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Riek Machar


Riek Machar Teny Dhurgon (born 1953) is a South Sudanese politician and military commander of Nuer ethnicity who has served as vice president of the country on multiple occasions, most recently as first vice president from 2020 until his house arrest in 2025, and leads the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-in-Opposition (SPLM-IO).
A former member of the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), Machar defected in 1991 alongside Gordon Kong Chuol, forming the SPLA-Nasir faction over disagreements with SPLA leader John Garang's authoritarian style and vision for a united "New Sudan," instead advocating for southern self-determination, though the split intensified factional fighting and enabled temporary alliances with Khartoum that prolonged the Second Sudanese Civil War. Forces under his command carried out the Bor massacre in November 1991, killing thousands of Dinka civilians and displacing many more in Jonglei State. He reconciled with the mainstream SPLM in 2002, contributing to the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement that paved the way for South Sudan's independence in 2011, after which he became vice president under President Salva Kiir.
Machar's deteriorating relationship with Kiir, marked by his July 2013 dismissal amid ambitions to challenge party leadership, escalated into the South Sudanese Civil War in December 2013 following Kiir's accusation of a coup plot, which Machar denied; the conflict rapidly devolved into ethnic violence between Nuer supporters of Machar and Dinka loyalists to Kiir, with atrocities committed by forces on both sides, including targeted killings, rape, and recruitment of child soldiers. Despite multiple peace accords, including his brief reinstatement as first vice president in 2016 and the 2018 Revitalized Agreement, implementation has faltered amid renewed clashes, leading to Machar's house arrest in March 2025 on treason charges related to alleged militia incitement, raising fears of renewed full-scale war.

Early Life and Education

Family Background and Upbringing

Riek Machar Teny Dhurgon was born in 1953 in Leer, in the oil-producing Unity State of what was then Sudan. He hails from the Dok subgroup of the Nuer ethnic group, South Sudan's second-largest after the Dinka, known historically as semi-nomadic pastoralists who rely on cattle herding for livelihood and social status. Machar's father served as a in the Ayod and Leer areas, a position of among the Nuer that involved , cattle allocation, and community leadership in a patrilineal, structure common to the . Both parents held prominence within the Dok Nuer community, embedding Machar in a lineage tied to local governance and ethnic networks that would later influence his political alliances. As one of numerous sons—accounts vary from the 26th to 27th—in this polygamous family setting, he experienced the hierarchical and kinship-based dynamics of Nuer society, where elder brothers and paternal lines dictate inheritance and obligations. His early upbringing occurred in a rural, riverine environment along the Nile's tributaries, shaped by seasonal cattle migrations, inter-clan feuds, and exposure to Anglo-Egyptian colonial administration's indirect rule through local chiefs. Machar grew up attending the Presbyterian Church, reflecting missionary influences in southern Sudan that introduced Western education and Christianity to Nuer communities amid ongoing Arabization policies from Khartoum. This blend of traditional pastoralism and early Christian schooling laid foundational exposure to literacy and external ideas, though his family's chiefly status prioritized practical skills in herding and mediation over formal early education.

Academic and Professional Training

Machar pursued engineering studies at the , earning a in 1977. He then traveled to the , where he completed a in at the in 1984. Upon returning to , Machar entered the armed struggle against the government by joining the /Army (SPLM/A) in late 1984, initially serving as a representative in . He underwent military training at the Bonga Revolutionary Military Training Centre in in early 1985, after which he commanded SPLA forces in Western Upper Nile, rising to the high command by 1986. This period marked his shift from academic engineering to leadership, leveraging his technical background in operational roles within the rebellion.

Involvement in the Second Sudanese Civil War

Joining the SPLA and Initial Roles

Riek Machar joined the /Army (SPLM/A) in 1984, during the early phases of the Second Sudanese Civil War, aligning with the rebel force led by that sought greater autonomy or independence for southern from the Khartoum government. Having recently earned a in and from the in , Machar defected amid growing political repression and ethnic tensions, traveling to —where the SPLM/A maintained training camps and received backing from the regime—to formally affiliate with the movement. In his initial role, Machar underwent military training in before being appointed zonal commander of Western Upper Nile, a strategically vital oil-bearing aligned with his Nuer ethnic base, reflecting the SPLM/A's efforts to incorporate regional leaders for broader ethnic representation within its predominantly Dinka-led structure. This position enabled him to direct SPLM/A forces in consolidating control over southern territories, countering government garrisons and rival militias like II holdouts. Under Machar's command, SPLM/A units in Western Upper Nile conducted key operations, including a 1987 scouting mission that penetrated the oilfields undetected, demonstrating the rebels' reach into economically critical government-held areas, and a September 1988 assault that captured the town of Mayom from II forces, securing supply routes and expanding territorial influence. These actions underscored Machar's emerging prominence as a field , leveraging local knowledge and resources to advance the SPLM/A's guerrilla against Sudanese forces prior to factional rifts in the early 1990s.

1991 Split from John Garang and Formation of NAS

In August 1991, tensions within the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) escalated into a formal schism when Riek Machar, a Nuer military commander and zonal leader in southern Upper Nile, alongside Lam Akol and other officers, challenged the leadership of SPLA chairman John Garang. The dissenters accused Garang of authoritarianism, corruption, and ethnic favoritism toward his Dinka group, while excluding non-Dinka commanders like Machar from key decisions and diplomatic roles. On August 28, 1991, in Nasir, Upper Nile, Machar and his allies issued the Nasir Declaration, effectively launching a coup attempt against Garang's mainstream SPLA faction, though it failed to oust him entirely. The split was rooted in ideological divergences as well as personal and ethnic grievances. Garang envisioned a "New Sudan"—a united, reformed through southern-led revolution—whereas Machar pushed for explicit , including the option of for southern , arguing it better addressed regional aspirations amid prolonged war fatigue. Machar's faction, drawing support primarily from Nuer communities in Upper Nile and Bahr el , framed the break as a effort to end Garang's centralized control, which they claimed stifled internal accountability and fueled tribal divisions within the SPLA. This realignment fragmented the rebel movement, with Machar's group controlling key eastern fronts but immediately sparking inter-SPLA skirmishes that exacerbated ethnic fault lines between Nuer and Dinka forces. Following the declaration, Machar formalized his breakaway as the SPLA-Nasir faction (often abbreviated as ), named after the site of the split and initially co-led with Lam Akol until internal rifts emerged later. The NAS adopted a political emphasizing , self-determination via , and power-sharing to counter Garang's unitary vision, attracting defectors disillusioned by the mainstream SPLA's logistical strains and battlefield setbacks. By late 1991, NAS forces had consolidated in Nasir and Ayod, positioning Machar as a rival authority who sought external aid, including covert overtures to , to sustain operations against both the Sudanese government and Garang's loyalists. This formation marked a pivotal weakening of the SPLA's unified front, prolonging the through factional warfare that claimed thousands of lives in the ensuing months.

1990s Alliances and Internal Conflicts

Khartoum Peace Agreement and Alliance with Sudan

In the mid-1990s, Riek Machar's South Sudan Independence Movement/Army (SSIM/A), successor to his earlier Nasir faction, faced significant military setbacks against John Garang's Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) loyalists, prompting Machar to seek accommodation with the Khartoum government to bolster his position. In April 1996, the Sudanese government signed a political charter with SSIM/A leaders, including Machar and Kerubino Kuanyin Bol, laying groundwork for broader integration while allowing continued operations against SPLA forces. The arrangement formalized on 21 April 1997 with the Peace Agreement, signed by Sudanese Vice President Zubair Mohamed Salih on behalf of the government and Machar as chairman and commander-in-chief of SSIM/A. The accord pledged an immediate end to hostilities through political means, a , disengagement of forces within 72 hours, and preservation of Sudan's unity pending a future southern on , though implementation emphasized absorption of Machar's faction into government-aligned structures rather than full . Under the agreement, Machar was appointed chairman of the newly established Southern States Coordinating Council (SSCC) on 7 August 1997, tasked with administering southern regions under 's oversight, and his forces formed the core of the Defence Force (SSDF), integrating partially with Sudanese military units. This alliance supplied SSIM/A and SSDF with , , and from , including direct military liaison officers assigned to Machar's units for coordinated attacks on SPLA positions, exacerbating ethnic divisions in southern by pitting Nuer-led militias against Dinka-dominated SPLA elements. The partnership, viewed by as a tactical split of southern opposition, provided Machar temporary respite but drew accusations of collaboration with a regime enforcing law and policies, alienating segments of the southern independence movement.

Atrocities and Ethnic Violence Under Machar's Command

During the 1991 split from John Garang's Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), Riek Machar's faction—primarily composed of Nuer fighters—initiated targeted attacks on Dinka communities, marking the onset of intensified in southern . These actions stemmed from factional rivalries that rapidly ethnicized the conflict, with Machar's forces seeking to undermine Garang's Dinka-dominated leadership through civilian targeting. The Bor Massacre on November 15, 1991, exemplified the scale of atrocities under Machar's command, as Nuer loyalists overran Dinka areas in and around county, killing an estimated thousands of civilians in reprisal-style raids involving mass executions and village burnings. This event, one of the war's most severe episodes, displaced tens of thousands and entrenched mutual ethnic animosities, with survivors reporting systematic killings based on tribal identity rather than combatant status. The violence extended beyond , as Machar's forces conducted similar assaults on Dinka settlements in Jonglei region, contributing to a broader pattern of retaliatory clashes that claimed additional civilian lives throughout 1991–1992. In the mid-1990s, following the formation of Machar's /Army (SPLM/A) and its 1996 alliance with the Sudanese government via the Peace Agreement, his forces integrated with Khartoum-backed militias, facilitating joint operations that exacerbated ethnic targeting against non-Nuer groups, including Dinkas and Equatorians. Reports from the period document Machar-allied units' involvement in scorched-earth tactics and abductions in and Upper Nile states, though direct command attribution varies amid fragmented loyalties. These actions prioritized territorial control over ideological goals, perpetuating cycles of displacement and revenge killings that weakened southern resistance against . Machar publicly acknowledged responsibility for the Nasir faction's crimes, including the Bor Massacre, in an August 2011 address to Bor community leaders, describing them as "heinous" and apologizing amid calls for reconciliation. However, the absence of accountability mechanisms during the allowed such violence to recur in later conflicts, underscoring unresolved ethnic fractures from the . No formal prosecutions for these specific atrocities have occurred, reflecting broader in Sudan's civil wars.

Reconciliation with the SPLM

Negotiations Leading to Reintegration

Following his from the Sudanese in February 2001, where he had served as assistant president after signing the 1997 Khartoum Peace Agreement, Riek Machar accused of failing to implement pledged autonomy for southern and began rallying support in Eastern Upper Nile alongside commander Tito Biel, forming the Southern People's Democratic Front () as a vehicle for renewed opposition. This shift prompted exploratory talks in 2001 between the and the /Army (SPLM/A) led by , aimed at unifying southern rebel factions against the Sudanese amid ongoing civil war dynamics and oil field control disputes. The negotiations, hosted primarily in , focused on reconciling ideological differences—Machar's emphasis on multi-party and versus Garang's vision of a united ""—while addressing command structures, resource sharing, and integration of forces into the SPLM/A. Key sticking points included Machar's prior alliances with , which had enabled government offensives against SPLM/A positions, and ethnic tensions exacerbated by past violence under his command; however, mutual incentives for a stronger front against drove progress, with Garang conceding to incorporate demands for internal SPLM/A reforms. On January 6, 2002, Garang and Machar formalized the agreement in , signing a joint declaration that merged the into the SPLM/A under Garang's overall , with Machar assuming a senior role and his forces integrating into the SPLA structure. This pact, announced publicly two days later, emphasized unity for peace negotiations with and reaffirmed commitments to via , marking Machar's reintegration after over a decade of factionalism. The merger bolstered SPLM/A cohesion, contributing to subsequent national talks, though underlying ethnic divisions persisted.

Return to the Fold and Role in Comprehensive Peace Agreement

Following the internal divisions and alliances of the , Riek Machar initiated reconciliation talks with leader in late 2001, amid pressure from southern Sudanese factions and international mediators to unify the insurgency against . On , 2002, Machar signed an agreement in dissolving his Southern People's Democratic Front () and reintegrating its forces into the SPLM/A, effectively returning to the organization's fold under Garang's command. This merger absorbed approximately 1,500 SPDF fighters and bolstered the SPLM's military cohesion, with Machar appointed as a senior deputy in the unified structure. Machar's reintegration facilitated broader factional unification, leveraging his prior ties to groups like the South Sudan Defence Forces (SSDF), which had signed the 1997 Khartoum Peace Agreement with Sudan. His mediation helped bridge divides between the SPLA and SSDF remnants, reducing intra-southern fighting and strengthening the SPLM's negotiating position ahead of formal talks with the Sudanese government. By mid-2002, this unity contributed to the Machakos Protocol, initialing provisions and a six-year interim period, signed on July 20, 2002, in . In the subsequent Naivasha negotiations (2004), Machar, as SPLM deputy, advocated for power-sharing and security arrangements, drawing on his background and factional networks to support protocols on wealth-sharing (May 2004) and resolution of conflicts (June 2004). These built toward the (CPA), signed January 9, 2005, in by Garang and Sudanese Vice President , which ended the Second , granted southern autonomy, and scheduled a 2011 on . Machar's role, though not as lead signatory, was instrumental in internal SPLM consensus-building, preventing factional sabotage during the talks. Critics within the SPLM, however, attributed lingering distrust to Machar's 1990s alliance with , which had supplied arms used against southern forces, though empirical unification outcomes prioritized strategic gains over historical grievances.

Path to South Sudanese Independence

Advocacy for Self-Determination

Riek Machar's advocacy for self-determination emerged prominently during his 1991 split from the SPLM/A, where he and commanders Gordon Kong and Lam Akol formed factions explicitly fighting for southern independence from Sudan, diverging from John Garang's preference for a united secular state. This Nasir Declaration on August 28, 1991, introduced self-determination as a core demand, influencing the broader southern liberation discourse despite the ensuing factional violence. After reconciling with the SPLM in 2002 and assuming roles as deputy chairman and later of Southern Sudan following the 2005 (CPA), Machar aligned with the implementation of the accord's self-determination provisions. The , signed January 9, 2005, mandated a on Southern 's status by 2011, reflecting a compromise that incorporated earlier secessionist pressures. In this capacity, Machar contributed to the political framework advancing the process, which saw 98.83% of participants vote for on January 9, 2011, amid a 97.35% turnout. As , Machar engaged in post-referendum , discussing north-south relations and transitional arrangements in public forums, such as a , , address on preparations for South Sudan's July 9 . His consistent emphasis on , rooted in addressing southern grievances against northern domination, positioned him as a key figure in the eventual , though critics attribute the outcome more to collective SPLM efforts under Garang and Kiir.

Contributions and Persistent Criticisms from Past Splits

Machar's advocacy for , articulated in the Nasir Declaration of August 28, 1991, marked a pivotal ideological challenge within the SPLM/A, emphasizing southern over John Garang's vision of a united, secular ; this stance influenced subsequent negotiations by highlighting demands for a on . In December 2001 and January 2002, Machar reconciled with Garang through agreements in and , where both leaders endorsed for southern , Nuba Mountains, and Blue Nile regions, integrating Machar's Southern People's Democratic Front forces into the SPLM/A and bolstering its negotiating power. This unity facilitated the 2005 (CPA), which enshrined a 2011 resulting in South Sudan's on July 9, 2011, with 98.83% voting for . Despite these contributions, Machar's 1991 split from the SPLM/A precipitated severe internal factionalism, sparking inter-clan that killed tens of thousands and exacerbated the 1992-1993 in southern , as rival groups diverted and resources. Forces aligned with Machar, primarily Nuer militias, were implicated in the Bor Massacre of November 1991, where over 2,000 Dinka civilians were killed in ethnically targeted attacks, deepening tribal divisions that persist as precursors to the 2013-2018 . His 1997 Khartoum Peace Agreement with the Sudanese government, which granted him a vice-presidential role and autonomy promises unfulfilled by , was widely condemned as collaboration with the enemy, further fragmenting southern resistance and prolonging the Second Sudanese by diverting Machar's SSIM/A forces from fighting to internal skirmishes. Critics, including former SPLM/A commanders, argue these actions prioritized personal ambition over collective liberation, sowing distrust that undermined long-term unity even after 2002 reintegration.

Post-Independence Political Career

Appointment as Vice President

President Salva Kiir appointed Riek Machar as Vice President of the newly independent Republic of on July 10, 2011, via presidential decree issued the day after independence celebrations on July 9. This reappointment extended Machar's prior position as Vice President of the autonomous Government of Southern Sudan under the 2005 , aiming to unify leadership within the (SPLM) following decades of civil war against . The appointment reflected strategic inclusion of Machar's faction, which had reconciled with the SPLM mainstream in 2002 after earlier schisms, to balance ethnic representation in the dominated by Kiir's Dinka group against Machar's Nuer base. Machar assumed responsibilities including oversight of development initiatives and foreign relations, such as representing at the July 14-15, 2011, summit where the nation was admitted as the 54th member state. Initial formation under Kiir prioritized continuity from the semi-autonomous , with Machar's role intended to stabilize post-secession amid ongoing border disputes with and internal resource allocation challenges. Despite the appointment's unifying intent, underlying power struggles between Kiir and Machar—rooted in competition for SPLM leadership—persisted, foreshadowing future instability, though Machar publicly committed to national development priorities like oil revenue management and in early addresses.

2013 Dismissal and Outbreak of Civil War

On July 23, 2013, South Sudanese President Salva Kiir dismissed Vice President Riek Machar and the entire cabinet, citing the need for a "reinvigorated" government amid internal divisions within the (SPLM). The move followed Machar's public announcement in March 2013 of his intent to challenge Kiir for SPLM chairmanship and the presidency in upcoming party elections, exacerbating factional rivalries that had simmered since South Sudan's independence in 2011. Kiir's decree suspended key figures aligned with Machar, including SPLM Secretary-General Pagan Amum, signaling a of perceived rivals rather than a routine reshuffle. Machar condemned the dismissal as unconstitutional and an authoritarian overreach, arguing it violated SPLM protocols and undermined democratic transitions, though he initially called for calm to avoid immediate unrest. He refused to vacate his position without , framing the sacking as Kiir's attempt to consolidate power and sideline Nuer ethnic interests, given Machar's affiliation with the Nuer community. Tensions persisted through cabinet reappointments that favored Kiir loyalists, primarily from his Dinka ethnic group, while sidelining Machar's supporters, fostering perceptions of ethnic favoritism in governance. These frictions culminated in violence on December 15, 2013, when clashes erupted in 's between units, reportedly triggered by a political meeting of SPLM officials where Machar and allies criticized Kiir's . Kiir accused Machar of orchestrating a coup attempt involving of officials and seizure of arms, leading to the arrest of several opposition figures. Machar denied any coup plot, attributing the fighting to Kiir's forces targeting Nuer soldiers in a premeditated ethnic purge, with initial skirmishes escalating as Nuer troops mutinied and fled . The clashes quickly polarized along ethnic lines, with Dinka militias mobilized against Nuer civilians, resulting in hundreds killed within days and the displacement of thousands. Machar escaped amid the chaos and relocated to , where he rallied Nuer defectors and formed the core of an armed opposition, denouncing Kiir's government as dictatorial and calling for its overthrow through "liberation" rather than electoral means. The fighting spread rapidly to other regions, intertwining political grievances with ethnic animosities rooted in historical Dinka-Nuer rivalries from the Sudanese , leading to widespread atrocities including revenge killings and village burnings by . By late December, the conflict had evolved into a full-scale , with over 1,000 deaths reported in the first week and international mediation efforts underway, though underlying power struggles between Kiir and Machar remained unresolved.

Leadership of the SPLM-IO and Civil War Dynamics

Formation and Objectives of SPLM-IO

The (SPLM-IO) emerged in 2013 under Riek Machar's leadership as a factional challenge to Salva Kiir's control of the ruling SPLM, following Machar's dismissal as on 23 2013 amid accusations of disloyalty and internal power struggles. The group's initial formalization occurred via a on 6 2013, where Machar and allied senior SPLM figures, including former detainees and Garang loyalists, publicly criticized Kiir's leadership for purges, centralization of power, and erosion of the party's democratic norms established during the liberation struggle. Tensions escalated into open conflict on 15 December 2013 when fighting broke out in between units of the , rapidly acquiring ethnic overtones as Dinka-dominated forces targeted Nuer soldiers and civilians, resulting in hundreds of deaths and prompting mass defections of Nuer SPLA officers to Machar's nascent opposition. Kiir's government accused Machar of orchestrating a coup attempt, which he denied, framing the events as a spontaneous against ; this violence catalyzed the SPLM-IO's military mobilization, drawing primarily from Nuer communities in through alliances with defected SPLA units and irregular militias like the "white armies." The SPLM-IO's core objectives, as articulated by Machar, focused on ousting Kiir to enable political reforms, including of the SPLM, of to devolve authority to states and mitigate ethnic-regional imbalances, and accountability for abuses such as the Juba killings via independent judicial mechanisms. These aims positioned the group as a reformist alternative rather than a secessionist force, emphasizing national reconciliation, transparent governance, and power-sharing to prevent the concentration of authority seen under Kiir; however, the objectives remained vaguely defined in early statements, with practical efforts blending (e.g., via IGAD ) and armed resistance. The movement's structures were consolidated at a convention in in April 2014, appointing Machar as chairman and , alongside figures like , while attempting to broaden beyond its Nuer base by including non-Nuer politicians and military leaders from Shilluk and Equatorian groups. Despite reformist rhetoric, the SPLM-IO's rapid ethnic homogenization— with Nuer comprising the bulk of fighters and leadership—reflected underlying causal drivers of tribal competition for state resources post-independence, complicating its national aspirations.

Military Campaigns, Ethnic Dimensions, and Human Rights Abuses

Following the 2013 political split, the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-in-Opposition (SPLM-IO), under Riek Machar's leadership, mobilized primarily Nuer ethnic militias, including irregular fighters known as the White Army, to launch offensives against government forces loyal to President Salva Kiir. In late December 2013, SPLM-IO forces advanced from Juba toward key northern towns, capturing Bentiu in Unity State by January 9, 2014, after intense fighting that displaced thousands. They also seized Bor in Jonglei State around January 7, 2014, and Malakal in Upper Nile State on December 24, 2013, though control over these oil-rich and strategic areas shifted repeatedly through 2014-2015 due to counteroffensives by government troops supported by Ugandan forces. The White Army, a decentralized Nuer youth militia historically used for cattle defense and mobilized by Machar loyalists, played a central role in these campaigns, providing the bulk of irregular fighters who overran government garrisons in Jonglei and Upper Nile regions, often without formal command structures. By mid-2016, SPLM-IO offensives had largely stalled, with heavy fighting erupting again in Juba in July, where Machar's forces attempted to consolidate power but were driven out, leading to his flight to Sudan. The conflict rapidly assumed ethnic dimensions, pitting Nuer fighters aligned with Machar against Dinka-dominated government forces under Kiir, exacerbating pre-existing tribal rivalries over resources and power. SPLM-IO recruitment drew overwhelmingly from Nuer communities, particularly Lou Nuer subgroups, framing the rebellion as a defense against perceived Dinka , while government portrayed it as a Nuer . This ethnic framing fueled revenge cycles, with SPLM-IO via radio in captured areas like inciting attacks on Dinka, Equatorian, and non-Nuer civilians as "traitors." The 's involvement intensified communal mobilization, as Nuer civilians were coerced or volunteered en masse for battles, viewing the war as existential protection against Dinka expansionism, though internal SPLM-IO fractures among Nuer subclans occasionally led to infighting. Reports from field observers noted that by 2014, up to 75% of SPLM-IO combatants were White Army irregulars, blurring lines between rebel military operations and ethnic militancy. SPLM-IO forces under Machar's command committed widespread human rights abuses, including targeted ethnic killings, rape, and looting, often amounting to war crimes as documented by UN and NGO investigators. In Bor from January 1-18, 2014, opposition fighters killed hundreds of Dinka civilians in reprisal attacks, with specific incidents including the shooting of 14 women sheltering in St. Andrews Episcopal Church and 13 patients at Bor Hospital; mass graves held 525 bodies by late January. In Bentiu on April 14-15, 2014, SPLM-IO elements massacred at least 385 civilians, primarily Dinka and Darfuri traders, by luring them into a mosque under false protection promises before opening fire, alongside killings in a hospital and targeted rapes broadcast over local radio to terrorize non-Nuer groups. These acts, verified through eyewitness accounts and forensic evidence, involved drunken fighters in mixed civilian-military attire systematically targeting based on ethnicity, with looting and arson destroying up to 10% of Bor's structures. SPLM-IO leadership, including Machar, denied systematic involvement but initiated internal probes only after international pressure, amid reports of child recruitment and forced conscription from Nuer communities. While government forces perpetrated parallel abuses against Nuer, the opposition's actions in controlled areas demonstrated a pattern of ethnic cleansing intent, contributing to over 4,000 civilian deaths in early 2014 alone.

Peace Processes and Returns to Power

2015 and 2018 Agreements

The Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in (ARCSS) was signed on August 17, 2015, in , , under mediation by the (IGAD), following two years of negotiations amid the that erupted in December 2013. Riek Machar, as chairman of the /Army in Opposition (SPLM/A-IO), affixed his signature alongside Salva Kiir of the SPLM in , representatives of former detainees, and other stakeholders, committing to a permanent and transitional arrangements. Key provisions included the formation of a Transitional of National Unity (TGNU) within 90 days, with Machar designated to resume his role as First ; power-sharing allocations granting SPLM/A-IO 33% of executive positions, 33% of legislative seats, and equivalent shares in state governments; and security sector reforms mandating the , , and gradual unification of opposing forces into a single national army. The agreement also outlined economic reforms, resource-sharing mechanisms, and a to constitutional reform, including provisions for , though implementation timelines were tight and reliant on trust between Kiir and Machar, whose rivalry had ignited the . Despite initial progress, such as Machar's return to in April 2016 and the swearing-in of the TGNU, the ARCSS collapsed amid renewed fighting in July 2016, triggered by clashes in the capital between government and opposition forces, which forced Machar to flee to the Democratic Republic of Congo and later . IGAD and international partners attributed the breakdown to failures in security arrangements, including incomplete disarmament of troops in and persistent command-and-control disputes, highlighting the agreement's overreliance on elite pacts without robust enforcement or addressing underlying ethnic mobilizations exploited by both sides. The Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of (R-ARCSS) emerged from IGAD-led talks in , , culminating in its signing on September 12, 2018, after the 2016 collapse and subsequent ceasefires. Machar, representing SPLM/A-IO, signed the document, agreeing to its core framework while securing adjustments like an extended 36-month transitional period (versus 30 months in ARCSS) and a reduction from 32 to 10 states to resolve disputes. Provisions reinstated Machar as First in the revitalized TGNU, maintained power-sharing ratios (SPLM/A-IO at 35% of ministerial posts, adjusted for inclusivity), and emphasized phased security unification with training and integration of 83,000 opposition forces into the national army, alongside mechanisms such as a Hybrid Court and truth commissions. The agreement also prioritized resource mobilization via a Special Reconstruction Fund and electoral preparations, though critics noted its elite-centric focus perpetuated fragility by sidelining broader societal reforms. Implementation of the R-ARCSS lagged, with the TGNU not fully constituted until , 2020—18 months late—due to disputes over sites and force ratios, during which sporadic violence persisted despite the nominal . Machar's delayed return to underscored ongoing mistrust, as SPLM/A-IO forces remained cantonment-dependent and unification stalled at under 50% by mid-2021, per reports, reflecting the agreements' repeated vulnerability to the personal dynamics between Kiir and Machar rather than institutionalized accountability.

Reappointment as First Vice President and Fragile Unity

The Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in (R-ARCSS), signed on September 12, 2018, by President Salva Kiir and opposition leaders including Riek Machar, outlined a power-sharing structure that allocated the position of First to Machar as leader of the (SPLM-IO). Implementation stalled for over a year due to disputes over security arrangements and the number of states, extending the pre-transitional period until February 2020. On February 22, 2020, Kiir issued a decree appointing Machar as First Vice President, and Machar was sworn into office later that day at the State House in Juba, formally launching the Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity (RTGoNU). This marked Machar's third stint in the vice presidency, following prior roles in 2005 and 2015, and aimed to consolidate the 2018 peace deal amid international pressure from mediators like IGAD and the United States. Machar's return to Juba, secured with guarantees of protection after his 2016 exile, symbolized renewed commitment to power-sharing but highlighted ongoing reliance on ethnic-based alliances, with SPLM-IO allocated 35% of positions in the unity cabinet. Despite the RTGoNU's formation, unity remained precarious, undermined by incomplete security sector reforms stipulated in Chapter II of the R-ARCSS, including the failure to graduate and unify over 220,000 troops from opposing forces by the agreed deadlines. Persistent subnational violence, often along Dinka-Nuer lines, claimed thousands of lives annually, with reports documenting over 1,000 civilian deaths in alone from inter-communal clashes. Political mistrust between Kiir and Machar exacerbated delays, evidenced by infrequent high-level meetings and unaddressed grievances over and command structures, fostering a parallel governance system where SPLM-IO maintained autonomous control in opposition-held areas. Economic stagnation and corruption further eroded the government's legitimacy, with oil revenues—comprising 98% of the budget—plagued by mismanagement and , leaving public services underfunded and fueling inflation rates exceeding 100% in 2020. observers, including the UN, noted impunity for past atrocities as a core obstacle, with hybrid courts mandated by the agreement remaining unestablished, allowing cycles of retaliation tied to Machar's Nuer base and Kiir's Dinka supporters. By late 2021, elections originally slated for December 2020 were indefinitely postponed, extending the transitional period and exposing the agreement's elite bargain nature, which prioritized positions over institutional reforms. These dynamics underscored causal factors like unresolved ethnic power imbalances and weak , rendering the unity fragile against shocks such as floods and crises displacing over 2 million people internally.

Post-2018 Governance and Tensions

Following the signing of the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS) on September 12, 2018, a Transitional Government of National Unity (TGONU) was established to implement power-sharing provisions, with President Salva Kiir retaining the presidency and Riek Machar appointed as First Vice President representing the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-in-Opposition (SPLM-IO). Machar's initial return to Juba occurred on October 31, 2018, for a peace ceremony, but substantive participation was delayed amid security concerns; he formally rejoined the government on February 22, 2020, after negotiations resolved preconditions including guarantees for his forces' integration. As First Vice President, Machar oversaw opposition-aligned ministries and engaged in bilateral talks with Kiir, such as the May 3, 2024, meeting focused on unifying armed forces, though progress remained limited. Implementation of the R-ARCSS faltered across critical benchmarks, with the Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (RJMEC) reporting overall progress at approximately 50% by mid-2024, hampered by inadequate funding, repeated cease-fire violations, and incomplete reforms. Security unification, requiring the integration of roughly 83,000 SPLA and 60,000 opposition troops into a unified force of 83,000, saw only partial cantonment and screening, with no full operational merger by 2024 due to disputes over command structures and . Elections, originally slated for 2022 under the agreement's 36-month transitional period extended to December 2019 formation, were repeatedly deferred; the December 2024 vote was postponed to December 2026 on September 12, 2024, citing unfinished tasks like constitutional drafting and for 5.8 million eligible citizens. Tensions between Kiir and Machar persisted, rooted in mutual distrust and ethnic alignments—Kiir's Dinka base versus Machar's Nuer support—exacerbated by stalled reforms that failed to address underlying grievances like resource distribution and elite capture. Sporadic clashes erupted, including government-opposition skirmishes in Upper Nile and Equatoria regions in 2023-2024, killing hundreds and displacing thousands, often tied to local power struggles rather than direct SPLM-IO mobilization but signaling fragility. The agreement's elite power-sharing model prioritized Kiir-Machar accommodation over broader institutional reforms, leaving governance vulnerable to patronage networks and economic stagnation, with South Sudan's GDP per capita remaining below $300 amid oil revenue disputes. Despite these strains, full-scale civil war was averted through IGAD-mediated dialogues and external pressure, though analysts noted the peace as a "negative peace" lacking positive transformation.

2025 Arrest, Charges, and Ongoing Trial

On March 26, 2025, South Sudan's government placed First Vice President Riek Machar under house arrest in Juba, following a series of attacks by the Nuer White Army militia on a military base in Nasir, Upper Nile State, earlier that month, which resulted in over 200 deaths, including soldiers and civilians. The National Security Service led the initial arrests of Machar and several associates, attributing the violence to his orchestration or incitement, though Machar's supporters described the move as politically motivated to sideline him ahead of delayed elections. Formal charges were filed against Machar on September 11, 2025, by the Minister of Justice, accusing him of treason, murder, crimes against humanity, and up to 99 related counts stemming from the Nasir incidents and alleged broader insurgent activities. President Salva Kiir simultaneously suspended Machar from his position, escalating tensions in the fragile power-sharing arrangement under the 2018 Revitalized Agreement. Machar and his seven co-defendants, including senior Sudan People's Liberation Movement-in-Opposition (SPLM-IO) figures, have denied the allegations, with defense lawyers arguing the proceedings constitute a "witch-hunt" lacking evidence of direct command responsibility. The trial commenced before a special in on September 22, 2025, with prosecutors presenting evidence from investigations into the White Army raids, including witness testimonies and forensic details of the Nasir assault. On September 29, 2025, the rejected Machar's immunity claim under the peace accord, affirming jurisdiction and proceeding despite international calls from groups like for due process safeguards. As of late October 2025, sessions have included cross-examinations of investigators and adjournments—such as to October 20 and beyond—amid defense challenges to the trial's legality and complaints over procedural irregularities, like the disappearance of vehicles during arrests. The case has heightened risks of renewed between Dinka and Nuer factions, with Ugandan troop deployments bolstering Kiir's regime amid fears of SPLM-IO resurgence.

Major Controversies

Repeated Rebellions and Accusations of Betrayal

In August 1991, Riek Machar, then a senior commander in the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), led a factional split from the SPLM/A under John Garang, forming the SPLA-Nasir group alongside Gordon Kong Chuol and others, primarily drawing support from Nuer ethnic militias. The breakaway was precipitated by disagreements over Garang's centralized leadership and vision for a united secular Sudan, with Machar advocating for southern self-determination and federalism, though critics within the SPLM-Torit faction, loyal to Garang, labeled it a coup attempt that fragmented the anti-Khartoum resistance and invited retaliatory ethnic violence, including the Bor massacre in November 1991 where thousands of Dinka civilians were killed by Nasir-aligned forces. Machar's Nasir faction further alienated southern unity advocates in 1997 by signing the Khartoum Peace Agreement with the Sudanese government in , incorporating his forces into 's military structure and accepting nominal autonomy for southern regions, a move decried by Garang loyalists as a betrayal that legitimized the Islamist regime and undermined the SPLM's , as it provided with a victory and divided southern fighters during ongoing hostilities. Despite these rifts, Machar reconciled with the mainstream SPLM in 2002, reintegrating into the movement ahead of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement, but accusations of serial disloyalty persisted among Dinka-dominated SPLM elements who viewed his actions as opportunistic power grabs exploiting ethnic grievances rather than principled stands. The pattern recurred post-independence in July 2013, when President Salva Kiir dismissed Machar as vice president amid internal SPLM politburo tensions; Machar rejected the ouster as authoritarian, mobilizing Nuer troops and launching the SPLM-In Opposition (SPLM-IO) rebellion after clashes erupted in on December 15, 2013, which Kiir's government framed as a failed by Machar and ten associates, betraying the hard-won statehood and reigniting ethnic massacres that killed tens of thousands in the ensuing . Machar denied coup allegations, portraying his uprising as a corrective to Kiir's centralization and , yet the rebellion's ethnic mobilization—SPLM-IO forces targeting Dinka civilians—reinforced charges from Kiir's camp of habitual treachery, as Machar's prior splits had similarly eroded trust and prolonged conflicts. Renewed fighting in July 2016, shortly after Machar's brief return as first under the August 2015 accord, saw SPLM-IO forces clash with government troops in , forcing Machar to flee the capital and prompting Kiir to declare him a threat to ; this episode, resulting in hundreds of deaths and widespread displacement, amplified longstanding critiques from South Sudanese analysts and SPLM hardliners that Machar's repeated insurrections—spanning 1991, 2013, and 2016—stemmed from personal ambition over collective stability, consistently fracturing fragile coalitions and exacerbating tribal divisions despite his defenses of democratic reform.

Role in Fomenting Tribal Divisions and Violence

Riek Machar's leadership of opposition factions has historically exacerbated ethnic tensions between Nuer and Dinka communities in , transforming political disputes into communal violence. During the 1991 SPLA split, Machar co-led the Nasir faction, whose forces conducted attacks in Dinka-dominated areas, culminating in the Bor Massacre where an estimated 2,000 Dinka civilians were killed by Nuer fighters in November 1991, an event that entrenched mutual distrust and set a precedent for ethnic targeting in Southern Sudanese conflicts. This violence stemmed from factional rivalries but rapidly assumed tribal dimensions, with Machar's group recruiting heavily along Nuer lines and justifying assaults as countermeasures against perceived Dinka favoritism under . The 2013 crisis following Machar's dismissal as by Salva Kiir further ethnicized , as Machar assumed command of the SPLA-in-Opposition (SPLA-IO), which became predominantly Nuer in composition and mobilized under narratives of Dinka tribal domination of state institutions. SPLA-IO recruitment emphasized ethnic solidarity, drawing Nuer youth into irregular militias like the , a cattle-herding force that served as auxiliaries and propagated revenge against Dinka civilians for alleged atrocities in . By framing the as a defense of Nuer interests against Kiir's "Dinka government," Machar contributed to cycles of retaliatory killings, with SPLA-IO forces responsible for displacing over 1 million people through targeted in and Upper Nile states between 2014 and 2016. SPLA-IO operations under Machar's direction included documented instances of tribal pogroms, notably the April 2014 Bentiu offensive where opposition fighters, including White Army elements, killed at least 385 civilians—primarily Dinka men, women, and children—sheltering in mosques, hospitals, and markets, with perpetrators using radio broadcasts to incite killings based on ethnicity and selectively raping women from opposing groups. United Nations investigations attributed these acts to SPLA-IO command structures, noting the systematic nature of the ethnic targeting that followed the group's capture of the town from government forces. Similar patterns recurred in 2015-2016 clashes in Unity State, where SPLA-IO-aligned militias enforced Nuer-only zones, executing Dinka and Equatorian residents and burning villages, actions that human rights monitors linked to orders from field commanders loyal to Machar. Despite Machar's public disavowals of ethnic motives, asserting a political basis for the , the SPLA-IO's reliance on tribal militias and failure to discipline abusers perpetuated divisions, as evidenced by ongoing White Army mobilizations in 2025 that targeted Dinka settlements in northern , killing at least 14 in clashes near and reigniting fears of broader communal war. Independent analyses highlight how this ethnic mobilization undermined pan-South Sudanese unity, with SPLA-IO rhetoric often invoking historical grievances to justify violence, thereby hindering efforts and sustaining low-level tribal skirmishes even during ceasefires.

Personal Life and Other Contributions

Family and Relationships

Riek Machar was first married to , a aid worker, in 1991; she died in a car accident in on July 24, 1993, at the age of 29 while pregnant with their child. Machar's second wife is , a South Sudanese politician who has held ministerial positions including Defense Minister in 2023 and thereafter; the couple married after McCune's death and share four children. One of their daughters, Meer Riek Machar, entered a in on July 31, 2022, to William Deng Rehan, with a of 45 cows, though the family initially requested only 11 per traditional norms. In March 2025, both Machar and Teny faced arrest and amid political tensions in , highlighting their intertwined personal and public lives.

Literary and Intellectual Works

Riek Machar holds a in from the , awarded in 1984, representing his primary academic intellectual contribution prior to his full immersion in Sudanese politics; the dissertation focused on aspects of , a field with potential applications in engineering and , though its specific title and contents have not been widely disseminated in public archives. In the realm of political intellectual works, Machar authored and presented "South Sudan: A History of Political Domination - A Case of Self-Determination" on 19 November 1995, a document issued under the Nasir faction of the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) that systematically detailed historical patterns of northern Sudanese domination over southern regions, including economic marginalization and cultural suppression, while arguing for self-determination as the logical remedy to entrenched inequities. This paper, circulated among international audiences and African studies circles, marked an early formal articulation of secessionist ideology within southern Sudanese opposition circles, influencing subsequent advocacy for referendums and federal structures. Machar has not published books, peer-reviewed articles, or essays in literary or scholarly journals, with his intellectual output largely confined to political manifestos, speeches, and factional declarations rather than standalone academic or literary productions; claims of forthcoming books on and post-war transitions, such as those referenced in partisan online discussions, lack verification from reputable publishers or archives as of 2025.

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