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Task Force 76

Task Force 76, officially designated as Commander, Task Force 76 (CTF 76), serves as the operational headquarters for Expeditionary Strike Group Seven within the United States Seventh Fleet, focusing on amphibious warfare and expeditionary operations across the Western Pacific Ocean and Indian Ocean regions. Headquartered at White Beach Naval Facility in Okinawa, Japan, it exercises command over Amphibious Ready Groups (ARGs) and associated Marine Expeditionary Units (MEUs), enabling rapid deployment of naval and Marine Corps forces for crisis response, theater security cooperation, and combat operations. Established as the amphibious component of the Seventh Fleet, Task Force 76 integrates U.S. Navy surface combatants, amphibious assault ships, and embarked air-ground task forces to support a spectrum of missions, including humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and in contested environments. In recent years, it has emphasized joint and combined exercises with allies, such as Talisman Sabre with Australian forces, to enhance interoperability and deterrence in the . The task force underwent structural evolution with the formation of Task Force 76/3 in 2023, merging elements of the Navy's CTF 76 and the to streamline command for amphibious and Marine operations. Notable leadership transitions, including the April 2025 to Thomas Shultz, underscore its ongoing role in maintaining forward presence amid regional tensions.

Overview

Mission and Strategic Role


Task Force 76, designated as Seven, functions as the amphibious force of the U.S. Seventh Fleet, with its core mission centered on operating from the sea to deter aggression and facilitate rapid mobilization in response to crises, conflicts, or . As the primary naval advisor to the Seventh Fleet on amphibious operations, it plans, coordinates, and executes amphibious activities across the fleet's area of responsibility, which encompasses the Western and portions of the . This includes operational control over Amphibious Ready Groups and embarked Expeditionary Units, enabling the seamless integration of naval and Corps assets for .
Strategically, Task Force 76 serves as a key enabler for Marine expeditionary operations ashore, leveraging sea-based platforms to deliver capabilities that neutralize adversaries quickly and decisively. Its forward-deployed posture in the Indo-Pacific region supports a spectrum of contingencies, ranging from humanitarian assistance and disaster relief to full-scale combat operations, thereby maintaining deterrence through persistent presence and readiness. The task force's unique role as the U.S. Navy's only permanently forward-deployed expeditionary strike group underscores its importance in sustaining operational tempo without reliance on rotational forces from the continental United States. In evolving operational concepts, Task Force 76/3—formed by merging naval and elements—acts as the Seventh Fleet's theater commander, overseeing traditional amphibious assaults alongside innovative approaches such as expeditionary advanced base operations. This integration enhances joint interoperability, littoral maneuver, and maritime campaign planning in contested environments, adapting to challenges like distributed operations and missions.

Organizational Composition

Expeditionary Strike Group 7 (ESG-7), designated as Task Force 76 (TF 76), is commanded by a serving concurrently as , Amphibious Force Seventh Fleet, and is headquartered at White Beach Naval Facility, Okinawa, Japan. The core staff integrates and Marine Corps personnel to plan and execute amphibious operations, with TF 76 acting as the primary advisor to U.S. Seventh Fleet on such matters. Subordinate Navy units include specialized support elements such as Sea Squadron 25 for rotary-wing operations, Naval 7 for shore party logistics, Fleet Surgical Team 7 for medical support, and Tactical Air Control Squadron 12 for air traffic coordination. These units enable sustainment of expeditionary forces ashore. TF 76 operationally controls Amphibious Ready Groups (ARGs), typically comprising amphibious assault ships like the USS America (LHA-6), amphibious transport docks, dock landing ships, and expeditionary sea bases such as USS Miguel Keith (ESB-3) and USS John L. Canley (ESB-6), along with the command ship USS Blue Ridge (LCC-19). Destroyer 7 provides surface escort and warfare capabilities, while Amphibious 11 manages specific amphibious ship maintenance and operations. TF 76 integrates closely with Marine Corps elements, embarking Marine Expeditionary Units (MEUs) on ARGs for operations, including ground combat, aviation, and logistics from units like the . Approximately 5,500 sailors form the naval component, supported by carriers' detachments, , and helicopters for vertical envelopment and littoral maneuver. In 2022, TF 76 merged staffs with the to establish Task Force 76/3, designated as Seventh Fleet's theater commander, enhancing joint command for expeditionary advanced base operations and distributed maritime operations. This structure retains ESG-7's naval assets while incorporating Marine brigade elements for scalable force projection across the .

History

World War II and Early Post-War Period

The Seventh Amphibious Force, operating as Task Force 76 under the U.S. Seventh Fleet, was established on 10 January 1943 in , , under Daniel E. Barbey to execute amphibious assaults in the Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA) as part of General Douglas MacArthur's island-hopping strategy against Japanese forces. This force integrated transport squadrons, attack transports, cargo ships, destroyers, and minesweepers to land and units, totaling over 300,000 troops and 350,000 tons of supplies across 14 major landings from September 1943 to September 1944 in , the , and the Halmaheras. Barbey advanced to in command, emphasizing coordinated naval gunfire, air support, and rapid unloading to overcome logistical challenges like uncharted reefs and enemy defenses. Key early operations included , the unopposed landings on and Islands on 30 June 1943 to establish air bases; the airborne-amphibious assault on , , on 4 September 1943; and the contested landing at on Scarlet Beach on 22 September 1943, where 76's escorts repelled Japanese counterattacks. Subsequent actions encompassed the diversions at Arawe Peninsula and Cape Gloucester in December 1943; the large-scale Operation Reckless at Tanahmerah Bay, , and from 22 April to 13 May 1944; and Operation Horlicks at Biak Island from 27 May to 11 June 1944, which secured airfields despite fierce resistance. By mid-1944, the force had evolved tactics for bypassing heavily fortified positions, landing at on 15 September to support further advances. In late 1944 and 1945, Task Force 76 shifted to the campaign, conducting landings at on 20 October 1944, on 15 December 1944, on 9 January 1945, and the recapture of and on 15-16 February 1945, where minesweepers cleared over 1,300 obstacles to enable unopposed assaults. Final wartime operations targeted southern sites like on 28 February 1945 and Zamboanga on 10 March 1945, followed by Borneo invasions at on 1 May 1945, Brunei Bay on 10 June 1945, and on 1 July 1945, marking the last Allied amphibious assault of the war. These 16 additional landings in 1945 demonstrated the force's proficiency in multi-island campaigns, though faced criticism for high costs against diminishing Japanese opposition. In the early post-war period, Task Force 76 supported occupation duties, transporting XXIV Corps to Jinsen (Inchon), , on 8 , and III Amphibious Corps to Tientsin on 30 September and Tsingtao on 11 October 1945 for operations in . It also facilitated the of Japanese forces from and amid . The force was disestablished on 23 December 1945, reflecting rapid U.S. naval reductions as threats receded, though its doctrinal innovations influenced future .

Cold War and Vietnam Era

Task Force 76 served as the designated Amphibious Force of the U.S. Seventh Fleet during the , focusing on and readiness for expeditionary operations in the Western Pacific to counter Soviet and communist influence. It maintained forward-deployed amphibious capabilities, integrating with Marine units under Task Force 79 to enable rapid response to regional contingencies, including deterrence patrols and joint exercises emphasizing littoral maneuver. In the , Task Force 76 supported U.S. Marine Corps deployments and operations along South Vietnam's coast, particularly in the I Corps area, through amphibious shipping that facilitated troop movements, logistics, and raids such as those in the and Rung Sat Special Zone. The task force's vessels, including amphibious assault ships and , enabled over-the-horizon operations that integrated with Marine ground actions, sustaining pressure on North Vietnamese and forces from 1965 onward. As the conflict waned in 1975, Task Force 76 played a pivotal role in , the evacuation of Saigon on April 29–30. Commanded by Rear Adm. Donald B. Whitmire, it assembled approximately 26 ships—including amphibious transports and dock landing ships—off , positioned 30 miles offshore to receive over 7,000 evacuees via from the USS Hancock (CVA-19), USS Midway (CVB-41), and other carriers, while providing and sea control against potential threats. This operation marked the amphibious force's final major commitment in , extracting U.S. personnel and select South Vietnamese allies amid the fall of the capital, with TF-76's landing ships facilitating secondary sea lifts and refugee processing.

Post-Cold War Reorganization and Modern Developments

Following the end of the in 1991, U.S. Navy amphibious forces, including those designated as Task Force 76 (TF 76) within the Seventh Fleet, shifted emphasis from large-scale forcible entry operations against peer adversaries to versatile expeditionary capabilities supporting crisis response, humanitarian assistance, and theater security cooperation in the . This reorganization aligned with broader naval transformations under the 1990s "Forward...From the Sea" strategy, which prioritized from the littorals using integrated naval forces rather than fixed forward bases vulnerable to missile threats. In the early 2000s, TF 76 evolved into Expeditionary Strike Group 7 (ESG 7), the Navy's sole permanently forward-deployed ESG, headquartered in White Beach, Okinawa, with key elements in Sasebo, Japan. The ESG structure, formalized around 2002 as part of Sea Power 21 initiatives, combined an Amphibious Ready Group (typically including one amphibious assault ship, one amphibious transport dock, and one dock landing ship) with Marine Expeditionary Unit elements, surface escorts, submarines, and maritime patrol aircraft to enable self-sustaining strike operations without reliance on distant carriers. This allowed TF 76/ESG 7 to maintain operational control over approximately 5,500 personnel, amphibious squadron assets like Amphibious Squadron 11, and rotational ships such as the forward-deployed USS America (LHA-6), enhancing responsiveness to regional contingencies. Modern developments have centered on deepening Navy-Marine integration amid rising great-power competition, particularly in countering anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) threats from . In 2022, ESG 7/TF 76 merged its staff with the (3rd MEB) to form Task Force 76/3 (TF 76/3), a hybrid headquarters experimenting with distributed lethality concepts under Marine Force Design 2030. This entity, commanded initially by Rear Adm. Derek Trinque, focuses on littoral maneuver, sea denial, and Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO), deploying Marine Littoral Regiments to austere island chains for missile strikes and while amphibious forces provide mobile command and sustainment. TF 76/3 participated in Noble Fusion 22.2 starting October 1, 2022, simulating joint aggregation for combat operations across the Strait to . Recent activities include multilateral exercises like Combined Task Force 76/79 operations in February 2022, demonstrating allied sea-denial with U.S., Japanese, and Australian forces, and an 18-month integration experiment launched in September 2022 to refine command structures for contested environments. ESG 7/TF 76 continues forward operations from bases supporting ships like USS Miguel Keith (ESB-5) for command, with command transitions such as Rear Adm. Fred Kacher's relief in May 2021 emphasizing expanded warfighting amid challenges. As of April 2025, TF 76 marked leadership changes at , Okinawa, underscoring sustained readiness for amphibious and expeditionary missions.

Structure and Forward Deployment

Headquarters and Command Structure

Expeditionary Strike Group Seven (ESG 7), operating as Commander, Task Force 76 (CTF 76), maintains its primary headquarters at White Beach Naval Facility in Okinawa, Japan. This forward-deployed location supports operational control over Amphibious Ready Groups and Marine Expeditionary Units within the U.S. Seventh Fleet's area of responsibility, spanning the Western Pacific and Indian Oceans. A smaller deputy commander staff operates from U.S. Fleet Activities Sasebo in Japan to facilitate coordination with assigned units. The command structure integrates and Marine Corps elements under a unified , formalized as Task Force 76/3 (TF 76/3) in September 2022 through the merger of CTF 76 and the . This structure separates core functions including , operations, , and plans to enable expeditionary operations. TF 76/3 encompasses subordinate units such as Destroyer Squadron 7, Amphibious Squadron 11, and amphibious assault ships like USS America (LHA 6) and USS Blue Ridge (LCC 19). As the sole permanently forward-deployed in the Seventh Fleet, CTF 76 reports to , and executes missions in support of theater contingencies. The commander, typically a , oversees a joint staff tailored for rapid response and multinational integration, with recent transitions including the April 18, 2025, change of command ceremony at , Okinawa. This setup emphasizes adaptability, as demonstrated in exercises highlighting cross-domain command options.

Key Bases and Facilities

Expeditionary Strike Group Seven, operating as Task Force 76, maintains its headquarters at White Beach Naval Facility on the Katsuren Peninsula in Okinawa, . This site serves as the central operational hub for coordinating Amphibious Ready Groups and Marine Expeditionary Units throughout the U.S. Seventh Fleet's area of responsibility, facilitating command and control for amphibious assaults, humanitarian assistance, and crisis response. White Beach supports a range of specialized subordinate units essential to expeditionary operations, including Helicopter Sea Combat Squadron 25 for rotary-wing aviation support, Naval Beach Unit 7 for establishment and , Fleet Surgical Team 7 for medical capabilities, and Tactical Air Control Squadron 12 for . These elements enable the seamless integration of naval, Marine Corps, and allied forces during deployments. Task Force 76 relies on U.S. Fleet Activities as its primary homeport for forward-deployed amphibious ships, providing berthing, repair facilities, and sustainment infrastructure critical for maintaining operational readiness in the Western Pacific. hosts vessels such as the USS America (LHA-6), which arrived there in April 2019 alongside the landing platform dock USS New Orleans (LPD-18) to bolster the task force's persistent presence and deterrence posture. This base also accommodates Amphibious Squadron 11 and supports joint training exercises, ensuring ships can rapidly aggregate for missions.

Assigned Ships and Units

Task Force 76, designated as the Amphibious Force Seventh Fleet and headquartered at White Beach, Okinawa, operationally controls Seven (ESG-7), encompassing subordinate commands that enable amphibious operations across the . Its permanent subordinate units include Helicopter Sea Combat 25 (HSC-25) for rotary-wing logistics and support; Naval Beach Unit 7 (NBU-7) for beachmaster and landing support roles; Fleet Surgical Team 7 (FST-7) for medical augmentation; and Tactical Air Control 12 (TACRON-12) for on amphibious ships. Amphibious 11 (PHIBRON 11) manages forward-deployed amphibious shipping, while elements of 7 (DESRON 7) provide surface escort and protection. Assigned ships under Task Force 76 are rotational and form Amphibious Ready Groups (ARGs), typically comprising one amphibious assault ship (LHA/LHD), one landing platform dock (LPD), and one dock landing ship (LSD) or additional LPD, capable of embarking a Marine Expeditionary Unit such as the 31st MEU. Permanent or frequently assigned vessels include the Seventh Fleet flagship USS Blue Ridge (LCC-19) for command and control; expeditionary sea bases USS Miguel Keith (ESB-5) and USS John L. Canley (ESB-8) for aviation and special operations support; and forward-deployed amphibious ships like the America-class USS Tripoli (LHA-7). As of October 2025, PHIBRON 11's ARG included USS Tripoli, USS New Orleans (LPD-18), USS Rushmore (LSD-47), and USS San Diego (LPD-22). These assets support rapid deployment of Marine forces for crisis response, with composition adjusted based on operational needs and forward basing at Sasebo, Japan.
Subordinate UnitRole
Helicopter Sea Combat 25 (HSC-25)Rotary-wing and
Naval Beach Unit 7 (NBU-7)Beach operations and landing support
Fleet Surgical Team 7 (FST-7)Expeditionary medical capabilities
Tactical Air Control 12 (TACRON-12)Airfield services on amphibious platforms
Amphibious 11 (PHIBRON 11)Amphibious ship operations and maintenance
7 (DESRON 7 elements) escorts for ARGs

Operations and Exercises

Major Historical Operations

Task Force 76 traces its operational lineage to the Seventh Amphibious Force, which executed amphibious assaults across the Southwest Pacific Theater during , participating in every major landing from September 1943 to September 1944. These operations transported approximately 300,000 Allied troops and involved 14 principal assaults, including the unopposed landings at Hollandia in April 1944 and the contested assault on Island in May 1944, where forces overcame Japanese defenses to secure airfields critical for further advances. The force's doctrine emphasized rapid ship-to-shore movement and close coordination with ground troops, enabling leaps along and the , such as the October 1944 landings at that initiated the liberation of the . In the post-war period, Task Force 76 supported in 1954, evacuating over 310,000 Vietnamese civilians from following the Accords' , utilizing amphibious ships to ferry refugees southward amid tense conditions with Vietnamese naval forces. During the , TF-76 facilitated the initial U.S. Marine deployment at on March 8, 1965, landing the 9th with elements of the via amphibious assault ships, marking the first major combat troops committed to and establishing a beachhead for escalation. The task force's most prominent Cold War operation was in April 1975, assembling 26 ships off to execute the final evacuation from Saigon as North Vietnamese forces closed in. From April 29 to May 1, TF-76 received over 7,000 evacuees via helicopter from the U.S. Embassy and other sites, with ships like USS Hancock (CV-19) and accommodating crowds on decks; the effort rescued approximately 130,000 South Vietnamese and Americans total, though under chaotic conditions with overloaded aircraft jettisoning equipment at sea. This non-combatant evacuation highlighted TF-76's role in humanitarian crises, with minimal losses despite the rapid collapse of South Vietnamese defenses.

Recent Deployments and Multilateral Exercises

In July 2025, Expeditionary Strike Group 7 (ESG-7), operating as Task Force 76, completed its participation in Exercise Talisman Sabre 25, a bilateral amphibious exercise with Australia that emphasized interoperability among U.S., Australian, and partner nation forces across maritime, ground, and air domains. During the exercise, personnel from the Australian and Royal New Zealand navies embarked aboard the expeditionary sea base USS John L. Canley (ESB 8) on July 20 for integrated mine countermeasures training, enhancing regional capabilities to counter maritime threats. Earlier in 2025, TF 76-supported units conducted a joint sail with forces on April 25, focusing on cooperation and operational coordination in the . The America Amphibious Ready Group (ARG), under TF 76 operational control, made a port visit to , , on July 10, supporting forward presence and training integration with allies. Complementing these efforts, the U.S. finalized Integrated Problem 25.5 on June 3, an experimental exercise testing unmanned systems and distributed operations, with ESG-7 assets contributing to amphibious integration scenarios. Deployments in 2025 reinforced TF 76's forward posture, including the arrival of the USS Tripoli (LHA 7) in , , on June 23 to augment ESG-7 capabilities, replacing USS America (LHA 6) and enabling sustained amphibious readiness in the Western Pacific. Additional transits involved USS San Diego (LPD 22) and USS Rushmore (LSD 47) joining USS America in on June 17, facilitating joint maneuvers and logistics support. In 2023, TF 76 elements supported a multinational mine countermeasures symposium and exercise hosted by Naval Forces Korea and the on November 2, involving participants from multiple partners to improve information sharing and operational capacity against underwater threats. These activities underscore TF 76's role in fostering allied deterrence through routine forward deployments and exercises emphasizing amphibious assault, humanitarian response, and contested logistics.

Leadership and Command

Notable Commanders

Rear Admiral Thomas Shultz assumed command of Expeditionary Strike Group 7 and in April 2025, succeeding Christopher D. Stone during a ceremony at Chapel, , . A Officer from , Shultz graduated from and previously served in various fleet commands, emphasizing amphibious integration in the . Rear Admiral Christopher D. Stone commanded from November 6, 2023, to April 2025, relieving Rear Admiral Derek A. Trinque and overseeing amphibious operations amid heightened regional tensions. Stone's tenure included coordination of multinational exercises and maintenance of forward-deployed readiness for over 5,500 personnel and amphibious assets. Rear Admiral Derek A. Trinque led Task Force 76/3 from approximately 2021 to November 2023, focusing on Navy-Marine Corps teaming, adaptation, and exercises such as Noble Fusion 22.2, which enhanced interoperability across the Luzon Strait to areas. His leadership advanced command structures for expeditionary forces, as detailed in professional analyses of TF 76/3's role in force design and maritime planning. Earlier, Christopher Engdahl commanded from May 12, 2021, to around 2021, succeeding Fred W. Kacher and prioritizing seamless integration of advanced platforms with allies during operations like those highlighting Combined Task Force 76/79 capabilities. Engdahl's period emphasized rapid advancement in for composite warfare. Rear Admiral Fred W. Kacher directed Task Force 76 from May 2019 to May 2021, later advancing to command U.S. Seventh Fleet, where he built on amphibious advisory roles to U.S. 7th Fleet. His service underscored the task force's evolution as the Navy's only permanently forward-deployed expeditionary strike group. Prior commanders include Charles B. Cooper II, who took command on January 22, 2018, managing approximately 5,500 sailors and 10 ships across , , and the , and John B. Nowell, who assumed duties on August 31, 2015, enhancing amphibious force posture in the Seventh Fleet area.

Command Transitions

Rear Adm. Thomas Shultz relieved Rear Adm. Christopher D. Stone as commander of Task Force 76 on April 18, 2025, during a change-of-command ceremony at Camp Courtney Chapel in Okinawa, Japan. Stone, who had held the position for nearly two years, oversaw four Amphibious Ready Group-Marine Expeditionary Unit (ARG-MEU) patrols emphasizing power projection in the Indo-Pacific region. Shultz, a surface warfare officer, assumed the dual role of Commander, Expeditionary Strike Group Seven and Commander, Task Force 76, focusing on continued readiness of the forward-deployed amphibious force. Prior to this, Rear Adm. Christopher D. Stone assumed command from Rear Adm. Derek A. Trinque on June 9, 2023, in a ceremony also at . This transition supported the ongoing integration of naval and Corps elements under Task Force 76/3, the experimental structure blending 7 with the for enhanced rapid mobilization. Stone's tenure prioritized joint operations and alliance interoperability with partners like the . An earlier notable transition occurred on December 5, 2021, when Rear Adm. Christopher Engdahl relieved Rear Adm. Fred Kacher as commander of 7 and 76. Engdahl's command emphasized forward-deployed amphibious capabilities amid increasing regional tensions, building on Kacher's prior focus on theater contingencies. These periodic handovers, typically spanning 18 to 24 months, ensure continuity in 76's mission to execute amphibious operations and support U.S. Seventh Fleet objectives in the .

Strategic Impact

Achievements in Regional Deterrence

Task Force 76 has contributed to regional deterrence in the by maintaining a forward-deployed amphibious presence capable of rapid response to aggression, particularly in contested areas like the , as part of the U.S. Seventh Fleet's strategy to uphold and support allies against coercion. This posture deters potential adversaries by demonstrating credible combat power aggregation for and expeditionary operations, integrating and Marine Corps assets to counter anti-access/area-denial threats. In April 2020, amid China's deployment of vessels to harass Malaysia's West Capella in its , Task Force 76 assets, including the littoral combat ships and USS Cesar Chavez (T-AKE 14), conducted operations in the vicinity to assert international maritime norms and support Malaysia's resource exploration rights. Task Force 76 Commander Rear Adm. publicly affirmed U.S. commitment to allies' sovereign activities, contributing to the of the standoff without direct engagement, thereby signaling resolve against gray-zone tactics. This presence helped deter further Chinese interference, preserving Malaysia's operational continuity in the Luconia Shoals area. The 2022 establishment of Task Force 76/3 as an integrated Navy-Marine command has enhanced deterrence through experimentation in and distributed operations, enabling persistent campaigning along the to complicate adversary planning. This structure supports theater-level coordination for amphibious assaults, missile engagements, and logistics in contested environments, as tested in exercises like Noble Fusion, bolstering allied and credible denial capabilities against potential invasions. Multilateral drills under Task Force 76, such as those with CTF-79, have demonstrated rapid force assembly for lethal sea-denial missions, reinforcing deterrence by showcasing joint and allied readiness in the Western Pacific.

Challenges, Criticisms, and Debates

Task Force 76, as the U.S. Navy's forward-deployed amphibious force in the Seventh Fleet, has encountered persistent readiness challenges stemming from systemic maintenance shortfalls in the amphibious fleet. A December () assessment found that, as of March , half of the Navy's 32 amphibious ships were in poor material condition, with nine of ten dock landing ships (LSDs) affected by issues including degraded diesel engines that caused seven of 13 readiness incidents in 2023 alone. These deficiencies, exacerbated by shipyard backlogs and deferred upkeep, have curtailed ship availability for Task Force 76's training exercises and crisis response missions, limiting integration with Marine Expeditionary Units and allied partners in the . Forward basing in , , amplifies these issues, as reliance on distant U.S. repair facilities prolongs downtime and strains local sustainment resources. Strategic debates center on the vulnerability of 76's large-deck platforms—such as amphibious assault ships and expeditionary sea bases—to peer adversary anti-ship missiles in contested littoral environments. In scenarios involving China's , equipped with systems like the DF-21D and , traditional amphibious operations risk high attrition, prompting arguments for doctrinal shifts toward distributed amphibious operations using smaller, unmanned, or allied vessels to disperse forces and enhance survivability. Critics, including military analysts, contend that massed amphibious groupings remain doctrinally emphasized despite anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) threats, potentially undermining deterrence by exposing high-value assets early in a contingency. Proponents counter that adaptations like enhanced integration and fires can mitigate risks, preserving amphibious forces' role in forcible entry and sustainment. Criticisms have also arisen regarding command integration and for 76's hybrid Navy-Marine structure. Observers note delays in developing unified command-and-control processes for maritime expeditionary operations, hindering seamless coordination with U.S. Command assets amid expanding multilateral exercises. Budget constraints and aging hulls—many exceeding expected service lives—further fuel debate over whether investments should prioritize new connectors and unmanned systems over sustaining legacy big-deck amphibs, with warning that current trends jeopardize statutory requirements for 31 operational ships. These factors collectively question 76's capacity to execute high-end deterrence without broader reforms in and force design.

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