Operation Focus
Operation Focus, also known as Operation Moked, was the Israeli Air Force's preemptive airstrike operation conducted on June 5, 1967, at the start of the Six-Day War, targeting Egyptian, Jordanian, Syrian, and Iraqi air assets to neutralize the threat of aerial bombardment against Israel.[1] The operation involved deploying nearly all of Israel's 196 combat aircraft in coordinated low-altitude waves beginning at 7:45 AM, with pilots maintaining radio silence to preserve surprise, striking 11 initial Egyptian airfields and destroying 197 Egyptian planes on the ground in the first wave alone.[1][2] This rapid execution crippled Egypt's air force, which lost over 200 aircraft within the first hour, enabling Israel to achieve complete air superiority across the theater within five hours and facilitating decisive ground advances.[2] The planning for Operation Focus emphasized deception, intelligence gathering, and contingency measures, drawing on years of aerial reconnaissance and simulations to map enemy airfield layouts and predict responses, while Israeli deception operations masked preparations amid escalating Arab mobilizations and blockades.[3] Execution proceeded in multiple waves, with subsequent strikes expanding to Jordanian, Syrian, and even Iraqi targets like the H-3 airfield, ultimately destroying approximately 400 enemy aircraft total—452 across the Arab forces—while shutting down six Egyptian airports and inflicting minimal Israeli losses of 19 planes in the initial phase.[1][2] This outcome, achieved through superior training, precise timing exploiting Egyptian routines, and overwhelming commitment of resources (leaving only 12 planes for home defense), marked one of the most effective air campaigns in military history, decisively shifting the war's momentum by denying adversaries close air support and reconnaissance.[3][2]Background and Strategic Context
Escalating Tensions in 1967
In the spring of 1967, border clashes between Israel and Syria intensified, exacerbating regional instability. On April 7, a skirmish escalated into a major air battle over the Golan Heights, during which Israeli forces shot down six Syrian MiG-21 aircraft without loss.[4] Syrian shelling of Israeli villages from elevated positions continued, prompting Israeli artillery retaliation on May 12–13 against Syrian artillery sites and military positions.[5] Israel publicly warned Syria of potential ground invasion if attacks persisted, heightening fears of broader conflict.[6] These incidents prompted erroneous Soviet intelligence reports on May 13 claiming Israel was concentrating forces for an imminent invasion of Syria, despite no such mobilization occurring.[6] Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser, responding to Syrian appeals and seeking to bolster his pan-Arab leadership, ordered the Egyptian army's mobilization to the Sinai Peninsula on May 16, deploying seven divisions and expelling United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) observers from the area by May 19.[7] This rapid buildup, involving over 100,000 troops and hundreds of tanks, transformed a defensive posture into an offensive threat along Israel's southern border.[6] Tensions peaked on May 22 when Nasser announced the closure of the Straits of Tiran to Israeli-flagged vessels and ships carrying cargo to or from Israel, effectively blockading the port of Eilat and severing Israel's access to the Red Sea.[8] This action contravened international maritime agreements established after the 1956 Suez Crisis, which had guaranteed free passage through the straits, and Israeli leaders regarded it as a casus belli equivalent to a declaration of war.[9] Concurrently, Nasser and other Arab leaders issued public threats of Israel's destruction; for instance, Nasser declared in a May 26 speech that Egyptian forces aimed to achieve "the restoration of Arab rights" through confrontation, while Syrian officials echoed calls for Israel's annihilation.[10] These developments, amid mutual defense pacts forming between Egypt, Jordan, and Iraq, created an existential encirclement perceived by Israel as imminent aggression.[7]Egyptian Mobilization and Threats
In response to reports of Israeli troop concentrations near the Syrian border—later attributed to Soviet misinformation—Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser ordered the mobilization of Egyptian forces on May 14, 1967, initiating a large-scale deployment to the Sinai Peninsula.[11] This included the movement of two infantry divisions toward the Israeli border, with reserves adding over 100,000 personnel to Egypt's active forces, estimated at around 200,000 by mid-May.[12] By May 20, approximately 60,000 Egyptian troops had entered Sinai, increasing to 85,000 within two days, forming defensive lines along the frontier.[13] Ultimately, Egypt concentrated seven divisions—comprising roughly 100,000 troops, 900 tanks, and extensive artillery—in the region by late May, positioning them in forward areas that suggested offensive potential rather than purely defensive posture.[14] Concurrently, on May 18, 1967, Egypt demanded the withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF), which had maintained a buffer presence in Sinai and Gaza since 1957 to prevent cross-border incursions.[15] UN Secretary-General U Thant acceded to the request, leading to the rapid evacuation of UNEF personnel from Egyptian territory, thereby removing the international peacekeeping barrier along the armistice lines.[4] This action, combined with the troop buildup, heightened Israeli perceptions of imminent threat, as Sinai's demilitarized status under prior agreements was effectively nullified. Nasser's public rhetoric amplified these military moves, framing them as preparation for confrontation. On May 23, addressing troops in Sinai, he declared, "The Jews threatened war. We tell them: You are welcome, we are ready for war," while announcing the closure of the Straits of Tiran to Israeli-flagged vessels and those carrying strategic materials to Israel, blockading the port of Eilat and severing a vital supply route.[16] Earlier statements included vows to enter "Palestine with its soil saturated in blood" and invitations for Israel to initiate conflict, signaling intent for total victory rather than deterrence.[5] The blockade, enacted on May 22 via naval forces, was condemned internationally as an act of aggression equivalent to casus belli, exacerbating the crisis despite Egypt's denial of aggressive aims.[4]Israeli Intelligence Assessments
Israeli military intelligence, directed by Aman (the IDF's intelligence directorate), assessed the Egyptian military buildup in the Sinai Peninsula following President Nasser's mobilization order on May 16, 1967, as comprising seven infantry divisions, three mechanized brigades, and substantial armored forces totaling around 1,000 tanks, deployed in forward positions that enabled rapid offensive maneuvers despite Cairo's claims of defensive intent.[17] Initial evaluations, drawn from limited advance warning—only hours for the initial troop movements—viewed the escalation as a political maneuver likely to culminate in withdrawal after demonstrating resolve, underestimating Nasser's commitment to confrontation.[17] However, subsequent aerial reconnaissance and signals intelligence refined these views, confirming concentrations vulnerable to preemption, particularly in air power, where Egyptian squadrons were parked in predictable, clustered formations at bases such as Inshas, Abu Suweir, and Almaza.[18] Aman estimated the Egyptian Air Force at approximately 420 operational combat aircraft, including MiG-21s, Su-7s, and bombers, outnumbering Israel's roughly 200 serviceable jets and posing the decisive threat to ground operations in Sinai.[17] Assessments highlighted the Arabs' overall aerial superiority—Egypt alone fielding over twice Israel's strength—and warned that Egyptian pilots, on heightened alert, maintained aircraft on the ground during daylight hours, creating a narrow window for surprise strikes before dispersal or sorties could complicate dominance.[18] This tactical intelligence, corroborated by photo-reconnaissance flights revealing exact runway layouts and aircraft parking, underscored the feasibility of destroying up to 80% of Egypt's air force in initial waves, provided Israel acted preemptively to avert coordinated Arab air responses.[18] By late May, as Egyptian forces fortified positions and Nasser expelled UN peacekeepers while threatening the Straits of Tiran, Aman's analyses shifted toward probabilistic war scenarios, estimating that prolonged standoffs would erode Israel's air edge through attrition and Arab acclimation, with each passing day reducing odds of securing uncontested skies essential for armored advances.[18] These evaluations, while accurate on deployments and vulnerabilities, reflected over-reliance on the notion of Nasser's bluff, a misjudgment rooted in historical patterns of Arab saber-rattling without full invasion; yet they correctly prioritized air neutralization as causal to ground success, directly shaping the doctrinal basis for Operation Focus.[17]Planning and Operational Design
Development of the Focus Plan
The development of Operation Focus, or Mivtza Moked in Hebrew, began in the aftermath of the 1956 Suez Crisis, with initial concepts for preemptive airfield strikes refined by Israeli Air Force (IAF) planners in the early 1960s.[19] Major General Ezer Weizman, IAF commander from 1958 to 1966, played a central role in formulating the core strategy, emphasizing surprise attacks on enemy airbases to neutralize superior Arab air numbers—approximately 600 combat aircraft against Israel's roughly 200.[20] [21] Practice missions were conducted repeatedly against mock Egyptian airfields in Israel's Negev Desert, honing low-altitude flight paths (as low as 50 feet to evade radar), radio silence, and precise targeting of runways, parked aircraft, and infrastructure.[22] As Egyptian forces mobilized in the Sinai Peninsula in May 1967 under President Gamal Abdel Nasser, IAF intelligence assessments confirmed that Egyptian aircraft remained dispersed on open aprons with minimal dispersal or hardened shelters, presenting a narrow window for decisive action before an anticipated Arab offensive.[2] The plan evolved to involve nearly the entire IAF combat fleet in coordinated waves: the first wave targeting 11 Egyptian airfields simultaneously at dawn on June 5, using specialized "dibber" bombs to crater runways and prevent scrambles, followed by rapid sorties against fighters, bombers, and control centers.[22] [2] Key decisions included timing the initial strike for 7:45 a.m. Egyptian time to exploit morning fog dissipation and catch pilots during breakfast routines, while reserving a small reserve force for air defense over Israel.[22] Under IAF Commander Major General Mordechai Hod, Weizman's successor appointed in 1966, the plan was finalized and rehearsed intensively in late May 1967 amid escalating threats, including Egypt's blockade of the Straits of Tiran on May 22.[20] [2] Hod coordinated with IDF Chief of Staff Yitzhak Rabin and, after Moshe Dayan's appointment as defense minister on June 1, secured political approval for the preemptive operation, prioritizing air superiority to enable ground advances in Sinai, the Golan, and West Bank.[20] The strategy drew on years of accumulated intelligence from reconnaissance flights and human sources, underscoring the IAF's emphasis on rapid turnaround—refueling and rearming in under eight minutes compared to Egypt's estimated eight hours.[20]Key Personnel and Resources
Maj. Gen. Mordechai Hod, Chief of the Israeli Air Force (IAF), served as the primary commander overseeing Operation Focus, coordinating the preemptive airstrikes against Egyptian airfields and briefing pilots on their objectives in the hours before launch on June 5, 1967.[23][24] The operational concept originated from earlier planning by Ezer Weizman, Hod's predecessor as IAF commander, who advocated for a decisive knockout blow against superior Arab air forces through concentrated preemption.[2][25] The IAF allocated nearly its entire combat aircraft inventory to the operation, deploying approximately 188 of 200 available fighters in the opening waves while reserving 12 for homeland defense against potential counterattacks.[24] These included French-origin jets such as the Dassault Mirage III interceptors for high-speed penetration and escort, Dassault Mystère IV fighter-bombers for low-level strikes, and Sud Aviation Vautour attack aircraft, with the latter numbering 25 in the pre-war fleet for bombing and strafing roles.[26] Additional types encompassed older Sud Ouragan and Dassault Super Mystère platforms repurposed for ground-attack missions, supported by limited aerial refueling and electronic warfare assets to maximize sortie endurance.[26] Ground resources emphasized rapid turnaround at Israeli bases like Ramat David and Hatzor, enabling multiple waves within hours despite the strain on maintenance crews.[24]Deception and Timing Strategies
Israeli military planners employed multiple layers of deception to mask offensive preparations and foster a perception of defensive posture amid escalating tensions. Public statements by Defense Minister Moshe Dayan emphasized diplomatic efforts over military action, while thousands of reservists were sent home on leave during the preceding weekend to simulate normalcy and reduce visible mobilization. Israeli Air Force (IAF) leaders, including Chief of Staff Yitzhak Rabin, maintained routine schedules, with public appearances suggesting restraint. Additionally, routine training flights over Israeli territory and the Mediterranean followed routes similar to planned strike paths, conditioning Arab observers to dismiss them as non-threatening. A diversionary IAF demonstration near the blockaded port of Sharm el-Sheikh redeployed Egyptian fighters southward, thinning defenses over key airfields.[27] Radio deception further obscured intentions: prior to the strikes, propeller-driven trainers simulated jet fighter communications to enable covert maintenance of combat aircraft, while on the morning of the attack, similar mimicry masked the assembly of strike packages. During the operation itself, pilots flew at ultra-low altitudes with strict radio silence—no transmissions during takeoff, en route, or in emergencies until after initial bomb drops—to evade radar detection and early warning. These measures ensured the Egyptian Air Force (EAF) remained unprepared, despite intelligence indicating Israeli attack risks.[27][1] Timing was calibrated for maximum surprise and vulnerability: pilots received final briefings around 4:00 AM on June 5, 1967, with the first wave launching precisely at 7:45 AM, after dawn fog dissipated but before full EAF alertness. This exploited Arab pilots at breakfast or in "dawn patrol" aircraft parked on tarmacs, avoiding an anticipated pre-dawn assault that might prompt dispersal. The delay allowed Egyptian forces to complete mobilization—concentrating aircraft for easier targeting—while Israeli secrecy prevented preemptive Arab strikes. Subsequent waves followed within hours, extending to Syrian and Jordanian targets by 11:30 AM, securing rapid air superiority.[27][1]Execution of the Strikes
First Wave Against Egyptian Airfields
At 07:45 on 5 June 1967, the Israeli Air Force initiated the first wave of Operation Focus by deploying nearly all of its 196 combat aircraft, reserving only 12 for air defense over Israel, to strike 11 Egyptian airfields across Egypt and the Sinai Peninsula simultaneously.[2] The operation exploited the element of surprise, targeting Egyptian planes on the ground during refueling and maintenance, when most pilots were asleep or unprepared, and runways were cluttered with aircraft.[2] [28] Israeli pilots approached the targets at low altitudes to penetrate gaps in Egyptian radar coverage, flying from unexpected directions such as over the Mediterranean Sea and from the west, rather than the anticipated east.[28] Strikes were conducted in small formations of four aircraft each, with successive waves arriving every few minutes to maximize disruption; initial attacks cratered runways using special penetrating bombs to immobilize remaining aircraft, followed by strafing runs with cannons and rockets against parked planes, fuel depots, and control towers.[28] This tactic prevented effective Egyptian scrambles, as the timing—mid-morning rather than dawn—coincided with Cairo's rush-hour traffic jams, delaying ground alerts and responses.[28] The first wave, lasting approximately 80 minutes, destroyed around 204 Egyptian aircraft—representing half of their operational fleet—including a significant portion of bombers (about 80%) and fighter jets (about 55%)—while rendering most targeted airfields inoperable for hours or days.[2] [28] Israeli losses in this phase were minimal, with aircraft primarily threatened by ground fire rather than aerial intercepts, enabling rapid rearming for subsequent waves within minutes.[2] Key targets included major bases like Cairo West and Inshas, where heavy bombers such as Tu-16s were systematically eliminated after runway strikes.[25]Follow-Up Waves and Expansion to Other Fronts
Following the first wave of strikes at 7:45 a.m. on June 5, 1967, which targeted 11 Egyptian airfields and destroyed 197 aircraft while cratering runways to prevent takeoffs, the Israeli Air Force executed a second wave approximately two hours later.[1] This follow-up focused on 14 additional Egyptian airfields, radar installations, and electronic warfare sites to neutralize remaining threats and ensure comprehensive denial of air operations.[22] A brief 10-minute interval preceded the second assault, allowing Israeli pilots to refuel and rearm before resuming attacks that extended over 170 minutes total against Egyptian targets.[22] These operations crippled Egypt's air force, with subsequent waves destroying an estimated 293 to 304 aircraft, including all Tu-16 and Il-28 bombers as well as 185 MiG fighters, primarily on the ground.[22] [17] Low-altitude runs using machine guns, rockets, and bombs minimized Israeli losses to 19 aircraft during the Egyptian phase, enabling rapid turnaround of the nearly 200 combat planes committed to the effort.[22] With Egyptian air power neutralized by midday, Operation Focus expanded to Jordanian and Syrian fronts later on June 5. Jordan's entry into the conflict, triggered by artillery barrages on West Jerusalem based on erroneous reports of Egyptian successes, prompted Israeli strikes starting around noon that obliterated Jordan's entire fleet of 28 aircraft at multiple bases, including Amman and Mafraq.[1] [22] Syrian airfields faced attacks from 11:30 a.m., redirected after Syrian jets struck Israeli positions; these sorties destroyed 57 aircraft—about two-thirds of Syria's operational force—through similar ground-targeting tactics with minimal opposition.[1] [22] This phase, alongside a limited strike on Iraq's H-3 base to preempt reinforcements, secured Israeli air superiority across multiple theaters within hours, totaling around 400 Arab aircraft lost on the first day.[1]Tactical Innovations and Challenges
Operation Focus employed several tactical innovations to maximize surprise and minimize detection. Israeli aircraft approached Egyptian airfields by flying low over the Mediterranean Sea at altitudes as low as 30-100 meters to evade radar, before climbing for bombing runs and then descending again for strafing attacks.[25] This low-level penetration tactic reduced the effective radar horizon and allowed strikes to commence without prior warning to Egyptian forces.[29] Additionally, the operation prioritized runway cratering with specialized bombs to disable takeoff capabilities, followed by immediate attacks on parked aircraft using machine guns and rockets, limiting each plane to a single quick pass per target to avoid anti-aircraft fire concentration.[29] [2] Coordination was enhanced through precise timing and radio silence, with waves launched in rapid succession—every Israeli combat aircraft committed in the first three waves between 07:45 and 08:30 on June 5, 1967—ensuring simultaneous hits across 18 Egyptian bases to overwhelm defenses before reinforcements could respond.[30] This all-in commitment, leaving only 12 fighters for home defense, represented a high-risk innovation in massed preemptive striking, forgoing traditional force reserves for overwhelming initial impact.[2] Deception elements included simulating routine patrols to mask preparations, further preserving the element of surprise critical to grounding over 300 Egyptian planes.[25] Challenges included the physical demands of low-altitude flight, which increased risks from terrain collision, navigation errors, and pilot fatigue during high-speed, low-visibility ingress over water.[31] Fuel limitations dictated strict adherence to timetables, with aircraft allocated minimal loiter time—typically 7-9 minutes per sortie—necessitating flawless execution to return before reserves depleted, as mid-air refueling was unavailable.[29] Egyptian anti-aircraft artillery posed immediate threats during attack runs, contributing to the loss of 19 Israeli aircraft in the opening strikes, often from ground fire after the surprise element partially dissipated in later waves.[2] A key operational hurdle was the potential for Arab aircraft to scramble; while most were caught on the ground, approximately 30 Egyptian planes managed takeoffs, engaging Israeli forces in dogfights that tested pilot skill and underscored vulnerabilities in achieving total immobilization.[32] The rapid turnaround for follow-on waves strained maintenance crews and pilots, who flew up to seven sorties in 12 hours, amplifying error risks amid the absence of defensive reserves against possible counterstrikes.[33] Despite these, adaptations like varying attack patterns mitigated predictable losses, enabling the operation's overall success in securing air superiority.[29]Immediate Results and Losses
Arab Aircraft Destroyed by Type and Nation
Operation Focus, launched on June 5, 1967, resulted in the destruction of 401 Arab aircraft over the initial two days of the Six-Day War, primarily through preemptive strikes on airfields while most were on the ground. Egyptian losses were the heaviest at 302 aircraft, crippling their operational capacity from the outset.[34] These figures encompass fighters, bombers, transports, and helicopters across multiple nations, as detailed in a U.S. Army analysis of the campaign.[34] The breakdown by nation and type highlights the comprehensive neutralization of Arab air power:| Nation | Type | Number Destroyed |
|---|---|---|
| Egypt | MiG-21 | 95 |
| Egypt | MiG-19 | 20 |
| Egypt | MiG-15/17 | 82 |
| Egypt | Su-7 | 10 |
| Egypt | Il-28 (bombers) | 27 |
| Egypt | Tu-16 (bombers) | 30 |
| Egypt | Transports (Il-14, An-12) | 32 |
| Egypt | Helicopters | 6 |
| Egypt Total | 302 | |
| Jordan | Hawker Hunters | 21 |
| Jordan Total | 21 | |
| Syria | MiG-21 | 32 |
| Syria | MiG-15/17 | 23 |
| Syria | Il-28 (bombers) | 2 |
| Syria | Transports (Mi-4) | 3 |
| Syria Total | 60 | |
| Iraq | MiG-21 | 9 |
| Iraq | Hawker Hunters | 7 |
| Iraq | Tu-16 (bombers) | 1 |
| Iraq Total | 17 | |
| Lebanon | Hawker Hunter | 1 |
| Lebanon Total | 1 | |
| Grand Total | 401 |
Israeli Aircraft and Personnel Losses
During the preemptive airstrikes of Operation Focus on June 5, 1967, the Israeli Air Force (IAF) lost 19 aircraft, primarily bombers and fighter-bombers engaged in low-level attacks on Egyptian airfields. These losses occurred mainly due to intense anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) fire from Egyptian defenses, supplemented by operational accidents such as mechanical failures and crashes during hasty returns to base under fuel constraints.[25][36] No IAF aircraft were downed in aerial combat during the initial waves, as Arab forces were largely surprised and their planes caught on the ground.[25] Personnel casualties included five pilots killed and five captured, with the fatalities resulting from the same AAA hits and accidents that claimed the aircraft. The IAF's rapid execution—over 300 sorties in the first two hours—minimized exposure despite the risks of operating nearly its entire fleet in vulnerable, unescorted formations. These losses, while significant relative to Israel's limited air assets (about 200 combat aircraft total), were offset by the destruction of over 300 Arab planes in the same period, securing tactical dominance.[36][37]Quantitative Assessment of Waves
![Destroyed Egyptian planes on the ground]float-right Operation Focus unfolded in three successive waves on the morning of June 5, 1967, enabling the Israeli Air Force (IAF) to neutralize the bulk of the Egyptian Air Force within hours. The first wave, launched at 0745 Israeli time, committed nearly the entire IAF operational fleet of approximately 183-200 combat aircraft to low-altitude strikes on 11 Egyptian airfields across Egypt and the Sinai Peninsula.[38][2] This assault, executed in under an hour of active strikes, destroyed 197-204 Egyptian aircraft on the ground, representing roughly half of Egypt's combat-ready fleet, while IAF losses totaled 19 aircraft, mainly from ground fire.[38][1][2] The second wave, initiated around 0930, involved about 164 sorties redirected against surviving Egyptian targets after rapid refueling and rearming of returning aircraft.[38] It inflicted further devastation, destroying an additional 107-113 Egyptian planes, bringing the cumulative toll from the first two waves to over 310 aircraft eliminated in approximately three hours.[38] Israeli attrition remained limited, with the operation's high sortie generation rate—enabled by pre-positioned fuel and meticulous planning—allowing multiple missions per aircraft despite the intense pace. The third wave, commencing near 1215, shifted focus to residual Egyptian assets and initial strikes on Jordanian and Syrian airfields, though with fewer dedicated sorties as air superiority over Egypt was secured.[22] By day's end, these waves contributed to the destruction of 452 Arab aircraft overall, against just 46 IAF losses for the war.[1][2] The waves' quantitative success is evident in the destruction-to-loss ratio exceeding 10:1 in initial phases, achieved via surprise, radar evasion, and airfield saturation tactics that minimized Arab response.[2]| Wave | Approximate Sorties/Aircraft | Primary Targets | Arab Aircraft Destroyed | IAF Losses (Wave-Specific) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| First | 183-200 aircraft | 11 Egyptian airfields | 197-204 Egyptian | 19 total (mostly this wave) |
| Second | 164 sorties | Remaining Egyptian airfields | 107-113 Egyptian | Minimal |
| Third | Not precisely quantified; follow-on | Residual Egyptian, Jordanian/Syrian | Contributed to daily total of ~452 | Minimal |