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National Guard Forces Command

The National Guard Forces Command (Russian: Командование войск национальной гвардии) of the Russian Federation serves as the primary military-operational component of the National Guard (Rosgvardiya), a federal executive body directly subordinate to the President. It oversees a paramilitary force comprising specialized troops, rapid-response units, and operational brigades tasked with maintaining public order, protecting critical infrastructure, countering terrorism and organized crime, and responding to internal security threats. Formed on April 5, 2016, via Presidential Decree No. 156, the Command reorganized the of the Ministry of Internal Affairs into a unified structure under Rosgvardiya, absorbing elements such as , special forces, and dedicated internal security divisions to centralize control over domestic assets. This restructuring, led by Director —a longtime associate of President —aimed to enhance regime stability by consolidating forces capable of quelling unrest or potential coups, drawing on historical precedents like the Soviet-era . The Command's troops, numbering over 300,000 personnel, are equipped with heavy weaponry including armored vehicles, , and aviation assets, enabling operations ranging from urban policing to fortified site defense. While officially focused on lawful , the Command has faced scrutiny for its deployment in suppressing anti-government protests, such as those in and , and for assuming quasi-military roles in annexed territories following Russia's 2014 and 2022 invasion of , where units have conducted duties and . These actions underscore its evolution into a versatile instrument of state power, with critics highlighting risks of politicized enforcement amid Russia's centralized governance, though proponents emphasize its effectiveness in preventing disorder and .

Historical Origins

Pre-Revolutionary Precursors

The earliest precursors to the military structures later incorporated into the National Guard Forces Command emerged in the Russian Empire's efforts to maintain internal order through dedicated guard units. On March 27, 1811 (Old Style ), Emperor Alexander I decreed the formation of Internal Guard detachments, initially comprising 10 companies of 100 men each, drawn from regiments and assigned to safeguard key state institutions such as the , ministries, and imperial residences in St. Petersburg and . These units functioned as a supplement to regular police, focusing on convoy duties, facility security, and rapid response to disorders, marking the institutionalization of specialized internal protection forces separate from field armies. Following the Decembrist uprising of December 1825, Emperor Nicholas I restructured internal security by establishing the Separate Corps of Gendarmes on July 3, 1826 (Old Style), under the command of General Count , who also headed the newly created Third Section of His Imperial Majesty's Own Chancellery for political surveillance. The Corps expanded rapidly, organizing into district gendarme commands by 1828, with a strength of approximately 4,000 officers and men by the 1830s, equipped as and for mobility in suppressing unrest, investigating , and enforcing . Unlike civilian , gendarmes reported directly to the emperor, embodying a militarized approach to counter-revolutionary policing that prioritized loyalty to the over local governance. By mid-century, the Corps had grown to over 10,000 personnel across 13 district commands, incorporating specialized roles in railway security post-1860s and industrial expansion, while collaborating with provincial administrations to monitor revolutionary agitation. Reforms in 1866 under Alexander II subordinated some functions to the Ministry of Internal Affairs but retained the Corps' independent status and military character, with gendarmes authorized to use lethal force against crowds, as demonstrated during the 1863 uprising where they numbered about 2,000 in alone. The 1880 reorganization transferred overt political policing to the Department of Police (precursor to the ), allowing gendarmes to emphasize uniformed patrols, border controls, and anti-bandit operations, yet their doctrine—emphasizing disciplined, armed enforcement—influenced subsequent internal troop formations by blending combat readiness with domestic stability missions. These entities dissolved amid the of 1917, with many gendarmes clashing violently against protesters before the Corps' formal disbandment on April 30, 1917 (Old Style).

Soviet-Era Internal Troops

The Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the (Vnutrenniye voyska MVD SSSR) originated from special-purpose detachments created by the in 1918 to safeguard Bolshevik Party institutions, suppress counter-revolutionary elements, and maintain order amid the . These units were formally organized in 1919 under the , which later evolved into the , marking the beginning of a force dedicated to rather than external defense. Throughout the Soviet period, the troops underwent frequent reorganizations tied to shifts in state security apparatus. Incorporated into the expanded structure by 1934, they assumed responsibilities for guarding forced labor camps, securing industrial sites, and quelling internal dissent, including during the Great Purges. During , many divisions were transferred to the Red Army's command, participating in frontline combat operations, such as the defense of and offensives in , before reverting to internal roles postwar. Control oscillated between the NKVD/MVD and state security organs like the ; a pivotal consolidation occurred in 1954 when they were placed under the MVD, where General Ivan Yakovlev served as chief until 1987, emphasizing their role as a distinct branch. The core missions of the centered on preserving public order, managing during riots and strikes, protecting vital like railroads and power plants, and securing installations and correctional facilities. They supported regular police () in large-scale disturbances, conducted rear-area security in wartime, and countered or threats. In the late Soviet era, particularly amid perestroika-era unrest, units were deployed to suppress worker strikes and nationalist demonstrations in republics such as the Baltics and , reinforcing the regime's stability without relying on the regular armed forces. Organizationally, the troops comprised operational divisions for mobile response, special motorized rifle units for rapid intervention, and static guarding formations for facilities and camps, subdivided into regional administrations aligned with Soviet republics. was provided through four dedicated officer academies, focusing on urban combat, convoy escort, and anti-riot tactics. By 1989, their authorized strength approached 260,000 personnel, equipped with infantry weapons, armored vehicles like BTR series APCs, and light artillery, positioning them as one of the USSR's premier contingents. This framework of localized control and specialized internal missions directly influenced the post-Soviet Russian Internal Troops, which inherited their districts, units, and doctrinal emphasis on regime protection.

Post-Soviet Reforms Leading to Establishment

Following the in December 1991, the of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) were reorganized under the Russian Federation's MVD, inheriting the Soviet-era structure with approximately 300,000 personnel tasked with guarding key infrastructure, combating , and suppressing internal unrest amid economic turmoil, surging criminality, and ethnic separatist movements in regions like and . These forces played pivotal roles in the 1993 constitutional crisis, where they supported federal loyalists against parliamentary opposition, and in the (1994–1996), deploying divisions for convoy protection and combat support, though operations revealed coordination deficiencies with regular armed forces. By the late 1990s, fiscal pressures led to troop reductions from 318,000 to 220,000 personnel, alongside efforts to professionalize units through contract service incentives and equipment modernization, though chronic underfunding hampered effectiveness against evolving threats like and . The Second Chechen War (1999–2009) further strained the , with sustained deployments for rear-area security and counter-terrorism, culminating in high-casualty engagements that highlighted vulnerabilities in rapid response and inter-agency collaboration. Upon Vladimir Putin's ascension in 2000, centralization reforms consolidated federal control over security apparatuses, including MVD enhancements via the 2001–2003 restructuring that created specialized agencies like the Federal Narcotics Control Service while preserving the ' core mandate under MVD oversight, aiming to streamline anti-extremism efforts without fragmenting command. Terrorist attacks, including the 2002 theater siege and 2004 school hostage crisis, exposed systemic flaws in MVD-led operations, such as delayed decision-making and overlapping responsibilities among security services, prompting incremental upgrades in training, aviation assets, and special units like integration for urban disorder control. By the 2010s, persistent political protests (e.g., 2011–2012 anti-government demonstrations) and the 2014 Crimea annexation amplified demands for a loyal, unified internal force to safeguard regime stability against "color revolutions" and extremism. Earlier proposals, such as a 2011 National Guard concept, were shelved amid bureaucratic resistance, but accumulating pressures— including duplication between Internal Troops (around 170,000 combat-ready personnel) and police special forces—culminated in reforms to consolidate these under direct presidential authority, eliminating MVD intermediation to enhance operational loyalty and efficiency in suppressing dissent and terrorism. This restructuring directly presaged the 2016 decree absorbing the Internal Troops into the new National Guard Forces Command, transforming fragmented post-Soviet security elements into a centralized paramilitary entity.

Creation in 2016

The National Guard Forces Command was established on April 5, 2016, through Presidential Decree No. 156 issued by , which transformed the of the Ministry of Internal Affairs into the Troops of the of the Russian Federation, forming the core military structure under the newly created Federal Service of the National Guard Troops (Rosgvardiya). The decree subordinated the command directly to the President, bypassing the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and integrated additional units including special-purpose police detachments and , federal services for specific facilities, and presidential security units, totaling an initial force of approximately 250,000 personnel equipped for internal security operations. The creation aimed to centralize control over internal security forces amid concerns over political instability, terrorism, and extremism, with Putin stating during the announcement that the would enhance the state's ability to combat and protect important state facilities without relying on fragmented structures. , former head of the and a close associate of Putin, was appointed as the first Director of the Federal Service, thereby assuming command over the forces, which retained much of the ' organizational framework including regional commands and specialized brigades for and counter-terrorism. Formalization followed on June 22, 2016, when the Russian parliament passed a codifying the decree's provisions, which Putin signed on July 3, 2016, granting the forces expanded powers such as warrantless searches, extrajudicial asset seizures in cases, and the right to use lethal force in public order scenarios. This legislative step addressed criticisms from legal experts regarding the decree's status, ensuring the command's operational independence while embedding it within Russia's constitutional framework for executive authority over security apparatus.

Governing Legislation and Authority

The Law No. 226-FZ "On the Troops of the of the Federation", enacted on July 3, 2016, serves as the primary governing legislation for the National Guard Forces Command, defining its status as a distinct militarized formation within the Federal Service of Troops of the of the Federation (Rosgvardiya). This law delineates the troops' composition, operational principles, and core functions, including the protection of public order, counter-terrorism operations, and the safeguarding of critical state infrastructure, while integrating elements previously under the of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The legislation explicitly positions the Forces Command as an executive body tasked with implementing these mandates through centralized command structures, emphasizing rapid response capabilities and coordination with other security apparatus. Authority over the National Guard Forces Command resides directly with the of the Russian Federation, who holds supreme command as per the law's framework and constitutional provisions on . The appoints and dismisses the Director of Rosgvardiya—currently , appointed on May 12, 2016—who exercises operational control over the troops, including the Forces Command, and reports exclusively to the rather than through intermediate ministries like the of Internal Affairs. This direct subordination, formalized in the 2016 decree and law, grants the unilateral authority to deploy the forces for domestic security tasks, such as suppressing mass unrest or armed threats, without requiring parliamentary approval, reflecting a consolidation of executive power in security matters. Subsequent amendments and presidential decrees have refined operational authorities, such as expansions in allowing temporary integration of regular Armed Forces units under Rosgvardiya command for specific internal operations, underscoring the President's role in adapting the troops' mandate to evolving threats. The law mandates inter-agency coordination but prioritizes presidential directives, ensuring the Forces Command's in executing orders while prohibiting actions that infringe on constitutional without legal basis, though enforcement remains under oversight. This structure has been critiqued in analyses from security think tanks for potentially enabling personalized control over , diverging from decentralized models in other federations.

Organizational Structure

Command Hierarchy

The Forces Command maintains a centralized, military-style directly accountable to the President of the Russian Federation, bypassing intermediate ministries to ensure rapid response to threats. At the apex is the Director of the Federal Service of Troops, who concurrently holds the title of of the Troops and wields operational authority over all formations, including troop deployments, training doctrines, and resource allocation. has occupied this role since his appointment by presidential decree on April 5, 2016. Supporting the is the Main Staff (or General Staff), headed by the Chief of the Main Staff, which handles , , mobilization readiness, and inter-unit coordination. A First , often a , assists in overall deputy functions, with additional deputy directors specializing in domains such as combat training, logistics, armaments, and . For instance, Viktor Strigunov serves as First , focusing on key operational oversight. This staff structure mirrors conventional armed forces command-and-control systems, emphasizing unified decision-making to prevent fragmentation during crises. The hierarchy cascades to eight territorial district commands (okrugs), covering Russia's federal regions, where district commanders—typically major generals or higher—direct subordinate operational-tactical formations, including divisions, brigades, regiments, and battalions. These district heads integrate local units with specialized detachments like () and (special rapid response), ensuring hierarchical obedience flows from central command to field-level execution. Regional commanders report directly to the Main for operational orders, while administrative functions align with federal subjects' . This layered structure, formalized under No. 226-FZ of July 3, 2016, prioritizes loyalty to the and swift suppression of disorders over decentralized .

Regional Districts and Formations

The National Guard Forces Command maintains a territorial structure comprising eight regional commands, each aligned with one of Russia's federal districts to ensure nationwide coverage of operational activities. These commands oversee the deployment and coordination of formations, including operational brigades, special motorized regiments, and rapid response units tailored for and counter-terrorism missions. Regional commanders hold authority over local units such as licensing departments and mobile special detachments, enabling rapid mobilization for public order enforcement and border protection. In a May 2017 presidential decree, regional commanders were granted the ability to assume direct control of operational formations from other agencies during crises, enhancing the command's flexibility in coordinating with federal forces. This structure inherits elements from the former ' regional commands, such as the transformation of the District into a central hub in 2008, which now integrates motorized and specialized units for high-threat environments. Key formations under these districts include operational brigades exemplified by the 21st Operational Brigade, which received the for distinguished service, alongside special rapid response units () and mobile detachments equipped for tactical operations. The districts vary in size and capability, with larger concentrations in urban centers like and St. Petersburg, supporting an estimated total personnel strength distributed across the federation for sustained readiness.

Specialized Training Institutions

The specialized training institutions of the National Guard Forces Command primarily consist of four military institutes responsible for officer preparation in command, engineering, legal, and operational specialties, inherited and restructured from the Soviet-era following the 2016 formation of the . These institutions emphasize practical training in , counter-terrorism tactics, and weapons handling, with curricula aligned to the troops' missions in public order maintenance and . In 2016, the Military Institute was disbanded, with its functions redistributed to the remaining facilities to streamline training. The Military Institute, named after I.K. , specializes in and technical , including fortifications and protective structures for and perimeter . The Military Institute focuses on command-staff preparation for motorized rifle and special motor units, producing graduates equipped for district-level operations. The St. Petersburg Military Institute trains officers in , communications, and tactical command, drawing on facilities for simulation-based exercises in urban environments. The Military Institute provides specialized in information protection and cybersecurity for units, addressing threats to . Pre-university cadet schools, such as the Moscow Presidential Cadet School named after M.A. Sholokhov and the Perm Presidential Cadet School, serve as foundational institutions for recruiting and initial military-patriotic education, feeding into the higher institutes. Overall, these entities ensure a cadre of approximately 340,000 personnel receives standardized doctrinal training, with annual intakes exceeding 1,000 officer cadets across programs.

Missions and Operational Doctrine

Core Responsibilities

The National Guard Forces Command oversees the operational deployment of paramilitary troops within the Russian National Guard, focusing on missions that prioritize the prevention of threats to state stability and public safety. Its primary mandate involves directing forces to maintain public order, suppress illegal armed formations, and protect citizens' rights and freedoms during emergencies or mass events. This command structure ensures rapid response capabilities for quelling disturbances, with units authorized to use proportionate force against violations of . Key duties include combating and through specialized operations, including the neutralization of armed groups and the elimination of explosive devices in urban environments. The command also manages , issuing permits for civilian and service weapons while regulating their storage, transportation, and use to curb illegal proliferation. Additionally, it coordinates the guarding of , such as nuclear facilities, transportation hubs, and special cargo convoys, employing both static security details and mobile response teams. In coordination with other agencies, the Forces Command supports border security by assisting in anti-smuggling operations and territorial defense, though its role remains auxiliary to the Federal Security Service's border guards. Troops under its authority participate in protecting federal property and correctional institutions, ensuring the secure transport of high-risk and the suppression of riots. These responsibilities are executed via a network of regional directorates, emphasizing de-escalation where possible but with legal provisions for lethal force in cases of direct threats to personnel or state assets.

Counter-Terrorism and Public Order Enforcement

The National Guard Forces Command, established under No. 226-FZ of July 3, 2016, holds primary responsibilities for combating on Russian territory and suppressing terrorist activities beyond its borders, as explicitly outlined in Article 4 of the law. This includes direct participation in counter-terrorist operations, often in coordination with the National Anti-Terrorism Committee, which oversees the nationwide system for preventing and responding to terrorist threats through intelligence sharing, threat assessment, and operational execution. The Command's specialized units, such as (Special Rapid Response Units), are equipped for high-risk interventions, including hostage rescues and neutralization of armed threats, drawing from pre-2016 precedents in internal troop deployments against insurgencies in the . In practice, the Command's counter-terrorism efforts emphasize rapid response to domestic , including to prevent terrorist access to weapons, with over 1.5 million firearms registered and monitored annually under its authority since 2016. While specific operational details remain classified, the force has integrated into broader anti-terror frameworks, such as post-2023 legislative updates enhancing level protocols and inter-agency cooperation. Critics from analyses note that these activities sometimes overlap with political measures, potentially inflating perceptions to justify expanded powers, though empirical data on thwarted plots—such as routine seizures of illegal explosives tied to groups—support the operational focus on tangible risks like those from ISIS-linked cells. For public order enforcement, the Command is mandated to protect public safety, manage mass events, and suppress riots or unauthorized assemblies that disrupt stability, absorbing former units to bolster capabilities. This role has been invoked in numerous domestic incidents, including the deployment of reinforcements to on January 17, 2024, where Rosgvardiya units clashed with protesters opposing the sentencing of activist Fail Alsynov, resulting in heightened security measures amid ethnic tensions. Similarly, during anti-mobilization protests following President Putin's September 21, 2022, announcement, elements supported in detaining over 730 individuals across multiple cities on September 24, 2022, using non-lethal measures like barriers and dispersal tactics to restore order. These actions align with the Command's doctrine of prioritizing regime stability, though reports from independent monitors highlight instances of excessive force, such as the use of grenades in crowd suppression, raising questions about in politically charged contexts. The Command's has drawn scrutiny for blurring lines between anti-terrorism and political enforcement, particularly in responses to framed as threats; for instance, while official narratives emphasize preventive efficacy, data from 2013–2023 show over 3,700 terrorism-related convictions, many non-violent and linked to expression rather than active plots, suggesting selective application influenced by state priorities. Nonetheless, verifiable deployments demonstrate a consistent pattern of rapid mobilization—numbering up to 400,000 personnel in peak scenarios—to enforce order, with equipment like armored vehicles and non-lethal munitions enabling containment without escalating to lethal force in most cases.

Border Security and Arms Control

The National Guard Forces Command participates in border security operations primarily through the protection of strategic and transport routes near state , rather than routine patrolling, which remains the domain of the Border Service. Official responsibilities include safeguarding key sites such as shipping lanes along the and the against vessel incursions and . In practice, these efforts involve deploying specialized units to secure cargo, facilities, and maritime approaches in remote regions, with expanded presence announced in early 2019 to support Russia's goal of handling 80 million tons of annual shipments. Arms control constitutes a core function of the Command, encompassing the issuance of licenses and permits for the acquisition, storage, carrying, and trade of civilian and service weapons, as well as oversight of their circulation to ensure compliance with federal law. By January 2020, Rosgvardia reported approximately 4 million licensed civilian firearm owners possessing 6.6 million weapons, subject to mandatory registration, safe storage inspections, and periodic checks. Following the May 2021 school shooting in Kazan that killed nine people, legislation was enacted to tighten controls, empowering Rosgvardia to revoke permits for individuals under investigation for extremism, domestic violence, or administrative offenses, and mandating biometric data collection for renewals. The Command also supervises private security firms and enforces norms in arms production and trade, with authority to conduct audits and seize non-compliant weapons. In March 2023, amendments prohibited granting licenses to suspects or accused persons, aiming to reduce risks from prohibited categories. These measures reflect a centralized approach to preventing illicit proliferation, though enforcement relies on regional directorates and faces challenges from patchy monitoring in rural areas.

Equipment and Capabilities

Armored and Heavy Weaponry

The National Guard Forces Command has expanded its of armored vehicles to include main battle , marking a shift from its primarily light and medium mechanized focus prior to 2023. In July 2023, lawmakers approved amendments to federal legislation explicitly authorizing the National Guard's use of heavy weaponry, including , in response to the Wagner Group's armed mutiny that exposed vulnerabilities in . This legal change facilitated the integration of units into the Command's structure, enhancing its capacity for rapid response to large-scale disturbances or insurgencies. By September 2025, National Guard Director confirmed the revival of dedicated battalions as part of a comprehensive buildup in heavy armament capabilities. Armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles form the backbone of the Command's ground mobility assets, enabling troop transport and in urban and rural operations. Units deployed in occupied territories, for instance, have been observed utilizing a mix of armored vehicles alongside heavier systems, supporting missions such as counter-partisan activities. These assets are supplemented by engineering vehicles derived from chassis, such as obstacle-clearing models and armored recovery vehicles like the BAT-2M, which were in service as of but have since been phased out in favor of modernized equivalents amid ongoing equipment rationalization. Heavy weaponry beyond armor encompasses artillery systems, including towed and self-propelled guns, which provide indirect fire support for National Guard formations. Reports from early 2024 indicate that operational brigades in contested regions are equipped with artillery pieces capable of engaging fortified positions or dispersed threats, integrated with helicopter assets for combined-arms tactics. This arsenal expansion reflects a doctrinal evolution toward greater autonomy in suppressing armed rebellions, though exact inventories remain classified, with procurement likely drawing from domestic manufacturers like Uralvagonzavod for standardization with broader Russian forces. The emphasis on heavy systems prioritizes deterrence against organized internal challenges over routine policing, aligning with the Command's mandate under Presidential Decree No. 395 of 2016.

Modernization Efforts and Recent Expansions

In response to operational demands, including counter-terrorism and public order maintenance, the Russian has pursued modernization of its equipment inventory since its 2016 formation from the . Efforts have emphasized enhancing mobility, firepower, and surveillance capabilities, with acquisitions including advanced armored personnel carriers and specialized for rapid deployment. For instance, in September 2025, the National Guard incorporated from the UAE-based , such as mine-resistant ambush-protected models, to bolster protected mobility in high-threat environments. Recent expansions have markedly increased the integration of heavy weaponry, marking a shift toward greater combat potency for the Forces Command's troop units. On September 11, 2025, Director announced the reintroduction of tank units, alongside anti-tank guns, , and multiple launch rocket systems, describing this as the first such incorporation into service. These additions, reported by assessments, extend beyond traditional roles and align with broader force structure enhancements amid ongoing conflicts. The expansions reflect prioritized resource allocation, with tank formations established to operate under direct oversight rather than conventional chains. This buildup, initiated in earnest during 2024-2025, aims to equip regional with sustained heavy support, though independent analyses question the logistical given Russia's parallel commitments. Special rapid response units () have also seen ongoing equipment upgrades, including enhanced and tactical gear, to maintain operational edge in urban and scenarios.

Operational History and Deployments

Domestic Operations

The National Guard Forces Command oversees domestic operations centered on , including the protection of , public order maintenance during mass events, and counter-terrorism efforts within Russian territory. These activities stem from the federal law establishing Rosgvardiya, which consolidated former units under direct presidential control to address threats like , , and civil unrest. Troops are routinely deployed to safeguard plants, , and transportation hubs, with over 340,000 personnel available for rapid response across Russia's districts. In public order enforcement, the Command's and subunits play a key role in managing protests and riots, often using non-lethal and lethal force as authorized. During the January 2021 protests sparked by Alexei Navalny's imprisonment, Rosgvardiya forces dispersed gatherings in major cities, arresting thousands alongside regular . Similarly, in response to 2022 anti-war demonstrations following the invasion, units assisted in rally suppression and participant detentions across and other regions. A notable recent example occurred in January 2024, when reinforcements were dispatched to Baymak in to counter ethnic protests against activist Fail Alsynov's sentencing, involving clashes that resulted in injuries and arrests. These deployments underscore the Command's prioritization of regime stability over de-escalation, as analyzed by security experts. Counter-terrorism operations form another pillar, with specialized detachments conducting raids and neutralizing threats in high-risk areas like the . units, focused on anti-organized crime and urban counter-insurgency, have executed operations against Islamist militants, including seizures of weapons caches and eliminations of cell leaders in and . The Command also enforces through inspections and licensing, seizing illegal firearms and explosives to prevent domestic insurgencies; in alone, such efforts reportedly confiscated thousands of units from civilians and criminals. While official reports emphasize successful preemptions, independent assessments highlight occasional overreach into non-terrorist dissident activities. Beyond conflict response, the Forces Command supports , though primarily in a security capacity rather than . Units have secured disaster zones during floods and wildfires, protecting relief convoys and evacuations while combating , as seen in Siberian deployments in 2021. This multifaceted role reinforces internal cohesion but raises concerns about of civilian policing, per critiques from policy institutes.

Involvement in External Conflicts

The National Guard Forces Command has seen limited direct involvement in foreign conflicts prior to 2022, with its predecessor Internal Troops occasionally providing security detachments abroad, but deployments under the current structure have primarily focused on the ongoing conflict in Ukraine. In Syria, elements associated with the National Guard, such as Chechen-led military police units integrated into Rosgvardiya, have been reported operating since 2017 in support roles, including facility protection and order maintenance alongside regular Russian forces. These units, numbering in the hundreds, focused on rear-area stabilization rather than frontline combat, reflecting the Command's gendarmerie-oriented doctrine adapted for expeditionary tasks. Following the full-scale invasion of on February 24, 2022, troops under the Forces Command were rapidly deployed to occupied territories, establishing bases in cities such as , , and parts of to enforce public order and counter insurgent activities. By mid-2022, these units, totaling thousands of personnel, assumed responsibility for rear-area security, including patrols, checkpoint operations, and suppression of pro-Ukrainian resistance groups, freeing elements for combat duties. Some formations participated in limited assault roles during the initial phases of urban clearances, leveraging their experience in domestic counter-terrorism. As of September 2025, the Command continues to expand its presence in , with approximately 700,000 total Russian forces including Rosgvardiya elements deployed across frontline and occupied zones, emphasizing in annexed regions. Recent enhancements include the formation of dedicated tank battalions equipped with and variants, integrated into Rosgvardiya structures to bolster defensive perimeters and convoy protection against partisan attacks. This shift marks a departure from purely internal missions, with the Command's up to 400,000-strong troop pool providing Putin direct control over occupation governance. No verified large-scale engagements have occurred in other external theaters, such as or the beyond , though legal frameworks permit or counter-terrorism operations abroad if authorized.

Controversies and Criticisms

Allegations of Repression and Political Role

The Russian National Guard, established by decree on April 5, 2016, and led by —a longtime personal to —has been characterized by critics as a force designed primarily for regime protection rather than solely counter-terrorism or public order. Zolotov reports directly to Putin, bypassing the , which enables rapid deployment for political stabilization; in November 2017, Putin expanded its mandate to safeguard regional leaders, reinforcing perceptions of its role in consolidating loyalty amid elite tensions. Allegations of repression center on the Guard's deployment against domestic dissent, particularly unsanctioned protests. During the January 2021 protests supporting , following his arrest on January 17, the —incorporating riot police units—led forceful dispersals in multiple cities, contributing to thousands of detentions amid baton charges and operations. Similarly, in the wake of Russia's February 24, 2022, invasion of , the Guard participated in suppressing anti-war demonstrations, with over 14,900 arrests recorded by OVD-Info between February 24 and March 13, 2022, as authorities framed protesters as threats to . Critics, including monitors, argue these actions exemplify a pattern of escalating state to deter opposition, with the Guard's militarized units—equipped for urban combat—prioritizing loyalty enforcement over proportionate response. The Guard's political role extends to internal security dynamics, where it serves as a to other agencies like the Defense Ministry; post-2022, its expansion with heavy weaponry has been linked to preempting dissent or coups, underscoring Zolotov's as a trusted amid purges. Russian state narratives portray these operations as defenses against "" and foreign-influenced unrest, yet analyses highlight how the Guard's structure incentivizes overreach to affirm allegiance to Putin, potentially at the expense of .

Effectiveness and Human Rights Concerns

The Russian National Guard, under its Forces Command, has proven effective in rapidly restoring public order during domestic unrest, as evidenced by its role in quelling the 2019 Moscow protests against alleged , where coordinated deployments dispersed crowds and limited disruptions to isolated incidents despite initial gatherings of thousands. This operational success stems from its large manpower—over 340,000 troops as of 2016—and direct reporting to the , enabling swift without intermediary bureaucratic delays. Independent analyses note that such interventions have consistently prevented protests from evolving into sustained challenges to authority, though at the expense of broader societal trust in state institutions. In counter-terrorism and operations, the reports high success rates, including the neutralization of over 1,000 armed criminals annually in the early 2020s through specialized units like and , though these figures derive primarily from official Russian sources with limited third-party . Its expanding arsenal, including recent acquisitions of main battle in 2025 for regime protection, enhances deterrence capabilities but raises questions about proportionality in roles. Overall effectiveness is constrained by inherited Soviet-era tactics emphasizing mass force over precision, mirroring broader Russian security apparatus limitations observed in rigid command structures. Human rights concerns center on allegations of excessive force and systemic abuses during public order enforcement. During the 2019 protests, units employed batons, , and rubber munitions, resulting in over 2,000 detentions and documented injuries from beatings, with observers reporting violations of the right to peaceful under international standards. Reports from groups like FIDH and , corroborated by video footage and detainee testimonies, highlight patterns of arbitrary arrests and post-detention mistreatment, including torture in pre-trial facilities, though authorities classify these as lawful countermeasures against "." These organizations, while subject to criticism for selective focus on authoritarian regimes, base claims on empirical evidence from multiple witnesses, contrasting with state denials that lack independent audits. In the context of post-2022 anti-war demonstrations, the National Guard's suppression efforts led to swift crackdowns, with over 15,000 arrests nationwide by mid-2022, often involving forced dispersals and charges under expanded "discrediting the military" laws that curtail free expression. UN experts have noted escalating repression, including against civilians, as a mechanism to enforce compliance, potentially amounting to widespread violations of and . Such tactics, while achieving short-term order, foster a climate of that undermines voluntary public cooperation with , per analyses of repression dynamics in hybrid regimes.

Internal Challenges and Refusals to Deploy

In early 2022, shortly after the onset of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, a group of approximately 115 personnel from the region, initially deployed to , refused orders to cross into Ukrainian territory on February 25. A subsequently ordered their dismissal on May 26, citing , marking one of the earliest documented instances of collective refusal within the 's ranks. This action stemmed from legal ambiguities surrounding the Guard's mandate, as its predecessor were restricted to domestic roles, and conscripts within the force were not authorized for foreign combat under law. Legal challenges followed, with at least 12 affected guardsmen, represented by Benyash, contesting their terminations through lawsuits against the Russian government, arguing the deployments violated statutory limits on operations abroad. These refusals highlighted internal tensions over the Guard's expanding role beyond , exacerbated by inadequate for frontline warfare and perceptions of mismatched equipment against Ukrainian forces. Broader morale issues have persisted, with reports of low motivation and disciplinary problems among deployed units, including and evasion of duties in occupied areas like by late 2024, prompting National Guard raids to apprehend deserters from the broader Russian military. However, no large-scale mutinies akin to the Wagner Group's 2023 rebellion have been recorded within the , though its forces faced criticism for limited effectiveness in countering that uprising due to lighter armament at the time. In response, the Guard has since received reinforcements in heavy weaponry, including tanks, to address vulnerabilities exposed by such lapses.

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