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Garbage can model

The garbage can model is a framework for understanding organizational decision-making in environments characterized by ambiguity and flux, where choices emerge from the independent streams of problems, solutions, participants, and decision opportunities that mix somewhat randomly, akin to items dumped into a garbage can.^[1] Developed by Michael D. Cohen, James G. March, and Johan P. Olsen, the model was introduced in their 1972 paper "A Garbage Can Model of Organizational Choice," published in Administrative Science Quarterly, drawing on computer simulations to illustrate processes in "organized anarchies" such as universities, where goals are problematic, technology is unclear, participation is fluid, and problems load unevenly.^[2]^[3] In this model, decision outcomes depend heavily on timing and access rather than sequential problem-solving, contrasting with traditional rational actor assumptions by highlighting how solutions may seek problems or vice versa, leading to resolutions that attach to flighty problems, independent of energy levels among participants or the flightiness of solutions.^[1] The framework identifies key variables like problem persistence, decision latency, and the resolution of problems, which vary with organizational load and access structures, providing metrics to assess decision quality in chaotic settings.^[3] Notable for challenging linear decision theories, the garbage can model has influenced studies of policy-making and public administration, with adaptations like John Kingdon's multiple streams framework applying its logic to agenda-setting, though critics argue it underemphasizes feedback mechanisms and efficiency criteria in real-world applications.^[4]^[5] Its simulation-based approach underscores causal dynamics in ambiguous contexts, revealing how temporal sorting and participant energy can yield effective or illusory resolutions without predefined rationality.^[6]

Foundations of Organized Anarchy

Core Characteristics

The garbage can model applies specifically to decision-making processes within organized anarchies, a class of organizations marked by three defining traits: problematic preferences, unclear technology, and fluid participation.^[1] Problematic preferences refer to situations where organizational goals are ambiguous, inconsistent, or subject to frequent revision, such that decision-makers cannot readily rank alternatives or articulate stable objectives.^[3] This instability arises because preferences emerge reactively during decision episodes rather than guiding them prospectively.^[6] Unclear technology denotes poorly understood or unreliable means-ends linkages, where standard operating procedures fail to produce predictable outcomes, compelling reliance on ad hoc experimentation or intuition.^[1] In such contexts, technologies—encompassing both technical methods and interpretive frames—are experimental and non-routine, exacerbating ambiguity in how problems should be addressed.^[3] Fluid participation involves turnover in the pool of decision-makers, whose involvement depends on factors like personal energy levels, competing demands, and chance availability rather than formal roles or expertise.^[6] Participants enter and exit decision arenas opportunistically, leading to inconsistent attention and influence across issues.^[1] These traits collectively produce a garbage can process, wherein problems, potential solutions, participants, and choice opportunities flow independently and combine quasi-randomly, often decoupling problem identification from resolution.^[3] Solutions may precede problems (as "solutions waiting for issues"), or unresolved issues may persist indefinitely, yielding outcomes like flight (issue avoidance), resolution (successful coupling), or organizational garbage (irrelevant actions).^[1] This mechanism contrasts with rational models by emphasizing temporal and structural contingencies over sequential optimization.^[6]

Implications for Rationality in Decision-Making

The garbage can model posits that decision-making in organized anarchies deviates substantially from conventional rational choice frameworks, which presuppose sequential stages of problem identification, alternative generation, evaluation, and selection based on clear preferences and foreseeable outcomes.^[3] In contrast, the model depicts choices as emergent from the temporal coupling of independent streams—problems, solutions, participants, and choice opportunities—where solutions may precede problems or attach arbitrarily, rendering outcomes independent of comprehensive analysis or goal alignment.^[3] This non-linearity undermines the applicability of normative rationality, as decisions often prioritize expediency over optimality; for instance, simulations demonstrate that only about 40% of problems achieve true resolution through matched solutions, with the remainder handled via oversight (hasty selection without problem linkage) or flight (problems departing unresolved).^[3] Such processes highlight the limits of bounded rationality, extending Herbert Simon's concept by illustrating conditions of extreme ambiguity where even satisficing becomes infeasible due to fluid participation, unclear technologies, and problematic preferences.^[7] In these settings, decision-makers expend energy reactively rather than proactively, with outcomes sensitive to exogenous factors like timing and system load rather than deliberate reasoning; high loads, for example, amplify problem proliferation and favor non-resolving mechanisms, reducing the efficacy of analytical tools.^[3] The model thus implies that rational strategies falter in environments like universities or public bureaucracies, where goals are contested and technologies ill-defined, leading to "pathological" results by rational standards—yet these enable organizational persistence through adaptive chaos rather than paralysis.^[3] Empirically, this challenges presumptions of rationality in policy and management, suggesting that interventions should target stream management—such as controlling access structures or deadlines—over enhancing information processing, as the latter assumes a coherence absent in anarchy.^[3] Problems may "track" decision-makers across arenas without resolution, implying that rationality's instrumental logic overlooks how ambiguity fosters innovation via serendipitous matches but risks inefficiency and inequity when influential participants dominate fleeting opportunities.^[3] Consequently, the framework advises skepticism toward rationalistic reforms in ambiguous domains, advocating instead for structural designs that mitigate overload and enhance coupling predictability to approximate rational ends indirectly.^[8]

Mechanics of the Garbage Can Process

The Four Independent Streams

The garbage can model posits that organizational decision-making arises from the confluence of four relatively independent streams—problems, solutions, participants, and choice opportunities—which flow through the system without inherent coordination or rational sequencing.^[9] These streams operate asynchronously, with their contents, timing, and availability determined exogenously to one another, leading to decisions that result from opportunistic couplings rather than deliberate matching of needs to remedies.^[9] The independence of the streams underscores the model's depiction of organized anarchies, where attention is scarce, preferences are unclear, and technology is problematic, allowing elements from each stream to enter and exit fluidly based on external triggers like crises or routine schedules.^[9] Problems represent perceived discrepancies or disturbances requiring attention, originating from internal organizational frictions or external pressures. They encompass a broad array of concerns, including lifestyle issues, family matters, work frustrations, career obstacles, group relations, distributions of status, jobs, or money, ideological conflicts, or interpretations of broader crises via media or personal networks.^[9] Unlike in rational models, problems do not precede or dictate solutions; instead, they persist until a choice opportunity aligns them with available elements, potentially leading to resolution, deferral, or neglect depending on the timing of other streams.^[9] Solutions are pre-packaged remedies or innovations actively seeking applicability, often developed independently of specific problems by participants or external actors. Exemplified by technologies like computers, which function not merely as responses to identified needs (e.g., payroll inefficiencies) but as versatile answers "looking for a question," solutions carry their own momentum and may attach to problems opportunistically.^[9] This stream highlights a reversal of typical decision logic, where fixes precede diagnoses, fostering ambiguity as solutions compete for relevance amid fluctuating attention.^[9] Participants introduce variability through their fluctuating involvement, energy levels, and shifting priorities, entering and exiting streams based on the demands of concurrent choices elsewhere. Since "every entrance is an exit somewhere else," participant distribution reflects trade-offs in time and attention rather than fixed roles, with energy allocation influencing which problems or solutions gain traction.^[9] This stream's independence amplifies ambiguity, as individuals' perceptions, expertise, and commitment vary, preventing consistent problem-solving and enabling fluid reallocation amid overloaded schedules.^[9] Choice opportunities serve as temporal bins or arenas—such as meetings, deadlines, or mandated actions—where the organization is compelled to generate observable decisions. These occasions arise predictably through routines or unpredictably via exigencies, acting as garbage cans into which problems, solutions, and participants are deposited for potential matching.^[9] Their independence from the other streams means outcomes hinge on contemporaneous arrivals; for instance, a problem may resolve if a suitable solution and attentive participants coincide, or it may be overlooked (flight), attached to an ill-fitting solution (resolution), or ignored (oversight).^[9]

Choice Opportunities and the Decision Arena

Choice opportunities form one of the four independent streams in the garbage can model, alongside problems, solutions, and participants. They manifest as discrete occasions when an organization confronts the necessity to generate a decision, often triggered by external deadlines, internal routines, or ambiguous stimuli such as contract expirations or personnel hires. These opportunities arise independently of the other streams, with their timing and frequency varying based on organizational access structures.^[3] The decision arena constitutes the functional space encapsulated by each choice opportunity, analogous to a garbage can where incoming elements from the streams coalesce without predetermined order. As articulated by Cohen, March, and Olsen, "to understand processes within organizations, one can view a choice opportunity as a garbage can into which various kinds of problems and solutions are dumped by participants as they are generated." Within this arena, participants allocate their limited energy to accessible choices, attaching problems that demand resolution and proposing solutions that may precede problem identification. The arena's composition at the moment of decision—dictated by the contemporaneous availability of streams—drives outcomes through mechanisms like energy matching, where the aggregate participant energy must suffice to address attached problems' requirements.^[3] Interactions in the decision arena eschew linear rationality, permitting phenomena such as solutions seeking problems (flight) or unresolved issues persisting due to energy shortfalls. Organizational decision structures modulate arena access: fluid structures allow broad entry, fostering chaotic mixes, while hierarchical ones restrict participation, potentially yielding more orderly but still ambiguous results. Simulations of the model, incorporating ten choice opportunities over simulated time periods, demonstrate how arena dynamics yield variable decision quality, with outcomes hinging on stream coupling rather than problem-driven analysis. Empirical observations in settings like universities corroborate this, where choice opportunities like committee meetings serve as arenas yielding decisions misaligned with originating problems.^[3]

Resulting Decision Outcomes

In the garbage can model, decision outcomes emerge from the temporal and probabilistic coupling of problems, solutions, participants, and choice opportunities within the decision arena, rather than through sequential problem-solving. This process yields three principal modes: resolution, flight, and oversight. Resolution entails a deliberate matching of a recognized problem with a fitting solution via engaged participants, resulting in substantive problem attenuation. However, such alignments are rare in high-ambiguity environments, as the independent streams rarely synchronize precisely.^[3] Flight predominates as a coping mechanism, where decisions prioritize energy conservation or load reduction over problem fidelity; participants attach solutions to problems hastily to escape demands, often yielding superficial or mismatched fixes that do not fully resolve underlying issues. Oversight occurs when streams decouple due to timing mismatches or overload, causing problems to dissipate unresolved, solutions to languish unattached, or entire choice opportunities to pass without action—effectively "solving" issues through neglect rather than intervention. Computer simulations of the model, incorporating variables like participant energy levels and problem loads, confirm that flight and oversight account for the majority of outcomes across organizational structures, with resolved problems comprising only a minority fraction (e.g., under fluid participation, fewer than 20% of problems attach to decisions in baseline runs).^[3]^[9] These outcomes underscore the model's depiction of decisions as ambiguous byproducts of organizational flux, where success depends less on rationality and more on exogenous factors like stream timing and arena access. In overloaded systems, oversight increases as unattended problems self-resolve or persist chronically, while flight escalates under deadline pressure, draining participant energy without proportional gains. Empirical extensions, such as agent-based replications, replicate these patterns, showing outcome variability tied to stream independence: tighter coupling boosts resolution but is atypical in anarchies.^[10]^[3]

Model Parameters and Constraints

Access Structures to the Decision Arena

In the garbage can model of organizational choice, access structures regulate the entry of problems into choice opportunities, known as the decision arena, thereby shaping the composition of streams within each "garbage can." These structures determine the extent to which problems can interact with potential solutions and participants, influencing the randomness and efficiency of decision processes. Cohen, March, and Olsen define access as a key parameter of organizational structure, where the assignment of problems to choices varies based on rules that either permit broad mixing or impose restrictions to reflect hierarchy or specialization.^[3] Three principal access structures are modeled: unsegmented, hierarchical, and specialized. Unsegmented access allows every problem to enter every choice opportunity without restriction, maximizing the potential for serendipitous couplings but heightening ambiguity in outcomes. Hierarchical access constrains problems to choice opportunities at equivalent or subordinate levels, mirroring authority flows in organizations and reducing cross-level contamination of issues. Specialized access routes problems exclusively to choice opportunities aligned with their domain or priority, fostering targeted attention but potentially isolating solutions from broader scrutiny.^[10] These structures extend to participant access, where decision-makers' entry into problem streams follows analogous rules, affecting who attends which arenas based on availability, energy, and organizational roles. Simulations of the model demonstrate that segmented structures (hierarchical or specialized) correlate with fewer resolved problems, longer latency periods for decisions, and higher rates of oversight—where choices occur without addressing attached issues—compared to unsegmented access, which yields more fluid but less predictable resolutions. For instance, in hierarchical setups, problems accumulate at higher levels if lower arenas fail to resolve them, exacerbating backlog. Empirical extensions, such as agent-based reconstructions, confirm that tighter access reduces overall anarchy but at the cost of innovation from unrelated stream intersections.^[10]^[3] Access structures interact with other parameters, such as participant load and choice opportunity frequency, to modulate decision success rates; for example, under high problem density, specialized access preserves decision-maker focus but risks siloed failures, as evidenced by Monte Carlo simulations in the original formulation showing variance in outcomes across structure types.^[3] This parameterization underscores the model's emphasis on how formal organizational designs constrain the inherent looseness of anarchic environments, without assuming rational optimization.^[10]

Influence of Deadlines and Participant Energy

In the garbage can model, participant energy represents a finite resource that individuals allocate selectively across choice opportunities, influencing the coupling of problems, solutions, and decisions. Participants enter arenas with a fixed energy level (typically modeled as 10 units), directing it toward the choice requiring the least additional effort to reach resolution, often prioritizing those closest to a decision point based on perceived energy deficits.^[3] This allocation mechanism reflects causal constraints in organized anarchies, where limited attention leads to uneven engagement, favoring problems or solutions that align with immediate availability rather than comprehensive evaluation. Under light energy loads (net load of -44 units per period), problem resolution rates are higher, with average problem activity at 114.9 units, as participants sustain involvement longer; conversely, heavy loads (net load of 0) elevate unresolved issues to 211.1 units of activity, diverting energy toward "flight" where participants disengage without commitment.^[3] Deadlines impose temporal boundaries on choice opportunities, accelerating or disrupting stream coupling by compelling outcomes before streams disperse. In simulations of the model spanning 20 discrete time periods, unresolved choices at the endpoint are classified as failures, with an average of 1.0 such choices and 12.3 unsolved problems per run, underscoring how finite time horizons prioritize timely matches over optimal ones.^[3] Timing interacts with energy: early-arriving problems (e.g., those entering in initial periods) achieve resolution probabilities up to 0.46 for high-importance cases, while late entrants drop to 0.25 for low-importance ones, as deadlines compress participant attention and force reliance on proximate solutions.^[3] This dynamic yields higher proportions of oversight or flight decisions (0.64 under heavy loads), where problems exit arenas unresolved, as energy depletion prevents sustained coupling amid rushed timelines.^[3] Empirical extensions via agent-based simulations confirm these effects, modeling participant energy as a threshold for arena entry (e.g., requiring sufficient energy to overcome opportunity demands), which under deadline pressure reduces decision coherence by amplifying random matches.^[11] Heavy energy demands coupled with strict deadlines empirically correlate with increased "livelock" in decision processes, where streams circulate without resolution, as seen in organizational simulations redirecting participant focus away from core issues.^[12] Thus, deadlines and energy scarcity causally amplify ambiguity, favoring expedient rather than rational outcomes in anarchic settings.^[3]

Historical Origins and Theoretical Evolution

Formulation in the 1972 Seminal Paper

The garbage can model was introduced in the article "A Garbage Can Model of Organizational Choice," authored by Michael D. Cohen, James G. March, and Johan P. Olsen, and published in Administrative Science Quarterly (Vol. 17, No. 1, pp. 1–25) in March 1972.^[9] The formulation targets decision processes within "organized anarchies," a category of organizations distinguished by three core traits: problematic preferences (where goals are inconsistent, vague, or contested); unclear technology (where cause-effect linkages and effective actions remain poorly understood); and fluid participation (where involvement in choices depends on variable loads, external demands, and personal energy rather than fixed roles).^[9] These anarchies, exemplified by universities and public bureaucracies, feature decisions that defy traditional rational or incremental models due to high ambiguity and loose coupling between problems and actions.^[9] Central to the model's depiction is the portrayal of organizational choice as a retrogressive, orderless process akin to a garbage can, where elements are deposited without inherent sequence or logic.^[9] Four independent streams flow into this arena: problems, which arise as demands for attention (such as performance shortfalls or external pressures); solutions, which circulate as answers seeking matching problems (often generated independently by participants); participants, whose entry and exit vary with their available energy and external commitments; and choice opportunities, which serve as temporal windows (e.g., crises, deadlines, or formal meetings) for potential coupling.^[9] These streams operate asynchronously, with problems and solutions arriving based on Poisson-like processes, participants fluctuating in load, and choices activating sporadically.^[9] Decisions emerge stochastically from the substantive and temporal alignment—or coupling—of streams within a choice opportunity, rather than deliberate matching.^[9] Possible outcomes include resolution (a solution addresses an attached problem), flight (a problem departs without resolution as energy shifts elsewhere), oversight (a choice occurs without a linked problem), or the generation of new problems or solutions.^[9] The authors emphasize that such couplings are influenced by organizational structure, including access to the "decision arena" (e.g., unsegmented, hierarchical, or specialized) and participant energy dynamics (additive across problems, allocated to proximate choices).^[9] The formulation incorporates a rudimentary computer simulation to operationalize these dynamics, using parameters such as 10 choice opportunities, 20 problems, 10 participants over 20 time periods, a solution generation probability of 0.6, and varying energy loads (light, moderate, heavy).^[9] This setup illustrates how constraints like segmented access reduce problem clearance or how heavy loads favor flight over resolution, providing a formal basis for predicting outcomes under ambiguity without assuming goal-directed rationality.^[9] The simulation underscores the model's focus on temporal sequencing and structural filters over intentional optimization.^[9] One prominent extension involves agent-based modeling, which reconstructs the garbage can processes through autonomous agents representing problems, solutions, participants, and choice opportunities interacting dynamically on a simulated spatial torus.^[10] Fioretti and Lomi's 2008 implementation in NetLogo introduces heterogeneous distributions of participant energy and treats solutions as independent agents rather than aggregated coefficients, allowing for flexible entry/exit rules and refined decision resolution equations.^[10] Simulations with parameters such as 100 participants, 200 opportunities, 100 solutions, and 400 problems over 200 time steps confirmed five of the original model's properties, including decisions often occurring by oversight and reduced efficiency with harder problems, but disconfirmed others, such as the pattern of unexploited opportunities favoring extreme importance levels.^[10] A 2019 refinement by Greve and Rao "relines" the model by conceptualizing problems, participants, and solutions as queues subject to stochastic matching via queuing theory, replacing earlier deterministic linkages with Poisson arrivals for problems (rate λ) and exponential service times for solutions (mean 1/μ).^[13] This approach incorporates decision forums as multi-server queues (M/M/c) and examines approval hierarchies, revealing that managerial oversight increases variance in problem resolution times, while mechanisms like teamwork or bypassing approvals reduce both mean processing time and variability.^[13] Simulations demonstrate that larger organizations achieve faster, lower-variance processing when scaled to inflow rates, highlighting trade-offs between decision efficiency and problem-solving effectiveness under temporal constraints.^[13] These computational extensions build on the original 1972 simulation by enabling sensitivity analyses to parameters like access structures and energy levels, while refinements emphasize probabilistic flows and institutional frictions, yielding insights into how structural variations influence outcomes such as problem latency and decision success rates.^[10]^[13] Agent-based variants have further integrated evolutionary dynamics, drawing from routines in organizational learning to model long-term adaptations in anarchic settings.^[10]

Applications in Organizational Contexts

Higher Education Institutions

The Garbage Can Model was originally formulated to explain decision-making in higher education institutions, which exemplify organized anarchies characterized by ambiguous goals, unclear technologies, fluid participation, and sensitivity to external pressures.^[1] In universities, goals such as prioritizing research over teaching or balancing academic freedom with administrative efficiency remain ill-defined and subject to ongoing debate, preventing consensus on evaluative criteria for choices.^[1] Technologies for achieving these goals—encompassing pedagogical methods, research protocols, and governance structures—are often experimental or poorly understood, with outcomes unpredictable due to the diverse expertise of faculty and administrators.^[1] Participant pools in higher education are highly transient, with faculty, students, and staff entering and exiting decision arenas based on personal energy levels, tenure cycles, and external commitments rather than fixed roles.^[1] Choice opportunities, such as departmental meetings, accreditation reviews, or budget reallocations, act as temporary "garbage cans" where problems (e.g., declining enrollment), solutions (e.g., proposed online programs), and participants mix asynchronously.^[14] For instance, in U.S. universities during the 1960s and 1970s, interdepartmental committees on curriculum reform illustrated how solutions like interdisciplinary majors attached to unrelated problems, such as funding shortages, yielding ambiguous or delayed resolutions.^[1] Empirical simulations of the model, calibrated to university contexts, reveal that high participant flightiness—common in academia due to sabbaticals and job mobility—reduces decision resolution rates, while energy constraints limit attention to salient streams.^[1] Case studies from American colleges demonstrate that during periods of overload, such as rapid expansion in the post-World War II era, problems often persist unresolved as solutions seek outlets independently, contributing to inefficiencies like program proliferation without clear need.^[15] These dynamics persist into the 21st century, as evidenced by responses to fiscal crises in state-funded universities, where ad hoc committees couple preexisting policy proposals (e.g., merger initiatives) with acute issues like tuition hikes, often bypassing sequential analysis.^[16] The model's applicability to higher education underscores challenges in governance reforms aimed at imposing hierarchy or coupling streams more tightly, as underlying anarchy resists standardization.^[17] For example, attempts to centralize decision-making through provost-led structures have shown limited success in reducing randomness, with faculty senates continuing to enable fluid entry of diverse problems and solutions.^[18] This framework highlights causal factors like temporal misalignment and participant selectivity as drivers of outcomes, rather than deliberate strategy, informing analyses of phenomena such as stalled innovations in online learning adoption during the early 2000s.^[19]

Public Policy and Governmental Processes

The garbage can model applies to public policy and governmental processes by portraying them as organized anarchies where decision-making deviates from rational models due to problematic preferences, unclear technology, fluid participation, and ambiguous choice opportunities. In governmental settings, problems such as economic crises or social issues arrive independently of solutions like proposed legislation, with participants including bureaucrats, politicians, and interest groups entering and exiting irregularly.^[5]^[20] John Kingdon adapted the model in 1984 to explain U.S. federal agenda-setting through his multiple streams framework, identifying three streams—problems, policies (solutions seeking problems), and politics—that must couple during policy windows for issues to gain traction. Kingdon explicitly likened the federal government to a garbage can process, noting its resemblance in chaotic coupling rather than linear progression.^[21] This framework has illuminated how policies emerge opportunistically, as seen in the coupling of environmental problems with ready-made regulatory solutions during political shifts, rather than through comprehensive analysis.^[22] Empirical observations in public administration highlight garbage can dynamics in legislative and bureaucratic arenas, where "organizational garbage" accumulates as solutions are applied without matching specific problems, leading to inefficient or unintended outcomes. For example, funding allocations in government agencies may prioritize available resources over identified needs, resulting in mismatched expenditures. Critics, including Gary Mucciaroni, argue that while the model captures ambiguity, it underemphasizes strategic agency in policy-making compared to more actor-centered approaches.^[23]^[22]

Private Sector and Management Practices

The garbage can model has been applied to private sector decision-making primarily in contexts of high ambiguity, such as strategic information systems planning, where firms exhibit problematic goals, unclear technologies, and fluid participant involvement, leading to decoupled problems and solutions.^[24] For instance, in corporate financial reporting, Greve and Rao (2020) reframed the model using queueing theory to analyze earnings restatements among U.S. public companies from 1998 to 2012, demonstrating that random temporal matching of detected errors (problems), corrective actions (solutions), and managerial attention (participants) predicts restatement likelihood more effectively than rational choice models, with empirical tests on 1,248 restatements showing queue buildup effects under time pressure. This extension highlights how corporate hierarchies can constrain but not eliminate garbage can dynamics in routine yet ambiguous processes. In professional service firms, such as consulting or law practices, the model describes decision arenas cluttered with unresolved issues like reward structures, client selection, and internal status hierarchies, where choice opportunities arise sporadically and solutions attach to available problems rather than through sequential analysis.^[25] Maister (2001) argued this pattern prevails in partnership-based businesses, where participant energy fluctuates with billable hours, exacerbating fluid participation and leading to outcomes like premature issue resolution or persistent inefficiencies, as observed in firm-wide policy shifts during growth phases. Empirical observations from such firms indicate that garbage can processes contribute to innovation in client problem-solving but risk misallocation of resources in administrative decisions.^[25] Applications extend to top management teams pursuing ambidexterity—balancing exploitation and exploration—in corporate strategy, where garbage can mechanisms enable opportunistic coupling of novel solutions to emerging problems amid executive turnover. Studies of multinational firms' strategic pivots, such as during market disruptions, reveal that unclear preferences and participation turnover foster "flight" modes, where decisions resolve independently of original intent, though structured access can mitigate chaos. In megaprojects managed by private contractors, the model illuminates delays from mismatched streams, with simulations showing that hierarchical controls reduce but do not eradicate random outcomes in resource-constrained environments.^[26] Overall, while private firms' profit-driven clarity limits full organized anarchy, the model illuminates pockets of disorder in R&D, entrepreneurship, and crisis response, informing management practices like timed interventions to align streams.

Empirical Validation and Criticisms

Evidence from Simulations, Case Studies, and Real-World Observations

The foundational evidence for the garbage can model derives from computer simulations detailed in Cohen, March, and Olsen's 1972 paper, which analyzed 324 simulated scenarios varying access structures, participant energy levels, and decision arenas.^[1] These simulations revealed key properties, including problematic problem resolution where only a fraction of issues attach to decisions, frequent flight from unresolved problems, and energy waste on irrelevant activities, particularly under conditions of high ambiguity and fluid participation.^[1] Subsequent agent-based simulations, such as those by Olsson (2008), replicated the model with 10 participants, 10 choice opportunities, and 20 problems over 20 steps, confirming that most decisions occur without solving problems and highlighting the role of temporal coupling in outcomes.^[10] Further simulation-based validation appears in agent-based interpretations like that of Eden (2007), which extended the model to demonstrate how anarchy intensifies under loose coupling, with decisions often resulting from chance matches rather than systematic problem-solving.^[27] A 1997 simulation study integrated a unified garbage can framework to test anarchy degrees, generating hypotheses on decision latency and problem resolution that aligned with observed inefficiencies in ambiguous settings.^[28] These computational approaches consistently underscore the model's predictions of disorganized processes yielding sporadic resolutions, though they rely on idealized parameters rather than direct data calibration.^[13] Case studies provide qualitative support, primarily from organized anarchies like universities, as illustrated in March and Olsen's 1979 analysis of educational institutions where problems, solutions, and participants mingled fluidly, leading to decisions detached from initial intents.^[13] A 2010 case of a contested green urban area in Sweden exemplified garbage can dynamics, with politicians, residents, and activists contributing mismatched solutions to evolving problems, resulting in stalled resolutions amid conflicting streams.^[29] In public schools, a 2018 study of Turkish administrations observed the model in resource allocation and change management, triggered by time constraints and administrative ambiguity, where decisions emerged from opportunistic couplings rather than linear planning.^[15] Real-world observations, often from single-case inquiries, indicate modest empirical backing, with the model's elements evident in policy arenas exhibiting high load and low agreement, such as fragmented governmental processes.^[30] However, comprehensive field validations remain sparse, as much evidence stems from interpretive applications rather than large-scale quantitative tests, limiting generalizability beyond simulation-confirmed patterns.^[13]

Major Theoretical and Empirical Critiques

The Garbage Can Model (GCM) has faced theoretical criticism for its inherent indeterminacy, which renders it insufficiently explanatory for specific decision outcomes in complex settings such as policy agendas. Critics argue that the model's emphasis on fluid streams of problems, solutions, participants, and choice opportunities fails to account for why particular issues achieve prominence amid ambiguity, leaving outcomes largely unpredictable and dependent on chance couplings rather than discernible causal mechanisms.^[4] Furthermore, the original verbal formulation lacks a robust theoretical foundation conducive to cumulative scientific advancement, with inconsistencies between the descriptive narrative and the accompanying computer simulation undermining internal coherence; simulations often produce orderly, lockstep agent behaviors that contradict the purported chaotic essence of "organized anarchy."^[31] Additional theoretical shortcomings include the model's relative neglect of power asymmetries, strategic maneuvering, and entrenched interests among participants, which can impose structure on ostensibly fluid processes and elevate certain solutions over others through bargaining or coercion rather than random mixing.^[6] This omission limits its applicability beyond low-stakes, high-ambiguity environments, as it underplays how political dynamics and resource control shape access to choice opportunities, a gap later partially addressed in extensions like Kingdon's multiple streams framework but not resolved in the core GCM.^[4] Empirically, the GCM struggles with falsifiability and predictive utility, as its process-oriented design prioritizes description over testable hypotheses, making rigorous validation challenging outside contrived simulations.^[10] Case studies in policy domains, such as tax reform and deregulation, illustrate this limitation by demonstrating the model's inability to specify causal pathways for agenda attainment, often retrofitting observations to fit the garbage can metaphor without forward-looking precision.^[4] In higher education contexts, applications reveal pitfalls in treating the model as a comprehensive paradigm, particularly its indifference to goal attainment and outcomes, which implies a dismissal of accountability for failures in resolving problems or achieving organizational aims.^[32] Overall, empirical efforts remain sparse and predominantly simulation-based, with critiques highlighting how these artificial setups fail to capture real-world coordination at scale or the persistence of unresolved issues despite decision proliferation.^[10]^[31]

Contemporary Relevance and Extensions

Recent Applications and Adaptations (2000–2025)

Since 2000, the garbage can model has been adapted to analyze decision-making in complex, ambiguous environments, including public policy arenas where problems, solutions, and opportunities collide unpredictably. In housing policy, for instance, the model explains how agenda-setting occurs through fluid interactions of policy streams, as seen in Australian contexts where entrenched issues like affordability meet opportunistic solutions amid political windows.^[33] Similarly, in governmental IT projects in developing countries, the framework highlights leadership failures in aligning participants and choices, leading to frequent project collapses due to mismatched problem-solution couplings. Applications in educational institutions demonstrate the model's utility under resource constraints and external pressures. A 2018 study of Israeli schools found administrators resorting to garbage can processes for pedagogical and resource decisions when facing administrative overload, resulting in ad hoc rather than sequential choices.^[15] During the COVID-19 crisis, higher education leaders exhibited garbage can dynamics in policy responses, with problems like remote learning clashing against available solutions in "organized anarchies" characterized by unclear goals and fluid participation.^[34] In crisis and digital contexts, adaptations emphasize temporal and technological streams. For serious digital incidents, such as cyberattacks, decision-making follows garbage can patterns where urgent problems overwhelm choice opportunities, exacerbated by participant turnover and solution ambiguity.^[35] Emergent volunteer groups during disasters, like "voluntweeters" in COVID-19 responses, self-organize via garbage can mechanisms, dumping digital tools and expertise into temporary arenas to address immediate needs. Computational extensions have revitalized the model for 21st-century simulations. Agent-based models (ABMs) represent streams as autonomous agents, simulating how organizations emerge from chaotic interactions, as in ecosystems where hierarchies form from problem collisions.^[36] Recent integrations with AI explore data scientists' roles in injecting analytical solutions into garbage cans, using ABMs to model adaptive behaviors and reduce anarchy in decision processes.^[37] These adaptations underscore the model's enduring relevance for non-linear, tech-infused environments, though empirical validation remains challenged by the difficulty in measuring fluid streams.

Integration with Emerging Theories and Future Directions

The Garbage Can Model (GCM) has been computationally extended through agent-based simulations, enabling empirical testing of its core propositions in virtual environments that replicate organized anarchies. These reconstructions model problems, solutions, participants, and choice opportunities as autonomous agents interacting probabilistically, revealing patterns such as flight from decision-making and resolution by flight under varying access structures.^[10]^[38] Such integrations with computational social science facilitate sensitivity analyses, as demonstrated in simulations adjusting parameters like participant energy levels and problem salience, which align with the model's original fluid participation assumption while quantifying outcomes unattainable through analytical solutions alone.^[10] Recent adaptations link GCM to technology adoption processes, particularly in artificial intelligence (AI) contexts, where streams of AI solutions seek matching problems amid organizational ambiguity. In a 2025 framework for identifying AI use cases, decision arenas are analyzed via GCM streams to explain why certain technologies attach to issues opportunistically rather than through linear needs assessment, highlighting mismatches in high-uncertainty settings like enterprise AI deployment.^[39] This convergence with innovation diffusion theories underscores GCM's utility in non-rational technology decisions, where solutions precede problem recognition, as evidenced in queue-based refinements modeling random matching of technological proposals and organizational pains.^[40] Looking forward, GCM's compatibility with new institutionalism offers pathways to examine institutional persistence in ambiguous governance, where rules and norms interact with garbage can dynamics to shape political outcomes, as explored in analyses of policy evolution.^[41] Reflections from the model's originators in 2012 emphasize its enduring appeal for tackling unresolved puzzles in decision theory, suggesting hybrid extensions incorporating behavioral mechanisms—like attention heuristics from recent economics—to address critiques of overemphasized ambiguity while preserving causal looseness in streams.^[42] Future research may prioritize empirical validation in digital ecosystems, where algorithmic choice opportunities accelerate stream coupling, potentially via longitudinal simulations tracking real-time data flows in platforms exhibiting organized anarchy traits.^[42]

References

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[PDF] A Garbage Can Model of Organizational Choice - Michael D. Cohen
Sep 3, 2006 · To understand processes within organiza- tions, one can view a choice opportunity as a garbage can into which various kinds of problems and ...
[2]
Cohen, M.D., March, J.G. and Olsen, J.P. (1972) A Garbage Can ...
Cohen, M.D., March, J.G. and Olsen, J.P. (1972) A Garbage Can Model of Organizational Choice. Administrative Science Quarterly, 17, 1-25. http://dx.doi.org ...
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[PDF] A Garbage Can Model of Organizational Choice Author(s)
Cohen et al: A GARBAGE CAN MODEL. 17. TABLE 5. EFFECT OF ADVERSITY ON FOUR TYPES OF COLLEGES AND. UNIVERSITIES OPERATING WITHIN A GARBAGE CAN DECISION PROCESS.
[4]
The Garbage Can Model & the Study of Policy Making: A Critique
John Kingdon adapted the garbage can model of organizational choice to explain the agenda-setting process in the making of public policy.
[5]
Decision-making and problem solving skills - garbage can model - PMI
The garbage can model does not assume a feedback loop. Indeed, in contrast to the rational models in which the content of the solution to a problem is not known ...
[6]
(PDF) A Garbage Can Model of Organization Choice - ResearchGate
Aug 5, 2025 · An explicit computer simulation model of a garbage can decision process. The general implications of such a model are described in terms of five major measures ...
[7]
Michael D. Cohen, James G. March, and Johan P. Olsen, “A ...
This chapter examines “A Garbage Can Model of Organizational Choice,” a paper authored by Michael D. Cohen, James G. March, and Johan P. Olsen.Opening The Garbage Can: The... · Recycling The Garbage Can... · Institutional Theory...
[8]
Bounded Rationality and Multiple Streams Approaches
Nikos Zahariadis. Bounded rationality models and their closely related garbage can family of models have emerged as important ways of examining national policy- ...
[9]
A Garbage Can Model of Organizational Choice - jstor
Cohen, James G. March, and. Johan P. Olsen. A Garbage Can Model of Organizational Choice. Organized anarchies are organizations characterized by problematic ...
[10]
An Agent-Based Representation of the Garbage Can Model ... - JASSS
Organizations characterized by fluid participation, unclear decision technologies and problematic preferences ... unclear technology. Although the ...
[11]
NetLogo User Community Models:
The "Garbage Can" is a model of organizational decision-making. In the Garbage Can model, decision is made when the members of an organization apply a solution ...Missing: core | Show results with:core
[12]
[PDF] Application of the Cohen, March and Olsen 'Garbage Can ... - DTIC
... GARBAGE CAN MODEL------------------------- 14. C. THE MILITARY DECISION MAKER ... decision arena" due to their own preference or because other problems ...
[13]
[PDF] Relining the garbage can of organizational decision-making
Dec 12, 2019 · organizations having problematic preferences, unclear technology, and fluid participation and was outlined in an in- fluential ...
[14]
A CASE STUDY ANALYSIS USING BOUNDED RATIONALITY ...
Nov 10, 2011 · The "Garbage Can" model was originally formulated in the context of the operation of universities and their many inter-departmental ...
[15]
[PDF] Why School Managements Use Garbage Can Model of Decision?
Feb 15, 2018 · The present study used the Garbage Can Model to examine decisions of public school managements. Schools were at the forehead of the first wave ...
[16]
'Organised anarchy' – The enduring paradigm of university ...
Jul 18, 2014 · Cohen and March, two leading organisational theorists, articulated higher education as 'organised anarchy' and used a 'garbage can model' to ...
[17]
Organized Anarchies: 13 Steps to Building a “Learning Organization”
Feb 5, 2018 · In their frequently cited 1972 work A Garbage Can Model of Organizational Choice, scholars Michael D. Cohen, James G. March and Johan P ...
[18]
[PDF] Inside the garbage-can: An orderly decision-making process in ...
This study examines Cohen, March, and Olsen's (1972) (CMO) garbage-can model, and reveals that many subsequent studies have misinterpreted CMO's original model.
[19]
[PDF] Birnbaum's five models of institutional govern - ERIC
Dec 31, 2021 · However, it cannot be said that universities or higher education institutions have definite boundaries or a single purpose. ... garbage can model ...<|separator|>
[20]
Garbage Can Models - an overview | ScienceDirect Topics
In addition, the garbage can model conceives of organizations as “organized anarchies” (e.g., having inconsistent goals). Universities are considered the ...<|separator|>
[21]
in defense of institutions as “garbage cans” - Peter Levine
Aug 27, 2024 · Kingdon cites the garbage-can model and comments, “On the face of it, this looks a lot like the federal government” (Kingdon 1984, p. 85).Missing: applications | Show results with:applications
[22]
The Garbage Can Model & the Study of Policy Making: A Critique
John Kingdon adapted the "garbage can model" of organizational choice to explain the agenda-setting process in the making of public policy.
[23]
5.10 – GARBAGE CAN MODEL – Public Administration
A primary feature of garbage can decision making is that it often results in unnecessary solutions. Known as the organizational garbage, situations arise in ...Missing: core | Show results with:core
[24]
IS Strategic Decision-Making: A Garbage Can View - ResearchGate
Aug 6, 2025 · The garbage can model involves three conditions, namely, problematic goals, unclear technology, and fluid participation (Fardal and Sørnes, 2008) ...
[25]
Garbage Can Decision Making > Managing article by David Maister
In a garbage can process, there are a large number of unresolved issues or problems: “What do we reward around here? Who has status? What clients should we ...Missing: criticisms applications<|control11|><|separator|>
[26]
[PDF] Symbols, Sublimes, Solutions, and Problems: A Garbage Can Model ...
Although based in the. Carnegie School of bounded rationality. (Cyert & March ... Cohen, March, and Olsen's pio- neering simulation work, using very.
[27]
The garbage can model of organizational choice: An agent-based ...
The emphasis is rightly put on the information properties of alternative organizational designs that might alleviate or worsen problems of bounded rationality ...
[28]
A Single Garbage Can Model and the Degree of Anarchy in ...
This paper incorporates two methodologies in an attempt to both validate and extend the garbage can model: Simulation is first used to generate a research ...
[29]
Garbage can order: A case study of a problematic green public ...
Aug 6, 2025 · Garbage can order: A case study of a problematic green public urban area. January 2008; World Leisure Journal 50(2):108-115. DOI:10.1080/ ...Missing: private | Show results with:private
[30]
The value of garbage can model of decision making - LinkedIn
Nov 18, 2024 · The garbage can model is a significant explanation to practical decision-making process when rational and political models fall short.Decision Speed And Ambiguity · Organizational Slack And... · Issue Framing<|separator|>
[31]
Recycling the Garbage Can: An Assessment of the Research Program on JSTOR
### Summary of Critiques of the Garbage Can Model
[32]
Tightening up Loose Coupling in Organizations of Higher Education
In its indifference to outcomes, the garbage can model seems to suggest the alternative of not taking the goals, or our failure to accomplish them, very ...
[33]
applying garbage-can theory to contemporary housing policy
This paper reviews the applicability of John Kingdon's garbage-can model of agenda setting and alternative specification for understanding ...
[34]
Navigating Higher Education: Garbage Can Approach vs ...
How can the resilience of academic institutions be understood through the perspectives of heads, integrating the Garbage Can theory and the institutional ...
[35]
Decision-making in crisis management of a serious digital incident
Decision-making in crisis management of a serious digital incident: A garbage can approach ... The garbage can model (GCM) of Organizational Choice with a ...
[36]
Emergence of Organizations out of Garbage Can Dynamics
Aug 7, 2025 · These ideas are translated into an explicit computer simulation model of a garbage can decision process. The general implications of such a ...<|separator|>
[37]
[PDF] How Data Scientists Contribute to Organizational Decision-Making
Dec 26, 2024 · decision arena introduces a layer of complexity. While diverse ... In The Garbage Can Model of. Organizational Choice: Looking Forward at Forty ( ...
[38]
The garbage can model of organizational choice: An agent-based ...
Aug 10, 2025 · We reconstruct Cohen, March and Olsen's original Garbage Can model of organizational choice as a multi-agent system.<|control11|><|separator|>
[39]
Identifying Artificial Intelligence Use Cases: Toward a Method that ...
Oct 7, 2025 · Also, we break new ground by describing the decision situations in the context of AI technologies by means of the garbage can model. Section ...
[40]
Relining the garbage can of organizational decision-making
We reline the garbage can model of organizational decision-making by modeling the arrival of problems, people, and solutions as queues that get matched randomly ...
[41]
Garbage Cans, New Institutionalism, and the Study of Politics - jstor
route and point research in the wrong direction. The Bendor, Moe, and Shotts rescue program is alien to the spirit of not only the garbage can model and the ...
[42]
“A Garbage Can Model” At Forty: A Solution that Still Attracts Problems
Aug 7, 2025 · In this essay, we consider some aspects of this process from our experience with garbage can ideas of organizational decision making.