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Name and shame

Name and shame is a form of public accountability that involves identifying and publicizing the identities of individuals, organizations, or states responsible for misconduct to impose reputational costs and encourage compliance with norms or laws.^[1] The practice leverages social pressure and deterrence through embarrassment, often employed in regulatory enforcement, corporate governance, environmental policy, and international relations.^[2] Historically rooted in communal shaming mechanisms predating modern law, the phrase "name and shame" emerged in English usage by the late 19th century to describe public exposure of anti-social acts.^[3] In contemporary applications, governments and regulators use it to target violators, such as underpaying employers or non-compliant financial firms, aiming to bypass costly litigation while signaling vigilance.^[4] Empirical studies indicate variable effectiveness: it can prompt behavioral changes in motivated actors, as seen in increased emissions reporting under the Paris Agreement when countries face reputational scrutiny from peers, but falters against regimes or entities indifferent to external judgment.^[5]^[6] Notable controversies arise from its potential for selective application and backlash; regulators like the UK's Financial Conduct Authority have encountered resistance to preemptive naming proposals, highlighting risks of premature stigma or legal challenges without due process.^[7] In human rights contexts, naming and shaming by international bodies influences state practices through automated analysis of reports, yet outcomes depend on domestic audience costs rather than universal moral suasion.^[8] Critics argue it may entrench defiance in "shameless" targets or amplify biases in source selection by advocacy groups, underscoring the need for evidence-based deployment over ideological campaigns.^[9]

Definition and Origins

Definition

"Name and shame" refers to the practice of publicly identifying and disclosing the identities of individuals, organizations, or entities that have engaged in wrongdoing, misconduct, or non-compliance with laws, regulations, or norms, with the intent of imposing reputational costs to deter future violations or encourage corrective action.^[10]^[11] This strategy leverages social disapproval and potential economic repercussions, such as loss of business or public trust, as informal sanctions alternative to or complementary with formal penalties like fines or legal proceedings.^[12]^[13] In policy contexts, name and shame operates by publicizing verifiable instances of failure to meet standards, often through government lists, media reports, or international reports, aiming to harness peer pressure and audience costs to enforce compliance without relying solely on coercive measures.^[5] The approach assumes that reputational harm motivates behavioral change, particularly in environments where formal enforcement is limited by resources or jurisdiction, though its efficacy depends on the credibility of the accuser and the target's sensitivity to public opinion.^[14]^[15]

Historical Origins

Public shaming practices, which often entailed naming or publicly identifying offenders to enforce social norms through humiliation, trace back to ancient civilizations. In ancient Greece, informal mechanisms of popular justice involved street theatre-like rituals where offenders were shamed, stoned, or starved in public view to deter misconduct and reinforce community standards, predating formalized state laws.^[16] Similar tactics appeared in other ancient societies, such as the use of badges of shame or punitive depilation in Mediterranean cultures to mark and disgrace wrongdoers, emphasizing reputational damage over physical harm. Shame masks were employed in various ancient contexts to punish behaviors like gossiping or lying, particularly targeting women, by visually branding the offender for communal scorn.^[17] During the medieval and early modern periods in Europe, these practices evolved within legal and folk traditions. Shaming rituals, including the pillory and public parades, were routinely applied to penalize offenders in Britain and elsewhere, integrating public naming with physical exposure to amplify social ostracism and encourage remorse.^[18] In pre-modern Britain, official courts frequently imposed shaming penalties alongside fines or imprisonment, viewing public identification as a key deterrent rooted in communal honor dynamics.^[19] By the eighteenth century, such humiliations persisted in Western justice systems, though debates emerged over their efficacy in eliciting genuine shame versus hardening offenders.^[19] The idiomatic phrase "name and shame," denoting the deliberate public disclosure of wrongdoing to invoke censure, emerged in the late nineteenth century. Its earliest recorded use as a noun phrase appeared in the Pennsylvania newspaper The Warren Ledger on October 1884, in reference to reluctance to claim association with alcohol: "None are willing to father the name and shame of being beer or whisky men."^[1] The verb form "to name and shame" gained traction in the 1970s, initially in contexts like parenting advice and social accountability, such as 1974 discussions of "naming, blaming and shaming" in child-rearing workshops.^[20] By the late 1970s, it appeared in media on crime and racial issues, solidifying its modern connotation of targeted reputational enforcement.^[20]

Theoretical Foundations

Shame, as a self-conscious emotion, functions psychologically to signal threats to one's social standing, motivating conformity through anticipated or experienced devaluation of the self. Unlike guilt, which targets specific behaviors and encourages reparative actions, shame implicates the entire self, often eliciting withdrawal, concealment, or defensive aggression to restore esteem.^[21]^[22] This mechanism evolved to regulate moral behavior and promote group welfare by deterring violations of norms via the pain of perceived inferiority or exposure.^[21] Empirical neuroimaging reveals shame activates brain regions associated with social pain and self-referential processing, amplifying its deterrent effect beyond private remorse.^[21] Public naming intensifies these effects by externalizing the transgression, transforming internal self-assessment into communal judgment and heightening the stakes through reputational loss. Individuals weigh the emotional cost of shame—manifesting as humiliation or embarrassment—against compliance, with studies showing reduced deviance, such as stealing, when shaming cues are present, as measured by physiological responses at decision points.^[23] However, chronic or unjustified shaming can erode self-worth buffers, fostering resentment or disengagement rather than reform, particularly absent internalized resilience.^[24] Socially, name and shame exploits interdependence in networks, where identification of wrongdoers signals to observers the enforcer's vigilance and the group's boundaries, reinforcing metanorms of cooperation without resource-intensive sanctions.^[14] In cohesive communities, this invokes ostracism fears, leveraging shame's role in maintaining bonds by punishing breaches that undermine collective trust.^[25] Reintegrative variants—condemning deeds while affirming the person's redeemability—facilitate prosocial reinclusion and sustained norm adherence, outperforming stigmatizing approaches that alienate and provoke backlash.^[26] Conversely, in diffuse or politicized settings, selective shaming risks perceived illegitimacy, triggering status defense and norm rejection among targets and sympathizers.^[27] Social media amplifies diffusion but introduces noise, diluting control as audiences fragment and counter-narratives emerge.^[28]

Economic and Reputational Incentives

Public disclosure of misconduct through naming and shaming damages an entity's reputation, which functions as a form of intangible capital influencing economic interactions by signaling reliability to stakeholders such as customers, investors, and partners.^[29] In economic theory, reputation reduces transaction costs in repeated exchanges; shaming erodes this by increasing perceived risks of future opportunism, prompting avoidance behaviors like boycotts or divestment that impose direct financial losses.^[30] Event studies of regulatory enforcements demonstrate this mechanism: announcements naming firms for violations trigger immediate stock price declines averaging nine times the magnitude of concurrent financial penalties, reflecting market anticipation of sustained revenue erosion from lost trust.^[30]^[29] These reputational costs amplify deterrence when misconduct directly harms observable stakeholders, as affected parties internalize the economic fallout through reduced patronage or collaboration, whereas harms to diffuse third parties yield weaker incentives due to misaligned accountability.^[30] In competitive markets, such as labor-intensive industries, governments' public naming of non-compliant firms for exploitative practices has spurred broader adherence, as peers adjust behaviors to safeguard their own market positions against analogous reputational penalties.^[31] Disclosure of poor performance similarly pressures organizations to improve, as reputational harm correlates with diminished access to resources and partnerships, creating self-reinforcing incentives for norm conformity.^[32] Economically, shaming elevates the shadow of future losses beyond immediate fines, including higher capital costs from investor skepticism and forgone opportunities in networked economies where relational capital predominates.^[29] Empirical analyses of enforcement contexts, such as securities violations, confirm that these indirect costs—manifesting as persistent valuation discounts—outweigh direct sanctions, underscoring reputation's role in aligning self-interest with compliance.^[30] In scenarios of economic interdependence, like international trade or investment flows, reputational signals from shaming can propagate globally, deterring violations by threatening exclusion from lucrative exchanges.^[5] This dynamic holds particularly where entities derive value from sustained goodwill, rendering shaming a low-cost lever for behavioral correction absent robust formal penalties.^[33]

Applications in International Relations

Human Rights Enforcement

In international human rights enforcement, naming and shaming involves non-governmental organizations (NGOs), United Nations bodies, and states publicizing specific violations by governments or non-state actors to impose reputational costs, thereby pressuring compliance with treaties and norms.^[34] This strategy leverages publicity—through reports, resolutions, and violation rulings—to highlight abuses such as torture, arbitrary detention, or extrajudicial killings, aiming to mobilize domestic and international audiences against perpetrators.^[35] For instance, human rights NGOs like Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch compile and disseminate detailed accounts of violations, which are then amplified by media and foreign governments to undermine the target's legitimacy.^[2] United Nations treaty bodies exemplify formalized naming and shaming through individual petitions (communications) filed by victims against states parties to conventions like the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. These bodies issue non-binding violation decisions that explicitly name the state and detail the abuses, serving as a public indictment.^[36] An analysis of an original dataset covering such rulings found that governments improved compliance with prohibitions on severe abuses involving bodily harm—such as torture or killings—immediately following decisions, with measurable reductions in reported incidents.^[37] Similarly, the UN Commission on Human Rights has historically passed resolutions condemning specific governments for ongoing violations, as seen in cases where publicity targeted persistent abuses despite prior diplomatic efforts.^[34] In conflict settings, the UN Security Council employs lists to name and shame parties—states and armed groups—for grave violations against children, including recruitment, killing, and sexual violence.^[38] Established under Resolution 1612 in 2005, this monitoring and reporting mechanism has identified over 100 parties annually in reports submitted to the Council, prompting some delistings after behavioral changes, such as cessation of child soldier recruitment in Colombia following FARC commitments in 2016.^[39] Empirical studies indicate that such targeted shaming correlates with improved human rights practices in shamed states, particularly when reputational damage affects trade or aid ties, though outcomes vary by the target's audience costs and domestic political context.^[40]^[41]

Environmental and Trade Agreements

In environmental agreements lacking binding sanctions, naming and shaming emerges as a key compliance mechanism, particularly in the Paris Agreement, ratified by 195 parties as of 2023. Adopted on December 12, 2015, the accord relies on voluntary nationally determined contributions (NDCs) for emission reductions, with enforcement hinging on transparency reports under the Enhanced Transparency Framework to identify laggards and apply reputational pressure through peer and public scrutiny.^[5] A 2023 peer-reviewed analysis of expert surveys (N=910 climate diplomats and researchers) indicates that 57% expect this strategy to effectively influence countries exhibiting high-quality political institutions (e.g., democracy scores above 6 on Polity IV scales), strong domestic public concern for climate issues, and ambitious, credible NDCs, as these factors amplify internal incentives for behavioral change.^[5] The same study notes that shaming proves less viable in autocratic or low-accountability regimes, where reputational costs fail to translate into policy shifts, underscoring the mechanism's dependence on audience effects rather than material penalties.^[5] Experts surveyed favor execution by intergovernmental entities, such as the UNFCCC secretariat or IPCC, over non-state actors like NGOs or media, with 77% endorsing use of official transparency data for comparative assessments to avoid perceptions of bias.^[5] Empirical evidence from experimental studies on public opinion supports conditional efficacy: shaming boosts domestic support for NDC compliance in targeted nations when framed as peer criticism, but risks backlash in contexts of low nationalist sentiments or perceived foreign overreach.^[6] Non-governmental organizations, including Greenpeace and WWF, supplement state-led efforts by publicizing discrepancies between pledges and outcomes, as seen in annual "Climate Action Tracker" reports ranking countries' performances since 2009, which have correlated with upward revisions in NDCs for shamed high emitters like Australia post-2015.^[42] In trade agreements, naming and shaming integrates into multilateral frameworks like the World Trade Organization's Trade Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM), initiated in 1995 to monitor adherence to GATT/WTO rules through mandatory peer reviews every two to six years based on member size.^[43] These reviews publicly document policy deviations—such as subsidies or barriers inconsistent with commitments—exposing them to criticism in TPRM reports and plenary sessions, which a 2018 academic analysis describes as deliberate "naming and shaming" to leverage reputational incentives absent direct fines.^[44] For instance, China's 2016 TPR highlighted intellectual property enforcement gaps, prompting domestic reforms amid international pressure, though effectiveness varies with economic dependence on trading partners.^[45] Bilateral and regional pacts incorporate similar tools within enforceable chapters; the US-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), effective July 1, 2020, subjects environmental obligations under Chapter 24 to state-to-state dispute settlement, culminating in public panel reports that spotlight violations like illegal fishing or pollution laxity, generating "naming and shaming" via transparency and potential tariffs.^[46] Analogous provisions in the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP, effective December 30, 2018 for initial signatories) feature civil society advisory mechanisms for public submissions on sustainability breaches, fostering reputational accountability in environmental side letters on biodiversity and fisheries subsidies.^[47] EU free trade agreements, such as those with Canada (CETA, provisional application 2017) and Vietnam (2020), embed trade and sustainable development chapters with domestic advisory groups that escalate non-compliance to public consultations, though enforcement remains consultative rather than punitive, relying on shaming to deter regressions in labor or ecological standards.^[48] Studies of these mechanisms reveal higher compliance in democratic trading blocs, where public exposure aligns with electoral pressures, but limited impact on authoritarian partners due to asymmetric reputational vulnerabilities.^[47]

Applications in Domestic Policy

Criminal Justice Systems

In criminal justice systems, name and shame practices entail the public dissemination of offenders' identities, often via registries, court publications, or media, to impose social stigma as a deterrent and to alert communities to potential risks. These measures aim to amplify informal sanctions beyond formal penalties like fines or imprisonment, drawing on reputational harm to encourage compliance and remorse.^[49]^[50] A key implementation is the United States' Megan's Law, federally enacted on May 17, 1996, as an amendment to the Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act, requiring states to establish public notification systems for convicted sex offenders, including online registries listing names, addresses, and photos. This has led to widespread community awareness but also documented adverse effects on offenders, such as elevated levels of shame, depression, hopelessness, and vigilante harassment, which hinder housing stability (with 20-30% reporting residency rejections) and employment prospects. Studies indicate no clear reduction in recidivism rates attributable to these disclosures; instead, they may prolong social exclusion, potentially increasing reoffending risks through isolation.^[51]^[52]^[53] In Australia, name and shame policies target high-range drink-driving offenders, defined as blood alcohol concentrations of 0.15% or higher, with jurisdictions like the Northern Territory and Queensland authorizing courts to publish names, photos, and offense details in newspapers or online. For instance, in 2021, Northern Territory publications listed dozens of such offenders weekly to underscore road safety enforcement. Road safety analyses report deterrent value, with experts noting reduced repeat offenses in publicized cases due to familial and peer pressure, though long-term recidivism data remains inconsistent.^[54]^[55]^[56] Effectiveness varies by shaming type: reintegrative approaches, which condemn the deed while fostering offender reinclusion, correlate with lower recidivism in controlled studies, as theorized by John Braithwaite in his 1989 framework, by promoting guilt over identity-based shame. Conversely, disintegrative shaming—prevalent in public registries—often yields counterproductive outcomes, amplifying stigma and defiance without proportional crime reduction, per meta-analyses of sentencing practices. For juvenile offenders, such tactics show minimal deterrence, as they overlook developmental factors and may solidify deviant self-concepts.^[57]^[58]^[59]

Regulatory and Corporate Compliance

In regulatory enforcement, naming and shaming manifests through public disclosure of corporate violations to impose reputational costs, complementing fines and legal penalties where prosecutorial resources are constrained. Agencies leverage websites, databases, and press releases to identify non-compliant entities, targeting behaviors such as tax evasion, environmental infractions, and securities breaches. This approach relies on external pressures from investors, consumers, and media to incentivize voluntary compliance, as evidenced in frameworks like the U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration's (OSHA) former "regulation by shaming" tactics, which publicized severe workplace safety violators to deter recurrence despite limited enforcement capacity.^[60] The United Kingdom's HM Revenue & Customs (HMRC) exemplifies tax compliance shaming via its Deliberate Tax Defaulters publication, mandated under the Finance Act 2009, which lists names, addresses, tax periods, and penalty amounts—often exceeding £25,000—for deliberate inaccuracies in returns or offshore evasion. Updated quarterly, the list as of September 25, 2025, includes over 100 entries, such as businesses penalized for failures between 2015 and 2023, aiming to deter evasion by amplifying financial penalties with public stigma; HMRC reports this has prompted settlements and improved voluntary disclosures post-publication.^[61]^[62] In environmental regulation, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) maintains the Enforcement and Compliance History Online (ECHO) database, accessible since 2008, which details enforcement cases, violations, and penalties for facilities under laws like the Clean Air Act, enabling public scrutiny of repeat offenders such as industrial polluters facing multimillion-dollar fines. For instance, ECHO logs thousands of cases annually, including civil settlements totaling $1.2 billion in fiscal year 2023, where disclosure facilitates NGO and community pressure for remediation. Similarly, the Dodd-Frank Act's Section 1502 on conflict minerals requires public reporting of supply chain risks in the Democratic Republic of Congo, effectively naming and shaming companies like Apple and Intel for sourcing issues since 2012, though compliance remains partial due to verification challenges.^[63]^[64]^[65] Securities regulators like the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) publicize enforcement actions through detailed announcements, which, while not explicitly labeled as shaming, generate immediate stock declines—averaging 1-2% on announcement days for charged firms—and board scrutiny, as seen in over 700 actions in 2023 targeting fraud and disclosure failures. Studies indicate such disclosures enhance deterrence by signaling heightened enforcement risk, though effectiveness varies with firm size and market visibility.^[66]

Empirical Evidence on Effectiveness

Key Studies and Findings

A 2005 analysis of human rights enforcement examined data from nongovernmental organizations, news media, and international institutions, finding that states named and shamed as violators frequently improved their practices in subsequent periods, though improvements were modest and selective rather than comprehensive.^[34] This effect was attributed to reputational costs incentivizing compliance, particularly in states sensitive to international opinion, but the study noted that shaming alone rarely transformed systemic abusers without complementary pressures like sanctions.^[34] In a 2022 empirical investigation, researchers applied automated text analysis to over 1,000 United Nations communications alleging human rights violations, revealing that targeted shaming correlated with measurable shifts in state practices, such as reduced reported abuses in named areas like detention conditions or discrimination.^[8] The study controlled for endogeneity by comparing pre- and post-shaming trajectories, estimating a 10-15% average decline in violation intensity for shamed states, though effects diminished in autocracies with low audience costs.^[8] Experimental research on the Paris Agreement, published in 2021, used surveys with over 4,000 respondents across multiple countries to test public reactions to shaming non-compliant states. Results indicated that naming partial compliers—those submitting national plans but underperforming—increased domestic support for punitive measures like trade restrictions by 20-30 percentage points compared to full non-compliers or overachievers, as partial efforts heightened perceptions of hypocrisy.^[67] Shaming by allied actors amplified this support more than by adversaries, suggesting identity alignment enhances reputational leverage.^[6] A 2023 study on climate enforcement mechanisms analyzed cross-national data from the Paris Agreement's transparency framework, concluding that naming and shaming effectively pressured mid-tier emitters with democratic institutions to enhance emissions reporting and ambition, yielding compliance gains in 60% of targeted cases from 2016-2022.^[5] However, it was least impactful in low-capacity or authoritarian states, where internal mobilization against external criticism often neutralized reputational damage, with no significant behavioral change observed in over 40% of such instances.^[5] Broader reviews of naming and shaming across policy domains, including a 2017 synthesis of corporate and state-level applications, identified prerequisites for success: credible shamers with verifiable evidence, targets reliant on international trade or aid (increasing vulnerability to boycotts), and domestic audiences amplifying pressure.^[68] Empirical cases, such as environmental NGO campaigns against polluting firms, showed short-term compliance spikes of 15-25% in emissions reductions post-shaming, but long-term effects waned without sustained monitoring, highlighting the strategy's reliance on repeated application rather than one-off exposure.^[68]

Contextual Factors Affecting Outcomes

The effectiveness of naming and shaming varies significantly based on the quality of political institutions in the targeted entity. In contexts with high-quality institutions, such as democracies with robust rule of law, naming and shaming garners 30% higher support among policy elites and is perceived as 15% more effective compared to lower-quality institutions, as these environments facilitate internal accountability and reduce defiance.^[5] Conversely, in authoritarian regimes, shaming often provokes backlash, as leaders frame it as foreign interference, rallying domestic support and entrenching non-compliance, particularly in human rights enforcement where empirical analyses show limited behavioral change.^[5] Public concern and domestic audience costs represent another critical moderator. High levels of public awareness about the issue, such as climate change, enhance shaming's impact by amplifying reputational pressures, with surveys of climate policy experts indicating statistically significant positive effects (P = 0.001–0.015).^[5] Experimental evidence from the Paris Agreement context demonstrates that shaming by foreign actors boosts public support for compliance, but this effect is stronger against partial compliers—where support increases notably—than against full compliers or non-compliers, who can dismiss it via counter-narratives.^[69] The credibility and nature of the shaming source further condition outcomes. Intergovernmental bodies like the UNFCCC are viewed as more legitimate than NGOs or media, leading to higher anticipated policy influence (57% of experts expect substantial domestic impact under such auspices).^[5] In human rights monitoring, shaming by state departments, such as the U.S. State Department's annual reports, correlates with reduced violations, whereas non-governmental reports like those from Amnesty International show weaker associations, attributable to perceived biases or lower enforcement leverage.^[8] Audience political identity also moderates receptivity, with left-leaning groups (e.g., Democrats in U.S. experiments) responding more favorably to shaming on issues like emissions reductions than right-leaning ones.^[69]^[6] In domestic regulatory settings, such as corporate compliance or healthcare performance disclosure, effectiveness hinges on market competition and reputational sensitivity; firms in competitive sectors with reputation-dependent stakeholders show greater behavioral adjustments post-shaming, though empirical surveys reveal mixed results where disclosure alone fails without verifiable data or enforcement backups. Ambitious prior commitments by targets also bolster outcomes, as less ambitious entities (e.g., 43% of experts doubting efficacy in low-ambition climate pledges) exhibit diminished responsiveness.^[5] Overall, these factors underscore that naming and shaming thrives under aligned domestic pressures and credible mechanisms but falters amid low institutional quality, skeptical audiences, or unverifiable claims.

Criticisms and Limitations

Risks of Backlash and Ineffectiveness

Public shaming tactics in regulatory and compliance contexts can elicit backlash by fostering defensiveness and resentment among targeted entities, potentially undermining long-term cooperation. Experimental analyses indicate that shaming, particularly from external actors, may trigger emotional responses such as anger in group settings, leading to reinforced non-compliance or retaliatory behaviors rather than reform.^[70] For instance, in financial regulation, naming and shaming individuals like bankers risks entrenching oppositional stances, as recipients perceive it as punitive rather than constructive, drawing parallels to evaluated cases like sex offender registries where public exposure spurred vigilantism and social isolation without proportional behavioral correction.^[71] Empirical assessments of shaming's effectiveness reveal inconsistent outcomes, with several studies documenting limited deterrence in environmental and human rights enforcement. In climate policy, efforts to "name and shame" high-emission states, such as through public rankings, have not demonstrably reduced emissions, as causal links between reputational pressure and policy shifts remain weak amid confounding geopolitical factors.^[68] Similarly, human rights shaming via mechanisms like UN periodic reviews shows uncertain impacts, often failing to alter state behavior in non-democratic regimes where domestic audiences prioritize sovereignty over international norms.^[72] Regulatory applications, including corporate compliance lists, may falter when targeted firms possess diversified stakeholder bases or low public visibility, resulting in negligible reputational costs and no verifiable uptick in adherence.^[66] Contextual variables exacerbate ineffectiveness, such as audience skepticism or cultural resistance to shame, which can neutralize intended social pressure. Research on alternative sanctions highlights how over-reliance on shaming for civic duties, like tax evasion disclosures, correlates with diminished overall compliance rates due to perceived unfairness or evasion of stigma through relocation.^[73] In cases of zero-tolerance policies paired with public naming, such as anti-drug initiatives, shaming has been critiqued for amplifying stigma without addressing underlying incentives, leading to recidivism rather than reintegration.^[74] These findings underscore that shaming's reliance on voluntary internalization of norms renders it vulnerable to failure when extrinsic motivations dominate.

Ethical, Legal, and Political Concerns

Ethical concerns surrounding name and shame policies center on the potential for disproportionate harm through public stigmatization, which may undermine rehabilitation efforts by fostering long-term social exclusion and psychological distress for offenders and their families. Critics contend that shaming amplifies punishment beyond judicial intent, often leading to job loss, harassment, or vigilante actions that exceed legal sanctions, as evidenced in cases where public exposure results in unintended collateral damage to dependents or communities.^[9] Furthermore, empirical analyses reveal that shaming can provoke defensive backlash, entrenching deviant behaviors rather than correcting them, particularly when targets perceive the tactic as illegitimate or hypocritical.^[14] This raises questions of moral proportionality, as shaming risks conflating moral condemnation with empirical efficacy, potentially eroding trust in enforcement institutions when outcomes deviate from restorative justice principles.^[68] Legally, name and shame practices encounter challenges related to defamation, privacy rights, and due process, as premature or inaccurate public identification can infringe on presumption of innocence and expose authorities or individuals to liability. In jurisdictions like Australia, legal experts have highlighted that social media-based naming of alleged offenders constitutes a criminal act under laws prohibiting vilification or sub judice contempt, with cases reported as recently as January 2024 where private citizens faced prosecution for such posts.^[75] For minors, policies naming young offenders conflict with protections against public juvenile proceedings, as outlined in frameworks emphasizing confidentiality to support reform over perpetual labeling.^[57] Internationally, shaming by nongovernmental organizations or governments must navigate data protection regulations and human rights standards, such as Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which safeguards private life unless overridden by compelling public interest—a balance often litigated when shaming leads to verifiable harms like identity theft or targeted violence.^[34] Politically, name and shame tactics invite accusations of selective enforcement and instrumentalization, where governments or activists apply them unevenly to advance agendas, fostering perceptions of bias and eroding legitimacy. Academic research documents how shaming in conflict zones or against authoritarian regimes can radicalize targets, spawning pro-government militias or hardened resistance as emotional responses to perceived status threats override compliance incentives.^[76] In domestic settings, proposals like the UK's September 2025 plan to photograph and publicize community service offenders have sparked debates over politicized humiliation, with opponents arguing it disproportionately affects vulnerable groups while shielding elites.^[77] Such strategies also risk backlash in polarized environments, where shamed parties mobilize counter-narratives, as seen in international human rights campaigns that inadvertently bolster defiant narratives among state actors.^[78] This selective "diplomacy of shame" underscores causal risks of entrenching divisions rather than resolving them, particularly when issuers lack consistent application across ideological lines.^[6]

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Sep 11, 2019 · Abstract. A firm's 'reputation' reflects the expectations of its partners of the benefits of trading with it in the future.Missing: incentives | Show results with:incentives
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Naming and Shaming: Evidence from Event Studies
Oct 11, 2019 · In contrast, reputational incentives are either non-existent or perverse where the misconduct afflicts third parties.
[32]
Government publicly 'naming and shaming' firms breaking labour ...
Nov 9, 2021 · Publicly naming businesses using exploitative practices or underpaying workers encourages other firms to comply with labour market rules.
[33]
(PDF) Naming Bad Performance: Does Naming and Shaming Work?
Second draft (april 2013). Abstract. If poor performance is disclosed, poorly performing organizations are likely to. face reputational ... incentives to ...
[34]
Naming and Shaming: Evidence from Event Studies (Chapter 50)
In contrast, reputational incentives are either non-existent or perverse where the misconduct afflicts third parties. In these cases, fines are the only ...
[35]
[PDF] Naming and Shaming the Human Rights Enforcement Problem
Abstract. “Naming and shaming” is a popular strategy to enforce international human rights norms and laws+ Nongovernmental organizations, news media, ...
[36]
Shame and shaming in international human rights advocacy
Dec 1, 2023 · To 'name and shame' can aim to harm an actor's interests by undermining the actor's relations with other actors that are essential for the ...
[37]
Naming and shaming in UN treaty bodies: Individual petitions' effect ...
Sep 26, 2024 · The victim(s) and involved civil society may name and shame before the Committee producing their final views, including publicizing the ...
[38]
[PDF] Naming and Shaming in UN Treaty Bodies: Individual Petitions ...
I argue that Committee violation rulings on petitions submitted by victims of abuse, despite their non-legally binding nature, can effectively name and shame ...
[39]
'Naming and Shaming' Violators of Conflict-Affected Children's Rights
Jul 12, 2011 · The Council also expressed deep concern that certain parties persisted in committing violations and abuses against children, and expressed its ...
[40]
[PDF] United Nations' Naming and Shaming of Children's Rights Abusers ...
Is UN's naming and shaming children's rights violators during conflict a successful strategy to help end such abuses? Do state and armed non-state actors agree ...<|control11|><|separator|>
[41]
Can Shaming Promote Human Rights? - GPPi
Dec 14, 2015 · There is robust academic evidence that shaming can have a positive impact on the human rights situation in targeted states.
[42]
[PDF] The Geopolitics of Shaming: When Human Rights Pressure Works ...
“Naming and shaming” states for their human rights abuses has long been a feature of international relations. Despite its consistent presence in the.
[43]
Climate shaming: explaining environmental NGOs targeting practices
Nov 11, 2022 · Lacking formal sanctioning capacities, NGOs primarily rely on 'naming and shaming' to hold states accountable to their commitments in climate ...
[44]
The Trade Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM)
The purpose of the TPRM is to contribute to improved adherence by all Members to rules, disciplines and commitments made under the Multilateral Trade ...
[45]
Critical Analysis of the TPRM | The Trade Policy Review Mechanism
For each of these, it examines the TPRM's objectives (including its implementation of the naming and shaming objective and potential link(s) with the Dispute ...
[46]
Introduction | The Trade Policy Review Mechanism: A Critical Analysis
In terms of objectives, increased attention should be paid to the TPRM's secondary goal of naming and shaming. This book does not argue for an amendment of the ...
[47]
ASG Analysis: Unpacking the USMCA: Answers to the Essential ...
Oct 11, 2018 · The USMCA sets out very high and stringent auto rules of origin that could disrupt regional supply chains. The new agreement has stronger ...
[48]
[PDF] Comparative Analysis of Trade and Sustainable Development ... - LSE
expanded scope of environmental provisions in TPP, duplicated in the USMCA (e.g., biodiversity, marine resources and fisheries) as well as new institutional ...
[49]
The enforceability of the trade and sustainable development ... - NIH
Jun 16, 2021 · This paper presents a comparative analysis, examining the TSD chapters of the FTAs between the EU and South Korea (EU-Korea), Canada (CETA) and ...
[50]
To Shame or Not to Shame? That is the Question
Mar 28, 2022 · Part II also will explain how law enforcement and the legal system have traditionally used public shaming as a crime prevention tool. ... cases ...
[51]
[PDF] The Role of Shame: A Creative Look at Justice
While shame plays a part in all criminal justice systems, creative sentencing is commonly geared towards exploiting that shame. The most commonly used creative ...
[52]
[PDF] Sex, Shame, and the Law: An Economic Perspective on Megan's Law
First, from the perspective of offenders, sex is an ideal context to inflict suffering through shame. Psychologically, we are inclined to be shameful of ...
[53]
Megan's Law and its impact on community re-entry for sex offenders
Megan's Law and its impact on community re-entry for sex offenders ... The majority experienced psychosocial distress such as depression, shame, and hopelessness.
[54]
The Effect of Megan's Law on Sex Offender Reintegration
The dangers of federalizing crime law: consequences of the Adam Walsh Act and sex offender registry expansion ... Lifers on the Outside: Sex Offenders and ...
[55]
Name and shame drink drivers: Stanhope - ABC News
May 19, 2009 · A road safety expert says there is strong evidence that publishing the names of drink driving offenders can work as a deterrent. Professor ...
[56]
NAMED AND SHAMED: High Range drink drivers revealed - NT News
Jun 6, 2021 · TO be charged with High Range drink driving, you have to blow 0.15 or higher.
[57]
NAMED AND SHAMED: List of the NT's Drink drivers revealed
Jul 20, 2021 · Check out all the drivers who took to NT roads and were caught with alcohol in their systems. See the FULL LIST OF NAMES here.
[58]
[PDF] Zero Tolerance, Naming and Shaming: Is There a Case for it with ...
Zero tolerance and public shaming are increasingly advocated for both crimes of the powerless and crimes of the powerful. In this essay we.
[59]
Shame, Guilt and Remorse: Implications for Offender Populations
First, regarding criminal sentencing practices, research argues strongly against “shaming” sentences designed to shame and humiliate offenders. Shame is ...
[60]
Naming and shaming young offenders: reactionary politicians are ...
Aug 21, 2012 · Queensland is not alone in promulgating name and shame policies. ... justice system are unlikely to be swayed by naming and shaming. A self ...
[61]
[PDF] SAVING LIVES THROUGH SHAMING - Harvard Law School Journals
20 See Gloria Gonzalez, OSHA Focus Shifts Away from Name and Shame Policy, BUSINESS INSURANCE (2017), ... Scholz, Voluntary Compliance and. Regulatory Enforcement ...
[62]
Current list of deliberate tax defaulters - GOV.UK
Sep 25, 2025 · Each entry on this list is specific to the default dates to which it refers. The address is the one associated with the published person at the time of the ...Details first published 25... · Details first published 18 June...
[63]
Details of deliberate tax defaulters - GOV.UK
HMRC publish details of deliberate tax defaulters, these are people who have received penalties either for: deliberate errors in their tax returns. ...
[64]
Enforcement and Compliance History Online | US EPA
Use EPA's Enforcement and Compliance History Online website to search for facilities in your community to assess their compliance with environmental ...Report an environmental... · Facility Search – Enforcement... · Data Downloads
[65]
Conflict Minerals: An Assessment of the Dodd-Frank Act | Brookings
Oct 3, 2011 · Primarily, the Act uses the instrumentality of “name and shame,” and is directed at companies engaging in economic activities in which ...
[66]
Enforcement Data and Results | US EPA
Mar 18, 2025 · EPA enforcement data includes civil/cleanup cases, criminal cases, ECHO data for regulated facilities, and annual results of enforcement ...
[67]
Is 'name and Shame' an Effective Regulatory Tool?
May 20, 2024 · The paper discusses the "name and shame" approach in regulatory contexts, highlighting its potential benefits such as deterring violations, ...Missing: empirical studies
[68]
An Experimental Analysis of the Paris Agreement | Dustin Tingley
How does naming and shaming affect public support for compliance with international agreements? We investigated this question by conducting survey experiments ...
[69]
On Effectiveness and Legitimacy of 'Shaming' as a Strategy for ...
Apr 11, 2017 · ... name and shame” states into cutting their emissions (Davenport 2014). ... Future empirical research needs to explore the effectiveness of shaming ...
[70]
The Effects of Naming and Shaming on Public Support for ...
Sep 21, 2021 · These findings suggest that shaming may be most potent when directed against “intermediate” policies that are prima facie neither shameful nor ...
[71]
[PDF] Backlash against human rights shaming: emotions in groups
Dec 11, 2019 · Shamers intend to promote compliance with norms they value, but shaming often triggers unintended consequences, including shame/anger/resentment ...
[72]
Naming and shaming bankers may be satisfying, but could backfire
Mar 15, 2017 · There are some policy contexts in which naming and shaming practices targeted at individuals have been evaluated for effectiveness. For example ...Missing: ineffectiveness | Show results with:ineffectiveness
[73]
[PDF] Can Shaming Promote Human Rights? - GPPi
Given such uncertainty, predictions about the effectiveness of shaming are important but cannot be the only considera- tion that determines when to shame.
[74]
[PDF] Social Repercussions for the Increased Use of Alternative Sanctions
shame criminals into fulfilling their civic duties, but this trend reflects a short-sighted misjudgment that may result in overall lower compliance for affected ...
[75]
Zero Tolerance, Naming and Shaming: Is There a Case for it with ...
(Eds.), War on drugs: Studies in the failure of US narcotic policy. Boulder ... Shaming and shame: An empirical analysis. Doctoral dissertation, Law ...
[76]
Legal experts warn naming and shaming alleged criminals on social ...
Jan 12, 2024 · Legal experts warn naming and shaming alleged criminals on social media can itself be a crime. By Hannah Walsh · A woman smiling at the camera ...
[77]
How Naming and Shaming Creates Pro-Government Militias
Aug 17, 2020 · A variety of actors can name and shame but it is mainly a tool used by NGOs, news media, and IGOs. While specific procedures vary, the basic ...Missing: risks | Show results with:risks
[78]
Ministers plan to allow naming and shaming of offenders completing ...
Sep 26, 2025 · Ministers are pushing through powers to photograph, name and shame offenders who have been ordered to complete unpaid community work in England ...
[79]
Why shaming other countries often backfires, with Rochelle Terman
Feb 22, 2024 · Shaming is most common in situations where it is least likely to be effective; and, most troublingly, it can often make human rights abuses worse.