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Price of anarchy

The price of anarchy (PoA) is a measure in that quantifies the potential loss in efficiency of a system when rational, self-interested agents pursue their individual objectives without coordination, compared to a centrally optimized outcome. Formally defined as the supremum over all equilibria of the ratio of the at to the social optimum, it captures the worst-case degradation due to decentralized decision-making. Introduced in 1999 by Elias Koutsoupias and Christos Papadimitriou under the original term "coordination ratio," the concept was later popularized as the price of anarchy in subsequent works, including Papadimitriou's 2001 overview and extensions by Tim Roughgarden and in 2002. The PoA applies to a broad class of non-cooperative games, particularly congestion games, where agents' strategies affect shared resources, leading to phenomena like traffic jams or overloaded servers. In the seminal application to selfish routing, the PoA bounds the inefficiency in networks where users select paths to minimize personal delay, often resulting in suboptimal total latency; for linear latency functions, the PoA is at most 4/3, as shown in Pigou's classic example of two parallel links. Beyond routing, the framework has been extended to job scheduling on related machines, where the PoA is Θ(log m / log log m) for m machines, auctions, and problems, providing guarantees on equilibrium performance even under incomplete information. These bounds highlight the robustness of decentralized systems, informing designs in computer networks, economics, and algorithmic mechanism design.

Fundamentals

Definition and Motivation

The price of anarchy (PoA) is a metric in that quantifies the inefficiency arising in decentralized systems where self-interested agents make decisions without coordination. It is defined as the ratio of the worst-case outcome achieved at a Nash equilibrium—where no agent can unilaterally improve their payoff—to the optimal outcome that maximizes overall social welfare. This measure captures the degradation in system performance due to non-cooperative behavior, highlighting how individual rationality can conflict with collective optimality. The motivation for studying the PoA stems from real-world scenarios where centralized control is impractical, such as in computer networks, traffic systems, or markets, leading to suboptimal . In these settings, agents prioritize their own utilities, often resulting in equilibria that perform significantly worse than if a benevolent could enforce the socially optimal . For instance, the concept addresses the tension between maximizing social welfare—typically the sum of all agents' utilities or the minimization of total system cost—and the pursuit of individual gains, which can amplify inefficiencies in environments like the . At its core, the PoA framework considers with multiple agents, each equipped with strategy sets representing possible actions, and payoff functions that determine individual benefits based on collective choices. Social welfare is then aggregated across agents, either as the total in maximization problems or the inverse of aggregate in minimization ones, providing a for comparison. An informal analogy is urban , where drivers selecting the seemingly fastest routes independently cause widespread delays, far exceeding what a coordinated plan could achieve. This setup underscores the PoA's role in evaluating the robustness of decentralized mechanisms against selfish incentives.

Historical Background

The concept of the price of anarchy (PoA) was formally introduced in 1999 by Elias Koutsoupias and Christos Papadimitriou in their paper "Worst-Case Equilibria," where they proposed it as a measure of inefficiency in systems where selfish agents share resources, initially applied to selfish routing and job scheduling problems. This work quantified the ratio between the worst-case cost and the optimal social welfare, highlighting the degradation caused by non-cooperative behavior in distributed systems. The concept drew from earlier foundations in , particularly John Nash's 1951 formulation of non-cooperative equilibria, which established the stability of selfish strategies in multi-agent settings. It also echoed insights from the 1950s and 1960s on inefficiency in non-cooperative games, such as the , originally developed by Merrill and Melvin Dresher in 1950 and formalized by Albert Tucker, which illustrated how rational can lead to suboptimal collective outcomes. However, the explicit metric as a worst-case efficiency bound did not emerge until the late , amid growing interest in algorithmic aspects of . Key milestones advanced the PoA framework in the early 2000s, including the 2002 paper by Tim Roughgarden and , "How Bad is Selfish Routing?," which derived tight bounds on PoA for routing games with linear latency functions, demonstrating its applicability to . Roughgarden's 2016 book, Twenty Lectures on , provided an accessible synthesis of PoA in broader algorithmic contexts, building on his earlier contributions. The significance of PoA research was recognized with the 2012 Gödel Prize, awarded jointly to Koutsoupias, Papadimitriou, Roughgarden, Tardos, Noam Nisan, and Amir Ronen for foundational papers on , including PoA in selfish routing and . By the 2020s, PoA had evolved beyond its origins, integrating into for multi-agent systems, for incentive-compatible algorithms, and for , reflecting its role in analyzing decentralized decision-making. Recent work, such as the 2023 paper by Joshua H. Seaton and Philip N. Brown on the intrinsic fragility of PoA, has explored how small perturbations can destabilize worst-case equilibria, underscoring vulnerabilities in equilibrium-based analyses.

Mathematical Formulation

Core Definitions

In , the price of anarchy is analyzed within the framework of finite strategic games involving n , indexed by i = 1, \dots, n. Each i has a finite set S_i, with the joint strategy space S = \prod_{i=1}^n S_i consisting of all possible strategy profiles s = (s_1, \dots, s_n). Each i receives a payoff u_i(s) \in \mathbb{R}, and the social welfare of a strategy profile s is defined as the payoff W(s) = \sum_{i=1}^n u_i(s) for welfare-maximization settings, or as the cost C(s) = \sum_{i=1}^n c_i(s) for cost-minimization settings, where c_i(s) represents i's contribution to the total cost. For welfare-maximization games, the price of anarchy of a game G, denoted \mathrm{PoA}(G), quantifies the inefficiency of equilibria relative to the social optimum and is formally defined as \mathrm{PoA}(G) = \frac{\max_{s^* \in S} W(s^*)}{\min_{s \in \mathrm{Eq}(G)} W(s)}, where s^* is an optimal strategy profile that maximizes social welfare W(s^*), and \mathrm{Eq}(G) denotes the set of equilibria of G. This ratio measures the factor by which the worst-case equilibrium welfare falls short of the optimum, with \mathrm{PoA}(G) \geq 1. The overall price of anarchy for a class of games is the supremum of \mathrm{PoA}(G) over all games in the class. In cost-minimization games, the definition is adjusted to reflect the objective of minimizing aggregate cost, yielding \mathrm{PoA}(G) = \frac{\max_{s \in \mathrm{Eq}(G)} C(s)}{\min_{s^* \in S} C(s^*)}, where s^* minimizes C(s^*), and the maximum is taken over equilibrium costs. Here, \mathrm{PoA}(G) \geq 1 captures the degradation in performance due to selfish behavior, with the supremum over game classes defining the worst-case inefficiency. This formulation originated in the context of resource allocation problems like load balancing. The price of anarchy is typically computed with respect to specific equilibrium concepts, focusing on the worst-case outcome over all such to bound inefficiency conservatively. A pure consists of profiles s where no i can unilaterally deviate to a different s_i' \in S_i to increase their payoff: u_i(s_i, s_{-i}) \geq u_i(s_i', s_{-i}) for all i and s_i'. For mixed , randomize over via probability distributions \sigma_i over S_i, and the equilibrium condition requires that each \sigma_i maximizes i's expected payoff given \sigma_{-i}. Coarse correlated equilibria extend this to joint distributions p over S where no regrets deviating after sampling from p: for all i and s_i' \in S_i, \sum_{s \in S} p(s) \, u_i(s_i, s_{-i}) \geq \sum_{s \in S} p(s) \, u_i(s_i', s_{-i}). The price of anarchy is defined analogously for each concept, often yielding looser (higher) bounds for coarser equilibria like coarse correlated ones, as they encompass more outcomes. The price of stability () provides a complementary measure to the price of anarchy by focusing on the best possible rather than the worst. Formally, for a game G with W, the PoS is defined as \text{PoS}(G) = \frac{\max_{s^* \in \text{optimal outcomes}} W(s^*)}{\sup_{s \in \text{Nash equilibria}} W(s)}, where the numerator is the maximum achievable welfare and the denominator is the welfare of the best Nash equilibrium. This ratio is always at most the PoA, as the best equilibrium cannot exceed the social optimum but may fall short of it, and it equals 1 if a Nash equilibrium achieves the optimum. In network design games with fair cost allocation, for instance, the PoS is O(\log k), indicating that reasonably efficient equilibria exist despite potential anarchy. The price of truthfulness extends these concepts to settings where outcomes are determined by designed , evaluating inefficiency specifically under incentive-compatible equilibria. In this , agents interact through a mechanism that elicits , and the price of truthfulness quantifies the of the optimum to the (or inverse for costs) of the worst-case incentive-compatible equilibrium of the induced game. This metric is crucial in algorithmic , where must balance with efficiency; for example, in auctions, simple greedy can achieve constant price of truthfulness bounds. Unlike the standard , it restricts equilibria to those that are strategy-proof, often leading to tighter or more nuanced inefficiency analyses in practical implementations. Other related metrics include the approximation ratio from , which measures how closely an algorithm's output approximates the optimum in a centralized setting, serving as a for equilibrium-based ratios like the . In congestion games, the ratio—often synonymous with the —compares the total system cost at to the minimum possible cost, highlighting degradation due to selfish behavior. In comparison, the offers a pessimistic view by capturing worst-case equilibrium degradation, while the PoS provides an optimistic assessment of the best-case performance, both informing the range of possible inefficiencies in strategic settings. These metrics, along with the price of truthfulness, can be bounded using smoothness arguments, where games satisfying certain Lipschitz-like conditions on utility functions yield constant-factor guarantees for all three ratios relative to the social optimum.

Illustrative Examples

Prisoner's Dilemma

The Prisoner's Dilemma serves as a foundational example in for illustrating the price of anarchy, highlighting how self-interested behavior can lead to suboptimal collective outcomes. In this two-player game, each player chooses between two strategies: cooperate or defect. The payoff structure is typically represented by the following , where higher numbers indicate better outcomes for the players (e.g., utilities or negative costs):
CooperateDefect
Cooperate(2, 2)(0, 3)
Defect(3, 0)(1, 1)
Mutual yields the highest social of 4 (sum of payoffs), while mutual results in the lowest total of 2. The unique pure-strategy occurs at (defect, defect), where no player can unilaterally improve their payoff by switching to , yielding a social of 2. In contrast, the socially optimal outcome is (, ), achieving the maximum of 4. The price of anarchy in this -maximization framing is calculated as the ratio of the optimal social to the worst-case : \frac{4}{2} = 2. When reframed as a cost-minimization problem using the classic interpretation—both players cooperating (remaining silent) incurs 1 year each (total 2) and both defecting (confessing) incurs 2 years each (total 4)—the price of anarchy is \frac{4}{2} = 2. This demonstrates that the can be substantially inefficient compared to the social optimum, with PoA > 1 arising from the absence of enforceable agreements among players. In the iterated version of the , where the game is repeated over multiple rounds, the folk theorem implies that a range of outcomes, including near-optimal , can be sustained as equilibria through strategies like tit-for-tat, provided players are sufficiently patient (discount factor close to 1). This contrasts with the one-shot game, underscoring how repetition and future interactions can mitigate the inefficiency captured by the price of anarchy.

Selfish

In selfish routing games, a network is modeled as a directed graph with a source and a sink, where indistinguishable agents representing units of flow seek to route from the source to the sink while minimizing their individual travel latency. Each edge e in the network has a latency function \ell_e(f_e) that is nonnegative, continuous, and nondecreasing in the flow f_e on that edge, capturing congestion effects. The total flow demand is fixed at some value r > 0, and flows must satisfy conservation at intermediate nodes and nonnegativity. The Nash equilibrium in this nonatomic setting, known as the Wardrop equilibrium, is a flow assignment where no agent can reduce its latency by unilaterally switching to an alternative path; equivalently, all paths carrying positive flow have equal and minimal latency, while unused paths have latency at least as high. Such equilibria always exist under the standard assumptions on latency functions and can be characterized variationally. A canonical illustration of inefficiency in selfish routing is Pigou's example, consisting of two parallel links connecting the source to the sink with total flow r = 1: the upper link has constant latency \ell_1(f_1) = 1, and the lower link has linear latency \ell_2(f_2) = f_2. The social cost, defined as the total latency experienced by all agents \sum_e f_e \cdot \ell_e(f_e), is minimized in the optimum by splitting the flow equally (f_1 = f_2 = 1/2), yielding latencies of 1 on the upper link and $1/2 on the lower, for a total cost of (1/2) \cdot 1 + (1/2) \cdot (1/2) = 3/4. In contrast, the Wardrop equilibrium routes all flow on the lower link (f_2 = 1, f_1 = 0), where each agent experiences latency 1, for a total cost of $1 \cdot 1 = 1. The price of anarchy is thus the ratio $1 / (3/4) = 4/3. This example demonstrates that selfish routing can degrade performance by a constant factor, even in simple networks. More generally, for networks with arbitrary but linear functions \ell_e(f_e) = a_e f_e + b_e (with a_e, b_e \geq 0), the price of anarchy is bounded above by $4/3, with the bound tight as achieved in Pigou's example; this worst-case ratio is independent of the network and arises solely from the lack of coordination among agents. The proof relies on a that bounds the at equilibrium relative to the optimum. The key insight is that, despite the absence of central coordination, selfish routing approximates the social optimum within a small constant factor when latencies are linear, providing a performance guarantee for decentralized network protocols.

Job Scheduling

In the context of price of anarchy, job scheduling games model scenarios where selfish agents, representing jobs, select among multiple processing resources to minimize their individual completion times, leading to potential inefficiencies in overall system performance. Consider a setting with n unrelated machines and m jobs, where each job i has a processing time p_{ij} on machine j, which may vary significantly across machines due to factors like hardware differences or task affinities. Upon assignment, the load of machine j is L_j = \sum_{i \in J_j} p_{ij}, where J_j is the set of jobs assigned to j, and the completion time of job i assigned to machine m(i) is C_i = L_{m(i)}, assuming non-preemptive scheduling and no setup times. The social cost is the makespan, defined as \max_j L_j, capturing the total time to complete all jobs. A Nash equilibrium in this game arises when no job can unilaterally migrate to another machine to reduce its own completion time, ensuring stability against individual deviations. Pure Nash equilibria always exist in this model, as demonstrated by an ordinal that decreases with best-response moves, guaranteeing of to an equilibrium; alternatively, the lexicographically minimal assignment among best responses also ensures existence. This stability contrasts with more complex game classes where mixed equilibria may be necessary. The price of anarchy for pure equilibria in this unrelated setting is \Theta(\log m / \log \log m), meaning the makespan of any equilibrium is within a logarithmic factor of the optimal makespan. This bound is tight, achieved in instances with layered structures where processing times increase exponentially across machine "levels," forcing equilibria to overload certain and resulting in a makespan that degrades logarithmically with m. For example, with m divided into logarithmic layers, jobs in higher layers have vastly higher times on lower-layer , leading selfish assignments to concentrate flow inefficiently. Thus, the captures a sublinear but growing inefficiency as the number of machines increases. The optimal schedule minimizes the and can be formulated as an integer linear , assigning jobs to machines subject to load constraints, though it is NP-hard; algorithms, such as the Lenstra-Shmoys-Tardos providing a PTAS, or simpler list scheduling heuristics that assign jobs greedily to the current lowest-load machine (yielding a 2-), offer practical solutions. Selfish job assignments can thus be inefficient, highlighting degradation with system scale, though the remains bounded logarithmically for this model; this differs markedly from related machine models, where processing times scale inversely with machine speeds and the equals 1 under certain utilitarian objectives.

Theoretical Bounds and Results

General Approximation Bounds

One of the most influential general techniques for bounding the price of anarchy (PoA) in broad classes of games is the smoothness framework, introduced by Roughgarden. A game is defined as (\lambda, \mu)-smooth if, for every strategy profile s and optimal strategy profile s^*, the following inequality holds: \sum_i u_i(s_i^*, s_{-i}) \geq \lambda \cdot W(s^*) - \mu \cdot W(s), where u_i is player i's utility, s_i^* is player i's strategy in the optimum s^*, and W(s) is the social welfare (sum of utilities) at s. This condition captures a trade-off between the benefit of unilateral deviations to optimal strategies and the overall social welfare loss. For such smooth games with \mu < 1, the PoA of pure Nash equilibria is at most \frac{1 + \mu}{\lambda}. The framework extends naturally to mixed-strategy equilibria through an approximation argument. For games satisfying , the PoA for mixed equilibria is bounded by \frac{1 + \mu}{\lambda}, the same as for pure equilibria. This extension ensures that the framework applies robustly beyond pure strategies, accommodating correlated or approximate solution concepts in many practical settings. These techniques yield varying bounds depending on game structure. In non-atomic games, where are infinitesimal and strategies are flows or distributions, often implies constant-factor PoA bounds of the number of . In contrast, atomic games with finite strategic can exhibit worse PoA, scaling with problem size due to indivisibilities and constraints. A notable special case is potential games, where the PoA equals 1, as every maximizes the and thus achieves social optimality. Despite their power, these general bounds have inherent limitations. They are often tight in the worst case for the classes they apply to, meaning examples exist where the achieves the predicted ratio. Moreover, no universal constant bound exists for arbitrary games; the can grow without limit as the number of players or action spaces expands, highlighting the need for structure-specific analyses.

Results for Specific Game Classes

In congestion games, the price of anarchy is bounded by 5/2 when functions are affine, as established for selfish routing models where players route unsplittable flows. This bound is tight, achieved in networks where selfish path selection leads to suboptimal load distribution compared to the optimum. For more general cost functions, the price of anarchy decreases toward 1 as the costs exhibit stronger convexity properties, reflecting improved alignment between Nash equilibria and optimal outcomes due to the potential function structure inherent in congestion games. Exact bounds for these cases can be derived using formulations, which characterize the inefficiency by comparing equilibrium flows to the minimum- flow satisfying demand constraints. In coordination games, the price of anarchy equals 1 when pure equilibria coincide with the social optimum, as occurs in settings where players' incentives naturally align without conflict, such as symmetric coordination on identical best responses. However, in potential-based variants like graphical coordination games or those with additive structure, the price of anarchy can exceed 1, often scaling with network size due to mismatched incentives in mixed equilibria or suboptimal coordination traps. For cut games modeling network partitioning or facility location, the price of anarchy is at most O(\log n / \log \log n), capturing the inefficiency in selfish subset selections that approximate maximum cuts or minimum partitions. This bound extends to buy-at-bulk network design games, where players collectively purchase capacity to connect demands, and selfish contributions lead to over-provisioning relative to the minimum-cost Steiner forest. In cost-sharing mechanisms using the for network formation, the price of stability achieves 1 in tree networks, as the fair allocation induces players to construct the matching the social optimum. The price of anarchy remains bounded by 2 in these settings, limiting the worst-case deviation from optimality even when equilibria diverge from the best possible outcome. Recent fragility results highlight vulnerabilities in price of anarchy bounds: the 2023 Seaton-Brown theorem demonstrates that arbitrarily small perturbations to payoff structures in certain coordination and congestion games can render the price of anarchy unbounded, underscoring the sensitivity of equilibrium efficiency to model assumptions.

Applications and Extensions

Network Congestion and Routing

In traffic networks, the price of anarchy quantifies the inefficiency arising from selfish decisions by individual drivers in urban environments, where users choose paths to minimize personal travel time without regard for overall congestion. A foundational illustration is Pigou's example, involving two parallel routes from a source to a destination: one with constant of 1 unit and the other with linear equal to the flow on that route. For a unit total flow, the social optimum splits the flow such that the total is 0.75 units, but the routes all flow on the linear-latency path, yielding a total of 1 unit and a price of anarchy of 4/3. This example, originally from transportation economics but analyzed in , demonstrates how selfish behavior can increase average travel costs by up to 33% even in simple networks. Braess's paradox extends this insight by showing that adding capacity to a can exacerbate under selfish . In a classic four-node with 4000 identical drivers, the initial equilibrium without an additional results in a travel time of 65 minutes per driver (2000 on each of two paths, each with 45-minute fixed segments plus 20 minutes of variable ). Introducing a new zero-latency connecting midpoints leads all drivers to use it in combination with parts of the original paths, increasing the equilibrium travel time to 80 minutes per driver due to induced overuse and effects. This counterintuitive outcome highlights the risks of infrastructure expansion without coordination. In generalized routing scenarios involving multi-commodity flows—where multiple origin-destination pairs share resources—the price of anarchy remains bounded for realistic models. For nonatomic congestion games modeling such flows, Roughgarden and Tardos established that if edge functions are polynomials of at most d, the price of anarchy is at most the value from the worst-case parallel-links instance, which approaches \frac{e}{e-1} \approx 1.582 as d \to \infty. This bound holds independently of the , ensuring that selfish inefficiency does not grow arbitrarily in complex multi-commodity settings like city-wide traffic systems. Wireless and ad-hoc networks introduce additional challenges, where selfish selection by nodes leads to and degraded throughput, resulting in a price of anarchy greater than 1. In games modeling , users compete for , and outcomes can suffer inefficiency compared to optimal assignments, as nodes overlook externalities. Mitigation strategies, such as pricing mechanisms that charge nodes based on induced , can reduce the price of anarchy toward 1 by aligning individual incentives with social welfare, as demonstrated in models of IEEE 802.11-like protocols. For Internet routing via the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP), the price of anarchy analyzes policy-based path selections that can lead to oscillations and suboptimal stable states. BGP's game-theoretic formulation reveals that transient oscillations may prevent convergence, but in stable states—defined as Nash equilibria where no autonomous system deviates unilaterally—the inefficiency is bounded. This bound captures the trade-off between routing stability and global optimality in interdomain routing. Empirical studies using real-world datasets confirm modest inefficiency in practice. Simulations on the Sioux Falls metropolitan network, a with 24 nodes and 76 links representing urban roadways, show that the price of anarchy ranges from approximately 1.2 to 1.5 as total traffic volume varies, with higher values emerging under heavy congestion due to nonlinear latency effects. These results, derived from solving Wardrop equilibria and social optima via , indicate that while theoretical worst-case bounds are rarely achieved, selfish still imposes a 20-50% loss in realistic urban scenarios.

Algorithmic and Economic Applications

In , the price of anarchy (PoA) quantifies the inefficiency arising from selfish behavior in computational settings where agents pursue individual objectives, often leading to suboptimal system-wide outcomes. The foundational framework for analyzing such scenarios was introduced by Nisan and Ronen, who integrated algorithmic problems with to evaluate equilibria under strategic agent interactions. This approach has been applied to tasks, such as selfish caching, where agents decide whether to cache resources based on personal costs and benefits. Extensions to larger systems, like networks, show that while PoA can grow with the number of agents, mechanisms such as incentives can mitigate it to constant factors. In auctions and , PoA assesses how strategic bidding impacts social welfare, particularly in complex environments like combinatorial auctions where agents bid on bundles of goods. The Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism achieves truthfulness as a dominant strategy, ensuring that the equilibrium outcome maximizes social welfare and thus yields a PoA of 1. In contrast, simpler mechanisms for digital goods auctions—where supply is unlimited—can suffer from unbounded PoA due to correlated bidder values and aggressive underbidding, as agents may conceal high valuations to minimize payments. These insights guide the design of robust auctions that balance with efficiency, prioritizing mechanisms with low PoA for practical deployment in online marketplaces. Resource allocation problems, such as those in , extend job scheduling models by incorporating selfish agents who select virtual machines to minimize their completion times amid varying workloads. In weighted shortest processing time (WSPT) scheduling games on uniformly related machines, the is upper bounded by \frac{m}{s_1} + 1, where m is the number of machines and s_1 the speed of the fastest. protocols, which aim to equitably distribute indivisible resources, also leverage to evaluate strategic manipulations; for instance, in cost-sharing games for network design, fair allocation rules achieve a price of stability (a related focusing on the best ) of O(\log n), where n is the number of agents, promoting near-optimal outcomes despite . These applications highlight PoA's role in ensuring scalable, incentive-compatible systems for dynamic environments like data centers. In AI and multi-agent systems, analyzes equilibria in (RL) settings where agents learn policies through interaction, often converging to suboptimal equilibria due to non-cooperative exploration. Recent work post-2020 has shown that in multi-agent RL for general-sum games, the PoA can exceed 2, but incentive adjustments—such as differentiable estimators of inefficiency—can reduce it to near 1 by steering agents toward cooperative policies during training. Applications to social networks and recommendation systems further illustrate this, where users' selfish content selection or platform optimizations lead to echo chambers or reduced diversity; recommender interventions modeled as congestion games achieve a PoA bounded by 4/3 for linear preferences, improving overall engagement and . Economic policy applications of address market failures like the , where shared resources are overexploited due to individual incentives, as exemplified in Hardin's seminal analysis of unregulated commons leading to depletion. In emission trading schemes, modeled as congestion games with linear abatement costs, the PoA reflects how firms' strategic permit trading can lead to inefficiency relative to cooperative emission reductions. These bounds inform policy designs, such as cap-and-trade mechanisms, that incorporate penalties to align private incentives with global welfare.

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