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Internal Security Forces

The Internal Security Forces (ISF; Arabic: قوى الأمن الداخلي, Qūwā al-Amn al-Dākhilī; French: Forces de Sécurité Intérieure) constitute Lebanon's national and , functioning as the primary civilian apparatus for , public order preservation, and internal security operations across all Lebanese territories, including land, territorial waters, and . Operating under the Ministry of Interior and Municipalities, the ISF execute judicial mandates, protect persons and property, uphold legal freedoms, and support broader governmental functions such as guarding public institutions and diplomatic missions. Originating from an Ottoman-era gendarmerie formed in 1861 and reorganized under the French Mandate with a key decree on September 20, 1920, establishing structured policing in , the ISF evolved into their modern configuration post-independence, encompassing specialized directorates like the for investigations and crime control, the as a reserve for order maintenance, the Territorial Gendarmerie for regional operations, and administrative units handling logistics and training. With roughly 26,000 personnel as of recent estimates, the force has navigated Lebanon's sectarian political landscape, where appointments and operations often reflect networks rather than merit-based . Amid 's protracted since 2019, the ISF have contended with severe funding shortfalls, salary devaluations prompting officer desertions estimated at 800 to 2,000, and institutional strains that have compromised equipment and response capabilities, yet informal adaptations have helped avert widespread disorder. Criticisms persist regarding , wherein the force prioritizes political loyalty over impartial policing, alongside documented lapses in adherence during operations, though donor-backed reforms—focusing on community partnerships, training, and measures—have yielded localized improvements, such as enhanced jurisdiction in .

History

Origins and Establishment

The origins of the Lebanese Internal Security Forces (ISF) date to the Ottoman period, when the Judiciary Police was founded on July 9, 1861, under Daoud Pasha in the Mutasarrifate of Mount Lebanon to handle internal law enforcement and judicial duties. This early force laid the groundwork for organized policing amid the region's semi-autonomous status within the Ottoman Empire. Under the French Mandate established after World War I, the gendarmerie was reorganized on September 20, 1920, through a decision by the French High Commissioner, which integrated Lebanese personnel with elements from Syrian gendarmerie units to cover the newly delineated Greater Lebanon territory; the force initially comprised 1,200 members led by 37 officers. This structure emphasized maintaining order in rural and urban areas, protecting public safety, and supporting mandate administration, evolving from prior Ottoman models while adapting to French colonial priorities such as territorial control and countering local unrest. Following Lebanon's independence on , 1943, the modern ISF emerged as a national institution distinct from military forces, formally established in 1953 via Legislative Decree No. 1953-59, which defined its core mandate for internal security and was amended by Legislative Decree No. 1955-20 to refine organizational aspects. The General Directorate of the ISF was then created in under Legislative Decree No. 1959-138 during President Fouad Chehab's tenure, centralizing command under the Ministry of Interior and expanding personnel to approximately 4,600 by the mid-1950s to address post-independence challenges like sectarian tensions and urban policing needs. The official designation "General Directorate of the Internal Security Forces" was solidified in 1967 by Legislative Decree No. 1967-54, marking the consolidation of its civilian-oriented role separate from the .

Post-Independence Development

Following Lebanon's on November 22, 1943, the Internal Security Forces (ISF), comprising the and inherited from the French Mandate period, underwent to operate under sovereign Lebanese command, separate from foreign oversight. In 1946, a governmental merged the —originally rooted in Ottoman-era structures from 1861—with urban units to establish the unified of the ISF, centralizing authority for internal policing and rural security operations. This restructuring empowered the ISF to enforce laws across all Lebanese territory, , and , with core mandates including preserving public order, communal harmony, property protection, and execution of judicial writs and arrests. Through the 1950s and early , the ISF developed specialized branches for criminal investigations, traffic regulation, and prison administration, while maintaining a character suited to Lebanon's sectarian and geographic diversity. Legislative Decree No. 17 of 1962 further codified the ISF's organization, affirming its role as the primary national police and force responsible for non-military internal threats, distinct from the . Personnel expansion supported urban growth in and rural patrols, though exact figures remain sparse; by the late , the ISF numbered in the thousands, focusing on routine amid rising Palestinian inflows and minor skirmishes without major structural overhauls until the mid-1970s.

Role During the Civil War and Reconstruction

During the from 1975 to 1990, the Internal Security Forces (ISF), established in 1964 as the country's primary civilian , largely lost operational control over vast territories to sectarian militias, rendering the force ineffective in maintaining national order. Militias such as the Phalangists, , and Palestinian factions assumed security roles in their enclaves, with ISF units fragmenting along confessional lines or confining activities to isolated government-held pockets, particularly in Beirut's eastern sectors under Christian control. This impotence stemmed from the war's estimated 150,000 deaths, widespread displacement of over 1 million people, and the collapse of central authority, which prioritized militia loyalty over state policing. The ISF's limited involvement included sporadic enforcement in stable areas, such as processing cases in courts that persisted amid chaos, but overall, the force was derided for failing to counter militia dominance or prevent atrocities like the 1975 or 1982 Sabra and Shatila events, where security vacuums enabled extrajudicial actions. By the late 1980s, as Syrian forces intervened to enforce ceasefires under the 1989 Taif Accord, ISF remnants supported minimal state functions, though without unified command or resources to challenge armed groups. Post-war reconstruction under the Taif Accord, ratified in November 1989 and implemented from October 1990, mandated the demobilization of militias and rebuilding of unified security institutions, including the ISF, to restore civilian policing authority. The ISF expanded from fragmented units to a centralized force of approximately 20,000 personnel by the mid-1990s, focusing on urban and in Syrian-occupied areas, though Syrian oversight from 1990 to 2005 prioritized regime-aligned loyalty over professionalization. Challenges persisted, including financial corruption, inadequate training, and sectarian imbalances—such as Sunni dominance in leadership—undermining effectiveness, with the force relying on support for stability operations. By 2005, following Syrian withdrawal, ISF efforts shifted toward countering non-state actors like Hezbollah's parallel security networks, but persistent underfunding and political interference limited reconstruction to partial restoration of pre-war mandates.

Primary Responsibilities

The Internal Security Forces (ISF) serve as Lebanon's primary civilian and agency, tasked with upholding and public order across the country's territory. Their core mandate encompasses preventing and investigating crimes, arresting perpetrators, and executing judicial warrants as the nation's . This includes routine patrolling, traffic regulation, and enforcement against violations such as drug trafficking, forgery, and economic offenses, with the ISF assuming direct responsibility for these functions under Lebanese law. In addition to general policing, the ISF protects individuals, property, and freedoms within legal bounds, while combating , , and through specialized operations. They coordinate efforts, including rescue operations and fire response, and secure key infrastructure such as diplomatic missions, , and public buildings. These duties extend to , , and security support, distinguishing the ISF from military roles while filling gaps in non-military internal threats. The ISF's strategic framework emphasizes fair , public safety coordination, and proactive to foster community trust, though implementation has faced challenges from resource constraints and overlapping jurisdictions with entities like the . As outlined in their 2018-2022 strategic plan, these responsibilities aim to consolidate the ISF as the lead agency for all missions prescribed by law, reducing reliance on intervention in civilian matters. The legal foundation of the Lebanese Internal Security Forces (ISF) is established by Legislative Decree No. 17/90 of January 17, 1990, which organizes the ISF as a unified public armed force responsible for internal security and law enforcement. This decree integrates prior gendarmerie and police structures, vesting the ISF with authority to maintain public order, prevent and combat crime, and enforce judicial decisions across Lebanon. Article 1 of the decree explicitly defines the ISF as "public armed forces whose jurisdiction covers all Lebanese territories and territorial waters and airspace," granting nationwide operational scope without territorial limitations. Under this framework, the ISF holds primary responsibility for criminal investigations, arrests, and prosecutions in coordination with the , including powers to conduct searches, seizures, and as authorized by Lebanese penal code provisions. The forces operate under the oversight of the of Interior and Municipalities, with the empowered to issue internal regulations and directives aligned with national law, subject to ministerial approval. While the ISF's mandate emphasizes civilian policing, it includes paramilitary capabilities for and border security support, distinct from the ' external defense role, though overlaps occur in crises via inter-agency decrees such as Cabinet Decision No. 5593 of 1991 authorizing military assistance. Jurisdictional boundaries are delineated to avoid duplication with entities like General Security (focused on immigration and counter-espionage) or military courts, which handle offenses against state security; however, ISF personnel remain subject to military tribunals for internal disciplinary matters under the 1951 Code of . Enforcement powers are constrained by constitutional protections for freedoms of expression and assembly, as affirmed in ISF operational guidelines referencing Article 13 of the Lebanese Constitution, requiring proportionate . In practice, the ISF's authority extends to specialized units for , traffic regulation, and economic offenses, with over 25,000 personnel deployed as of 2020 to execute these mandates.

Organization and Structure

Command Hierarchy

The Internal Security Forces (ISF) of are subordinate to the Ministry of Interior and Municipalities, which provides political oversight, budgetary approval, and coordination through bodies such as the Central Security Council chaired by the . The , appointed by decree requiring two-thirds parliamentary approval and traditionally a Sunni Muslim officer of rank or higher, holds supreme operational authority over the ISF, directing all units, personnel, and missions except those of the Inspector General. Directly beneath the is the , responsible for administrative coordination, order dissemination, and managing the general staff, including specialized branches like the Information Branch, which handles internal monitoring and security with approximately 1,000 personnel. The Command Council, chaired by the but effectively influenced by the minister, comprises 10 unit leaders (five and five for sectarian balance) and decides on promotions, appointments, and policy, convening with 48-hour notice. All commanding officers of operational units report to the and are accountable to him for assigned duties, ensuring centralized control despite regional autonomies. The Inspector General operates independently, reporting directly to the Minister of Interior to investigate violations, ensure compliance, and handle complaints through divisions like Investigations and , thereby providing oversight external to the operational chain. At the field level, regional commanders—typically generals—oversee territorial units such as the Territorial Gendarmerie (outside ) and (national reserve), while specialized directorates like , Police, and Embassy Security maintain dedicated commands that coordinate via the but retain autonomy in routine operations. This structure, governed by Law No. 17 of 1990, balances centralized authority with sectarian representation amid Lebanon's system, though it has faced criticism for fragmented oversight and vulnerability to political interference.

Regional and Specialized Branches

The Internal Security Forces (ISF) of maintain a decentralized structure with regional commands aligned to the country's administrative divisions, including , , , Bekaa, and South Lebanon. These commands oversee local , patrol operations, and subunits, which are subdivided into companies, brigades, and posts for granular coverage of urban and rural areas. The Police operates as a distinct regional entity focused on urban policing within the capital, handling , , and public order in densely populated zones. Outside , the Territorial assumes primary responsibility for non-urban territories, enforcing laws in rural districts and coordinating with local posts to address community-level security needs. Specialized branches complement the regional framework by addressing targeted functions nationwide. The serves as a general reserve force, deployable across all regions for maintaining public order, suppression, and emergency interventions, with units stationed both in and provincial areas. The handles investigative duties, encompassing subunits for scientific forensics, tourist police operations, crime prevention, and into organized offenses, extending its jurisdiction throughout Lebanese territories. Additional specialized entities include the of the Security of Embassies and , which protects diplomatic missions and ; the Inspection General, tasked with internal oversight, violation probes, and complaint processing; and the ISF , which administers colleges and centers to standardize personnel skills. Support branches such as (managing welfare funds and cultural programs) and the (overseeing logistics, equipment, and facilities) ensure operational sustainability across both regional and specialized operations.

Elite and Special Units

Information and Counter-Terrorism Branches

The Information Branch (شعبة المعلومات), also known as the Information Department, functions as the principal intelligence apparatus of Lebanon's Internal Security Forces (ISF), encompassing responsibilities in national security intelligence, counterintelligence, and counter-terrorism operations. Established in 1993 under the premiership of Rafik Hariri, the branch was initially led by Brigadier General Wissam al-Hassan, who served as Hariri's former chief of security and expanded its focus on internal threats amid post-civil war reconstruction. Its mandate includes collecting, analyzing, and disseminating intelligence on criminal networks, espionage, and militant activities, often integrating tactical elements for raids and arrests across urban and rural areas. International assessments have highlighted the branch's motivation and aptitude for intelligence-driven urban counterterrorism, distinguishing it from other ISF units in operational effectiveness against non-state actors. Counter-terrorism duties within the Information Branch involve proactive disruption of plots by groups such as and affiliates, including , informant networks, and joint operations with the . For instance, in 2018, ISF officials credited the branch with foiling multiple large-scale terrorist attacks during heightened sectarian tensions, leveraging real-time intelligence to preempt bombings and infiltrations. The branch has faced direct retaliation from extremists; on January 8, 2016, -linked militants assassinated an Information Branch officer near Arsal in a targeted , underscoring its frontline role in border-adjacent efforts. Operations often extend to dismantling foreign rings, with the branch employing technical and undercover tactics to identify and neutralize threats, as evidenced by routine arrests documented in ISF communiqués for trafficking and militant financing linked to regional instability. Structurally, the Information Branch operates semi-autonomously under the ISF Directorate General, with specialized teams for cyber , forensic analysis, and intervention squads trained in hostage rescue and high-risk apprehensions, akin to tactical units. It collaborates with partners for capacity-building, including U.S. programs focused on sharing to counter foreign terrorist organizations operating in , such as Hezbollah's rivals and Palestinian jihadist factions. Despite achievements, the branch's efficacy is constrained by Lebanon's , where appointments and resource allocation reflect networks, potentially introducing vulnerabilities in impartial threat assessment. No distinct standalone Counter-Terrorism Branch exists within the ISF; such functions are consolidated under the Information Branch's purview, integrating with broader research units for investigative continuity.

Tactical and Intervention Forces

The constitutes the primary tactical and intervention component of the Lebanese Internal Security Forces (ISF), functioning as a general reserve for rapid deployment in maintaining public order and executing high-intensity security operations nationwide. These units are structured for swift mobilization, with active detachments stationed in and regional outposts, equipped for , suppression, and intervention in armed confrontations or civil unrest. Complementing this are Special Weapons and Tactics () teams, specialized elite squads within the ISF responsible for high-risk tactical engagements, including hostage rescues, barricaded suspect apprehensions, and the execution of search warrants in fortified or hazardous environments. Personnel in these forces undergo rigorous emphasizing urban combat, marksmanship, and non-lethal crowd management techniques, often at dedicated facilities like the ISF's Institute of Internal Security Forces, which includes shooting ranges and simulated training villages spanning approximately 40,000 square meters. operators receive advanced instruction in specialized equipment handling, such as breaching tools and tactical gear, with international exchanges enhancing capabilities—for instance, U.S.-based programs demonstrating tactics and weaponry as of 2009. The Mobile Gendarmerie's role extends to supporting broader ISF missions under Decree No. 1157 of March 20, 1991, which outlines the organizational framework integrating these units into the ISF's 10 core directorates for coordinated responses. These forces have been pivotal in operational scenarios requiring immediate escalation, such as responding to terrorist incidents or organized disturbances, where teams serve as for armed threats, prioritizing containment and neutralization to minimize casualties. includes standard issue firearms, armored vehicles for mobility, and protective gear adapted for Lebanon's urban and sectarian flashpoints, though resource constraints from the ongoing since 2019 have strained and procurement. Integration with other ISF branches ensures these units provide surge capacity, distinct from the ' parallel intervention regiments, focusing instead on rather than military defense.

Leadership and Directors General

Appointment Process and Sectarian Conventions

The Director General of the Lebanese Internal Security Forces (ISF) is appointed by decree of the , typically following negotiations among Lebanon's major political blocs to select a senior officer from within the ISF ranks. The appointee is usually promoted to the rank of upon assuming the role, as seen in the March 13, 2025, appointment of Raed Abdallah, who advanced through ISF positions including roles before his elevation. This prioritizes candidates with extensive internal experience, often colonels or higher-ranking officers, though exceptional cases may involve Grade 1 civil servants; the decree formalizes the cabinet's decision after informal vetting for competence and political alignment. Lebanon's confessional system imposes unwritten sectarian conventions on security leadership to maintain balance among religious communities, with the ISF Director General customarily allocated to a Sunni Muslim, reflecting the broader distribution where the commander is a Maronite Christian and the General Directorate of General Security head is Shia. This allocation, rooted in the 1943 and reinforced by post-civil war agreements like the 1989 Accord, ensures representation across sects in sensitive institutions but often politicizes appointments, leading to prolonged vacancies—such as the near four-year resolved in 2017—until quotas are negotiated. Sectarian considerations extend to subordinate command roles, where exert influence along confessional lines, potentially undermining merit-based selection despite formal emphasis on experience. These conventions perpetuate a patronage dynamic, where appointments serve to consolidate elite control over security apparatus amid Lebanon's fragmented power-sharing, though recent selections like Abdallah's have been framed as prioritizing expertise over explicit sectarian horse-trading. Critics argue this system fosters clientelism, with sect-based allocations correlating to loyalty toward dominant factions rather than operational efficacy, as evidenced by historical delays tied to inter-sectarian bargaining.

Key Directors and Tenures

Major General Raed Abdallah has served as Director General since his appointment on March 13, 2025, succeeding Imad Othman amid a under Nawaf Salam. Born in 1972 in Shhim, Chouf, Abdallah brings expertise in counter-terrorism operations prior to his elevation. His predecessor, Imad Othman, held the position from March 8, 2017, to March 2025, overseeing responses to , protests, and Hezbollah-related security dynamics during an extended tenure marked by institutional strain. Othman succeeded Ibrahim Basbous, who directed the ISF from June 27, 2013, to March 2017, focusing on internal stability amid Syria's spillover conflicts. Basbous followed a brief interim period under Roger Salem, acting director from April 1 to June 27, 2013, during political deadlock preventing a permanent appointment. Salem's interim came after Major General Ashraf Rifi, who led from April 2005 to April 1, 2013, implementing intelligence recruitment drives and navigating post-Syrian withdrawal challenges, including an eight-year term extended briefly before retirement at age 59. Rifi, a Sunni figure aligned with politics, preceded Salem upon reaching mandatory retirement. Earlier, Major General directed until April 2005, handing over amid Syria's influence waning after the .
Director GeneralRankTenureKey Context
Raed AbdallahMarch 13, 2025 – presentAppointed post-Hezbollah tensions; counter-terrorism focus.
Imad OthmanMarch 8, 2017 – March 2025Managed 2019 protests, economic .
Ibrahim BasbousJune 27, 2013 – March 2017Syria conflict spillover response.
Roger SalemBrigadier General (acting)April 1 – June 27, 2013Transitional amid impasse.
Ashraf RifiApril 2005 – April 1, 2013Post- intelligence reforms.

Notable Operations and Events

Counter-Terrorism and Militant Arrests

The Internal Security Forces (ISF), particularly its Information Branch, has prioritized counter-terrorism operations against Sunni militant networks linked to and , amid spillover from the Syrian conflict and activities in Palestinian refugee camps such as . These efforts involve intelligence-driven raids to disrupt cells, foil plots, and apprehend suspects planning attacks on , civilians, and . U.S. State Department reports highlight the ISF's role in arresting individuals suspected of affiliations, contributing to a decline in attacks after through network disruptions, though challenges persist due to porous borders and militant entrenchment in ungoverned areas. Notable operations include the August 18, 2020, arrest by ISF elite units of an operative in northern who was planning attacks on Lebanese positions, following that uncovered weapons and explosives. In June 2017, the ISF dismantled a seven-member cell with a handler based in camp, seizing arms and preventing potential bombings. By January 27, 2018, the Information Branch arrested a Lebanese national in Majdel Anjar wanted on multiple warrants for terrorist activities, including arms smuggling and links to threats against state stability. These actions reflect a pattern of targeting returnees from and local recruiters. In a more recent surge, from July to November 2022, the ISF arrested 30 suspects tied to , dismantling eight cells primarily composed of Syrian and Lebanese nationals involved in plotting and logistics support. State Department assessments credit such ISF and collaborations with preventing ISIS fighters from establishing footholds, including arrests of border-crossing combatants, though enforcement relies on U.S. training and equipment amid Lebanon's economic constraints. Overall, these operations have apprehended hundreds of suspects since , focusing on preventing bombings and foreign fighter flows, but critics note uneven application across sectarian lines.

Response to Protests and Internal Crises

The Lebanese Internal Security Forces (ISF) have been primarily responsible for maintaining public order during protests and internal crises, often deploying units equipped with , , and water cannons to disperse crowds. In response to demonstrations, the ISF has frequently been accused by organizations of employing disproportionate force against predominantly peaceful gatherings, resulting in hundreds of injuries from baton charges, projectiles, and chemical agents. For instance, during the widespread protests sparked by proposed taxes on , 2019—known as the "" or "Thawra"—ISF officers fired massive quantities of and at demonstrators in downtown , including families and children, leading to respiratory issues and trauma among participants. Escalations occurred when some protesters responded with rocks, , or bottles, prompting further ISF interventions, such as the use of live , metal pellets, and birdshot in isolated incidents, which caused at least 20 deaths and thousands of injuries by late . The ISF arrested over 967 individuals between October and mid-2021 for protest-related activities, averaging 6.4 detentions per day, often on charges like obstructing traffic or , which critics argued suppressed dissent rather than addressing underlying grievances over and . In a letter to , the ISF denied deploying live rounds or metal pellets, attributing injuries to protester violence or unauthorized actors, though video evidence and witness accounts contradicted these claims in several cases. Earlier precedents include the 2015 garbage crisis protests in , where ISF forces used excessive and beatings to clear blockades, injuring dozens and drawing condemnation for failing to distinguish between peaceful residents and agitators. Amid the post-2019 economic meltdown, which fueled ongoing unrest through bank runs, fuel shortages, and , the ISF coordinated with the to prevent looting and riots, relying on informal patronage networks to sustain operations despite salary cuts exceeding 70% for personnel. These responses have highlighted systemic challenges, including politicized deployments that prioritize elite interests over , as noted in analyses of clientelist influences within the force, contributing to eroded and sporadic accountability failures, with no prosecutions of officers for protest-related abuses as of 2023.

Controversies and Criticisms

Human Rights Abuses and Excessive Force

The Lebanese Internal Security Forces (ISF) have faced repeated accusations of excessive force during crowd control operations, particularly in response to the 2019-2020 anti-government protests. Human Rights Watch documented instances where ISF riot police deployed tear gas, rubber bullets, and batons against largely peaceful demonstrators in downtown Beirut on December 20, 2019, resulting in injuries including fractures and concussions among protesters who posed no immediate threat. Similarly, on January 18-19, 2020, ISF units fired rubber bullets at close range during clashes near parliament, alongside water cannons and tear gas, exacerbating violence that left dozens hospitalized. Amnesty International reported that on October 17-19, 2019, ISF forces in Beirut dispersed overwhelmingly peaceful assemblies with massive tear gas barrages and physical beatings, contributing to at least 200 injuries nationwide in the initial protest wave. These actions often targeted journalists and medical personnel, with eyewitness accounts describing deliberate targeting, such as ISF officers using live ammunition in northern Lebanon on October 31, 2019, wounding two protesters severely. The U.S. Department of State's 2023 human rights report highlighted a pattern of such force, noting that security forces, including ISF, frequently resorted to unnecessary lethal or non-lethal munitions against non-violent gatherings. Beyond field operations, ISF detention practices have drawn scrutiny for violations, including and ill-treatment. The Lebanese Center for Human Rights recorded 25 verified cases by in 2023, many occurring in ISF stations where detainees reported beatings, electric shocks, and forced confessions during interrogations related to arrests. investigations into post- detentions revealed systemic abuses, such as arbitrary arrests followed by physical assaults, with little medical documentation or independent oversight. Official ISF inquiries, such as those following the 2019 events, often attributed injuries to protester aggression rather than force proportionality, denying the use of live rounds despite video evidence. No ISF personnel have faced prosecution for these incidents as of 2023, fostering impunity that attributes to inadequate internal investigations and political interference. While ISF officials claim adherence to use-of-force protocols amid threats from armed protesters—such as rock-throwing or fireworks in some clashes—the preponderance of documented cases involves disproportionate responses to peaceful elements, undermining public trust in the force's role as a protector of .

Political Clientelism and Sectarian Bias

The Lebanese Internal Security Forces (ISF) have long been embedded in the country's , where appointments to senior positions, including the , adhere to unwritten sectarian conventions that prioritize communal representation over merit. Traditionally, the ISF is a Sunni Muslim, reflecting Lebanon's power-sharing formula, which fosters perceptions of institutional bias toward Sunni political interests and undermines operational impartiality. Political manifests through networks, whereby politicians and sectarian leaders secure ISF positions for loyalists, distributing jobs, promotions, and resources as rewards to maintain voter support and influence over security operations. Both the ISF and serve as reservoirs for such appointments, generating pools of officers indebted to patrons, which perpetuates corruption and erodes professional standards. This practice intensified post-civil war, with elite groups leveraging sectarian ties to embed personnel, enabling selective enforcement that favors aligned communities while neglecting others. Sectarian bias extends to recruitment and deployment, where communal affiliations influence hiring quotas and unit compositions, leading to uneven trust across Lebanon's diverse groups; for instance, the ISF is often viewed as pro-Sunni due to its leadership structure, resulting in lower legitimacy in Shia- or Christian-dominated areas. In April 2025, President Joseph Aoun publicly urged ISF and General Security leaders to resist political and sectarian interference, highlighting ongoing pressures that compromise neutrality amid economic collapse and regional tensions. These dynamics contribute to high corruption perceptions, with surveys indicating sectarian factors play a role in judicial and security decisions, further politicizing law enforcement. Critics argue that hampers ISF effectiveness against cross-sectarian threats, as loyalty to patrons overrides institutional cohesion, evidenced by delayed responses in mixed areas during crises like the 2019 protests. Despite attempts, including donor support for , entrenched persists, as political actors retain leverage over budgets and postings, perpetuating a cycle where security serves elite interests rather than public order.

Ineffectiveness Against Non-State Actors

The Lebanese Internal Security Forces (ISF) have demonstrated limited capacity to counter non-state armed groups, particularly , due to the latter's entrenched military superiority, political influence, and control over Shia-majority territories. Hezbollah maintains parallel security structures, including intelligence and enforcement units, that effectively supplant ISF operations in and Beirut's southern suburbs, where presence is minimal or cooperative rather than assertive. This dynamic stems from Hezbollah's arsenal of advanced weaponry—estimated at over 150,000 rockets and missiles—and its integration into Lebanon's sectarian power-sharing system, rendering direct ISF confrontations politically untenable and logistically infeasible without broader . Clientelism within the ISF exacerbates this ineffectiveness, as officers often prioritize tied to political factions over impartial enforcement against protected non-state actors. Reports indicate that ISF units avoid high-risk arrests or raids in militia-dominated areas, deferring instead to informal arrangements that preserve fragile amid economic crisis and sectarian tensions. For instance, while the ISF has conducted operations against smaller non-state elements like Palestinian factions in camps, it has rarely targeted operatives involved in illicit activities such as captagon trafficking, despite linking the group to regional . This selective enforcement reflects systemic impunity for non-state armed groups, with Department assessments noting that such entities operate with , hindering movement and in their zones of influence. Empirical data underscores the ISF's operational constraints: between 2019 and 2023, arrests of militants were disproportionately from weaker groups, with zero high-profile detentions of commanders reported by official channels, despite ongoing threats like border incursions and internal . The ISF's reliance on lighter armament and training focused on urban policing—rather than —further limits its role, as evidenced by post-2019 adaptations that emphasized community liaison over aggressive interventions against armed non-state rivals. Consequently, non-state actors like continue to shape security outcomes, with the ISF functioning more as a reactive force in state-aligned areas than a proactive deterrent nationwide.

Reforms, Challenges, and International Involvement

Post-2019 Economic Crisis Adaptations

The Lebanese Internal Security Forces (ISF), responsible for internal policing, faced severe resource constraints following the onset of the country's economic crisis in October 2019, which led to a sharp of the and a contraction in public funding. Salaries for ISF personnel, previously sufficient for , plummeted in real terms, with many non-commissioned officers unable to cover living expenses amid , contributing to lowered morale and increased absenteeism. Budget shortfalls resulted in depleted vehicle fleets and reduced operational capacity, exacerbating challenges in maintaining public order. To cope, the ISF demonstrated operational by prioritizing responses to surging rates, including a reported 90% increase in murders compared to pre-crisis levels, while managing social tensions and infrastructure with limited personnel and equipment. Informal adaptations emerged, such as tolerance for officers taking secondary to supplement incomes, mirroring trends in other branches where salaries had eroded to under $50 monthly by 2021. In March 2024, the ISF initiated a drive for 800 new personnel, targeting prior applicants from 2018-2019, though official announcements omitted details amid ongoing fiscal uncertainty. International assistance played a role in mitigating collapse, with temporary foreign aid measures extended until January 2024 to address economic hardships and sustain basic security functions across agencies including the ISF. The crisis also prompted discussions of broader security sector reforms, including capacity-building initiatives focused on training and organizational efficiency, though implementation remained hampered by political paralysis. These adaptations preserved core policing amid institutional strain but highlighted vulnerabilities to further fiscal deterioration without structural economic recovery.

Security Sector Reforms and Community Policing Efforts

Efforts to reform Lebanon's (ISF) have focused on addressing longstanding issues of , inadequate training, and operational inefficiencies, with donors providing support since the early . Key initiatives include capacity-building programs funded by the , which aim to enhance internal stability through improved equipment, training, and coordination with other agencies. The Centre for Security Sector (DCAF) has collaborated with ISF since 2008 to promote reforms, emphasizing and civilian oversight amid sectarian influences within the force. However, post-2019 economic collapse has constrained these efforts, with ISF salaries depreciating by approximately 90% since that year, leading to institutional adaptations such as reduced operational scope and reliance on donor aid rather than comprehensive structural overhaul. Community policing initiatives represent a targeted reform strand, seeking to rebuild public trust eroded by perceptions of political bias and heavy-handed tactics. The EU-funded "Promoting Community Policing in Lebanon" project, launched in partnership with organizations like Caritas and Adyan Foundation, commenced activities on December 14, 2023, to foster partnerships between ISF and civil society through training in inclusive engagement and digital tools. By February 2025, the four-year program—supported by Spanish National Police via FIIAPP—reported achievements in digitizing police services and enhancing inclusivity, including workshops that trained over 200 officers in community dialogue techniques. Earlier U.S.-backed efforts, dating to at least 2016, emphasized modern policing methods to improve ISF responsiveness to public needs, though evaluations highlight persistent challenges in implementation due to resource shortages and cultural resistance within the force. These reforms have yielded localized successes, such as improved jurisdictional performance in parts of through donor-supported training, but broader systemic change remains limited by financial constraints and political interference. International assessments note that while has increased ISF visibility in non-confrontational roles—like and public awareness campaigns—sustained impact requires addressing underlying issues of sectarian and budget dependency.

Foreign Assistance and Its Limitations

The has provided targeted security assistance to Lebanon's Internal Security Forces (ISF), including $40 million allocated from a $230 million package approved in October 2025 to bolster state institutions amid efforts to disarm , with the remainder directed primarily to the (LAF). Earlier, in January 2025, the U.S. announced over $117 million in expanded assistance encompassing both the LAF and ISF to support cessation of hostilities implementation, focusing on equipment and training. In June 2023, a $16.5 million U.S.-funded program via the delivered six months of financial support to ISF personnel, addressing economic hardships from the ongoing crisis. The has extended technical and material aid to the ISF, including €50 million since 2017 for , integrated border management, and civilian oversight of . In August 2025, the , through the , delivered 17 vehicles to the ISF's unit to enhance mobility for 17 stations, improving operational reach in post-conflict areas. Additional EU initiatives, such as the four-year "Promoting " program concluded in February 2025, aimed to foster inclusive, digitized policing practices, though evaluations noted persistent gaps in accountability and public trust. Despite these inputs, foreign assistance to the ISF faces structural limitations rooted in Lebanon's institutional frailties, including pervasive financial and administrative that diverts resources from frontline capabilities. The post-2019 has eroded ISF funding and morale, compelling reliance on aid, regulatory workarounds, and , which undermine long-term self-sufficiency and expose forces to . Such aid often bypasses central state mechanisms, fostering dependency and weakening , as donors "adopt" functions like salaries or equipment without addressing confessional political interference that hampers unified command. Reports highlight that while equipment bolsters tactical responses, systemic issues like sectarian bias and inadequate training limit effectiveness against non-state threats, perpetuating a where aid sustains operations but fails to underlying deficits.

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