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Target acquisition

Target acquisition is the detection, identification, and location of a target in sufficient detail to permit the effective employment of weapons, also known as TA.^[1] This process is fundamental to military operations across various domains, enabling forces to engage threats accurately while minimizing risks to friendly units and civilians.^[2] In broader military contexts, target acquisition encompasses surveillance, reconnaissance, and intelligence gathering to support direct fire, indirect fire support, and precision strikes. Key processes include initial detection through visual, thermal, or radar means; location using methods such as grid coordinates, reference points, or ballistic trajectory analysis; and identification to classify targets by threat level and type, ensuring engagement aligns with rules of engagement.^[2] Systems facilitating this include weapon-locating radars like the AN/TPQ-36, AN/TPQ-37, AN/TPQ-50, and advanced AN/TPQ-53, which provide 360-degree coverage, simultaneous tracking of hostile and friendly fire, and early warning capabilities.^[3] Optical and thermal sights, such as the Enhanced Night Vision Goggle-Binocular (ENVG-B) and advanced thermal weapon sights, enhance detection in low-visibility conditions, particularly in cavalry and aviation roles.^[4] The importance of target acquisition lies in its role in counterfire operations, force protection, and mission success, particularly in field artillery where it integrates with systems like the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS) for real-time processing and prioritization.^[3] Control methods—centralized, decentralized, or combined—adapt to operational environments, using zones like Critical Friendly Zones (CFZs) and Censor Zones (CZs) to focus efforts and avoid fratricide.^[3] Over time, it has evolved from primarily visual methods reliant on ground observers to automated, technology-driven approaches incorporating satellite navigation and joint force integration, reflecting advancements in radar automation and multi-domain synchronization since earlier doctrines like FM 3-09.12 (2002) and continuing with updates in FM 3-09 (2024).^[5]

Overview

Definition and Scope

Target acquisition refers to the process of detecting, locating, identifying, and designating a target for subsequent engagement, enabling accurate prosecution in both lethal operations aimed at destruction and non-lethal operations such as surveillance or disruption.^[6]^[2]^[7] This foundational step ensures that resources are directed efficiently toward objectives, minimizing risks to friendly forces and collateral damage.^[6] The core components of target acquisition include initial search and cueing, where sensors or external inputs narrow the field of view; detection to spot potential anomalies; discrimination through classification to categorize the entity; and handoff for designation to engagement systems.^[6] Cueing often relies on prior intelligence to guide the search, while discrimination distinguishes threats from non-threats based on signatures like shape or movement.^[6] These elements form a sequential pipeline that integrates human and automated decision-making for timely results.^[2] Primarily applied in military contexts for kinetic strikes via direct fire or indirect support, target acquisition also extends to non-kinetic operations involving electronic warfare or information effects.^[7] In law enforcement, it supports surveillance and apprehension by identifying suspects through visual or sensor means.^[8] Civilian applications include search-and-rescue missions, where algorithms detect and locate individuals in distress using imagery or signals.^[9] Target acquisition integrates into broader military frameworks like the kill chain (Find-Fix-Track-Target-Engage-Assess) and the OODA loop (Observe-Orient-Decide-Act), where it primarily encompasses the observe and orient phases leading to decision and action.^[10] A simplified outline of its role in the F2T2EA kill chain is as follows:

Find → Fix → Track → **Target (Acquisition: Identify & Designate)** → Engage → Assess
Find → Fix → Track → **Target (Acquisition: Identify & Designate)** → Engage → Assess

This positioning highlights its pivotal role in bridging intelligence to execution.^[10]

Importance in Modern Warfare

Target acquisition plays a pivotal strategic role in modern warfare by enabling commanders to reduce response times to emerging threats through the rapid detection, identification, and location of targets, thereby supporting the dynamic targeting of time-sensitive objectives via processes like the find, fix, track, target, engage, and assess (F2T2EA) cycle.^[11] This capability minimizes collateral damage by incorporating collateral damage estimation (CDE) and proportionality assessments during target development, ensuring engagements align with the law of war and balance military advantage against potential civilian harm.^[11] It underpins precision warfare doctrines, as outlined in U.S. Joint Publication 3-60 (updated 2013, with revisions through 2018), by linking strategic objectives to tactical actions through weaponeering and capabilities analysis that match precision-guided munitions to target vulnerabilities.^[11] Tactically, effective target acquisition enhances force multiplication by amplifying the impact of limited assets through accurate and timely engagements, allowing smaller forces to achieve disproportionate effects against adversaries.^[12] It enables standoff engagements, where platforms can neutralize threats at extended ranges without exposing personnel to direct risk, thereby increasing survivability and operational tempo.^[13] Furthermore, integration with command-and-control (C2) systems facilitates networked warfare, where joint targeting coordination boards synchronize intelligence, fires, and effects across components for real-time decision-making and shared situational awareness.^[11] The impact of rapid target acquisition on battlefield outcomes is evident in operations like the 1991 Gulf War, where superior acquisition capabilities allowed coalition forces to swiftly establish air superiority by neutralizing Iraqi command-and-control and air defense networks in the initial phases, crippling the enemy's ability to respond effectively.^[13] This shift enabled subsequent dominance in the air campaign, demonstrating how timely acquisition can decisively alter the course of engagements by prioritizing high-value targets.^[14] Metrics of success in target acquisition systems emphasize the probability of detection (Pd), which measures the likelihood of correctly identifying a true target, and the false alarm rate (Pfa), which quantifies erroneous detections that could waste resources or compromise operations; high Pd paired with low Pfa is essential for reliable performance in cluttered environments.^[15] These concepts guide system design to balance sensitivity and specificity, ensuring operational effectiveness without overwhelming operators with false positives.^[16]

Historical Development

Early Methods

Prior to the 20th century, target acquisition in military operations predominantly depended on visual observation by scouts and sentinels, who served as the primary means of gathering intelligence on enemy positions and movements. Cavalry patrols and vedettes conducted direct assessments of terrain and forces, often from elevated vantage points, to inform commanders of potential threats. In the Napoleonic Wars (1803–1815), such patrols were integral to centralized command structures, enabling rapid decision-making based on firsthand reports.^[17] Signal flags and semaphore systems facilitated the transmission of these observations over distances; for instance, the French Chappe telegraph system used visual signals to relay messages to Napoleon's headquarters.^[17] Basic optics, including telescopes and binoculars, augmented human vision for distant reconnaissance, as evidenced by Napoleon's deployment of aides-de-camp as a "directed telescope" to extend his observational reach beyond the chain of command.^[18]^[17] These techniques, while effective in clear conditions, were constrained by line-of-sight limitations and the physical endurance of observers. World War I introduced aerial reconnaissance as a transformative method for target acquisition, leveraging aircraft to extend visual observation beyond ground-based constraints. By 1914, major powers had established dedicated air corps for intelligence gathering, with planes initially used to track troop movements and spot artillery positions from altitudes up to several thousand feet.^[19] Photography from aircraft became routine, producing millions of images for mapping and target identification, while observers relayed findings via rudimentary air-to-ground communication.^[20] Rudimentary radio direction finding (RDF) emerged to support these efforts, particularly for night operations and navigation; German forces employed RDF on airships like the L10 in 1915 to triangulate positions over enemy territory using ground stations at Nordholz and Borkum.^[21] British experiments in early 1918 at Andover Junction and Cranwell tested RDF to guide bombardment aircraft, with the U.S. Army Signal Corps ordering 550 sets for similar reconnaissance roles.^[21] These advancements allowed for broader coverage but still required skilled human interpreters to process data from photographs and radio signals. During World War II, electronic methods began to supplant purely visual techniques, with radar emerging as a pivotal tool for target acquisition. The United Kingdom's Chain Home system, operational by the late 1930s, formed the world's first integrated early-warning radar network, using high-frequency transmitters to detect incoming aircraft at ranges exceeding 100 miles and altitudes up to 25,000 feet.^[22] This network of coastal stations provided critical data to Fighter Command, enabling timely intercepts during the Battle of Britain in 1940. Complementing radar, acoustic locators such as sound-ranging systems were employed for artillery spotting, triangulating enemy gun positions by detecting muzzle blasts and shell sounds through microphone arrays spaced several miles apart.^[23] These devices, including parabolic mirrors and war tubas, offered passive detection in low-visibility conditions but were phased out as radar matured.^[24] Despite these innovations, early methods up to World War II retained significant limitations rooted in human dependency and environmental vulnerabilities. Reliance on observers for visual and acoustic interpretation introduced high error rates from fatigue, misjudgment, and subjective assessments, as seen in the variable accuracy of aerial photo analysis.^[19] Weather conditions severely hampered operations—fog, rain, or darkness obscured visual sightings and degraded acoustic signals, while dust clouds or low visibility confounded ground scouts.^[17] Low automation meant manual plotting and communication, slowing response times and amplifying risks from enemy countermeasures like camouflage or fire.^[17] These factors often resulted in incomplete or delayed target data, underscoring the need for more reliable technologies in subsequent eras.

Cold War Era

During the 1940s and 1950s, target acquisition evolved from World War II-era technologies to more integrated electronic systems suited for the emerging threats of the Cold War. The U.S. SCR-584 radar, initially developed for anti-aircraft fire control during the war, continued to play a role in early Cold War air defense by providing precise target tracking and acquisition for ground-based systems.^[25] This radar's high-resolution capabilities were adapted for use with emerging missile defenses, enabling automated guidance against high-altitude bombers. By 1954, the Nike Ajax surface-to-air missile system became the first operational guided missile in the U.S. arsenal, relying on dedicated acquisition radars to detect and track incoming aircraft at ranges up to 25 miles and altitudes of 60,000 feet.^[26]^[27] These systems marked a shift toward radar-directed interception, prioritizing rapid detection of massed bomber formations in line with U.S. strategic deterrence against Soviet air threats. The Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 underscored the critical need for real-time target acquisition and reconnaissance capabilities amid escalating nuclear tensions. U.S. intelligence relied on delayed film-return satellites like Corona, which took days or weeks to deliver imagery, proving insufficient for the 13-day crisis timeline.^[28] U-2 overflights provided some low-altitude reconnaissance, but their vulnerability highlighted gaps in persistent, timely surveillance for identifying and prioritizing missile sites. This event accelerated demands for near-real-time systems, influencing subsequent investments in electro-optical and airborne platforms to support crisis response and strategic targeting.^[28] Cold War military doctrine emphasized nuclear deterrence against potential Soviet invasions involving massed armored formations, such as those anticipated through the Fulda Gap in Europe. NATO strategies focused on countering echelon-based armored surges with integrated air defenses, where target acquisition systems were designed to detect and engage large-scale conventional threats before escalation to nuclear use.^[29] This doctrinal priority shaped the development of multi-layered defenses, balancing conventional interdiction with nuclear options to maintain credible deterrence without immediate escalation. In the 1970s and 1980s, advancements integrated space and airborne assets for enhanced strategic and tactical acquisition. The U.S. launched the KH-11 reconnaissance satellite on December 19, 1976, introducing near-real-time electro-optical imagery transmission via relay satellites, which revolutionized strategic targeting by providing high-resolution views of Soviet military installations.^[30] Concurrently, the E-3 AWACS entered U.S. service in 1977, offering airborne early warning and control with detection ranges up to 520 km for medium-altitude targets, enabling real-time command and control over battle spaces.^[31] On the Soviet side, the S-300 surface-to-air missile system achieved initial operational status with its first site active by 1980, designed to acquire and engage aircraft and ballistic missiles in defense of key areas against NATO air campaigns.^[32] These platforms reflected the era's emphasis on persistent surveillance and rapid response to sustain mutual deterrence.

Post-Cold War and Contemporary

The end of the Cold War marked a pivotal shift in target acquisition practices, emphasizing precision-guided munitions and satellite-enabled navigation over massed formations. During the 1991 Gulf War, the U.S.-led coalition demonstrated the transformative role of GPS in target acquisition, enabling accurate positioning for artillery, aircraft, and ground forces in the featureless desert terrain. GPS receivers, such as the AN/PSN-10 Small Lightweight GPS Receiver, allowed tank commanders and artillery units to determine precise locations, facilitating rapid target nomination and fire support coordination against Iraqi forces. This integration reduced navigation errors from kilometers to meters, contributing to the coalition's overwhelming air and ground superiority.^[33]^[34] In response to these successes, U.S. military doctrine evolved to formalize precision targeting processes. Joint Publication 3-60, Joint Targeting, first issued in draft form in the mid-1990s and finalized in 1996, incorporated lessons from the Gulf War by outlining a structured joint targeting cycle that integrated GPS-aided acquisition with intelligence preparation of the battlespace. This publication emphasized deliberate and dynamic targeting phases, prioritizing effects-based assessments to align fires with operational objectives, and influenced subsequent updates through the 2000s.^[35] Following the September 11, 2001 attacks, target acquisition adapted to counterinsurgency and counterterrorism, focusing on time-sensitive targets (TSTs) such as high-value individuals in fluid environments. In operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, U.S. forces integrated human intelligence (HUMINT) from local informants and signals intelligence (SIGINT) from intercepted communications to nominate and prosecute TSTs within compressed timelines, often under 60 minutes from detection to strike. This approach was refined through high-value target teams that fused real-time intelligence to disrupt insurgent networks. Post-2003 Iraq invasion, biometric technologies enhanced identification for targeting; the U.S. military established databases like the Automated Biometric Identification System (ABIS), collecting iris scans, fingerprints, and facial recognition data from millions of detainees and suspects to link individuals to threats, preventing releases of known insurgents and supporting persistent surveillance. By 2011, these databases held records on over 3 million Iraqis, aiding in the denial of safe havens for targeted actors.^[36]^[37]^[38] The 2010s and 2020s saw the proliferation of unmanned aerial systems (UAS) revolutionizing networked target acquisition, particularly in operations against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). The MQ-9 Reaper drone emerged as a cornerstone, providing persistent intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) with full-motion video feeds to joint strike cells, enabling dynamic targeting cycles reduced from weeks to 24-48 hours. In Operation Inherent Resolve (2014-2019), Reapers flew over 12,000 sorties, delivering approximately 2,900 precision-guided munitions like Hellfire missiles and GBU-38 bombs, supporting key campaigns such as the defense of Kobani (2014-2015, with 663 strikes), the liberation of Mosul (2016-2017, countering vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices), and the battle for Raqqa (2017, contributing to 3,796 coalition strikes). Networked integration via systems like Remote Optical Video Enhanced Receiver (ROVER) and Android Team Awareness Kit (ATAK) allowed seamless data sharing with ground partners, including Iraqi Counter-Terrorism Service and Syrian Democratic Forces, while minimizing collateral damage through target validation.^[39] Globally, the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine highlighted electronic warfare (EW) integrations in target acquisition amid high-intensity conflict. Russian forces employed drones for reconnaissance and initial target spotting, augmented by EW systems to jam GPS signals and disrupt Ukrainian command networks, forcing adversaries to rely on less precise inertial navigation. This approach created operational windows for frequency-hopping countermeasures against Ukrainian UAS jamming, while tracing control signals enabled counter-battery fire on operators. In examples like the defense of Kyiv and Donbas advances, Russian EW degraded incoming Ukrainian precision-guided munitions, integrating with artillery spotters to prioritize mobile targets in contested electromagnetic environments.^[40]^[41] From 2023 to 2025, target acquisition continued to evolve with AI-driven enhancements in ongoing conflicts, particularly in Ukraine, where machine learning algorithms improved real-time target identification and classification for drone swarms, enhancing resilience against EW disruptions (as of November 2025).^[42]

Acquisition Processes

Detection

Detection in target acquisition refers to the initial phase of locating potential targets through wide-area surveillance using sensor systems. This process employs both active and passive sensing methods to identify anomalies in the environment that may indicate the presence of a target. Active sensing involves transmitting energy, such as radar pulses, and detecting the echoes reflected from objects, enabling range and velocity measurements via the time delay and Doppler shift of the returned signals.^[43] Passive sensing, in contrast, relies on naturally emitted or ambient energy from targets, such as infrared emissions from heat sources or opportunistic signals like radio broadcasts, without transmitting dedicated pulses, which reduces detectability but limits control over illumination.^[44] These methods facilitate broad-area searches, often scanning sectors or volumes to maximize coverage in military operations. A fundamental concept in detection is the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR), which quantifies the ability to distinguish a target echo from background noise and clutter. The SNR is defined as the ratio of the average signal power to the average noise power, expressed mathematically as:

\text{SNR} = \frac{P_{\text{signal}}}{P_{\text{noise}}}

Higher SNR values improve the separability of target returns, directly influencing detection reliability; for instance, an SNR threshold of around 13 dB is often required for reliable single-pulse detection in radar systems.^[45] Environmental factors significantly degrade detection range and effectiveness. Terrain features, such as hills or urban structures, introduce clutter echoes that mask targets, while weather conditions like rain or fog attenuate signals and increase noise, potentially reducing range by factors dependent on precipitation rate—for example, heavy rain can attenuate microwave signals by several dB per kilometer.^[46] Electronic countermeasures, including jamming signals that elevate the noise floor or deceptive emitters mimicking clutter, further limit range; interference-to-noise ratios as low as -9 dB can cause insidious target loss without overt indicators, with pulsed jamming tolerated up to +30 dB for low-duty-cycle sources but causing degradation at higher levels.^[47] Mitigation techniques, such as frequency agility to evade jammers, help but cannot fully eliminate these impacts.^[48] Performance in detection is evaluated using metrics like the probability of detection (Pd), defined as Pd = 1 - probability of miss, where the probability of miss is the chance of failing to declare a target when present. Pd is assessed alongside the probability of false alarm (Pfa), the likelihood of declaring a target absent when none exists, typically set low (e.g., 10^{-6}) to minimize unnecessary alerts. These metrics are analyzed through receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves, which plot Pd against Pfa to characterize detector performance across varying conditions like SNR. To derive an ROC curve step-by-step: (1) Model the probability density functions (PDFs) under the null hypothesis (H0: no target, noise only) and alternative hypothesis (H1: target present, signal plus noise); (2) Compute the likelihood ratio or test statistic from the observation; (3) Set a detection threshold T to achieve a desired Pfa by integrating the H0 PDF above T (Pfa = ∫{T}^∞ p(y|H0) dy); (4) Compute Pd by integrating the H1 PDF above the same T (Pd = ∫{T}^∞ p(y|H1) dy); (5) Vary T (or equivalently SNR) to generate pairs of Pd and Pfa, plotting Pd versus Pfa to form the curve, where optimal thresholds maximize Pd for a fixed Pfa under the Neyman-Pearson criterion. ROC curves enable threshold optimization, balancing detection reliability against false alerts, with steeper curves indicating superior performance.^[49]

Identification and Classification

Identification and classification in target acquisition involve verifying detected objects as legitimate threats and categorizing them by type, such as distinguishing between friendly, neutral, or hostile entities, and further specifying attributes like vehicle class or armament. This phase assumes initial detection has occurred via sensors like radar or electro-optical systems, providing raw data for analysis. The process is critical for reducing false positives and enabling precise engagement decisions in dynamic battlefields.^[50] Key techniques include feature extraction, where attributes such as size, velocity, spectral signatures, spatial orientation, statistical distributions, and temporal behaviors are isolated from sensor data to characterize the object. For instance, radar returns might reveal a target's velocity profile to differentiate aircraft from ground clutter, while infrared sensors could extract thermal signatures for vehicle identification. Pattern recognition complements this by employing shape-based template matching or model-based comparisons against pre-stored libraries of known targets, allowing systems to align observed patterns with expected profiles for verification.^[50]^[50] Classification algorithms process these features to assign categories, often using basic decision trees or Bayesian classifiers. Decision trees operate by recursively partitioning the feature space into decision nodes based on thresholds—such as pulse repetition interval or radio frequency for radar signals—leading to leaf nodes that designate target types, enabling rapid hierarchical classification of intercepted signals into categories like surveillance or fire-control radars.^[51] Bayesian classifiers, rooted in probabilistic reasoning, compute the posterior probability of a target hypothesis given the data, leveraging Bayes' theorem. The theorem derives the updated belief as follows: first, the prior probability P(\text{[target](/page/Target)}) represents the initial likelihood based on context; the likelihood P(\text{[data](/page/Data)}|\text{[target](/page/Target)}) measures how well the observed features match the hypothesis; the marginal probability P(\text{[data](/page/Data)}) normalizes across all possibilities, often approximated via evidence integration; thus, the posterior is

P(\text{target}|\text{data}) = \frac{P(\text{data}|\text{target}) \cdot P(\text{target})}{P(\text{data})}.

This approach integrates multi-sensor evidence, such as radar and identification-friend-or-foe (IFF) data, to yield probabilities for identities like hostile (e.g., 42%) or friendly (e.g., 32.5%) in air combat scenarios.^[52]^[52] Real-time challenges arise in multi-target environments, where clutter, variability in target signatures, and adversarial tactics like camouflage complicate discrimination, often requiring processing timelines reduced by an order of magnitude through automated aids. A particular difficulty is distinguishing valid targets from decoys, which mimic real signatures to induce false engagements, as seen in ballistic missile defense where decoys evade spectral or kinematic separation.^[50]^[50]^[53] Outputs of this phase include target designation, typically with associated confidence levels—such as high, medium, or low threat—derived from posterior scores, informing downstream prioritization and engagement rules. For example, a Bayesian-derived confidence exceeding 60% might trigger hostile classification and handover to fire control systems.^[50]^[52]

Tracking and Prioritization

Tracking in target acquisition involves maintaining continuous estimates of a target's position, velocity, and other dynamic states over time, despite noise, occlusions, or maneuvers, to enable sustained monitoring and engagement preparation. A foundational method for this is the Kalman filter, which recursively predicts and updates target states using a linear dynamic model. The process model is given by the state transition equation:

\mathbf{x}_k = \mathbf{F} \mathbf{x}_{k-1} + \mathbf{w}_{k-1}

where \mathbf{x}_k is the state vector at time k, \mathbf{F} is the state transition matrix, and \mathbf{w}_{k-1} is Gaussian process noise with zero mean and covariance \mathbf{Q}.^[54] The measurement model is \mathbf{z}_k = \mathbf{H} \mathbf{x}_k + \mathbf{v}_k, where \mathbf{z}_k is the observation, \mathbf{H} is the measurement matrix, and \mathbf{v}_k is measurement noise with covariance \mathbf{R}. The filter operates in two steps: prediction, which propagates the state estimate \hat{\mathbf{x}}_{k|k-1} = \mathbf{F} \hat{\mathbf{x}}_{k-1|k-1} and error covariance \mathbf{P}_{k|k-1} = \mathbf{F} \mathbf{P}_{k-1|k-1} \mathbf{F}^T + \mathbf{Q}; and update, which incorporates the new measurement via the Kalman gain \mathbf{K}_k = \mathbf{P}_{k|k-1} \mathbf{H}^T (\mathbf{H} \mathbf{P}_{k|k-1} \mathbf{H}^T + \mathbf{R})^{-1} to yield the corrected estimate \hat{\mathbf{x}}_{k|k} = \hat{\mathbf{x}}_{k|k-1} + \mathbf{K}_k (\mathbf{z}_k - \mathbf{H} \hat{\mathbf{x}}_{k|k-1}) and minimized covariance \mathbf{P}_{k|k} = (\mathbf{I} - \mathbf{K}_k \mathbf{H}) \mathbf{P}_{k|k-1}, ensuring optimal least-squares estimation under Gaussian assumptions.^[55] This approach, widely adopted in radar and sensor systems, provides robust predictions even with intermittent data, as demonstrated in applications like air defense tracking where it reduces position errors by fusing sequential observations.^[54] Once tracks are established from initial detection and classification outputs, prioritization ranks targets for engagement based on criteria such as threat level (e.g., potential to harm friendly forces), proximity to critical assets, and compliance with rules of engagement (ROE). In U.S. military doctrine, ROE frameworks emphasize proportionality and necessity, directing forces to prioritize time-sensitive targets that pose imminent dangers, such as incoming missiles over distant reconnaissance assets.^[56] Threat assessment often incorporates factors like target speed, armament, and intent, derived from track data, to assign priority scores that guide resource allocation in dynamic battlespaces. Handoff refers to the seamless transfer of validated track data from acquisition sensors to downstream weapons systems, ensuring continuity in the kill chain. This process involves formatting track estimates (position, velocity, confidence) into compatible protocols for cueing fire control systems, minimizing latency to support rapid engagement; for instance, studies on air-to-ground handoffs highlight the need for standardized interfaces to reduce designation errors in joint operations.^[57] Effective handoff maintains track integrity across platforms, enabling effectors like missiles or artillery to acquire and prosecute targets without reacquisition.^[57] In multi-target environments, handling multiple tracks requires data association to correctly pair measurements with existing tracks amid clutter or crossings. The nearest-neighbor (NN) assignment algorithm, a suboptimal yet computationally efficient method, associates each predicted track state with the measurement minimizing a Mahalanobis distance metric, effectively resolving ambiguities by greedy selection.^[55] This approach excels in low-clutter scenarios, as in radar surveillance, where it achieves near-optimal performance by iteratively matching the closest validated pairs, though it may falter with dense targets resolved via extensions like probabilistic data association.

Technologies and Systems

Sensor Technologies

Sensor technologies form the foundational hardware for target acquisition, enabling the detection and localization of objects through various physical principles such as electromagnetic waves, light, sound, and radio emissions. These sensors operate by interacting with the environment to gather data on potential targets, often in challenging conditions like adverse weather or low visibility. In military contexts, they must provide real-time, accurate measurements to support subsequent identification and tracking phases. Radar systems are among the most critical sensors for target acquisition, utilizing radio frequency (RF) waves to detect and measure the range, velocity, and direction of objects. Pulse-Doppler radar, a widely adopted variant, excels in velocity measurement by exploiting the Doppler effect, where the frequency shift of the reflected signal indicates relative motion. The Doppler shift frequency f_d is given by the equation f_d = \frac{2 v f_0}{c}, where v is the radial velocity of the target relative to the radar, f_0 is the transmitted frequency, and c is the speed of light; this arises from the relative motion altering the wavelength of the propagating wave during transmission and reception. This capability allows radars to distinguish moving targets from clutter, such as ground returns, enhancing detection in dynamic environments. Synthetic aperture radar (SAR) principles further improve resolution by simulating a large antenna aperture through platform motion, enabling high-fidelity imaging for target localization even from moving sensors. A representative example is the AN/TPQ-47 counter-battery radar, developed by the U.S. Army in the 1990s, which uses these radar techniques to detect incoming artillery projectiles and compute their firing points with accuracies under 100 meters. Electro-optical/infrared (EO/IR) sensors provide passive imaging capabilities, detecting targets via visible light or thermal emissions without emitting signals, which is advantageous for acquiring low-signature or stealthy objects that evade active radars. EO sensors operate in the visible spectrum (approximately 0.4–0.7 μm) to capture reflected light, forming images based on contrast and shape, while IR sensors detect heat signatures in mid-wave (3–5 μm) or long-wave (8–12 μm) bands, ideal for night or obscured conditions. Multispectral EO/IR systems combine multiple wavelength bands to enhance discrimination, reducing false alarms from environmental interference like foliage or atmospheric haze. These sensors achieve resolutions down to sub-meter levels in clear conditions, supporting visual confirmation of targets. Other sensor modalities complement radar and EO/IR for specialized target acquisition scenarios. Acoustic sensors, such as sonar systems, propagate sound waves underwater to detect submerged targets through echo ranging, with applications in naval target acquisition where RF signals attenuate rapidly; they rely on the speed of sound in water (about 1,500 m/s) for time-of-flight calculations. Laser-based LIDAR (Light Detection and Ranging) sensors emit pulsed laser beams to measure precise distances via time-of-flight, offering centimeter-level accuracy over kilometers for 3D mapping and target ranging in clear air, though limited by weather like fog. Passive RF sensors, including electronic intelligence (ELINT) systems, intercept and analyze target emissions (e.g., radar or communication signals) without transmission, geolocating emitters through direction-finding and time-difference-of-arrival techniques to acquire non-cooperative targets. These diverse sensors collectively enable robust target detection across domains, from air to underwater environments.

Data Fusion and Processing

Data fusion in target acquisition integrates heterogeneous sensor data to produce a unified, more reliable representation of potential targets, improving overall system performance by mitigating individual sensor limitations such as noise, occlusions, or limited fields of view. This process enhances accuracy in detection, classification, and prioritization by leveraging complementary information from sources like radar, infrared, and electro-optical sensors.^[58] The Joint Directors of Laboratories (JDL) model serves as a foundational framework for structuring data fusion processes, organizing them into hierarchical levels that progress from raw data handling to higher-level inference. Level 0 focuses on sub-object data association, involving the detection and estimation of signal sources from raw sensor inputs. Level 1 addresses object refinement, correlating measurements to maintain and update individual target tracks. Level 2 performs situation assessment by aggregating object-level data to understand relational contexts, such as target formations. Level 3 evaluates impact or threat assessment, projecting potential outcomes based on fused situational data. Finally, Level 4 handles process refinement, optimizing fusion parameters and resource allocation through feedback mechanisms. This model, originally developed in the 1980s and revised in subsequent efforts, facilitates modular system design and interoperability across fusion applications.^[58]^[59] Central to data fusion algorithms are techniques for resolving measurement-to-track ambiguities in multi-target environments. Multi-hypothesis tracking (MHT) maintains a set of competing hypotheses for each potential track, probabilistically weighting them based on incoming measurements to defer association decisions until sufficient evidence resolves uncertainties, thereby reducing track breaks and swaps in dense scenarios. Complementing MHT, probabilistic data association (PDA) computes association probabilities for measurements to existing tracks, accounting for clutter and missed detections through Bayesian updates, which is particularly effective in low-density clutter for real-time state estimation. These algorithms operate within the JDL levels 0 and 1 to ensure robust track continuity before higher-level fusion.^[60]^[61] The data fusion processing pipeline typically follows a sequential structure to transform raw sensor inputs into actionable insights. It begins with signal conditioning, which applies filtering and normalization to mitigate noise, distortions, and environmental interferences, ensuring data quality for downstream analysis. This is followed by feature extraction, where domain-specific algorithms isolate salient attributes such as velocity profiles, spectral signatures, or spatial patterns from the conditioned signals. Finally, machine learning classifiers, including neural networks, integrate these features for pattern recognition and target classification; for instance, convolutional neural networks (CNNs) excel at extracting hierarchical features from imagery or time-series data to distinguish between target types with high accuracy, often achieving classification rates exceeding 90% in controlled benchmarks when fused with multi-sensor inputs. Fused outputs from this pipeline support tracking applications by providing refined state estimates for continuous target monitoring.^[62]^[63] To enable seamless integration across allied systems, standards like NATO STANAG 4586 define interoperability protocols for unmanned aerial vehicle control systems, specifying data formats, interfaces, and message structures that facilitate efficient exchange and fusion of target-related information in joint operations. This standard supports levels of interoperability from basic data link to full autonomous control, ensuring that fused data can be shared without proprietary barriers.

Platforms and Integration

Target acquisition platforms encompass a diverse array of ground, airborne, space, and naval systems designed to host sensors and processing capabilities for detecting and engaging threats. These platforms integrate radar, electro-optical, and other sensors to enable real-time surveillance and response in dynamic environments. Ground-based systems, such as mobile radars and unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs), provide tactical flexibility for forward-deployed operations, while airborne and naval platforms extend coverage over larger areas. Space-based assets offer persistent global monitoring, and overall integration through command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) architectures ensures coordinated data flow across these domains.^[64]^[65]^[66]^[67]^[68]^[69] Ground platforms form the foundational layer for close-range target acquisition, often mounted on mobile systems to support maneuver forces. The AN/MPQ-53 radar, integral to the U.S. Army's Patriot air defense system, is a semi-trailer-mounted, frequency-agile multifunction unit operating in the G/H-band that conducts low- to high-altitude surveillance, target detection, classification, and tracking of up to 100 simultaneous threats.^[64]^[70] This radar's phased-array design allows rapid beam steering for engaging tactical ballistic missiles and aircraft, with a range exceeding 100 kilometers under optimal conditions.^[64] Complementing such radars, UGVs enhance ground-based acquisition by deploying autonomous or remotely operated platforms equipped with multispectral sensors for reconnaissance and targeting. For instance, the Small Multipurpose Equipment Transport (S-MET) integrates electro-optical/infrared cameras and laser designators to detect and prosecute targets in urban or contested terrain, reducing operator exposure while providing persistent surveillance.^[71] These vehicles often feature stabilized payloads for accurate target handoff to fire control systems, supporting roles in observation and communications relay.^[65] Airborne platforms leverage altitude and speed for wide-area coverage, integrating sensors directly into aircraft structures for enhanced acquisition. The RQ-4 Global Hawk unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), developed by Northrop Grumman, serves as a high-altitude, long-endurance asset capable of providing near real-time intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) data, including target acquisition over vast theaters.^[66] Equipped with synthetic aperture radar (SAR) and electro-optical/infrared (EO/IR) sensors, it can loiter for over 30 hours at altitudes above 60,000 feet, detecting moving targets and relaying coordinates for precision strikes.^[66] In manned fighters, the Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II exemplifies advanced integration through its sensor fusion architecture, which merges data from the active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar, distributed aperture system, and electro-optical targeting system to create a unified battlespace picture for pilots.^[72]^[73] This fusion enables automatic threat prioritization and cueing, allowing the F-35 to acquire and designate targets at beyond-visual-range distances while maintaining stealth.^[74]^[73] Space and naval platforms extend target acquisition to strategic scales, providing all-weather, persistent monitoring from orbit or at sea. The Lacrosse/Onyx series of satellites (launched 1988–2005), operated by the U.S. National Reconnaissance Office, utilized space-based SAR to image ground targets through clouds and darkness, achieving resolutions sufficient for identifying military assets like vehicles or installations. These low-Earth orbit systems supported time-critical targeting by downlinking high-fidelity radar maps to ground stations for rapid analysis. The program was succeeded by advanced radar imaging systems under subsequent NRO initiatives, such as Topaz.^[67]^[75] On naval vessels, the Aegis Combat System, deployed on Arleigh Burke-class destroyers and Ticonderoga-class cruisers, integrates the SPY-1 phased-array radar for simultaneous acquisition and tracking of over 100 air and surface targets.^[68]^[76] The system's automated fire control loop enables rapid engagement of anti-ship missiles or aircraft, with the radar providing initial detection at ranges up to 300 nautical miles.^[77]^[68] Integrating these platforms into cohesive networks poses significant challenges, primarily addressed through C4ISR architectures that facilitate seamless data sharing and interoperability. Key issues include ensuring compatibility across disparate systems, such as linking ground radars with airborne feeds, amid evolving cyber threats and bandwidth constraints.^[78]^[69] For example, service-oriented architectures (SOA) in C4ISR aim to enable plug-and-play connectivity, but acquisition complexities like certification and security accreditation often delay implementation.^[79] These frameworks support fusion techniques by standardizing data protocols, allowing platforms like the F-35 to cue Aegis systems for cooperative engagements.^[69] Overall, advancements in open standards and cloud-based processing are mitigating integration hurdles to enhance joint operations.^[78]

Applications

In Ground-Based Systems

In ground-based systems, target acquisition primarily supports terrestrial artillery and infantry operations by detecting, locating, and designating threats to enable precise counterfire and fire support. These systems emphasize mobility, rapid processing, and integration with fire direction centers to neutralize enemy indirect fire assets like mortars, artillery, and rockets. Key technologies include radar-based weapon locating systems and man-portable laser designators, which provide real-time data for artillery response while operating in contested environments. Artillery targeting in ground-based setups relies heavily on counter-battery radars such as the AN/TPQ-36 and AN/TPQ-37 Firefinder systems, which detect incoming projectiles and compute their points of origin (POO) for immediate counterfire. The AN/TPQ-36, a short-range variant, uses pulsed Doppler radar to track mortar, artillery, and rocket trajectories over ranges up to 24 km for rockets, employing multilateration—essentially triangulation based on time-of-flight and velocity data—to achieve location accuracies within 50-75 meters. Similarly, the AN/TPQ-37 extends coverage to longer ranges, up to 50 km for rockets, supporting brigade-level operations by automatically processing up to 10 simultaneous threats and transmitting POO coordinates to artillery units. These radars are positioned 3-12 km behind the forward line of own troops, depending on the model, to minimize exposure while maximizing coverage of critical friendly zones. For infantry applications, man-portable systems like the Lightweight Laser Designator Rangefinder (LLDR) AN/PED-1 enable dismounted soldiers to acquire and designate targets for precision-guided munitions. This crew-served device integrates a laser rangefinder, designator, and GPS for day/night operations, providing target coordinates with sub-meter accuracy up to 5 km, allowing joint terminal attack controllers or forward observers to call in fire support from howitzers or mortars. The LLDR's modular design weighs under 20 kg, facilitating rapid deployment in forward positions to mark high-value targets like enemy vehicles or positions for laser-guided artillery rounds. In the Ukraine conflict from 2022 to 2025, drone-assisted ground acquisition has enhanced traditional radar and laser systems, with first-person view (FPV) and reconnaissance drones spotting enemy artillery for Ukrainian ground forces. These unmanned aerial systems, often commercially adapted, provide real-time video feeds to forward observers, enabling precise targeting of Russian howitzers and rocket launchers, as seen in operations where drones cue counter-battery fire to disrupt barrages. For instance, U.S.-supplied AN/TPQ-36 radars, delivered starting in 2015 and expanded post-2022, have integrated with Ukrainian artillery to locate incoming Russian fire, contributing to defensive successes against rocket and artillery threats that caused significant casualties early in the war. As of November 2025, these systems continue to adapt to evolving tactics, including AI-enhanced drone swarms for improved targeting resilience.^[80] Integration of these acquisition tools with fire support networks occurs through digital links to artillery fire direction centers, where radar-derived POO data is fused with ballistic solutions to generate fire missions for howitzers like the M777. In Firefinder operations, the radar's target processing section automatically formats location data for transmission via secure networks to the fire direction center, which clears fires and adjusts for terrain before directing responsive volleys, often within seconds to minimize enemy repositioning. This closed-loop process ensures that ground-based acquisition directly amplifies artillery effectiveness in dynamic battlespaces.

In Air and Naval Operations

In air operations, target acquisition relies heavily on airborne early warning and control systems to provide persistent surveillance in dynamic environments. The E-3 Sentry AWACS exemplifies this capability, equipped with a rotating radome that enables all-altitude, all-weather detection, identification, and tracking of airborne and surface targets at ranges exceeding 250 miles, while eliminating ground clutter for accurate battlespace awareness.^[81] This platform supports command and control by exchanging real-time data via datalinks with joint forces, allowing air battle managers to vector fighter-interceptor aircraft toward threats and direct close-air support missions.^[81] Naval target acquisition emphasizes integrated sensor-missile systems to counter high-speed, low-observable threats over vast maritime areas. On U.S. Navy Arleigh Burke-class destroyers, the AN/SPY-6(V)1 active phased-array radar serves as a core component, utilizing gallium nitride-based digital beamforming for simultaneous multi-mission tracking of air, surface, and ballistic threats with enhanced sensitivity compared to legacy systems.^[82] Integrated with the Aegis Combat System, it cues the Standard Missile-6 (SM-6) for engagements, as demonstrated in 2017 when the USS John Paul Jones used AN/SPY-1D(V) radar guidance to intercept a medium-range ballistic missile target during its terminal phase via semi-active radar homing.^[83] Historical examples from the 1982 Falklands War illustrate the consequences of acquisition shortcomings in naval operations. Argentine forces experienced targeting failures due to uncoordinated Exocet missile strikes from Super Etendard aircraft, which sank HMS Sheffield but missed opportunities to disable British carriers through poor sensor fusion and attack planning.^[84] Submarine operations further faltered, with the ARA San Luis launching ineffective torpedoes at British vessels like HMS Brilliant owing to acquisition errors from limited sonar effectiveness and inadequate threat prioritization, contributing to the Argentine Navy's overall withdrawal after the sinking of the cruiser General Belgrano.^[84] These lessons emphasized the need for robust, integrated acquisition to maintain sea control in contested waters. Modern U.S. carrier strike groups (CSGs) advance target acquisition through networked sensors that enable distributed operations. Systems like the AN/SPY-1 phased-array radar and Mark-23 Target Acquisition System (TAS) provide 360-degree coverage for detecting low-radar-cross-section targets up to 185 km, tracking up to 54 simultaneously, and illuminating for SM-2 and SM-6 launches via vertical launch systems.^[85] In a 2021 exercise, the USS John Finn demonstrated over-the-horizon acquisition by integrating passive sensors and unmanned surface vessels to cue an SM-6 strike on a target beyond 250 miles without active radar emissions, enhancing stealth in high-threat scenarios.^[86] Multi-domain coordination extends acquisition beyond line-of-sight by leveraging space assets for over-the-horizon support in air and naval contexts. Space-based intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) sensors, coupled with satellite communications (SATCOM), deliver near real-time data on distant threats, enabling precise cueing for airborne and surface platforms across theaters.^[87] This integration, as outlined in U.S. Space Force doctrine, facilitates missile warning and battlespace awareness, allowing CSGs and AWACS to synchronize strikes with minimal latency.^[87]

In Counter-Terrorism and Asymmetric Warfare

In counter-terrorism and asymmetric warfare, target acquisition relies heavily on adaptations that prioritize signals intelligence (SIGINT) and human intelligence (HUMINT) over traditional sensor-based methods, due to the decentralized nature of non-state actors and the need for rapid, precise identification in fluid environments.^[36] High-value target (HVT) teams integrate SIGINT from agencies like the National Security Agency (NSA) for intercepting communications and HUMINT from tactical interrogation units to map insurgent networks, enabling the fusion of intelligence sources for actionable targeting.^[36] Biometric tools, such as facial recognition integrated into drone surveillance systems, further enhance this approach by allowing real-time identification of suspects from afar, as seen in U.S. military contracts for equipping unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) with such technology to counter terrorist movements.^[88] These adaptations address the limitations of conventional sensors in scenarios where adversaries blend into civilian populations or operate in denied areas. Doctrinally, target acquisition in these contexts has shifted toward the "find, fix, finish" paradigm within special operations, formalized as the F3EAD (find, fix, finish, exploit, analyze, disseminate) methodology to systematically disrupt terrorist networks.^[89] The "find" phase uses all-source intelligence, including HUMINT and SIGINT, to identify network vulnerabilities; "fix" refines location through persistent surveillance; and "finish" executes capture or elimination, followed by exploitation of captured materials like biometrics or documents to generate follow-on targets.^[89] This cycle, integrated into joint operations planning, emphasizes iterative analysis to adapt to adaptive threats, as outlined in U.S. military handbooks for attacking networks.^[89] In U.S. operations in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2021, persistent surveillance via UAVs exemplified these adaptations, providing continuous monitoring to support HVT acquisition against Taliban and al-Qaeda elements.^[90] For instance, MQ-9 Reaper drones conducted targeted killings of insurgent leaders, contributing to numerous strikes that degraded al-Qaeda networks while minimizing ground troop exposure.^[91] Precursors to the 2011 bin Laden raid involved CIA drone surveillance, including the RQ-170 Sentinel, which mapped the Abbottabad compound and confirmed the presence of high-value individuals through persistent overhead imagery.^[92] Urban environments pose significant challenges to target acquisition in asymmetric warfare, where clutter from intermingled military and civilian objects complicates discrimination between combatants and non-combatants.^[93] Dense infrastructure, such as buildings and crowds, obscures SIGINT signals and biometric scans, increasing the risk of misidentification.^[94] Rules of engagement (ROE) further constrain operations, mandating proportionality under international humanitarian law to minimize civilian harm, including advance warnings and avoidance of wide-area effects weapons in populated areas.^[93] These factors demand enhanced precautions, such as multi-source verification, to balance counter-terrorism imperatives with civilian protection, as evidenced in urban counterinsurgency doctrines.^[94]

Challenges and Future Directions

Technical and Operational Challenges

Target acquisition systems face significant technical challenges from electronic warfare tactics, particularly jamming and spoofing, which disrupt critical navigation and positioning signals. GPS jamming involves transmitting noise on GNSS frequencies to deny receivers access to satellite signals, rendering systems ineffective in contested environments where adversaries deploy ground-based jammers within operational ranges.^[95] This denial directly impairs target acquisition by degrading platform positioning accuracy, essential for sensor alignment and fire control in aerial and ground-based operations. Spoofing exacerbates these issues by broadcasting counterfeit signals that mimic authentic GNSS transmissions, potentially misleading receivers into calculating erroneous locations and allowing adversaries to hijack or redirect unmanned systems during target tracking.^[96] In military contexts, such vulnerabilities have been noted in aerial platforms, where spoofing can compromise UAV target acquisition by inducing false trajectories, with implications for broader strike missions.^[96] Low-observable targets, often incorporating stealth technologies, present another formidable technical hurdle by minimizing radar cross-section (RCS) through radar-absorbent materials, shaping, and signature management. These designs reduce detectability across radar bands, particularly X-band fire-control radars, forcing acquisition systems to operate at extended ranges or rely on less effective multi-static configurations, which increase false alarm rates.^[97] The evolution of low-observable principles has historically shifted detection strategies from monostatic radars to advanced counters like low-frequency surveillance, yet challenges persist in achieving reliable probability of detection (Pd) against fluctuating RCS in dynamic scenarios.^[98] Data overload compounds these issues in contested environments, where sensor fusion from multiple intelligence sources—such as radar, electro-optical, and signals intelligence—generates excessive data volumes that overwhelm processing capabilities, leading to delayed or erroneous target identification.^[99] In urban or cluttered settings, this overload can result in reduced Pd rates, as clutter from buildings and civilian objects masks targets and inflates error rates in detection models. Operationally, interoperability among allied forces, such as in NATO coalitions, remains a persistent challenge due to disparate communication protocols, data formats, and security standards that hinder seamless target acquisition sharing. For instance, variations in C4ISR systems across member states lead to delays in real-time data exchange during joint operations, complicating coordinated strikes and increasing the risk of friendly fire incidents.^[100] Ethical concerns arise with autonomous targeting, where systems capable of independent engagement raise issues of accountability and moral judgment, as machines lack human-like ethical reasoning and may propagate biases in target selection algorithms.^[101] Latency in decision loops further operationalizes these risks; processing delays in the observe-orient-decide-act (OODA) cycle, often exceeding critical thresholds in high-tempo environments, can extend response times from seconds to minutes, allowing targets to evade or counter effectively.^[102] A notable case study illustrating these intertwined challenges occurred during the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, where Azerbaijani electronic warfare systems jammed Armenian air defense radars and communications, severely degrading target acquisition for Soviet-era platforms like the S-300. This EW dominance blinded Armenian forces to incoming drones and missiles, contributing to high attrition rates and operational paralysis, as acquisition processes reliant on disrupted links failed to provide timely cues.^[103] Such failures underscore how jamming not only affects technical detection but also amplifies operational latency, historically prompting doctrinal shifts toward resilient, multi-domain sensing in coalition warfare.^[104]

Emerging Technologies and Trends

Advancements in artificial intelligence (AI) and autonomy are poised to revolutionize target acquisition by enabling machine learning algorithms to perform real-time classification and prioritization of threats, thereby minimizing the need for human intervention in decision loops. Programs like DARPA's Air Combat Evolution (ACE), initiated in the early 2020s, demonstrate this through AI systems that autonomously identify and engage aerial targets in simulated and live-flight scenarios, using reinforcement learning to process sensor data for rapid threat assessment. Similarly, efforts in automatic target recognition (ATR) leverage deep learning models, such as convolutional neural networks, to detect and classify objects in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) feeds with accuracies exceeding 90% in complex environments, reducing operator workload and enabling faster response times. These developments, building on DARPA's Real-Time Machine Learning (RTML) initiative, aim to deploy edge-computing hardware that processes vast data streams on-board platforms without latency from cloud reliance.^[105]^[106] Advanced sensor technologies, particularly quantum radar, represent a prospective leap in countering stealth and hypersonic threats by exploiting quantum entanglement for enhanced detection sensitivity. Quantum radar systems transmit entangled photon pairs, allowing receivers to distinguish target echoes from noise. Experimental prototypes, such as those developed in European labs by 2023, have demonstrated up to 20% faster detection in controlled tests against stealth-mimicking targets.^[107] Assessments highlight their potential for precise tracking of hypersonic vehicles traveling at Mach 5+, where traditional Doppler radars struggle with velocity ambiguities.^[108]^[109] Military applications focus on integrating these into air defense networks to erode stealth advantages, though challenges like atmospheric decoherence remain; U.S. Department of Defense reports note adversarial pursuits, such as China's single-photon detector production in 2025, as drivers for accelerated R&D.^[109] Emerging trends in distributed systems include swarm intelligence for collective target acquisition, where networks of unmanned vehicles collaborate via bio-inspired algorithms to cover wide areas and refine detections. In reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition (RSTA) missions, swarms employ digital pheromones—virtual markers deposited by detecting units—to guide peers toward high-probability targets, enabling automatic target recognition (ATR) confirmation across air and ground platforms with success rates of 75% in field demonstrations involving multiple UAVs and UGVs. Research on intelligent swarm munitions emphasizes task allocation for detection and tracking, using multi-agent reinforcement learning to adapt to dynamic threats, such as dispersing to evade countermeasures while maintaining persistent surveillance. Complementing this, space-based constellations akin to Starlink's Starshield provide resilient command-and-control (C2) backbones, relaying real-time ISR data for global target cueing; the U.S. Department of Defense's deployment of over 180 such satellites by 2025, including U.S. Army trials, enhances multi-domain synchronization, ensuring low-latency fusion of acquisition data from disparate sensors.^[110]^[111]^[112]^[113] Future doctrines, such as the U.S. Army's multi-domain operations (MDO) vision outlined post-2020, integrate these technologies to achieve decision dominance by fusing target acquisition across land, air, maritime, space, and cyber domains. The Multi-Domain Task Force (MDTF) concept employs all-domain operations centers (ADOCs) for continuous ISR, leveraging AI-enhanced sensors to generate targeting data for cross-domain fires, enabling strikes on adversary systems at operational depths beyond line-of-sight. This doctrinal evolution prioritizes network-centric architectures that synchronize acquisition with effectors, as detailed in Army transformation strategies, to counter peer competitors in contested environments by 2035.^[114]^[115]

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### Summary of Active and Passive Detection Methods for Missiles
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Patriot Major Components - GlobalSecurity.org
Dec 20, 2017 · The AN/MPQ-53 is a frequency-agile multifunction G/H- Band radar group which performs surveillance, Identification Friend-or-Foe (IFF), ...Missing: acquisition | Show results with:acquisition
[65]
Target Detection, Acquisition, and Prosecution from an Unmanned ...
Examples include the Special. Weapons Observation Reconnaissance Detection System (SWORDS), and the Gladiator Tactical Unmanned Ground. Vehicle (TUGV). While ...
[66]
F-35A Lightning II > Air Force > Fact Sheet Display - AF.mil
The F-35A is an agile, versatile, high-performance, 9g capable multirole fighter that combines stealth, sensor fusion and unprecedented situational awareness.
[67]
[PDF] F-35 Lightning II - Lockheed Martin
Sensor Fusion. F-35's advanced sensor fusion creates a single integrated picture of the battlefield that greatly enhances awareness, survivability and ...Missing: target acquisition
[68]
Outsight In: F-35 Sensor Fusion in Focus
Mar 14, 2024 · Advanced sensor fusion automatically analyzes data from sensors embedded throughout the jet and merges it into relevant information for pilots.Missing: acquisition | Show results with:acquisition
[69]
Onyx 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 (Lacrosse 1, 2, 3, 4, 5) - Gunter's Space Page
Jun 3, 2025 · A project to develop a SAR satellite was initiated in late 1976 under project Indigo and later Lacrosse (the spelling Lacros was also used).Missing: target acquisition
[70]
Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense
Aug 4, 2021 · Aegis BMD is a component of the Aegis Combat System, an integrated naval weapon system that provides air and fleet defense against enemy aircraft and cruise ...Missing: shipborne | Show results with:shipborne
[71]
The Ticonderoga Story: Aegis Works - May 1985 Vol. 111/5/987
In application with Aegis, the SPY-1A provides extremely rapid target acquisition ... Aegis weapon system and the Aegis ship combat system. The former ...
[72]
C4ISR Technology and Strategy Opportunities for 2024 and Beyond
Mar 5, 2024 · Current Challenges within C4ISR Systems: The major challenge areas include interoperability, integration, and security within an evolving threat ...
[73]
Challenges to Acquiring C4ISR Systems Based on Service Oriented ...
The challenges of achieving service/system C&A in a services-based net-centric environment range from dealing with the very newness of SOA and its evolving ...
[74]
E-3 Sentry (AWACS) > Air Force > Fact Sheet Display - AF.mil
The E-3 Sentry is an airborne warning and control system, or AWACS, aircraft with an integrated command and control battle management, or C2BM, surveillance ...
[75]
AN/SPY-6(V)1 Radar: Eyes of the fleet - Naval Sea Systems Command
Jul 15, 2025 · Designed as the Navy's next-generation air and missile defense radar, the AN/SPY-6(V)1 is a marvel of modern engineering. It utilizes ...Missing: SM- | Show results with:SM-
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VIDEO: Navy, Missile Defense Agency Succeed During SM-6 ...
Aug 30, 2017 · Two missiles launched from the guided-missile destroyer USS John Paul Jones (DDG-53) bullseyed a complex medium-range ballistic missile target in a successful ...
[77]
[PDF] The Falklands War - DTIC
In the end, it was poor management of the available assets and failure to capitalize on advantages that cost the. Argentines the war. These failures were a ...
[78]
American Carrier Strike Groups: An Electronic Perspective (Part 2 of 5)
Oct 1, 2015 · The entire system consists of a target acquisition radar called Mark-23 target acquisition system (TAS), an illuminator radar and missile ...
[79]
Unmanned Systems, Passive Sensors Help USS John Finn Bullseye ...
Apr 26, 2021 · A guided-missile destroyer launched an anti-surface missile from over-the-horizon to hit a target more than 250 miles away without using active sensors.
[80]
None
### Summary: Multi-Domain Coordination with Space Assets for Over-the-Horizon Target Acquisition in Air and Naval Operations
[81]
US military enters contract to install facial recognition on drones - IAPP
The U.S. military is developing lethal drones implanted with facial recognition technology.<|separator|>
[82]
[PDF] Commander's Handbook for Attack the Network - Joint Chiefs of Staff
May 20, 2011 · ... .................... VI-4. • Find-Fix-Finish-Exploit-Analyze-Disseminate Methodology ............. VI-7. CHAPTER VII. ASSESS. • Introduction ...
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[PDF] Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan - DoD
Jul 1, 2020 · During this reporting period, terrorist and insurgent groups continued to present a formidable challenge to Afghan, U.S., and coalition forces.
[84]
Targeted Killings | Council on Foreign Relations
Targeted killings, especially those conducted by drone strikes, have become a central component of U.S. counterterrorism operations around the globe.Missing: precursors | Show results with:precursors
[85]
In bin Laden's Death, CIA Drones Played Their Part | Wilson Center
May 2, 2011 · The armed drones the CIA has been flying over Pakistan didn't kill Osama bin Laden, but drones undoubtedly played a key role in finding him.
[86]
[PDF] challenges-report_urbanization-of-armed-conflicts.pdf - ICRC
CHAPTER 5: TERRORISM, COUNTERTERRORISM MEASURES, AND IHL ... ities, this intermingling presents important challenges, both militarily and in terms of avoiding ...
[87]
[PDF] Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain (MOUT) - Marines.mil
Feb 12, 2020 · ... terrorism (Joint Pub 1-02). Population protection and control to combat the terrorist threat may be a major effort within the urban environment.
[88]
GNSS under attack: Recognizing and mitigating jamming and ...
May 27, 2025 · Jamming occurs when signals are disrupted or denied, making it difficult or impossible for receivers to interpret information correctly. In ...
[89]
On GPS spoofing of aerial platforms: a review of threats, challenges ...
The vulnerability of GPS to spoofing has serious implications for UAVs, as victim drones using civil GPS can be misdirected or even completely hijacked for ...
[90]
[PDF] RF Stealth (Or Low Observable) and Counter - DTIC
This thesis will examine the evolution of stealth, with a focus on RF low observables, and the counter technologies to detect RF stealth or low observable ...
[91]
Overview of Low Observable Technology and Its Effects on Combat ...
The introduction of low observable (LO) technology on combat aircraft has produced a leap in aircraft survivability, but it has also raised some difficult ...
[92]
[PDF] information overload: impacts on brigade combat team s-2 - DTIC
Dec 6, 2019 · The primary research question of this thesis is: how does information overload impact the current operations element within a BCT? The U.S. Army.
[93]
Radar detection in clutter - ResearchGate
Aug 6, 2025 · In order to quantify the effect of clutter on the probability of detection, we must first specify sets of models suitable for representing the ...
[94]
[PDF] Interoperability: A Continuing Challenge in Coalition Air Operations
This report describes research that was conducted (1) to help the. U.S. Air Force identify potential interoperability problems that may arise in NATO ...
[95]
Full article: The ethical legitimacy of autonomous Weapons systems
Yet empirical studies of existing automated targeting systems reveal a troubling inverse relationship between technical speed and ethical diligence.
[96]
The Three Wicked Problems Inhibiting Data-Driven Decision-Making ...
Jun 27, 2023 · These challenges fall into three categories: collection, transport, and presentation. They represent the most significant barriers to meeting the threefold ...
[97]
The Air and Missile War in Nagorno-Karabakh - CSIS
Dec 8, 2020 · The conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region included the heavy use of missiles, drones, and rocket artillery.
[98]
[PDF] The Second Nagorno-Karabakh War: A Milestone in Military Affairs
According to Global Defense Corp., another internet publication, “Electronic warfare killed Russian-made weapons in Nagorno-Karabakh.” This could explain ...
[99]
[PDF] LEVERAGING ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND AUTOMATIC ...
Jan 9, 2020 · Research into Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Automatic Target Recognition (ATR) illuminates various efforts having the potential to mitigate ...
[100]
RTML: Real Time Machine Learning - DARPA
The Real Time Machine Learning (RTML) program seeks to solve this problem by creating no-human-in-the-loop hardware generators and compilers.Missing: target acquisition classification
[101]
A quantum radar that outperforms classical radar by 20% - Phys.org
Jul 20, 2023 · A research team at Ecole Normale Supérieure de Lyon, CNRS recently developed a quantum radar that could significantly outperform all existing radars based on ...<|control11|><|separator|>
[102]
[PDF] Quantum Radar and Research Assessment (Preprint) - arXiv
Jun 17, 2025 · Abstract: Quantum Radar was studied in many Nations for about fifteen years with the production of some hundred publications.
[103]
[PDF] Overview of the Status of Quantum Science and Technology ... - DTIC
The ability of U.S. adversaries to defeat stealth through the use of quantum radar could provide them with a strategic advantage and force the United States ...
[104]
[PDF] The use of swarming unmanned vehicles to support target ...
Swarm intelligence algorithms, inspired by the mechanisms used in natural systems to coordinate the activities of many entities provide a promising alternative ...
[105]
Overview of research on intelligent swarm munitions - ScienceDirect
Aug 22, 2024 · These applications encompass collaborative search, detection, surveillance, target tracking, electronic countermeasures, swarm attacks, and ...
[106]
Starshield - SpaceX
Secured satellite network for government entities. Starshield leverages SpaceX's Starlink technology and launch capability to support national security efforts.Missing: command control target acquisition
[107]
Reliant on Starlink, Army eager for more SATCOM constellation ...
Aug 21, 2024 · The Army is leaning heavily on SpaceX's Starlink satellite network for advanced command and control, but service officials say they want to keep their options ...
[108]
[PDF] Army Multi-Domain Transformation
Mar 22, 2021 · Army Multi-Domain Transformation describes why and how the U.S. Army must transform to enhance our core competencies and become a multi-domain ...
[109]
Defense Primer: Army Multi-Domain Operations (MDO) - Congress.gov
Oct 1, 2024 · The Army developed MDO in response to the 2018 National Defense Strategy which shifted the previous focus of U.S. national security from ...