Fact-checked by Grok 2 weeks ago

Malpasset Dam

The Malpasset Dam was a thin-arch structure built on the Reyran River near in , designed to store approximately 50 million cubic meters of water for agricultural , domestic supply, and development. Completed in 1954 after construction began in 1952, the 66-meter-high dam featured a double-curvature arch design with a crest length of 224 meters and a maximum thickness of 6.8 meters. On December 2, 1959, during its first full reservoir filling amid torrential rains, the dam catastrophically failed at 9:13 p.m., releasing a massive that devastated downstream areas and resulted in 423 deaths. The project's origins traced back to earlier proposals from the , but the final design was selected in 1949 and relocated 200 meters downstream without comprehensive geological reassessment, despite known faults in the foundation. Construction proceeded rapidly under the direction of the engineering team, incorporating a notched and a on the left , but filling of the was delayed until 1959 due to concerns over stability. In late November 1959, exceptional rainfall—exceeding 300 millimeters in the Reyran watershed—caused the river to swell, rapidly raising the level by 4.5 meters on the day of and overwhelming the . The breach was primarily attributed to uplift pressures from water infiltrating beneath the dam base through undetected faults and joints in the heterogeneous rock, which reduced effective foundation stability and led to cracking at the dam-rock . Inadequate geotechnical investigations during design, including limited borehole recovery that missed critical foliations and a , compounded the issue, as the rock's low deformability modulus (around 1,500 ) amplified from the rising water. No diversion tunnel was built to manage floodwaters during , and the absence of uplift measures reflected an overreliance on the arch design's assumed resistance to such forces. The ensuing floodwave, carrying 50 million cubic meters of water at speeds up to 40 meters per second, submerged the town of under up to 5 meters of water and a 50-centimeter layer of , rendering roads and bridges impassable and hindering operations. The left 7,000 people homeless, destroyed including roads, railways, electricity, and water networks, and inundated 1,350 hectares of farmland along with 80,000 hectoliters of wine production. Material damages exceeded 100 million French francs (equivalent to approximately 100 million euros in 2006 values), with no dam ever rebuilt at the site. In the aftermath, official inquiries cleared the dam's builders of direct liability but highlighted systemic failures in geological assessment and regulatory oversight, prompting the establishment of France's Permanent Technical Committee on Dams in 1966 to enforce stricter safety standards worldwide. The event remains a pivotal in , underscoring the risks of thin-arch dams on faulted foundations and the need for thorough hydrological and geotechnical evaluations in flood-prone regions.

Background and Construction

Site Selection and Planning

The Malpasset Dam was constructed on the Reyran River in a narrow gorge approximately 10 km upstream from Fréjus, in the Var department of the French Riviera, selected for its geological features that allowed for an economical arch dam design and its strategic position to meet regional water demands. Proposals for a dam on the Reyran date back to the 1860s, but modern planning intensified post-World War II around 1941. The final site, selected in 1949, was relocated 200 meters downstream from initial plans without comprehensive geological reassessment. The site's proximity to the coastal plain facilitated the distribution of stored water to address chronic shortages exacerbated by the region's Mediterranean climate, where seasonal rivers like the Reyran provided insufficient reliable supply. Planning for the dam originated from early discussions around 1941, driven by post-World War II needs to supply , expand for , and bolster infrastructure amid rapid development on the Côte d'Azur. The project aimed to create a holding 50 million cubic meters to serve the local area around , with a population of about 13,000 that swelled significantly due to summer on the Côte d'Azur, requiring water for potable use and agricultural to support export markets and economic recovery. Owned by the département, the initiative reflected broader efforts to modernize water management in southern France, with engineer André Coyne later tasked with the design. Formal authorization came in 1951 after initial proposals gained traction in the late 1940s, but pre-construction faced significant hurdles from postwar economic constraints. Funding shortages delayed progress, with the budget for preliminary studies slashed from 27 million to 8 million francs, limiting site reconnaissance, while labor strikes further postponed the start of work until 1952. These challenges underscored the tensions between ambitious goals and the realities of rebuilding after the war.

Design and Engineering

The Malpasset Dam was designed as a thin, double-curvature by the renowned Coyne of the firm Coyne et Bellier, who specialized in such structures to optimize material use in narrow valleys. This type of dam relied on the natural abutments of the gorge to transfer water pressure horizontally through the arch, minimizing the concrete required compared to gravity dams initially considered for the site. The design incorporated a crest length of 222 meters, including a 20-meter , with a maximum thickness of 6.8 meters at the base tapering to 1.5 meters at the crest. Key specifications included a structural height of 65 meters above the foundation rock and 60 meters above the riverbed, utilizing approximately 48,000 cubic meters of made with crushed rhyolite from a nearby for enhanced strength and workability. The foundation rested on rock, which was presumed impermeable and stable based on preliminary assessments, allowing the dam to seal effectively against seepage. The was engineered to hold 50 million cubic meters at full capacity, supporting , , and for the region. Engineering features encompassed an un-gated, notched spillway at the crest center with a 30-meter width and an associated stilling basin to manage overflow, alongside outlet works featuring a bottom valve capable of discharging up to 50 cubic meters per second for routine releases. The project, reflecting post-World War II economic priorities, was budgeted at 580 million French francs in 1955 prices, funded by the Var Department to balance cost efficiency with structural integrity.

Construction Process

Construction of the Malpasset Dam commenced on April 1, 1952, under the direction of the French engineering firm Coyne et Bellier, with the project owned by the Var Department. The dam, designed as a thin double-curvature concrete arch by André Coyne, reached substantial completion in October 1954, with initial partial reservoir filling beginning on April 20, 1954. The building process involved excavating the foundation to the underlying gneiss bedrock, followed by grouting operations performed by the firm Bachy to seal joints and ensure stability. for the structure was sourced from crushed aggregate at a nearby rhyolite and placed using conventional methods to form 16 cantilevers separated by 15 joints, along with a on the left . The primary contractor, Entreprise Léon in partnership with a local firm, oversaw the assembly of this 66.5-meter-high arch, which spanned 222 meters at the crest, including a 20-meter . Challenges during construction included delays from land acquisition issues and budgetary constraints that limited preparatory work. Geodetic surveys were conducted throughout the build to monitor progress and alignment. Following substantial completion, initial hydraulic testing through partial filling in late 1954 verified the structure's immediate integrity, allowing provisional water storage to begin. The dam was officially received by authorities in 1954, enabling its operational handover.

The Disaster

Prelude to Failure

In the weeks leading up to the Malpasset Dam's collapse, the region experienced exceptionally intense rainfall that saturated the watershed and strained the structure. From November 19 to , 1959, approximately 50 cm (20 inches) of rain fell in the Reyran River basin near , with the heaviest downpours occurring in the final days, including an estimated 13 cm in a single 24-hour period on . This deluge was compounded by strong winds and already saturated soils from prior autumn precipitation, leading to rapid runoff and unprecedented inflow into the . The level rose swiftly in response to the rainfall, reaching within about 5 meters of the 's crest by mid- and approaching full capacity by late . Operators observed mounting water pressure against the but hesitated to initiate full releases through the outlet valves, citing risks of downstream flooding that could endanger ongoing construction of the Marseille-Nice motorway bridge. On 30, despite a request from the local service for preventive drawdown, authorities declined to open the bottom outlet, prioritizing protection over management. By December 1, the water level had climbed to approximately 97 meters above , prompting limited partial efforts that proved insufficient against the continuing inflow. On December 2, at 6:00 p.m., as the level neared the crest, the bottom outlet was opened, but the continued inflow overwhelmed these efforts. Early indicators of structural distress emerged amid these conditions, with initial leaks appearing along the right bank and around mid-, roughly 7 meters below the operating level of 98.5 meters. These seepages, initially a trickle of clear about 20 meters downstream, intensified by November 30 as the filled further. Concurrently, cracks were noted in the apron at the dam's toe and in the stilling basin by site personnel, including the dam guard, though their extent and implications were not fully assessed at the time. relied on daily visual inspections by engineers, but the dam lacked comprehensive for measuring deformations or internal pressures, limiting the ability to detect escalating issues systematically. Geodetic surveys from the previous summer had indicated non-negligible displacements, including up to 15 mm, but results were not analyzed until November and failed to trigger immediate action.

The Breach and Immediate Flood

The complete breach of the Malpasset Dam occurred at approximately 21:13 CET on , 1959, when the arch structure fractured along the right due to sliding on a weak layer. This sudden failure released the reservoir's contents in a catastrophic manner, as the dam's thin arch , reliant on abutment support, could not withstand the accumulating stresses from recent heavy rainfall. The rupture unleashed approximately 50 million cubic meters of water, forming a massive wave estimated at 40 meters high and laden with , which propagated downstream at speeds reaching 70 km/h along the narrow Reyran River valley. The wave's immense force scoured the riverbed and eroded the banks over the initial 7 km of its path, demolishing bridges, roads, and rural infrastructure in its immediate trajectory before entering more densely populated areas. In the moments following the , the flood's struck workers at a nearby construction site and residents on adjacent farms, resulting in immediate fatalities among those caught without escape. No advance warning sirens were activated in time to alert those in the upstream vicinity, exacerbating the suddenness of the disaster.

Impact on and Surroundings

The floodwaters devastated and surrounding areas, resulting in 423 deaths, including 135 children under the age of 15, 83 injuries, 79 children orphaned, and approximately 7,000 people left homeless. The majority of fatalities occurred in the lower Reyran Valley, where the sudden inundation caught residents unaware during the night, overwhelming residential neighborhoods and temporary settlements. Structural damage was extensive, with 155 buildings completely destroyed in alone, encompassing homes, schools, and military barracks, while 796 others sustained severe damage. lines and highways, including sections of National Road 7, were severed, isolating the region and disrupting all transportation networks. A layer of mud up to 50 cm thick blanketed key districts such as Reyran, Pavadou, and the railway station area, rendering much of the urban infrastructure uninhabitable. Environmentally, the disaster inundated 1,350 hectares of farmland, forests, and vineyards, devastating fruit and vegetable crops along with an estimated 80,000 hectoliters of wine production. The Reyran Valley was denuded over a 5-km stretch, with the flood scouring the valley floor and significantly deepening the riverbed in places through erosion of , , and . Debris, including massive concrete blocks weighing up to 2,000 tons, was scattered downstream for several kilometers, altering the landscape and contributing to long-term sedimentation in the Gulf of . The economic toll was immense, with immediate damages exceeding 100 million French francs in 1959 values, equivalent to approximately 425 million euros adjusted to 2010 . This figure encompassed losses to , , and property, underscoring the disaster's role in reshaping priorities.

Causes and Investigation

Geological Factors

The Malpasset Dam was constructed on a foundation of crystalline within the Tanneron , a formation characterized by banded with north-south striking and dips of 30° to 50° toward the downstream right bank. This rock was initially deemed impermeable and stable due to its massive nature, but it contained undetected tectonic faults, joints, and shears resulting from the Hercynian , including lenses and heterogeneous micaceous varieties that reduced overall cohesion. Pre-construction geological surveys were inadequate, relying on limited boreholes and visual inspections of excavation surfaces without comprehensive mapping of subsurface structures. These efforts overlooked a major fault line, approximately 1 meter thick and dipping at 45° upstream, running parallel to the Reyran River beneath the left , which allowed potential water seepage pathways under pressure. During periods of heavy rainfall in late November 1959, water infiltrated the undetected faults and joints, exploiting the fractured and clay-filled zones in the to generate high pore pressures. This infiltration reduced effective permeability by factors of 100 to 1,000 under , creating uplift forces that eroded a rock wedge at the foundation-abutment interface and promoted sliding along the fault plane with a friction angle of 30° to 35°. Post-failure investigations, including borehole drilling and geophysical analyses, confirmed the presence of the major fault and dense fracture network absent from surveys. A 2009 French Ministry report, along with Jean Goguel's 2010 geological assessment, verified the gneiss's heterogeneity and the fault's role in facilitating water-induced instability through detailed testing.

Engineering and Human Errors

The design of the Malpasset Dam incorporated several oversights that failed to account for potential hydraulic and seismic loads on its thin arch structure. Engineers assumed the foundation was impermeable, leading to the omission of foundation drains and an inadequate cutoff wall that did not extend sufficiently into the rock to prevent uplift pressures. Additionally, the was limited in depth and extent, only reaching about 5 meters in some areas, which proved insufficient to seal against seepage in the fractured rock base. These choices reflected an overreliance on theoretical models without robust margins for calculations, particularly under extreme conditions. Construction practices further compounded these vulnerabilities through inadequate preparation of the . The micaschist and was not properly compacted or treated, with pre-construction investigations relying on shallow boreholes that missed key fault zones, resulting in a foundation with a low deformation of around 1500 . Grouting was performed hastily using blanket holes rather than targeted deep injection, allowing water to infiltrate along undetected discontinuities. Operational decisions during the 1959 flood season highlighted critical failures in and response protocols. Despite rising levels reaching 4.5 meters above normal in just two days, the bottom outlet gate was not opened promptly due to concerns over a downstream bridge under , delaying discharge until late afternoon on December 2. The dam lacked advanced such as piezometers to track pore pressures or internal movements, and early signs of seepage and cracks observed during initial filling were dismissed as insignificant by engineers without further . Surface measurements indicating abutment shifts in 1959 were recorded but not analyzed for implications. These errors were exacerbated by systemic driven by budget constraints and rushed timelines. Geological surveys were curtailed after spending only a fraction of the allocated 27 million francs, halting recommended deeper explorations despite evident risks in the site's fractured . No independent oversight or state-mandated controls were enforced during , and post-completion contracts were absent due to further cuts, leaving no provisions for contingencies beyond the dam's standard design capacity of 1500 cubic meters per second.

Official Inquiry and Findings

Following the Malpasset Dam failure on December 2, 1959, the French government promptly appointed an investigative comprising six engineers and the Jean Goguel to examine the causes. This initial inquiry, launched in December 1959, involved on-site observations, geodetic measurements, and field tests such as jack tests conducted by (EDF) to assess rock elasticity. International expertise was consulted through academic collaborations, though the core team remained primarily French. Subsequent judicial inquiries included a second commission appointed by the Draguignan court in early 1960, consisting of six academics, which attributed responsibility to the Rural Engineering service for oversight failures. A third tribunal-appointed panel of six experts, including two from the Académie des Sciences, began work in spring 1962 and issued findings in 1965, emphasizing the role of unforeseen water circulation in the foundation. These efforts incorporated laboratory permeability tests under stress at institutions like École Polytechnique, witness auditions, and hydraulic analyses. The commissions collectively ruled out sabotage or explosive interference, despite initial rumors linked to nearby road construction. The 1960 commissions primarily blamed foundation instability due to an undetected fault allowing uplift pressures, compounded by inadequate site investigations and the intense rainfall of late November 1959. In a 1967 ruling, no malpractice was found, classifying the event as involving unforeseeable geological factors at the time. A retrospective analysis by the French Bureau for Analysis of Industrial Risks (ARIA) in 2009 reclassified the disaster as a technological accident rather than a purely natural one, highlighting human and engineering contributions to the foundation failure. This assessment drew on prior commission data and modern understandings of rock mechanics, influencing later studies such as Luino and Trebò (2010), which reviewed the event's fiftieth anniversary through comparative case analyses. The inquiries' methodologies, including excavations revealing fault planes and modeling of water pressures, established that design flaws like insufficient drainage provisions exacerbated the undetected geological weakness during reservoir filling.

Aftermath and Legacy

Rescue and Recovery Efforts

Following the collapse of the Malpasset Dam on December 2, 1959, which resulted in 423 deaths, search operations were launched immediately in the devastated Reyran Valley and area. Military units from local bases, along with firefighters, police, gendarmes, and civilian volunteers, mobilized overnight into December 3 to comb through extensive mudfields and debris for survivors and bodies. and U.S. helicopters were deployed to access hard-to-reach zones, airlifting aid and conducting aerial surveys to locate victims buried under sediment up to 10 meters deep. Neighborhood committees assisted by compiling lists of the missing and assessing damage in affected communities. Aid efforts focused on immediate humanitarian needs, with the French Red Cross, army, and government authorities providing emergency shelter, food, and medical care to approximately 7,000 people left homeless by the flood. Local hospitals served as casualty centers and temporary mortuaries, treating 83 injured individuals, many suffering from trauma and exposure; special attention was given to the 79 children orphaned in the disaster, including arrangements for their temporary relocation and support. Town officials distributed bread, water, and anti-typhoid vaccines, while national funds totaling 103 million French francs were allocated for emergency relief, housing repairs, and victim assistance. By December 10, basic road, rail, electricity, and water networks were partially restored to facilitate ongoing aid. Cleanup operations commenced on , involving and teams in removing massive piles, including wrecked vehicles, buildings, and sediment that had buried over 1,000 hectares. The Reyran River was diverted by mid-1960 to stabilize the valley floor and enable full site clearance and , a process that extended over several months due to the scale of destruction. Psychological support for survivors was initiated through and services, addressing widespread and among the affected population. of all remains proved arduous, spanning months amid the rugged terrain. Memorials commemorating the victims were erected by 1961, including a central monument in planned as early as 1960.

Legal and Financial Consequences

Following the Malpasset Dam failure, numerous legal actions were initiated by affected families, the city of , and other victims against the département, its engineers, and the dam's constructors. A for involuntary homicides and injuries was opened shortly after the , targeting the chief rural engineer of the département, his successor, the director of the engineering firm responsible for design, and managers of the phototopography company involved in site surveys. In 1966, the Court of Appeal acquitted all defendants, attributing the failure primarily to unforeseen geological conditions rather than personal , a decision upheld by the Cour de Cassation in 1967. Civil proceedings, however, shifted focus to administrative responsibility. The city of Fréjus sued the Var département for damages to public property and infrastructure. On October 22, 1971, the Conseil d'État ruled that the Var département bore responsibility for the damages suffered by Fréjus due to the dam's rupture, stemming from inadequate oversight during construction and operation, though the constructors were ultimately cleared of liability in related appeals. This ruling stemmed from brief references in the official inquiry to engineering and human errors, such as insufficient geological assessments, but emphasized institutional faults over individual culpability. The disaster also prompted immediate legislative changes, including the enactment on December 31, 1959, of a law allowing posthumous marriage in France. This provision, requiring presidential approval, was introduced in response to cases where one or both partners in impending marriages perished in the flood, enabling surviving fiancés to legally wed their deceased loved ones for inheritance and social recognition purposes. Financial settlements were substantial and multifaceted, drawing from state aid, private donations, and departmental funds. By December 31, 1970, Fréjus city hall had disbursed over 103 million new French francs (equivalent to approximately 15.7 million euros at 1970 exchange rates) in , including 12 million francs directly to , 25 million to farmers for agricultural losses, 8 million for residential repairs, and 1.5 million for operations; claims covered partial costs for rebuilding like roads and bridges. The total material damages exceeded 100 million francs in 1970 values (roughly 100 million euros adjusted to 2006 purchasing power), encompassing widespread destruction across 3,000 hectares of farmland and urban areas. The Var département faced severe institutional fallout, including risks of financial from the burden. A 1974 dispute between the département and the national government highlighted the strain, with the departmental council refusing to impose the costs on local taxpayers and arguing against its sole responsibility; this led to a national and state assumption of significant liabilities to avert . Project overseers in the rural engineering service were reassigned or removed from duties amid the inquiry's findings on oversight lapses, though no formal dismissals for criminal fault occurred. Ongoing liabilities persisted into the 1970s, with some victim claims unresolved due to disputes over fault attribution and compensation amounts, finally settled through administrative channels by the mid-1970s. Public funding continues for annual memorials in , commemorating the 423 victims with ceremonies and site maintenance, supported by the département and national heritage programs.

Engineering Lessons and Influence

The failure of the Malpasset Dam underscored the critical need for comprehensive geological mapping prior to dam construction, particularly in identifying subsurface faults and heterogeneous rock formations such as micaschist foundations. Investigations revealed that inadequate pre-construction surveys failed to detect a fault zone in the left , which contributed to sliding under pressure; this led to widespread adoption of geophysical methods like seismic refraction and borehole logging for fault detection in dam site evaluations. Similarly, the absence of sufficient during initial filling highlighted the necessity of installing piezometers and joint meters to monitor pore water pressures and structural movements in real time, prompting engineers to integrate such devices as standard practice for early detection of anomalies. In , the disaster directly influenced dam safety legislation in the 1960s, resulting in stricter requirements for site investigations, foundation treatment, and independent design reviews to prevent similar oversights. These reforms emphasized mandatory geological expertise and monitoring protocols, marking a shift toward more rigorous oversight by national authorities. On the international stage, the event contributed to updates in International Commission on Large Dams (ICOLD) guidelines following 1960, particularly those concerning foundations, by advocating for enhanced analysis of rock discontinuities and uplift pressures in Bulletin 99's statistical review of failures. Globally, Malpasset has been a seminal in and , as detailed in U.S. Bureau of Reclamation analyses that compare it to other failures like to stress foundation stability evaluations. It inspired probabilistic risk models for events, influencing frameworks in the United States and elsewhere to incorporate geological uncertainties in design. In contemporary contexts, the incident remains relevant in discussions of on flood-prone dams, serving as a for assessing heightened risks, and provides a validation for simulation such as the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers' LifeSim model.

References

  1. [1]
    [PDF] Burst of a dam 2 December 1959 Malpasset (Var) France - ARIA
    The disaster resulted in 423 victims and left. 7,000 people homeless. All road, telephone, electricity and water networks to. Fréjus were completely cut off.Missing: history | Show results with:history
  2. [2]
    Dam Failure Case Study: Malpasset Dam (France, 1959)
    The sudden failure of the dam resulted in the death of 421 people when emergency rescue attempts were thwarted due to the inaccessibility of the town's flooded ...Missing: facts | Show results with:facts
  3. [3]
    The traps behind the failure of Malpasset arch dam, France, in 1959
    After the failure, a flow of 50 million cubic meters of water have cleaned the slopes perfectly from any loose or even weathered material, the rock mass ...
  4. [4]
    [PDF] Concrete Dams Case Histories of Failures and Nonfailures with ...
    This compilation of case history summaries is intended to assist risk analysis teams in estimating probabilities related to concrete dams.
  5. [5]
    [PDF] 3 sciences behind the Malpasset dam failure (France, Dec. 2, 1959)
    Sep 4, 2019 · This section provides some elements of the construction site and the reasons why it was chosen (1.1), it then reflects the genesis of the ...
  6. [6]
    [PDF] Empire and Catastrophe - UNL Digital Commons
    had been discussion of various solutions to the region's shortage of water for irrigation, the project that became the Malpasset Dam was proposed in 1946 by.
  7. [7]
    Malpasset Dam - Structurae
    Jul 29, 2014 · Dimensions ; retained water volume, 50 000 000 m³ ; crest length, 225 m ; crest thickness, 1.5 m ; base thickness, 6.82 m ; spillway, width, 30 m ...
  8. [8]
    This Day in Weather History: December 2nd
    1959: Between November 19 and December 2, an estimated 20 inches of rain fell near Frejus on the French Riviera. The rain caused the Malpasset Dam to collapse, ...Missing: total | Show results with:total
  9. [9]
    [PDF] Scaling of Static Fracture of Quasi-Brittle Structures: Strength ...
    dam is loaded by the slip of its right abutment (Fig. 5). To simplify the analysis of the failure of the Malpasset Dam in. 1959, we assume the hydraulic ...
  10. [10]
    The 1959 Malpasset, France, Dam-break disaster - David L George
    In 2010 this was applied to the Malpasset dam break disaster in southern France, 1959 to test the ability to extend GeoClaw's tsunami modeling methodology to ...Missing: facts | Show results with:facts
  11. [11]
    Are sirens effective tools to alert the population in France? - NHESS
    Sep 30, 2021 · Nevertheless, many disasters did not result in sirens being activated, for example during the 1969 dam failure in Malpasset (421 victims) or ...
  12. [12]
    The Malpasset Dam Disaster - could the Var suffer again?
    Jan 7, 2012 · The spillway capacity of this dam was 5,663 m3 / second, whereas the volume required to be evacuated after the heavy rainfall was estimated at ...Missing: per | Show results with:per
  13. [13]
    Malpasset Dam in Fréjus
    The arch-shaped dam design means that the water pressure tightens the wall and the arch transmits the colossal forces it receives to the banks. This type of ...Missing: specifications | Show results with:specifications
  14. [14]
    The Malpasset dam (France) fifty years after the failure of December ...
    Aug 7, 2025 · For example, the 1959 Malpasset floods, caused by the Malpasset dam break, killed at least 423 people, injured 83, and caused nearly 425 million ...<|control11|><|separator|>
  15. [15]
    [PDF] Tour of the ruins of Malpasset dam Exhibition at Villa Aurélienne
    The Malpasset catastrophe left 79 children orphans. When the school term started at Turcan school on 5 January 1960, a number of seats were empty. Mme Legrand's ...
  16. [16]
    Case History 12: Malpasset Dam, France
    The 66.5 m high, double curvature concrete arch dam at Malpasset was completed about 1954. Its first filling took place very slowly.
  17. [17]
    Break of the Malpasset Dam - La référence du retour d'expérience ...
    A 50 million-m3 deluge of water flooded the Reyran Valley, devastating everything in its path. The city of Fréjus was inundated in just a few minutes by a wave ...Missing: immediate | Show results with:immediate
  18. [18]
    PHOTOS&VIDEO. Le 2 décembre 1959, la rupture du barrage de ...
    Dec 2, 2016 · Au matin du 3 décembre 1959, pompiers, militaires et bénévoles partent à la recherche des corps, viennent au secours des sinistrés toujours ...Missing: chiens | Show results with:chiens
  19. [19]
    Le barrage de Malpasset : une catastrophe historique - Futura
    Mar 27, 2017 · Les militaires des bases locales ainsi que des hélicoptères de l'armée américaine se chargent de porter secours aux survivants. Le général ...
  20. [20]
    Barrage de Malpasset : Les hélicoptères de secours
    Apr 10, 2006 · 423 victimes sont dénombrées. L'armée intervient pour secourir les sinistrés et déblayer la ville. Le général de Gaulle, accompagné du Premier ...Missing: chiens recherche corps<|separator|>
  21. [21]
    Memorial for frejus victims Stock Photos and Images - Alamy
    28, 1960 - Memorial For Frejus Victims : A Memorial in commemoration of the Frejus Dam Disaster Casualties is to Be Erected in the Centre of the Ill-fated Town.Missing: 1961 | Show results with:1961
  22. [22]
    Cour de Cassation, Chambre criminelle, du 7 décembre 1967, 66 ...
    ... BARRAGE DE MALPASSET, SURVENUE LE 2 DECEMBRE 1959, UNE INFORMATION JUDICIAIRE, PRIMITIVEMENT OUVERTE CONTRE INCONNU, DU CHEF D'HOMICIDES ET BLESSURES ...
  23. [23]
    Conseil d'Etat, 4 / 1 SSR, du 22 octobre 1971, 76200 ... - Légifrance
    LE DEPARTEMENT DU VAR EST DECLARE RESPONSABLE DES DOMMAGES CONSECUTIFS A LA RUPTURE DU BARRAGE DE MALPASSET QUE LA VILLE DE FREJUS A SUBIS SUR SES BIENS, A L' ...
  24. [24]
    Conseil d'Etat, Assemblée, du 28 mai 1971, 76216, publié au recueil ...
    SUR LES APPELS EN GARANTIE : - CONS. QUE LE TRIBUNAL ADMINISTRATIF DE NICE, SAISI D'UN APPEL EN GARANTIE DES CONSTRUCTEURS DU BARRAGE DE MALPASSET ET DE L'ETAT ...
  25. [25]
    [PDF] Rupture d'un barrage Le 2 décembre 1959 Malpasset [Var] France
    Des comités de quartier prennent en charge l'analyse des dommages en vue des indemnisations qui seront d'ailleurs exceptionnellement gérées directement par ...Missing: procès civil
  26. [26]
    Polémique entre l'État et le département du Var Qui va indemniser ...
    Mar 14, 1974 · Le conseil général refuse de faire supporter les dépenses aux contribuables varois, estimant qu'il n'est pas responsable de la catastrophe. Par ...Missing: procès civil
  27. [27]
    556-3-F-4 : Barrage de Malpasset. - Conséquences financières de l ...
    Titre : 556-3-F-4 : Barrage de Malpasset. - Conséquences financières de l'arrêt du Conseil d'Etat du 28 mai 1971 mettant à la charge du département du var ...
  28. [28]
    [PDF] CHAPTER 11 - ARCH DAMS
    and 0.95 for two-dimensional flow over the flat-topped portion of an arch dam when flows exceed the spillway capacity and overtops the dam. The length ...
  29. [29]
    Malpasset Validation Dataset - the Risk Management Center
    Malpasset Validation Data Set. Overview. The Malpasset Dam was a concrete arch dam about 10 miles upstream of the town of Frejus on the Reyran River, France.Missing: exact | Show results with:exact