
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Hand Counting Ballots | Brennan Center for Justice
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[54]
On Election Day, most voters use electronic or optical-scan ballots
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[55]
[PDF] The Importance of Voter Verifiable Ballots in Modern Elections
It's a refrain that election officials and the public have been hearing for more than three years now: voter confidence in election results is at a ...
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Paper ballots are good, but accurately hand-counting them all is ...
Sep 5, 2023 · Hand-counting every ballot might sound like a great idea, but it's both slower and less accurate than machine-counting votes.
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Brennan Center Overview of Voting Equipment
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Historical Review — - ACE Electoral Knowledge Network
Optical scanning voting systems were developed in the 1970s. Voters make marks on paper ballots to indicate their choice of candidates. A scanning device ...
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[PDF] Overview of Voting Systems Testing and Certification in the United ...
The Help America Vote Act (HAVA) of 2002 created the U.S. Election Assistance. Commission (EAC) and mandated that the EAC provide certification,.<|separator|>
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[PDF] Software Independence Revisited
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(PDF) Document Analysis Issues in Reading Optical Scan Ballots
PDF | Optical scan voting is considered by many to be the most trustworthy option for conducting elections because it provides an independently.
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Nov 1, 2020 · According to a Pew Research Center analysis, nearly half of registered U.S. voters live in jurisdictions that use optical scan machines as ...
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[PDF] Electronic Voting Machines (EVMs)
When talking about EVM, we mostly think of a DRE – a machine on which the voter makes the ballot choice directly without first marking a paper ballot, hence the ...<|control11|><|separator|>
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[PDF] The Direct Recording Electronic Voting Machine (DRE) Controversy
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The 2000 presidential election and the consequential actions of Congress and the states are dramatically changing the American election process.Missing: post- | Show results with:post-
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Voting machines are electronic devices used in various election processes across the United States, with their usage increasing significantly in the early 2000 ...
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Nov 3, 2022 · During this election year, it's become especially important to understand the differences between and confusion around absentee voting and ...
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What is the difference between an absentee and a mail-in ballot in PA? Absentee ballots have existed in Pennsylvania for decades. Absentee ballots require a ...
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Typically, in these states voters will register by Party so that they may receive the correct Primary ballot when Primary Elections occur. Absentee Voting by ...
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Sep 28, 2020 · Excuse-required absentee voting started during the Civil War—a product of the competition between Abraham Lincoln and George McClellan,” Paul ...
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Sep 24, 2020 · By the late 1800s, some states were extending absentee ballots to civilian voters under certain conditions, but it wasn't until 2000 that Oregon ...
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Aug 1, 2020 · By World War II, every state let soldiers vote absentee, and the military was responsible for about 3.2 million absentee ballots cast, nearly ...
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Feb 28, 2024 · Americans have traditionally voted in neighborhood polling places, but since the 1980s, many states have eased rules on issuing absentee ...
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Jun 28, 2024 · Election officials have multiple, overlapping safeguards to secure mail voting, including signature verification, bipartisan review of ballots, chain of ...
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Mar 13, 2024 · ... mail ballot submission, as explained below. Mail ballots suspected of fraudulent activity are set aside for further investigation and, when ...
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The United States Postal Inspection Service® is the federal law enforcement organization assigned to protect the mail, including ballots mailed to and from ...
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Jun 30, 2025 · To this end, the EAC is pleased to present to the 119th U.S.. Congress its report on the 2024 EAVS. This report describes in detail how the 2024 ...
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Aug 18, 2025 · 18 with redistricting proposal on the agenda; Did you know that South Dakota was the first state to adopt a constitutional amendment creating an ...
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1 After the 2020 U.S. presidential election, the losing candidate, Donald Trump, claimed that he had been the victim of massive voter fraud that denied him ...
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Oct 26, 2020 · We estimate the change in the reported number of voter fraud cases when states switch to conducting elections by mail. We consider two types of ...
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We know now from several years of testing ballots all over the U.S. that implementing simple principles of design make it much more likely that voters are ...
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Feb 3, 2020 · Poor design can confuse voters and cause their votes to be discounted, but common problems are often easily resolved.
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Top 10 election design guidelines Use lowercase letters Lowercase letters are more legible than ALL CAPITAL LETTERS because they are easier to recognize.
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Feb 3, 2020 · Design guidelines provide a tool for helping voters focus on their goal to cast votes for their preferred candidates.
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Overview The Help America Vote Act (HAVA) of 2002 was passed by the United States Congress to make sweeping reforms to the nation's voting process.
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Information for election officials make polling places accessible as well as for people with disabilities about how the ADA protects their right to vote.
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Aug 13, 2024 · A healthy democracy requires that every citizen has an equal opportunity to effectively participate, including voting in elections.
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We show that the butterfly ballot used in Palm Beach County, Florida, in the 2000 presidential election caused more than 2,000 Democratic voters to vote by ...
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We develop new hypotheses by bringing together theoretical insights from usability research and political science about the effects of ballots with and without ...
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There have been excellent ballot design guidelines around since about 2007 when the U.S. Election Assistance Commission published AIGA's work in its report, ...
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Our stakeholders include not only election officials, system developers, and voting system test laboratories (VSTLs), but also voter advocates. NIST performs ...
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Sep 30, 2025 · Congress's response to those findings, in HAVA, spanned a correspondingly wide range of elections topics, from voting systems to voter ...
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The 2002 Help America Vote Act has given NIST a key role in helping to realize nationwide improvements in voting systems.
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Voluntary Voting System Guidelines
Voluntary Voting System Guidelines (VVSG) are a set of specifications and requirements against which voting systems can be tested to determine if they meet ...
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Ballot Order: Randomization and rotation. The Voluntary Voting System Guidelines (VVSG 2.0), a standard published by the federal Election Assistance ...
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Sep 20, 2022 · As a result, U.S. voters can face challenges in casting error-free absentee or mail-in ballots. While those mail-in ballot requirements ...
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[PDF] USING INTERNATIONAL ELECTION STANDARDS
The team of the Division of Electoral Assistance of the Directorate General for Democracy of the Council of Europe for co-ordination of the drafting process, ...<|control11|><|separator|>
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In FPTP systems, the winning candidate is simply the person who wins most votes. In theory, a candidate could be elected with two votes.
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First Past the Post (FPTP) is the name for the electoral system used to elect Members of Parliament (MPs) to Westminster.
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Voting systems, or electoral systems, are the method by which we elect representatives. A voting system determines the rules on how we elect parties and ...
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It provides a clear cut choice for voters between two main parties. · It gives rise to single party governments. · It gives rise to a coherent parliamentary ...<|separator|>
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A ranked-choice voting system (RCV) is an electoral system in which voters rank candidates by preference on their ballots.How RCV works · Where is RCV used? · State laws · Arguments for and against...
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RCV combines the general election and the runoff by letting voters select—or “rank”—the candidates in order of preference ...
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[PDF] Best Practices for Designing Ranked Choice Voting Ballots
At CCD, we know that good ballot design and effective voter education make informed and confident voters. It can be a challenge to fit everything on a ...
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We document a problem known as ballot “exhaustion,” which results in a substantial number of votes being discarded in each election.Missing: empirical | Show results with:empirical
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[PDF] How Ranked Choice Voting Burdens Voting Rights and More
Details about RCV, FAIRVOTE, https://www.fairvote.org/rcv#how_rcv_works, (last visited. April 27, 2021). 1. Bryer: One Vote, Two Votes, Three Votes, Four: How ...
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It is sometimes referred to as instant runoff voting (IRV), preferential voting, proportional representation, single transferable vote (STV), and a number of ...
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Dec 13, 2023 · Roughly 50 American voting jurisdictions have now moved to a ranked choice voting system, and it's shaping up to be one of the political ...
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We analyze the susceptibility of instant runoff voting (IRV) to a lesser-studied paradox known as a reinforcement paradox, which occurs when candidate X X ...
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What We Know About Ranked Choice Voting, Updated for 2025
Mar 6, 2025 · This paper examines whether ranked choice voting (RCV) enhance American democracy by better representing the people and increasing the focus ...
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Apr 30, 2024 · Andrew Eggers is a Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago. His research focuses on electoral systems, the relationship ...
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[PDF] Addressing Concerns About Instant Runoff Voting
Oct 2, 2024 · * Voters can ensure that IRV always elects a majority winner among all votes cast if they all fill out a complete ranking. ◊ IRV fails the ...
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[PDF] Demographic Disparities Using Ranked-Choice Voting - CalPERS
This study seeks to answer three interrelated questions: 1) Which demographic groups find it difficult to rank candidates in RCV elections? 2) Who is more ...<|control11|><|separator|>
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Mar 14, 2025 · Proportional Representation (PR): the creation of multi-member districts in which seats are allocated to parties in proportion to their vote.
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Dec 5, 2023 · Proportional representation is an electoral system that elects multiple representatives in each district in proportion to the number of people who vote for ...
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Voters vote for a party, and parties receive seats in proportion to their overall share of the vote in the electoral district. Winning candidates are taken from ...<|separator|>
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In Party List systems, seats in parliament closely match how many votes each party receives, but there is often a weaker constituency link.
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The open-list proportional representation (OLPR) system, as opposed to the closed-list version, allows voters to pick their favourite candidate from the party ...
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How does proportional representation work in Germany?
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Ireland uses proportional representation (PR) for voting in elections, with each voter having a single transferable vote (STV).
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Single Transferable Vote – Electoral Reform Society – ERS
These representatives reflect the diversity of opinions in the area. On election day, voters number the candidates on their ballot paper. Their favourite as ...
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[PDF] Chain of Custody Best Practices
Jul 12, 2021 · This report outlines items election officials should consider when developing or revising their chain of custody procedures for physical ...
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[PDF] Chain of Custody Your Evidence Trail for Secure Ballot Management
Ballot security goes beyond locks and cameras. Election officials must be able to prove they were in control of ballots and voting equipment at all times.Missing: protocols | Show results with:protocols
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Chain of custody documentation ensures election procedures are followed and that security is maintained. Specifically, the chain of custody provides evidence ...
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Voter ID Laws - National Conference of State Legislatures
Thirty-six states have laws requesting or requiring voters to show some form of identification at the polls.
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Sep 29, 2023 · Requiring voter identification (voter ID) to verify a mail-in ballot ensures the voter is who they claim to be.
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[PDF] Voter ID Laws
Sep 1, 2025 · Thirty-six state laws request or require voters to show some form of identification at the polls. Fourteen states and Washington, D.C., do not ...
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Aug 5, 2025 · As part of S.B. 1, the Texas Election Integrity Act of 2021, Texas voters must list an ID number, such as a driver's license number, on any mail ...
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Table 14: How States Verify Voted Absentee/Mail Ballots
Summarizes methods states use to verify absentee/mail ballots, such as signature verification and having the absentee/mail ballot witnessed or notarized.
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Understand the ID requirements for voting in Texas. Learn which forms of identification are accepted at the polls.
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[PDF] Strict Voter Identification Laws, Turnout, and Election Outcomes
We do so using historical data on more than 2,000 races in Florida and Michigan, which both allow and track ballots cast without identification. Results ...
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Voter ID | Brennan Center for Justice
Overly burdensome photo ID requirements block millions of eligible American citizens from voting. We can improve the security of elections without ...
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Post-Election Audits - National Conference of State Legislatures
A post-election tabulation audit—often known as a post-election audit or PEA—checks that the equipment and procedures used to count votes during an election ...Introduction · Types of Post-Election Audits · Other Post-Election Options
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[PDF] 6 TIPS For Conducting Election Audits
custody procedures and instruct staff, warehouse personnel, moving companies, polling places and poll workers. □ Insert mismarked and blank ballots during pre- ...
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[PDF] A Gentle Introduction to Risk-Limiting Audits
Risk-limiting audits provide statistical assurance that election outcomes are correct by manually examining portions of the audit trail—paper ballots or voter- ...
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Risk-Limiting Audits - Verified Voting
A risk-limiting audit (RLA) checks a random sample of voter-verifiable paper ballots, giving strong evidence to support the reported election results.
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Risk-Limiting Audits - National Conference of State Legislatures
Risk-limiting audits are one version of a postelection audit, and a version that is growing in interest among election officials and legislators.What Are Risk-Limiting Audits? · Components of an RLA · Types of RLAs
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A risk-limiting audit is a post-election audit that gives a statistical level of confidence that the outcome of an election is correct.
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[PDF] Risk Limiting Audit - Virginia Department of Elections
INTRODUCTION. 1.1 Risk-Limiting Audits (RLA). A RLA is a type of post-election audit that utilizes statistical methods and a manual review of.
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Election Recounts - National Conference of State Legislatures
Recounts are conducted after an election either automatically when the margin of victory for a race was narrow, or because someone (usually the losing ...
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Election recount laws and procedures in the 50 states - Ballotpedia
In 31 states voters can request recounts in only some elections or just for ballot measures. Can a candidate or voter request a recount? State, Can a candidate ...50-state overview of recount... · State-specific summary of...
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A recount provides an op- portunity for an election official to ensure that all the ballots cast are counted accurately and that the correct candidate or ballot ...
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Recounts - Minnesota Secretary Of State
A recount is a process to precisely determine the vote count between two candidates whose vote margin is extremely close. During a recount, election officials ...
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Audits of the 2020 American election show an accurate vote count
May 13, 2025 · We find that election audits shifted the net presidential vote count by only about 0.007%, with similarly minuscule errors across all major types of electoral ...
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Audits of the 2020 American election show an accurate vote count
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Tammany Hall | Political Machine Ran NYC in the 1800s - ThoughtCo
May 11, 2025 · ... Tammany workers stuffing ballot boxes and engaging in flagrant election fraud. Tammany Hall's Corruption Expands. Corruption in the ...
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How to Win a 19th Century Election - Atlas Obscura
Aug 17, 2015 · ... fraudulent and violent elections of 19th century America. Nothing was off limits when making sure that the “right candidate” was elected to ...
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Anecdotes about vote buying and electoral fraud, particularly in the mid to late nineteenth century, are an inescapable, and colorful, part of American ...
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Disputed Election of 1876 | Miller Center
In the presidential election of 1876, Democrat Samuel Tilden ran against Republican Rutherford B. Hayes. At the end of election day, no clear winner emerged.
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The Election of 1876 | American Battlefield Trust
Nov 1, 2024 · The Democratic Party nominated Samuel J. Tilden. Three smaller political parties also put forward candidates for the presidential election; the ...
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The Electoral Vote Count of the 1876 Presidential Election
The Democratic controlled House and the Republican dominated Senate came to a compromise on how to resolve the problem by creating an Electoral Commission: a ...Missing: ballot | Show results with:ballot
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Did the Chicago Outfit elect John F. Kennedy president?
Oct 22, 2020 · A recount of about 490,000 paper ballots, in which Adamowski gained 6,186 votes but Nixon gained only 943 votes, showed that the vote fraud was ...
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Was the 1960 Presidential Election Stolen? The Case of Illinois - jstor
vote fraud deprived Nixon of the electoral votes of Illinois and possibly enough other states to have changed the outcome of the election.4. Although the ...
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" He found cases of Republican voter fraud in southern Illinois but said that the totals "did not match the Chicago fraud he found." An academic ...Primaries · Democratic · Results · Analysis
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2020 Election Litigation: The Courts Held - Judicature
Numerous cases were filed in state and federal courts by the Trump campaign, challenging the results of the election in different states and on a variety of ...
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Trump's judicial campaign to upend the 2020 election: A failure, but ...
Nov 30, 2021 · When President Donald Trump tried to enlist the courts in his campaign to overturn the results of the election, state and federal judges applied ...
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Results of Lawsuits Regarding the 2020 Elections
The various claims of evidence alleging a stolen 2020 election have been exhaustively investigated and litigated. Judges heard claims of illegal voting and ...
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Georgia reaffirms Biden's victory for 3rd time after recount, dealing ...
Dec 7, 2020 · Georgia recertified its presidential election results on Monday, again finding Joe Biden as the winner following three counts of ballots, ...
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Fact check: Trump had his day in court to dispute 2020 election
Sep 10, 2024 · Donald Trump falsely claimed in Tuesday night's presidential debate that all 64 of his election lawsuits failed in 2020 only on "a ...
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Georgia's Recount Confirms Biden's Lead; AP Declares Him State's ...
Nov 19, 2020 · The full hand recount of the state's 5 million presidential votes resulted in a narrowing of Biden's lead over President Trump in Georgia.
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Trump friendly Cyber Ninjas audit of Arizona votes still shows Biden ...
Sep 24, 2021 · A draft report of the much-criticized, Republican-backed review of 2020 election results in Arizona's largest county has in fact confirmed ...
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[PDF] Mail-in Voting 2020 Infrastructure Risk Assessment - CISA
Jul 28, 2020 · To address this risk, election officials should focus on cyber risk management activities, including access controls and authentication best ...
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[PDF] THE DANGERS OF MASS MAIL-IN VOTING
Jun 20, 2024 · While it is not a process without merit, it comes with many risks to election integrity, especially if no safeguards are in place to ensure its ...
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[PDF] INVESTIGATION OF ELECTION IRREGULA - NCSBE
Mar 13, 2019 · Election for North Carolina's 9th Congressional District was corrupted by ... absentee ballot fraud in Bladen County referred to state and federal.
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Four people plead guilty in North Carolina ballot probe of 2016 and ...
Sep 26, 2022 · Four people pleaded guilty on Monday to misdemeanors for their roles in absentee ballot fraud in rural North Carolina during the 2016 and ...
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AG Grewal Announces Voting Fraud Charges Against Paterson
Jun 25, 2020 · TRENTON – Attorney General Gurbir S. Grewal today announced voting fraud charges against Paterson City Councilman Michael Jackson, ...
[181]
New Local Election Ordered in N.J. After Mail-In Voter Fraud Charges
Aug 19, 2020 · The discovery triggered an investigation that led to charges of voter fraud against two local elected leaders and resulted in nearly 20 percent ...
[182]
Woman Convicted for Voter Fraud Scheme - Department of Justice
Nov 21, 2023 · Kim Phuong Taylor, 49, of Sioux City, perpetrated a scheme to fraudulently generate votes for her husband in the primary election for Iowa's 4th US ...Missing: verified | Show results with:verified
[183]
Election Fraud Database Tops 1,400 Cases | The Heritage Foundation
Jan 18, 2023 · The database, which provides a sampling of recent election fraud cases, demonstrates the vulnerabilities within the electoral process and the need for reforms.
[184]
How Voting Laws Have Changed in Battleground States Since 2020
Aug 15, 2024 · In the years since the 2020 election, many states have aggressively attempted to restrict voting access. Limiting absentee voting has been the ...
[185]
How widespread is election fraud in the United States? Not very
Oct 28, 2024 · Voter fraud is minuscule in US elections. Share of reported cases of fraud over the past 13 to 38 years is less than 1%.
[186]
New Report: How We Voted in 2024 | MIT Election Lab
Jul 21, 2025 · Support for most security practices rose from 2022 to 2024, particularly among Republicans. Fraud. Respondents continue to believe that voter ...Missing: studies rates
[187]
The Electoral Integrity Project
The Electoral Integrity Project is an academic research project based at the Royal Military College of Canada/Queen's University and the University of East ...Missing: empirical 2020-2025