Like-Minded Developing Countries
The Like-Minded Developing Countries (LMDC) is a coalition of developing nations that operates as a negotiating bloc in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), prioritizing the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDR-RC) to differentiate obligations based on historical emissions and economic development levels.[1][2] Emerging formally around 2007 amid intensifying UNFCCC talks, the LMDC coordinates stances among members to demand that developed countries shoulder primary responsibility for mitigation, provide substantial climate finance, and facilitate technology transfers, thereby safeguarding the developmental priorities of nations with limited contributions to cumulative global warming.[1][3] The group encompasses over 20 countries, including major economies such as China, India, and Indonesia, alongside oil-exporting states like Saudi Arabia and Egypt, collectively accounting for more than half of the global population and a majority of the world's poor.[4][5] In negotiations, LMDC interventions have reinforced UNFCCC commitments to equity, influencing outcomes like the Paris Agreement by opposing dilutions of CBDR that could impose premature constraints on industrial growth in low-emission-per-capita economies.[6][7] Critics, often from developed-country perspectives, have labeled the bloc obstructive to universal emission caps, yet empirical assessments of per-country emissions underscore the causal rationale for differentiated approaches, as developing LMDC members emit far less historically than industrialized nations.[8][9][10]Formation and History
Origins and Early Alignments
The origins of alignments among what would become the Like-Minded Developing Countries (LMDC) trace to the UNFCCC negotiations in the mid-2000s, where developing nations began coordinating positions to uphold the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR) and to emphasize the historical emissions of industrialized countries as the primary cause of climate change.[1] These efforts stemmed from the Group of 77 (G77) plus China framework, but ad hoc subgroups formed to counter proposals that aimed to impose mitigation obligations on non-Annex I parties, particularly following the Marrakesh Accords in 2001 and subsequent talks on post-Kyoto commitments.[1] By 2007, around the time of COP13 in Bali, these like-minded developing countries solidified their stance in response to the Bali Action Plan, which sought long-term cooperative action while maintaining differentiation between developed and developing nations.[1] Early alignments featured cooperation between emerging economies like China and India—rapidly industrializing with significant coal dependencies—and resource-exporting states such as Saudi Arabia, Venezuela, and Iran, whose economies relied on fossil fuel revenues and who viewed stringent global mitigation regimes as threats to sovereignty and development rights.[11] This grouping rejected unilateral measures by developed nations and advocated for technology transfer and finance as prerequisites for any developing country actions.[1] The coalition's cohesion strengthened during the failed Copenhagen talks at COP15 in 2009 and the Durban Platform at COP17 in 2011, where LMDC precursors resisted efforts to establish a new agreement without firm commitments from Annex I countries on emission reductions and support mechanisms.[1] Informal meetings in Bonn and Bangkok in 2012, involving around 20 countries, marked the transition from loose alignments to a more structured bloc, setting the stage for the group's first formal gathering in Beijing on October 18–19, 2012, hosted by China.[4][3] These early dynamics reflected pragmatic self-interest: developing countries with growing emissions sought to avoid caps that would constrain industrialization, while leveraging the UNFCCC's equity-based structure to demand reparative finance from historical polluters.[11]Formal Emergence in Climate Negotiations
The Like-Minded Developing Countries (LMDC) coalesced as a formal negotiating bloc within the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 2012, amid growing tensions over the post-Kyoto architecture following the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action agreed at COP17 in Durban, South Africa, on December 11, 2011. This platform committed parties to negotiate a new legal instrument applicable to all by 2015, prompting concerns among certain developing nations that it could erode the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR) by imposing undifferentiated obligations.[3] The group's inaugural meeting occurred in Beijing, China, on October 18–19, 2012, hosted by the Chinese government and attended by representatives from Bolivia, China, Ecuador, Egypt, India, Malaysia, Nicaragua, Pakistan, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Thailand, and Venezuela. This gathering, convened ahead of COP18 in Doha, Qatar, focused on exchanging views and aligning strategies to safeguard developing countries' interests, particularly emphasizing that any new framework must uphold historical responsibility, equity, and adequate financial and technological support from developed nations.[3][4] At COP18, held from November 26 to December 8, 2012, the LMDC began issuing coordinated statements, advocating for the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol and rejecting attempts to shift mitigation burdens onto developing countries without commensurate action from Annex I parties. The bloc's positions underscored opposition to non-market mechanisms that could bypass UNFCCC processes and insisted on ring-fencing adaptation and loss and damage as distinct from mitigation efforts. Subsequent intersessional meetings, such as those in Bonn in 2013, saw the LMDC articulate specific demands for the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP), including that the new agreement preserve the firewall between developed and developing countries' obligations and prioritize finance scaling to $100 billion annually by 2020 from public sources. By mid-2013, the group had formalized its role as a counterweight to more flexible developing country coalitions, consistently prioritizing CBDR-RCB (responsibility and capability) in submissions to the UNFCCC secretariat.[12]Expansion Beyond Climate Issues
The Like-Minded Developing Countries (LMDC) bloc, while originating and predominantly operating within the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), has extended its coordinated advocacy to critique unilateral economic measures by developed nations that intersect with climate policy, particularly those perceived as protectionist trade barriers. In July 2025, during the Bonn intersessional climate talks, LMDC representatives, speaking for Bolivia, insisted on agenda items addressing such measures, including carbon border adjustment mechanisms (CBAMs) like the European Union's, arguing they impose disproportionate burdens on developing economies by raising export costs and violating equity principles under the UNFCCC.[13][14] These positions frame trade distortions as extensions of historical responsibilities, with LMDC emphasizing that such unilateral actions exacerbate global inequalities rather than fostering cooperative mitigation efforts.[15] This spillover into trade-related discourse reflects broader geopolitical tensions, as LMDC statements have repeatedly opposed "green protectionism" and called for strengthened multilateralism over competitive trade wars, as articulated by group ministers ahead of COP27 in 2022.[16] For instance, in November 2024 at COP29 preparations, LMDC highlighted unilateral measures as threats to global equity, urging their incompatibility with UNFCCC commitments and demanding compensatory mechanisms for affected developing states.[15] Such advocacy, though rooted in climate forums, influences parallel discussions in bodies like the World Trade Organization (WTO), where member states like China and India—core LMDC participants—have raised similar concerns about environmental trade rules disadvantaging exporters from the Global South.[17] Beyond direct trade critiques, LMDC coordination has appeared informally in United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) and Human Rights Council (HRC) contexts on developmental rights, with member states aligning against Western-led agendas that prioritize conditional aid over sovereignty. In March 2022 HRC sessions, a coalition largely comprising LMDC countries resisted resolutions seen as diluting state autonomy in human rights frameworks, signaling shared resistance to perceived neocolonial impositions.[18] However, these alignments occur more through ad hoc member-state cooperation than formalized LMDC expansion, as the group's charter and meetings remain UNFCCC-centric, with no dedicated structures for non-climate issues established as of 2025.[1] This limited extension underscores causal linkages between climate finance demands and economic sovereignty, driven by empirical disparities in per capita emissions and historical emissions data, rather than a pivot to unrelated domains like security or migration.[19]Core Objectives and Principles
Common but Differentiated Responsibilities
The principle of common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR), enshrined in Article 3.1 of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) adopted in 1992, posits that all countries share obligations for addressing climate change but that responsibilities vary based on historical emissions, economic capabilities, and developmental needs, with developed nations bearing the primary burden. Like-Minded Developing Countries (LMDC) consistently interpret CBDR as requiring developed parties to undertake ambitious mitigation and provide financial, technological, and capacity-building support to developing nations, while rejecting efforts to impose comparable economy-wide emission reduction targets on all parties.[20] This stance aligns with LMDC's broader advocacy for equity in global climate governance, emphasizing that historical cumulative emissions from industrialized countries—estimated at over 70% of total anthropogenic CO2 from 1850 to 2011—justify differentiated commitments.[20] In UNFCCC negotiations, LMDC has actively defended CBDR against attempts to dilute it, such as proposals for uniform mitigation obligations across all nations. At COP20 in Lima in December 2014, LMDC interventions ensured the inclusion of explicit language reaffirming CBDR in the decision text on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action, countering pushes for symmetry in responsibilities.[21] Similarly, during the 2015 Paris Agreement negotiations, LMDC coordinated positions to preserve CBDR and respective capabilities (CBDR-RC) in the treaty's core provisions, arguing that any erosion would undermine the UNFCCC's foundational equity principles and allow developed countries to evade leadership roles.[22] LMDC submissions, such as their 2013 statement on the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform, framed CBDR as a "concrete treaty application of the scientific and environmental fact" of disparate historical contributions, insisting that developing countries' actions remain contingent on support from Annex I parties.[20] LMDC continues to invoke CBDR in recent forums to operationalize differentiation, particularly in demands for enhanced ambition from developed nations. In a November 2024 intervention at the UNFCCC Subsidiary Body for Implementation, India speaking for LMDC reiterated that mitigation commitments must respect CBDR and respective capacities, urging developed countries to achieve net-zero emissions by 2050 while scaling up finance beyond the $100 billion annual target.[23] Their 2021 submission on Article 6.8 mechanisms emphasized applying CBDR to ensure non-market approaches prioritize equity, avoiding outcomes that burden developing parties disproportionately.[24] This position has drawn criticism from some analysts for potentially overlooking current emission profiles of major LMDC members—such as China, responsible for 30% of global CO2 emissions in 2023—but LMDC maintains that CBDR remains rooted in UNFCCC text and historical accountability rather than shifting baselines.[25]Advocacy for Financial Reparations and Reforms
The Like-Minded Developing Countries (LMDC) advocate for developed nations to provide substantial financial resources to address the disproportionate climate impacts borne by developing economies, emphasizing the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDR-RC) enshrined in the UNFCCC and Paris Agreement. This includes demands for scaled-up public finance to support mitigation, adaptation, and loss and damage, with LMDC submissions stressing that such funds must be new, additional, grant-based, and predictable to avoid diverting resources from development priorities.[26] In joint statements, LMDC has criticized developed countries for failing to meet the $100 billion annual climate finance pledge from 2009 until its retrospective fulfillment in 2022, arguing this shortfall erodes negotiation trust and exacerbates vulnerabilities in member states.[27] [28] Central to LMDC's position is the establishment and capitalization of dedicated mechanisms for loss and damage, viewed as compensation for irreversible climate harms attributable to historical emissions by industrialized nations. LMDC supported the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage in 2013 and pushed for its evolution into a dedicated fund, agreed at COP27 in November 2022 and operationalized at COP28 in December 2023, with an initial focus on particularly vulnerable developing countries. The group demands trillions in annual funding for this fund, far exceeding the $700 million in pledges secured by mid-2024, and opposes reliance on loans or insurance schemes that could burden debtors further, insisting instead on non-debt-creating support from developed parties.[29] While LMDC avoids the term "reparations" in official UNFCCC texts to sidestep legal liability debates, their advocacy aligns with calls from broader developing coalitions for accountability for emissions since the Industrial Revolution, estimating needs at $400-580 billion annually by 2030 for loss and damage alone based on empirical impact models.[30] Beyond immediate climate finance, LMDC seeks reforms to international financial institutions to enhance developing countries' access to concessional resources and representation. They have urged integration of climate risks into IMF surveillance and lending, including through special drawing rights (SDRs) reallocations—$650 billion issued globally in 2021, with LMDC pushing for targeted channeling to climate-vulnerable members via voluntary mechanisms.[31] In submissions, LMDC calls for overhauling multilateral development banks (MDBs) like the World Bank to unlock $1 trillion in annual climate lending through capital increases and risk-sharing, criticizing current governance for underrepresenting emerging economies despite their growing emissions shares.[32] For the new collective quantified goal (NCQG) on climate finance under Paris Article 9, LMDC proposes at least $1.3 trillion per year by 2030, primarily from developed countries' public budgets, with reforms to eligibility criteria to prioritize non-Annex I parties facing high adaptation costs estimated at 2-10% of GDP in low-income members.[33] [34] These positions reflect LMDC's broader critique of inequitable global architecture, though implementation remains stalled amid disagreements on funding sources and baselines.[35]Opposition to Unilateral Measures by Developed Nations
The Like-Minded Developing Countries (LMDC) group has articulated strong opposition to unilateral measures imposed by developed nations in the name of climate action, contending that such actions, including carbon border adjustment mechanisms (CBAMs), constitute discriminatory trade barriers that exacerbate economic disparities and contravene principles of common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR) enshrined in the UNFCCC. These measures, such as the European Union's CBAM implemented provisionally from October 2023 and fully from 2026, require importers to purchase certificates for embedded carbon emissions in goods like cement, steel, and aluminum, which LMDC members argue disproportionately burdens their export-dependent economies without equivalent support for mitigation efforts in developing states.[36][37] At the COP29 conference in Baku, Azerbaijan, in November 2024, Bolivia, speaking for the LMDC, alongside over 130 developing nations, condemned these unilateral trade measures as "unfair" and harmful to global cooperation, emphasizing their potential to fragment international climate efforts by prioritizing protectionism over multilateral commitments on finance and technology transfer.[37][38] LMDC representatives highlighted that developed countries' failure to meet the $100 billion annual climate finance pledge—reached cumulatively only in 2022, two years late—renders such measures punitive rather than cooperative, as they impose additional costs estimated to reach €5 billion annually for affected developing exporters by 2030 without offsetting aid.[17] This stance persisted into the June 2025 Bonn climate talks, where LMDC, supported by the G77 and China, proposed dedicated agenda items to scrutinize unilateral measures and their compatibility with UNFCCC Article 3.5, which urges parties to abstain from actions causing damage to other states' economies during climate responses. Developed nations, including the EU and US, resisted these inclusions, leading to procedural delays and underscoring LMDC's view that such opposition shields unilateralism from accountability.[17][39] In a joint submission, LMDC invoked WTO rules against discrimination, arguing that measures like CBAM fail to account for varying national circumstances and risk retaliatory tariffs, potentially reducing global emissions reductions through heightened trade tensions rather than incentivizing joint action.[40][15] LMDC's critiques extend to broader implications, positing that unilateralism erodes trust in forums like the UNFCCC by allowing developed economies—responsible for 79% of historical CO2 emissions—to externalize costs onto nations contributing just 21% despite facing disproportionate climate impacts, such as a 20-30% higher vulnerability in GDP losses from extreme weather.[41] This position aligns with LMDC's advocacy for reformed global trade rules that prioritize equitable burden-sharing, as evidenced by their blocking of progress on unrelated agenda items until unilateral measures are addressed multilaterally.[42]Membership and Composition
List of Current Members
The Like-Minded Developing Countries (LMDC) constitutes an informal coalition without a codified roster of members, allowing for fluid participation across UNFCCC sessions.[1] As of sessions in 2023–2024, the group encompasses roughly 24 nations from Asia, Africa, and Latin America, focused on unified stances in climate diplomacy.[1] Membership alignment is evidenced by joint submissions, coordinated statements, and representational speeches, such as Bolivia's address on behalf of the LMDC at COP29 in 2024.[43] Countries routinely participating in or endorsing LMDC positions, drawn from documented group activities and analyses, include:- Algeria
- Bangladesh
- Bolivia
- China
- Cuba
- Ecuador
- Egypt
- India
- Indonesia
- Iran
- Iraq
- Kuwait
- Malaysia
- Mali
- Nicaragua
- Pakistan
- Saudi Arabia
- Sri Lanka
- Sudan
- Syria
- Venezuela[44][45]