Fact-checked by Grok 2 weeks ago

Fire for effect

Fire for effect is a core procedure in operations, defined as the concentrated delivery of a large volume of fire on a target after initial adjustment shots have ensured accuracy, aimed at maximizing damage to enemy positions or assets. The concept developed from early 20th-century advancements in techniques during , building on 19th-century massed tactics. It was significantly refined by German tactics under Colonel in 1917–1918, who developed tailored fire groups for rapid, overwhelming barrages. A landmark application occurred during the U.S. First Army's 1 offensive in the Meuse-Argonne, where over 1,500 guns supported an advance of up to five miles across the sector. This procedure remains vital in contemporary U.S. Army doctrine for operations, providing responsive, high-volume that complements and disrupts enemy defenses to facilitate ground advances. As of 2025, advances in precision technology, including GPS-guided munitions like the , continue to enhance its lethality while minimizing .

Definition and Terminology

Core Definition

Fire for effect is a command in operations that indicates the delivery of a specified volume of fire and munitions to achieve the desired effect on a , following any necessary adjustments to confirm accuracy. It represents the terminal phase of an observed fire mission, where the observer determines that the is sufficiently accurate for the initial volley to effectively with minimal further correction. The primary purpose of fire for effect is to saturate the target area with concentrated rounds from one or more firing units or batteries, maximizing destructive impact, casualties, neutralization, or suppression as required by the mission. This volume-based approach ensures efficient use of while delivering decisive effects, often aiming for first-round fire for effect to forces rapidly. Unlike preliminary adjustment fire, which refines the point of impact through and corrections, or intended to disrupt enemy movement without full destruction, fire for effect is the conclusive delivery of massed fires once the mean point of impact falls within the desired accuracy bracket. U.S. Army doctrine defines it as "fire that is intended to achieve the desired result on target," emphasizing its role in transitioning from observation and adjustment to execution within the broader fire mission process. In field artillery doctrine, several key terms support the execution of fire for effect, providing the foundational vocabulary for accurate targeting and fire control. These terms are standardized in U.S. Army publications and align with NATO glossaries, such as AAP-6 and STANAG 3680, to ensure interoperability among allied forces. Adjusting fire refers to the process of observing and correcting the impact of preliminary rounds to refine the placement of subsequent on a , typically when the initial location is uncertain due to factors like or . This method involves an observer directing corrections for deviation, , and height-of-burst until the is accurately positioned. A fire mission encompasses the complete request and execution cycle for delivering artillery , initiated by an observer's call for that includes location, description, method of engagement, and instructions, proceeding through adjustment if needed to final impact. It represents a specific task assigned to a firing unit to engage a effectively. The mean point of impact (MPI) is defined as the average location of a group of bursts relative to an adjusting point or , serving as a statistical measure to gauge and refine the accuracy of during and registration. It is calculated by averaging the deviations of multiple rounds and applying observer- factors. A describes the initial firing pattern that establishes a interval by placing one round short of and another over the along the observer- line, allowing for successive splits to narrow the until the MPI falls within 50 meters of the desired point. This technique ensures precise range corrections before transitioning to sustained fire. These terms collectively culminate in fire for effect, where concentrated rounds are delivered to maximize damage once accuracy is confirmed.

Historical Context

Early Development

The principles underlying "fire for effect" in tactics trace their origins to the 17th century, when Swedish King revolutionized battlefield during the . He introduced lighter, more mobile field pieces, such as three-pounder guns, which could be positioned directly with units for rapid deployment and support. These innovations allowed for concentrated fire from organized batteries targeting specific enemy formations, integrating with volleys and charges to achieve decisive effects, as demonstrated at the of Breitenfeld in 1631 where shifting light cannons disrupted enemy lines. This approach emphasized massed, coordinated barrages over isolated shots, prefiguring modern effect-based firing by prioritizing overwhelming firepower at key moments. By the 19th century, during the , these concepts evolved into more systematic area saturation tactics through the French "" doctrine. Napoleon Bonaparte massed dozens of guns into temporary super-batteries to deliver intense, concentrated fire on enemy positions, softening defenses for assaults and demoralizing opponents. A notable example occurred at the in 1809, where General Jacques Lauriston's of approximately 112 guns unleashed a prolonged barrage, enabling Marshal Étienne Macdonald's advance by saturating the Austrian center. This tactic shifted artillery from dispersed, direct support to large-scale volleys aimed at achieving suppressive effects across broader areas, building on earlier mobile principles to exploit numerical superiority in guns. The began adopting similar effect-oriented artillery practices during the (1861–1865), particularly in response to the demands of large-scale battles. At on July 3, 1863, Confederate forces under General massed approximately 150 guns along Seminary Ridge for a two-hour barrage prior to , intended to suppress Union positions on after initial adjustments for range and effect. Though limited by fuse inaccuracies and , this represented an early application of barrage fire post-adjustment, where artillery aimed to saturate an area to neutralize defenses before infantry engagement. Union artillery chief Brigadier General Henry J. Hunt similarly conserved ammunition for effect, shifting to canister loads as the assault neared, highlighting the tactical focus on impactful, volley-style delivery. This period marked a broader transition in from single-shot, direct-fire methods—common in earlier linear tactics—to coordinated as a precursor to effect-based systems. Batteries firing in allowed for rapid, overwhelming salvos that compensated for individual gun inaccuracies, evolving massed volleys into analogs like the "barrage," an early term for sustained .

and II

During , the concept of fire for effect was refined through the integration of barrages in from 1914 to 1918, where static fronts demanded coordinated suppression to enable advances. The employed the creeping barrage—a slow-moving curtain of fire ahead of troops—to protect advancing soldiers from enemy machine guns and counterfire. This tactic evolved significantly during the in 1916, where on , forces initiated an assault behind a creeping barrage following a week-long preliminary of 1.5 million shells, aiming to neutralize German defenses and facilitate rapid penetration. However, initial executions often faltered as struggled to maintain pace with the barrage, leading to heavy exposure and underscoring the need for precise timing in delivering for effect. German forces developed a parallel approach with the Feuerwalze, or rolling barrage, which emphasized sudden, concentrated phases to disrupt enemy lines before assaults, contrasting with the more prolonged Allied preparatory fires by prioritizing and depth. These tactics were significantly refined by Colonel in 1917–1918, who developed tailored fire groups for rapid, overwhelming barrages. Introduced prominently in the 1918 Spring Offensives, the Feuerwalze incorporated an accurate creeping element that advanced with units, using high-explosive and gas shells in staged lifts to maximize neutralization without exhaustive destruction. A notable U.S. application occurred during the First 's offensive on 1 November 1918 in the Meuse-Argonne, where 1,538 guns delivered 10–12 rounds per minute across a 15-mile front, enabling a five-mile advance. This method highlighted tactical differences: while Allied barrages often sought to pulverize positions over days, fire for effect focused on rapid, phased suppression to enable breakthroughs. overall proved devastating, accounting for approximately 75 percent of casualties in through such massed, suppressive applications. In World War II, fire for effect advanced with improved observation and timing, particularly in the US Army's operations during the Normandy campaign of 1944, where forward observers integrated real-time adjustments to deliver concentrated barrages. Forward observers, embedded with infantry units and equipped with radios like the SCR-194, directed fires from positions near the front, shifting from adjusting rounds to massed volleys once targets were bracketed. A key example occurred during Operation Cobra on July 25, 1944, south of Saint-Lô, where 21 field artillery battalions unleashed 140,000 rounds in an 80-minute timed concentration, synchronized with aerial bombings to shatter German defenses and enable armored breakthroughs. However, the tactic faced challenges due to logistical constraints, as seen at the 1942 Buna campaign where only five guns were available amid difficult terrain. This approach contrasted with World War I's more rigid barrages by leveraging mobility and communication for responsive, high-volume fire for effect, amplifying tactical scale in fluid maneuvers.

Post-WWII Advancements

Following the foundational massed fires established during , post-war conflicts drove significant refinements in fire for effect tactics. During the (1950–1953), U.S. integrated closely with to compensate for initial shortages in ground-based systems, employing Tactical Air Control Parties (TACPs) equipped with VHF radios to coordinate strikes from aircraft such as the F-84 Thunderjet and F-51 Mustang, often achieving response times of minutes. This integration refined for effect, with Fire Direction Centers (FDCs) centralizing control and leveraging forward observers at the company level alongside proximity fuses on 155-mm howitzers to target enemy positions effectively against massed assaults. By the static phase of the war (1951–1953), up to 20 nondivisional battalions supported a 150-mile front, delivering high-volume fires that halted Chinese advances through combined artillery-air barrages, as seen in operations like the Battle of Soyang River where over 10,000 rounds were fired in a single engagement. In the Vietnam War (1955–1975), artillery tactics adapted to dense jungle terrain by emphasizing mobile Fire Support Bases (FSBs) with 1–2 batteries each, using lightweight M102 105-mm howitzers airlifted by helicopters for rapid repositioning and continuous coverage in areas like the A Shau Valley. These adaptations prioritized rapid adjustment to fire for effect, with enhanced FDCs and forward observers (FOs) trained for quick feedback via improved communications, enabling batteries to dedicate fires to specific infantry units amid dispersed operations and enemy sapper threats. Integration with attack helicopters, such as the AH-1G Cobra from units like the 1st Cavalry Division's 9th Air Cavalry Brigade, provided agile support arriving in approximately 12 minutes, complementing artillery's volume fires for suppressive effects in low-visibility environments. Standardization in doctrines during the 1960s–1980s built on these experiences, incorporating U.S. procedures into allied frameworks for interoperable , with emphasis on massed volume fires to counter threats in . The U.S. Army's FM 6-40 (1960) formalized for effect as a starting at trial elevations after adjustments, stressing large volumes of fire for unobserved targets to maximize destruction while integrating with air and armored elements. This manual influenced 's concept (adopted 1982), which extended fire for effect to deep strikes using systems like the Multiple Launch Rocket System for synchronized conventional effects across theaters. The Cold War's nuclear deterrence shaped conventional fire tactics by introducing dual-capable , such as atomic shells for 155-mm howitzers, which expanded fire for effect's versatility but prompted a doctrinal shift toward precision hybrids in non-nuclear scenarios to avoid escalation. U.S. and planning integrated conventional volume fires with options under doctrines like (1967), emphasizing controlled, targeted effects to maintain deterrence without immediate atomic resort, as units trained for both massed conventional barrages and selective delivery. This hybrid approach, evident in the 1970s modernization of systems like the M109, balanced high-volume suppression with improved accuracy to support limited conventional operations amid superpower standoffs.

Operational Procedure

Fire Mission Initiation

The initiation of a fire mission in operations begins with the observer's call for fire, a standardized request that provides essential details to enable effective targeting. This call includes the observer's and location, a warning specifying the type of mission (such as observed or predicted fire), the target's location using grid coordinates or other precise with associated accuracy categories (e.g., Category I for 0-20 feet precision), a description of the including its size, nature, and activity, the of (such as type of or munitions like high-explosive with variable time ), and the of fire or control (e.g., adjust fire to refine aim before proceeding to fire for effect). Once transmitted, the call for fire is relayed to the fire direction center (FDC), where it is processed to plot the target coordinates on firing charts and assign appropriate firing batteries or units based on availability, proximity, and mission requirements. Transmission occurs via digital systems like the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS) for rapid integration or voice radio in degraded environments, ensuring synchronization with coordination measures to avoid risks. The FDC verifies target data against commander intent and high-payoff target lists, preparing fire orders that incorporate safety protocols, such as a 1,000-meter offset if needed. Initial data computation at the FDC involves calculating firing parameters using ballistic tables, meteorological data, and weapon characteristics to determine , of fire, range, and settings tailored to the and environmental conditions. This step relies on accurate inputs including firing unit position, type, and / effects to generate initial firing solutions, which form the basis for subsequent adjustments or for effect. Computational accuracy is critical, often supported by automated tools to minimize errors and expedite the process. Fire missions are categorized as observed or predicted, with initiation procedures signaling potential for fire for effect when conditions allow rapid, effective delivery. Observed fire requires an observer with line-of-sight to the for adjustments, typically starting with an adjust-fire request to bracket the before transitioning to fire for effect. Predicted fire, in contrast, uses precomputed without observation, enabling first-round fire for effect if the five key requirements—accurate , firing , / , meteorological information, and computational precision—are met, making it ideal for time-sensitive targets. The choice of mission type during initiation directly influences the pathway to massed, suppressive fires for desired effects.

Adjusting Fire

Adjusting fire is the critical refinement phase in operations where forward observers correct the initial fire data using spotting rounds to align the mean point of impact (MPI) precisely with the , ensuring subsequent fire for effect achieves maximum effectiveness. This follows the fire mission initiation, where initial location and fire direction are communicated to the fire direction center (FDC). Observers employ manual techniques to iteratively adjust rounds in flight, compensating for variables such as ballistic errors, , and until the fire is accurately registered. Spotting procedures form the core of adjustments, with observers providing based on the observed of spotting rounds relative to the adjusting point—a well-defined near or on the . are categorized into three primary dimensions: (left or right), (add or drop), and vertical deviation (up or down, often tied to height-of-burst or HOB). For , observers measure lateral deviation in mils using the observer-target (OT) line as , issuing commands such as "LEFT 40" or "RIGHT 20" to shift horizontally. Range adjustments address forward-backward errors, with spottings like "OVER" prompting "ADD 100" or "SHORT" leading to "DROP 50," typically in 50- to 400-meter increments depending on the bracket size. Vertical deviation , such as "UP 25" or "AIR 10" for bursts above the , refine to achieve an optimal HOB of around 20 meters for fuzes, ensuring the round's effect is maximized on the ground. These are transmitted via radio to the FDC, which computes and fires the next spotting round accordingly. The bracketing method is the standard technique for range adjustments, involving successive rounds to establish and narrow a bracket around the target until the error is minimized. Observers first fire to create an initial bracket, such as 400 meters wide, by achieving one over and one short impact along the OT line; this bracket is then split repeatedly—halving the interval with each correction (e.g., from 200 meters to 100, then 50)—until the MPI falls within 50 meters of the adjusting point. Hasty bracketing accelerates this for time-sensitive missions by using a single initial bracket as a scaling factor, while one-round adjustments rely on precise spotting for rapid corrections when observer experience or conditions allow. Direction and HOB are adjusted concurrently or sequentially to maintain alignment throughout. This methodical narrowing ensures the fire's accuracy without excessive rounds, typically requiring 4 to 8 spotting shots per mission. Manual tools are essential for observers conducting adjustments in the field, enabling precise spotting and computation without reliance on automation. Binoculars, often with mil-scale reticles, allow measurement of deviation in mils (approximately 1 mil equating to 1 meter at 1,000 meters range) and HOB assessments. Maps facilitate target plotting, terrain analysis for site corrections, and altitude determinations via contour lines to adjust for vertical intervals. Early rangefinders, such as optical or laser models predating full digital integration, provide accurate distance measurements to verify range data and support one-round adjustments. These tools, combined with standard observer aids like plotting boards, enable effective manual refinement in varied environments. Adjustment concludes when the MPI is sufficiently close to the target to guarantee effective fire for effect, typically within 50 to 100 meters (CEP) depending on mission type and target size. For area targets, a 50-meter is standard, verified by averaging usable round impacts or observer confirmation of "" or "ADJUSTMENT COMPLETE." Precision missions may demand tighter tolerances, such as 25 meters, while larger areas allow up to 100 meters before transitioning to full barrage. Upon meeting this criterion, the observer issues a fire for effect command, shifting from single spotting rounds to multiple guns for saturation.

Executing Fire for Effect

Once a satisfactory adjustment has been achieved during the preceding phase, the forward observer issues the command "fire for effect" to the fire direction center (FDC), signaling the transition to the destructive phase of the mission. This command triggers the FDC to direct simultaneous or rapid serial fire from multiple pieces, such as a or , to saturate the target area with concentrated rounds. The volume of fire is determined by the FDC based on target size, type, and the desired effect, such as neutralization (disrupting enemy activity) or destruction (eliminating the ). Typically, this involves 3 to 6 volleys per gun, with the observer specifying the number of rounds in the command, for example, "2 ROUNDS" or "3 VOLLEYS," to ensure adequate coverage without excessive expenditure. Representative examples include using one volley for point targets like or multiple volleys for area targets like troop concentrations, guided by joint munitions effectiveness manuals (JMEM). High-explosive projectiles are standard for area effects in fire for effect, paired with appropriate fuzes to maximize impact: quick or super-quick fuzes for surface burst, delay fuzes for ground penetration, time fuzes for airburst at a set height, or variable time (VT/proximity) fuzes for optimal fragmentation over personnel. The observer or FDC may adjust fuze and projectile types during the command if needed for the target, such as switching to VT for exposed troops. Upon completion of the fire for effect, the observer assesses the results and may send refinement corrections if necessary, followed by the "end of mission" call to terminate the engagement. For safety, the observer can issue "check fire" at any point to immediately halt all firing activities, such as if friendly forces enter the or if a is observed; the FDC then relays "check firing" to the guns, suspending operations until "cancel check fire" is authorized. If further engagement is required, the observer may request a repeat of the fire for effect using the same parameters.

Modern Applications

Technological Enhancements

Since the , the integration of GPS and inertial navigation systems has revolutionized fire for effect by enabling predicted fire capabilities, allowing artillery units to achieve first-round effects without extensive manual adjustments. For instance, the incorporates an onboard digital with encrypted GPS and an inertial navigation unit that provides precise positioning and orientation, supporting accurate ballistic computations for support. This shift from traditional survey-dependent methods reduces the need for adjusting rounds, minimizing exposure to and enhancing operational tempo in dynamic environments. The Advanced Tactical Data System (AFATDS) further automates direction (FDC) operations, performing rapid computations for planning and execution. AFATDS integrates targeting data from multiple sources to generate automated solutions for for effect, including calculations and across joint fires assets. By streamlining the transition from to delivery, it supports high-volume, synchronized strikes while reducing in complex scenarios. As of 2025, the U.S. Army introduced the AFATDS Artillery Execution Suite (AXS), an upgraded software version that enhances intuitiveness, data-centric operations, and adaptability for quicker system updates. Precision-guided munitions like the round exemplify how GPS/inertial guidance achieves destructive effects with minimal rounds, significantly lowering risks. The , a 155mm , delivers sub-10-meter accuracy at extended ranges up to 40 km, enabling single-round fire for effect that replaces salvos of unguided shells and conserves ammunition. This precision mitigates logistical burdens and protects non-combatants by confining blast effects to intended targets. In 21st-century U.S. Army doctrines, drones and advanced sensors enhance real-time targeting for fire for effect through seamless sensor-to-shooter networks. Unmanned aerial systems (UAS) provide persistent surveillance and geolocation data fed directly into systems like AFATDS, shortening the kill chain and enabling dynamic adjustments to moving threats. This integration, as outlined in field manuals such as FM 3-09, supports multi-domain operations by fusing electro-optical, , and laser-designator inputs for immediate, effects-based fires. Recent tests in October 2025 by demonstrated a new precision-guided 155mm round with increased range and accuracy, further advancing these capabilities.

Usage in Contemporary Conflicts

In the Gulf War of 1991, coalition artillery extensively employed fire for effect, with most cannon missions executed as first-round fire for effect due to precise positioning from GPS and inertial navigation systems, which drastically reduced the need for adjusting fire. Counterfire radars, such as the AN/TPQ-36 and AN/TPQ-37, played a pivotal role in rapidly detecting and targeting Iraqi artillery batteries, enabling swift suppressive barrages that neutralized enemy counterbattery threats within minutes. This approach contributed to the overwhelming firepower superiority that facilitated the ground campaign's rapid advance. During the Iraq and Afghanistan wars from 2001 to 2021, U.S. and allied forces adapted fire for effect for operations, leveraging counterfire radars like the AN/TPQ-47 to locate insurgent and positions in . These systems allowed fire missions to commence directly as fire for effect, using as the primary observer, which provided proactive responses to attacks on bases and convoys. In , this tactic disrupted insurgent operations by delivering rapid, massed volleys that suppressed launch sites before attackers could disperse, while in 's rugged terrain, it supported maneuver units against positions. Such applications highlighted the shift toward integrated sensor-to-shooter networks for time-sensitive targeting. In the conflict since 2022, Ukrainian has incorporated U.S.-supplied HIMARS systems to execute high-mobility fire for effect against Russian forces, targeting ammunition depots, command nodes, and units with guided rockets for deep strikes up to 80 kilometers. This has enabled effective counterbattery operations, particularly following HIMARS deliveries in mid-2022, resulting in the destruction of hundreds of Russian pieces and a notable decline in their firing rates. Ukrainian tactics emphasize rapid repositioning after firing to evade retaliation, amplifying the system's disruptive impact on Russian and maneuver. As of November 2025, HIMARS continues to influence the battlefield, with Ukrainian efforts to replicate its effects using domestically developed drones for precision strikes amid ongoing Russian advances. Urban environments in these conflicts, such as in and in , have posed significant challenges to traditional fire for effect due to dense civilian populations and collateral risk, prompting a hybrid approach that pairs precision-guided munitions for initial bracketing with restrained effect phases to limit wide-area blast effects. This evolution prioritizes that mandate verified targeting to avoid incidental harm, often integrating drones for real-time battle damage assessment. Despite these adaptations, explosive remnants from effect fires continue to endanger non-combatants post-battle. Overall effectiveness has improved through technological enablers like automated fire direction centers, reducing adjustment times from several minutes in earlier eras to seconds in modern systems, thereby allowing fire for effect to commence almost immediately upon . In and , this has translated to response times under 30 seconds for counterfire missions, enhancing survivability and operational tempo against elusive threats.

References

  1. [1]
    [PDF] Fire for Effect: field artillery and close air support in the US Army
    effective means to coordinate infantry and artillery actions. The artillery liaison teams were, therefore, tasked with fire planning rather than adjusting ...<|control11|><|separator|>
  2. [2]
  3. [3]
    [PDF] FM 3-09 - GlobalSecurity.org
    Apr 4, 2014 · round fire for effect on targets. Fire for effect is 1. A command to indicate that fire for effect is desired. 2. Fire that is intended to ...
  4. [4]
  5. [5]
    FM 6-30 Chapter 5 Adjustment Of Fire - GlobalSecurity.org
    ... mean point of impact [MPI] of a group of bursts) with respect to the adjusting point as observed along the OT line. Spottings are made for the following ...
  6. [6]
    Gustavus Adolphus - Military History Online
    He also deployed his light, nimble artillery consisting of three-pounder guns with his infantry instead of the old tactic of placing the infantry in front of ...
  7. [7]
    Artillery Tactics Combat in the Napoleonic Wars
    The land based artillery can be divided into two categories: siege and field artillery. Siege artillery was designed to bombard fortifications, cities, and ...Missing: saturation | Show results with:saturation
  8. [8]
  9. [9]
    Gettysburg | Artillery Placements | July 3, 1863
    A massive infantry attack on the center of the Union position, preceded by an artillery barrage to soften up the Federal infantry at that point in their line.
  10. [10]
    Battle of the Somme | National Army Museum
    When the attack began, it would provide a creeping barrage behind which the infantry could advance. The British believed that the Germans would be so ...
  11. [11]
    Tactics in warfare during World War I - Anzac Portal - DVA
    May 18, 2023 · Creeping barrage consists of slow-moving artillery fire to create a defensive 'curtain', behind which infantry (armed soldiers on foot) follow ...
  12. [12]
    [PDF] The Changes in German Tactical Doctrine During the First World War
    85 His support included an accurate creeping barrage, the Feuerwalze, for the advancing infantry. Bruchmilller knew how to derive the greatest benefits from ...<|control11|><|separator|>
  13. [13]
    Artillery - 1914-1918 Online
    Dec 16, 2014 · By contrast, in trench warfare, the artillery was responsible for 75 percent of the known casualties. During the war, the artillery not only ...1The structure of artillery · 2Artillery in war · 3Numerical examples · 4Conclusion
  14. [14]
    [PDF] Operational Artillery in the Korean War - DTIC
    May 23, 2013 · The Korean War provides a unique window to examine the effective use of artillery in a high intensity conflict because of the unprecedented ...
  15. [15]
    [PDF] The NATO-Warsaw Pact competition in the 1970s and 1980s
    Sep 3, 2014 · 157 Beyond airpower, a key enabler for. FOFA was the new US Multiple Launch Rocket System, designed to fire artillery rounds, anti-armour ...
  16. [16]
    [PDF] FIELD A'RTILLEiY CANNON GUNNERY - BITS
    ... 1960. Page 2. *FM 6-40. S. FIELD MANUAL. HEADQUARTERS, m. DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY. No. 6-40. ) -. WASHINGTON 25, D. C., 9 November 1960. FIELD ARTILLERY CANNON ...Missing: 1980s | Show results with:1980s
  17. [17]
    Ending Tactical Nuclear Weapons: A Brief History and a Path Forward
    Aug 1, 2023 · One Soviet commentator stated in 1972 that “development of atomic shells has made artillery a versatile weapon of modern war.” 27 In this way, ...
  18. [18]
    [PDF] Integrating Army Capabilities into Deterrence: The Early Cold War
    Nov 20, 2023 · Kennedy's administration continued to increase and upgrade American strategic nuclear capabilities alongside his conventional forces buildup. By ...<|control11|><|separator|>
  19. [19]
    [PDF] MODERNIZING THE KING OF BATTLE . 1973-1991 - GovInfo
    Jun 5, 2003 · This monograph is the story of that aggressive U.S. Army program of the 1970s and. 1980s to modernize the field artillery. Under pressure to ...
  20. [20]
    [PDF] Fire Support and Field Artillery Operations
    Aug 12, 2024Missing: 3-09.15 | Show results with:3-09.15
  21. [21]
    [PDF] Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Field Artillery Manual ...
    definition, it means simultaneous execution of two or more firing elements to achieve maximum ... fire for effect. The type of target (troops, vehicles, hard, ...
  22. [22]
    FM 6-40 Chptr 5 Fire Mission Messages - GlobalSecurity.org
    However, the method of fire for effect must be announced. b. The FDO must ensure that the fire order is clear, concise, and in the proper format. The fire order ...Fire Mission Messages · 5-5. Fire Order Standing... · 5-7. Massing Of Fires
  23. [23]
    FM 6-30 Chapter 4 Call For Fire - GlobalSecurity.org
    The warning order consists of the type of mission, the size of the element to fire for effect, and the method of target location. It is a request for fire ...
  24. [24]
    The Case for a Medium Towed Artillery Army Training Publication
    Oct 6, 2020 · The M777A2 howitzer has onboard encrypted GPS, an inertial navigation unit, and vehicle motion sensor that all work together to track and ...Missing: predicted | Show results with:predicted
  25. [25]
    Fire Support Command and Control (FSC2) empowers ... - PEO C3N
    These systems integrate Army, joint and coalition targeting capabilities and fuse that information with the ballistic calculations required to deliver precision ...
  26. [26]
    [PDF] ATP 3-09.23 (FM 3-09.21) Field Artillery Cannon Battalion - BITS
    Section I – Field Artillery Battalion Fire Mission Processing ... covers the fire mission process, including tactical and technical fire direction, massed.
  27. [27]
    Excalibur Projectile | Raytheon - RTX
    Excalibur increases precision, minimizes collateral damage and reduces the logistical burden for artillery forces. True precision weapon. The Excalibur ...
  28. [28]
    Picatinny's GPS-guided Excalibur artillery round deemed 'amazingly ...
    Sep 11, 2008 · Not only do more accurate rounds reduce collateral damage and risk to dismounted Soldiers on the ground, but using less rounds limits the ...Missing: fewer | Show results with:fewer
  29. [29]
    [PDF] Army Futures Command Concept for Fires 2028
    Oct 6, 2021 · The concept aims for Army fires to support future forces in MDO, enabling deterrence, integrating fires at all echelons, and improved range and ...
  30. [30]
    [PDF] Dedicated Aerial Forward Observers
    Jan 31, 2023 · The Army Field. Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS) is doctrinally the standard fire coordination system for incorporating UAS into Target ...
  31. [31]
    [PDF] LANDPOWER ESSAY SERIES - AUSA
    Most fire missions were "first round fire for effect." Very little adjustment onto the target was necessary or used. Cannon artillery had accurate ...
  32. [32]
    [PDF] October
    Oct 11, 1991 · It was very reliable, accurate, easy to use and greatly improved our artillery first-round fire-for-effect capabilities. ... Counterfire Radars.
  33. [33]
    [PDF] Counter– Insurgency
    Oct 2, 2008 · in Iraq and Afghanistan and Artillery- ... The counterfire was sent as a “fire for effect” from the start with the radar used as an observer.
  34. [34]
    [PDF] U.S. Army Field Artillery Relevance on the Modern Battlefield - DTIC
    target areas of interest providing first round fire for effect accuracy. However, the ... Interview by LTC Manning of the OIFSG in Baghdad,. Iraq, 15 May 2003 ...
  35. [35]
    [PDF] Does the Global War on Terrorism Signal the Demise of the Field ...
    concerning air power made for the ground war in 1991. ... The Division Artillery (DIVARTY) owned the counter-fire/counter-rocket radars under ... fire for effect ...
  36. [36]
    Zelensky showcases the destruction of Russian artillery - Militarnyi
    Volodymyr Zelensky has demonstrated the effective operation of the M142 HIMARS artillery rocket system against Russian artillery.
  37. [37]
    Fire for Effect in Ukraine | Small Wars Journal
    Oct 1, 2024 · In artillery terms, it is time to FIRE FOR EFFECT and provide the quantities of ammunition Ukraine needs to win the war. The slow increase in ...
  38. [38]
    American HIMARS missile launchers disrupt Russian military ...
    Jul 20, 2022 · Romanenko estimates that the HIMARS have produced a 25% decrease in Russian fire. But is it enough to turn the tide? "The use of HIMARS is ...
  39. [39]
    [PDF] Explosive Weapons With Wide Area Effects - ICRC
    While it is indeed important that fire 'for effect' be on-target, the use ... , “The effect of civilian casualties in Afghanistan and Iraq”, National Bureau of ...
  40. [40]
    [PDF] ARES Indirect Fire - International Institute of Humanitarian Law
    The battlefield impacts of massed fire delivered by indirect-fire artillery systems executing a fire for effect mission can be devastating. Primarily ...
  41. [41]
    [PDF] The Employment of Artillery Units in Counterinsurgency - DTIC
    support NCO during an artillery live fire exercise. 115. John J. McGrath, Fire for Effect: Field Artillery and Close Air Support in the US Army (Leavenworth ...