Fact-checked by Grok 2 weeks ago

Greater and Lesser Tunbs

The Greater Tunb and Lesser Tunb are two small, rocky islands located in the eastern near the , consisting of low hills and limited flat terrain, with the Lesser Tunb situated approximately 11 kilometers west of the Greater Tunb and measuring about 1 square kilometer in area. has maintained control over both islands since militarily occupying them on , 1971, just prior to the withdrawal from the , establishing a presence there amid their strategic oversight of vital oil shipping routes. The contests Iranian administration, asserting rooted in pre-occupation affiliations with the of al-Khaimah and historical documentation indicating local Arab before the seizure, which sparked immediate regional protests and enduring diplomatic friction. counters with claims of ancient Persian dominion over the islands tracing to imperial eras, supported by records of administrative integration, though effective control lapsed during periods of foreign influence in the Gulf. Their proximity to the —through which roughly 20% of global oil passes—amplifies their geopolitical weight, enabling potential dominance over chokepoints and fueling persistent bilateral tensions despite intermittent calls for joint development or arbitration.

Geography

Location and Physical Characteristics

The Greater and Lesser Tunbs consist of two small islands in the eastern , positioned near the western entrance to the , a strategically vital chokepoint approximately 30 miles (48 km) wide at its narrowest point. Greater Tunb, roughly circular in shape, covers about 10.3 square kilometers and lies approximately 17 miles (27 km) southwest of . Lesser Tunb, situated 11 kilometers west of Greater Tunb, has an area of around 1 square kilometer. Both islands exhibit arid terrain dominated by low rocky hills interspersed with flatter patches of land, with Greater Tunb noted for its red soil and seasonal grass cover in late winter and early spring. The surrounding waters form part of the Persian Gulf's continental shelf, with depths suitable for large vessel navigation near the islands, facilitating their proximity to major international shipping lanes transiting the Strait of Hormuz. Lesser Tunb remains uninhabited by civilians but includes man-made features such as an airfield and harbor.

Climate and Environment

The Greater and Lesser Tunbs experience an arid subtropical climate typical of the eastern , dominated by extreme heat, minimal precipitation, and persistent winds. Annual rainfall averages less than 100 mm, primarily occurring sporadically during winter months from to , fostering hyperarid conditions that result in barren, landscapes with negligible development. Summer daytime temperatures routinely surpass 40°C, occasionally reaching 50°C, accompanied by high levels that intensify , while winter lows seldom fall below 15°C. Geologically, the islands comprise exposed and formations shaped by tectonic uplift and , lacking perennial freshwater sources such as aquifers or streams due to the impermeable terrain and evaporative dominance. is exceedingly sparse, confined to scattered halophytic shrubs and salt-tolerant grasses adapted to saline soils and desiccating winds, with no extensive plant cover reported. The absence of significant and further limits ecological productivity on land. Surrounding shallow waters contribute to regional marine biodiversity, hosting diverse assemblages of fish, mollusks, and arthropods akin to nearby habitats, though the islands' steep, rocky coastlines restrict intertidal zones and coral development compared to fringing reefs elsewhere in the Gulf. Over 700 fish species inhabit the broader Persian Gulf ecosystem, supporting food webs influenced by nutrient upwelling and seasonal currents, yet local environmental stressors like elevated salinity (averaging 40-42 ppt) constrain endemic adaptations.

Etymology and Toponymy

Historical Names

The Persian designations for the islands, Tunb-e Bozorg (Greater Tunb) and Tunb-e Kuchek (Lesser Tunb), derive from the local southern dialect where tonb denotes a or , with tonbu as its form, reflecting the islands' topographic features. This underscores ancient Iranian , as the term appears in regional linguistic patterns predating influences. Earlier Persian references include variants such as Nāz for Greater Tunb (alluding to its relative amenities) and Nāmaʿan for Lesser Tunb (indicating ), or Gonbad (dome), tied to observable landmarks like domed structures or elevations on the islands. Persian-Arabic manuscripts from historical periods record forms like Tumb Namiu for Lesser Tunb and Tonb Namiveh for Greater Tunb, preserving phonetic elements consistent with Iranian linguistic roots. Arabic nomenclature, such as Ṭanb al-Kubrā and Ṭanb al-Ṣughrā, emerged primarily as transliterations in 19th-century , including colonial records referring to them as "Tumbs," without of distinct pre-19th-century toponyms in surviving maps or texts. These variants lack independent etymological foundations in sources, contrasting with the persistent forms in regional chronicles.

Modern Designations

designates the larger island as Tonb-e Bozorg (تنب بزرگ, meaning "Greater Tunb") and the smaller as Tonb-e Kuchek (تنب کوچک, meaning "Lesser Tunb"), incorporating both administratively into as integral components of its territory. This nomenclature, employed consistently in official Iranian communications and legal frameworks, emphasizes longstanding national possession without qualifiers denoting dispute. The employs the designations Greater Tunb and Lesser Tunb (in Arabic, Tunb al-Kubra and Tunb as-Sughra), frequently grouping them with as territories historically linked to the emirate of Ras al-Khaimah and subject to Iranian occupation since 1971. This usage in UAE diplomatic statements and maps positions the islands within its claimed pre-federation boundaries, framing them as unlawfully detached emirati lands. United Nations documents and international mappings refer to the islands neutrally as Greater Tunb and Lesser Tunb, listing them alongside in resolutions and correspondence without adjudicating ownership or adopting either party's narrative. Such terminology maintains procedural , reflecting the unresolved in multilateral forums.

Historical Ownership

Ancient and Medieval Periods

The Greater and Lesser Tunbs, situated approximately 12 kilometers south of in the , were encompassed within the territorial sphere of ancient empires due to their proximity to the Persian mainland and the strategic control exerted over the . The (c. 550–330 BCE) administered the Gulf coasts through satrapies including (Fars), integrating maritime outposts and islands for naval and trade purposes, though direct records naming the Tunbs are absent; their position aligns with ' account of Alexander's fleet mooring near similar islands in 325 BCE. Similarly, the Sassanid Empire (224–651 ) maintained dominance over Gulf waters, with administrative ties evidenced by control of nearby Hormuz and evidence of cultural influence via toponymy, as "Tonb" derives from tonb meaning "hill." No contemporary sources indicate independent sovereignty by external powers during these periods. In the medieval Islamic era, the islands appear in Persian geographical compilations, reflecting ongoing association with Iranian domains. Ebn al-Balḵi's Fārs-nāma (c. 1111 ) references an island off the coast of Pars likely corresponding to Greater Tunb, while Ḥamd-Allāh Mostawfi's Nozhat al-qolub (c. 1340 ) and earlier 10th-century works by Eṣṭaḵri mention related toponyms like Ṭasuj Tonbuk, underscoring linguistic and cartographic recognition. Under dynasties such as the Buyids and Seljuks, which preserved administrative traditions, the supported regional defense and taxation indirectly through mainland oversight from Hormuzgān. The (1501–1736 ), restoring imperial structure, incorporated the eastern into provincial governance, with records of naval patrols and fiscal levies on maritime trade implying nominal control, though specific Tunb or defense documents remain untraced in extant archives. Primary historical records, including pre-Islamic inscriptions and Islamic-era geographies, lack documentation of tribal sovereignty over the Tunbs before the , with earliest associations emerging only in observations of the Hormuz around 1518 , itself under fluctuating influence. This evidentiary gap contrasts with consistent referential ties, suggesting integration into Iranian spheres absent competing claims.

18th and 19th Centuries

Following the decline of Safavid authority in the early 18th century, the Greater and Lesser Tunbs came under the influence of the Qawasim sheikhs, an Arab tribe with bases in Ras al-Khaimah and the Persian coastal port of Lingeh. The Qawasim administered Lingeh as delegates of Persian governors from approximately 1789 to 1887, exercising de facto control over the islands through claims to grazing rights and resource management. This arrangement reflected loose Persian suzerainty, with local Qawasim rulers mediating disputes and collecting tributes, though Persian central authority remained nominal amid regional instability. In the early 19th century, Qawasim sheikhs of Ras al-Khaimah asserted hereditary claims over the Tunbs, as evidenced by intermittent interventions such as the 1884 destruction of date trees on Greater Tunb by Sheikh Humaid bin Abdullah. British maritime expeditions, including surveys by John McCluer in 1786 and George Barnes Brucks in 1829, recorded the islands as dependencies of Lingeh under Persian oversight, with maps consistently depicting them as part of Persian territory. The 1835 maritime truce, extended perpetually in 1853, curtailed Qawasim maritime activities but did not resolve underlying administrative ambiguities. British protectorate treaties, such as the General Maritime Treaty of 1820 and the Perpetual Maritime Truce of 1853, recognized the authority of Trucial sheikhs—including those of Ras al-Khaimah—over coastal domains but omitted explicit references to over the offshore Tunbs. In 1873, the British Political Resident in the Gulf affirmed the islands' status as a , aligning with contemporary cartographic evidence like 19th-century maps. Period naval records and journals indicate Qawasim control was nominal, characterized by sporadic visits for grazing or enforcement rather than sustained governance or permanent settlements on the uninhabited islets. By 1887, Persia reasserted direct control over Gulf ports, dissolving Qawasim administration in Lingeh and formalizing claims to the islands.

Early 20th Century Transitions

During the , Britain upheld the status quo on the Greater and Lesser Tunbs as appendages of the , administering them through alliances with local rulers such as the Qawasim sheikhs of Ras al-Khaimah, who claimed nominal following earlier assertions. This arrangement, rooted in early 1900s flag-hoisting actions to preempt control, involved periodic patrols and maintenance on Greater Tunb, ensuring the islands remained uninhabited outposts except for transient fishermen and activity. Population estimates varied, with Iranian reports citing around 60 residents (mixed Arab and ) in 1929, contrasted by counts of fewer than 30, mostly Arabs, underscoring contested presence amid sparse habitation. Iran lodged diplomatic protests asserting historical sovereignty over the Tunbs during the 1920s and 1930s, coinciding with burgeoning oil explorations in the , where concessions like those in (1930) and (1933) heightened regional stakes. Notable incidents included the 1928 seizure of a vessel by Persian customs near Greater Tunb, prompting British demands for compensation and reparations, and repeated Persian naval visits in July, August, and September 1934, which elicited formal British protests against perceived encroachments. These actions reflected Iran's strategy to challenge British-backed Arab claims through on-site assertions rather than outright , maintaining pressure without escalating to conflict. Negotiations between and from 1929 to 1939 sought resolution but yielded no agreement, with proposing recognition of its rights to the Tunbs in exchange for conceding to Qasemi interests, only for talks to falter by 1935 amid mutual distrust and broader treaty discussions under . The outbreak of suspended further dialogue, preserving the prewar arrangement. Post-1945, Britain's global influence eroded, exemplified by the 1956 , which exposed vulnerabilities in maintaining Gulf protectorates amid rising nationalism and U.S.-Soviet pressures. By the , as accelerated and Britain contemplated withdrawal from (formally announced in 1968), diplomatic efforts intensified to stabilize the region, including British urgings for Ras al-Khaimah's ruler to cede the Tunbs to in return for financial assistance, proposals consistently rejected by the sheikhdom. These overtures highlighted Britain's diminishing leverage, shifting dynamics toward potential Iranian reassertion while Trucial States leaders resisted concessions to preserve ahead of federation talks.

Sovereignty Claims

Iran maintains that sovereignty over the Greater and Lesser Tunb islands derives from longstanding administrative control dating to the imperial era, with the islands functioning as dependencies of mainland provinces such as Laristan during the nineteenth century and earlier periods of dominance in the Gulf. Historical Iranian narratives emphasize continuous oversight from regional centers like , including defense of Gulf territories against external pressures, positioning the islands within the political and economic sphere rather than as isolated outposts. This continuity, argues, predates colonial interferences and reflects effective control through taxation, governance, and strategic patrols, undocumented in rival claims prior to the nineteenth century. In the early twentieth century, amid colonial administration, protested encroachments and asserted rights based on prior possession. A key element involves 1933–1935 correspondence between Iranian officials and authorities, where extensive review of ownership history led to allowance of Iranian visits to Greater Tunb by the Governor of and establishment of posts, implicitly affirming 's historical title over abstract protections granted to local sheikhs. views these exchanges as validation of its claims, distinguishing them from temporary custodianship vacated without transfer to new entities. The 1971 reassertion of control is framed by Iran as a restoration of de facto authority in the post-colonial vacuum following Britain's Gulf withdrawal, aligning with prior recognitions and predating the UAE's formal unification on December 2, 1971. Legally, Iran rejects arbitration proposals, contending that UAE assertions hinge on unverifiable post-1860s British concessions to Trucial sheikhs—lacking independent pre-nineteenth-century evidence—while Iran's position rests on enduring administrative records and maps, such as 1888 British charts depicting the islands within Iranian domains. This stance prioritizes empirical continuity over third-party adjudication of disputed colonial-era arrangements. The asserts sovereignty over the Greater and Lesser Tunbs based on their administration by the Emirate of Ras al-Khaimah, a Trucial State under British protection, from the early until 1971. The Qawasim tribe, rulers of Ras al-Khaimah, maintained control through activities such as collecting taxes and enforcing authority, exemplified by Sheikh Humaid bin Abdullah Al Qasimi's 1884 destruction of date trees planted on Greater Tunb by a Lingeh notable, demonstrating asserted . This administration continued formally from June 7, 1921, to November 30, 1971, when Iranian forces seized the islands, an event the UAE describes as terminating its prior possession. Upon UAE in December 1971, Ras al-Khaimah's territorial claims, including the Tunbs, were incorporated into the federal inheritance. Legally, the UAE frames the 1971 takeover as an unlawful occupation violating principles of , invoking Charter Article 2(4) against force in settling disputes. It has repeatedly petitioned the UN General Assembly, where resolutions urge bilateral negotiations without adjudicating sovereignty, though UAE statements highlight lack of progress. The has endorsed UAE claims through declarations, such as the 2018 reaffirmation of sovereignty over the islands and calls for Iranian withdrawal, reflecting regional solidarity. These arguments emphasize de facto control under international recognition via British treaties, like the 1820 General Maritime Treaty, which placed Trucial sheikhs under protection without ceding sovereignty to Britain. UAE evidence centers on colonial-era records and tribal governance post-18th century, with British acknowledgments of Ras al-Khaimah's role but no comprehensive pre-19th-century documentation establishing uninterrupted exclusivity absent external influences. Lacking claims to ancient ties, the relies on effective occupation doctrine under modern , contending that prior UAE-linked administration suffices for title absent contrary adjudication.

Comparative Analysis of Evidence

Iranian assertions of sovereignty emphasize a protracted historical continuum, drawing on documentary evidence from the Sassanid period onward, including 10th-century Arabic geographers' accounts placing the Tunbs under administrative purview and Safavid-era farmans (royal decrees) from the appointing governors to the islands as integral to the Hormuz province. records in the further document intermittent tax collection and naval oversight, though often nominal amid tribal autonomy. This chain exhibits greater longitudinal depth, predating modern state formations, but is punctuated by lapses in direct governance, with local Qawasim sheikhs exercising practical authority under loose suzerainty as tributaries. UAE counter-claims hinge on a more circumscribed evidentiary base rooted in 19th- and 20th-century colonial interactions, where Qawasim rulers of Ras al-Khaimah were recognized as controllers of the Tunbs following maritime truces from 1820 and explicit notations from 1864 affirming their possession. Administrative continuity under protection from 1921 to 1971, including leasing arrangements for pearl fishing, underpins this position, yet it remains derivative of protectorate-era pacts rather than indigenous pre-colonial titles independent of overlordship. In assessing documentary continuity, Iran's archival precedence—spanning dynastic epochs with references to the islands as "Tonb-e Bozorg" and "Tonb-e Kuchek" in gazetteers—affords it an edge in establishing titular longevity, whereas UAE documentation, while precise in delineating post-1860 local , manifests as a truncated sequence tethered to extraterritorial without antecedent from claims. Effective , as a pragmatic criterion of possession, decisively favors post-1971, marked by uninterrupted military garrisoning, civilian resettlement on Greater Tunb (with documented populations exceeding 200 by the 1990s), and infrastructural investments like plants and airstrips, unaccompanied by UAE reclamation efforts beyond . Empirical indicators reinforce this asymmetry: Cartographic depictions, including 19th-century hydrographic surveys invoked by , position the Tunbs within Persian littoral boundaries; Iranian demographic enumerations and resource yields from fisheries and potential hydrocarbons evince sustained exploitation; conversely, UAE records yield no post-1971 metrics of on-island activity, underscoring diplomatic assertion sans territorial incumbency.

Key Events in the Dispute

Pre-1971 Developments

In January 1968, the United Kingdom announced its decision to end treaties of protection with the Trucial States and withdraw all military forces from the Persian Gulf by December 1971, thereby relinquishing oversight of territories including the Greater and Lesser Tunbs, which were administered by the emirates of Ras al-Khaimah (Greater Tunb) and Sharjah (Lesser Tunb). This announcement intensified Iranian diplomatic pressure to reclaim the islands, which Tehran viewed as integral to its historical domain in the Strait of Hormuz, based on pre-19th-century Persian administrative records and maps depicting them as dependencies of Fars province. British mediation efforts followed, with London backing the emirates' claims while privately urging the Ruler of Ras al-Khaimah to transfer sovereignty over the Tunbs to Iran in exchange for substantial financial compensation, a proposal repeatedly rejected by the emirate's leadership. Parallel trilateral discussions involving Iran, Sharjah, and Britain focused on Abu Musa, yielding preliminary agreements in 1970 for potential shared administration and resource revenues, but these explicitly excluded the Tunbs, as Iran demanded undivided control without concessions to the emirates. U.S. diplomatic assessments noted Iran's unyielding stance, attributing it to strategic imperatives near the Strait of Hormuz, where the islands' position enabled potential dominance over Gulf shipping lanes. Throughout the late 1960s and into 1970, declassified and U.S. intelligence reports documented 's naval expansions and contingency planning for island occupations, including troop mobilizations and surveys, signaling preparations to enforce claims independently upon British departure absent negotiated cessions. These developments heightened regional tensions, as the lacked independent military capacity to resist, relying on waning British guarantees that prioritized avoiding confrontation with the militarily superior .

1971 Iranian Reassertion

On November 30, 1971, Iranian naval and military forces occupied the Greater and Lesser Tunb islands in the , landing troops on both locations early that morning. This action took place on the final day of British colonial presence in the region, as the United Kingdom's protectorate treaties with the were set to expire, creating a strategic ahead of the ' independence. The timing aligned directly with Britain's announced withdrawal of forces from , completed by the end of November, which removed the external security umbrella previously provided to the islands under Ras al-Khaimah's administration. The occupation encountered negligible opposition, as the islands hosted only a small contingent of local police—approximately a personnel on Greater Tunb—lacking the capacity for sustained defense against Iran's organized . Iranian forces quickly secured control, expelling the police and any residents aligned with the prior administration, with reports indicating around 70 inhabitants on Greater Tunb at the time. In the immediate aftermath, Iran positioned troops and initiated basic setups to consolidate its foothold, capitalizing on the ' fragmented and underdeveloped military structure, which comprised rudimentary forces unable to across the Gulf. The rulers of Ras al-Khaimah and the emerging federation responded with diplomatic protests lodged shortly after the events, including appeals to the highlighting the forcible seizure just prior to UAE independence on December 2. No armed counteraction was attempted, reflecting the nascent states' prioritization of federation-building over immediate confrontation amid the British exit's uncertainties. In December 1971, following Iran's military seizure of the Greater and Lesser Tunbs on November 30, several Arab states, including and , raised the matter before the UN Security Council, alleging a violation of . The Council convened a formal meeting on December 8 (S/PV.1609) to address the "question concerning the islands of , the Greater Tunb and the Lesser Tunb," where Arab representatives demanded Iranian withdrawal, while defended the action as reassertion of longstanding sovereignty. A follow-up session on December 9 (S/PV.1610) reiterated calls for immediate troop withdrawal, but the Council issued no binding resolution or enforcement measures, effectively acknowledging the dispute without intervention due to geopolitical divisions and 's veto power as a permanent member. The , formed on December 2, 1971, attempted to escalate the issue legally in 1972 by seeking referral of the Tunbs dispute to the (ICJ), arguing for adjudication based on historical administration under British protection. rejected the referral outright, insisting the islands were inalienably Iranian and that ICJ jurisdiction required explicit mutual consent, which it refused to provide; this stance has persisted, blocking compulsory adjudication. 's position aligned with its broader policy against third-party on core territorial claims, rendering the UAE's effort unsuccessful. The Arab League swiftly condemned the occupation as aggression, with its members affirming UAE sovereignty over the islands from December 1971 onward and viewing the takeover as a threat to regional stability. League statements framed the action as incompatible with Arab territorial integrity, prompting repeated diplomatic protests but no coordinated military response, limited by intra-Arab divisions and Iran's regional influence. These responses highlighted broader Gulf wariness of Iranian expansionism amid the shah's modernization drive, though enforcement remained absent internationally.

Strategic Importance

Geopolitical Role

The Greater and Lesser Tunbs occupy a commanding position in the , situated roughly 12 kilometers southeast of Iran's and directly overlooking key shipping lanes leading into the . This strait functions as the world's premier oil chokepoint, with flows averaging 20 million barrels per day in , accounting for approximately 20% of global liquids consumption and over one-quarter of total seaborne traded . The islands' proximity—within 50 kilometers of the strait's narrowest point—affords vantage points for of maritime traffic, bolstering Iran's capacity to monitor approximately 21% of global seaborne passing through the . In the context of dynamics, Iranian control of the Tunbs underpins a deterrence posture against naval threats originating from Gulf Arab states or external powers, such as U.S. naval forces patrolling the area. The islands' geostrategic placement enables projection of influence over the , where disruptions could cascade through markets, thereby serving as a credible asymmetric to superior conventional naval capabilities of adversaries. This role has manifested in Iran's repeated threats to impede transit during escalations, leveraging the islands' oversight of chokepoints that historically facilitated blockades, as evidenced by wartime precedents like the .

Military and Economic Value

The Greater and Lesser Tunb islands host key Iranian military infrastructure, including advanced coastal defense missile systems deployed by the (IRGC) in March 2025, positioned to safeguard the against potential naval threats. These systems, comprising air defense and anti-ship missiles, enable real-time monitoring of maritime traffic and rapid response capabilities, bolstering Iran's layered defense architecture in the . Subterranean missile bases on Greater Tunb further enhance operational secrecy and survivability, allowing for concealed launches that project power over vital chokepoints. Economically, the islands offer limited direct value due to their arid terrain and small size—Greater Tunb spans about 6 square kilometers with a sparse supporting needs, while Lesser Tunb remains largely uninhabited—yielding negligible output beyond . Their principal economic significance derives from strategic control over adjacent waters in the hydrocarbon-rich , where proximity to potential fields could facilitate future , though no major developments have occurred specifically around the Tunbs amid the dispute. This positioning indirectly underpins regional by influencing access to shipping lanes that handle roughly 21 million barrels of daily, equivalent to one-fifth of global liquids consumption.

Current Administration and Developments

Iranian Control and Infrastructure

Since 1971, Iran has exercised de facto administrative control over the Greater and Lesser Tunbs, integrating them into Hormozgan Province with civil and military infrastructure developments primarily on Greater Tunb. Greater Tunb hosts a small civilian population estimated at under 200 residents, consisting mainly of military personnel and their families, who receive education in Persian through a primary school established by 1983. This facility supports basic governance functions, though detailed public records on expansions remain limited. Desalination efforts, aligned with Iran's broader Gulf island water projects, provide fresh water to sustain habitation, as natural sources are scarce. Military infrastructure dominates both islands, enhancing Iran's strategic posture near the . On Greater Tunb, Iran inaugurated a 2,150-meter in recent years, capable of accommodating small passenger aircraft such as the ERJ-145, alongside a naval station and fish storage facilities. Lesser Tunb, largely uninhabited except for military units, features a small airfield with an approximately 800-meter airstrip, a harbor for naval operations, and entrenched positions for missile systems unveiled by the in March 2025. These enhancements, including red-soil operations, underscore resource extraction and defensive capabilities without significant civilian growth.

Ongoing Diplomatic Tensions (1971–2025)

Following Iran's 1971 occupation of the Greater and Lesser Tunbs, the United Arab Emirates has lodged repeated formal protests at the United Nations, maintaining that the islands rightfully belong to the emirates of Ras Al Khaimah and Sharjah based on prior administrative control under British protection. These complaints have continued annually, framing the situation as an unlawful seizure without international arbitration. The Arab League has backed the UAE's claims, including in its May 2025 Baghdad summit communique, which reaffirmed support for Emirati sovereignty over the islands and prompted Iranian condemnation of the statement as interference in its territorial integrity. Iranian official visits to the islands have repeatedly triggered UAE diplomatic backlash. In July 2019, the UAE issued a strong to over a parliamentary delegation's tour of the Greater and Lesser Tunbs, deeming it a provocative assertion of control. Similar responses followed a 2013 visit by Iranian lawmakers, described by the UAE as a "flagrant violation of ," and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's 2012 trip, which led to the UAE recalling its ambassador from . These incidents underscore a pattern of unilateral actions by exacerbating bilateral frictions despite occasional economic dialogues. Efforts at Iran-UAE , including the 2022 restoration of full diplomatic ties after years of strain, have not yielded progress on the islands' , with the UAE insisting on no concessions in normalization talks. Bilateral discussions in in March 2025 focused on regional stability but sidelined the dispute, highlighting its role as a persistent barrier amid broader economic . Analysts note that while trade has expanded, the territorial impasse remains unresolved, complicating deeper political alignment. Escalations intensified in 2023–2025 through multilateral statements. The (GCC), in coordination with the , issued a joint call on October 6, 2025, urging to "end its occupation" of the Greater Tunb, Lesser Tunb, and . dismissed the demand as "baseless" and "interventionist," summoning EU envoys and reiterating its historical claims, including references to pre-20th-century documentation. This followed similar GCC-EU language in 2024 and UAE-aligned resolutions at the , reflecting growing international alignment with the UAE's position but no enforcement mechanisms. maintains de facto administration, rejecting arbitration while portrays Western-backed statements as biased geopolitical maneuvering.

References

  1. [1]
    [PDF] IRAN: THE PERSIAN GULF ISLANDS DISPUTE - CIA
    Lesser Tunb, 11 km west of Greater Tunb, is only I square km in area. All three islands consist of low rocky hills interspersed among flatter patches of land.
  2. [2]
    Unresolved Territorial Disputes: The Tunbs and Abu Musa in the Gulf
    Oct 4, 2013 · Abu Musa, Greater Tunbs and Lesser Tunbs are three small islands located along the mid-point of the Persian Gulf near the strategically ...
  3. [3]
    The Greater Tunb, The Lesser Tunb, and Abu Musa Island - Drishti IAS
    Jun 13, 2024 · ... Greater Tunb, and Lesser Tunb islands. These are small disputed islands between Iran and UAE, located at the entrance of the Strait of ...
  4. [4]
    [PDF] The Question of Iranian Occupation of the Islands, Greater Tunb ...
    This monograph reviews the historical documentation which demonstrates without a shadow of a doubt, that Greater Tunb, Lesser Tunb and Abu Musa originally ...
  5. [5]
    Flare Up in Iran-UAE Island Dispute - AGSI
    Iran and the United Arab Emirates both claim sovereignty over the Greater Tunb, Lesser Tunb, and Abu Musa islands. This conflict predates the Islamic Republic, ...Missing: evidence | Show results with:evidence
  6. [6]
    The Historical and Legal Foundations of Iran's Sovereignty over ...
    In fact, since the beginning of history up to the 19th century, the Persian Gulf coastal areas and the islands have been under Iran's sovereignty.
  7. [7]
    Legal and Historical Evidence for the Iranian Sovereignty over the ...
    There are several strong evidence supporting Iran's ownership and sovereignty over the Islands both historically and legally.
  8. [8]
    [PDF] Disputed Islands between UAE and Iran
    Abu Musa, Greater Tunb, and Lesser Tunb are islands in the Strait of Hormuz that, if used militarily, could “command the traffic in the Gulf and virtually ...
  9. [9]
    The Three Islands: Mapping the UAE-Iran Dispute - RUSI
    For over forty years, the dispute over the three islands of Abu Musa, Greater Tunb and Lesser Tunb has been a sore in relations between the United Arab Emirates ...Missing: sovereignty | Show results with:sovereignty
  10. [10]
    The Tunbs and Abu Musa Islands: Britain's Perspective - jstor
    The Tunbs lie 17 miles southwest of Iran's Qeshm Island and 46 miles northwest of the nearest point on the United Arab Emirates (UAE) coastline. Greater ...<|separator|>
  11. [11]
    Features, Tonb islands, Guive Mirfendereski - THE IRANIAN
    This brown circular isle, with a 4-kilometers diameter and a maximum height of 52 meters, was covered with grass in the late winter and early spring months, and ...
  12. [12]
    Strait of Hormuz - Geography - The Strauss Center
    Iran and the United Arab Emirates disagree as to the ownership of the strategically located Abu Musa, Greater Tunb, and Lesser Tunb islands. Nonetheless ...
  13. [13]
    Greater Tunb - World Islands
    Jan 6, 2024 · Greater Tunb is a Medium Island spanning 11 km² with a coastline of 15 km. Archipel: –. Tectonic Plate: Africa – One of the world's largest ...
  14. [14]
    Persian Gulf desert and semi-desert | Research Starters - EBSCO
    This ecosystem is sometimes classified as hyperarid. A hyperarid climate is the driest type of climate, with annual rainfall often less than 100 millimeters ( ...
  15. [15]
    About the Persian Gulf
    Climatology. The climate of the Persian Gulf is arid and subtropical. In summer, the temperature sometimes reaches 50 degrees Celsius and the rate of ...
  16. [16]
    Iran's Persian Gulf Islands Travel Guide 2024 - EavarTravel
    Feb 3, 2024 · Summers are marked by scorching temperatures, often exceeding 40 degrees Celsius (104 degrees Fahrenheit), while winters are relatively mild.
  17. [17]
    TONB ISLANDS - Encyclopaedia Iranica
    (GREATER and LESSER), two tiny islands of arguable strategic importance in ... The anecdotal information indicates at present (2003) a population count of less ...
  18. [18]
    Biodiversity of intertidal and shallow subtidal habitats in Abu Musa ...
    In total, 366 marine species, belonging to 13 phyla were collected among which Arthropoda and Mollusca, together with more than 66%, were the most diverse taxa.
  19. [19]
    10 Persian Gulf Facts You Must Know - Marine Insight
    Mar 2, 2023 · 9. More than 700 fish species, mostly native, are found in the Persian Gulf or Arabian Gulf. Approximately 700 types of fish are found here.
  20. [20]
    Hidden Depths: A Unique Biodiversity Oasis in the Persian Gulf in ...
    Jun 13, 2023 · Owing to extreme environmental conditions, the Gulf hosts a unique ecosystem characterized by mangroves, coral reefs, seagrass, and algal beds ...
  21. [21]
    Historical Roots of Iran's Ownership of Tunb Islands - Tehran Times
    May 5, 1999 · In a Persian-Arabic manuscript, the Lesser Tunb has been recorded as Tumb Namiu and the Greater Tunb as Tonb Namiveh, both of which declared ...
  22. [22]
    Right of Reply: Iran's Full Sovereignty over 3 Islands
    Oct 4, 2025 · Iran's representative has exercised his right of reply and once again reaffirmed the Islamic Republic's full sovereignty over the three ...
  23. [23]
    Occupied UAE Islands
    Iran illegally occupied Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tunbs on November 30, 1971. The UAE has protested and seeks resolution, but Iran refuses to discuss ...
  24. [24]
    [PDF] S/2019/412 Security Council - the United Nations
    May 17, 2019 · Musa, the Lesser Tunb and the Greater Tunb has been supported. In this regard, I would like to bring the following to your attention. The ...
  25. [25]
    [PDF] S/2020/1271 - Security Council - the United Nations
    Dec 21, 2020 · Iranian islands of Abu Musa, the Lesser Tunb and the Greater Tunb. Supporting such a baseless claim runs counter to the peremptory norms of.Missing: reference | Show results with:reference
  26. [26]
    Ambassador's Letter to UNSC Regarding Claims over Iranian Islands
    The Islamic Republic of Iran reaffirms its sovereignty over the Iranian islands of Abu Musa, Greater Tunb, and Lesser Tunb in the Persian Gulf.Missing: reference | Show results with:reference
  27. [27]
    Bu Musa and the Tunbs Islands in Persian Gulf - Maritime Education
    Rating 4.0 (1) Sep 2, 2025 · Beyond historical chronicles, the case for Iranian sovereignty is firmly grounded in legal principles and the undeniable facts of geography.<|separator|>
  28. [28]
    (PDF) The Fight for Abu Musa and The Tunbs - ResearchGate
    Jul 5, 2015 · 18). Specifically, Iran claims that the historical chronology is like this: ”In 1884, it was part of the Persian Gulf ports.<|separator|>
  29. [29]
    Perpetual Maritime Truce - Wikipedia
    The Perpetual Maritime Truce of 1853 was a treaty signed between the British and the Rulers of the Sheikhdoms of the Lower GulfMissing: Tunb | Show results with:Tunb
  30. [30]
    Iran cites 19th century British maps in row over ownership of islands
    Nov 12, 2024 · Iran seized the Tunbs by force on Britain's departure, claiming they had been part of the Persian empire since the 6th century BC. Lesser Tunb ...Missing: Sassanid | Show results with:Sassanid
  31. [31]
    Anglo-Iranian Treaty Negotiations: Reza Shah, Teymurtash and the ...
    Jan 1, 2022 · From 1927 to 1932, wide-reaching negotiations took place between Reza Shah's court minister, 'Abdolhossein Khan Teymurtash, and the British ...
  32. [32]
    Iran's Dispute With the UAE Over Three Gulf Islands
    Nov 30, 2009 · From 1929 to 1939, Iran and Britain engaged in unsuccessful negotiations over Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tunbs. With the outbreak of ...
  33. [33]
    British Policy in the Persian Gulf between the World Wars (Chapter 2)
    Jul 24, 2020 · The challenge of Iranian nationalism to the British position in the Persian Gulf prompted the British government to conduct a thorough review of ...
  34. [34]
    Historical Documents - Office of the Historian
    On the morning of November 30 Iranian forces landed on the disputed Persian Gulf islands of Abu Musa, Greater Tunb and Lesser Tunb.Missing: records Islamic
  35. [35]
    [PDF] THE THREE ISLANDS - RUSI
    In these cases, states would normally produce historical claims in old documents, ancients maps, references from other states to the islands, geological ...
  36. [36]
    Sovereignty, history, and geopolitics at the heart of the Persian Gulf
    Oct 11, 2025 · Greater Tunb, Lesser Tunb, and Abu Musa were integral to the Persian political sphere, administered and defended both from the mainland and ...
  37. [37]
    Iran Reaffirms Sovereignty over Three Islands, Rejects UAE ...
    Oct 4, 2025 · TEHRAN (Tasnim) – Iran's UN envoy reiterated Tehran's full sovereignty over the Iranian islands of Abu Musa, Greater Tunb, and Lesser Tunb ...Missing: arbitration | Show results with:arbitration
  38. [38]
    United Arab Emirates - General Debate
    Greater Tunb, Lesser Tunb, and Abu Musa — she noted the issue ...
  39. [39]
    Arab League reaffirms UAE's sovereignty over occupied islands
    CAIRO, 7th March, 2018 (WAM) -- The Arab League has reaffirmed UAE's sovereignty over its three islands of Greater and Lesser Tunbs and Abu Musa, and ...Missing: position | Show results with:position
  40. [40]
    122 - Historical Documents - Office of the Historian
    Iran's threat to oppose a union of the Trucial States unless the Shah's claim to ownership of three gulf islands—Abu Musa and the two Tunbs—was recognized also ...Missing: chronicles references
  41. [41]
    143 - Historical Documents - Office of the Historian
    The British and Iranians have agreed in principle on an arrangement for resolving the dispute over the Gulf islands of Tunbs and Abu Musa in a manner meeting ...
  42. [42]
    [PDF] Deterring Iran, 1968–71—The Royal Navy, Iran, and the Disputed ...
    Nov 25, 1971 · The ownership of Abu Musa, Greater. Tunb, and Lesser Tunb—three islands astride the western approaches to the. Strait of Hormuz—was as ...Missing: km | Show results with:km
  43. [43]
    101 - Historical Documents - Office of the Historian
    British View: [less than 3 lines not declassified] The British recognize Iran as the unchallenged military power in the area. Iran is rapidly expanding naval ...Missing: Greater Lesser negotiations
  44. [44]
    The Persian Gulf's 'Occupied Territory': The Three-Island Dispute
    Sep 8, 2008 · The disagreement over the island and the neighboring Greater and Lesser Tunbs has been mired in legal uncertainty and historical claims and counterclaims.
  45. [45]
    Middle East | Security Council - UN.org.
    In 1971, several Arab States brought to the Security Council's attention the alleged occupation of the islands of Abu Musa, the Greater Tunb and the Lesser Tunb ...
  46. [46]
    1971 (S/RES/292-307) - UN Security Council Meetings & Outcomes ...
    Question concerning the islands of Abu Musa, the Greater Tunb and the Lesser Tunb, --. S/PV.1609. 08 December. Admision of new Members, S/RES/304 (1971) 15-0-0.Missing: debates | Show results with:debates
  47. [47]
    [PDF] 9 DECEMBER 1971 NEW YORK CONTENTS Provisional agenda (S ...
    Dec 3, 2024 · We demand that the Security Council call on Iran to withdraw its troops from the Arab islands immediately. What we ask is that the Iranian ...Missing: 1971-1972 | Show results with:1971-1972
  48. [48]
    [PDF] tion violate the principle of the territorial integrity of Member States
    He held that in so far as the islands of the two Tunbs were an integral part of the ... and Decisions of the Security Council 1971, p. 11.Missing: debates 1971-1972
  49. [49]
    Amid regional conflict, the Strait of Hormuz remains critical oil ... - EIA
    Jun 16, 2025 · In 2024, oil flow through the strait averaged 20 million barrels per day (b/d), or the equivalent of about 20% of global petroleum liquids ...
  50. [50]
    World Oil Transit Chokepoints - EIA
    Flows through the Strait of Hormuz in 2023 made up more than one-quarter of total global seaborne traded oil. In addition, around one-fifth of global liquefied ...
  51. [51]
    The Strait of Hormuz: What It Is, Where It Is, and Why It Matters
    Jun 23, 2025 · Iran also controls several strategic islands overlooking the shipping lanes, including Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tunbs, which serve as ...
  52. [52]
    Geopolitical and Geostrategic Importance of the Iranian Islands in ...
    In addition, some of its islands particularly, three islands of Greater Tunb, Lesser Tunb and Abu Musa have essential military role in Iran's security. Full ...
  53. [53]
    Naval Power and Deterrence: Iran's Role in Regional and Global ...
    May 28, 2025 · From asymmetric warfare to regional diplomacy: Understanding Iran's naval build-up, deterrence doctrine, and the risks of US Confrontation.
  54. [54]
    The Iranian Threat to the Strait of Hormuz
    Sep 3, 2025 · The notion of closing the Strait of Hormuz, thereby obstructing the flow of goods and oil from the Arabian Gulf to the wider world, is not new.
  55. [55]
    Iran's Guards install missile systems on contested Arabian Gulf islands
    Mar 24, 2025 · The weapons were deployed on Greater Tunb, Lesser Tunb and Abu Musa near the Strait of Hormuz, a globally-vital shipping lane.Missing: radar | Show results with:radar
  56. [56]
    Iran strengthens its military in the Persian Gulf - FDD
    Mar 25, 2025 · The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has reinforced its military presence in the Persian Gulf, deploying advanced missile systems on the islands.
  57. [57]
    Breaking News: Iran Deploys Air Defense Systems on Disputed Gulf ...
    Mar 22, 2025 · ... Iranian naval and missile forces are on high alert and constantly monitoring enemy movements. Tangsiri reaffirmed that Greater Tunb, Lesser Tunb ...Missing: bases | Show results with:bases<|separator|>
  58. [58]
    EXCLUSIVE REPORT - Iran's Strategic Fortification of Greater Tunb ...
    Mar 24, 2025 · Central to Iran's recent military showcase is the revelation of three subterranean missile bases, described by IRGC commanders as “missile ...
  59. [59]
    Strategic Islands in the Gulf - Greater Tunb, Lesser Tunb
    Where are the Greater Tunb, Lesser Tunb, and Abu Musa islands located? These three strategic islands are located in the Persian Gulf, near the Strait of Hormuz.
  60. [60]
    The Petroleum Gulf - GeoExpro
    Dec 1, 2016 · It dawned on the oilmen that there was a good possibility of finding oil offshore in the region: the Arabian side of the Gulf has similarities ...Missing: Persian | Show results with:Persian
  61. [61]
    Iran launches new runway on Greater Tunb island - The Cradle
    The runway is 2,150 meters long, and capable of handling small passenger planes, such as the ERJ-145. The islands of Greater Tunb, Lesser Tunb, and Abu Musa, ...Missing: military | Show results with:military
  62. [62]
    Iran announces housing and tourism projects for contested Gulf ...
    Nov 6, 2024 · Some 13km west of that is Lesser Tunb, which is just 2km2; it has a small port, and a short airstrip around 800 metres long. The three islands ...<|separator|>
  63. [63]
    Iran unveils missile systems on Gulf islands | The Express Tribune
    Mar 24, 2025 · Iran's Revolutionary Guards have unveiled new missile systems on three strategic islands in the Gulf, saying they can target nearby "enemy ...
  64. [64]
    Iran criticises Arab League support for UAE claim on Persian Gulf ...
    May 19, 2025 · Iran's foreign ministry has criticized the Arab League's support for the United Arab Emirates' claim to three Iranian islands in the Persian Gulf.
  65. [65]
    Iran slams Arab League's support for UAE sovereignty over disputed ...
    May 19, 2025 · The Arab League reaffirmed its support for the UAE's sovereignty over the three islands in the final communique of the Baghdad-hosted 34th Arab ...
  66. [66]
    UAE condemns Iran over lawmakers' tour of islands - Gulf News
    Jul 23, 2019 · The UAE yesterday delivered a strongly-worded protest to Iran over a visit by an Iranian parliamentary delegation to the three UAE islands ...
  67. [67]
    UAE protests Iran visit to disputed Persian Gulf islands
    May 6, 2013 · Gulf state calls trip by Iranian lawmakers to islands near Strait of Hormuz a 'flagrant violation of sovereignty'
  68. [68]
    Ahmadinejad's visit to island prompts UAE to recall Iran ambassador
    Apr 12, 2012 · The UAE recalled its ambassador to Iran on Thursday in protest of a visit by Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to a disputed island.
  69. [69]
    Is Russia really siding with the UAE against Iran? - Atlantic Council
    Jul 18, 2023 · After years of tensions, ties between the UAE and Iran improved in August 2022 when the two countries agreed to resume full diplomatic relations ...
  70. [70]
    Iran calls for Islamic unity against Israel in UAE diplomatic talks
    Mar 1, 2025 · Iran and the UAE held political talks in Abu Dhabi, discussing bilateral ties, regional stability, and unified opposition to Israel's ...Missing: normalization | Show results with:normalization<|control11|><|separator|>
  71. [71]
    Challenges Ahead For UAE-Iran Rapprochement - Stimson Center
    Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tunbs. In late November 1971, Iran – at the time ...
  72. [72]
    Joint Statement of the 29th Joint Council and Ministerial ...
    Oct 6, 2025 · 51. The Joint Council called on Iran to end its occupation of the three islands of the United Arab Emirates, Greater Tunb, Lesser Tunb, and Abu ...Missing: 2023-2025 | Show results with:2023-2025
  73. [73]
    Iran rejects Gulf, EU demand to end 'occupation' of Gulf islands
    Oct 7, 2025 · Iran and the UAE have each laid claim to the mostly uninhabited islands near the Strait of Hormuz, a dispute that has persisted for more than ...Missing: arbitration | Show results with:arbitration
  74. [74]
    Iran summons European envoys over EU-GCC statement on islands ...
    Oct 8, 2025 · The move is a response to an EU-GCC meeting whose final statement backed the UAE's claim to Abu Musa, Greater Tunb and Lesser Tunb -- urging ...Missing: occupation 2023-2025
  75. [75]
    [PDF] 1st European Union-Gulf Cooperation Council Summit Joint ...
    Oct 16, 2024 · In this respect, we call on Iran to end its occupation of the three islands of the United. Arab Emirates, Greater Tunb, Lesser Tunb, and Abu ...
  76. [76]
    Anger continues to grow over EU's backing of UAE claims to Persian ...
    Oct 8, 2025 · The Persian Gulf islands of Abu Musa, and the Greater and Lesser Tunbs have historically been part of Iran, proof of which can be found and ...