Fact-checked by Grok 2 weeks ago

Multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle

A (MIRV) is a system consisting of a post-boost , or "bus," that deploys several independently guided reentry vehicles, each carrying a capable of striking a distinct target. This configuration allows a single to attack multiple separated targets, multiplying the effective destructive capacity without requiring additional launchers. The technology relies on precise thrust maneuvers by the bus in space to dispense warheads sequentially, with each reentry vehicle following a unique toward its point after atmospheric reentry. The pioneered MIRV development in the as a response to emerging systems, with the first operational deployment occurring on the Minuteman III in 1970. This innovation significantly enhanced strategic deterrence by enabling one missile to overwhelm defenses and conduct strikes against hardened military assets, though it also intensified the by complicating dynamics. Subsequent adoption by the and other powers, including through systems like the , underscored MIRVs' role in escalating warhead counts under constraints. MIRV-equipped missiles, such as the Trident II submarine-launched variant, remain central to modern arsenals, balancing efficiency against treaty-limited vehicles.

Definition and Principles

Core Concept

A (MIRV) constitutes a designed to deliver several , each capable of striking a distinct . This capability arises from integrating multiple reentry vehicles—each containing a —onto a single , allowing to separate geographic locations rather than concentrating destructive power on one site. MIRVs emerged as a technological advancement in the to maximize the efficiency of limited inventories against hardened or dispersed , such as hardened or installations. The operational principle centers on a post-boost , commonly termed a "bus," which activates after the missile's primary propulsion stages exhaust their fuel in the exoatmospheric phase. This bus employs small thrusters for precise attitude control and velocity adjustments, sequentially releasing individual reentry vehicles on divergent ballistic trajectories toward pre-programmed targets. Each reentry vehicle then follows an independent path through reentry, relying on inertial guidance or stellar updates for accuracy, while countermeasures like decoys may accompany to evade defenses. The system necessitates compact warheads yielding 100-500 kilotons, to withstand reentry heat exceeding 1,600°C, and deployment mechanisms ensuring reliable separation without collision. In essence, MIRVs amplify a missile's strategic value by enabling one launch to threaten multiple sites, thereby complicating adversary defenses that must intercept numerous objects instead of a solitary . This contrasts with multiple reentry vehicle (MRV) configurations, where warheads lack independent targeting and cluster around a common aim point for area saturation. The independent targeting of MIRVs demands sophisticated engineering to achieve accuracies under 300 meters, underscoring the interplay of , , and guidance in realizing dispersed strikes. A multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) deploys multiple from a single , with each reentry vehicle (RV) guided to distinct, widely separated targets via a post-boost vehicle that maneuvers to release them on divergent trajectories, in contrast to a conventional single RV that delivers only one to a solitary aim point. This capability multiplies the effective targets per missile without proportional increases in , enabling strategic efficiency. MIRVs differ from multiple reentry vehicle (MRV) configurations, which release several warheads aimed at the same or closely proximate to achieve or area coverage, lacking independent post-release guidance for dispersed strikes; for instance, early systems like the U.S. A-3 employed MRVs where warheads followed ballistic paths with minimal separation, impacting within a limited footprint. Unlike decoys or other penetration aids—lightweight, non-explosive replicas released alongside RVs to overload defenses by mimicking signatures—MIRV RVs themselves house functional payloads designed for terminal impact. Decoys serve as countermeasures but do not contribute destructive yield, whereas MIRVs prioritize targetable lethality. MIRVs are also distinct from maneuverable reentry vehicles (MaRVs), which incorporate control surfaces or thrusters for adjustments during atmospheric reentry to evade interceptors or refine accuracy, typically as singular units rather than multiples independently dispensed; MIRV independence occurs primarily exoatmospherically via bus propulsion, though hybrid MIRV-MaRV designs have been explored for enhanced penetration.

Historical Development

Early Concepts and US Origins

The concept of affixing multiple warheads to ballistic missiles originated in the United States in the late 1950s, with early proposals for multiple reentry vehicles (MRVs) documented as early as 1959, though these systems dispensed warheads in a single trajectory without independent targeting. These initial ideas focused on increasing warhead delivery efficiency per missile to counter growing Soviet missile deployments and potential anti-ballistic missile (ABM) defenses, reflecting a shift toward counterforce targeting strategies that prioritized hardened military sites over broad area coverage. By the early 1960s, the MIRV configuration—featuring independently maneuverable reentry vehicles—emerged as a refinement, enabled by parallel advances in warhead miniaturization to yields of around 170 kilotons and lightweight post-boost propulsion systems. A critical technological foundation was laid in 1962 through space dispenser experiments, such as the ABLE-STAR and TRANSTAGE vehicles, which demonstrated the feasibility of sequentially releasing payloads from a single booster, serving as direct precursors to the MIRV "bus" that positions and releases individual reentry vehicles toward distinct targets. military planners, including the and , integrated these elements to address Soviet ABM developments like the Galosh system, aiming to saturate defenses and deliver precise strikes with reduced compared to single large-yield warheads (e.g., Minuteman I's 1.2 device). The MIRV approach thus represented a causal from MRV limitations, prioritizing multiplicity and accuracy over raw explosive power. Development accelerated with the 1966 decision to enlarge the third stage of the Minuteman III (ICBM), creating space for the post-boost vehicle to carry up to three reentry vehicles. The first full MIRV succeeded on August 16, 1968, validating the system's ability to deploy multiple independently guided warheads from a single Minuteman III launch. Initial operational deployment of MIRVed Minuteman III missiles occurred in June 1970 at , marking the as the pioneer in fielding this technology on an ICBM scale, ahead of submarine-launched variants like the C3 (deployed 1971). This progression stemmed from empirical testing of reentry dynamics and guidance, overcoming challenges like atmospheric dispersion and boost-phase maneuvering without reliance on unverified foreign intelligence claims of parity.

Soviet and Global Adoption

The accelerated MIRV research in the late 1960s following U.S. demonstrations, prioritizing heavy ICBMs to match or exceed American capabilities in warhead delivery. The R-36M ( SS-18 ), designed by Yuzhnoye Design Bureau, achieved initial operational capability in 1975 as the first Soviet MIRV-equipped ICBM, capable of carrying up to 10 warheads each with yields up to 750 kt, launched from hardened silos using cold-launch ejection. Subsequent variants, including the R-36M2 deployed in 1988, enhanced MIRV capacity to 10 reentry vehicles with improved post-boost vehicles for targeting over intercontinental ranges exceeding 11,000 km. The ( SS-19 ), entering service in 1975, provided a lighter MIRV option with 6 warheads, reflecting Soviet emphasis on silo-based and potential amid U.S. Minuteman III deployments. By the early 1980s, over 300 Soviet MIRV missiles were fielded, complicating as verified under the II framework, though systemic overestimation of Soviet accuracy in Western assessments later proved exaggerated. Global adoption lagged behind superpower competition, with allies and emerging powers integrating MIRVs primarily via submarine-launched systems for second-strike assurance. The , reliant on U.S. technology, equipped its Vanguard-class with the II D5 SLBM in 1994, each configurable for up to 8 MIRVs with 100-475 kt yields, maintaining a posture of minimum credible deterrence under integration. independently developed MIRV for its Triomphant-class SSBNs, deploying the M45 SLBM in 1996 with 6 TN-75 warheads of 100 kt each, later upgrading to the M51 series from 2010 onward for enhanced range over 9,000 km and flexibility against hardened targets. modernized its arsenal more recently, achieving MIRV deployment on the silo-based DF-5B ICBM around 2015, enabling up to 5-10 warheads per to penetrate U.S. defenses, as confirmed in assessments amid rapid construction. India joined the MIRV club in March 2024 with a successful test of the technology on its ICBM, featuring 3-6 independently targetable warheads for ranges beyond 5,000 km, driven by deterrence needs against and without formal treaty constraints. , as Soviet successor, retains legacy SS-18s alongside newer MIRVed ICBMs with 4-6 warheads, while has pursued but not confirmed operational MIRVs on Shaheen-series missiles. Proliferation remains limited by technical barriers, including post-boost propulsion and decoy discrimination, with non-proliferation regimes like the MTCR constraining transfers despite covert assistance allegations.

Key Milestones and Proliferation

The initiated MIRV development in the mid-1960s, with formal authorization in 1965 for integration into the Minuteman III (ICBM). The first successful of a Minuteman III carrying a MIRV configuration occurred on August 16, 1968, demonstrating the release and independent targeting of multiple reentry vehicles. Operational deployment began in 1970, with the Minuteman III entering service equipped with up to three Mark 12 warheads, marking the first fielding of true MIRV technology and significantly expanding U.S. nuclear strike capacity against hardened targets. The Soviet Union accelerated MIRV research in response to U.S. advances, achieving its first operational deployment in December 1974 on the R-36M (SS-18 ) ICBM, capable of carrying up to 10 warheads. This followed initial tests in the early 1970s and rapidly scaled Soviet arsenal potency, with systems like the UR-100N (SS-19) also incorporating MIRVs by the mid-1970s. By the late 1970s, both superpowers had integrated MIRVs into submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), with the U.S. Poseidon C3 entering service in 1971 and Soviet equivalents like the R-29RM Shtil following in the 1980s. Proliferation beyond the original rivals occurred gradually, with deploying MIRVs on its M4 SLBM in the 1980s aboard Le Triomphant-class submarines, enhancing its independent deterrent with up to six s per . The adopted MIRV capability through the U.S.-supplied II D5 SLBM in the , deployed on Vanguard-class submarines with configurable loads up to eight. fielded its first MIRVed ICBM, the DF-5B, around 2015, capable of delivering multiple s and reflecting a shift toward capabilities amid arsenal modernization. joined this group with a successful MIRV test on the ICBM on March 11, 2024, under Mission Divyastra, enabling up to three independently targeted s to bolster second-strike reliability against regional threats. Russia, successor to the Soviet program, maintains extensive MIRV deployments on ICBMs like the and SLBMs, while has tested MIRV prototypes such as the Ababeel medium-range ballistic missile since 2017 but has not confirmed operational deployment amid reported test setbacks. and are assessed to possess or be developing MIRV technology, though public evidence remains limited to claims and indirect indicators rather than verified fielding. This spread has complicated , as MIRVs evade numerical limits under treaties like by concentrating warheads on fewer launchers, prompting debates over strategic stability.

Technical Operation

Post-Boost Vehicle Mechanics

The post-boost vehicle (PBV), also referred to as the bus or reentry system, separates from the missile's upper booster upon termination, initiating the dispensing for multiple reentry (RVs) in MIRV configurations. This self-contained functions exoatmospherically as a maneuvering platform, carrying the RVs, penetration aids, and decoys while executing precise velocity adjustments to enable independent targeting. Propulsion in the PBV relies on restartable engines, such as liquid-fueled or solid-propellant motors like the in systems such as the Minuteman III, which deliver impulsive burns for delta-v increments. These burns provide the differential velocity needed to disperse RVs onto divergent ballistic trajectories, with total delta-v capabilities historically limited to approximately 1,000 m/s per under agreements like SALT II to constrain target separation over hundreds to thousands of kilometers. control thrusters, often using hypergolic propellants like , maintain orientation during maneuvers, minimizing structural stresses on the . Guidance and control are managed by an onboard , exemplified by the Set (MGS) in U.S. ICBMs, which employs accelerometers, gyroscopes, and a digital flight computer (e.g., NS-20 or upgraded NS-50 series) to compute and corrections. The PBV orients to pre-programmed release points, sequencing RV deployments individually to optimize —typically releasing longer-range warheads first—while backing away post-release to prevent collision. This sequential process, conducted in the vacuum of space, ensures each RV acquires a unique apogee and impact without atmospheric interference. Engineering emphasis on lightweight composites and redundant systems addresses mass constraints, as the PBV must accommodate up to 10 or more RVs in advanced designs like while preserving overall limits. Reliability challenges include management during orbital coast and precise timing to counter potential defenses, with verification historically derived from data.

Reentry and Guidance Systems

The reentry vehicles (RVs) of MIRV systems are engineered as compact, conical structures to endure hypersonic at velocities exceeding 7 km/s, generating intense and sheaths that can disrupt communications. These RVs, such as the Mk 12 for Minuteman III or Mk 21 for , feature sharp-nosed cones to reduce , maintain speed, and minimize detectability compared to earlier blunt shapes, enabling penetration of defended . Thermal protection relies on ablative heat shields, where outer layers of materials like carbon-phenolic composites or erode through and , dissipating frictional heat fluxes that can reach thousands of kW/m². Asymmetric ablation on nose tips, observed in early tests, risked perturbations, prompting refinements in material uniformity and hypersonic validations to ensure structural integrity under peak deceleration forces exceeding 20g. The process culminates in the RV's descent to impact, with the arming near terminal phase. Guidance for MIRV RVs integrates inertial navigation primarily during boost and post-boost phases, with the missile's onboard computer—such as the D-37D in Minuteman III—computing velocity vectors for sequential RV releases from the post-boost vehicle (e.g., the 440-second active PSRE stage). Each RV receives a pre-set via differential maneuvers of the bus, lacking active or surfaces in standard designs to preserve simplicity and reliability. Gyro-stabilized platforms and accelerometers correct for launch errors, enabling independent targeting over intercontinental ranges. System accuracies, quantified by circular error probable (CEP)—the radius within which 50% of warheads are expected to land—demonstrate precision refinements: Minuteman III achieves approximately 120 m CEP post-upgrades, while attained 90 m CEP through advanced inertial components. These metrics support hard-target engagement, though environmental factors like atmospheric variability impose inherent limits on unpowered reentry paths.

Engineering Challenges Overcome

The development of MIRV systems required overcoming significant engineering hurdles, primarily in miniaturizing nuclear s, designing a maneuverable post-boost vehicle (PBV), achieving precise guidance for independent targeting, and ensuring reentry vehicle survivability. , these challenges were addressed through iterative testing and innovations starting in the early , culminating in the first successful MIRV on the Minuteman III ICBM in August 1968. Warhead miniaturization demanded reducing size and weight to accommodate multiple units within existing payloads; for instance, the for Minuteman III and achieved yields of 170 kt and 40-50 kt respectively at weights allowing 3-14 per , resolved via advanced physics package designs at despite constraints on efficiency. The PBV, or "bus," posed the core mechanical challenge: it must execute low-thrust maneuvers in vacuum to sequentially release reentry vehicles (RVs) onto divergent trajectories, stabilizing against perturbations while expending minimal propellant. US engineers developed liquid-fueled Vernier engines and attitude control systems for this, enabling the Minuteman III PBV to dispense three RVs by 1970 and the Poseidon C-3 up to 14 by 1971, overcoming initial weight and volume limits through two-tier platform designs that adjusted for target dispersion. Guidance systems required inertial platforms augmented by stellar-inertial updates for circular error probable (CEP) accuracies of 300-400 meters, doubling Minuteman III precision by 1977 via onboard digital computers and gyroscopes, which mitigated errors from boost-phase vibrations and space-environment disturbances. Reentry engineering addressed hypersonic atmospheric stresses, including peak heating exceeding 10,000°C and plasma-induced , through ablative heat shields and spin-stabilization techniques to maintain RV integrity and accuracy. —where one 's or debris affects siblings—was mitigated by timed releases and trajectory spacing in the PBV sequence. These solutions, validated in over 100 flight tests by the early 1970s, enabled operational deployment on 550 Minuteman III silos by 1975 and submarines, transforming single-warhead missiles into multi-target systems without proportional increases in launch mass. Later refinements, such as the Mk-12A in 1979, further optimized yield-to-weight ratios under test ban constraints post-1992.

Strategic Implications

Deterrence Enhancement

MIRVs bolster nuclear deterrence by enabling a single to deploy multiple warheads against disparate targets, thereby expanding the scope and lethality of retaliatory strikes without necessitating an equivalent expansion in missile inventories. This efficiency allows nations to maintain a robust second-strike , where surviving can inflict unacceptable on an aggressor's centers or command , reinforcing . For instance, the U.S. Minuteman III, operational with three MIRVs since 1970, exemplified this by tripling the warheads per silo amid Soviet numerical advantages in ICBMs, ensuring greater coverage and credibility in targeting. Furthermore, MIRVs enhance penetration against emerging missile defenses, as the simultaneous arrival of multiple reentry vehicles, often accompanied by decoys and penetration aids, overwhelms interceptor systems and elevates the likelihood of successful warhead delivery. This dynamic strengthens deterrence by diminishing an adversary's confidence in neutralizing an opponent's arsenal, particularly in scenarios where defenses might otherwise erode second-strike efficacy. Pakistan's pursuit of MIRV technology on systems like the Ababeel missile, tested in 2017, has been explicitly framed as a means to "increase stability and deterrence by increasing the chances of penetrating" Indian ballistic missile defenses. Similarly, India's 2024 demonstration of MIRV capability on the Agni-V ICBM aims to counter Chinese advancements, restoring strategic balance through improved survivability and targeting flexibility. In broader strategic terms, MIRVs facilitate arsenal growth without proportional infrastructure demands, allowing states to scale numbers rapidly—China's DF-5B, MIRVed since around 2015, exemplifies this by potentially deploying 5-10 s per missile, complicating U.S. damage-limiting options and upholding deterrence amid expanding production. However, while this amplifies offensive potential, it hinges on operational reliability, as verified through tests like the U.S. Peacekeeper's 10- configuration in the 1980s, which underscored the technology's role in sustaining credible threats despite constraints.

Counterforce and Stability Dynamics

Multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) augment strategies by enabling a single booster to deliver several warheads to distinct hardened targets, such as enemy silos or command nodes, thereby optimizing strike efficiency against military infrastructure over broad targeting of population centers. The pursued this capability during the , integrating MIRVs into the LGM-30G Minuteman III starting with operational deployment of three Mk-12 warheads in June 1970, followed by the LGM-118A in 1986, which carried ten Mk-21 reentry vehicles each yielding approximately 300 kilotons, explicitly designed to penetrate Soviet silo defenses. The mirrored this with the R-36M (SS-18 ) , deploying up to ten MIRVs by the mid-1970s to achieve comparable potential against assets. In terms of stability dynamics, MIRVs erode crisis by magnifying first-strike incentives: a preemptive attacker can destroy multiple fixed-site using fewer missiles than would be required with unitary warheads, potentially degrading the defender's retaliatory capacity and creating a "use it or lose it" during escalatory tensions. This dynamic contrasts with single-warhead systems, where assured second-strike forces maintain mutual vulnerability under principles; MIRV proliferation instead fosters perceptions of feasible damage limitation, as evidenced by U.S. doctrinal shifts toward limited nuclear options under the 1974 Schlesinger Doctrine, which emphasized selective employment to control escalation. Soviet analysts similarly viewed MIRVs as first-strike enablers, contributing to pressures despite mutual deterrence . Arms control measures highlighted these tensions, with the 1972 SALT I treaty capping launcher numbers but permitting unrestricted MIRV deployment, resulting in a surge of deliverable s—from roughly 1,000 U.S. strategic s in 1972 to over 7,000 by the early 1980s—exacerbating instability until subsequent accords like in 1991 limited total s to 6,000 per side. De-MIRVing proposals, such as those considered in the U.S. 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, aimed to restore stability by reducing prompt options and first-strike advantages, though implementation remained partial amid ongoing modernization. Contemporary developments, including China's ICBM with MIRV capacity tested in 2019, revive similar concerns, as expanded multiplication on mobile or silo-based systems could further compress decision timelines in crises. While MIRVs enhance operational flexibility and deterrence credibility against limited threats, their net effect on strategic stability favors over assured mutual restraint, underscoring the causal link between multiplicity and preemptive pressures.

Interplay with Missile Defenses

Multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) fundamentally challenge (BMD) systems by enabling a single to deliver numerous warheads to distinct , thereby saturating limited interceptor capacities. Unlike single-warhead missiles, MIRVs multiply the number of threats without a proportional increase in launch platforms, making it economically inefficient for defenses to scale interceptors accordingly; for instance, a carrying 3-10 warheads requires an equivalent number of successful intercepts to neutralize, often exceeding the deployed inventory of systems like the U.S. (GMD), which fields around 44 interceptors as of 2023 primarily for rogue-state threats rather than peer adversaries. This saturation effect was a key factor in the U.S. deployment of MIRVs on Minuteman III ICBMs in the 1970s, specifically to penetrate anticipated Soviet (ABM) defenses around . MIRVs exacerbate BMD difficulties when paired with penetration aids and countermeasures, such as decoys, , and maneuvering reentry vehicles, which complicate target discrimination during the midcourse phase. These aids create a cluttered exo-atmospheric where s must distinguish lightweight decoys from heavier real warheads amid and orbital , a problem amplified by MIRV patterns that spread reentry vehicles over hundreds of kilometers. SS-18 missiles, capable of up to 10 MIRVs, incorporate such measures to counter U.S. and defenses, rendering interception probabilities low without massive interceptor deployments. Engineering analyses indicate that even advanced hit-to-kill interceptors like the U.S. struggle against MIRV salvos, as discrimination failures can lead to wasted shots on non-threatening objects. Strategically, MIRVs shift the offense-defense balance toward offense, as their deployment incentivizes attackers to exploit defense vulnerabilities while deterring robust BMD expansion due to cost asymmetries—each additional interceptor costs tens of millions, whereas MIRV adaptations leverage existing missiles. This dynamic contributed to the 1972 ABM Treaty's emphasis on limiting defenses to preserve mutual vulnerability, though post-2002 U.S. withdrawals have prompted and to enhance MIRV capabilities on systems like the and to offset perceived BMD advantages. Empirical assessments from U.S. tests show interception success rates dropping significantly against simulated MIRV scenarios with countermeasures, underscoring persistent technical hurdles.

Deployed Systems

United States Arsenal

The United States deploys MIRV capabilities on select strategic ballistic missiles as part of its nuclear triad, with the Trident II D5 submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) serving as the primary system configured for multiple warheads under current operational deployments. The land-based LGM-30G Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) retains MIRV capability but is limited to single warhead configurations to comply with arms control limits. As of early 2025, approximately 400 Minuteman III missiles are deployed across silos in Wyoming, Montana, and North Dakota, each capable of carrying up to three reentry vehicles armed with W78 (350 kilotons yield) or W87 (300 kilotons) warheads, though operational loads are restricted to one warhead per missile. The U.S. Air Force conducts periodic test launches of Minuteman III with unarmed MIRVs to verify post-boost vehicle functionality and maintain technical proficiency. The II D5, deployed on Ohio-class submarines, represents the only U.S. strategic routinely loaded with MIRVs, enabling up to eight warheads per through its Mk 4 or Mk 5 reentry vehicles, typically employing W76-1 (90 kilotons) or fewer (455 kilotons) warheads to balance and payload under treaty constraints. Each of the 14 operational U.S. submarines carries up to 20 D5 s, though actual warhead counts are reduced for compliance, which caps deployed strategic warheads at 1,550. The system's post-boost vehicle dispenses warheads independently, with a exceeding 12,000 kilometers, supporting flexible targeting from submerged platforms. The retired LGM-118A Peacekeeper ICBM, deactivated in 2005, previously carried up to ten W87 warheads, demonstrating advanced MIRV density but was phased out to adhere to START II provisions and reduce silo vulnerability. Ongoing modernization efforts, including the W87-1 warhead for the future Ground Based Strategic Deterrent (Sentinel) ICBM, focus on single warhead designs initially, though debates persist on reinstating MIRVs for Minuteman III before its replacement around 2030. These configurations reflect a balance between deterrence requirements and verifiable limits under treaties like New START, set to expire in 2026 absent extension.

Russian Federation Systems

The Russian Strategic Rocket Forces maintain several intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) systems equipped with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs), primarily silo-based and mobile platforms designed for enhanced penetration and target coverage. These systems form a core component of Russia's nuclear triad, with MIRV configurations allowing for the delivery of multiple warheads per missile to counter defenses and maximize destructive potential. As of 2024, key deployed MIRV-capable ICBMs include the R-36M2 Voevoda (NATO: SS-18 Mod 6 Satan) and the RS-24 Yars (NATO: SS-27 Mod 2), with the RS-28 Sarmat in limited initial deployment to replace older heavy ICBMs. The R-36M2 Voevoda, a liquid-fueled, two-stage silo-launched ICBM introduced in the late , remains operational with approximately 46-50 missiles as of early 2024, each capable of carrying 10 MIRVs with yields of 500-750 kilotons each, plus penetration aids and decoys for up to 40 total objects to overwhelm missile defenses. Its range exceeds 11,000 km, and it employs a cold-launch ejection system from hardened silos, enabling rapid salvo firing. for the MIRV variant concluded in 1988, with ongoing service life extensions supporting its role in Russia's strategic deterrent amid treaty limits. The , a solid-fueled, three-stage ICBM deployable from TELs or , entered service in 2010 and constitutes the bulk of Russia's ICBM , with over 150 launchers operational by 2024. It carries 3-4 MIRVs, each with variable yields up to 300 kilotons, alongside maneuverable reentry vehicles and decoys for evading defenses; some configurations may support up to 6 warheads under treaty constraints. With a of 11,000-12,000 km, Yars emphasizes survivability through road-mobile basing and quick-reaction launches, as demonstrated in exercises deploying nuclear-capable units in 2024-2025. The UR-100NUTTH (: SS-19 ), a liquid-fueled -based ICBM from the 1970s, supported up to 6 MIRVs with 400-500 kiloton yields and a 10,000 range but has been largely retired, with service life extensions only to 2023 and negligible operational numbers post- inspections. The RS-28 , a super-heavy liquid-fueled ICBM tested since 2022, is MIRV-capable with a projected 10+ warheads (potentially up to 15 lighter ones) and fractional orbital bombardment options, boasting an 18,000 range and 208-ton launch weight; initial deployments began in 2023-2024 at sites like Uzhur, though full operational status remains limited by testing delays. These systems adhere to caps, with suspending inspections in 2022 but continuing data exchanges until the treaty's 2026 expiration.

Other Nations' Capabilities

China possesses operational MIRV capabilities on its DF-41 road-mobile (ICBM), which entered service around 2017 and can carry up to three warheads according to U.S. Department of Defense assessments, though some analyses suggest potential for more. The silo-based DF-5B ICBM, an earlier system, also features MIRV with up to five warheads, enhancing 's ability to penetrate missile defenses. These systems form the backbone of 's expanding nuclear arsenal, with the DF-41 publicly displayed during a . India conducted its first successful MIRV test using the Agni-V ICBM on March 11, 2024, demonstrating the ability to deliver multiple warheads to independent targets over 5,000 km. A follow-up test in August 2025 confirmed the system's canister-launched configuration and bunker-busting potential, positioning as India's premier strategic deterrent against regional adversaries. While not yet fully deployed at scale, these tests mark India's entry into operational MIRV territory. France's M51 submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM), deployed since 2010 on Triomphant-class submarines, supports MIRV with up to six TN75 warheads per missile, totaling around 80 warheads across 16 missiles in some configurations. The ongoing M51.4 upgrade, contracted in 2025, aims to extend range and penetration against defenses for future submarines. The United Kingdom relies on the U.S.-developed Trident II (D5) SLBM, MIRV-capable with up to eight warheads per missile, deployed on Vanguard-class submarines since the 1990s and planned for Dreadnought-class successors. Each missile carries a post-boost vehicle enabling independent targeting over 12,000 km. Israel's Jericho-3 ICBM, operational since around 2011, is suspected of MIRV potential with a payload capacity for 1,000-1,300 kg supporting multiple warheads, though official confirmation remains absent due to policy opacity. North Korea unveiled the Hwasong-20 solid-fueled ICBM in October 2025, claiming MIRV capability with a 15,000 km range, but lacks verified flight tests confirming independent reentry vehicle deployment. Pakistan's Ababeel medium-range ballistic missile, tested since 2017, is designed for MIRV to counter Indian defenses, but a July 2025 test failure highlights ongoing developmental challenges.

Testing and Arms Control

Major Tests and Verifiable Deployments

The pioneered MIRV technology with flight tests of a MIRVed system conducted in 1968, culminating in the operational deployment of the LGM-30G Minuteman III ICBM, which carried up to three independently able reentry vehicles. The first Minuteman III missile was placed on alert status on August 19, 1970, at , , marking the initial verifiable fielding of MIRVs in the U.S. arsenal. Subsequent tests validated the system's accuracy and reliability, with operational configurations emphasizing hardened target engagement. The ICBM, designed to carry up to 10 MIRVs for counterforce missions, underwent extensive flight testing in the early 1980s, including demonstrations of multiple reentry vehicle dispersion observed at test ranges like . Initial deployments began in 1986 at Air Force Base, , with 50 missiles eventually silo-based, each equipped with warheads in MIRV configuration until retirement in 2005 under reductions. For sea-launched systems, the UGM-133 Trident II (D5) SLBM achieved first deployment in 1990 aboard USS Tennessee (SSBN-734), capable of delivering up to eight MIRVs with W88 or W76 warheads. Ongoing verification tests, such as the two-missile launches from USS Wyoming in 2018, have confirmed sustained MIRV functionality, with over 190 successful flights by 2025 demonstrating system readiness. The responded with its first confirmed ICBM MIRV test in July 1973 using the R-36 (SS-18 Satan) platform, followed by SLBM MIRV validation with the RSM-40 (SS-N-18 ) in November 1976. Verifiable deployments included SS-18 variants operational from 1974 onward, carrying up to 10 MIRVs, which formed the backbone of Russia's heavy ICBM force and influenced subsequent treaties limiting such capabilities. Russian systems like the continue MIRV deployments today, with tests verifying up to six warheads per missile. France and the United Kingdom maintain MIRV capabilities on M51 and Trident II SLBMs, respectively, with initial deployments in the 1990s and 2010s following successful post-Cold War tests. China operationalized MIRVs on ICBMs by the early 2010s, with recent tests of the road-mobile ICBM confirming up to 10 reentry vehicles. India's MIRV test on March 11, 2024, demonstrated three-warhead capability, though full deployment remains pending verification.

Influence of Treaties

The (SALT) I Interim Agreement of May 26, 1972, indirectly facilitated MIRV deployment by capping (ICBM) and (SLBM) launchers at existing levels—1,054 for the and 1,618 for the —while permitting the retrofitting of existing missiles with multiple warheads, thereby enabling warhead proliferation without additional launchers. The accompanying Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, signed on the same date, restricted nationwide missile defenses to two sites (later reduced to one in 1974), which reduced incentives for defensive investments and amplified the strategic value of MIRVs by enhancing offensive penetration capabilities against limited defenses. SALT II, signed on June 18, 1979, imposed direct constraints on MIRVs by limiting MIRV-equipped missiles to 1,320 per side within a broader ceiling of 2,250 strategic delivery vehicles, alongside prohibitions on new ICBM types exceeding certain parameters and requirements to treat all missiles of a tested MIRV type as MIRV-capable for verification purposes. Although the U.S. did not ratify SALT II due to concerns over Soviet compliance and verification, both superpowers adhered to its provisions until 1986, influencing deployment decisions such as the U.S. restraint in MIRVing additional Minuteman III missiles beyond tested configurations. The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) I, effective July 31, 1991, shifted focus to limits—6,000 accountable s and 1,600 deployed launchers—attributing multiple s to MIRVed missiles based on prior testing data, which compelled transparency through on-site inspections and data exchanges to verify MIRV loadings and prevent undeclared additions. This counting rule addressed MIRV-induced asymmetries but highlighted verification challenges, as post-boost vehicles could obscure exact numbers without intrusive measures. , signed January 3, 1993, sought to mitigate first-strike incentives by banning MIRVs on land-based ICBMs—requiring conversion to single- configurations—and capping total s at 3,000–3,500, though it never entered force due to Russian Duma rejection amid expansion concerns. New START, signed April 8, 2010, and extended to February 5, 2026, further refined MIRV influences by capping deployed strategic warheads at 1,550, delivery vehicles at 700, and launchers at 800, with warheads counted per deployed MIRVed missile via exchanged notifications and inspections, effectively pressuring parties to optimize loadouts (e.g., U.S. Trident II submarines carrying up to 8 MIRVs but often fewer to stay under limits). Russia's February 2023 suspension of —citing U.S. compliance issues and the ongoing conflict—has loosened these constraints, potentially enabling resumed MIRV expansions on systems like the , though mutual adherence had previously stabilized deployments by linking MIRV numbers to overall warhead ceilings.

Recent Developments

In September 2025, the U.S. recommended re-uploading multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) onto existing Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missiles to enhance targeting flexibility amid delays in the replacement program, which has faced cost overruns exceeding initial estimates by billions and potential operational delays beyond 2029. The , designed to succeed the Minuteman III fleet of approximately 400 missiles, incorporates provisions for multiple warheads per missile, though current U.S. policy under limits—prior to Russia's suspension—constrained such configurations to single warheads on most deployed ICBMs. Russia's February 2023 suspension of participation in the treaty eliminated on-site inspections and data exchanges, reducing transparency on MIRV loadings for systems like the , which can carry up to six warheads plus penetration aids and has undergone multiple tests, including a successful launch on October 21, 2025, from demonstrating its 12,000 km range. This move, justified by as a response to U.S. policies, has heightened uncertainties in warhead counting rules that attribute MIRV-capable missiles with their maximum potential warheads under the treaty's framework. China continues expanding its road-mobile ICBM arsenal, capable of carrying up to 10 MIRVs with yields up to 150 kilotons each, as part of a buildup projected to exceed 1,000 warheads by 2030; construction for DF-41 variants accelerated post-2021, with the integrating these into operational units despite lacking formal constraints. India's March 2024 test of a MIRV configuration on the ICBM, featuring three warheads with independent targeting, marked a milestone in its strategic deterrence posture, extending effective range to over 5,000 km and complicating regional calculations. These advancements reflect broader trends, where MIRV adoption by non-superpower states amplifies strike capabilities against hardened targets without proportional increases in delivery vehicles.

Controversies and Critiques

Escalation and First-Strike Incentives

The deployment of MIRVs incentivizes first-strike strategies by permitting a single to deliver multiple warheads against dispersed fixed targets, such as enemy ICBM , thereby enhancing efficiency and the potential for a disarming . In the U.S.-Soviet context, the Minuteman III ICBM, which entered service in 1970 equipped with up to three MIRVs, exemplified this by enabling more warheads to be allocated per launcher for targeting Soviet , a dynamic that Soviet systems like the R-36M (deployed 1975) mirrored in response. This multiplication of destructive potential per missile reduces the number of surviving adversary launchers in a hypothetical preemptive exchange, eroding the survivability central to . Silo-based MIRVed systems amplify first-strike pressures through a "use them or lose them" imperative, as a single incoming can destroy an entire , prompting rapid launch decisions during crises to preserve retaliatory options. U.S. Minuteman III missiles, previously MIRVed, faced this , with approximately 450 kept on high alert, heightening risks of accidental or premature use; to mitigate this, the U.S. de-MIRVed all Minuteman IIIs by June 2014, limiting each to one in line with the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review's stability goals and limits of 1,550 deployed warheads. Soviet adoption of MIRVs similarly destabilized forces, contributing to launch-on-warning postures in the 1970s amid perceived U.S. advantages. MIRVs exacerbate escalation risks by compressing response times—ICBM flights under 30 minutes—and fueling arms races through action-reaction cycles, as seen in the U.S.-Soviet buildup from around 5,000 U.S. warheads in 1970 to over 10,000 by 1978, unconstrained by SALT I (1972). Such proliferation supports counterforce-oriented doctrines, like U.S. Presidential Directive 59 (1980), which prioritized military targets and increased miscalculation potential in crises. In regions like , emerging MIRV capabilities, such as India's (tested 2012), risk analogous instability by prompting responses from and , potentially adding hundreds of warheads and lowering thresholds for nuclear employment amid limited dialogue.

Proliferation and Verification Issues

The proliferation of MIRV technology beyond the original developers—the United States and Soviet Union—has introduced significant challenges to global non-proliferation efforts, as emerging nuclear powers acquire capabilities that amplify strike potential without corresponding transparency mechanisms. India conducted its first MIRV test flight using the Agni-V missile on March 11, 2024, joining the ranks of nations with demonstrated MIRV proficiency, though full operational deployment remains under development. Pakistan tested its Ababeel missile, designed for MIRV payloads, in January 2017, raising concerns over regional arms races in South Asia where counterforce targeting incentives could destabilize deterrence. North Korea has pursued MIRV development for its Hwasong-series ICBMs, with state media claims of success in 2017 tests, though independent verification is limited. These advancements occur outside the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)'s direct purview on delivery vehicles, complicating export controls under regimes like the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), which lacks enforcement teeth against state programs. Verification of MIRV deployments poses acute technical and political hurdles in regimes, as distinguishing MIRVed from single- via national technical means (e.g., or ) is inherently difficult without intrusive inspections. The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) process relied on data exchanges and on-site inspections to monitor MIRV bus deployments, but these measures proved inadequate for counting, enabling potential breakout scenarios where a single could deliver multiple undeclared strikes. Post-New START expiration in February 2026, the absence of successor agreements exacerbates risks, with U.S. assessments highlighting unverifiable reductions in MIRVed systems amid hypersonic and fractional orbital bombardment developments that further obscure payloads. Multilateral verification for proliferators like or lacks precedents, as bilateral U.S.- frameworks do not extend to third parties, fostering mistrust and incentives for over-arming. Efforts to mitigate these issues through release protocols or seals have faltered due to concerns and technological countermeasures, such as decoys and penetration aids that mimic MIRV signatures. amplifies verification opacity, as non-NPT states face no obligations for declarations, while even compliant parties exploit ambiguities—e.g., Russia's alleged non-compliance with INF telemetry in the —to mask capabilities. Balanced against these risks, some analysts argue MIRVs enhance second-strike credibility for smaller arsenals, but empirical data from South Asian tests indicate heightened escalation ladders without verifiable restraints.

Balanced Assessment of Risks vs. Benefits

Multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) offer strategic benefits primarily through enhanced efficiency in nuclear delivery systems. By enabling a single to deploy multiple warheads against separated , MIRVs allow for greater destructive potential per launch platform, reducing the need for additional missiles and associated costs while maximizing utilization. This capability was developed in the to counter (ABM) defenses, as the dispersion of warheads can saturate interceptors, ensuring higher penetration rates and bolstering second-strike assurance under (MAD) doctrines. For instance, the U.S. Minuteman III, deployed with up to three MIRVs since 1970, exemplified this by providing flexible targeting against hardened Soviet or cities without proportional expansion of the ICBM fleet. Despite these advantages, MIRVs introduce significant risks that often undermine strategic . Their potential—destroying multiple enemy warheads or silos with one —creates incentives for preemptive first strikes, as an attacker could neutralize a disproportionate share of an adversary's arsenal in a disarming blow, eroding retaliatory capabilities. This dynamic fueled arms racing, with the U.S. deploying MIRVs on 450 Minuteman III missiles by the 1980s, prompting Soviet countermeasures that escalated warhead totals to over 10,000 on each side by 1986. Verification challenges further exacerbate risks; distinguishing MIRVed from single-warhead missiles or accurately counting reentry vehicles proves difficult under treaties like START, complicating compliance monitoring and fostering mistrust, as seen in post-ABM Treaty negotiations where MIRV limits were prioritized to mitigate proliferation incentives. On balance, while MIRVs enhance deterrence against defenses and improve , their destabilizing effects—particularly first-strike temptations and barriers to verifiable arms reductions—predominate, as evidenced by historical escalations and ongoing analyses from strategic experts. Empirical outcomes, such as the U.S.-Soviet buildup following MIRV introduction, indicate that benefits accrue asymmetrically to aggressive postures, whereas risks amplify and proliferation pressures in multipolar contexts, like potential or deployments. Prioritizing single-warhead systems in future arsenals could restore stability by aligning capabilities more closely with pure retaliatory deterrence, though transitioning incurs technical and doctrinal hurdles.

References

  1. [1]
    Fact Sheet: Multiple Independently-targetable Reentry Vehicle (MIRV)
    Aug 28, 2017 · MIRVs were originally developed in the early 1960s to permit a missile to deliver multiple nuclear warheads to different targets.Missing: explanation | Show results with:explanation
  2. [2]
    [PDF] Multiple Independently-targetable Reentry Vehicle (MIRV)
    MIRVs allow a missile to deliver multiple nuclear warheads to different targets, unlike traditional missiles that carry only one warhead.Missing: explanation | Show results with:explanation
  3. [3]
    The Rise and Semi-Fall of MIRV | Air & Space Forces Magazine
    The US flight-tested a MIRVed system in 1968 and began deploying the triple-warhead Minuteman III in 1970. The USSR soon followed, catching and up with and then ...
  4. [4]
    The Minuteman III Missile (U.S. National Park Service)
    Oct 20, 2020 · The Minuteman III was the first US Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) that could deliver Multiple Independent Reentry Vehicles (MIRVs) to a target.Missing: definition | Show results with:definition
  5. [5]
    MIRVs - The National Security Archive
    MIRVs are multiple, independently targetable reentry vehicles, designed to enhance first-strike capability and reduce collateral damage by matching yield to ...Missing: explanation | Show results with:explanation
  6. [6]
    Air Force history of ICBM development, safeguarding America
    Mar 5, 2012 · This idea influenced the Minuteman III, which introduced the MIRV system (Multiple Independently- Targeted Reentry Vehicle). The Minuteman ...Missing: definition | Show results with:definition
  7. [7]
    A Brief History of U.S. Navy Fleet Ballistic Missiles and Submarines
    Jun 24, 2024 · MIRV, or multiple independently-targeted reentry vehicle, indicates multiple nuclear payloads capable of striking multiple targets.Missing: definition | Show results with:definition
  8. [8]
    [PDF] Research and
    (This is a quite different concept from the M1RV, which stands for multiple independently-targetable reentry vehicle: that a missile is. MIRVed merely means ...
  9. [9]
    India's Missile Modernization Beyond Minimum Deterrence
    Oct 4, 2013 · ... (MIRV) missiles deliver two or more warheads against different targets. ... MRV might involve 2-3 warheads but 4 or more warheads imply MIRV.
  10. [10]
    [PDF] Lesson 4: Mulple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicles (MIRVs)
    Sep 10, 2025 · A Mulple Reentry Vehicle technology basically means that the countries can release mulple warheads after the boosng phase of the missile flight, ...
  11. [11]
    We Must Prevent North Korea from Testing Multiple Reentry Vehicles
    Nov 5, 2020 · The more advanced MIRV (multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle) capability is far better known and more flexible. As the name ...
  12. [12]
    A MIRVed Agni to Counter China and Pakistan
    Oct 6, 2021 · MIRVs are also different from the Multiple Reentry Vehicle (MRV) technology, whereby two to three reentry vehicles strike on the same target to ...
  13. [13]
    What India's MIRV test adds to the 'strategic trilemma' in South Asia
    May 3, 2024 · Decoy warheads can also be deployed on missiles fitted with MIRVs to overwhelm the adversary's ballistic missile defense systems, making ...Missing: distinction | Show results with:distinction
  14. [14]
    China - Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance
    MIRV allows for ballistic missiles to carry multiple warheads that can be aimed at different targets within the same area, whereas MaRV is capable of ...
  15. [15]
    Countermeasures, Penetration Aids, and Missile Defense
    Oct 17, 2025 · By the mid-1970s, the MK500 Evader MaRV had been flight tested four times, while PAVE PEPPER, a concept for up to seven small reentry vehicles ...
  16. [16]
    [PDF] The Lure and Pitfalls of MIRVs - Stimson Center
    The time frame of US MIRV development was shorter, but still relatively long. In the US case, the idea of MIRVing dates back to at least 1959; development began.
  17. [17]
    Retrospectives on MIRVing in the First Nuclear Age
    Apr 5, 2016 · So what were the prime movers behind MIRVs in the United States? Two stand out: the Soviet challenge and the embrace of counterforce targeting.
  18. [18]
    [PDF] USAF Ballistic Missile Programs 1969 to 1970
    The PBPS permitted deployment of the multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle -. (MIRV). These might be directed to separate and widely dispersed ...Missing: distinction | Show results with:distinction
  19. [19]
    Air Force celebrates 50th anniversary of the Minuteman III ICBM
    Aug 21, 2020 · The Minuteman III was the first ICBM designed to carry the Multiple Independently targetable Re-entry Vehicle capability, or MIRV. This ...
  20. [20]
    R-36 (SS-18 "Satan") | Missile Threat - CSIS
    The first three initial versions of the SS-18 were designed to have either a single warhead or MIRV capability. ... Russia to Deploy Sarmat ICBM in 2021.
  21. [21]
    R-36M | 15A14 | SS-18 | Satan| RS-20 - RussianSpaceWeb.com
    Developed in the early 1970s, the R-36M became the largest ballistic missile ever deployed by the Soviet strategic forces. Known in the West as SS-18 Satan ...
  22. [22]
    UR-100 (SS-19) - Missile Threat - CSIS
    The SS-19 entered development in 1968 with the first flight test of the Mod 1 taking place in April 1973. The missile entered service in 1975 as the last of the ...
  23. [23]
    Trident D5 - Missile Threat - CSIS
    In 1994, the United Kingdom began equipping the Trident D5 aboard its four Vanguard-class missile submarines. Each submarine can carry 16 missiles and are ...
  24. [24]
    M51 - Missile Threat - CSIS
    The M51 is a French long-range, solid-fueled, MIRV-capable, submarine-launched ballistic missile. It is a core component of France's nuclear deterrent force.
  25. [25]
    Pentagon Report: China Deploys MIRV Missile
    May 11, 2015 · China's ICBM force now includes the “multiple independently-targetable re-entry vehicle (MIRV)-equipped Mod 3 (DF-5).”
  26. [26]
    Indian Test-Launch of MIRV Missile Latest Sign Of Emerging ...
    Mar 12, 2024 · The test-launch demonstration of MIRV capability on the Agni-5 with a significantly modified payload section marks a significant development for India's ...
  27. [27]
    Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) Frequently Asked ...
    There are currently 35 countries that are members (Partners) of the MTCR: Argentina (1993); Australia (1990); Austria (1991); Belgium (1990); Brazil (1995); ...<|separator|>
  28. [28]
    Nuclear U.S. and Soviet/Russian Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles ...
    Jan 1, 2009 · The first Soviet MIRV was deployed in December 1974. 5. Both the SS-27 and SS-27A are presently being deployed. ∗. Solid ...<|control11|><|separator|>
  29. [29]
    France's Nuclear Reach | Proceedings - U.S. Naval Institute
    The new MIRVed M-4 missiles now entering the French SSBN fleet give France a 4,000-mile nuclear reach. And this is but one improvement to this independent ...
  30. [30]
    India shows its deterrent holds Chinese cities at risk
    Apr 19, 2024 · On 11 March 2024, India successfully tested its first MIRV using the under-development Agni-V intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) as a delivery vehicle.
  31. [31]
    Pakistan missile test confirms its MIRV ambitions
    Nov 7, 2023 · Pakistan's test of the Ababeel medium-range ballistic missile, designed to carry multiple nuclear warheads, puts it one step closer to achieving an enhanced ...
  32. [32]
    The Second Coming of MIRVs: The Future of Strategic Arms ...
    Aug 23, 2016 · Between the late 1960s and mid-1970s, the United States and the Soviet Union inducted MIRVs into their nuclear arsenals, moves that encouraged ...Missing: invention timeline<|separator|>
  33. [33]
    [PDF] Minuteman Weapon System: History and Description
    Each missile was capable of being launched, even after being subjected to overpressure from a nuclear blast, with a range of over 5,000 nautical miles and a ...
  34. [34]
    [PDF] The Missile Threat - Aerospace Center for Space Policy and Strategy
    Jan 6, 2020 · Payloads that include a kick motor may also include an ACM to perform finer velocity corrections after boost. Post Boost Vehicle (PBV): ...
  35. [35]
    [PDF] Ballistic Missiles and Reentry Systems: The Critical Years
    The Atlas liquid-propellant ICBM, declared operational in 1959, was the primary land-based launch vehicle when Aerospace began supporting the U.S. ICBM program.
  36. [36]
    LGM-118 Peacekeeper (MX) - Missile Threat - CSIS
    Apr 23, 2024 · The Peacekeeper had a range of 9,600 km while carrying 10 MIRV warheads. Although it could carry as many as 12 warheads, the Strategic Arms ...
  37. [37]
    Inside the guidance system and computer of the Minuteman III ...
    Aug 19, 2024 · A MIRV configuration with three W78 warheads on the Minuteman III MK-12A reentry vehicle system. The conical reentry vehicles are smaller than ...
  38. [38]
    Minuteman III | Missile Threat - CSIS
    On February 9, the U.S. Air Force successfully test launched an unarmed Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) from Vandenberg Space Force Base ...
  39. [39]
    [PDF] Multiple Warheads Increase Missile Effectiveness
    In the 1970s, Minuteman III missiles with Livermore- designed W62 warheads were deployed in 550 silos at U.S. Air Force bases in three states. The Poseidon C-3.Missing: engineering | Show results with:engineering
  40. [40]
    Indian Missile Capable of Firing Multiple Warheads
    Apr 17, 2024 · Pakistan also has been developing MIRV technology “to increase stability and deterrence by increasing the chances of penetrating of India's ...Missing: enhance | Show results with:enhance
  41. [41]
    India's Nuclear Arsenal Takes A Big Step Forward
    Dec 23, 2021 · For India, MIRV capability would allow it to more rapidly increase its nuclear stockpile in the future, if it so decided––especially if its ...Missing: enhance | Show results with:enhance
  42. [42]
    The Geopolitical Origins of U.S. Hard-Target-Kill Counterforce ...
    Jun 28, 2016 · ... MIRVs” – scrupulously delve into the nuances in America's policy decisions on strategic stability, HTK counterforce, doctrinal changes, etc.
  43. [43]
    [PDF] SALT I: The Morning After - RAND
    It may also be noted that the U.S. MIRV hardware was developed in about three years, 1966-69, and that a good deal of information on its engineering.
  44. [44]
    [PDF] Coping with Soviet Deception Under Strategic Arms Agreements
    Only 10 MIRV's are allowed for the SS-18, or RS-20 system as the Soviets call it.<|separator|>
  45. [45]
    What if China develops MIRVs? - Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
    Mar 24, 2015 · MIRV technology is controversial because it can potentially destabilize the nuclear balance by creating incentives to strike first. One ...
  46. [46]
    [PDF] Strategic Nuclear Weapons, Arms Control, and the NATO Alliance
    The 1974 "Schlesinger Doctrine" and Presidential Directive 59 (PD-59) issued during the Carter Administration reflected the increasing emphasis placed upon the ...Missing: historical | Show results with:historical
  47. [47]
    Strategic Stability and Instability during the Middle Years of the Cold ...
    Dec 10, 2021 · In his comments, Jack Ruina observed that MIRVs could be perceived as “first-strike weapons.” Some of the Soviets, such as Millionshchikov ...
  48. [48]
    The New Era of Counterforce: Technological Change and the Future ...
    Apr 1, 2017 · The new era of counterforce challenges the basis for confidence in contemporary deterrence stability, raises critical issues for national and ...
  49. [49]
    MIRVing and Deterrence Challenges for India - Stimson Center
    Jul 6, 2016 · According to the authors, the technological imperative and security concerns are also drivers of India's quest for MIRVs. They explain in great ...
  50. [50]
    ABM, MIRV, and the Arms Race - jstor
    Jul 17, 1970 · As a result, we decided to deploy MIRV as the one certain means of assuring penetration of Soviet defenses and thus maintaining the cred- ...
  51. [51]
    [PDF] Ballistic Missile Defense: Capabilities and Constraints - LSE
    BMD systems must deal with three general problems: 1) defending the target set and successfully coping with penetration aids and countermeasures; 2) defending ...
  52. [52]
    [PDF] Ballistic and cruise missile threat
    Jun 17, 2017 · Other techniques that complicate missile defense operations include separating payloads, multiple RVs, depressed trajectories, and boost-phase, ...
  53. [53]
    [PDF] MISSILE DEFENSE AND THE OFFENSE-DEFENSE RELATIONSHIP
    Strategic Stability and. Missile Defenses. The MIRV and ABM systems posed chal- lenges for both crisis and arms race stability. MIRVs increased the number of ...
  54. [54]
    Arms Control and Proliferation Profile: The United States
    The Trident II D5 is the only strategic missile in the U.S. arsenal that is deployed in a MIRV'ed warhead configuration. Bombers. As of May 2024, the Air Force ...
  55. [55]
    United States nuclear weapons, 2025 - Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
    Jan 13, 2025 · The USAF occasionally test-launches Minuteman III missiles with unarmed multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) to maintain ...
  56. [56]
    Trident II (D5) Missile > United States Navy > Display-FactFiles
    Sep 22, 2021 · The Trident II SWS is deployed aboard Ohio-class submarines, each capable of carrying 20 D5 missiles. Under the provisions of the Polaris Sales ...<|separator|>
  57. [57]
    RS-24 Yars (SS-27 Mod 2) | Missile Threat - CSIS
    Specifications. The missile is estimated to be 22.5 meters in length and 2 meters in diameter. The missile is also believed to be fitted with a newer RV design ...
  58. [58]
    RS-28 Sarmat - Missile Threat - CSIS
    The RS-28 Sarmat is a liquid-fueled, silo-based ICBM with a 10,000-18,000 km range, 35.3m long, 3m diameter, and 208.1 ton launch weight.
  59. [59]
    SS-18 Mod 5 - R-36M2 "Voivode" - GlobalSecurity.org
    Sep 25, 2023 · The flight tests of the R-36M2 equipped with 10 MIRVs began in March 1986 and were completed in March 1988. The first regiment with these ...
  60. [60]
    SS-18 Satan/R-36M2 Voyevoda - Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance
    Jan 17, 2017 · This extended range, coupled with the R-36M2's ability to be armed with 10 MIRVs and an unconfirmed number of penetration aids (countermeasures ...
  61. [61]
    SS-27 Mod 2 / RS-24 Yars - Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance
    The missile has the capability to maneuver during flight and deploy both active and passive decoys which gives Yars the advantage against modern missile defense ...
  62. [62]
    Russia Rearms Forces With Nuclear-Capable Yars Intercontinental ...
    Nov 7, 2024 · Each Yars ICBM can carry up to four multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) warheads, each with a yield of around 500 kilotons, ...<|control11|><|separator|>
  63. [63]
    Russia to extend service life of UR-100N 'Stiletto' ICBM to 2023
    Oct 21, 2021 · The service life of Russia's UR-100N (SS-19 'Stiletto') intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) is to be extended to 2023.
  64. [64]
    [PDF] RS-28 SARMAT INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILE
    The RS-28 Sarmat is a Russian, silo-based, three-stage, liquid-fueled ICBM with a 18,000 km range, 208.1 metric tons launch weight, and 10 ton payload.
  65. [65]
    Arms Control and Proliferation Profile: Russia
    As of early 2025, the Federation of American Scientists estimated that Russia deploys around 1,720 warheads on roughly 590 deployed strategic delivery systems, ...
  66. [66]
    How is China Modernizing its Nuclear Forces? - ChinaPower Project
    Some reports claim the DF-41 could be MIRVed with up to 10 warheads, but the DoD assesses that it likely carries no more than three warheads per missile. In ...
  67. [67]
    China Is Building A Second Nuclear Missile Silo Field
    Jul 26, 2021 · China has already decided to equip its DF-5B ICBM with multiple warheads (MIRV); each missile can carry up to five. The new DF-41 ICBM is also ...Missing: 5C | Show results with:5C
  68. [68]
    Military Might Takes Center Stage at Chinese 70-Year Anniversary ...
    Jan 10, 2019 · The DF-41, which is China's first road-mobile ICBM capable of carrying MIRV, was described by the official parade commentator as to ...
  69. [69]
    India tests its most formidable Agni-5 missile - Times of India
    Aug 21, 2025 · Significantly, the Agni-5 is a canister-launch missile, with a mated warhead in a ready-to-fire configuration. The hermetically-sealed canisters ...
  70. [70]
    Arms Control and Proliferation Profile: France
    1 – The French reportedly have 16 M51.1 missiles carrying a total of 80 TN75 warheads. Each missile can carry up to six 100 kt multiple independently targetable ...
  71. [71]
    ArianeGroup to develop M51.4 Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile
    Sep 13, 2025 · The French DGA has awarded ArianeGroup a contract to design and produce the fourth version of the M51 submarine launched ballistic missile ...
  72. [72]
    Jericho 3 | Missile Threat - CSIS
    Jericho 3 is a solid-fueled intermediate-range ballistic missile developed and produced by Israel to replace its older Jericho 2 ballistic missiles.
  73. [73]
    Hwasong-20 ICBM: North Korea's New “Doomsday Missile” With ...
    Oct 12, 2025 · North Korea unveils the Hwasong-20 ICBM with a 15000 km range and MIRV warheads, capable of striking the entire U.S. mainland.
  74. [74]
    Ababeel | Missile Threat - CSIS
    Sep 12, 2017 · The Ababeel is Pakistan's first surface-to-surface medium range ballistic missile (MRBM), reportedly capable of carrying Multiple Independently Targetable Re- ...
  75. [75]
    Pakistan's MIRV dreams crash again: Ababeel missile test ends in ...
    Jul 23, 2025 · Reports from open-source investigations (OSINT) network suggest that Pakistan's MIRV-capable Ababeel missile test has failed again.
  76. [76]
    Martin Marietta LGM-118A Peacekeeper - Air Force Museum
    When combined with new Multiple Independently Targeted Re-entry Vehicles (MIRV) technology, one Peacekeeper could accurately deliver a number of nuclear ...
  77. [77]
    Trident II D-5 Fleet Ballistic Missile FBM / SLBM - Nuke
    The first deployment of Trident II was in 1990 on the USS Tenessee (SSBN 734). While Trident I was designed to the same dimensions as the Poseidon missile it ...
  78. [78]
    USS Wyoming Successfully Tests Trident II D5LE Missiles
    The U.S. Navy conducted a scheduled, two-missile test flight of unarmed life-extended Trident II (D5LE) missiles from USS Wyoming (SSBN-742), an Ohio-class ...
  79. [79]
    Soviet-American Strategic Arms Limitation and the Limits of Co ...
    Mar 6, 2022 · Once the Soviet Union tested an ICBM MIRV in July 1973, however ... The Soviet Union vigorously defended its rights on MIRV, deflecting ...<|separator|>
  80. [80]
    [PDF] Coping with MIRV in a MAD World - Wilson Center
    The Soviet Union reportedly tested its first MIRVed SLBM. (the SS-NX-18) in November 1976 (See Washington Post,. November 24, 1976). In terms of warhead ...
  81. [81]
    Trident II D-5 (UGM-133A) - Nuclear Companion
    Apr 28, 2025 · The Trident II (D-5) Missile, also known as the UGM-133A, is a US inter-continental-range, submarine-launched, solid-propellant, MIRV-capable ballistic missile.
  82. [82]
    India joins the elite list of nations with test of Agni-V MIRV tech
    Mar 11, 2024 · Currently, MIRV systems are confirmed to be deployed by major nuclear powers like US, Russia. Prime Minister Narendra Modi today announced the ...Missing: verifiable | Show results with:verifiable
  83. [83]
    Strategic Arms Limitations Talks/Treaty (SALT) I and II
    SALT II limited the total of both nations' nuclear forces to 2,250 delivery vehicles and placed a variety of other restrictions on deployed strategic nuclear ...
  84. [84]
    Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT II) - State.gov
    The primary goal of SALT II was to replace the Interim Agreement with a long-term comprehensive Treaty providing broad limits on strategic offensive weapons ...
  85. [85]
    Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty II
    Nov 16, 2022 · Limitations on multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV)-capable ballistic missiles to 1,320. A ban of the construction of new ...
  86. [86]
    Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty II (START II) -- Article by ... - State.gov
    The START II Treaty allows each Party to increase or decrease the number of warheads for which a heavy bomber is actually equipped. Paragraph 5 of Article IV ...
  87. [87]
    New START at a Glance | Arms Control Association
    Under the new treaty, both sides will exchange lists of the number of warheads deployed on individual missiles.
  88. [88]
  89. [89]
    GAO: Military urged to re-add MIRV warheads to mitigate strategic ...
    Sep 11, 2025 · The U.S. military is planning to add multiple nuclear warheads to aging Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missiles to increase their ...Missing: developments | Show results with:developments
  90. [90]
    ICBM Modernization: Air Force Actions Needed to Expeditiously ...
    Sep 10, 2025 · DOD is replacing the Air Force's Minuteman III missile—which is over 50 years old—with the new Sentinel system. The transition is the most ...Missing: 2023-2025 | Show results with:2023-2025
  91. [91]
    United States nuclear weapons, 2025 - CNDP
    Sep 20, 2025 · Although the Minuteman III was initially deployed in 1970, it has been modernized several times, including in 2015, when the missiles completed ...
  92. [92]
    Russia Suspends New START - Arms Control Association
    Mar 1, 2023 · Russian President Vladimir Putin announced his decision last month to suspend the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START).Missing: MIRV | Show results with:MIRV
  93. [93]
  94. [94]
    Implications of Russian Suspension of the New START Treaty
    Aug 1, 2023 · It might reimpose a ban for silo-based ICBMs along with MIRV or restricting the number of nuclear warheads for each missile. Thus, there can ...
  95. [95]
    DF-41 (Dong Feng-41 / CSS-X-20) - Missile Threat - CSIS
    DF-41 Development​​ China's Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology (CALT) began developing the DF-41 in July 1986. This initial project, named Project No. 204, was ...
  96. [96]
    [PDF] V. Chinese nuclear forces - SIPRI
    Sep 13, 2024 · the MIRV-capable DF-5B, which can carry up to five warheads, and the MIRV-capable DF-41, which is estimated to carry three warheads. China's ...<|separator|>
  97. [97]
    India Successfully Tests Agni-V Ballistic Missile Upgrade - tradoc g2
    In March 2024 IND successfully tested a MIRV, with a reported three-warhead capacity, for its Agni-V ICBM as part of a long-term deterrence effort.
  98. [98]
    The End of MIRVs for U.S. ICBMs - Union of Concerned Scientists
    Jun 27, 2014 · The United States first tested MIRVs in 1968, and first deployed them in 1970 on the Minuteman 3, which can carry up to 3 warheads. The U.S. ...Missing: timeline | Show results with:timeline
  99. [99]
    India conducts first flight of missile that can carry multiple warheads
    Mar 11, 2024 · The United States, United Kingdom, France, China and Russia are among the countries that already use MIRV missiles, while Pakistan tested the ...
  100. [100]
    [PDF] The Challenge for Arms Control Verification in the Post-New START ...
    Jul 16, 2012 · Of particular concern is the possibility of deception and breakout when declared and observed numbers of weapons are below the level considered ...
  101. [101]
    [PDF] VERIFICATION AT RISK: EXAMINING GROWING CHALLENGES TO ...
    Mar 31, 2025 · The verification measures used to validate and monitor compliance of multilateral arms control agreements are under threat.
  102. [102]
    Nuclear Arms Control: U.S. May Face Challenges in Verifying Future ...
    Sep 28, 2023 · This report describes (1) U.S. goals and likely verification measures for future nuclear arms control treaties, including a successor to New ...
  103. [103]
    Pakistan, MIRVs, and Counterforce Targeting - Belfer Center
    Sep 18, 2025 · Strategic competition between Pakistan and India is intensifying. Both countries have now entered into a phase of modernization and expansion of their ...Missing: non- | Show results with:non-
  104. [104]
    [PDF] Mitigating Challenges to U.S.-Russia Strategic Stability - RAND
    In short, for largely historically contingent reasons, the U.S. stra- tegic force has significant counterforce capability and its employment policy openly ...
  105. [105]
    9DASHLINE — Indian MIRV-ed missiles augur stability, not escalation
    May 20, 2024 · MIRV-ed missiles can be used to target warheads of a rival state, thus posing a threat to the latter's second-strike capability. This can ...
  106. [106]
    What Is a “MIRV,” and Why Could It Doom America?
    Sep 13, 2025 · Why MIRV Matters for Nuclear Defense. The implications of the MIRV are profound. From a strategic standpoint, MIRVs have fully shifted the ...Missing: enhancement | Show results with:enhancement