Mudug

Mudug is an administrative region in north-central Somalia comprising five districts, with Galkacyo as its capital city.^[1] The region spans territory divided between the semi-autonomous Puntland state in the north and the Galmudug federal member state in the south, a division that has fueled persistent clan-based territorial disputes, most notably in the bisected city of Galkacyo.^[1] Population estimates for Mudug vary, with UNOCHA projecting 1,244,027 inhabitants in 2021 based on humanitarian data collection.^[1] Security remains precarious due to armed confrontations between government-aligned forces and al-Shabaab insurgents, compounded by intra-clan rivalries that exacerbate localized violence and hinder governance.^[1]^[2] Mudug's economy centers on pastoral nomadism, with livestock herding dominating livelihoods amid arid conditions that limit crop cultivation to sporadic rain-fed agriculture in riverine areas.^[3]

History

Pre-independence era

The Mudug region, situated in central Somalia, was historically inhabited by nomadic pastoralists primarily affiliated with sub-clans of the Hawiye and Darod lineages, who established territorial influence through migrations across the Horn of Africa dating back several centuries. These clan groups adapted to the arid grasslands by prioritizing camel and livestock herding, forming decentralized social structures based on patrilineal kinship and diya-paying groups for conflict resolution and resource allocation. Oral traditions and genealogical records indicate that Hawiye clans, such as the Abgaal, consolidated presence in southern and central areas, while Darod branches, including Majerteen elements, exerted control northward, fostering a landscape of fluid alliances rather than fixed state boundaries.^[4]^[5] Pre-colonial Mudug served as a nexus for inland trade routes connecting pastoral interiors to coastal outlets, where clans exchanged livestock, resins, and hides for imported goods via caravan systems linked to ancient networks spanning the Red Sea and Indian Ocean. Settlements functioned as seasonal hubs, with inter-clan pacts ensuring passage and barter, underscoring the region's economic integration without centralized authority. This commerce reinforced clan autonomy, as groups like the Murusade leveraged strategic locations for procurement and distribution, shaping Mudug's role in broader Somali exchanges prior to European incursions.^[6]^[7] European colonial spheres divided Somali territories in the late 19th century, with Mudug falling under Italian administration as part of Italian Somaliland, formalized through coastal concessions starting in the 1890s and inland expansion by the early 1900s. Italy initially relied on indirect rule via local sultans, such as in the Hobyo area, but shifted to direct control post-1920, establishing military posts and rudimentary infrastructure while favoring nomadic Mudug clans as intermediaries to manage pastoral lands. This period saw land surveys and limited agricultural trials, altering some grazing patterns, alongside sporadic resistance from clans opposing taxation and forced recruitment, exemplified by uprisings in adjacent interiors crushed by Italian forces around 1925. British influence remained peripheral, confined to northern borders, leaving Italian hegemony dominant in Mudug until the 1940s.^[8]^[9]^[10]

Post-independence and Siad Barre regime

Following the formation of the Somali Republic on July 1, 1960, through the unification of British Somaliland and Italian Somaliland, Mudug emerged as a key central district contributing to the nascent economy's pastoral and agricultural base.^[11] The region's vast rangelands facilitated livestock herding, with central areas like Mudug supporting a surge in exports that nearly doubled in value and volume between 1960 and 1965, overtaking bananas as Somalia's primary commodity by the mid-1960s.^[12] Local markets in Galkayo, Mudug's administrative center, channeled camels, sheep, and goats to ports, underscoring the district's role in sustaining foreign exchange amid limited infrastructure.^[12] Siad Barre's military coup on October 21, 1969, ushered in a socialist-oriented regime that prioritized state-led modernization, including collectivization drives and villagization programs to sedentarize nomads for agricultural development.^[13] In pastoral-dominant Mudug, these policies conflicted with clan-based mobility essential to drought resilience, imposing fixed settlements that disrupted traditional grazing rotations and provoked resistance from herders reliant on unregulated transhumance.^[14] Barre's centralization eroded local decision-making, favoring state monopolies over clan-managed resources and igniting resentments, particularly among Darod subclans like the Majeerteen who perceived favoritism toward Barre's Marehan kin.^[15] Somalia's defeat in the Ogaden War (July 1977–March 1978) exacerbated these frictions, draining resources and prompting Barre to suppress perceived disloyalty in Mudug.^[3] Post-war reprisals targeted Majeerteen military officers, with 17 executed in April 1978 on coup allegations, followed by Red Beret operations killing over 2,000 civilians in the region during May–June 1979.^[16]^[17] This violence, rooted in Barre's clan favoritism, prefigured broader dissent, as Majeerteen elites formed the Somali Salvation Democratic Front in Ethiopia, challenging regime control without yet fracturing national unity.^[15]

Civil war and regional fragmentation

The overthrow of President Siad Barre on 26 January 1991 dismantled Somalia's central authority, creating a governance vacuum that rapidly devolved into clan-based warfare nationwide, including in Mudug where local power structures collapsed amid competing territorial claims.^[18]^[19] In Mudug, this manifested as intense clashes between Hawiye clans—predominantly the Habar Gedir Saad subclan in the south—and Darod clans, notably the Majerteen in the north, fracturing the region along these lineage divides and halting centralized administration.^[20]^[21] The ensuing instability fostered the proliferation of factional militias and warlord-led groups, which supplanted traditional xeer-based dispute resolution mechanisms reliant on clan elders, as armed enforcers prioritized resource control over customary mediation in districts like Galkayo.^[22] Galkayo, Mudug's principal city, epitomized this fragmentation, with its northern sectors falling under Majerteen influence and southern areas under Hawiye dominance, a divide solidified by recurring militia skirmishes that prioritized clan loyalty over unified regional governance.^[21] This warlordism, emerging directly from the post-Barre anarchy, entrenched localized fiefdoms, as militias drawn from clan networks exploited the absence of state coercion to impose de facto rule through violence and extortion.^[22] By the late 1990s and early 2000s, these dynamics paved the way for nascent autonomous administrations: northern Mudug aligned with Puntland's 1998 declaration as a semi-autonomous entity, justified on Majerteen clan demographics, while southern portions foreshadowed Galmudug's conceptualization in the late 2000s around Hawiye strongholds, marking an initial shift from pure militia anarchy to proto-state experiments amid persistent clan rivalries.^[21]^[2] Puntland's incorporation of northern Mudug territories formalized Darod control, yet exacerbated administrative splits by contesting Hawiye areas, setting a precedent for enduring regional bifurcation driven by the civil war's legacy of decentralized power vacuums.^[23]^[2]

Geography

Location and boundaries

Mudug occupies a central position in north-central Somalia, extending from the Indian Ocean coastline in the east to the international border with Ethiopia's Somali Region in the west.^[24] It shares internal boundaries with Nugal region to the north and Galguduud region to the south.^[24] The region spans approximately 72,933 square kilometers, encompassing diverse terrain from coastal plains to inland plateaus.^[25] Galkayo serves as the regional capital, situated near the midpoint of Mudug's north-south axis, while Hobyo provides key access to the Indian Ocean along the southern coastal stretch.^[26]^[27] This coastal frontage, roughly 200-300 kilometers in length depending on delineations, facilitates maritime connections but remains underdeveloped due to security challenges.^[24] De facto boundaries within Mudug deviate from formal administrative lines, with the northern portion effectively administered by Puntland and the southern by Galmudug, reflecting clan-based power distributions rather than fixed legal demarcations.^[28] Clan overlaps, particularly among Darod sub-clans like Majerteen and Hawiye, contribute to fluid territorial control, often resolved through local agreements rather than centralized enforcement, complicating precise border enforcement amid ongoing fragmentation.^[29]^[28]

Physical features and climate

Mudug region comprises the expansive Mudug Plain, a flat to gently undulating expanse of semi-arid steppe transitioning into subdesert savanna, with aridity intensifying eastward toward the Indian Ocean coast.^[30] The terrain lacks significant elevation changes or perennial watercourses, featuring instead seasonal wadis and minor tributaries of the Shebelle River system that enable sporadic irrigation and groundwater recharge during wet periods.^[31] Soils are predominantly shallow to moderately deep loamy types overlying limestone formations, supporting sparse vegetation dominated by drought-tolerant acacias, commiphora bushes, and coarse grasses adapted to low moisture conditions.^[32] The climate is semi-arid, with average annual rainfall ranging from 200 to 400 mm, primarily bimodal in the Gu season (April to June) and Deyr season (October to December), though distribution is highly erratic due to variable monsoon influences.^[33] Temperatures remain consistently high, averaging 25–30 °C year-round, with minimal seasonal variation exacerbating evapotranspiration rates that exceed precipitation. Recurrent droughts, including the severe events of 2011 and 2017 triggered by consecutive failed rainy seasons, have intensified resource scarcity, livestock losses, and land degradation in the region, underscoring the vulnerability of rain-fed pastoral systems to precipitation shortfalls.^[34]^[35] Overgrazing, evident in expanded bare soil patches detectable via remote sensing, further compounds aridity effects by reducing vegetative cover and accelerating soil erosion.^[36]

Administrative divisions

Districts and sub-divisions

Mudug region is divided into five official districts: Galkayo, Goldogob, Hobyo, Jaribaan, and Harardhere, as established under Somalia's pre-1991 administrative framework and largely retained in local governance structures.^[1]^[37] These districts serve as primary units for local administration, including coordination of basic services, security patrols, and resource allocation, though effectiveness varies due to decentralized authority and resource constraints. Galkayo functions as the regional capital and central hub for administrative oversight, hosting key offices for regional coordination and serving as a focal point for population registration and dispute mediation.^[38] The districts' population centers anchor local economies and governance, with estimates derived from projections accounting for high growth rates and nomadic patterns. In 2019 projections, Galkayo district had an estimated population of 501,542, making it the most populous and the primary urban center for trade, markets, and administrative services in northern Mudug. Goldogob district, with around 115,009 residents, centers on its namesake town as a midpoint for pastoral mobility and limited agricultural administration. Hobyo district, estimated at over 67,000 in earlier baselines scaling to similar projections, administers coastal access and port-related functions from Hobyo town, historically linked to militia-led security amid past maritime threats. Jaribaan district, with approximately 39,207 residents, focuses on inland administrative outposts for herder support and basic infrastructure maintenance. Harardhere district, estimated at 65,543, manages southern coastal zones from its main town, prioritizing localized security and aid distribution amid challenging terrain.^[25]^[39]

District	Main Population Center	2019 Population Projection	Key Administrative Role
Galkayo	Galkayo	501,542	Regional coordination and urban services
Goldogob	Goldogob	115,009	Pastoral and transit administration
Hobyo	Hobyo	~100,000 (projected)	Coastal access and security management
Jaribaan	Jaribaan	39,207	Inland resource and herder support
Harardhere	Harardhere	65,543	Southern aid and localized governance

These figures reflect projections from baseline data, as Somalia lacks a comprehensive recent census, leading to variances in estimates across sources. Districts operate with district commissioners appointed or influenced by regional authorities, focusing on enumerating settlements for aid and maintaining rudimentary records for governance continuity.^[25]

Division between federal entities

Mudug region is de facto partitioned between Puntland, which administers the northern half including areas north of Galkayo based on predominant clan affiliations, and Galmudug, which controls the southern portions.^[1]^[2] This split overrides nominal federal boundaries, reflecting practical control established amid Somalia's post-1991 state fragmentation, with Puntland's authority rooted in Darod (Majerteen) clan dominance in the north and Galmudug's in Hawiye clans to the south. The division manifests starkly in Galkayo, Mudug's largest city, where an east-west line—effectively north-south in administrative terms—separates Puntland's northern jurisdiction from Galmudug's southern control, a arrangement solidifying since the mid-1990s collapse of centralized governance.^[1]^[40] Northern Galkayo remains under Majerteen-influenced Puntland administration, while southern areas align with Saad sub-clan interests within Galmudug, perpetuating parallel municipal services and security apparatuses.^[41] Attempts at administrative unification, including the 2009 Galkayo Agreement between the Transitional Federal Government and Puntland, sought broader reconciliation but failed to reconcile territorial claims over Mudug due to entrenched clan suspicions and competing state-building agendas.^[42]^[43] Similar 2010 follow-ups yielded no meaningful implementation, as relations deteriorated amid unresolved disputes, leaving the de facto bifurcation intact.^[44] These governance realities exacerbate disparities in resource distribution and public services, with Puntland's northern Mudug benefiting from relatively more consistent revenue collection and infrastructure maintenance—such as roads and water systems—compared to Galmudug's southern zones, where fragmented authority hinders equitable aid delivery and development projects.^[2]^[23] Clan-based mistrust continues to prioritize localized control over integrated federal administration, limiting cross-entity cooperation on shared regional needs like drought response or market access.^[45]

Demographics

Population and urbanization

The Mudug region had an estimated population of 864,700 inhabitants in 2019, based on projections from national surveys.^[25] ^[46] Annual growth rates averaged 3.8% from 2014 to 2019, driven by high fertility and net migration patterns typical of Somali regions.^[25] A 2021 United Nations estimate raised the figure to 1,244,027, accounting for influxes of internally displaced persons amid regional instability.^[1] The population density stands low at approximately 11.9 persons per square kilometer, reflecting the region's expansive 72,933 km² area.^[25] Settlement patterns are overwhelmingly rural, with the majority of residents maintaining pastoralist livelihoods in nomadic or semi-nomadic communities across arid zones. Urbanization levels remain modest compared to Somalia's national average of about 45%, concentrating in administrative and trade hubs that draw IDPs from conflict-affected rural districts.^[47] Galkayo, the principal urban center and regional capital, exemplifies this dynamic, functioning as a refuge for those displaced by inter-clan violence and insurgency, with its divided layout—north under Puntland and south under Galmudug—accommodating an estimated total population of 137,000 to 200,000 as of the mid-2010s.^[21] ^[48] Mudug's demographics feature a youth bulge akin to Somalia's national profile, where rapid population growth has concentrated over 60% of residents under age 25, amplifying pressures on resources and services in both rural and urban settings. Gender imbalances arise from male out-migration for labor, leaving rural areas with disproportionately female-headed households, though precise regional ratios are constrained by limited disaggregated data.^[49] Mudug's clan structure reflects a north-south divide, with the Majerteen sub-clan of the Darod dominating northern areas, particularly through groups like the Omar Mohamoud, who control key districts such as Garowe and Hobyo.^[1] In contrast, southern Mudug, including Galkayo's southern neighborhoods, is primarily inhabited by the Saad sub-clan of the Habar Gidir (a Hawiye branch), alongside other Hawiye elements like the Sheekhaal.^[20] Minority clans, such as the Leelkase (Darod), maintain presence across the region, often in peripheral or mixed zones, contributing to layered social hierarchies where larger patrilineal groups exert influence over resource access and local decision-making.^[50] Social dynamics are governed by xeer, an unwritten customary legal system enforced by clan elders, which prioritizes collective accountability over individual guilt to preserve kinship ties and avert escalation in pastoral disputes over water, grazing, or livestock.^[51] Central to xeer is the diya mechanism, whereby the offender's clan collectively pays blood money—typically in livestock or cash equivalents—to the victim's lineage, distributing the burden across the diya-paying group (mag-pay) of 100-200 adult males to incentivize internal restraint and de-escalate retaliatory cycles that could fracture broader alliances.^[52] This system empirically fosters cohesion by aligning incentives: clans monitor members to avoid collective liability, reducing feud durations compared to unchecked vengeance, though failures occur when payments are evaded or politicized.^[53] Inter-clan marriages historically forge stabilizing bonds, embedding mutual obligations that deter aggression and facilitate resource-sharing pacts, as seen in pre-civil war Mudug where such unions bridged Hawiye-Darod divides.^[54] Alliances, like the 1993 Mudug Peace Agreement between Majerteen and Habar Gidir, exemplify kinship functionality in filling state voids by enforcing truces through elder-mediated guarantees.^[29] However, politicized favoritism—where federal entities like Galmudug allocate positions via clan quotas—can undermine these dynamics, privileging dominant groups and marginalizing minorities, thus straining xeer's impartiality amid weak formal institutions.^[2]

Economy

Pastoralism and agriculture

Pastoralism dominates the economy of Mudug, where the arid landscape supports nomadic and semi-nomadic herding of camels, goats, and sheep as the primary livelihood for the majority of households. In Galmudug State, which includes Mudug, livestock populations totaled approximately 2.99 million head in 2018, comprising 324,593 camels, 1.88 million goats, and 777,236 sheep, reflecting the emphasis on drought-resilient species suited to the region's rangelands. ^[55] Nationally, over 65% of the population engages in livestock-related activities, with pastoralism comprising more than 80% of economic output in central arid zones like Mudug, where natural pastures and seasonal migrations sustain production with minimal external inputs. ^[56] ^[57] Livestock exports, primarily to Gulf states, underpin pastoral incomes, but recurrent bans have inflicted severe setbacks; Saudi Arabia's prohibition on Somali imports from 1998 to 2009, prompted by Rift Valley fever concerns, resulted in losses exceeding $330 million for exporters and producers through 2003 alone, forcing many Mudug herders to destock or shift to alternative livelihoods amid collapsed markets and reduced food security. ^[58] ^[59] Droughts exacerbate vulnerabilities, with events like 2016–2017 causing millions of animal deaths nationwide, though traditional mobility and clan-based resource management mitigate some risks in Mudug's pastoral systems. ^[55] Crop agriculture remains marginal in Mudug due to low rainfall and sandy soils, confined largely to small-scale sorghum and maize cultivation in agro-pastoral pockets near seasonal wadis or limited irrigation sites, yielding far below potential amid chronic insecurity that disrupts planting and harvest more than climatic variability alone. ^[56] ^[60] In coastal Hobyo district, fisheries provide a supplementary sector, with communities harvesting inshore pelagic species using traditional boats, though production data is sparse and constrained by piracy, inadequate infrastructure, and illegal foreign vessels depleting stocks. ^[61] Pre-civil war banana cultivation occurred sporadically along Mudug's limited riparian zones, contributing to national exports of around 40,000 tons annually in the 1980s from coastal irrigated plots, but post-1991 collapse reduced output to negligible levels due to abandoned plantations and water shortages.

Trade, resources, and challenges

Galkayo serves as a central hub for livestock trade in Mudug, facilitating the export of camels, sheep, and goats primarily to Gulf states such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Somalia's national livestock exports reached $974 million in 2024, with projections exceeding $1 billion in 2025, driven by demand for live animals in these markets.^[62]^[63] Local markets in Galkayo connect pastoral producers to export chains, supported by service sectors handling transport and veterinary services, though volumes from Mudug specifically contribute to the broader Somali total of over 20 million heads exported between 2018 and 2024.^[64]^[65] Remittances from the Somali diaspora bolster household incomes and local commerce in Mudug, mirroring national patterns where inflows equate to approximately 25% of GDP, or $2 billion annually.^[66] These transfers, estimated at 16.7% of GDP in 2022 by World Bank data, fund consumption and small-scale trade but remain vulnerable to global economic shifts.^[67] Mudug holds untapped resource potential, including onshore oil and gas deposits explored sporadically before the 1990s civil war, with recent concessions in adjacent Galmudug areas signaling renewed interest.^[68] Frankincense harvesting persists in northern Mudug's Puntland portions, part of a regional trade yielding over 1,000 metric tons annually from Boswellia species, though overshadowed by livestock dominance.^[69] Persistent insecurity from clan disputes and Al-Shabaab operations disrupts trade routes, such as those linking Galkayo to Bosaso ports, elevating transport costs and deterring investment.^[70] Heavy reliance on humanitarian aid exacerbates dependency, distorting local markets by flooding them with free goods and undermining incentives for domestic production.^[71]^[72] This aid influx, while mitigating acute food insecurity, perpetuates structural vulnerabilities amid weak infrastructure.^[73]

Governance and politics

Local administration and leadership

Local administration in Mudug, part of Galmudug state, centers on district-level structures such as councils and commissioners, which blend elected councilors with traditional leaders nominated through clan delegate systems.^[74] In districts like Galkayo, councils have been established with up to 29 seats, exceeding legal limits of 27, while others such as Hobyo remain unformed due to unresolved power-sharing disputes among sub-clans like the Saleban and Sacad.^[74] These hybrid bodies aim to manage local services and resources but face operational constraints from inadequate funding, with formation costs ranging from $60,000 to $100,000 per council often covered by donors or internal fees, limiting broader functionality.^[74]^[23] Traditional leadership, embodied by suldaans (hereditary clan chiefs) and elders, exerts greater on-ground influence than formal bureaucracies, particularly in adjudication and mediation under the customary xeer system.^[75] These leaders resolve intra-clan and local disputes through community-embedded processes, deriving authority from clan consensus rather than distant state proxies, which often lack legitimacy or reach in rural areas.^[75] Elders select delegates for council elections, embedding clan dynamics into governance, though this can marginalize non-dominant groups.^[74] Governance effectiveness is hampered by corruption, including elite capture of aid resources by powerful clans, as seen in 2012 reports of diversion from IDP camps in Galkayo where local authorities were accused of withholding humanitarian supplies.^[76] Broader assessments highlight risks in indirect elections, with imposters posing as elders to influence outcomes, and clan dominance restricting inclusive participation, such as low female representation (around 15% in existing councils).^[23] These issues reflect systemic challenges in aid-dependent local systems, where limited revenue from checkpoints and fees fails to counterbalance elite influence.^[23]

Integration with federal states

Northern Mudug has been under the de facto administration of Puntland since the region's self-declaration as an autonomous state in August 1998, while southern Mudug falls under Galmudug, established in 2006 as a transitional federal entity comprising southern Mudug and Galgaduud regions.^[1]^[77] This bifurcation, centered around the divided city of Galkacyo, reflects underlying clan territorial claims—primarily Darod in the north and Hawiye in the south—rather than centralized federal directives, leading to recurrent border skirmishes and parallel governance structures.^[78] Efforts to integrate southern Mudug into Galmudug through clan-based power-sharing intensified with the 2015 Adaado conference, which convened representatives from the 11 clans of Galgaduud and southern Mudug to negotiate resource allocation and leadership roles, resulting in a transitional government but failing to resolve deep-seated rivalries.^[79] The federal 4.5 power-sharing formula, which assigns equal parliamentary seats to Somalia's four major clan families (Darod, Hawiye, Dir, and Rahanweyn) plus a half-share to minorities, has exacerbated tensions by imposing a clan-blind quota system that disregards local demographic majorities, allowing smaller clans disproportionate influence in regional assemblies and fueling perceptions of inequity among dominant groups like the Habar Gidir Hawiye in southern Mudug.^[2] Empirical evidence from post-conference conflicts indicates this top-down federalism prioritizes national proportionality over regional clan realities, perpetuating instability as majority clans view allocations as zero-sum losses rather than merit-based distributions.^[79]^[80] Federal initiatives since 2023, including Galmudug's alignment with national security operations, have sought greater unification of divided regions like Mudug, yet Puntland's resistance—rooted in safeguarding northern control—highlights the formula's causal role in entrenching fragmentation, with joint Puntland-Galmudug patrols in Mudug remaining ad hoc amid unresolved sovereignty disputes.^[81]^[2] This approach's empirical shortcomings are evident in sustained inter-state frictions, where federal pressures for integration overlook clan incentives for autonomy, yielding minimal progress toward cohesive administration by 2025.^[82]

Security and conflicts

Inter-clan disputes

Inter-clan disputes in Mudug primarily involve competition for scarce resources such as pastureland, water points, and settlements, rather than ideological differences, with Galkayo serving as a flashpoint due to its division between southern Saad (Hawiye Habar Gedir sub-clan) and northern Majerteen and Leelkase (Darod sub-clans) territories.^[83]^[20] These rivalries have led to recurrent militia clashes, often triggered by disputes over grazing access during seasonal migrations or control of key routes, including informal checkpoints used for extortion.^[84]^[85] Significant escalations occurred in 2017, building on prior violence, with clashes in Galkayo and surrounding areas resulting in dozens of deaths from revenge cycles and territorial skirmishes, exacerbating displacement and economic disruption.^[83] Violence spiked again in 2024, with incidents such as June fighting near Towfiq and Afbarwaqo villages over rural land and a water well killing at least 20 and injuring dozens, alongside October clashes in Mudug claiming four lives and 11 injuries.^[86]^[87] ACAPS data indicate a broader upward trend in inter-clan violence across Mudug that year, with heightened incidents displacing thousands and underscoring resource scarcity as the core driver amid drought recovery challenges.^[20]^[88] Traditional Xeer mediation by clan elders has facilitated truces in several cases, such as local agreements in Galkayo that have intermittently held despite revenge killings, leveraging customary practices to enforce diya (blood money) payments and boundary delineations with reported adherence in stable periods.^[89]^[78] Success rates vary, with elder-led processes proving more enduring in insulated local contexts compared to those undermined by political actors or rival administrations introducing external agendas, leading to truce breakdowns and renewed hostilities.^[90]^[91]

Islamist insurgency and Al-Shabaab

Al-Shabaab, an al-Qaeda-affiliated Islamist insurgent group, has maintained operational strongholds in rural southern Mudug, particularly in districts like Harardhere, where it enforces control through taxation and intimidation of pastoral communities.^[92] The group's Amniyat intelligence wing operates extensive networks in these areas, monitoring herders and extracting revenues via mandatory levies on livestock and trade routes, often disguised as religious zakat but functioning as extortion to fund operations.^[93] This economic coercion sustains Al-Shabaab's presence amid weak state authority, with herders facing penalties such as asset seizure or violence for non-compliance.^[94] Exploiting post-ATMIS drawdowns that began in 2024, Al-Shabaab intensified offensives across central Somalia, including Mudug, reclaiming territory lost in prior government pushes; by early 2025, the group controlled strategic areas enabling encirclement of government-held positions.^[95] Tactics include rural ambushes on Somali National Army convoys and improvised explosive device attacks, with UN monitoring verifying heightened violence in regions like Galmudug, which encompasses Mudug.^[96] In urban centers such as Galkayo, Al-Shabaab has conducted bombings targeting security forces and civilians, as documented in UN reports on persistent insurgent capabilities despite counteroffensives.^[97] Recruitment in Mudug draws on ideological appeals transcending clan loyalties, portraying Al-Shabaab governance as merit-based and free from nepotistic divisions that plague federal structures, thereby attracting disenfranchised youth from clans like the Hawiye sub-groups.^[98] The group integrates clan members into leadership to mitigate internal fractures, using propaganda to frame insurgency as jihad against apostate rulers, though forced conscription persists in contested zones.^[99] These efforts have bolstered ranks amid 2025 resurgences, with Al-Shabaab leveraging anti-clan rhetoric to sustain influence in pastoral heartlands.^[100]

Counter-insurgency and stabilization efforts

In August 2023, Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud declared a nationwide offensive against Al-Shabaab, mobilizing the Somali National Army (SNA), clan-based Macawisley militias, and international partners to reclaim territory in central regions including Mudug.^[101] Operations in southern Mudug, such as around Hobyo, resulted in temporary clearances of Al-Shabaab fighters, with federal forces and local Hawiye clan militias capturing key districts by late 2023, though gains were fragile due to insufficient troop holds.^[102] By early 2024, Al-Shabaab had re-infiltrated cleared areas through guerrilla tactics, reversing approximately 20-30% of territorial advances in central Somalia, as evidenced by increased militant attacks and taxation resumption in Mudug's rural zones.^[102] Northern Mudug saw Puntland's Danab special forces, trained and supported by the United States, conduct joint operations with Galmudug allies, including a October 2025 sweep in southern districts to disrupt Al-Shabaab supply lines. U.S. drone strikes played a supporting role, targeting high-value militants; for instance, a September 2025 airstrike near Ceel Dheer in adjacent Galguduud-Mudug border areas killed several Al-Shabaab operatives, contributing to localized disruptions but not broader territorial shifts.^[103] These efforts yielded measurable kills—Danab raids neutralized over 20 militants in mid-2025 operations—but failed to prevent Al-Shabaab's February 2025 counteroffensive, which recaptured strategic points in central Mudug through ambushes on overstretched SNA units.^[104] Stabilization faced persistent challenges from clan dynamics, with militias often prioritizing neutrality or switching allegiances based on local power balances rather than sustained anti-Al-Shabaab commitment, leading to defections that eroded frontline cohesion.^[105] Empirical data shows operations triggered IDP surges, such as over 5,820 displacements in western Mudug by June 2024 from clan clashes intertwined with counter-insurgency vacuums, exacerbating humanitarian strains without corresponding governance consolidation.^[106] Overall effectiveness remains limited, as Al-Shabaab exploited these fissures to maintain influence over 40-50% of Mudug's rural territory as of mid-2025, underscoring the need for integrated clan reconciliation alongside military pushes.^[100]